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War, the United Nations, and Peacekeeping

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While the amount of interstate war in the international system had declined by 2013, since then both intrastate and internationalized intrastate war has increased. In 2015 there are sixteen UN peacekeeping operations around the globe, involving about 130,000 military, police, and civilian personnel. Over the past seventy years, UN peacekeeping operations have evolved from simple buffer forces tasked with observing cease-fires and armistices to complex multidimensional operations in intrastate conflicts, involving peacebuilding in an increasingly dangerous environment.

Empirical data gathered by respected peace research institutes around the world indicate a trend of decline in the amount of interstate warfare in the international system. The amount of civil or internal war, however, has increased. Also, the civil conflicts are often characterized by external intervention, usually by neighboring states or transnational “terrorist” groups, such as the Islamic state in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The conflict data program at the University of Uppsala in Sweden reports thirteen intrastate conflicts in 2013, representing a decline of one from 2012, and no interstate conflicts in 2013, representing a decline of one from 2012. The number of internationalized intrastate conflicts in 2013 stands at nine, representing an increase of one from 2012.

Iran, for example, has become involved in the civil conflict in Syria, as has the United States along with a coalition of other countries. The United States claims there are sixty countries participating in the coalition fighting the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The ongoing civil conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has seen the intervention of several neighboring states, especially from Rwanda, with Hutu forces who have been there for twenty years, as the genocidal conflict that took the lives of eight hundred thousand civilians spilled over into the Congo.

More recently, Russia, in a new type of warfare known as “hybrid” warfare, has intervened in the civil conflict that has taken place in Ukraine since 2014 and in 2015 has continued its development amid some actions of the international community to find a solution. That conflict is estimated to have cost about six thousand lives. The Russians and the pro-Russian separatists have allowed the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe to send observers into some of the conflicted areas. The Ukrainian government had made a decision to ask that a UN peacekeeping force be sent into Ukraine, but the United Nations had not received a formal

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request from Kiev. Any resolution calling for the deployment of a peacekeeping force in Ukraine would be vetoed by Russia.

Apart from civil or intrastate conflicts, another major form of warfare known as internationalized intrastate warfare has also been occurring across the globe. Internationalized intrastate warfare implicates nonstate actors, such as the transnational revolutionary Islamic groups Al Qaeda and its offshoots and ISIS. Internationalized intrastate warfare can spill across the boundaries of the state where the civil conflict is occurring, thereby significantly increasing the complexity of efforts to resolve the conflict. Most of the civil or intrastate conflicts raging around the world are caused by ethnic, religious, nationality, and racial differences between various groups, sometimes becoming or threatening to become genocidal. Economic issues, such as the scarcity of water in Darfur, can also be a cause of conflict. The UN Security Council has become increasingly alarmed about the targeting of religious groups, such as Egyptian Coptic Christians by ISIS, for cruel and barbarous treatment.

War is usually defined by political scientists as a conflict in which 1,000 battlefield deaths occur in a year, a figure some analysts may regard as too low. Millions of civilians have perished directly or indirectly as a result of these conflicts. Although it is often difficult to establish an accurate figure of the numbers of civilians killed, it is estimated that over 6 million civilians have perished in the wars that have raged in the Democratic Republic of the Congo since the 1990s (often referred to as Africa’s Great War or World War) and as of mid-March 2015, according to media reports, 220,000 civilians have been killed in the civil war that started in Syria in 2011.

By now it is clear that peacekeeping is central to achieving the major purpose of the United Nations, which is the maintenance of international peace and security. In 2014, as the international community observed the centenary of the start of the Great War (World War I), it was clear that another great war had been avoided and that the goal of protecting humanity from the scourge of another world war had been realized during the seventy years of the existence of the United Nations. And though the contribution the United Nations made to this achievement can be debated, it is clear that over the past seventy years the concept of peacekeeping has evolved from the interposition of buffer forces to more complex, multidimensional operations. Despite this evolution, key members of the United Nations continue to take what might best be described as a strict constructionist view of the authorization and mandates entrusted to peacekeeping operations. For example, stress is placed on such guidelines as the principle that the Security Council is the sole primary organ entrusted with the responsibility by the UN Charter to legitimize and oversee peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping operations cannot interfere in matters that fall essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a state, respect for state sovereignty is a sacrosanct and fundamental principle, the political independence and territorial integrity of states should be observed, peacekeeping forces cannot be deployed on the territory of the host state without its consent, and peacekeepers should be allowed to use force only in self-defense. The word “peacekeeping” itself is not mentioned anywhere in the UN Charter, since the concept of peacekeeping was invented to compensate for the failure of the United Nations to act as an instrument of collective security.

The classic version of peacekeeping was invented by UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold in 1956 when the first Emergency Special Session of the UN General Assembly authorized the creation of the United Nations Emergency Force to be deployed in the Sinai Peninsula to observe the cease-fire that had ended the Suez Canal War and to serve as a buffer force between the Egyptians and the Israelis. The evolution to more complex operations can be seen in the current peacekeeping force operating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
UN peacekeeping force has been set up to engage in the monitoring of a cease-fire agreement ending interstate conflict since 2000, when a UN force was deployed to keep the peace between Eritrea and Ethiopia. As of 2014, 95 percent of the conflicts taking place around the globe were intrastate.

Sixteen UN peacekeeping forces representing several different models are operating in various parts of the world today. Some of these forces have been in place for decades. Thus, even though the United Nations never set up a permanent international military force, in keeping with Chapter VII of the UN Charter, some of these forces have been in operation for so long they could be described as quasi-permanent.1 Such forces in 2015 continue to provide a UN presence that can help maintain peace in places such as Kashmir, Cyprus, Lebanon, and the Golan Heights. They constitute one model of UN peacekeeping forces that are enmeshed in “frozen conflicts” that have defied political settlement for decades. Some quasi-permanent forces may have been on the scene of a conflict for so many decades that the circumstances for which they were deployed may have changed.

After the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974, for example, the circumstances changed for the United Nations Force in Cyprus, which had been deployed in 1964. And though the United Nations Force in Lebanon had been deployed along the Lebanese-Israeli border in 1978, it could do little to stop the Israel invasion of Lebanon in the 1980s. Most recently, the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) was caught up in the Syrian civil conflict. UNDOF was initially deployed in 1974 in the Golan Heights to ensure the cease-fire that was negotiated between Israel and Syria after the war that began in 1973 when Israel recaptured the Golan Heights from the Syrians. Rebel groups seeking to overthrow the Assad regime in Syria have periodically taken UNDOF peacekeepers as hostages. Most have been released unharmed. In response, however, the United Nations has decided to expand UNDOF to a full complement of 1,250 and has taken further steps to ensure the security of the units comprising the force. While UNDOF continues to fulfill its original mandate, the fighting between the rebel forces and the Syrian regime in the current civil conflict have occasionally spilled over into the Israeli side of the Golan Heights, triggering Israeli military responses.

The majority of the current UN peacekeeping operations are in the Middle East and Africa. Half are in Africa, and, of these, three are in Sudan and South Sudan alone. The Russian representative to the Security Council, noting the inefficiency of maintaining three separate operations in what is essentially the same region, has suggested that these operations be merged. Moreover, the environment and conditions in which peacekeeping operations now occur have changed, and the United Nations increasingly finds itself involved in state building. Most recent peacekeeping operations have been set up to deal with internal or civil conflicts, some of which involve the intervention of paramilitary groups and militias from neighboring states. These external groups often have found a sanctuary and base of operations in a fragile or failed state where a power vacuum exists because state authority has collapsed or is minimal. In such a situation, UN and regional and subregional peacekeeping forces may find themselves in a complex environment marked by ethnic and religious conflict, sometimes compounded by the economic looting of the resources of the conflicted state, such as tin, gold, and diamonds in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where there is no peace to keep. The looting of the resources of a war-torn state may actually be the work of transnational criminal gangs, as well as the governments of nearby states.

In a growing trend, the peacekeepers themselves are now often the target of rebel groups, paramilitary organizations, and what the United Nations refers to as “terrorists.” The “terrorists”
do not respect the international status of the peacekeepers, often targeting them because they seek military equipment and weapons. If the perpetrators of violence against peacekeepers are not held accountable for their actions, however, a culture of impunity develops. Governments should be held responsible for the crimes committed by their nationals against UN peacekeepers, who are protected by international law, or the lawbreakers should be turned over to the International Criminal Court for prosecution. In a civil conflict, there may be spoilers in whose interest it is to prevent the establishment of a sustainable peace, making it difficult to engage in the transition to a peaceful postconflict society. Thus, another major problem the United Nations faces is establishing a sustainable peace. The experience of the United Nations in civil conflicts is that often it is necessary to reconfigure peacekeeping forces several times when the parties to the conflict do not observe cease-fires. An example is the several reconfigurations of the UN peacekeeping forces that were deployed in the long civil conflict in Angola.

Another recent trend in peacekeeping has been the increasingly close connection between peacekeeping and peacebuilding. In Haiti, for example, the United Nations Stabilization Mission has been playing a critical role with its military personnel and its police in ensuring a secure environment and helping to support the development of a rule of law state, in which free and fair elections could take place this year. Establishing a viable security sector is another key task of UN peacekeeping in a complex and multidimensional operation that may go on for years.

As the General Assembly’s Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations points out in its 2014 report, however, a stable security sector is needed to secure the establishment of a rule-of-law state. Furthermore, it is up to the national government of the host state to ensure that a stable security environment exists, especially as a state, with the aid of peacekeepers and peacebuilders, transitions from a conflict situation to a postconflict situation. To ensure the establishment of a sustainable peace, this transition requires reform of the security sector. In this connection, the police component of a peacekeeping operation can play a critical role. In the same way, various agencies of the UN system can also be involved in creating an effective judicial system and a prison system. Thus, another major trend in peacekeeping has been an increase in the number of police who constitute part of a UN peacekeeping operation.

Peacekeepers need to have the adaptability and flexibility necessary to deal with the new threats and challenges to international order that have emerged in the first fifteen years of the twenty-first century. In some countries, UN and regional and subregional peacekeeping forces must cover vast distances under harsh and inhospitable conditions. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for example, these forces are entrusted with the responsibility of patrolling more than seven million square kilometers. Because of these challenges, the UN Secretariat has been enthusiastic about the use of unarmed drones in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Where peacekeepers are deployed over large distances and thus stretched thin, contrary to good practices and peacekeeping guidelines and without the knowledge of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations at UN headquarters, the commander of the peacekeeping force of the mission should inform UN headquarters.

Although peacekeepers have always operated in dangerous conditions (for example, in the UN operations in the Congo in the 1960s, an Italian contingent of peacekeepers was killed), peacekeepers recently have become the targets of improvised explosive devices. In such increasingly dangerous conditions marked by violent extremism, peacekeepers need clear mandates from the UN Security Council to move beyond using their weapons in self-defense.

Most of the current peacekeeping operations that are active in conflict-ridden areas are authorized by Chapter VII, meaning the peacekeepers can engage in enforcement action. But the
issue of allowing UN peacekeepers to engage in “robust” military action is controversial. The representative of the Russian Federation to the Security Council, for example, pointed out in a debate in the Security Council on June 11, 2014 that there are basic principles and guidelines of peacekeeping that would be involved in a decision to authorize a force to engage in robust action.

The Russians still seem to hew to a strict constructivist version of the UN Charter in connection with the control of peacekeeping operations, just as the Soviets did during the Cold War. A strict constructionist view of the UN Charter could be based on the interpretation that only the Security Council has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. But it can be argued that if the Security Council is unable to act because of the casting of vetoes, under the Uniting for Peace Resolution (adopted in 1950 during the Korean War), the General Assembly can step in to fill the gap by creating a peacekeeping operation, as it did in 1956 with the creation of the First United Nations Emergency Force. The Uniting for Peace Resolution, however, has rarely been used. The usual practice is that the Security Council reviews the mandate of an existing force and decides whether to renew it.

Peacekeepers must be able to protect civilians from mass atrocities, massacres, and genocide. UN peacekeepers have been involved in civil conflicts where millions of civilians have perished and millions were internally displaced or forced to flee as refugees. In this context, it is estimated that over six million civilians have perished in the Democratic Republic of the Congo since the various wars began there in the 1990s. Still burned into the memory of the United Nations are the genocides that occurred in Rwanda in 1994 and Srebrenica, Bosnia Herzegovina, in the former Yugoslavia in 1995, where UN forces failed to protect civilians.

The 2000 “Brahimi Report” had stressed the need for peacekeeping mandates to contain a reference to the responsibility of the peacekeeping forces to protect citizens from genocide. Unfortunately, in 2014, that responsibility received a major setback when UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon issued a report to the Security Council that consists of a strategic review of peacekeeping. The report focuses on the inability of some units of the United Nations–African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) that were deployed in Sudan in 2007 to protect civilians from attacks and atrocities committed by militias and Sudanese military forces unleashed by the Sudanese government. It makes clear that the experiment with the “hybrid” force was a failure. UNAMID was one of the largest forces ever created by the United Nations. To make matters worse, the spokeswoman of UNAMID resigned in 2013, accusing the UN mission in Darfur of covering up human rights violations that were committed by Sudanese government and paramilitary forces.

One of the major difficulties that the United Nations faced in Darfur was securing the cooperation of the Sudanese government. Because the Sudanese government had been pressuring the United Nations to withdraw UNAMID, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon took into consideration the drawing up of an exit strategy for the force that was being considered by the Security Council. In Security Council Resolution 2173, the members of UNAMID were urged to be more “preventive” and “preemptive” in protecting citizens. The Security Council had long been divided over the mission in Darfur, with Russia and China unwilling, as opposed to the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, to support stronger action against the Sudanese government. The withdrawal of UNAMID in such circumstances would amount to a spectacular failure of UN peacekeeping.

Efforts by the international community to enforce the punishment of perpetrators of genocide received a setback when the prosecutor-general of the International Criminal Court
(ICC) announced in December 2014 that the court was suspending its efforts to prosecute Omar al-Bashir, the president of Sudan, on counts of war crimes, including genocide, brought against him by the court in 2007. No real effort had been made by the ICC to move against Bashir since 2009.

The ICC does not have an enforcement capacity to arrest Bashir and relies on the UN Security Council to enforce an international arrest warrant. Bashir and other Sudanese officials who were indicted by the ICC have been protected by Russia and China. Moreover, the African Union had expressed its opposition to the efforts to arrest Bashir, arguing that the ICC’s indictment of the Sudanese president (the first indictment ever delivered by an international criminal court against a sitting president) was the work of a “colonial” court. Furthermore, Bashir traveled to other African countries after he had been indicted by the ICC, and even though some of these countries were signatories to the statute of the ICC, the governments concerned did not arrest him.

Several African states believe that the ICC had unfairly singled out Africa for punishment because of other cases of African defendants the court was dealing with. Bashir, for example, celebrated the suspension of the ICC’s efforts to move against him in 2014. His regular and paramilitary forces had relaunched a military offensive that had been marked by an increase in extreme violence after the conflict in Darfur had been quiescent for some time. The relaunch of this offensive resulted in the displacement of about 450,000 additional people, and overall there were over 2 million individuals uprooted as a result of from the conflict, about 1.4 million of whom were children.

The United Nations certainly played an important role in ensuring that the internally displaced persons (IDPs) received adequate medical care and food. And it is important to point out that the ICC’s efforts to arrest Bashir have been suspended, not canceled, and he is still subject to arrest. But the decision by the prosecutor-general of the ICC to suspend efforts to deal with Bashir is a major setback for the efforts of the international community, and seen in connection with the failure of UNAMID to protect civilians, it represents an enormous catastrophe for the concept of peacekeeping. More important, it represents a significant setback for the efforts of the international community to hold genocidaires accountable for their horrible crimes. It represents a failure to deal with the culture of impunity in which the perpetrators of mass atrocities feel that they can get away with the commission of such crimes against vulnerable citizens of their own country.

The US position is that when faced with establishing a mandate for a peacekeeping operation, it is necessary for the UN Security Council to establish a priority clearly in the mandate of a peacekeeping operation to protect civilians. Emphasis on the protection of civilians stems from the failure of the United Nations to protect about eight hundred thousand people who were massacred in Rwanda in 1994, and the genocide committed in Srebrenica in 1995. Unfortunately, the vulnerable population of a country may have too high expectations of the protection that they will receive from peacekeepers, especially if the UN forces fail to venture out from their bases to protect civilians, as has happened in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

The protection of civilians includes the protection of women against sexual violence in armed conflicts. The tribunal created by the Security Council to deal with the genocide in Rwanda documents many cases of mass rapes and other acts of sexual violence against women. Unfortunately, the United Nations has also documented cases in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and elsewhere of women as victims of peacekeepers as well as combatants. Thus, the
United Nations has attempted to include more women, for example, in police units that are sent into a conflict and has mainstreamed gender in its peacekeeping perspective. The protection of civilians also includes the protection of children, who may be kidnapped by various factions fighting in a conflict, brutalized and transformed into child soldiers.

Around the world, millions of civilians are displaced as a result of civil conflicts, and UN peacekeepers may not have the capacity or resources to adequately protect them. Also some units and governments supplying troops may lack the political will to protect civilians. Civilians continue to be at risk, for example, in the civil conflict that has been ongoing in Darfur since 2005. Taking these facts into account, it should be noted that the Security Council now includes the protection of civilians in the mandates of most peacekeeping operations that have been established recently. It is difficult to protect civilians, however, if the host government does not cooperate and actually may even be responsible for harming its own citizens.

In March 2014 the Security Council extended the mandate of the UN force in the Democratic Republic of the Congo for another year, amid charges that two generals in the government’s army were guilty of human rights violations. The UN peacekeeping force was reduced by two thousand, despite arguments by the representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo that the force be reduced by a larger number. The United Nations apparently wanted a larger force to protect civilians from rebel groups and militias as well as the Congolese armed forces.

For civilians to be protected, peacekeeping forces also need the flexibility to be deployed rapidly. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the United Nations did establish a special robust rapid intervention force. But despite years of discussion, the United Nations has yet to develop a standby rapid reaction force. Because so many peacekeeping operations are taking place in Africa, the United Nations is working with the African Union to develop a standby force. UN peacekeepers are expected to observe cease-fires, to protect citizens, and to disarm and demobilize combatants and reintegrate them into society.

Peacekeepers are also mandated to engage in activities that can best be described as peacebuilding. Among the lessons learned by the United Nations is that in order to prevent armistices and cease-fires from being repeatedly violated by spoilers bent on creating a situation in which there is no peace to keep, it is essential to create an environment that will result in a sustainable peace in a postconflict situation. Thus, police as well as peacekeepers are needed to provide a security environment that will allow people to venture out from their homes in order to participate in elections and make the transition from democracy to a state based on the rule of law.

Several years ago, the United Nations created the Peacebuilding Commission, backed by the Office for Peacebuilding Support, which has enjoyed some success. In 2014, for example, it put a lot of effort into building peace in Burundi, in the Great Lakes region of Africa. Such efforts, however, may be made more difficult by unexpected events, such as the earthquake that occurred in Haiti in 2010, taking over two hundred thousand lives, and the Ebola epidemic in Liberia.

The United Nations has engaged in sixty-nine peacekeeping operations since 1948 and continues to face difficulties in fielding such operations, in part because it does not have a single unified military force but relies on its members to volunteer their forces. India has been the largest contributor of forces over the years, with Pakistan and Bangladesh also supplying some of the largest contingents. China is the largest contributor of peacekeeping forces among the five permanent members of the Security Council, having supplied over twenty thousand troops. In some cases, Chinese participation in peacekeeping forces serves the country’s national interest,
helping, for example, to provide a stable environment for a country that supplies China with oil or other raw materials. The UN stresses that its peacekeeping operations are also based on cooperation (triangular consultation) among the Security Council, the Secretariat, and the countries that contribute the troops.

At the first-ever conference of the Chiefs of Defense held at the United Nations in March 2015, however, the Indian general present, citing an on-going problem, complained about the inadequacy of consultations between the Security Council and troop-contributing countries. He also spoke of the need for more transparency in the decisions reached by the Security Council concerning the mandates and deployments of forces. The problem of inadequate consultation by the Security Council with the troop-contributing countries has been addressed in some instances. The Advisory Committee for the First United Nations Emergency Force, for example, was created in 1956 to advise the Secretary-General, though the extent to which the Secretary-General consults with such committees is open to question, as is the extent to which the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping maintain contact with the contributing countries.

The United Nations needs to improve its peacekeeping effectiveness in the face of new asymmetrical threats to civilians and also to peacekeepers, the need to take advantage of new technologies, such as drones, the need for clearer mandates that also contain an exit strategy, the need to take advantage of intermission operability in order to react quickly to sudden crises, and the need to continue working with regional and subregional organizations.

It has been about fifteen years since the Brahimi Report was published. In recognition of the need for a new analysis, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has appointed a high-level panel to put together a new study of peacekeeping. In the final analysis, it is necessary to identify the root causes of conflict and pursue policies that will eliminate them, such as promoting the economic development of areas that have been torn by conflict.

Notes

1 Agreements establishing such a force were called for in Article 43 of Chapter VII but were never implemented because of the outbreak of the Cold War and the inability of the United States and the Soviet Union to reach an agreement on the make-up of a permanent peacekeeping force and the extent of its authority.