Document Type

Occasional Paper

Publication Date

3-15-2004

Abstract

The United States is a distinctive case for studying the way extensive direct democracy can affect fiscal policy. Every state in the Union allows voters to decide certain ballot questions about how to raise and spend public revenue. The U.S. record shows that large‐scale plebiscites fail to produce reliably “pro‐poor” government finance. Direct citizen involvement in fiscal policy has not led to uniformly equitable or financially sustainable state budgets. Nor has it mobilized low‐income groups to express and defend their economic interests. When called upon to make decisions about the amounts and purposes of statewide government spending, the electorate is apt to disregard any hardship for poor people. Political parties and advocacy organizations, working through traditional representative institutions, are usually a more promising avenue for fighting poverty.

Comments

Working Paper.

Share

COinS
 
 

To view the content in your browser, please download Adobe Reader or, alternately,
you may Download the file to your hard drive.

NOTE: The latest versions of Adobe Reader do not support viewing PDF files within Firefox on Mac OS and if you are using a modern (Intel) Mac, there is no official plugin for viewing PDF files within the browser window.