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Cover Page Footnote

This article is based on a paper I presented at the University of the Sacred Heart, Santurce, Puerto Rico, in April 1994. I am grateful to Carlos Santiago and Todd Swanstrom for their comments.

Puerto Rican Politics in the United States

A Preliminary Assessment

José E. Cruz

This article examines the following question: What characterizes Puerto Rican political development and what promise does electoral politics hold for Puerto Ricans in the United States? Its central premise is that an analytical framework which focuses on economic deprivation and racial prejudice is partial and inadequate to an understanding of the political experience of Puerto Ricans. Throughout the years, mainland Puerto Ricans have moved in and out of the political stage holding the banners of anticolonialism, separatism, incorporation, and ethnic identity in search of vantage points from which they can satisfy their cultural, social, and economic needs. Despite the Airbus and circular migration, Puerto Ricans are part of established, stable, and integrated communities; in other words, they are a group that has been consistently interested in improving its socioeconomic status through electoral politics. There is, however, a negative corollary to this premise: while strong evidence suggests that electoral politics matters and does make a difference in the life chances and actual progress of previously excluded groups, this does not seem to be true for Puerto Ricans. But while this would indicate that electoral politics offers an empty promise, there are reasons that suggest a different approach to the question of political representation, namely, focusing on the leadership qualities and the demographic and political context necessary for success.

The history of Latinos in the United States has been characterized as one of “open conflict, economic deprivation, and racial prejudice. . . . Mexican-Americans, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans share this overall framework.”¹ Within that framework, Mexican-American history has received special attention and emphasis, partly because Mexican-American problems allegedly “foreshadow those of all Hispanics.”²

This is surely a partial and inadequate framework for understanding Latino politics in the United States. It is particularly inadequate for an analysis of Puerto Rican politics because it neither captures nor does justice to the richness and complexity of the Puerto Rican experience. That experience includes, without a doubt, the aforementioned elements, but it also registers instances of intergroup cooperation and solidarity, social progress, and political incorporation.

Mexican-Americans represent the oldest Latino group in the United States. But their experience is not that of other Latino subgroups. It is important to emphasize this point because scholars often give it no more than lip service. For example, no other Latino subgroup has experienced “expulsions, deportations, lynchings . . . labor wars, orga

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“Early in the 1990s, Puerto Ricans used reapportionment and redistricting to increase their level of political representation. Now they must turn to other strategies. These include enforcement of the Voting Rights Act, increasing the number of Puerto Ricans who run for office, and increasing the number of those who vote. In light of marked demographic dispersion, Puerto Ricans will have to build more and better coalitions with African-Americans, whites, and others, as they have done brilliantly in the past in places like Massachusetts and Connecticut.”

— José E. Cruz

nized banditry, filibustering expeditions, and three formal wars.”³ Also, no other group has dominated the political life of an American state as Latinos in New Mexico did for three generations.⁴ Only the experience of Puerto Ricans on their island parallels this one, but the similarities are superficial and the comparison inappropriate. In short, a historical characterization suggesting that the Mexican-American experience is paradigmatic stretches the limits of comparative analysis and uses a lens that distorts the image of Latino political development.

The analysis of Latino politics in the United States requires a new account and a new synthesis of Latino historical development that builds upon a polythematic interpretive framework. Such analysis must identify the factors that have contributed to the formation of a Latino community based on the elaboration of the following themes: the relationship between separatist and accommodationist tendencies as strategies to promote policy responsiveness, anticolonialism and anticommunism as political mobilization strategies, and the politicization of ethnicity as a strategy for socioeconomic progress and political incorporation. I contend that these broad themes are the fundamental elements of an integrative dynamic of political development which foreshadows the emergence of a new American identity.

In this context, what characterizes Puerto Rican political development and what promise does electoral politics hold for Puerto Ricans in the United States? The central premise of this article is that, with the probable exception of anticommunism, the themes cited above articulate the political experience of Puerto Ricans in the United States. Throughout the years, mainland Puerto Ricans have moved in and out of the political stage holding the banners of anticolonialism, separatism, incorporation, and ethnic identity in search of a permanent space, a vantage point or points from which they can satisfy their cultural, social, and economic needs. I have arrayed below the evidence in support of this contention under three categories: incorporation, separatism, and identity.

I emphasize the notion of permanent space to suggest that, despite the Airbus and circular migration, we are looking at individuals who are part of established, stable, and integrated communities; in other words, they are a group that has been consistently interested in improving its socioeconomic status through electoral politics. But there is a negative corollary to this premise: while strong evidence suggests that electoral politics matters and does make a difference in the life chances and actual progress of previously excluded groups,⁵ this does not seem to be true for Puerto Ricans — or Latinos — at least not yet.

The evidence that buttresses these claims comes from two sources: research on Puerto Rican political development in the city of Hartford, Connecticut, and two surveys of Puerto Rican elected officials that I conducted in 1989 and 1992.⁶ Because data from one city cannot be used to generalize about Puerto Ricans in the United States, my assessment is, as the title indicates, preliminary. Yet the Hartford experience is both useful and refreshing because it provides a counterpoint to the tendency to see the U.S. Puerto Rican experience as the New York experience writ large. The surveys, on the other hand, give us an image of Puerto Rican political representation that can be correlated with their socioeconomic status.

Hartford is a medium-size city with a population of 140,000. According to the 1990 census, Puerto Ricans number about 40,000, or 27 percent of the total. Proportionally, this is the largest Puerto Rican community in the United States. New York City com-

Table 1

U.S. Cities with Large Puerto Rican Concentrations, 1990

State and City	Total Population	Puerto Ricans	Percentage of Total
California			
Los Angeles	3,485,398	14,367	0.4
Connecticut			
Bridgeport	141,686	30,250	21
Hartford	139,739	38,176	27
New Haven	130,474	13,866	11
New Britain	75,491	10,325	14
New York			
New York City	7,322,564	896,763	12
Rochester	231,636	16,383	7
Yonkers	188,082	14,420	8
New Jersey			
Camden	87,492	22,984	26
Elizabeth	110,002	12,062	11
Jersey City	228,537	30,950	14
Newark	275,221	41,545	15
Paterson	140,891	27,580	20
Massachusetts			
Boston	574,283	25,767	4
Lawrence	70,207	14,661	21
Springfield	156,983	23,729	15
Ohio			
Cleveland	505,616	17,829	4
Pennsylvania			
Philadelphia	1,585,577	67,857	4
Reading	78,380	11,612	
Florida			
Miami	358,548	72,827	20
Illinois			
Chicago	2,783,726	119,866	4

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, 1990 Census of Population, unpublished data.

pares with only three of the twenty-one cities with the largest concentrations of Puerto Ricans — Chicago, Los Angeles, and Philadelphia — while Hartford is comparable to six — Bridgeport, Connecticut, Elizabeth, New Jersey, New Haven, Connecticut, Paterson, New Jersey, Springfield, Massachusetts, and Yonkers, New York. In terms of the proportion of the total Puerto Rican population of a big city, New York has no parallel, while Hartford compares with Bridgeport, Paterson, and to a lesser extent, Springfield. Moreover, while New York City is the only large city where Puerto Ricans make up more than 10 percent of the total population, they comprise more than 10

percent of the population in eight of the ten medium-size cities — those with between 150,000 and 250,000 inhabitants. Their total number in these ten cities, 218,158, accounts for 8 percent of U.S. Puerto Ricans.

Incorporation

In the political science literature, the analysis of electoral participation is typically explained in reference to the social and psychological characteristics of voters.⁷ An electorate composed of young, uneducated, and alienated people participates less than one composed of older, better educated, and integrated individuals.⁸ In the case of Puerto Ricans, this approach is offered in tandem with the observation that their interest in the island politics of Puerto Rico has affected their interest in mainland politics, effectively reducing their level of participation.⁹ This dynamic has been synthesized in the literature on Puerto Rican politics in terms of two distinctions: the first refers to differences between “migrants” and “citizens”¹⁰ and the second to the dilemma between island- and mainland-based politics.¹¹

Concerning these issues, my research of Puerto Rican political development in Hartford suggests that individual characteristics might be less important as determinants of political participation than the structure of partisan and electoral options available to voters. In Hartford, the political incorporation of Puerto Ricans was rapid largely because the city Democratic Party was interested in mobilizing their support, even when their numbers within the electorate were small. Ironically, the fact that the Democratic Party dominated the city also helped, because in this context Puerto Ricans felt closer to home. Because almost all newcomers were supporters of the Partido Popular Democrático in Puerto Rico, they readily identified with and sought membership in Hartford’s Democratic Party, assuming that the two organizations were similar in social composition and goals. Education did have an impact on participation, but not in the sense that the least educated were apathetic. On the contrary, it was not until the 1970s that the social composition of the political leadership began to change from predominantly blue-collar and uneducated to predominantly white-collar and professional. But even then, this new leadership mobilized a mass of mostly poor and uneducated voters. Instead, low levels of education were a barrier in the context of literacy requirements to register, which, until their elimination in 1976, dampened participation. In short, Puerto Rican political participation in Hartford was determined more by the structure and dynamic of the political and electoral setting than by the individual characteristics of voters, a finding that has been noted elsewhere.¹²

Political participation took off as early as 1955. In 1956, about 200 Puerto Ricans were registered to vote, a fact that was reported by the press with some surprise.¹³ In that year, Puerto Rican numbers in Hartford were estimated at 2,000, which represented a 300 percent increase from an estimated 500 in 1954. Assuming that about 25 percent were qualified to vote, the registration level was 40 percent, a remarkable proportion for a community in which at least 75 percent were recent arrivals. Over time, registration and turnout have been low but electoral participation has been steady.

In Hartford, the relationship between mainland- and island-based mobilization has been complex, yet clearly tilted toward mainland-focused agendas.¹⁴ The archives of the Department of Puerto Rican Community Affairs in the United States of the commonwealth of Puerto Rico contain a reference to 40 tobacco workers from the Hart-

ford area who flew to Puerto Rico allegedly to vote in the 1960 general election.¹⁵ In contrast, Puerto Ricans who settled in the city never even considered voting in the Puerto Rican election through absentee ballots; they visited their island, but more for pleasure than out of an interest in politics. The community was not as interested as the elite in Hartford's electoral politics, but this was dictated more by the conditions that fostered disfranchisement than by an exclusive concern with homeland issues.

In 1986, a leading political action group, the Puerto Rican Political Action Committee of Connecticut, issued a resolution condemning as a civil rights violation the arrest of a group of independentistas in Puerto Rico. But one looks in vain for indications that this case moved Hartford's Puerto Rican community beyond a sporadic expression of solidarity. The campaign of the local socialists and their allies to free those arrested and to publicize the island's colonial status was marginal.

When the 1989–1990 debate on the proposed plebiscite on the status of Puerto Rico raised the question whether mainland Puerto Ricans should be allowed to vote, the overwhelming consensus in the community was that they should. In a New York policy forum, Edwin Vargas, Jr., a local leader, presented a spirited argument for participation, but he was then representing the National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights, a group with a programmatic interest in the status issue whose main agenda is nonetheless focused on issues that affect mainland Puerto Ricans. Still, Vargas began his presentation by regretting that the status issue had once again surfaced to “threaten unity in our community.”¹⁶ In the same breath he suggested that the issue might be of ephemeral concern. The idea of a plebiscite, in fact, was forced upon Congress by island leaders; once Congress killed the initiative, mainland interest faded. Puerto Ricans in Hartford and elsewhere went on with their lives and elite concerns went back to mainland policy and power issues.¹⁷

The Hartford case also suggests that although the distinction between “migrant” and “citizen” is sociologically adequate in explaining differences between urban dwellers and seasonal farmworkers, it does not adequately represent stages in a process of political development entailing a mental and attitudinal transition leading from marginality to active participation. A better characterization is provided by the distinction between ethnic awareness and power awareness.

Ethnic awareness in Hartford has been an expression of otherness. As a community leader put it, “The Hartford community must understand Puerto Ricans as Puerto Ricans. . . . Yes, we are Americans, but we don't look like Americans. Americans must look for what the Puerto Rican has to offer.”¹⁸ Power awareness refers to the crystallization of an attitude. “From now on,” declared another community leader in the wake of two waves of rioting by Puerto Ricans in 1969, “we are going to show [everyone] that we are not only here, but that we want improvements . . . We plan to follow through with our plans of bettering and upgrading the whole concept of the Puerto Rican around the state.”¹⁹

Such has been the framework of political participation that has been constant and defined at various moments by a sense of self and by a sense of how other political actors come to be favored by the polity.

Separatism

While among Puerto Rican activists independence seems to be the preferred solution to the colonial status of Puerto Rico, a majority feels that the U.S. Puerto Rican population

predominantly favors a permanent relationship between the island and the United States. These sentiments came to the fore in two surveys conducted by the New York-based Institute for Puerto Rican Policy in 1988 and 1989. According to the 1988 poll, 44 percent of Puerto Rican activists in the United States supported independence, while only 14 percent each supported statehood and the current commonwealth. The 1989 survey, on the other hand, revealed that 45 percent of Puerto Rican activists agree that the preferred status of most mainland Puerto Ricans is continued commonwealth, while 30 percent believe that statehood is the preferred solution and only 14 percent think the same about independence.²⁰

These findings are only suggestive, yet they are in keeping with the results of the Latino National Political Survey, which shows that a majority of mainland Puerto Ricans (69.4%) prefer commonwealth as the permanent status of Puerto Rico. In contrast, only 27 percent of respondents supported statehood, and a low 3.5 percent preferred independence.²¹ Moreover, in response to the question "How strong is your love for the United States?" 31.5 percent of Puerto Ricans said "extremely strong" and 37.1 percent said "very strong"; only 8.1 percent responded "not very strong." To the question "How proud are you to be an American?" 38.5 percent responded "extremely proud" and 44.6 percent said "very proud." A tiny minority, only 2.3 percent of respondents, said they were "not very proud" of their citizenship.²²

The history of Puerto Rican separatism in the United States is in tune with these sentiments. Hartford Puerto Ricans came into the public eye on March 2, 1954, when four members of the Puerto Rican Nationalist Party took their claims for Puerto Rican independence directly to the U.S. Congress, not in the form of a signed petition nor through a formal process of consultation, but with guns in their hands.

The nationalists wanted to alert the world that Puerto Rico was not the showcase of democracy touted by the United States at the United Nations and elsewhere in Latin America but a colony of an imperial power. The United States was not Puerto Rico's senior partner but its ruler. It had masterminded and controlled the repression of pro-independence advocates on the island, of which the most visible example was the jailing in a federal prison of the nationalist leader Pedro Albizu Campos.

The reactions to the shooting, however, were highly unsympathetic. In Puerto Rico and Washington the attack was characterized as "savage and unbelievable lunacy"²³ and contrary to our belief and our peaceful nature, an instance of "the misbehavior of a very few."²⁴ In New York, Felipe N. Torres, a Puerto Rican assemblyman from the Bronx, introduced a resolution condemning the shooting, which the state assembly approved.²⁵ And in Illinois, a group of twenty-one Puerto Ricans presented themselves at Hines Veterans Hospital in Maywood, a suburb of Chicago, to donate blood as a gesture of sympathy for the wounded representatives. "We want to show the American people that the people of Puerto Rico do not hate them," said Luis Martínez, a bodega operator. "The nationalists are not representative of our native country. We are proud to be citizens."²⁶

The day after the shooting, the *Hartford Times* ran a story titled "Local Puerto Ricans, Few in Number, Deplore Shootings." In it Julio Falcón, a Puerto Rican liaison officer for tobacco workers, expressed his dismay over the incident. Defined as transient tobacco and apple harvesters, Puerto Ricans were said to be unhappy about the shooting. The report included a message from the fire chief of Puerto Rico to "the fire chiefs of every town and city in the United States," reassuring them that "the vast majority of the people of Puerto Rico are indignant at the unbelievable and criminal

aggression of which the members of the United States Congress have been victims.”²⁷

During the 1970s, the Hartford Puerto Rican community, like most U.S. Puerto Rican communities, experienced a surge in radical political activity. The People's Liberation Party (PLP) — a clone of the Young Lords Party — erupted onto the political scene in 1970, and a year later the Puerto Rican Socialist Party (PSP), which operated throughout the Northeast, began its activities in the city. While the PLP vanished rather quickly, the PSP was active for several years. Yet it was never fully accepted by the community and by the mid-1970s it divided and broke apart. The most notorious separatist event in local politics took place in 1983, when the group Los Macheteros stole over \$7 million from a Wells Fargo branch in West Hartford. The key operative in the heist was Víctor Gerena, a second-generation Puerto Rican Hartfordian born in the Bronx. But in his chronicle of the episode, Fernandez shows how the class symbolism of the robbery completely overshadowed its political intent. Puerto Ricans, and others, cheered Gerena's feat, not because they sympathized with his separatist politics, but because it was a Robin Hood sort of adventure; they were in awe of him because he represented a working-class David who had inflicted severe damage on a greedy, capitalistic Goliath.²⁸

Identity

Identity politics in Hartford has been both an expressive process and one in which prior organization and instrumental rationality played a significant role.²⁹ Mobilization was not driven solely by cost-benefit calculations; rationality was also mediated by psychosocial factors. Moreover, the purposive defense of identity (that is, ethnic awareness; for example, the Puerto Rican parade, which in Hartford dates from 1964) rather than collapsing into a solipsistic exercise (for example, overemphasis on Puerto Rican pride) led to the pursuit of concrete political advantages (for example, seeking representation through extra-partisan organization and mobilization).

Although the desire for economic betterment was there, the earliest forms of Puerto Rican association were religious and cultural. Examples include the *Legión de María* (Legion of Mary) and the *Rosario Cantado* (Sung Rosary) that Olga Mele, probably the first Puerto Rican to move to Hartford in 1941, joined and founded, respectively, in the 1950s, the baseball leagues that various community leaders organized, the Puerto Rican parade itself, the San Juan Bautista and Park Street festivals, and so on. These initiatives, however, cut across their constitutive boundaries and spilled over into politics.

When La Popular, Bodega Hispana, the first Puerto Rican restaurant in the city, opened in 1956, it quickly became the meeting place for Puerto Ricans interested in politics. Their purpose was not to plot strategies to fight corporate power but to penetrate the Democratic Party and to fight City Hall if necessary. The interest of early leaders in class issues was never strong; educational policy, particularly bilingual education, provided the focus for their activities. Many were convinced that politics was important for the community without really knowing exactly why. Politics was seen not as the pursuit of abstract goods but as the means to achieve a citizens' agenda whose goals were defined by ethnic needs. While community as well as elite concerns did not center around issues of “industry and idleness,”³⁰ identity was intertwined with status. Employment and unionization issues were there, but always in the background. As a matter of fact, a key question that observers asked was whether Puerto Ricans would ever tackle issues other than those related to their culture.

Even leaders with socialist credentials and links to the labor movement recognized

that ethnicity was a crucial mobilizing factor, even if they tinted their rhetoric with a bit of class analysis. Thus, in many electoral campaigns, support for Puerto Rican candidates listed on row B in the ballot was sought by using the slogan "Vota por la B de Boricua" (Vote for row B, for Boricua), Boricua being another way of referring to a member of the group.

Was this an opportunistic utilization of ethnicity to advance economic interests? Many have made this claim about the relationship between ethnicity and status. David Ward summarizes this view when he writes,

Ethnicity is a label to describe reactive responses of interest groups that have perceived detrimental alterations in the allocation principles of public policies. Their political loyalties do not, therefore, reflect their interests in ancestral foreign causes but rather their concern over threats to their well-being from competing interest groups.³¹

Ethnic identity, however, need not be exclusively or predominantly related to a concern with an ancestral homeland to be authentic. This is particularly true in the American context, where one finds dissonance between identity and ancestry,³² where identity attachments suggest more an accumulation of cultural capital than a return to ancestral roots,³³ and where individuals are often externally prompted to adopt ethnic classifications that they would otherwise not think about.³⁴ To be sure, ethnicity has socioeconomic referents, but these are contingent; its distinctiveness is psychological and cultural. Gurak and Kritz, for example, compared Puerto Ricans with Hispanic immigrants to the Northeast in the 1970s to find that, among Puerto Ricans, ethnic identity in the second generation correlated with low socioeconomic status.³⁵ Rogler, Cooney, and Ortiz, on the other hand, found that ethnic identity was strong regardless of higher levels of acculturation among second-generation Puerto Rican families.³⁶ While these findings are problematic, they do suggest that ethnic identity is a complex process with a wide range of expressions from ancestral callings to leisure-time pursuits.³⁷ For Hartford Puerto Ricans, identity coincided with ancestry, it cut across class and generation, and its symbolism was public and politically powerful.³⁸

Electoral Politics

This leads us to the question of electoral politics and its promise. Between 1989 and 1992, Puerto Rican communities across the country witnessed a surge in political activity and involvement at all levels. The most notable result of this was their election to Congress of two Puerto Ricans, one each from Illinois and New York. They were also active in the New York City charter revision process and the redistricting process in the Northeast.

Puerto Ricans made significant strides in running for local offices. In New York City, where they were 12 percent of the population, they captured 16 percent of the City Council seats. In Hartford, they held three votes in the coalition of five that controlled city government during the 1991-1993 term. At the time, the office of the corporation counsel, the city's lawyer, and the Democratic Party organization in the city were presided over by Puerto Ricans.

But in 1989 the central fact concerning Puerto Rican electoral politics was underrep-

Table 2

Puerto Rican Elected Officials as a Percentage
of Popularly Elected Officials

State	Total	Puerto Rican	Percentage	Puerto Rican Percentage of State Population
California	19,279	03	*	+
Connecticut	9,929	15	*	04
Florida	5,368	02	*	02
Illinois	38,936	08	*	1.2
Indiana	11,355	02	*	+
Massachusetts	13,888	04	*	2.4
Michigan	19,292	01	*	+
New Jersey	9,345	25	*	04
New York	26,343	71	*	06
Ohio	19,750	05	*	+
Pennsylvania	33,242	07	*	1.2
Total	206,737	143	*	02
United States	504,404	143	*	1.1
Federal Officials	540	4 ^a	+	

Sources: José E. Cruz, 1992 elected officials survey; U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Popularly Elected Officials in 1987*, Preliminary Report, GC87-2(P), December 1988.

^a Includes Puerto Rico's resident commissioner in Washington.

* Less than one-tenth of one percent.

+ Less than one percent.

resentation. By 1983, three states with large Puerto Rican concentrations — Illinois, New Jersey, and New York — had six congressional districts with Latino proportions ranging from 26 to 51 percent. This circumstance was considered favorable to the election of an ethnic candidate, possibly a Puerto Rican.³⁹ But by 1989 this had not come about.

1989 Survey

The 1989 survey identified 123 elected officials of Puerto Rican background in eleven states with Puerto Rican populations of 10,000 or more —California, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. With 74 percent of all Puerto Ricans in the United States living in those states in 1980, it was reasonable to compare the level of representation there against the total number of elected officials in the country. Puerto Ricans were one percent of the total U.S. population but less than one-tenth of one percent of all elected public office-holders in the fifty states. Puerto Ricans represented 1.6 percent of the total population in the states mentioned above, but again, less than one-tenth of one percent of all elected officials.

Compared with Latinos, Puerto Ricans were still underrepresented. They were 21 percent of all Latinos in the surveyed states but only 17 percent of all Latino elected officials. Considering only those states where Puerto Rican numbers were highest,

Table 3

**Puerto Rican Elected Officials (PREO) as a Percentage
of Hispanic Elected Officials (HEO)**

State	HEO	PREO	Percentage	Puerto Rican Percentage of State Population
California	617	03	+	1.7
Connecticut	17	15	88	69
Florida	60	02	3.3	16
Illinois	139	08	06	17
Indiana	09	02	22	14
Massachusetts	04	04	100	53
Michigan	12	01	8.3	09
New Jersey	42	25	60	42
New York	76	71	93.4	49
Ohio	08	05	63	3.5
Pennsylvania	09	07	78	65
Total	993	143	14.4	17.5

Sources: NALEO, 1991 *National Roster of Hispanic Elected Officials*; José E. Cruz, 1992 elected officials survey; U.S. Bureau of the Census.

+ Less than one percent.

the comparison was more favorable. In Connecticut, Puerto Ricans were 71 percent of the Latino population but 99 percent of all Latino elected officials. In New Jersey, they were 50 percent of all Latinos but 60 percent of Latinos elected to public office. In New York, where Puerto Ricans were 59 percent of all Latinos, they were 79 percent of all Latino elected officials.

Still, while they constituted 4.4 percent of the total population in those three states, they were less than one-half of one percent of all public officeholders.

1992 Survey

Although it is widely acknowledged that redistricting brought increased representation for Puerto Ricans, the aggregate gains were not significant enough to achieve parity. The survey conducted in 1992 identified 143 elected officials of Puerto Rican background in the eleven states of the 1989 survey, an increase of twenty officials, or 16.2 percent.

Currently, 90 percent of all Puerto Ricans in the U.S. mainland live in these eleven states. While in 1990 Puerto Ricans exceeded one percent of the total U.S. population for the first time, in 1992 they were less than one-tenth of one percent of the total number of popularly elected officials in the country. In the eleven states with Puerto Rican representation, they were 2 percent of the total population in 1990 but less than one-tenth of one percent of all elected officials.

In 1989, Puerto Ricans, compared with Latinos, were underrepresented in the eleven states by four percentage points. In 1992 the gap widened, the Puerto Rican proportion of Latinos being 17.5 percent compared with 8.2 percent of Latino elected officials. This was partly owing to the inclusion of Chicago school council members in the total number of Illinois officials.

Table 4

Puerto Ricans as a Percentage of Hispanics and Hispanic Elected Officials (HEO) in States with Largest Puerto Rican Concentrations

	1989			1992		
	Percentage of Hisp	Percentage of HEO	Gap	Percentage Hisp	Percentage of HEO	Gap
Connecticut	71	99	+28	69	88.0	+19.0
New Jersey	50	60	+10	42	60.0	+18.0
New York	59	79	+20	49	93.4	+44.4

Sources: José E. Cruz, 1989 and 1992 elected officials survey; National Puerto Rican Coalition, *Puerto Ricans in the U.S. Mainland: A Special Report Based on the 1990 Decennial Census* (June 1992).

Puerto Ricans do much better in the most populous states. In Connecticut, they were 69 percent of Latinos but 88 percent of Latino elected officials in 1992; in New Jersey, the proportions were 42 percent and 60 percent, respectively. And in New York, Puerto Ricans were 49 percent of Latinos but 78 percent of Latino elected officials. Table 3 summarizes this correlation for the surveyed states. Table 4 shows, however, that changes in the overrepresentation margin in Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York were in part the result of decreases in the percentage of Puerto Rican Latinos in those states. In New Jersey, the overrepresentation margin increased by eleven points even though representation decreased slightly. In Connecticut, the margin increased slightly in tandem with a slight increase in representation. But in New York, a decrease in the proportion of Puerto Rican Latinos correlated with significant increases in the number of elected officials and the overrepresentation margin.

In absolute terms, the balance was positive for the years 1989-1992. But Indiana saw its representation shrink by more than 50 percent and New Jersey lost one representative. Florida, whose Puerto Rican population grew by 158.6 percent during 1980-1990, re-reported no net gains in representation. In Massachusetts, the Puerto Rican population grew by 102 percent and gained one elected official. This balance, however, obscures the fact that Puerto Ricans lost their only representative at the state level, the Honorable Nelson Merced. Although California, Connecticut, and Ohio had net gains, New York recorded the largest gain, with an increase in Puerto Rican representation of 31.4 percent, a direct result of the New York City charter revision redistricting. Table 5 illustrates the changes in representation by state.

At the federal level, Puerto Rican representation more than doubled. Counting the resident commissioner of Puerto Rico in Washington, Puerto Ricans comprise 24 percent of Latinos in the House of Representatives (4 of 17). Island and mainland Puerto Ricans constitute 24 percent of U.S. Latinos. If the resident commissioner is excluded, the Puerto Rican proportion of Latinos in the House decreases to 17.6 percent; but this share goes beyond parity, since mainland Puerto Ricans are only 12.2 percent of the 22.4 million Latinos counted by the 1990 census.

In 1992, Puerto Rican representation in Congress as a percentage of federal elected officials moved a bit closer to parity compared with the Puerto Rican proportion of the total U.S. population (1.1%), with 0.7 percent of all officials, compared with less than half of one percent in 1989.

Table 5

Puerto Rican Elected Officials by State, 1989 and 1992

State	1989	1992	Change
California	1	3	+02
Connecticut	14	15	+01
Florida	2	2	00
Illinois	8	8	00
Indiana	5	2	-03
Massachusetts	3	4	+01
Michigan	1	1	00
New Jersey	26	25	-01
New York	54	71	+17
Ohio	2	5	+03
Pennsylvania	7	7	00
Totals	123	14	+20

Source: José E. Cruz, 1989 and 1992 elected officials surveys.

Table 6

**Total, Hispanic, and Puerto Rican Population of Jurisdictions
with Puerto Rican Political Representation, 1990**

City	Total	Hispanic	Puerto Rican	Puerto Rican Percentage of Total	Puerto Rican Percentage of Hispanic
California					
San Francisco ^a	723,959	100,717	4,701	*	4.6
San Jose	782,248	208,388	4,472	*	2.1
Connecticut					
Bridgeport	141,686	37,547	30,250	21.3	80.5
Hartford	139,739	44,137	38,176	27.3	86.4
New Britain	75,491	12,284	10,325	13.6	84.0
New Haven	130,474	17,243	13,866	10.6	80.4
Willimantic ^b	14,746	2,343	1,942	13.1	82.8
Florida					
Orlando	164,693	14,401	7,035	4.2	48.8
Sweetwater	13,909	12,938	338	2.4	2.6
Illinois					
Chicago	2,783,726	545,852	119,866	4.3	21.9
Lombard ^c	39,408	1,090	139	*	12.7
Indiana					
East Chicago	33,892	16,196	3,446	10.1	21.2
Lake Station	13,899	1,834	748	5.3	40.7

Table 6, continued

City	Total	Hispanic	Puerto Rican	Puerto Rican Percentage of Total	Puerto Rican Percentage of Hispanic
Massachusetts					
Amherst ^b	17,824	679	260	1.4	38.2
Chelsea	28,170	9,018	4,581	16.2	50.7
Holyoke	43,704	13,573	12,687	29.0	93.4
Michigan					
Madison Heights	32,196	399	35	*	8.7
New Jersey					
Camden	87,492	27,273	22,984	26.2	84.2
Englewood	24,850	3,893	583	02.3	14.9
Hoboken	33,397	10,036	6,833	20.4	68.0
Jersey City	228,537	55,395	30,950	13.5	55.8
Mount Holly	10,639	609	450	4.2	73.8
Passaic	58,041	29,028	11,626	20.0	40.0
Paterson	40,891	57,711	27,580	19.5	47.7
Perth Amboy	41,967	23,310	13,531	32.2	58.0
Vineland	54,780	12,926	11,672	21.3	90.2
Woodbine ^d	2,678	441	361	13.4	81.8
New York					
Brentwood ^b	45,218	15,692	8,203	18.1	52.2
Bronx County	1,203,789	523,111	349,115	29.0	66.7
Buffalo	328,123	16,129	12,798	3.9	79.3
Kings County (Brooklyn)	2,300,664	462,411	274,530	11.9	59.3
New York City ^e	7,322,564	1,783,511	896,763	12.2	50.2
New York County	1,487,536	386,630	154,978	10.4	40.0
Queens County	1,951,598	381,120	100,410	5.1	26.3
Richmond County (Staten Island)	378,977	30,239	17,730	4.6	58.6
Rochester	231,636	20,055	16,383	7.0	81.6
Ohio					
Cleveland	505,616	23,197	17,829	3.5	76.8
Lorain	71,245	12,065	9,382	13.1	77.7
Pennsylvania					
Bristold	10,405	914	805	7.7	88.0
Harrisburg	52,376	4,022	3,051	05.8	75.8
Philadelphia	1,585,577	89,193	67,857	04.2	76.0
Reading	78,380	14,486	11,612	14.8	80.1
Totals	16,094,176	3,238,525	1,424,120	88.8	43.9

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, 1990 Census of Population, unpublished data.

^aCounty.

^bCensus designated place; these are closely settled population centers without legally established limits. State and local officials delineate CDPs following Census Bureau guidelines.

^cVillage.

^dBorough.

^eNumbers not included in total.

*Less than one percent.

Constituencies and Public Policy Priorities

Puerto Rican elected officials serve large and diverse constituencies. Fourteen percent of respondents serve populations numbering between 50,000 and 100,000, and a full 50 percent serve constituencies of more than 100,000. Almost half serve constituencies that are more than 50 percent Latino; of these, 52 percent serve constituencies that are more than 50 percent Puerto Rican. Only 30 percent of respondents serve voters who are more than 50 percent non-Hispanic white, and a small proportion, 9 percent, serve constituencies that are more than 50 percent African-American. A full 30 percent, however, serve constituencies that are between 20 percent and 40 percent non-Hispanic white, and 63 percent serve voters who are between 20 percent and 40 percent African-American.

Education is the single most important public policy priority of respondent elected officials, but there is no single focus on this issue. Of the fifty-four respondents (51.4% of the total) listing education at the top of their agenda, 61 percent further specified the focus of their interest, which included everything from bilingual education to dropout prevention to physical plant issues. Housing came next, but with only twenty-six respondents (25% of the total) listing it as a priority; it was followed by economic development, with twenty-one respondents indicating it as an issue. For Puerto Rican elected officials, the top six public policy issues are, in rank order, education, housing, economic development, health care, crime prevention, and civil rights. Presumably, these issues provided the campaign themes on which the officials were elected and should provide the criteria of evaluation of their performance.

Representation and Socioeconomic Status

It is not possible to provide an adequate evaluation of that performance in this review, except indirectly. The 1990 census shows that the labor-market performance and socioeconomic status of Puerto Ricans were mixed during the 1980s, marked by both progress and stagnation. However, there are no indicators to support a positive correlation between political representation and socioeconomic status. The available evidence suggests that during the 1980s, Puerto Rican progress and stagnation were functions of economic growth, differences in regional economies, human-capital characteristics, and migration status.⁴⁰ Yet because public policy often moves in the interstices of individual capabilities and economic conditions, some inferences can be made about the relation between political representation and socioeconomic status.

Between 1979 and 1989, the mean annual household income of Puerto Ricans increased by 25 percent, from \$23,463 to \$29,264. Similarly, the mean per capita household income grew by 29 percent, from \$6,490 to \$8,370, with the margin between household and per capita income accounted for by reductions in the size of the average household.⁴¹ On the other hand, the income gap between Puerto Ricans and non-Hispanic whites continued to be enormous, with Puerto Ricans earning only fifty-three cents for every dollar earned by non-Hispanic whites in 1989. While the poverty rate among Puerto Ricans decreased from 36.4 percent in 1980 to 30.3 percent in 1990, it was still more than double the rate for the population as a whole and six percentage points higher than the rate for Latinos.⁴²

This situation suggests that in the absence of public policies which target Puerto Rican needs, some Puerto Ricans experience increases in earnings and move out of poverty, in keeping with increases in economic activity and gains in human capital,

while others continue to experience economic and social disadvantage. Indeed, reductions in poverty rates are associated with decreases in unemployment, and between March 1986 and March 1989, decreases in Puerto Rican unemployment correlated with shifts in occupational patterns — from blue- to white-collar occupations — and increases in educational attainment.⁴³ What this means is that Puerto Rican elected officials are saddled with the central responsibility of supporting and effecting two kinds of public policies: those which promote economic growth and those which enable individuals to reap the benefits of growing economic environments.

While it would be tempting at this point to conclude that political representation has failed to deliver on its promise of progress for Puerto Ricans, three major reasons suggest a different approach. First, electoral politics matters. When the face of power changes, public policy changes in tandem. Yet simple representation is not enough; to be successful, political representation requires a certain kind of leadership and a certain kind of demographic and political context. Leaders must be honest, committed, energetic, and smart;⁴⁴ emerging constituencies must be demographically strong. At a minimum, access to governing bodies must translate into significant influence and, optimally, it must entail control of crucial decision-making structures; finally, public opinion must favor the direction sought for public policy, and local policy responsiveness must be matched by state and federal support.⁴⁵ This is a complex set of requirements, but it nonetheless provides a realistic prescription for success in electoral politics.

Second, the system is relatively open, so that outcasts can and do become protagonists. The conventional wisdom about interest groups in America is that they control congressional decision making. If this is true, the logical corollary is that to control public policy, political representation is unnecessary. Indeed, by this logic government is simply the executive committee of the best-organized and most resourceful group. But the conventional wisdom about interest groups is, in fact, not true. The pressure system in the United States has been charged with having a definite “upper class bias,”⁴⁶ which has contributed to an image of homogeneity of interests, structure, goals, and effectiveness that does not jibe with the reality. The system is, instead, “conflictual, permeable, [and] unpredictable,”⁴⁷ marked by different rates of success among groups and by a curious inability of any one group to seize control of the public policy agenda.⁴⁸ This agenda is susceptible to external input, but it is ultimately controlled by those who hold public office. If this were not the case the pressure system would not be necessary; but it is the case, and more important, control of public office is not beyond the scope of possibilities for Puerto Ricans locally or at the national level.

Third, public policy makes a difference. When early on in his presidency, Ronald Reagan stated that in the 1960s we declared a war on poverty and poverty won, he was making a case against public policy. In fact, in what amounted to a rekindling of 1960s Cold War liberalism, Reagan was telling the American people to “ask not what your country can do for you, ask what you can do for your country.” The corollary question here is, Who should not ask for governmental favors? The construction and automotive interests that benefited from the creation of the interstate highway system? The homeowners who were rewarded with the mortgage interest deduction? The veterans who were given access to higher education through the GI bill? Clearly, these are sectors of the population for whom public policy did work. They were never told to “ask not,” and no one ever suggested to them that government responses to social needs are doomed to fail.

The problem in the United States, however, is not one of failed public policies but of

a failure to establish them in the first place; we are at fault by omission rather than by commission. During the 1980s, tax and transfer systems in seven Western European countries cushioned the effects of economic change on the incomes of their citizens; this did not happen in the United States, where the absence of subsidized child care, the failure to expand the earned income tax credit,⁴⁹ and heavy reliance on means-tested benefits were contributing factors to the country's inability to provide economic security to families with children. In France and the United Kingdom, about 50 percent of households headed by young adults were lifted out of poverty by tax and transfer programs in the first half of the 1980s, but the United States experienced no such reductions.⁵⁰ Thus, it is clear that government intervention is not futile and that the failure — or success — of representation is relative to the philosophy and interests of those who control public office at any given time.

What Must Be Done?

Early in the 1990s, Puerto Ricans used reapportionment and redistricting to increase their level of political representation. Now they must turn to other strategies. These include enforcement of the Voting Rights Act, increasing the number of Puerto Ricans who run for office, and increasing the number of those who vote. In light of marked demographic dispersion, Puerto Ricans will have to build more and better coalitions with African-Americans, whites, and others, as they have done brilliantly in the past in places like Massachusetts and Connecticut.⁵¹

The key challenge that Puerto Rican elected officials face is how to translate access into power in the context of small numbers, universalism in public policy, and slow growth. Getting elected is only half the game — governing being the other half. Puerto Rican elected officials have their public policy priorities right, but the available evidence strongly suggests that they are not having an impact on Puerto Rican problems. Whether this is due to structural factors (economic restructuring, declining regional economies), political factors (such as universalism and pitfalls of coalition-based regimes), the characteristics of Puerto Rican elected officials (for example, a majority of first-termers/mediocre leaders), or a combination of these and other factors, this analysis cannot tell.

One general prescription, however, seems appropriate. To be effective Puerto Ricans must become full partners in the process whereby government develops working relations with public and private centers of power.⁵² The Hartford experience suggests that effective leaders cannot be good brokers between public and private power if the institutional component of public power shuts out the electorate.⁵³ But it is clear that a concern with grassroots interests should not be equated with a rejection of private power as somehow illegitimate.

Many centuries ago, Aristotle dealt with the issue of pluralism and its relationship to political power. In *The Politics* he wrote, "Suppose all these to be present in a single city — that is to say, the good, the rich and the well-born, and beside them a mass of citizens — will there or will there not be dispute as to which should rule? . . . We have to ask ourselves how to reach a conclusion [regarding who should rule] when these elements are present at one and the same time."⁵⁴ Needless to say, he did not reach an acceptable conclusion. Yet when he argued that the "state is a plurality, which must depend on education to bring about its common unity,"⁵⁵ he implicitly suggested that to resolve these disputes, the integrity of the groups and interests in question need not be

sacrificed. Puerto Ricans should pay heed to this Aristotelian insight by recognizing that without the cooperation of business and labor, insurance companies and nonprofit corporations, private lobbies and public bureaucracies, it is unlikely that Puerto Ricans will be able to legislate and implement the public policies needed to bring equality and progress for all. ▀

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Notes

1. Joan Moore and Harry Pachon, *Hispanics in the United States* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1985), 18.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., 20.
4. Ibid., 21; Nancie L. González, *The Spanish Americans of New Mexico: A Distinctive Heritage of Pride* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1969).
5. Rufus P. Browning, Dale Rogers Marshall, and David H. Tabb, *Protest Is Not Enough: The Struggle of Blacks and Hispanics for Equality in Urban Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986).
6. The 1989 survey targeted states with 10,000 or more Puerto Ricans: California, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin. Almost 80 percent of Puerto Ricans lived in those states in 1980. Using the National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials' *National Roster of Hispanic Elected Officials*, state directories, and *Who's Who in American Politics* to compile a preliminary list, I asked local Puerto Rican organizations to identify the officials of known Puerto Rican background and to add names as appropriate. I made these requests via mail and follow-up telephone calls. As a result, 352 individuals in the states selected were sent questionnaires. I made telephone calls to verify receipt, request prompt return, and encourage referrals of known Puerto Rican officials not included on the list. I made a second round of calls to follow up on nonrespondents. In a number of cases, I checked compilation and verification by telephone. Overall, the verification process occurred on the basis of returned questionnaires, telephone confirmation, consultations with staffers, associates, and colleagues of nonrespondents, and access to correspondence and published information. I identified Puerto Rican elected officials in eleven of the fifteen states originally selected. I then circulated the draft list among a selected group of researchers, community leaders, and representatives of voter registration and political action groups to check for accuracy. Time constraints did not allow for this kind of final accuracy check of the 1992 list. Except for this, the 1992 survey followed the steps outlined above.
7. See Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York: Wiley, 1960); Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie, *Participation in America* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972); Raymond E. Wolfinger and Steven J. Rosenstone, *Who Votes?* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980).
8. Two other major schools of thought, the rational choice theory best associated with Anthony Downs and the structuralists, do consider the impact of structure on political behavior. See, respectively, Anthony Downs, *Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1957); Walter Dean Burnham, "The Changing Shape of the American

Voter," *American Political Science Review* 59: (7–28); Elinor Scarbrough, *Political Ideology and Voting: An Exploratory Study* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984). Yet as recently as 1993, Rosenstone and Hansen could claim, with good reason, that "the reigning theories of participation in American politics . . . do not have much to say about politics. Instead, they trace activism to the characteristics of individual American citizens." See Steven J. Rosenstone and John Mark Hansen, *Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy in America* (New York: Macmillan, 1993), 3.

9. James Jennings and Monte Rivera, eds., *Puerto Rican Politics in Urban America* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1984), 3.
10. Lloyd Rogler, *Migrant in the City: The Life of a Puerto Rican Action Group* (New York: Basic Books, 1972).
11. Rosa Estades, *Patterns of Political Participation of Puerto Ricans in New York City* (Rio Piedras, P.R.: Editorial Universitaria, 1978), 8–9; Jennings and Rivera, *Puerto Rican Politics*, 139–140.
12. Virginia Sánchez Korrol, *From Colonia to Community* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1983), 183; John Hull Mollenkopf, "Political Inequality," in John Hull Mollenkopf and Manuel Castells, eds., *Dual City: Restructuring New York* (New York: Russell Sage, 1991), 344.
13. "Puerto Rican Relations in Community Vary," *Hartford Times*, May 10, 1957, 7.
14. The 1989–1990 debate around the proposed plebiscite on the status of Puerto Rico and the surge of interest and mobilization it generated show that there is a complex middle ground between these two general models. See Edwin Meléndez and Edgardo Meléndez, "Introduction," in Edwin Meléndez and Edgardo Meléndez, eds., *Colonial Dilemma* (Boston: South End Press, 1993), 1–16; Angelo Falcón, "A Divided Nation: The Puerto Rican Diaspora in the United States and the Proposed Referendum," in Meléndez and Meléndez, *Colonial Dilemma*, 176–180; Institute for Puerto Rican Policy, *The Plebiscite and the Diaspora, Policy Forum Proceedings*, ed. Gordon Jonathan Lewis (New York: IPRP, 1993).
15. Department of Puerto Rican Community Affairs in the United States, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, New York City.
16. Institute for Puerto Rican Policy, *The Plebiscite and the Diaspora*, 23.
17. At the national level, for example, at the beginning of 1990, AIDS and enterprise zone legislation kept the National Puerto Rican Coalition busy (see "Equitable Grant Motivates NPRC's AIDS Initiative" and "NPRC Testifies before House Ways and Means Committee," *NPRC Reports* 11, no. 1 [January–February 1990]: 5), and by April the group had outlined an advocacy program for the 101st session of Congress that included community economic development, welfare reform, civil rights, the 1990 census, the federal budget process, and long-term poverty. (See "NPRC Outlines Advocacy Program for Current Congressional Session," *NPRC Reports* 10, no. 3 [April 1990]: 1). Except for its opposition to cuts proposed by the Bush administration to Puerto Rico's Nutritional Assistance Program (see "NPRC Calls for More Nutritional Assistance to Puerto Rico," *NPRC Reports* 10, no. 4 [May 1990]: 1), the year was dominated by mainland-based policy concerns, and during the last quarter of 1990 the leading concerns were the proposed Community Housing Partnership Act (see "Major Compromises Needed for Congress to Pass Housing Bill," *NPRC Reports* 10, no. 8 [October 1990]: 4) and the development of a community economic development network. (See "CED Symposium Paves Way for an Emerging Puerto Rican Network," *NPRC Reports* 10, no. 9 [November 1990]: 1).

18. Gerald A. Ryan, "Need for Involvement in Community Is Seen," *Hartford Courant*, November 20, 1965, 1.
19. "Puerto Ricans to Parade Today," *Hartford Times*, September 28, 1969, 2B.
20. Falcón, "A Divided Nation," 177.
21. Rodolfo O. de la Garza, Louis DeSipio, F. Chris Garcia, John Garcia, and Angelo Falcón, *Latino Voices* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1992), 104, 210.
22. *Ibid.*, 80, 201.
23. Peter Kihss, "Puerto Rico Head Calls It 'Lunacy,'" *New York Times*, March 2, 1954.
24. "F.B.I. and Police Dig for Plot Roots Here," *New York Times*, March 3, 1954, 1.
25. "Assembly Condemns Shooting," *New York Times*, March 4, 1954, 10.
26. "Puerto Ricans Donate to Illinois Blood Bank," *New York Times*, March 4, 1954, 10.
27. "Local Puerto Ricans, Few in Number, Deplore Shootings," *Hartford Times*, March 3, 1954.
28. Ronald Fernandez, *Los Macheteros* (New York: Prentice Hall Press, 1987), 31–33.
29. Expressiveness has been singled out as characteristic of identity-oriented social movements. Instrumental rationality has been associated with social movements based on resource mobilization. See Jean L. Cohen, "Strategy or Identity: New Theoretical Paradigms and Contemporary Social Movements," *Social Research* 52, no. 4 (Winter 1985): 663–716.
30. This phrase is borrowed from Frank Bonilla and Ricardo Campos, *Industry and Idleness* (New York: Centro de Estudios Puertorriqueños, Hunter College, CUNY, 1986).
31. David Ward, *Poverty, Ethnicity, and the American City, 1840–1925* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 177.
32. Richard D. Alba, *Ethnic Identity: The Transformation of White America* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 49.
33. *Ibid.*, 58.
34. Lawrence H. Fuchs, *The American Kaleidoscope: Race, Ethnicity, and the Civic Culture* (Hanover and London: University Press of New England/Wesleyan University Press, 1990), 337–338; Joseph Rothschild, *Ethnopolitics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), 24, 61.
35. Douglas Gurak and Mary M. Kritz, "The Caribbean Communities in the United States," *Migration Today* 12, no. 2 (1985): 6–12.
36. Lloyd H. Rogler, Rosemary Santana Cooney, and Vilma Ortiz, "Intergenerational Change in Ethnic Identity in the Puerto Rican Family," *International Migration Review* 14 (Summer 1980): 193–214.
37. These polarities describe authentic and symbolic ethnicity, respectively. The former refers to group membership, cultural values, and practices while the latter involves a degree of identity and feeling that is secondary and can easily be satisfied privately. See Herbert Gans, *The Urban Villagers* (New York: Free Press, 1982), 235–236.

38. José E. Cruz, *Consequences of Interest Group Political Mobilization: A Case Study of the Puerto Rican Political Action Committee (PRPAC) of Connecticut*, Ph.D. diss., Graduate Center, City University of New York, 1994.
39. Harry P. Pachon, "The Puerto Rican Voter Potential in the United States," in *Strategies for Increasing Voter Participation in Puerto Rican Communities in the Continental United States* (Alexandria, Va.: National Puerto Rican Coalition, 1983), 18–29.
40. Francisco L. Rivera-Batiz and Carlos Santiago, *Puerto Ricans in the United States: A Changing Reality* (Washington, D.C.: National Puerto Rican Coalition, 1994).
41. *Ibid.*, 26.
42. *Ibid.*, 33, 41.
43. "Census Bureau Reports Drop in Puerto Rican Poverty Rates," *NPRC Reports* 10, no. 6 (July/August 1990): 1.
44. Nicholas Carbone, "The General Assembly's Failure to Help Its Capitol City," in Clyde D. McKee, Jr., ed., *Perspectives of a State Legislature*, 2d ed. (Hartford, 1980), 220.
45. Browning, Marshall, and Tabb, *Protest Is Not Enough*, 52, 250–253.
46. E. E. Schattschneider, *The Semi-Sovereign People* (Hinsdale, Ill.: Dryden Press, 1960), 33.
47. Thomas L. Gais, Mark A. Peterson, and Jack L. Walker, Jr., "Interest Groups, Iron Triangles, and Representative Institutions," in Jack L. Walker, Jr., *Mobilizing Interest Groups in America* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991), 125.
48. John P. Heinz, Edward O. Laumann, Robert L. Nelson, and Robert H. Salisbury, *The Hollow Core* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), 369.
49. Late in the Bush administration, the House of Representatives proposed an expansion of the earned income tax credit, which became a reality during the Clinton administration.
50. Katherine McFate, *Poverty, Inequality and the Crisis of Social Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Joint Center for Political Studies, 1991).
51. Carol Hardy-Fanta, *Latina Politics, Latino Politics* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993), 108–110; Cruz, *Consequences of Interest Group Political Mobilization*, 264–277.
52. John H. Mollenkopf, *A Phoenix in the Ashes: The Rise and Fall of the Koch Coalition in New York City Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 5.
53. Cruz, *Consequences of Interest Group Political Mobilization*, 72–75.
54. Aristotle, *The Politics*, trans. T. A. Sinclair, Trevor J. Saunders rev. ed. (New York: Penguin Books, 1982), 211–212.
55. *Ibid.*, 116.

“Contrary to their invisibility in the political leadership literature, Latina women play important leadership roles in both the electoral arena and at the community level. As political leaders, Latina women make significant contributions to Latino community empowerment.”

– Carol Hardy-Fanta