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Citizen Participation and Strategic Planning for an Urban Enterprise Community

Michael Leo Owens

Public policies rarely have single objectives. For the federal Empowerment Zones and Enterprise Communities initiative, bettering the socioeconomic opportunity structure among a collection of the nation's low-income areas is only one of its goals. Another initiative objective is to foster the representation of common citizens, especially residents, in the planning and implementation of strategies and programs designed to redevelop these low-income areas. Strategic community planning was the method chosen by the initiative's designers to achieve both objectives. This article, which makes use of the case study approach, addresses strategic community planning as an instrument of advancing citizen representation in urban redevelopment processes. Specifically, it describes and critiques the process jointly administered in three upstate New York cities—Albany, Schenectady, and Troy—that are participating in the urban portion of the federal initiative. The purpose of this study is to assess the degree to which residents of the low-income areas of these three cities participated in the strategic community planning process.

Residents who participate directly in the process of urban redevelopment planning have the opportunity to acquire expertise in the subject matter, patience to see projects through from problem definition to implementation, and new skills, for example, idea formulation, deliberation, negotiation, and consensus building, along with a sense of political efficacy. Moreover, citizen engagement in urban redevelopment, both at the planning and policy implementation levels, holds out a possibility for "the development of responsible social and political action on the part of the individual," which democratic theorists like Carole Pateman and Jane Mansbridge envision as the end product of political participation and the central aim of democratic societies. Consequently, urbanists of all types, for example, planners, philosophers, and political scientists, assert that urban redevelopment should be democratized, namely, that citizen participation in urban decision making should be increased and widespread. Scholars, however, are not alone in calling for greater citizen participation: governments have also made this assertion. Consider the example of the Clinton administration and the implementation of the urban Empowerment Zones and Enterprise Communities initiative by its Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). 

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In the early stages of the initiative, which is a reincarnation of earlier federal policies targeting grants and tax incentives to low-income urban neighborhoods,\textsuperscript{7} strategic planning was relied upon to provide for and encourage citizen participation in the redevelopment decisions for low-income neighborhoods nominated by their cities to receive federal reinvestment funds from HUD under the initiative.\textsuperscript{8} In the hands of common citizens, strategic planning is a tool for identifying community problems and priorities; scanning their community’s weaknesses and strengths vis-à-vis those of other communities; formulating plans aimed at minimizing the disadvantages of their communities and exploiting their strengths in relation to new opportunities; and targeting community resources more efficiently and effectively.

HUD required prospective applicant cities to administer strategic community planning processes that were bottom-up driven and open to all who had stakes in the future of the targeted communities.\textsuperscript{9} As Marilyn Gittell notes, “The Clinton Administration invited — indeed encouraged — communities, including community organizations as well as rank-and-file citizens, to pull together in drafting blueprints for future economic growth and urban development.”\textsuperscript{10} A cross section of affected groups — community residents, social and religious organizations, representatives from the private and nonprofit sectors, and local governments — were to be involved. However, of the ordinary citizens who were expected to participate in the planning process, no group was considered more important than the residents of the low-income communities that would eventually be targeted for federal funding: it was expected that they would be full partners in the process.\textsuperscript{11} This notion was mortgaged to a belief that the representatives from low-income neighborhoods should be, would want to be, and are capable of being active participants in the redevelopment of their communities.

An evaluation of the Empowerment Zones and Enterprise Communities initiative showed that, among the sample of eighteen cities selected for study, most of the strategic community plans submitted to HUD were initiated and designed through processes that included cross sections of citizens.\textsuperscript{12} This study of participation and governance in the planning phase concluded that “the citizen participation that occurred during the development of strategic [community] plans was significantly and substantively greater than that which [took] place under previous federal urban initiatives.”\textsuperscript{13} However, “because community involvement is solicited,” notes Gerry Riposa, “it does not necessarily follow that . . . [political elites] will divide authority and decision-making powers with those whose input is sought.”\textsuperscript{14}

Despite the finding of “significant and substantive” citizen participation, some strategic community plans submitted to HUD were formulated with very little, and sometimes without any, citizen involvement. In an undetermined number of cases, the Clinton administration’s call for citizen participation and community empowerment went unheard. In some instances, as John Gaventa and his colleagues found, “regional development districts or industrial boards led the effort to draft [strategic community plans]. Because some institutions had little experience with bottom-up planning, strategies that they devised largely flowed from the top down.”\textsuperscript{15} As a result, “participation of community groups was only an afterthought; for the most part, professional bureaucrats and politicians shaped [their] city’s plan.”\textsuperscript{16} Absent high levels of government involvement, private-sector elites from both the non- and for-profit realms assumed responsibility for and control of their city’s strategic community planning process.\textsuperscript{17} While a wide range of groups may have been present “around the table,” those involved in designing and setting the agendas that created the plans for their cities

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were “the same old players who had always managed planning and development [in their cities]” — government, philanthropic, and economic elites.18

Looking through the lens of citizen participation and participatory planning literature, this study evaluates HUD’s use of strategic community planning in its Empowerment Zones and Enterprise Communities initiative. It describes and critiques the strategic community planning process that took place in one of the nation’s sixty-five urban enterprise communities, namely, Albany-Schenectady-Troy.19 The survey centers on the case study approach to detail the strategic community planning process that took place among the poorest sections of these three cities prior to their joint submission of an application to HUD for designation as an enterprise community. It (1) identifies the actor(s) who initiated and guided the strategic community planning process that was administered; (2) describes the level of resident participation throughout the strategic community planning process; and (3) outlines how such planning for federal urban neighborhood redevelopment initiatives can be enhanced to promote greater citizen participation in the future.

The Urban Enterprise Community Program

According to HUD secretary Andrew Cuomo, the urban Empowerment Zones and Enterprise Communities initiative is the Clinton administration’s opportunity “to prove to the nation that we do know how to revitalize devastated areas.”20 Functioning as the nation’s urban policy, the initiative targets low-income urban neighborhoods for concentrated and coordinated federal resources; coordinates redevelopment and revitalization efforts among both the public and private sectors; promotes long-range strategic community planning as a vehicle for citizen participation and community empowerment; and promotes holistic redevelopment strategies that combine physical, social, and economic revitalization activities.21 The Clinton administration hopes that HUD’s implementation of the initiative, which incorporates federal funds with regulatory relief, technical assistance, and the participation of stakeholders — residents, business owners, service providers, and governments — will yield inner-city low-income communities that provide security, community, and opportunity to their residents.22

The initiative is comprised of two components — the Empowerment Zones program and the Enterprise Communities program. The former targets $815 million in flexible grants and $900 million in federal tax credits among a few central cities;23 the latter targets far less money at a far greater number of small to medium-size cities.24 Of the two, the Empowerment Zones portion has received the bulk of the academic community’s attention.25 The Enterprise Communities program,26 however, while not as well funded or administered in the nation’s largest cities, cannot be overlooked: Over the next ten years it will aim an estimated $195 million in Title XX Social Services Block Grants and $195 million in federal tax credits at improving the economies and social environments among a number of U.S. urban low-income communities.27

Cities in this program, as well as those in the Empowerment Zones program, were chosen by HUD on the basis of their submission of strategic community plans that (1) identified specific geographic areas that met the initiative’s criteria for socioeconomic distress;28 (2) detailed how the economic, physical, and human capital among the residents of the identified impoverished communities would be increased; and (3) noted the degree to which state, local, and private resources would be made available for redevelopment these communities. Taken as a whole, a city’s strategic community plan had to address the creation of economic opportunities and sustainable community development
in its low-income neighborhoods by identifying strategies that could effectively lower the barriers to employment faced by the residents of their city's low-income communities and rebuild the physical and social environments of such places. But that was not all.

Developing strategies for bettering the socioeconomic opportunity structure in the nation's low-income areas was only one requirement for cities applying to the urban Enterprise Communities program. For another, the cities had to foster the participation of ordinary citizens, especially residents, in planning and implementing strategies for redeveloping their low-income areas. This participation, according to the Clinton administration's written record and the rules and regulations for the Empowerment Zones and Enterprise Communities initiative, was to be direct and have the effect of empowering average citizens.29 As a consequence, applicant cities had to describe the extent to which rank-and-file citizens, especially residents of target communities, participated in the strategic community planning process, along with their anticipated roles in the post-designation process.30

**Empowerment through Participation: A Note on Praxis**

Susan Fainstein and Clifford Hirst discern a strong belief that "participation in urban politics and community life [is] a potentially transformative experience."31 Those favoring citizen participation, especially among residents, in the public decision-making processes surrounding urban planning and redevelopment consider collaboration itself to be educative and socially transformative; participation fosters the development of "public regardedness" and a concern for collective interests over individual interests.32 But beyond serving as a means of fostering public regardedness and collectivism, citizen participation in urban redevelopment is promoted as an instrument of empowerment, notably among the residents of low-income urban neighborhoods.33

Empowerment is centered around the axiom that the inclusion and ongoing involvement of residents in the formulation and implementation of community-based agendas are essential to the sustained revitalization of low-income communities.34 As Robyne Turner informs us, empowerment "is more than agenda access; it is the ability to change direction and be responsible for making it happen. . . . It addresses the question of who defines the process rules and ultimately the agenda."35 In their study of neighborhood participation in five U.S. cities, Jeffrey Berry, Kent Portney, and Ken Thomson conclude that it "may not transform people to the degree that participation theorists have anticipated, but it does make a difference in the attitudes of people who become involved in such political activities"; resident empowerment can come from participation in public decision-making processes.36 Through education and encouragement by governments and philanthropies, residents can play a direct role in and influence, if not control and determine, the course of their communities.37

"Making the case for [participation and empowerment] on theoretical grounds is much easier," caution Berry et al., "than demonstrating that it will work."38 But theory is being put into practice and yielding the expected results. Around the United States, low-income communities are being reconverted to stable places of residence through the organization and mobilization of their occupants, coupled with external funding from not-for-profit and public institutions.39 In these situations, residents are often the primary instruments for reversing the downward trajectory of their neighborhoods. Boston's Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative (DSNI), for example, demonstrates
empirically that participation and empowerment are not only possible but fundamental to the redevelopment of low-income localities.\textsuperscript{40}

In the Dudley Street neighborhood, incorporation and involvement not only encouraged the leadership of residents in addressing community issues but increased their political efficacy, which was necessary to the success of resident-controlled community redevelopment.\textsuperscript{41} The DSNI illustrates that in choosing action over resignation (accepting neighborhood conditions as unalterable) and exit (flight from a neighborhood), citizens can be effective at community problem solving.\textsuperscript{42} Although resignation and exit remain viable options for them, the residents of such neighborhoods can also choose to engage in day-to-day, grassroots, community-based activities intended to reverse spiraling socioeconomic conditions in their surroundings.\textsuperscript{43} Examples of these activities include neighborhood crime watches, incumbent upgrading, community gardens, formation of neighborhood associations, and chartering community development corporations.

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Albany, Schenectady, and Troy in a Regional Context

As in other northeastern U.S. cities, economic restructuring has had a profound effect on Albany, Schenectady, and Troy, which, 150 miles north of the Bronx, are in New York State’s Capital Region.\textsuperscript{44} For example, over the last quarter of a century, manufacturing jobs in and around these three cities have decreased by more than 40 percent\textsuperscript{45} while technology and advanced service industry employment has increased. Between 1973 and 1995, manufacturing employment in the region dropped from 19 percent to 9 percent, while service employment increased to 36 percent, up from 25 percent.\textsuperscript{46}

Besides experiencing alterations in the private-sector employment structure of their economies, public-sector employment, which has been central to the three cities and their economies, especially Albany’s, is declining.\textsuperscript{47} By century’s end, the public sector is expected to have contracted by 10 percent.\textsuperscript{48} If predictions prove true, government employment will account for fewer than 20 percent of the region’s jobs, down from the current 30 percent.\textsuperscript{49} The restructuring of employment opportunities in the public sector, particularly at the state government level, is expected to have “major direct and indirect impacts for the long term stability of the region’s economy,”\textsuperscript{50} for instance, retail vacancies, declining home ownership and housing values, and decreased local revenues, especially in Albany, Schenectady, and Troy.\textsuperscript{50}

In addition to transformed economies, the region’s urban housing markets have undergone noticeable changes; a majority of the region’s population has shifted from its cities to its suburbs. In 1970, 53 percent of this population resided in the three cities.\textsuperscript{51} Twenty years later, less than half (44 percent) of this population resided in one of the three.\textsuperscript{52} Coupled to the region’s increased suburbanization of population and housing is the increased suburbanization of commercial activity and employment. In 1972, Albany, Schenectady, and Troy accounted for 63 percent of the region’s retail sales, but by 1990 the figure was less than 50 percent.\textsuperscript{33} Windshield tours of the three cities reveal that commercial vacancies have increased; in some sections, whole commercial blocks have been abandoned. Buildings in which large retailers like Woolworth once prospered are empty; they are too large and too expensive for most local entrepreneurs.

The migration of human, financial, and social capital to the suburban peripheries of the region’s three urban centers has depressed the socioeconomic conditions of the inner
cities. Social distress, as measured by indicators such as poverty and physical deterioration, have risen. In Albany, for example, the poverty rate has grown and the number of people on public assistance has doubled. This downward mobility has occurred despite the fact that the city’s residents have experienced an overall increase in their median household incomes. Moreover, in the poorest communities of the three cities — Albany’s South End, Arbor Hill, and West Hill neighborhoods, Schenectady’s Hamilton Hill neighborhood, and Troy’s North Central neighborhood — representatives of neighborhood-based and grassroots community development organizations assert that municipal services, the quality and quantity of housing, and the public infrastructure of roads, parks, and sewers are all in decline. Unemployment and poverty, along with other measures of socioeconomic distress, are believed to be higher in these communities relative to their cities and the region.

There is no statistical proof to support the claims made by community organizations regarding municipal malfeasance. But there is evidence that the social environments of the cities’ poorest neighborhoods differ markedly from the rest of the Capital Region. While unemployment stood at 10 percent in the poorest urban neighborhoods of Albany, Schenectady, and Troy at the start of the decade, the rate for the region was 5 percent. In terms of poverty, 33 percent of families residing in the cities’ low-income neighborhoods were in poverty in 1990, compared with 9 percent of families throughout the region. As for the proportion of households on public assistance, 19 percent of those in the region’s poor urban communities received public assistance compared with 5 percent for the region. Finally, 67 percent of adults residing in the cities’ low-income neighborhoods were high school graduates, compared with 87 percent for the region as a whole.

These statistics show clearly that the low-income neighborhoods of Albany, Schenectady, and Troy would be nominated to participate in the urban Enterprise Communities program. They typify the districts the Clinton administration’s Empowerment Zones and Enterprise Communities initiative intended to target. As one mayor wrote to HUD, “The neighborhoods that would benefit the most from [the Enterprise Communities program] are overwhelmed by the more complex and life-threatening burdens of the drug war and the associated social ills of unemployment, teenage pregnancy, and substance abuse.”

**Planning for the Albany-Schenectady-Troy Enterprise Community**

HUD issued criteria for the selection of city-nominated communities to participate in the Empowerment Zones and Enterprise Communities initiative in January 1994. Applicant cities were given six months to organize residents; involve representatives from both the public and private sectors; formulate strategic plans for their communities and submit them to HUD. Applicant cities were required to form strategic community planning committees comprised of a cross section of people broadly representing the racial, cultural, and economic diversity of the neighborhood. HUD mandated that committees include all stakeholders: residents of target areas, along with officials from municipal and state government and representatives of the private for- and not-for-profit sectors had to be chosen as members.

Generally, local governments were the catalysts for the strategic community planning process in the cities that applied for federal funding under the initiative. Mayors or city managers usually initiated their cities’ application. But the mayors of Albany,
Schenectady, and Troy initially chose not to apply to the program despite the fact that an Enterprise Community designation would provide $2 million in federal-state funding to each municipality. The catalyst for the initiation, development, and submission of the Albany-Schenectady-Troy Enterprise Community application was a nongovernmental institution established and funded by the 300 largest private for-profit corporations in the Capital Region, the Center for Economic Growth (CEG). This group formulated the proposal for a joint-municipality application; convinced the mayors to pursue an Enterprise Community designation; raised funds to arrange for the strategic community planning process; served as the liaison between the three cities, New York State, and HUD; and selected the membership of the strategic community planning committee.

The Center for Economic Growth

Prior to HUD’s inviting applications for the urban Enterprise Communities program, projects involving the redevelopment of the region’s poorest urban communities, especially those with large African-American and Latino populations, were absent from the activities of the Center for Economic Growth. In line with the perspective of Paul Peterson on urban economic development, CEG adheres to the notion that urban policy alternatives are limited by cities’ having to be economically competitive. Emphasizing the commercial intensification of land use and economic growth, CEG seeks to expand commercial opportunities for established companies, attract new firms to the region, and provide services to firms that either relocate to the region or are starting up. It attempts to increase its ability to accomplish such goals by advocating for public policies assumed to increase the region’s competitive advantage in relation to its economic position, political influence, and social prestige, namely, tax abatements, wage credits, and low taxes, which are common government inducements to entice investors, producers, and consumers to relocate from other areas.

CEG’s interest in the low-income neighborhoods of Albany, Schenectady, and Troy was fostered by the urban Enterprise Community program’s emphasis on economic opportunity, especially job creation and entrepreneurship, rather than on social services. Because the program was not redistributive in terms of policy, CEG’s involvement would not gainsay its growth-oriented agenda. (It is plausible that had the application for the program required a financial commitment from the private and local public sectors, CEG would probably not have initiated the pursuit of an Enterprise Community designation for the three cities. Residents and activists from the target neighborhoods, however, contend that the motivation behind CEG’s involvement was a public relations campaign aimed at providing its membership with the appearance of being responsible corporate citizens.)

Moreover, since the program called for collaboration and cooperation between the public and private sectors, CEG, which has promoted public-private partnerships since its inception, viewed it as an opportunity to advance the interests of the region. It was in the spirit of creating a regional private-public partnership that the Center for Economic Growth involved itself with the Enterprise Community program: “By working with [Albany, Schenectady, and Troy] to coordinate the application, CEG [played] the role of honest broker in an effort which could result in additional federal assistance for a vast array of economic development and job creation efforts in the region.”

Following HUD’s issuance of the Empowerment Zones and Enterprise Communities initiative’s criteria, CEG spent three months promoting the joint application of Albany, Schenectady, and Troy to the urban Enterprise Community program. In its meetings
with the mayors of the three cities, CEG proposed to cosubmit to HUD an application that focused on regional collaboration and cooperation among the for-profit, nonprofit, and public sectors. Such an application, influenced by the scholarship which contends that regions, not cities or states, are increasingly the central social and economic units of society, might prove to be novel compared with others received by HUD. Beyond its originality, regionalization made sense in the context of the Capital Region and the relationship among its three cities: “No community in the region [was] economically self-sufficient, nor will they be. . . . The region already functions as a region, not as a collection of self-sufficient municipalities.” A region-based strategic community plan would allow the municipalities to deal together with problems like poverty, unemployment, and crime, something that had never happened in the region. Should an Enterprise Community designation be awarded, a regional plan for the cities’ low-income communities would, in the words of one mayor, “allow for a sharing of successful programs [that] will greatly enhance the efforts to improve distressed neighborhoods in all three communities.” Collaboration would allow the cities to coordinate their policies and programs and share in a new pool of resources that might allow them to be effective at turning around their poor neighborhoods.

There were, however, more practical reasons for CEG’s regional approach. If the cities applied to the Enterprise Community program individually, each would probably be rejected. Although each city had low-income areas, no single city could identify enough of them to meet HUD’s criterion of socioeconomic distress. In addition, should an Enterprise Community designation be awarded to the three cities, the moneys that accompanied the designation could be used to enhance the background conditions that are believed to influence decisions regarding business relocation, for example, implementing human resource policies that foster and sustain a skilled workforce. Finally, because HUD did not require a financial commitment, the cost of applying for an Enterprise Community designation was low.

The Albany-Schenectady-Troy Committee

With the consent of the mayors of the three cities, along with $30,000 in public funds — $10,000 in discretionary funding from each municipality — CEG established the Albany-Schenectady-Troy Enterprise Community (TriCity EC) Steering Committee. According to HUD, this committee “reflected the age, ethnic, economic, and gender diversity of the designated neighborhoods and representatives were identified through a community-based nomination process which identified one resident from each of the participating neighborhoods as a member.” This description is inaccurate.

The committee was comprised solely of representatives of the three cities’ private, nonprofit, and public sectors, and the strategic community planning process was top-down and elite-driven rather than bottom-up and community-centered. No residents of the communities that would be targeted by the TriCity EC Steering Committee’s strategic community planning process served on the committee, nor was the membership of the steering committee decided by nomination and election or by governmental appointment.

The membership of the steering committee was determined by CEG. It extended invitations to those groups believed to possess the best knowledge about and resources for developing and submitting a strategic community plan that emphasized regionalism. These groups then selected representatives to serve on the committee. The result was a steering committee that represented the interests of the three municipalities: high-level
staffers from their economic development and planning departments; the Council of Community Services, an association of the region’s not-for-profit social services agencies and a United Way human services planning affiliate; the Capital District Regional Planning Commission, a regional planning agency; and the Center for Economic Growth.84

The TriCity EC Steering Committee charged itself to identify and assess the strengths and weaknesses of the cities’ low-income communities and create a strategic community plan that would be submitted to HUD by Albany, Schenectady, and Troy. However, by the time the steering committee convened its first meeting, three months had elapsed since the application guidelines for the Enterprise Communities program were issued. It was only three months until the June deadline for HUD’s receipt of applications. To expedite its planning process, the TriCity EC Steering Committee issued a request for proposals from local economic development consultants and grant writers. One month later it hired EastWest Planning & Development, a Troy-based firm, to assist the steering committee in formulating a planning process for the three cities.85 It would prepare strategic plan narratives, complete the application forms, conduct a survey, and organize a set of community forums.86 Most important, EastWest was contracted to “structure a strategic plan consistent with Enterprise Community principles.”87 Its “presence in the process,” from EastWest’s perspective, “would provide an opportunity to help the [steering] Committee think critically about the decisions” it would make concerning its target neighborhoods.88

Citizen Participation and Resident Input

With the hiring of EastWest Planning & Development, the TriCity EC Steering Committee had three options concerning the strategic community planning process: (1) with an impending June deadline, the steering committee could limit resident access to the process, focusing more of its attention and time on institutional cooperation and the production of a plan suitable for submission to HUD; (2) influenced by EastWest’s knowledge of the importance of legitimacy to comprehensive community initiatives, the steering committee could open its planning and decision-making processes to direct resident participation; or (3) the steering committee could apply a midrange approach, one that would allow for a modest degree of resident incorporation to occur without jeopardizing the committee’s ability to meet HUD’s deadline. The TriCity EC Steering Committee chose the third option.

According to the application the steering committee submitted to HUD, “Many of the Steering Committee members believed that resident input into the strategic planning process could be obtained by gathering key human service agencies together to represent the needs of their constituencies.”89 Over time this belief was muted. The opinions and attitudes of residents concerning their communities and policy priorities entered the strategic community planning process through two mechanisms that are widely used to capture citizens’ sense of problems and priorities: public forums and surveys. In theory, when used as part of public decision-making processes, forums and surveys are useful.90 In practice, however, these instruments have been used by political elites to limit the direct participation of citizens in public decision making.91

To facilitate citizen participation in the strategic community planning process, the TriCity EC Steering Committee sponsored “structured community workshops.”92 A workshop was held in each of the three cities one month prior to the date the strategic community plan was due to HUD.93 These workshops introduced the target communi-
ties to the Enterprise Communities program and the membership of the TriCity EC Steering Committee. The intent of these public forums was to elicit community participation and provide the committee with a clearer understanding of the communities’ problems, resources, and prospects for affecting positive socioeconomic and physical change, that is, job creation, home ownership, and youth enrichment. The workshop format consisted of a general introduction by the committee followed by a question-and-answer period and small-group discussions.

The Enterprise Communities program “promised residents authentic input into the planning process and the opportunity to share feedback on the proposed strategic plan, giving them reassurance that their voices mattered.”94 According to the steering committee, its workshops fulfilled this promise by providing a mechanism which ensured that the strategic community planning process for the TriCity EC “was driven by the needs and wishes of the residents”; “represented the diversity of the neighborhoods”; demonstrated “hands-on resident support” in its development and implementation; and validated “the importance of the problems, resources, and obstacles identified in other studies by residents of the targeted communities.”95

The application submitted to HUD by the TriCity EC Steering Committee does not state the number of attendees at these community workshops, which, with the exception of the Schenectady workshop, were held outside its targeted neighborhoods.96 But few residents from these neighborhoods attended the workshops. Those who did attend the workshops were generally “outnumbered three-to-one by the service providers operating in the target neighborhoods.”97 Consequently, most of the “citizen” input came from neighborhood social service providers, many of whom “were perceived by neighborhood residents as unaccountable, unresponsive, over-professionalized, and inaccessible,” as well as “partially responsible for abandoning their problems, choosing professionally or politically expedient courses of action, and setting up unnecessary programmatic limitations, guidelines, and rules which isolate many residents from needed services and support.”98

Concurrently with the community workshops, EastWest Planning & Development conducted a survey among the five neighborhoods that the TriCity EC Steering Committee would eventually nominate to participate in HUD’s Enterprise Communities program. This “needs assessment” survey was designed to identify the strengths, problems, and policy priorities of the neighborhoods, which would be used by EastWest in preparing the strategic community plan.99 Social services and human resource providers, along with local businesses serving the neighborhoods targeted by the steering committee, were surveyed by mail. Resident were also surveyed for their opinions about the problems and prospects for these neighborhoods. According to the steering committee, nearly two-fifths of the 600 surveys (38 percent or 227) were completed and returned to EastWest.100 Of this number, almost three-quarters (71 percent or 162) were returned by residents of the steering committee’s target communities. The resident response rate, however, must be put in perspective: fewer than one percent of the five neighborhoods’ 39,072 residents responded to the survey.

Relying on the information culled from the three community workshops and the survey responses, EastWest prepared the TriCity EC strategic community plan. The steering committee then submitted the plan, which emphasized three areas of “community” concern — employment, youth development, and neighborhood capacity building — to HUD. At the end of the strategic community planning process, the steering committee declared in its application to HUD that the degree of participation in the three
cities “was designed to maximize community involvement and consensus.”\textsuperscript{101} Pointing to its public forums and survey, the committee avowed that it had met its requirement of participation.

\textbf{Reflections on Strategic Community Planning and Federal Urban Initiatives}

Urban scholars acknowledge that introducing common citizens to the process of public decision making is difficult; making collective decisions “can be time-consuming, co-optative, and nonproductive”\textsuperscript{102} for rank-and-file citizens.\textsuperscript{102} Moreover, issues of expertise and incrementalism, along with citizen interest and ability to articulate alternatives effectively, influence levels of citizen participation and incorporation into public decision making.\textsuperscript{103} Residents of low-income neighborhoods targeted for redevelopment are prone to be intimidated by the jargon and complexity of redevelopment and, perhaps rightfully so, suspicious and impatient with the process of incremental urban policymaking.\textsuperscript{104} Nevertheless, the inclusion of ordinary citizens in the planning and implementation stages of public policymaking continues to have its academic advocates.\textsuperscript{105}

Robert Chaskin and Sunil Garg note that there are ethical and practical reasons for the incorporation of citizens in public decision-making processes that affect their communities.\textsuperscript{106} “Ethically, to include citizens in policymaking and program delivery is to take seriously their rights and responsibilities to have some control over policies that will have an impact on their lives.”\textsuperscript{107} Additionally, as theorists of democratic participation profess, “the experience of participation [in public decision making] in some way leaves the individual better psychologically equipped to undertake further participation in the future.”\textsuperscript{108} Average citizens, whether from poor or nonpoor communities, possess that which government lacks: “a unique understanding about their own lives, hopes, aspirations, goals, and preferences and about the manner in which resources should be provided or services should be designed and delivered.”\textsuperscript{109} In accordance with this idea, Jeffrey Henig has found that citizens “represent resources in knowledge, information, creativity, commitment, and energy” that often prove useful to government decision-makers and policy success.\textsuperscript{110} Therefore, “practically, involving citizens in planning and implementing practices that affect them promotes better (i.e., more connected, directed, and appreciated) public policies.”\textsuperscript{111} Being closest to the problems facing their communities, citizens can provide perspectives that may go unconsidered by public officials and their staff in the absence of resident involvement.\textsuperscript{112} Yet the structure of citizen participation in public initiatives that promote urban redevelopment makes “a substantial difference in the degree to which such structures can be seen as connected to, and acting on behalf of, the interests of the community.”\textsuperscript{113}

The key terms of the federal administration’s urban policy orientation and the tenets underlying its Enterprise Communities program are cooperation and collaboration; participation and empowerment.\textsuperscript{114} Still, the strategic community planning process for the Albany-Schenectady-Troy Enterprise Community failed to engender cooperation and collaboration among residents and nonresidents or to promote high levels of participation from or empowerment in the areas targeted for federal revitalization funds. By the TriCity EC Steering Committee. Surveys and forums proved inferior methods of effectively structuring resident input into the strategic community planning process for the TriCity Economic Community. “Residents of the [TriCity EC] had participated in the
community workshops and filled out surveys — but they lacked the capacity to develop a truly “bottom-up” neighborhood plan. Instead, the EastWest Planning & Development plan outlined a citizen-driven process in the post-strategic community planning period. This was a blueprint for neighborhood planning and resident empowerment after HUD designated the three cities as a joint Enterprise Community. In short, the strategic community planning process for Albany, Schenectady, and Troy deferred resident participation and community empowerment to an unknown point in time. Why?

The rules and regulations for the Enterprise Communities program were not specific about the role of residents in their city’s planning process. Beyond the statement that community residents were to be included in partnerships with the public and private sectors, there was no definitive message about the type and quality of resident participation that should characterize the process. This lack of specificity allowed for narrow definitions of participation to be used in determining who would be involved in a city’s strategic community planning process and how their connection would be facilitated. It also impressed upon elites that resident participation was a suggestion, not a requirement for strategic community planning; resident consultation was adequate to constitute participation.

In the future, policymakers designing federal urban neighborhood redevelopment initiatives could ensure, through direct language, that citizen participation go beyond the level of consultation, as expressed through surveys and forums. As Sherry Arnstein’s “ladder of citizen participation” illustrates, unless citizen consultation by government decision makers is linked to other opportunities for participation, communities cannot be guaranteed that their resident ideas and concerns will be taken into account by those guiding the agenda-setting and decision-making processes. Moreover, when government decision makers “restrict the input of citizens’ ideas solely to [consultation], participation remains just a window-dressing ritual.”

Residents of areas targeted for redevelopment often want to serve their communities in capacities that go beyond survey responses or public forum statements. If this is to be believed, policymakers could create opportunities for resident participation by mandating that urban neighborhood redevelopment programs that receive federal funds must, during the planning and post-planning periods, include residents of the affected communities on the committees appointed to formulate neighborhood redevelopment plans. Policymakers could also establish formal institutions for citizen governance of strategic community planning processes. Such neighborhood-based entities could be charged with arranging, planning, and coordinating strategies for neighborhood redevelopment. In terms of their membership, these institutions might be comprised of neighborhood representatives chosen by election or by stratified, random sampling from communities targeted for public reinvestment and redevelopment. Also, policymakers could require that the proposals formulated by neighborhood-based institutions be submitted to resident comment, perhaps through resident-community referenda.

Citizen participation comes with costs, the most basic being time and money. Policymakers should grant enough time and public funds to program administrators to allow citizen participation to reach a level above consultation. In the Enterprise Communities program, cities were afforded six months to create and submit their strategic community plans. Because of the time it takes to select and organize committees, orient members with the requirements and processes of a given program, and raise
awareness among affected communities, federal urban initiatives relying on strategic community planning probably should last longer than six months. A period of a year, for example, would allow planning committees more time not only to organize themselves and their communities, but increase the likelihood that their activities, be they surveys, community forums, or other mechanisms for divining citizen opinions, will produce better plans in terms of their citizen input and ideas. Not only might more citizens participate in the planning process, but a greater number of cities might be able to compete for funding based on their plans, and the quality of the plans submitted to the program itself increase.

The Enterprise Communities program is grounded on the belief that citizen participation and sustained community involvement are essential to the success of federal initiatives to influence the revitalization of low-income communities. Therefore, residents of the neighborhoods targeted by the TriCity EC Steering Committee, with the assistance of public, private, and not-for-profit professionals, should have been at the forefront of the strategic community planning process of the TriCity EC. But residents were not significant and substantive participants in that strategic community planning process.

The lack of resident participation in the planning for the Albany-Schenectady-Troy Enterprise Community was partly the result of the steering committee’s misunderstanding that resident participation would matter more in the post-designation period, after areas of Albany, Schenectady, and Troy were designated as an Enterprise Community and federal funds were secured. It was also the result of the committee’s reliance on forms of participation that discouraged citizen incorporation and community empowerment. Moreover, the opportunity for citizens to take part in the planning was limited by HUD itself: (1) it failed to define what it meant by resident involvement; (2) it did not account for slow responses from cities and the weak commitment of elites to empower residents; and (3) it overlooked the importance of funding cities to promote citizen participation and neighborhood empowerment as part of strategic community planning.

Another reason was the steering committee’s displacement of the Clinton administration’s goal of resident incorporation. By placing its goal of meeting HUD’s application deadline ahead of HUD’s goal of resident incorporation, the committee obstructed the realization of high levels of resident participation and community empowerment.

The TriCity EC Steering Committee achieved its goal in December 1994: HUD designated portions of Albany, Schenectady, and Troy as one of the nation’s sixty-five urban Enterprise Communities. This designation was accompanied by $3 million in federal funds to be shared equally among the three cities. However, this goal was achieved in violation of the principles outlined by the Clinton administration’s written record and the Enterprise Communities program’s formal requirements.

In the pre-designation period, the TriCity EC Steering Committee lost an opportunity to empower residents of the low-income neighborhoods of Albany, Schenectady, and Troy. In the post-designation period, however, new opportunities for participation and empowerment appeared with the establishment of a second steering committee and the implementation of the Albany-Schenectady-Troy Enterprise Community’s strategic community plan that emphasizes resident planning and neighborhood empowerment.

“The people in the neighborhoods [comprising the TriCity Enterprise Community],” according to the president of the Center for Economic Growth, “will be making the
decisions.” Unfortunately, the residents of the low-income neighborhoods in the three cities have yet to influence the public decision-making process of their Enterprise Community. Instead, the TriCity EC Steering Committee continues to favor elite control and expediency. Unfortunately, resident skepticism and reticence concerning the possibility of collaboration and cooperation between residents and nonresidents of the targeted communities has deepened.

Notes

6. The Empowerment Zones and Enterprise Communities initiative emphasizes both urban and rural community renewal. The urban portion is administered by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development; the rural component is administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture. This study focuses solely on the HUD-administered portion of the Empowerment Zones and Enterprise Communities initiative. In particular, it emphasizes the small-medium cities component of this urban initiative—the Enterprise Communities program.

8. Strategic planning is a method for maximizing the position of an organization in a changing and competitive environment; its objective is to provide the organization with an effective and efficient means of adapting to future economic, social, and physical conditions. The logic behind strategic planning, which guides corporations and governments alike, is to pull out of losing ventures and concentrate resources on strategic opportunities. See Todd Swanstrom, The Limits of Strategic Planning for Cities, *Journal of Urban Affairs* 9, no. 2 (1987); 139, 152. This way of reasoning, however, is no longer practiced solely by the institutions of the market and the state. Acting through neighborhood associations and community-based organizations, common citizens use strategic planning to prepare and respond to changing environmental and urban conditions. See, for example, Berry et al., *The Rebirth of Urban Democracy*, and Michael J. Rich, Community Building and Empowerment: An Assessment of Neighborhood Transformation Initiatives in American Cities, paper prepared for 1995 meeting of the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.


13. This study, however, failed to distinguish between citizen participation and resident participation. The degree to which the residents of the target communities included in the study sample of eighteen cities were involved in the strategic community planning process that preceded their city's designation as either an Empowerment Zone or an Enterprise Community is unknown. See Rockefeller Institute of Government, *Empowerment Zone Initiative*, 2.

14. Riposa, From Enterprise Zones to Empowerment Zones.

15. Gaventa et al., Empowering People.


18. Gaventa et al., Empowering People, 118.

19. This single upstate New York Enterprise Community is comprised of the poorest sections of the cities of Albany, Schenectady, and Troy.


21. Liebschutz, Empowerment Zones and Enterprise Communities; Riposa, From
Enterprise Zones to Empowerment Zones; and Rubin, Can Reorchestration of Historical Themes Reinvent Government?

22. HUD and DOA, Building Communities Together.

23. Six cities—Atlanta, Baltimore, Chicago, Detroit, New York, and Philadelphia/Camden were designated Empowerment Zones, which were accompanied by an award of $100 million in block grant funding, coupled with another $150 million in federal tax credits, to assist the cities in the implementation of their strategic plans. At the same time, Los Angeles and Cleveland were chosen as Supplemental Empowerment Zones, the former being awarded $125 million in economic development assistance and the latter receiving $90 million.

24. HUD has designated areas of sixty-five cities as urban Enterprise Communities. These include Birmingham, Alabama; Phoenix, Arizona; Pulaski County, Arkansas; San Diego and San Francisco, California; Denver, Colorado; Bridgeport and New Haven, Connecticut; Wilmington, Delaware; Miami and Tampa, Florida; Albany, Georgia; East St. Louis and Springfield, Illinois; Indianapolis, Indiana; Des Moines, Iowa; Louisville, Kentucky; New Orleans, Louisiana; Lowell and Springfield, Massachusetts; Flint and Muskegon, Michigan; Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minnesota; Jackson, Mississippi; St. Louis, Missouri; Omaha, Nebraska; Las Vegas, Nevada; Manchester, New Hampshire; Newark, New Jersey; Albuquerque, New Mexico; Albany/Schenectady/Troy, Buffalo, Newburgh/Kingston, and Rochester, New York; Charlotte, North Carolina; Akron and Columbus, Ohio; Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; Portland, Oregon; Harrisburg and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; Providence, Rhode Island; Charleston, South Carolina; Memphis and Nashville, Tennessee; Dallas, El Paso, San Antonio, and Waco, Texas; Ogden, Utah; Burlington, Vermont; Norfolk, Virginia; Seattle and Tacoma, Washington; Huntington, West Virginia; and Milwaukee, Wisconsin.

25. See, for example, Gittell et al., Expanding Civic Opportunity; Gerry Riposa, L.A. s Empowerment Zones: Can the Community Development Bank Empower South Central? paper prepared for the 1998 meeting of the Urban Affairs Association; Rockefeller Institute of Government, Empowerment Zone Initiative; Tajbaksh and Sahd, Community Empowerment in Urban Policy.

26. HUD applies two designations to cities participating in the Urban Enterprise Communities program—Enhanced Enterprise Communities and Enterprise Communities. A city’s designation determines the amount of public investment it will receive: Enhanced Enterprise Communities receive $25 million in Title XX Social Services Block Grants; Enterprise Communities receive $3 million in Title XX Social Services Block Grants and $3 million in tax credits.

27. HUD and DOA, President Clinton Announces Designation of More Than 100 Empowerment Zones and Enterprise Communities, joint press release, December 21, 1995. See also HUD and DOA, Building Communities Together.

28. To be eligible for designation as an enterprise community, target areas must have had a maximum population which is the lesser of 200,000 or the greater of 50,000, or ten percent of the population of the most populous city located within the nominated area; pervasive poverty, unemployment, and general distress; not exceed twenty square miles in total land area; a poverty rate equal to greater than 20 percent in each of its nominated census tracts, or 25 percent in 90 percent of the census tracts within the nominated area, or 35 percent for at least 50 percent of the census tracts within the nominated area; a continuous boundary or consist of not more than three noncontiguous tracts of land; been located entirely within the jurisdiction of the unit(s) making the nomination, and not be located in more than two contiguous States; and not included in any portion of a central business district unless the poverty rate for each census tract in the district was at least 30 percent. See U.S. Government Printing Office, Federal Register, 2701.

29. See, for example, HUD and DOA, Building Communities Together. See also, HUD and DOA, President Clinton Announces Designation.


31. Fainstein and Hirst, Urban Social Movements, 170.

32. Medoff and Sklar, Streets of Hope; Shiffman with Motley, Comprehensive and Integrative Planning for Community Development; Stoecker, Defending Community; and


34. This presumes, however, that when communities obtain more influence and control over the definition of their needs, as well as more influence and control over the responses to them, the visions they hold for their neighborhoods' future stand a stronger chance of becoming a reality.


39. See, for example, Keating et al., *Revitalizing Urban Neighborhoods*, and Medoff and Sklar, *Streets of Hope*.

40. For more on the Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative, see Nagel, *The Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative*, and Medoff and Sklar, *Streets of Hope*.

41. Medoff and Sklar, *Streets of Hope*.


46. Ibid.

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid.

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid.


52. Ibid.

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid.


59. Ibid.

60. Ibid.

61. Ibid.


63. Although the formal guidelines were not available until January 1994, the Empowerment Zones and Enterprise Communities initiative was announced by the Clinton administration, along with an invitation for applications, in December 1993. Cities across the United States were mobilized and began tentatively to plan for submitting applications to these programs as soon as the regulations were released. See, for example, Gittell et al., Expanding Civic Opportunity; June Manning Thomas, Applying for Empowerment Zone Designation: A Tale of Woe and Triumph, Economic Development Quarterly 9, no. 3 (1995); and Robin Boyle, Notes on the Detroit Empowerment Zone Process, manuscript.

64. The justification for including both residents and nonresidents in strategic community planning processes is that the union of different perspectives, bases of knowledge, bodies of expertise, access to resources connects professional planning with grassroots knowledge and intent. In the case of the Empowerment Zones and Enterprise Communities initiative, residents and nonresident partnerships were anticipated to combine the skills and energies of professional planners and the residents of the target neighborhoods to produce consensus documents that outlined common understandings of the target neighborhoods priorities and pragmatic solutions for advancing community renewal. See Robert Chaskin and Sunil Garg, Neighborhood Governance, in Core Issues in Comprehensive Community-building Initiatives, ed. Rebecca Stone (Chicago: Chapin Hall Center for Children, University of Chicago, 1996), 44; U.S. Government Printing Office, Federal Register, especially 2701; and HUD and DOA, Building Communities Together.


67. August 27, 1996 interview with Kevin O Connor, president, CEG, Albany, N.Y. This finding is surprising considering that local officials had proved quite entrepreneurial in the past, seeking federal funds for such economic development projects as the Omni Hotel in downtown Albany. See Rabrenovic, Community Builders, 61.

68. O Connor interview.


71. Michael Leo Owens, Enterprise Zones and their Incentives for Business and Jobs in Poor Places: A Review, manuscript.

72. O Connor interview.

73. Dare, Mair, and Stewart interviews.

74. O Connor interview.


79. See letter to Henry Cisneros from Kay Ackerman, Schenectady director of development, June 17, 1994.
80. Some believe that CEG involved itself only to acquire federal revitalization moneys for projects outside the neighborhoods targeted for investment by the Enterprise Community program, namely, the central business district of Albany, where CEG is headquartered. This insight was obtained from my interviews with Dare, Mair, and Stewart.
81. In other cities across the country, the private sector made substantial financial pledges to support efforts of their cities should their target areas be designated Enterprise Communities. See HUD and DOA, President Clinton Announces Designation.
83. HUD’s description is applicable only to the steering committee formed in the post-award process of the Enterprise Communities program, not the committee that managed the pre-award process of strategic community planning for the three cities in the Capital Region.
84. CEG, Enterprise Community Designation Application, 15—17.
85. To supplement the work of EastWest Planning & Development, the membership of the TriCity EC Steering Committee volunteered their staff and other organizational resources. CEG provided the committee with the technical assistance for defining the objectives of the strategic community plan and the blueprint for its implementation if the three cities received an Enterprise Community designation. It also coordinated the committee’s public relations and media strategy. The Council of Community Services identified the social, economic, and physical assets of the target communities and identified barriers to the start-up of new social services and human development programs. Additionally, they were used to assist the committee in organizing community workshops. The Capital District Regional Planning Committee analyzed census data and created demographic neighborhood profiles and maps for the committee, which it included in the final version of its plan. The local municipalities contributed resource materials and considered changes to their regulations and ordinances. See CEG, Enterprise Community Application, 29.
87. Ibid.
88. Telephone interview with Margaret Irwin, EastWest Planning & Development, October 26, 1995.
89. CEG, Enterprise Community Designation Application, 72. Critics of the TriCity EC Steering Committee contend that it backed away from significant resident involvement for fear of being criticized for the past actions of committee members and their organizations. This information was obtained from my interviews with Dare, Mair, Stewart.
91. Arnstein, A Ladder of Citizen Participation.
93. CEG, Enterprise Community Application, 45—51.
94. Ibid., 75.
95. Ibid., 45.
96. Ibid., 45—51.
98. CEG, Enterprise Community Application, 72.
99. Ibid. This was further supported by my interview with Irwin.
100. CEG, Enterprise Community Application, 52.
101. Ibid., 3.


103. Daley and Angulo, People-centered Community Planning; Berry et al., The Rebirth of Urban Democracy; Jack DeSario and Stuart Langton, Citizen Participation and Technocracy, in Citizen Participation in Public Decision Making; Jane J. Mansbridge, Beyond Adversary Democracy; Medoff and Sklar, Streets of Hope; Stoecker,Defending Community; and Taub, Nuance and Meaning in Community Development.

104. See Stoecker, Defending Community, and Medoff and Sklar, Streets of Hope.

105. See, for example, Arnstein, A Ladder of Citizen Participation; Barber, Strong Democracy; Barr, Empowering Communities; Nigel Berkeley, George Goodall, David Noon, and Clive Collins, Involving the Community in Plan Preparation, Community Development Journal, no. 2 (1995); Berry et al., The Rebirth of Urban Democracy; Daley and Angulo, People-Centered Community Planning; DeSario and Langton, Citizen Participation in Public Decision Making; Susan S. Fainstein and Clifford Hirst, Neighborhood Organizations and Community Planning: The Minneapolis Neighborhood Revitalization Program, in Revitalizing Urban Neighborhoods; and Stuart Langton, Citizen Participation in America (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1978).

106. Chaskin and Garg, Governance in Neighborhood-based Initiatives.

107. Ibid., 633.

108. Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory, 45.

109. Daley and Angulo, People-centered Community Planning, 93; see also Henig, Neighborhood Mobilization.


111. Chaskin and Garg, Governance in Neighborhood-based Initiatives, 633.


113. Chaskin and Garg, Governance in Neighborhood-based Initiatives, 638.

114. HUD, Empowerment.

115. CEG, Enterprise Community Application, 74.

116. Irwin interview.

117. Ibid. and Sauer interview.

118. The sets of rungs on Arinstein s ladder of citizen participation, from lowest to highest levels of participation, are nonparticipation (manipulation and therapy), tokenism (informing, consultation, and placation), and citizen power (partnership, delegated power, and citizen control). See Arinstein, A Ladder of Citizen Participation.

119. Ibid., 219.

120. See, for example, Berry et al., The Rebirth of Urban Democracy; Medoff and Sklar, Streets of Hope; Rabrenovic, Community Builders; and Stoecker, Defending Community.

121. For more on this, see Berry et al., The Rebirth of Urban Democracy; Chaskin and Garg, Governance in Neighborhood-based Initiatives; and Chaskin and Garg, Neighborhood Governance.

122. HUD, Empowerment.


124. See Poe, Empowerment Failure, and Albany s Enterprise Zone Slow to Show Progress, Albany Times Union, September 14, 1996.

125. See Poe, Empowerment Failure, and Albany s Enterprise Zone Slow to Show Progress.