Panel IV: Cultural Effects of War
Event Title
Damage Prevention or Damage Control: The Ability of MFAA Officers to Protect Culture During World War II
Start Date
31-3-2012 11:15 AM
End Date
31-3-2012 1:00 PM
Description
This paper will examine the ability of the United States Army to protect cultural monuments and works of art during World War II. The Army assigned Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives officers (“MFAA officers”) to coordinate the protection of cultural items and locations. While this program strove to prevent damage before it occurred (“damage prevention,”) larger issues well outside their control forced MFAA officers to primarily engage in limiting existing damage (“damage control”) instead of damage prevention.
Three major factors forced MFAA officers engage in damage control rather than damage prevention. First, combat experience forced MFAA officers to dispose ineffective damage prevention techniques and adopt more effective damage control techniques. Second, U.S. military policies and objectives further limited damage prevention. Placing cultural protection below tactical and strategic military objectives, creating an inefficient administrative system, and dealing with manpower issues kept MFAA officers from reaching vulnerable locations until after the damage occurred. Third, the realities of combat further hindered the ability of MFAA officers to prevent damage. Such problems included a lack of coordination with frontline soldiers, the destructive nature of combat, the amount of firepower used in achieving military objectives, and the effects of strategic bombing. All of these factors limited the ability of MFAA officers to engage in damage prevention and forced them to limit existing damage.
Damage Prevention or Damage Control: The Ability of MFAA Officers to Protect Culture During World War II
This paper will examine the ability of the United States Army to protect cultural monuments and works of art during World War II. The Army assigned Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives officers (“MFAA officers”) to coordinate the protection of cultural items and locations. While this program strove to prevent damage before it occurred (“damage prevention,”) larger issues well outside their control forced MFAA officers to primarily engage in limiting existing damage (“damage control”) instead of damage prevention.
Three major factors forced MFAA officers engage in damage control rather than damage prevention. First, combat experience forced MFAA officers to dispose ineffective damage prevention techniques and adopt more effective damage control techniques. Second, U.S. military policies and objectives further limited damage prevention. Placing cultural protection below tactical and strategic military objectives, creating an inefficient administrative system, and dealing with manpower issues kept MFAA officers from reaching vulnerable locations until after the damage occurred. Third, the realities of combat further hindered the ability of MFAA officers to prevent damage. Such problems included a lack of coordination with frontline soldiers, the destructive nature of combat, the amount of firepower used in achieving military objectives, and the effects of strategic bombing. All of these factors limited the ability of MFAA officers to engage in damage prevention and forced them to limit existing damage.
Comments
Panel IV of the 2012 Graduate History Conference features presentations and papers under the topic of "Cultural Effects of War."
Tasnin Chowdhury's presentation is the third presentation in this panel.