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Key Issues Facing the Boston Public Schools

Robert A. Dentler

This article is the third examination of the six issues the author identified in "Some Key Issues Facing Boston's Public Schools in 1984," following the November 1983 election of the first thirteen-member Boston School Committee. He revisited these issues in a 1988 report and now assesses how the policy leadership of the system fared in dealing with these challenges during the past decade. He discusses other issues at the close of this article. Writing from a sociological point of view, Dentler is primarily concerned with the question of how well the public school districts and their school staff are able to provide optimal learning opportunities to all students. He assumes that this can best be appraised in terms of district structure, history, and educational policy.

The Boston School Committee and the Superintendency

In 1983 the Boston School Committee (BSC) was recomposed for the first time in many decades. The membership expanded from five to thirteen, nine of whom were elected from subdistricts whose boundaries bore no relation to the distribution of school facilities or households with enrolled students.

This recomposition seemed portentous at the time but in fact had no observable effects on educational policy or practice. After all, the political culture of the BSC had already undergone its biggest change in 1977. Voters at that time repudiated the professional politicians who had opposed racial desegregation and chose moderate amateurs, including the first black member to be elected in this century, John O’Bryant, in the aftermath of the federal court desegregation decisions of 1974-1975.

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The corruption, venality, and self-seeking characteristic of the BSC fell away after 1977, thanks to court-ordered reforms. Kickback schemes, the sale of administrative positions, campaign fund-raising for school committee members, and the many ways in which involvement in leading the BSC had become lucrative financially and profitable politically between the Great Depression and the years before the rise of the Boston Teachers Union were cleared away. Court-ordered desegregation acted like the rays of sunlight that at long last reach under a rock of custom and air out and even kill off the rot that builds up in darkness. Significant increases in levels of funding were introduced as well, and between 1974 and 1980 more than a thousand black and other minority teachers and school administrators were recruited to give not only diversity but new ideas to the system.

However, the political leadership of Boston under Mayor Kevin White had created an elaborate rhetoric of blame to heap on the BSC for educational and child and youth policy failures in the Boston public schools (BPS) throughout the 1970s, a legacy that continued into the late 1980s under Mayor Raymond Flynn.

The recomposition and rule changes proposed by the Flynn administration, the City Council, and the state legislature led to a second attempt at organizational reform in which the mayor appointed a six-person Boston School Committee. In this way and others, Mayor Flynn sought to take charge of policy for the Boston schools, a reform that was first implemented in 1991. Time had run out for City Hall on the device of blaming the BSC for most woes yet disclaiming policy responsibility. The rhetoric of blame persisted, but Mayor Flynn projected himself as the leader who would reform the system from top to bottom.

Dramatic as this departure from national and state custom has been, appointing rather than electing school committee members has had few consequences for school operations and the quality of opportunities for students to learn. The procedural traditions of the BSC persisted from its five-member composition through its expansion to thirteen, and they continue under the appointed six-member structure. In that tradition, the BSC holds monthly public meetings at which it debates and ratifies or amends strings of proposals placed before it by the superintendent, followed by comments and reactions from the floor and the gallery. Few agenda items can be termed policy questions. Most concern budget, personnel, and operating issues which, however pressing, are formulated through the bureaucracy and embodied as operating tasks facing the superintendent. Under the mayor’s appointment reform, the tradition persisted although the advance work between BSC staff and City Hall became more frequent, complex, and fractious.

The appointed school committee was too severely cross-pressured during its first two years of life to be able to contribute much to school system improvement goals. Mayor Flynn tended to back away from deepening involvement in BSC policy issues for a host of reasons peculiar to his lengthening career as mayor. Under Mayor Thomas Menino, the boldest policy step taken by the BSC has been to approve the distribution of condoms in the high schools — but only with parental permission.

Talks on a new three-year contract with the Boston Teachers Union (BTU) began in May 1992. These negotiations did not come to a head for the BSC until a year later, when they overlapped problematically with the city’s election primaries. Then came the mayoral election campaign characterized by highly changed conditions that stemmed from the resignation of Mayor Flynn.
The same period of initial work for the new BSC was overshadowed by statewide policy debates over education reforms in funding and organization. Soon after the election of Mayor Menino and a new City Council in November 1993, the BSC’s proposed contract with the BTU was revised. The future viability of a BSC appointed by Mayor Menino therefore cannot be assessed, except to note his inclusion of the superintendent in his cabinet of commissioners and his attribution to her of authority over job skills training programs for adults.

Boston has had twelve public school superintendents since 1970; Lois Harrison-Jones, the twelfth, accepted the job late in 1991. Like her predecessors, Harrison-Jones spent most of her first year in office campaigning for public support and weathering short-term crises such as a bus driver’s strike and the harsh politics of retrenchment.

Of greatest importance politically, Harrison-Jones was appointed to office by the thirteen-member elected school committee, which became a lame-duck body soon after she arrived. As a result, she was not given a set of instructional and safety initiatives until the spring of 1993. Mayor Flynn named his own key leader, Robert Consalvo, when he appointed the new BSC in January 1992, and Paul Parks, the interim chair of the BSC, announced that Consalvo would be “our chief of staff.” Harrison-Jones survived power and policy struggles with Consalvo at the cost of ill will from Mayor Flynn. When Consalvo quit the post, Harrison-Jones was able to consolidate her control after losing the chance to initiate educational changes for more than a year. Just as she accomplished this, Mayor Flynn resigned to become ambassador to the Vatican, and Tom Menino was elected mayor. He and Harrison-Jones have yet to build a trusting relationship.

Superintendents, to be effective educational leaders, need strong, consistent, and positive support from their school boards. They also need deputies, associates, and assistants who are primarily loyal to them and share in the aims and operations of the administration. The needs of Superintendent Harrison-Jones have not been met in Boston. She remains — in her relations with Boston’s power elites and among school staff — an outsider who will continue to have to earn every grudging inch of educational progress on her own. Under her leadership several important improvements have been introduced, albeit on a small scale: instructional and support programs for pregnant teenagers are available in two high schools; safety and disciplinary practices have been reformulated and tightened; and innovative programs have been introduced and supported in a small handful of elementary schools.

Resources

In fiscal year 1984 the BPS spent $265 million in operating funds from all sources. That spending level increased to $270 million in fiscal 1986, when funds were added late in the year. By fiscal 1988 spending had risen to $330 million. Against this backdrop, the BSC approved, and City Hall later ratified, a budget of $388.8 million for fiscal year 1994. To this one must add $72.8 million in new state reform funding and in federal aid in order to make the budget comparable with 1984. This amount of $461.6 was termed a “belt tightening” budget by the BSC, which cut $11.9 million in order to stay within its allocation.
In June 1993 the Citywide Educational Coalition reported that in 1991, Boston ranked third — just below Cambridge and Wellesley — in overall per pupil expenditures ($6,618) among twenty-one Greater Boston districts, and only twelfth in expenditures per “regular education” pupil ($4,921). In other words, considered in isolation or over time, Boston public school expenditures have soared. Considered comparatively, Boston continues to do little more than maintain its big-city position within the suburban pack of school districts. Some New England districts now spend more than $10,000 per pupil.

Each year since passage of Proposition 2-1/2 has been filled with great fiscal uncertainty and resulting tensions for localities, however. A new state aid package, which became law in June 1993, may stabilize the situation considerably during the 1990s, although uncertainties are cropping up as to whether the aid goals will be met. This may become another Massachusetts example in which the politics of finance come to supplant commitments to progressive social policies.

Boston has succeeded since 1984 in not only maintaining but increasing significantly the resource base of its public schools. In spite of this accomplishment, the path to better opportunities for students to learn has been strewn with the rocks of formidable contract disputes over wages and fringe benefits with several of the main unions and with shortages in textbooks, materials, and instructional equipment, facility repairs and maintenance, and transportation routes and equipment. The rhetoric of personnel crises, cutbacks, and deprivation, which took its vocabulary and decibel level from the real exigencies of 1981–1983, has thus persisted over time as if the growth of resources were a mere mirage.

It would be accurate to generalize that 1965 to 1980 were the years of conflict around the issue of racial/ethnic segregation and discrimination and their elimination, while 1981 to 1994 have been years of conflict around the politics of funding public education in Boston. This trend is not peculiar to Boston; it is shared by every large urban public school district from Miami–Dade County in Florida to Seattle, Washington. Nor is it peculiar to public education, as most other city services have gone into crisis over resource shortfalls during the same era.

Teachers

The Boston teaching force has been successfully desegregated and its continuity stabilized since 1988. The Massachusetts Education Reform Act exempted Boston from several reform clauses that would have limited the power of the Boston Teachers Union, although the statewide changes in tenure and term limits on certification affect all teachers in all public schools.

A new union contract signed in December 1993 increased the so-called empowerment — that is, functional autonomy and locus of control — of classroom teachers and continues to assure BTU members that they will remain the best-paid teacher force, with the best fringe benefits, in Massachusetts. Ironically, the new fiscal 1994 state aid will go exclusively to meet the new costs of the salary increases for teachers in Boston.

In spite of these advantages, the politics of budget setting are so volatile and protracted that many of the youngest teachers, in a district where more than half the teachers are past the age of fifty and teachers under the age of thirty-five are sorely
needed, are not sure whether they will receive pink slips each spring. In May 1993, for example, 202 such layoff notices were sent out, only to be retracted later in the summer.

The policy concept of school- or site-based management (SBM) came to Massachusetts with the 1993 mandate of the Education Reform Act. In Boston, the idea has become a commonplace. It began to be discussed and tried out tentatively in a few schools as early as 1982. BTU negotiators argued hard for a maximum power role for teachers in the evolution of this policy into practice, which has been combined with the idea of shared decision making (SDM), a role that would be grounded in majority rule decisions in the councils of SBM/SDM schools. Again, as historical fact, the federal court ordered similar councils into being at each school in 1975, but few of them ever exercised much authority or made noteworthy decisions about anything. Moreover, schools that continue to include these advisory councils from 1975 treat them simply as parent organizations.

Further, as decentralization gradually came into play during the 1990s, the BSC and the superintendent have simultaneously and contradictorily intensified central office control over the district and its programs by establishing assistant superintendencies, one for each level of schooling, a pattern common to the system in the pre-1975 period. The likelihood is slight that much authority over programs, personnel, or finances will move downward toward principals and school councils.

Attaining Academic Achievement Goals

In 1983, racial desegregation combined with massive structural reforms of the Boston public schools had not resulted in changes in academic achievement test scores, withdrawal rates, or suspension rates during the years 1974 through 1981. In 1988, the elaborate program and school improvement plans developed under the leadership of then superintendent Laval Wilson led me, with the announcement in 1987 of moderate gains in median Metropolitan Achievement Test scores, to forecast probable improvements in public confidence in the educational service delivery capability of the system.

This was a wishful and mistaken forecast: measures of student outcomes have not worsened between 1988 and 1993, but they have not improved either, and they have certainly not generated increased public confidence. Indeed, except in a few outstanding schools, the various indicators show little improvement, whether the baseline is 1973 or 1983. Results from the Massachusetts Educational Assessment Program (MEAP), which generates proficiency scores in mathematics and science in grades eight and twelve, support this conclusion. Among BPS eighth-graders in 1992, 12 percent scored above the statewide median in mathematics and 13 percent in science. Among BPS twelfth-graders, 18 percent scored above the median in mathematics and 14 percent in science. Only Chelsea and Lynn students did less well among thirty-nine Greater Boston area districts according to a report from the Massachusetts secretary of education in June 1993.

A twenty-year plateau of low achievement outcomes might constitute relative and technical progress to the extent that conditions of childhood poverty have worsened since 1988, numbers of limited-English-proficient students have grown greatly, and both employment and public safety conditions have deteriorated in the
most economically disadvantaged neighborhoods of Boston. Against this temporal backdrop, then, most of the BPS system has held its own.

Moreover, drop-out rates have decreased significantly and college-bound rates have improved since 1983. A state study concluded that more than half the state’s black, Hispanic, and other ethnic minority children live in the four largest central cities and New Bedford. The 1991 statewide drop-out rate was more than 40 percent for Hispanic students and more than 30 percent for black students, using as the base the cohort that entered ninth grade in 1987.¹ These rates compared with an overall statewide rate of about 19 percent.

In spite of its holding its own educationally against the odds, no newcomer to Boston would recognize any progress from reading the two major newspapers or listening to radio and TV talk shows. Christopher Lydon, an accomplished journalist who ran in the 1993 mayoral primary, for example, bashed the public schools as dreadful in their educational performances in all respects. Mike Barnicle, a major Boston Globe columnist, devotes several columns a year to vilifying the BPS — particularly its administrators and teachers. These media commentators and other pundits like Steve Wilson of the conservative Pioneer Institute (1993) are convinced that the public schools of Boston and similar large cities have collapsed into abject failure under the unbearable and strangulating weight of state and city laws, bureaucratic procedures and controls, union rules, and federal court orders. Their alternative vision consists of replicating the autonomy of nonpublic schools, a policy idea embodied in the state’s enactment of a charter school law for the experimental formation of up to twenty-five such schools beginning in 1995. Boston can create up to five charter schools under the new law.

Proposals for charter schools were filed early in 1994 and will be under the control of the Massachusetts secretary of education. In March 1994, Secretary Piedad Robertson announced her approval of the five Boston “experiments,” as she called them. They include an Edison Project school, a middle and high school intended to emphasize community service, a sixth- to twelfth-grade alternative school based at a community college, a vocational high school focusing on housing construction, and a settlement house type of school emphasizing family and child social services. Not one of these charter schools, slated to open in 1995, is based on curricular or instructional innovations and all will face substantial obstacles in securing facilities and adequate funding and teacher involvement at what may be increased work hours for less pay. Some advocates hope these charter schools will eventually stimulate deep, positive changes in the BPS, while opponents regard them as diversionary and divisive. The outcomes will not become apparent for several years.

In a March 1993, five-page letter to the Boston School Committee and Superintendent Lois Harrison-Jones, Mayor Raymond Flynn demanded a host of changes he said were overdue reforms that could improve the quality of public education. In addition to calling for complete freedom of choice in enrollments, regardless of racial/ethnic composition, Flynn wanted his appointed committee to mandate the removal of school principals who have been unable to improve “weak schools,” to create a quasi-public sports and fitness corporation, and to move early childhood programs for three- and four-year-olds out of city schools and into Head Start and licensed child care centers.

These demands are indicative of the rather uniformly low quality of educational reform ideas coursing through the minds of many decision makers in Boston and on
Beacon Hill. For instance, in the debates about state funding increases and equalization formulas in the spring of 1993, much was made by some officials over the fact that some districts educate children more effectively than others despite spending fewer dollars per child. The reform policies, however, like Mayor Flynn’s demands, did not grow out of valid knowledge about why some districts and schools within them do well.

Data presented by the Office of the Secretary of Education did not, for example, examine the relation between mean achievement scores and the demographics of poverty, ethnicity, and language.\(^2\) The evidence on this count is that the correlation coefficients, which run as high as \(r = 0.76,^3\) suffice to account for most of the sources of cross-district achievement differences. In other words, achievement test and proficiency test score differences are, in the district level aggregate, a function of the extent of household poverty and proportions of ethnic and lingual minority students per district.

### Court-Ordered Desegregation

Federal court intervention in the Boston public schools virtually ended after 1988, save for occasional disputes and readjustments among attorneys for the parties and a small handful of hearings and minor decisions. Although few aspects of court jurisdiction have still to be concluded and returned, if ever, to the Boston School Committee and City Hall, the federal court era of active oversight has ended.

Student assignment on the basis of race and ethnicity has been discontinued, and the court order to maintain representative racial/ethnic mixes has become permanent. (Mayor Flynn knew this when he made abandonment of student mix guidelines his first demand to the BSC in March 1993. Several mayoral candidates tried to renew this issue in order to get voter mileage during the 1994 fall election campaigns.)

A controlled-choice policy has been introduced so that parents now enjoy many options. Schools that failed to attract students were to be given strong support to improve during a limited period of years. This part of the policy has yet to be implemented by the BSC. Nine out of ten students are assigned to their parents’ first or second choices, however, and parental interest in school quality has benefited from controlled choice.

The federal court orders — erroneously and harmfully referred to by the *Boston Globe* and other media as the “forced busing” orders — brought deep structural changes to the BPS and to the political culture of Boston. They introduced not only racial equality in the treatment of students, but also teacher and administrative integration, special educational services, bilingual instruction, transportation services, and the introduction of multicultural parent participation. These improvements have become a permanent part of Boston and its public schools.

Federal court jurisdiction over the BPS has not been fully or permanently withdrawn. In order to terminate jurisdiction, a defendant public school district must show that it has eliminated all facets of racial duality in its policies and practices and has thus attained what courts term a racially unitary status. The door has been open to the BSC and the BPS to initiate such a showing since 1982, when the court began to move toward disengagement. Lacking such a showing, the court moved instead to withdraw carefully from sector after sector and to place the case on its inactive
docket, leaving in place permanent injunctions against racial discrimination and any return to segregation. It also established, with BSC consent, a procedure for mediating disputes between the parties.

A few politicians continue to garner what electoral mileage may still be left in pressing for a return to neighborhood schools, the code word for racially separate and identifiable schools. City councilors James Kelly and Peggy Mullen-Davis, both from South Boston, try to mobilize enthusiasm for a return to the 1970 status quo, for example. They do not bring up the law of the case, however.

Two state court actions have played an important part in educational opportunity reforms since 1988. The 1993 Educational Reform Act is a legislative by-product of a Supreme Judicial Court case adjudicating fiscal inequities in the funding of school districts. The increased aid that will flow to Boston and other affected cities and towns of the commonwealth will have significant influences on stabilization, and perhaps academic improvement, of the public schools during the 1990s. So, too, state Superior Court Judge Catherine A. White ratified a settlement in a seventeen-year-old dispute, which assured the reintegration of many special needs students into regular classrooms in Boston, reversing a trend toward isolation and labeling.

Stability

My 1988 report noted that “stability was not achieved” during the years from 1981 through 1988. “Operations of the school system remained extremely volatile . . . There was intense turbulence, confusion, and uncertainty around school bus routes, the delivery of transportation services, strikes and sickouts, parts of the Superintendent’s Education Plan for school improvement . . . and more.”

During 1988–1993, this pattern of instability persisted. The school committee’s future composition, relations with City Hall, and performance in shaping educationally sound policies remain uncertain. The superintendent is expected to undergo committee evaluation in the spring of 1994, and the effects of this process could induce whole new surges of volatility in system-community relations. Although the teachers received favorable new contract terms at the start of 1994, they suffer the demoralizing impacts of constant bashing in the media and by public officials, the effects of two decades of conflict and uncertainty over resources and support, and the combined discouragement of low infusions of new, young talent and occupational burn-out among the teachers yearning to retire but unable to afford to do so.

Future Issues and Some Imagined Solutions

The educational reform features of the new state law — resource equalization, increased authority for superintendents and principals, school-based management, teacher empowerment, heightened parent participation, and charter schools — may have an incrementally positive effect on improving the quality and equality of learning opportunities in Massachusetts, including Boston. They barely begin to create the conditions under which Boston schoolchildren could benefit quickly and substantially, however. They were not designed, and are not by coincidence or happy convergence of ideas, to be solutions to the crushing challenges facing children and teachers in the state’s largest cities.
The political magnetism of proposals to combat urban crime is rising. Massachusetts children as young as eight may now be permanently expelled from school. School-based detention rooms and separate centers are multiplying. Suspension rates are not only rising, but suspension, after a quarter century of evidence indicating its negative effects, has gained new popularity. Boot camp schools for troublesome adolescents, which are proposed without benefit of any evidence of their effectiveness, the removal of children from single parents on welfare and the renewal of orphanages and residential schools, the reintroduction of school uniforms and punitive dress codes, and the privatization of health and social services for families of the poor all represent cheap and quick appeals to public fears of violence.

Boston, like the other great central cities of the United States, is staggering under an accumulating burden of economic dislocations, commercial decline, rising levels of poverty and dependency, and the despair and violence that spring from beneath loss of hope among the young and old alike, particularly within the most vulnerable economic and ethnic minority. The Boston public schools cannot be strengthened or reconstructed academically except as part of a wider, deeper reconstruction of the broad range of occupational, housing, and medical and welfare supports that have been left to wither over the past fifteen years. The future of Boston public education is at risk because the employment and related support structures are at risk.

The findings from a three-year study of urban school districts and schools in California, Arizona, and Nevada provide some clues to better ideas about how Boston might achieve positive reconstruction of public education in at least modest independence from broader citywide structural improvements, however. The aim of the study was to find the features of a model of effectiveness in districts that exhibited success between 1984 and 1990 in educating disadvantaged children and youth.

Applying the model to Boston, we find several major ways in which the Boston public school system will have to improve swiftly and dramatically if it is to fulfill its mission.

1. The mayor, the Boston School Committee, and other agencies and groups in the city must begin to trust and support Superintendent Harrison-Jones strongly and consistently and work together harmoniously on ways to improve student opportunities to learn. Financial and political difficulties should not divert these agencies and officials from a shared focus on this goal.

2. Teacher staff development assistance must be provided on a sustained and substantively expert basis, so that new knowledge can be exchanged and new hope generated about its practical utilization.

3. Bolstered by up-to-date technical assistance, Boston’s teachers will also need strong support from the district in using instructional strategies that focus on meaning; encourage active student participation through cooperative learning and peer learning; teach basic and advanced facts and concepts through meaningful exercises rather than by rote; make close connections with students’ experiences and cultures; use manipulatives and realia; and teach reading and writing from a literature-based program. The district also needs to abandon tracking and ability grouping and to reward teachers who team up to formulate and deliver a strong core of academic instruction with high standards for all their students.

There are other curricular, instructional, and pedagogical approaches that have emerged as field-tested successes in recent years. These include the approaches of James Comer, the Success for All program developed at Johns Hopkins University,
and others identified by Jeff Howard under the Efficacy program. Some school administrators and individual teachers in the BPS have studied these innovative approaches and adopted some of them since 1988. Much more knowledge exchange is needed, however.

4. Improved opportunities to learn depend equally on the delivery of good social, health, and psychological support services to students. Close collaborative coordination between schools and health services and social agencies and the police are essential. Health screening should begin at birth, and the BPS should be intimately involved in delivering or linking early screening and health care for preschoolers to their eventual enrollment in the system.

These major features of effectiveness rest on interlocking parts. Instructional change depends on swift and deep stabilization of the organizational structure and the policy climate surrounding the BPS. The rhetoric of outrage, condemnation, and attack must give way if that climate is to change favorably.

The best news to emerge from the BPS system in the last four years is that a few schools have been redesigned and improved substantially in ways that accord in some instances with the model I have outlined. Luis A. Vélez, executive director of Boston Children’s Services and former member of the Boston School Committee, lectured recently on the Donald McKay School in Boston, which was designated a magnet school by the federal court in 1975.

The Donald McKay was one of the poorest performing schools in the BPS system... However, this was destined to change starting in September 1991.

Boston Children’s Services staff, led by then executive director Richard Jones, felt strongly that as the oldest child welfare agency in the city, BCS had an opportunity to pull together a citywide collaboration of leading agencies... to establish a school-community organizing project. That initiative became known as Project Excel, a comprehensive child development school improvement initiative whose mission is to develop the capacity of families, schools, and communities to ensure that children succeed academically in public school...

The main programmatic components of Project Excel include school-based individual, group, and family counseling and mentors and tutors... parent outreach, education, and leadership... after-school programs and activities... the infusion of efficacy principles and practices... professional staff development... by more than quadrupling the number of hours spent per year... community collaboratives... and program evaluation.5

Change on the scale that is so desperately needed will most likely take place only under very special political and economic circumstances, however. In the past it occurred during World War II, the Sputnik challenge of the late 1950s at the height of the cold war, and the Great Depression. It usually entails telescoping initiatives and funding from the federal to the state to the district level.

We are presently more than a year deep into Bill Clinton’s administration, and federal investments in educational improvements were barely mentioned in President Clinton’s first State of the Union Address.

Moreover, Boston and the other Massachusetts cities have little confidence that Governor William Weld and the Massachusetts legislature will play a significant part in funding or inducing the sorts of reconstruction summarized above, at least between 1994 and 1997. If the gubernatorial and other election campaigns of 1994 come to turn on the public appeal of reduced taxes, continuing privatization of state
and county services, reductions in welfare support and in related social and health services, it will matter very little whether there are better ways to run a public school district than those now in place. The systemic conditions surrounding and intersecting school dynamics will prove to be too aversive to permit school improvement to flourish in Boston.

Notes

2. Ibid., June 6, 1993.
4. Ibid.
"The problem is not defining good education, it’s getting there."

— Abbie Thernstrom