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This article traces the history of the five presidential successions that have taken place at the University of Massachusetts since 1970. No manual or campus report will reveal the one best way to conduct a presidential search. How to do so is not easy to prescribe. Suitably fleshed out, the events surrounding these five searches tell us a great deal about what works and what doesn’t. It is one thing to offer case illustrations of past events, another to say how they might be put to use by other people in another era with quite different situations and concerns. In evaluating these transitions and leaderships, this article also raises the question of what is the proper role of the president in university governance. The hard question for us is not that the public land-grant university is an integral part of state government. It is, rather, How integral should it be? To the extent that these examples provide for broad understandings of the system, they are valuable for heuristic purposes.

When a college or university president departs from office, the problem arises of picking a successor. During this critical period of transition, the academic community spends a great deal of time and emotional energy in trying to find a suitable replacement. Looking for the particular kind of leadership required is a very challenging and difficult assignment. Because the presidency is conceived to be the cardinal position in the academic enterprise, and as such the initiating and driving force in the decision-making process, the trustees view the selection of a new president as their ultimate responsibility. Within the total scheme of things, it is probably the single most important act that they perform. For their part, it is a thoughtful exercise in judgment. Nothing is more steeped in institutional protocol nor more sensitive politically. As a result, the search for a chief executive officer is accorded top priority and shrouded in relative secrecy.

From Henry Flagg French, who took office in 1864, to Elbert K. Fretwell, the current incumbent, twenty men have served as president of the University of Massachusetts. All have been white males, mostly of Anglo-Saxon Protestant extraction.
None has been a woman or a person of color. Nor has a Catholic or a Jew held the presidency. Be that as it may, the achievements and careers of these presidents, and the development of the office they served, provide a fascinating panorama of the growth of the university. Evaluating the leadership of a single president is no simple undertaking, and gathering evidence of changing conditions is infinitely more complicated. Fortunately, because of the limited scope of this inquiry, my task has been greatly simplified. Throughout its history, the office of president has gradually increased in authority and prestige, although this has varied somewhat according to the character and leadership style of each president.

In the years since a systemwide office of president was created for the University of Massachusetts in 1969, there have been five presidential successions, each with its unique search. That there are differences between the five searches is hardly surprising, but those differences are complemented by a number of striking similarities. Through a comparative examination of each, I have classified them accordingly: (1) a corporate-style search; (2) an insider search; (3) a national search; (4) an heir-apparent search; and (5) a politicized search. While not universal, these categories are intended to illustrate the way presidential searches — at least at the University of Massachusetts — shift with changing social, economic, and political conditions.

A special word: governors and legislative leaders, along with trustees, faculty, students, and alumni, react in some significantly similar ways to the problem of presidential succession, but in other equally significant ways they perform in a markedly different manner. These wide disparities reflect sharply contrasting philosophies about the sort of person needed as president and sharply contrasting methods of selection. It is the purpose of this article to identify some of those variations and similarities and suggest their importance for tomorrow’s transitions in leadership.

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**Background: Searching for Success**

There is no magic formula for conducting a presidential search. A lot depends on the innate wisdom and collective experience of those involved. The procedures are fairly simple and straightforward. Ideally, the board of trustees appoints a broadly representative search committee, whose primary function is to identify a pool of potential prospects and narrow the field to a slate of finalists. Consultants who specialize in executive recruiting are often hired to help in this endeavor. If compliance with affirmative action does not always place the competition on a level playing field, it occasionally gives constituencies the opportunity to make the claim of virtue by appointing either a woman, a black person, or a Hispanic person. Adherence to the sunshine laws in various states guarantees the openness of the search and exposes it to full public view, but these statutes cause more problems than they solve. The search committee, which is advisory in nature, eventually makes its recommendations to the appointing authority. In the last stages of deciding among the serious contenders, the governing board selects the person who, in their judgment, is best suited for the job.

Few contemporary searches follow this ideal. Many, if not most, are beset with tensions and controversy. Much can go wrong and often does. Mistakes and unforeseen circumstances are almost bound to occur. Some searches are disrupted by leaks to the press and the hazards of premature publicity, while others suffer from political intrusion and manipulation. Some suffer from the folly and foibles of human judgment usually ending in dismal failure. This is what happens when the trustees
pick the wrong incumbent, who inevitably will prove unsuitable. Still other searches are notably successful, resulting in an admirable choice that satisfies nearly everyone. Failures are dramatic and illuminating; despite the best of intentions, the most thoughtfully planned and carefully executed searches do not always succeed.

Successes, however, add to understanding. They provide a mandate or sense of legitimacy to the person chosen. In 1990, Judith McLaughlin and David Riesman published a definitive study entitled Choosing a College President: Opportunities and Constraints. As they argue, “The best searches serve to legitimate the final choice of the search committee and trustees so that a new president can have a smooth entrée to the presidency. Many searches, however, are fraught with missteps that leave constituents on the campus enraged about the search and hostile to its outcome. The search ends up an abysmal failure, not because the wrong person has been chosen, but because someone who might have been right for the institution is rendered ineffective by the traumas connected with his or her succession to the presidency.”

McLaughlin and Riesman’s research included the investigation of more than two hundred presidential searches. During the ten years of their collaborative effort, they interviewed numerous presidential candidates and search committee members, including trustees, faculty, students, and alumni. Their comparative study covers a broad spectrum of American colleges and universities — public and private, large and small — along with a good geographical spread. Throughout their book, the authors discuss questions about the search process, such as how members of the search committee are chosen, what committee size is most desirable, what procedures help prevent breaches of confidentiality, and how search committees go about choosing a consultant and evaluating candidates. All in all, they are persuaded that the search process at many public and private institutions more closely resembles a political contest than the corporate method of picking a chief executive officer.

This situation is especially true in Massachusetts, which is a highly political state. One would be hard pressed to find a state where the battles in public higher education are waged more fiercely. These conflicts are characterized by intense competition from the private schools and by the underlying issues of money, class, and ethnicity. Historically, the prestigious elite institutions have always held a most favored position. Their hegemony can be attributed in large part to the fact that the state legislature had subsidized Harvard as a provincial college over two hundred years before the publics came into existence. Consequently, the latter have always been treated as “academic orphans,” to use Charles Radin’s felicitous phrase. In his words, “Public higher education in Massachusetts got a late, weak start. Born in the shadow of Harvard, its development was hampered at every subsequent stage by the dominance of Harvard and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and by the struggle of institutions such as Boston University and Boston College to develop themselves.”

Unless one understands these dynamics, one cannot fully comprehend or appreciate the policy environment in which the scrappy battles are fought.

It is natural then to ask: Do searches really make a difference? This central question is addressed squarely by McLaughlin and Riesman. They frame their question more broadly by asking a series of other related questions.

Just as there is argument as to whether presidents make a difference, so there is corresponding debate as to whether searches matter. Can a search be organized so that it will identify the person most appropriate for the institution? Does a
"good" search produce a "good" president? Or is the outcome of a search basically random? Is the search merely a ceremonial activity, having little or no bearing on the quality of the person selected at its conclusion?6

The answers to these questions not only convey important messages about the obligations of trustees to each other and to the faculty, students, and alumni, but they also require us to think hard about the role of the search itself. How does one predict the future leadership potential of a particular candidate? The relative effectiveness of a president's leadership involves such things as his or her personal qualities, his formal as well as informal authority, his communication skills, the reputation he acquires, the funds he raises, and the respect he commands both inside and outside the academic community. Indeed, the modern president is as much a power broker as he is an overseer of administrative operations. As one UMass report says, "The president's role is enormously varied, especially in a multi-campus system. He is part leader, part diplomat, part broker, part manager, part negotiator, part cajoler, part commander, part spokesman, and part of many other things as well." Whether a president will prevail in a dispute over policy (or even whether he or she will be significantly involved) is the result of a subtle combination of factors, not of any single determinant.

Contemporary presidents at UMass tend to remain in the job for a longer period of time than many of their counterparts elsewhere. It is estimated that 40 percent of college presidents nationwide have a tenure in office of about three years. Burnout and political interference are the principal factors that account for the high rate of turnover, which are aspects of the problem that make the search doubly difficult.

Other factors include the fears of different groups that come into play. Suspicious faculty members are often fearful of trustee collusion. They tend to be wary that the selection may already be predetermined, or afraid that trustee priorities will be at variance with theirs. By the same token, trustees tend to underestimate the pragmatism and common sense of faculty. Given the culture of the academy, faculty usually prefer someone who has earned his or her professional spurs in academia. But faculty factions on most campuses are usually so fragmented that it is difficult for them to achieve consensus on a specific candidate. The same sort of political fragmentation occurs among student and alumni groups.5

It is well to remember that the search process is not an end in itself, but a means to an end. This activity has many salutary effects in energizing trustees, faculty, alumni, and students alike. A presidential transition provides them with a unique opportunity for institutional learning. They must examine the problems and priorities the institution faces, consider what sort of leadership is desired, and evaluate the credentials and experiences of candidates accordingly. There are also dangers, however. The most important of these is outside political interference that may rob the academy of its autonomy. There is also a tendency to look for an absence of negatives in candidates rather than the presence of positives, which leaves the search committee guessing about their real strengths and weaknesses.

Conditions and constituencies often change substantially between presidential transitions. So even when we want to do better, we know less than we should about what works and why. And what works in the private sector does not necessarily work in the public sphere. Seeking an appropriate balance between process and outcome
The Development of the UMass System

Founded in 1863 at the height of the Civil War, the state university began as an agricultural school, when Massachusetts was primarily a farm state. A year earlier, Vermont’s Justin Morrill had sponsored a bill in Congress to grant public lands to the states for the promotion of higher education in “agriculture and the mechanic arts.” The second mission of this dual federal mandate was assigned to MIT. The success of the land-grant college movement was attested by the later development of first-class institutions in many states and world-famous universities at Berkeley, Ithaca, Madison, Minneapolis, and Urbana.

The trustees in Massachusetts appointed Henry Flag French as the first president on November 29, 1864. They chose rural Amherst as the site for the new school, and classes began in the fall of 1867. Popularly known as Mass Aggie, the fledgling institution remained a relatively small but important school for nearly seventy years. In the late nineteenth century, nine field research and experiment stations were set up across the commonwealth from Deerfield to Nantucket. Under the presidency of Kenyon Butterfield (1906–1924), the cooperative extension service flourished in rural areas and provided technical assistance to countless farmers and their families. In 1924, Butterfield left to become president of Michigan State University.

In 1931, when Roscoe Thatcher presided over the agricultural school, it was upgraded to the rank of a state college. In 1947, when Ralph Van Meter was at the helm, it emerged as a full-fledged university. By this time, however, Massachusetts ceased to be a farm state. With the onrush of urban industrialism and the rapid growth of its cities, its people had become more urban than rural.

After World War II, change came rapidly. Returning military veterans, with their GI benefits, provided the first large influx of students. Andrew Greeley points out in his memoir, “The Crooked Lines of God,” that the GI Bill brought Irish and Italian young people to college in as high, or higher, numbers as any ethnic group. A generation later, their college-age sons and daughters followed in their footsteps. These demographics profoundly altered campus life.

By the end of the 1960s, the land-grant university had grown in size and prominence. Enrollment figures had more than tripled. Several academic departments at Amherst gained national distinction, and the number of graduate programs increased sharply. A new urban commuter campus opened at Boston in the fall of 1965, when the tidal wave of high school graduates was at its crest and the need to provide quality liberal arts education at low cost at its strongest. During this era of euphoria the original academic plans of the Boston campus were formulated as six colleges of a size intended to provide some intimacy and largely established on the traditional liberal arts pattern. At the same time, a medical school was being built in Worcester and admitted its first class of sixteen students in 1970. With this enormous growth came an increased diversity of students and faculty.

In 1969, the UMass board of trustees followed the recommendations of the Marcus report and restructured the university into a system of co-equal campuses. This reorganization placed the president in overall charge of the system and made the chancel-

is a constant but healthy challenge. In the end, of course, that is what really matters; the pivotal question is not what mistakes we have made in the past, but what we have learned from them.
lors responsible for managing their own respective campuses. Up to this point, both Boston and Worcester had operated as branch campuses with the direction and control flowing from the original “flagship” campus at Amherst. The location of the president’s office was shifted in 1970 from Amherst to Boston, which is the capital city and the locus of political power in the state. A decade later, in 1983, Boston State Teachers College was merged with UMass/Boston. In July 1991, the state legislature passed a reorganization bill that added two more free-standing public universities, the University of Lowell and Southeastern Massachusetts University, to the multicampus system.

This latest consolidation, which unified the entire public university sector in Massachusetts, enlarged the system to five campuses. The same statute also abolished the board of regents and replaced it with a higher education coordinating council. This brief chronicle history provides a broad overview of the institutional mosaic and sets the stage for exploring the period under consideration.

A Corporate Old-Boy Search

In 1969—1970, the university conducted a search for a successor to John Lederle, who had been president for ten years and was soon to retire. As it turned out, this search was characterized by two separate and simultaneous activities. Because the board of trustees assumed that the selection was exclusively their prerogative, they began the search process in a manner marked by informality and discretion: two hallmarks of corporate executive recruitment that academe adopted as its own. At the same time, the faculty at Amherst began a search process that was more open and democratic.

The trustees hoped to recruit an academic star who would bring the university greater academic respectability, perhaps someone with national stature and visibility. While scouting around for such prospects, they focused their attention primarily on Robert C. Wood, an MIT professor of political science with a national reputation. Wood was a very bright, hard-driven, and ambitious person. He had recently worked in Washington as under secretary and then as secretary of HUD in the Lyndon B. Johnson administration. A vigorously public man, Wood first learned the ways of the political world while working as an assistant auditor in the Florida state government. Later he worked as a management organization expert in the federal bureau of the budget in the Harry Truman administration and as a housing expert in the John F. Kennedy administration. So he had a practical as well as a theoretical knowledge of politics.

The son of a traveling shoe salesman, Robert Wood was born in Saint Louis, Missouri, and grew up in Jacksonville, Florida, where he attended public schools. He then went to Princeton, which introduced him to the cultural elitism of the Ivy League — something new for this southern young man who was more used to life as a street fighter. After World War II, in which he served as an army sergeant, he went to Harvard, where he earned a master’s degree in public administration and a doctorate in political economy.

Returning to Cambridge in 1969 from his Washington sojourn, he reentered academe by resuming his duties as chairman of the Political Science Department at MIT and director of the Harvard-MIT Joint Center for Urban Studies. Governor Francis Sargent soon appointed him chairman of the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority. In spite of these diverse assignments, Wood found the readjustment to be trying.
Prior to Wood’s return to the Northeast, three years earlier, in late 1967, UMass trustee Robert Gordon and president John Lederle had flown to Washington to see if they could interest Wood in the chancellorship at the Boston campus. But Wood was totally absorbed in helping Lyndon Johnson design and implement his Great Society programs. Spurning their overtures, he turned them down flatly. His work in Washington was too important for him to leave.

But this rebuff did not cool the ardor of trustee Bob Gordon, who continued his energetic courtship of Wood. During the late winter of 1970, Gordon visited Wood again to see if he could interest him in taking on the presidency. As residents in the town of Lincoln, the two men had known each other since the mid-1950s. Gordon informed Wood that Lederle, who had devised the strategy of growth at the university during the 1960s, would soon announce his intention to retire. This courting, unlike the previous one, rekindled Wood’s enthusiasm. He was restless at MIT and did not want to become strictly a fund-raiser.

When Wood first began to consider the UMass presidency, he explored the position very carefully. He talked with James Killian, who was chairman of the board of trustees at MIT. As a favor to Wood, Killian visited the Amherst campus for the purpose of checking it out for him. This was an intriguing way of learning about an institution without lifting the veil of confidentiality. Killian came back favorably impressed both with the caliber of its faculty and with the quality of its science and engineering programs. He told Wood that he was particularly impressed with the recognition the faculty had achieved in the field of polymer sciences. Their conversation convinced Wood that UMass could quickly become a much more nationally visible institution, thanks to the distinction it had already achieved and the willingness of the state legislature to provide the necessary funding. With the emerging campuses at Boston and Worcester, it showed greater growth potential and a special capacity to do even better.11

Wood signaled Gordon that he would be interested in talking about the job. Gordon then introduced him to Joseph Healey, who was chairman of the board of trustees. Together, the three men discussed the position during lunch at the Marriott Hotel in Newton. Healey was very persuasive and so was Gordon. After lunch, Wood indicated that he wanted to talk to his wife, Peggy, and to think about it some more, but he was very attracted to the idea of taking on this new responsibility. Moreover, because he was assured that the president’s office would be located in Boston, the thought of their not having to move another time was appealing to them. One of the most attractive features of the job was the opportunity to work with leaders in other fields and to shape public policy.

A few days after the meeting, Wood contacted Healey and told him that he would be interested. Healey then arranged for a meeting with the executive committee of the board at the Parker House in Boston. They talked at great length and got along well, after which the committee was ready to go to the board. That night, Healey called Wood to say that if he was willing to accept the presidency, they could talk about specific terms. And so they did. They offered him a starting salary of $50,000.

At the next meeting of the full board, on May 13, 1970, Wood was named president of the University of Massachusetts. The vote was unanimous.

Meanwhile, no one had informed Wood about the ongoing search at Amherst. Once he learned that a search committee existed, he immediately decided to go meet with the faculty. In the meantime, the story of his selection broke in the press
before Wood could have this meeting. The situation was as embarrassing as it was awkward. Wood later described the cold reception he received from the faculty:

Now all that time, no one had told me that there was a search committee going on and that the faculty was strongly represented on the search committee, and particularly the Amherst campus. There had been a sociologist who had been a faculty advisor to the committee. He was Charles Paige and his specialty was sports sociology and he was an able counsellor. Anyway, he had not been consulted and apparently the search committee continued to identify people and I had never met them. In the meantime, I said that I’d be glad to be part of the university and to take the presidency, and the executive committee so voted.

But the fact remains that I still had not met a search committee and they were quite angry. Healey phoned me to tell me about them after the news had come out, and I said that maybe I’d better meet with them. I had an engagement down at Yale in their urban studies program with Kingman Brewster, so I drove up to the campus. Oswald Tippo, who was then chancellor, put me up in a small motel near campus and I went in to see a very frosty and very cold search committee. I think Professor Stone, the great mathematician, was either on it or the chairman of it and the first question was, “What is your concept of the university?” And it was as if we were playing a record prior to any recommendation.

At any rate, that was a complication, reflective probably of Joe Healey’s style of liking to work informally and getting everything settled before the formal mechanisms had finished their work. And I became his great admirer for the eight years that I worked with Healey during some turbulent times. But nonetheless, from the Amherst perspective, it started my time off on an awkward foot.¹²

Not surprisingly, the trustees had abruptly halted the faculty search. The board simply decided that Wood would make an excellent president for the university. Their preemptive action caused suspicion and mistrust. Also not surprisingly, the Amherst faculty felt betrayed and immediately protested. Years later, reflecting on how the trustees had handled the matter, Chairman Healey reportedly exclaimed, “We did it backwards. We got the right guy, but the wrong way.”¹³ When Wood was appointed president in mid-May, the trustee meeting was picketed by students protesting his stance on Vietnam and by people protesting the bad service on the MBTA’s Green Line. Many faculty thought that Wood had obtained the job solely because of his friendship with powerful leaders in the state. Uppermost in their minds was Joe Healey’s close identification with the Kennedys, the dominant political family in Massachusetts. Wood was one of the few Cambridge intellectuals who had supported Edward Kennedy for the U.S. Senate in 1962 and continued to maintain a relationship based upon mutual high esteem.

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A Transformational Leader

Anxious to get to work, Wood took office on July 1. He brought to the presidency an unusual combination of talents and a grand concept of what he intended to do. He was formally installed as president on December 9, 1970, at the Statler-Hilton Hotel in Boston. In his inaugural address, Wood asserted that he had no desire to lead “cookie-cutter campuses” and called for substantial autonomy and flexibility in developing academic goals and missions. Although Wood was animated by this vision, the issue of whether he adhered to such an approach would soon become a matter of intense debate.
Wood had the personal qualities indispensable to leadership — a driving will to succeed, the capacity to inspire loyalty, the ability to communicate, and a genuine interest in people. He assembled an unusual staff, which caused some concern. Outside people who lacked previous academic experience, like Nan Robinson, Peter Edelman, and Edward Lashman, were brought in. This recruitment pattern stood in sharp contrast to that of Ernest Lynton, the vice president for academic affairs, who had had an adventurous experience as dean at Livingston College of Rutgers. The staff was fiercely competitive, yet they got along well and were of central significance to Wood’s success.14

Wood quickly moved to center stage and emerged as one of the most influential national players in public higher education. A tireless president with a first-rate mind, one who set his goals and pursued them relentlessly, he pressed his faculty hard and worked his staff to exhaustion. Moreover, his political instincts were extraordinary. He possessed a shrewd sense of political maneuvering, inherited, no doubt, from his experiences in Washington, where he had built a reputation for political acumen. On top of all his other duties, he managed to teach an undergraduate seminar in urban politics. Few university presidents keep in touch with students through teaching the way he did.

Initially, Wood enjoyed much success. He made a series of moves — some highly publicized — on the future directions in which he thought the university should be headed. In 1971, he appointed a special blue ribbon committee to examine the university’s role in modern society and lay the groundwork for executive action.15 Laudable in its intent, the committee’s subsequent report was controversial and was greeted by faculty with healthy skepticism. Nevertheless, Wood used it to great advantage. Armed with the committee’s recommendations, he helped pave the way for the university’s transformation into a major academic institution. In all, he was seen as a master builder who played by his own set of rules.

But the rules of the game were soon to change as the college-age population began to change. Preoccupied during the 1970s with the tasks of restoring campus peace, sorting out student demands, and reuniting fiercely divided faculties, Wood was quick to recognize that the demographic prospects were unpromising. Demographic changes meant smaller numbers in the college-age population. Enrollment projections based on the 1970 census data contributed to decisions to scale down the size of the campuses. In place of a projected 40,000 enrollment at Amherst, the trustees fixed a ceiling of 25,000. They likewise modified the planned size of the Boston campus from 15,000 to 12,500.

Undaunted by this, Wood pushed for curriculum reform and launched a broad range of innovative academic initiatives designed to improved the undergraduate learning experience. Student internships flourished, as did field-based education projects such as the University Year for Action Program and the University Without Walls. One such innovation was the creation of a College of Public and Community Service in Boston. Although these educational programs broke new ground, they also upset traditional faculty, who were concerned about maintaining academic standards and the limits of the university’s service capacity. Occasionally, in his haste to get his “ducks in line,” Wood grew impatient with delay and ran roughshod over the formalities of university governance. On some issues he met firm resistance from faculty leaders, but he usually got his way in the end. Yet the price exacted proved costly.
Despite quarrels with his chancellors, Wood profited from the expanding mode of the university and used it as a convenient excuse for centralizing power in the president's office. To offset the growing criticism of his heavy-handed style of management, he justified this centralization by saying, "I believe that academic missions properly begin at the initiative of the campuses, subject to availability of resources and to considerations of redundancy. I appreciate that no academic community places high priority on administrative activities, but I am persuaded that effective administration can do much to improve academic performance and enrich the lives of students and faculty alike."16

Beset with conflicting demands, Wood pulled off a major coup for the university by bringing the Boston and Worcester campuses on line well ahead of schedule. Concern for the university's neighbors in both cities led to decisions that softened campus impact on the surrounding neighborhoods and made it responsive to local community needs. While working at HUD during the mid-1960s, Wood had experienced firsthand the consequences of what had happened in New Jersey when the trustees of its state medical college failed to reach out to the black community in Newark. He was determined not to make the same mistake in Massachusetts. As an expert in housing and urban renewal, he engineered plans for redeveloping the Columbia Point peninsula, the site of the Boston campus, and for converting its beleaguered public housing project into a mixed-income family development. A savvy mix of city planning and good public relations helped to defuse community opposition.

As a veteran of the Great Society programs, Wood was process oriented. In 1972, he appointed a group of senior faculty to study university governance. Headed by Professor Robert Wellman, this group produced some workmanlike procedural results. They drafted a plan that outlined areas of primary responsibility for initiating action and for faculty consultation and participation in governance.17 The trustees adopted the Wellman report on April 4, 1973. The language of this trustee document with regard to conducting presidential searches is quite specific. It reads as follows:

When appointing the president, the board will seek nominations from a broadly representative search committee appointed by the board. The board will determine the charge to and composition of the search committee after seeking the recommendations of the appropriate campus governing body(s) and, when appropriate, other components of the university. The board will appoint faculty and student representatives to the search committee upon nomination by the appropriate governing body(s).18

Meanwhile, by the mid-1970s, with the Arab oil embargo and soaring inflation, surrounding conditions began to change dramatically. The state faced a serious economic downturn. University expansion suddenly turned into university retrenchment. In November 1974, Michael Dukakis, a liberal reform Democrat, defeated the Republican incumbent Frank Sargent for the governorship. During his election campaign, Dukakis announced that he intended to cut 30 percent from the public higher education budget, news that distressed Wood. On December 12, 1974, Wood spoke out on the issue and declared that adoption of the proposed budget would "strike at the heart of the university." In keeping with his style, he did not intend to let this happen and decided to fight back.

Desiring to confront Dukakis directly, Wood took him on when he insisted on imposing across-the-board budget cuts. He found Dukakis adamant and unwilling to
compromise in the least. The two adversaries began to wage a fierce budget battle. Wood saw the episode as a substantial effort to subvert the fiscal autonomy and independence of the university and to bring it under the direct control of the executive branch of state government. Adept at political bargaining and compromising, he reluctantly yielded to administration pressure and reduced the original budget request of $118 million to a bare-bones request of $103 million. The Dukakis administration recommended $90 million, a budget which, if enacted, would have required major layoffs and program curtailments. Maneuvering behind the scenes and contacting other Democratic party leaders, Wood managed to get most of these cuts restored by the legislature, which passed an appropriation of $101 million.

This did not end the matter. The outcome of the budget battle placed the governor's office on the defensive against what it perceived as an expansionist university. Wood saw the executive incursion as political interference and questioned the governor's commitment to public higher education. This conflict put them on a collision course. At the time, the salient question was, Who has the power? Dukakis could ill afford to be upstaged by a university president. To recoup his position, he needed to teach Wood a lesson and assert executive control. It was a rivalry of gigantic dimensions that was played out in the public realm.

Another sore spot was the luxurious suite of offices that Wood maintained at One Washington Mall (at an annual rental of $146,000), something that irritated the parsimonious Dukakis, who rode the subway to work. Students complained vociferously that while their educational programs were being cut, Wood continued to sit in the lap of luxury. This issue escalated when the Boston campus moved into its new facilities at Columbia Point, thereby leaving the vacated building at Boston's Park Square with plenty of space available for the president's office. Nevertheless, Wood stubbornly refused to give up his Washington Mall offices on the grounds of fiscal autonomy and a valid lease. Such goading made Dukakis furious. Dynamic personalities polarized this controversy even more than the situation warranted. It is worth remembering that disputes over offices and presidential mansions have been a characteristic source of unseating or unsettling presidents.

Despite these troubles, Wood scored a second major coup by persuading the Kennedy Corporation to build the John F. Kennedy presidential library at Columbia Point instead of at Harvard, where it was originally scheduled to be erected. For several years the project had been thwarted by resisting local groups in Cambridge, which complained about the traffic congestion that it would cause. While Harvard dallied, Wood acted. He not only brought Jacqueline Onassis to view the oceanfront location at sunset, but also paid a well-publicized call upon Robert McNamara at the World Bank in New York City and convinced him that the site would make a fitting memorial for the slain president. Wood saw the favorable decision as a catalyst for the development of programs related to public policy at the Boston campus as well as offering the prospect for new development to the entire peninsula.

Emboldened by success, Wood enjoyed exercising power and knew how to use it. He allied himself with local politicians and was not unwilling to utilize patronage to achieve his ends. Bitter toward a governor who did not assign a higher priority to the land-grant university, he went over his head and appealed for public support. In the eyes of Dukakis, however, Wood seemed overly ambitious and desireous of too much power. Their already impaired relations were not improved by Wood's support for a plan to reorganize higher education, which was sponsored by Senate president Kevin
Harrington. These two disgruntled leaders represented the foremost political dangers to Dukakis. Of the two, Harrington posed the greater threat because he seemed likely to become the Democratic nominee for governor in 1978. Liberal Democrats, like state representative Barney Frank, were outraged by the behavior of their party leader. They did not intend to let Dukakis forget that he owed his election mostly to them. In a stinging rebuke, Frank chastised the governor by calling him “the perfect political ingrate.” While Dukakis was perceived by the electorate as a liberal, it is not entirely clear that he played a liberal role in all this.

In March 1976, in keeping with his process mode, Wood organized a forum of the higher education establishment in an effort to achieve consensus on reorganization. He lobbied hard for Harrington’s plan, which was opposed by John Silber, the president of Boston University, who hoped to obtain public funds for private schools. At this point, Dukakis suspected that Wood wanted to become the czar of public higher education. The governor tried in vain to promote his own reorganization bill. After much public wrangling, including accusations against Wood for overreaching, the fight ended in a stalemate with both plans being shelved. The governor seemed strangely indifferent. Instead of straightening things out, however, this indifference in some respects made them worse.

If Wood had trouble dealing with Dukakis, the same cannot be said of his relations with other leaders. He had the ability to work with partisans of a different persuasion for the common cause. Not surprisingly, Wood struck a deal with John Silber and worked with private Catholic institutions like Boston College and Holy Cross. In return for Silber’s support of Harrington’s reorganization plan, Wood agreed to hold the development of graduate programs at the Boston campus. This action infuriated many faculty members who had been recruited with the expectations of teaching at the graduate level. They accused Wood of having “gone to bed” with Silber.

Meanwhile, trouble loomed at the Amherst campus. In what was described as a “love-hate relationship” between Wood and the faculty, the president encountered stiff resistance. Some of his difficulties stemmed from his having gotten off on the wrong foot at the time of his search. He also locked horns with Chancellor Oswald Tippo in a running battle over the university budget. A former provost, Tippo, who was cut from the “old aggie” mold, was a beloved figure on campus. He engaged in a heated dispute with Wood over the use of trust funds at the school of agriculture. Given the university’s strong tradition in this area, Wood hit an exposed institutional nerve. This invoked a storm of protest and Tippo resigned in a huff. His resignation triggered a rebellion against Wood, who became increasingly unpopular at the flagship campus. This confrontation was as much an institutional struggle as it was a clash of strong personalities. It was a classic case of the fear of change and what would happen when funds were diverted.

More fundamentally, the Amherst faculty objected to the president’s centralization of power and his micromanagement of the university. At one point they sent Wood a memo urging him to allow them more leeway in managing their own affairs and permit greater campus autonomy and decentralization. Beyond that, they suspected that Wood suffered from Washington fever or what amounted to an infectious yearning to move back on the national scene. From their perspective, he seemed more interested in pushing his own political agenda than in promoting the academic missions of the university. They viewed his behavior as a threat to the stability of the institution.

That Wood aroused heated opposition at Amherst is not surprising when one considers the strong leadership he exercised. A vote of “no confidence” by its fac-
ulty required Wood to swallow an extra large slice of humble pie. This action under-
mined his presidency and hastened his demise. Yet Wood had always claimed that 
he would stay in the job a minimum of five years and no longer than ten. After the 
no-confidence vote his position became shakier than ever.

Almost simultaneously, Dukakis was close to gaining control of the board of 
trustees. In the end, it was clear that the governor had the ultimate power. It seemed 
only a matter of time before Wood would be removed. His ego bruised, he hoped to 
regain glory by entering the political arena and running against Dukakis for governor. 
But this spoiling strategy did not work out for him. The attempt to promote a Wood 
boom fizzled. Calculating that he could not stop Dukakis without raising substantial 
campaign money, he decided to bow out gracefully.25

In retrospect, Robert Wood was a venturesome and risk-taking president. In a bold 
break with tradition, he blazed a new trail and made something different out of the 
president's office — he turned it into a tool for vigorous leadership. Viewed in this 
context, he was a transformational leader during a very turbulent era. As such, he was 
regarded as one of the university's strongest presidents, a man who greatly enhanced 
its reputation and quality.

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Picking an Insider

When Wood submitted his letter of resignation on June 17, 1977, the board of 
trustees resorted to a different style of searching for a successor and a different mode 
of leadership. They agreed to recommend that an interim president be recruited 
and take it on themselves to identify someone who would serve in this capacity.24 
In fact, they already had someone in mind — Franklin Patterson, a political scientist 
who had served as secretary of the university since 1973. Because of his work with 
the board, Patterson had gotten to know the trustees intimately. Obviously, he 
had won their trust and confidence and was an alternative leader for them to put 
in place.

Before coming to UMass, Patterson had taught at NYU and Tufts. He directed 
the Lincoln Filene Center at Tufts, was the founding president of Hampshire College 
(1966–1971), and board chairman there from 1971 to 1974. Drawing upon this expe-
rience, he knew how to run things during the interregnum.

In sounding out Patterson, board chairman Healey asked him if he could accept the 
interim presidency with the stipulation that he would be unable to become a candidate 
for the permanent position. Patterson had no problem in accepting this condition.25 
The rationale for exacting this limitation was to prevent an inside candidate from 
gaining an unfair advantage over outside candidates. It was an important episode 
because it set a precedent.26 Patterson was named to the interim post without any 
faculty consultation or participation. He declared that he would not be a candidate 
for the permanent position. The trustees made the announcement quietly and as a 
fait accompli.

If anyone could pacify the Dukakis trustees, Patterson was the man. A caretaker 
executive, he kept things running smoothly and did not go off in any wild directions. 
Patterson made similar efforts to pacify other critics and to smooth ruffled feathers. 
During his brief nine months in office, he maintained a steady course. Indeed, the 
university did not lose any momentum while the trustees were searching for a 
permanent replacement.
A Textbook National Search

With Patterson surely at the helm, Chairman Healey saw no need to rush to appoint a new president. Again the trustees adopted a different approach. The search officially began with the establishment of an ad hoc committee headed by trustee Ruth Morgenthau. This small group of trustees, which met on June 25, 1977, was asked to draw up the charge and composition of the search committee, plus a timetable for completing the search. They completed their assignment that same day.

Based on the advice of the Morgenthau committee, the board established a search committee consisting of six trustees, three faculty members (one from each campus), and two students (one from Amherst and one from Boston). In addition, there were faculty advisory committees at each campus and student advisory committees at Amherst and Boston. Indeed, the trustees not only faithfully adhered to the spirit of the Wellman report, but they also scrupulously followed the search procedures outlined in their governance document.

The 1978 presidential search began with high hopes of recruiting the “outstanding candidates in the nation.” By this time, the nature of the constituencies had changed dramatically. Stephen Breyer, a trustee and a faculty member at the Harvard Law School, chaired the search committee. Instead of hiring an executive recruiting firm, the trustees named Dorothy Marshall to serve as its senior consultant. She had extensive experience in academia as a professor at Bryn Mawr, as provost at UMass Boston, and in recent years as a trustee of Bryn Mawr, Holy Cross, and Smith, where she chaired the board. Obviously, Marshall did not need a “headhunter” to tell her and the search committee where to look for possible candidates.

For his part, Breyer was a skilled chair in the activist mode. He threw himself into the search with the requisite energy. Under his leadership, the search committee did its own analysis of the major problems facing the university. They held hearings on each campus, meeting with administrators, faculty members, and students. Based on what they heard, they identified six problems: (1) level funding and the need to maintain stable financial support; (2) the need for a planning process concerned with educational objectives and emerging from the university community, not simply reflecting administration dictates; (3) the need for a president qualified to deal with collective bargaining; (4) the issue of reorganization of public higher education; (5) the relationship between the public and private sectors in a period of declining enrollments and financing; and (6) the role of the medical school in providing health care in the commonwealth.

After discussing these issues with the full board, the search committee developed a set of qualifications for the new president. These included the ability to administer a $200-million-dollar budget, to manage the educational responsibilities of the university, to obtain governmental funding, and to relate to the private sector of higher education.

Meanwhile, the search committee was seeking to identify prospective candidates. It sent letters to many educational institutions and placed advertising in leading journals, including those aimed at women and minorities in higher education. It also tracked prospects through a variety of networks, then actively sought them through telephone calls and visits. These included both traditional and nontraditional networks. Such efforts involved meeting with officials of the Ford Foundation, the State University of New York, the Carnegie and Rockefeller foundations, the Legal
Defense Fund, and others. Moreover, committee members interviewed people from the business, scientific, government, legal, and health communities. They made telephone calls to individuals who might provide additional information.

Their networking activity produced about 300 nominees, from whom they received 197 actual applicants. Some of the names that turned up were those of perennial applicants. The search committee sifted through these files and reduced the field to 30. Since most of the 197 were not senior administrators, they were disposed of easily. Visits were paid to individuals who could serve both as resources concerning academic leadership and likely prospects for the presidency. Breyer and a few other committee members flew to the West Coast and interviewed David Saxon, the president of the University of California, and Albert Bowker, the chancellor at Berkeley. Neither of them, however, showed any interest. They also contacted Vartan Gregorian, then provost at the University of Pennsylvania, but he decided not to pursue the matter. According to Richard Lyons, the Boston faculty member on the search committee, these efforts were not very productive. He commented, "The smart ones detected some structural difficulties inherent in the office and politely declined." Such difficulties had to do mainly with the relationships of the presidency to the trustees and to the Massachusetts board of higher education.

Despite these extensive efforts, many faculty members were sorely disappointed in the list of candidate names because it was shy of college or university presidents. At any rate, the search committee produced a short list of five candidates whom they considered serious contenders. These included Randolph Bromery, a black and chancellor at Amherst; Charles Foster, dean of the Forestry School at Yale; Marilyn Gittell, associate provost at Brooklyn College; David Knapp, provost at Cornell; and James Vorenberg, associate dean at Harvard Law School. With one minority and one female candidate, this list barely met the affirmative action criteria. In late April, these finalists made campus visits and were interviewed by various constituencies.

Earlier, Lewis Mainzer, the Amherst faculty member on the search committee, had contacted David Knapp to see if he might be interested. They had done their graduate work in political science together at the University of Chicago in the early 1950s. Knapp initially said no, but later changed his mind, so he entered the search late. As a late prospect, he had to have special qualities. He made a good impression on students and alumni because they felt that they could trust him. Students sensed that Knapp had an appropriate concern for the rising costs of education. He also had strong supporters among the Amherst faculty members on the advisory committee who felt that he was a traditional academic who would give academic concerns top priority. In addition, they saw the Cornell provost as an academic insider, an experienced administrator with a long record of accomplishment. The result was to place David Knapp among the finalists.

On May 13, the search committee met for seven hours to consider the strengths and weaknesses of the finalists. While there was support for each of them, the consensus of the committee was to recommend to the board the top three, namely, Marilyn Gittell, David Knapp, and James Vorenberg. Some wished to offer all five names to the board for consideration.

Two days later, on May 15, 1978, the full board met at Boston’s Copley Plaza Hotel to make a final selection. They decided to consider the entire slate of finalists. After Chairman Breyer gave a summary of the search, the trustees proceeded to a public
discussion of the professional competence of the candidates, in which the latter were
openly criticized. Bromery was viewed as an insider who had dealt with many of the
issues facing the university, but some trustees believed that he had brought some prob-
lems on himself and had not handled others very successfully. It was a time for healing
and Bromery was not perceived as a unifying figure. There was little support for him at
Amherst. Charles Foster, who previously served as a state cabinet member in environ-
mental affairs, had sound experience as a public administrator, but he showed a basic
lack of curiosity and enthusiasm for the job. Both Foster and Bromery were eliminated
from further consideration.

Gittell, Knapp, and Vorenberg emerged as the front-runners. All three were praised
by their supporters. Marilyn Gittell, who came across as a sharp, lively, and intelligent
woman, conveyed the impression of very much wanting the president’s job. In the
eyear 1970s, she had been involved in the Ocean Hill–Brownsville controversy, which
erupted in New York City over the decentralization of its public schools. This dispute
had caused considerable tension between the black community and white Jewish
teachers. For her participation in this controversy, Gittell had encountered intense
opposition from the local teachers’ union. A mover and shaker, she was a community
activist who strongly believed that scholarship should be used as a tool in social
activism. With Mario Fantini, she was coauthor of a left-liberal critique of urban public
education.25 Her experience at Brooklyn College made her receptive to the idea of
open admissions. To some members of the committee, Gittell appeared brash and
aggressive. In fact, she polarized the search committee, which split along the lines of
the old guard versus the Dukakis loyalists. The latter saw her essentially as a female
version of Bob Wood.

A promising candidate and faculty colleague of Breyer’s at Harvard Law School,
James Vorenberg had organized the Watergate special prosecution force under
Archibald Cox. He impressed everyone with his intellect and ability, but some felt that
he was disappointing in the interview. Vorenberg did not have a good sense of the uni-
versity, nor did he seem anxious to tackle the job.

Given his strong base of faculty support, Knapp became a late favorite because he
had covered so much administrative terrain in his years at Cornell as provost and as
dean of the College of Human Ecology. Before then, he had spent ten years at the
University of New Hampshire as a professor of government, assistant to the president,
and dean of the College of Liberal Arts. While having dinner with the search commit-
tee at the 57 Restaurant in Boston, he had had a good discussion with them and later
with the full board. The following day, trustee Paul Marks had taken Knapp to meet
with Governor Dukakis, who inquired whether “this one” was their choice.

The main dynamic operating here was to avoid a repetition of Bob Wood. The polit-
ical backlash was strong, especially among the Dukakis trustees. Such a reaction to a
predecessor president is not unusual. As McLaughlin and Riesman remind us, “If this
president was beloved, his or her clone is desired. If the president was unpopular, his
or her opposite is sought: a calm, conservative individual if the former president was
regarded as pressing the faculty too hard or being too flamboyant or eccentric, or an
‘exciting’ figure if the past president seemed dull or staid.”26

After the trustees finished discussing the character and reputation of the candidates
in executive session, they returned to open meeting. Chairman Healey then stated
that, unless there was objection, the vote for president would be taken by secret ballot,
a move that would come back to haunt them. There was no objection. This was the
procedure traditionally used by the board for matters of great moment. Furthermore, the legality of this procedure had been upheld by Attorney General Edward Brooke in 1965 in a formal opinion concerning the board’s voting by secret ballot in selecting Worcester as the site for the medical school.

Of the trustees in attendance, twenty were eligible to vote. On the first ballot, the count was Bromery 2, Gittell 7, Knapp 10, Vorenberg 1. On the second ballot, Gittell received 8 votes and Knapp 12. Stephen Breyer then moved to elect Knapp by acclamation, and his motion passed unanimously.33

After the trustees had made their selection, Breyer telephoned Knapp and offered him the job. He wanted an immediate yes or no answer. There was a sense of urgency in Breyer’s voice, which no doubt reflected the political division on the board.34 His appointment was the last fling of the old guard. In the negotiations that followed, Knapp was offered a salary of $58,000, plus a housing allowance — about the same compensation he had received as provost at Cornell.

The secret ballot was a mistake on the trustees’ part because of statutory changes since the attorney general’s 1965 opinion. Their vote was promptly challenged by the Associated Press, which filed a complaint that the trustees had violated the state’s open-meeting law. The issue, however, was settled out of court. As part of the settlement, the trustees agreed to a roll call vote in open meeting, whereupon Knapp picked up an extra vote that was in dispute.

A Professional Academic Administrator

An academic traditionalist, David Knapp considered himself to be a pragmatic idealist. He was no Robert Wood. The two men were a study in contrasts. In many respects Knapp was the antithesis of all that Wood represented. He was essentially a quiet, scholarly man who listened well. He was less flamboyant and aggressive. Knapp was always gentle and soft-spoken in his dealings with people. While he was less of a communicator and much less personal, he understood the inner workings of the university better than Wood did. If the two men shared anything in common, it was that they were both political scientists and both cared deeply about their children.35 Although Knapp was utterly different in personality and outlook from Wood, he was nevertheless similar in the sense that he, too, became a very effective leader. Paradoxically, Wood’s legacy both helped and hurt him.

At the time of his inaugural, which was held at historic Faneuil Hall in Boston on October 29, 1978, Knapp frankly confessed that if he survived the presidency for ten years, he would consider himself a success. He was first and foremost a professional academic administrator. As a person who had come up through the ranks in academia, he was the quintessential insider, seeing himself as an integral part of the institution. While he had less natural ability than Wood in dealing with conflict over turf issues, he knew instinctively how the academy works. He was a most unusual man, efficient at his work, a quality one might expect from a highly capable administrator. He knew how to make choices and put together a cohesive multicampus system. This is where he made his mark and must be judged accordingly.

Faced during his first days in office with the same problem that had wrecked the Wood administration, Knapp was determined that it not ruin his. He soon became convinced that the dispersal of power was necessary, useful, and desirable. Quickly grasping the situation, he responded by decentralizing university governance. Steering
clear of any conflict and capitalizing on the desire for stability, he set about making
the university, in his own words, “an academic institution, where academic values had
top priority.” 36 As fate would have it, he assumed office in the throes of state elec-
torial change.

In September 1978, Michael Dukakis was defeated for the Democratic gubernato-
rial nomination in a startling political upset by the upstart Edward King in a bitter
party primary. King then went on to win the governorship against the Republican can-
didate, Frank Hatch. The circumstances at the corner office of the State House had
changed dramatically. The mood of the times was also partly responsible. No longer
was the university being disrupted by antiwar protests and campus disorders.

Most large public organizations experience cycles of administrative centralization
and decentralization that succeed each other regularly and produce their own counter-
effects. It is true of all massive bureaucracies, including the university. Knapp experi-
enced this phenomenon in many different ways. Before long, he had recruited a new
team of chancellors and given them plenty of room to maneuver. These included
Henry Koffler at Amherst, Robert Corrigan at Boston, and Robert Tranquada at
Worcester. 37 True to form, Knapp showed a great deal of respect for both faculty and
institutional autonomy. Indeed, he was much more of a team player than Bob Wood.
He delegated responsibility and much discretion — some thought too much — to cer-
tain of his subordinates. As might be expected under these circumstances, the campus
chancellors asserted strong leadership in managing their own campuses. They did not
always cooperate with one another or with the president.

Despite his efforts to decentralize, Knapp was soon forced to assume a defensive
posture. In 1980, state senator Chester Atkins, who chaired the Senate Ways and
Means Committee, cut the funding for the president’s office by 50 percent. This hos-
tile legislative action prompted the resignation of senior vice president Ernest Lynton
in protest. He believed that the debilitating budget reduction would make it extremely
difficult, if not impossible, for the president’s office to function properly and viewed
these formidable constraints as punitive and unwarranted. 38

This disturbing development was an accurate omen of things to come. When Atkins
put the final touches to the appropriations bill for 1981, he attached “an outside sec-
tion,” which created the powerful state board of regents. This peculiar legislation also
abolished the board of higher education along with the governing boards for the state
colleges and the community colleges. This sweeping change not only superimposed a
new layer of bureaucracy, but also submerged the authority of the UMass trustees in a
complex maze of bureaucratic power. Such centralization came in stages. Working
with a board of regents commonly regarded as authoritative, Knapp and the trustees
found themselves acting as a rubber stamp for many of its policies. Frustrated in their
attempts to maintain their own autonomy, they chafed under these institutional
arrangements. Virtually every key decision they made was second-guessed by one state
agency or another. Faced with this kind of bureaucratic nightmare, it was little wonder
that the trustees felt “impotent.” 39

Meanwhile, in the fall of 1982, Michael Dukakis had regained the governorship.
Prior to that, he had beaten his nemesis Ed King in a much publicized “rematch” that
pitted the two of them against each other in another bitter Democratic primary. With
the resurgence of the economy and the birth of the so-called Massachusetts miracle,
tax revenues gradually replenished the state treasury. The whole dynamic had changed.
No longer was the question Who has the power? but rather Who has the money? Unlike Wood, Knapp did not present a personal threat to Dukakis and was no match for the governor in the game of politics. Nor did he pretend to be. He chose the safer course of conciliation and nonconfrontation, another important difference between Knapp and Wood as university leaders.

With the board of regents in control of the entire public higher education system, many politicians concluded that the president’s office was no longer needed. This is about the only reasonable explanation for the sporadic sorties that were made to disband the office. Chester Atkins, who was also chairman of the state Democratic Party, led the assault. Even state senator John Olver, who had once taught chemistry at UMass/Amherst, wanted to abolish the president’s office. The motive force of this drive was the concentration of power in the board of regents. These crosscutting pressures made Knapp’s life miserable, but he endured them for several more years. As a pragmatic realist, he reluctantly accepted what had to be accepted.

Despite all this, Knapp steered a steady course. His accomplishments were many. Foremost among these would be the creation of the Center for Polymer Science Research at Amherst and the Biotechnology Research Park at Worcester. Under his leadership the university became an internationally recognized research institution and an integral component of the state’s economic development efforts. Through his tenure at Cornell and the University of New Hampshire, Knapp fully understood the land-grant mission and fostered a wide range of public service activities. He spearheaded pioneering efforts in industry-university partnerships and the development of corporate relations and patent policies. He oversaw the initial steps in building private support for the university and the development of modern computerized management information systems and a state-of-the-art telecommunications system. Concerned about education at all levels, Knapp emphasized the need for collaboration with the Boston public schools and helped produce a breakthrough on graduate education at the Boston campus. He also actively supported faculty and student foreign exchange programs.

These halcyon days in the mid-1980s seemed to mark a pinnacle of UMass success. Its academic reputation continued to improve, as evidenced by the quality of its undergraduate applications, the academic achievements of its student body, and its ability to attract faculty of the highest caliber. By 1986, the Boston campus was listed in Time magazine as one of the nine “hot colleges” in the country. Similarly, the Amherst campus had improved its image from a three-star to a four-star university in the 1988 edition of Edward Fiske’s “A Guide to Colleges.” This ranking was based on the quality of its academic, social, and campus life. It had surpassed both Penn State and the University of Maryland. The most dramatic change at the university came in the area of increased salaries for faculty and administrators. Over 200 faculty members earned in excess of $60,000. In August 1987, the trustees approved a $20,000 pay raise for Knapp, which brought his annual salary to $119,000.

Despite its increasing national recognition and growing attraction to students, Knapp knew that the institution still had a long way to go if it was to become a world-class university. In 1988, he persuaded the trustees to appoint the special blue ribbon Saxon Commission, which outlined a plan for achieving this goal. As they took stock of the situation, they realized that it would require a bold strategy to overcome the bureaucratic stranglehold of the regents. In order to make the state university truly
independent and internationally competitive, they recommended the merger of the three existing public universities along with a formula for stable funding and greater trustee autonomy. They spent a year working on the assignment.

No sooner had the Saxon Report rolled off the presses in March of 1989 when Franklyn Jenifer, the regents chancellor, came out with a plan of his own. This preemptive strike was a blatant attempt to circumvent the work of the Saxon Commission. Knapp was appalled. In a rare display of public anger, he spoke out on the issue saying, "The regents' proposal in no way changes the current system of centralized governing authority and weak boards of trustees. Indeed, it would carry centralization further. The proposal's principal object is to break up the University of Massachusetts system. It would isolate the Boston campus under a weak board of trustees, and make the Medical Center a branch of the Amherst campus." Chancellor Jenifer's counter-plan, which was put together in three weeks, went nowhere. For that matter, it would take another two years before the Saxon Report was finally implemented.

To add to Knapp's woes, the much heralded "Massachusetts miracle" collapsed. The causes of the fiscal crisis were complex. Following nearly seven years of dramatic growth, the regional economy took a nosedive between 1989 and 1991. At the same time, the federal government was withdrawing from many areas of domestic policy, except for Medicaid, leaving it to state and local governments to pick up the vacated program and funding responsibilities. The state budget became unmanageable. Given a Dukakis administration, which had no respect for the land-grant university, and difficult internal adjustments to meet a future of diminishing resources, Knapp faced some agonizing problems. Among the worst was the lack of revenue; there simply was not enough money to do things that seemed absolutely necessary, such as providing for heating fuel and building maintenance. Although Knapp clamored for more funds, he rarely complained, rarely quarreled with associates, but went ahead and did the job with the resources at hand. Such a low-key posture, however, made him an easy target for criticism. His sharpest critics were fellow state educational officials.

Some regents, including Edward Lashman and Paul Tsongas — along with state higher education chancellor Franklyn Jenifer — tried to abolish the president's office. Jenifer, a black, allied himself with local politicians to maximize his power and gain more funding for public higher education, but he did not stay around very long. He left in 1989 to accept the presidency of Howard University. These officials developed a jaundiced view of Knapp, and they were harsh in their judgment of him. Essentially, they saw him as a colorless and competent bureaucrat. The most searing attack was launched by Paul Tsongas, who proclaimed that Knapp appeared to do nothing but "hang on" and "hole himself up in the office." This accusation contained little if any truth; indeed, it was most unfair. But the steady barrage of criticism about his low profile and the fact that he became more isolated politically played a part in the growing disenchantment with Knapp. Some trustees wanted a leader with more vigor and boldness.

In his last years as president, Knapp seemed to lose interest in his pressure-filled tasks. Many faculty wondered if the trustees might be thinking ahead to his resignation. If Knapp was a man of practicality who did not undertake risky ventures, he was also a man of ideals and integrity. Above all, he was a survivor. He lasted for twelve years — two more than he originally had anticipated. By his own definition,
he was a success. It was much to his credit that he did not blame subordinates for his shortcomings and that he ushered in major structural changes before announcing his resignation.

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**Tapping the Heir Apparent**

Apart from its timing, Knapp’s departure came as no surprise. Under increasing fire to step down, Knapp wanted to be able to pick his own time to avoid the appearance that he was being forced out. In the fall of 1989, Governor Dukakis was still thinking about abolishing the office of president, but the trustees at UMass persuaded him otherwise. Delicate negotiations along these lines were worked out with the governor’s office. While this was going on, Knapp was visiting the University of Hokkaido in Japan, where former UMass president William Smith Clark had helped to establish an agricultural college in 1876.

The trustees had in mind the person they wanted to succeed Knapp. He was Joseph Duffey, the Amherst chancellor, whom they considered the heir apparent. To close observers, it was evident for some time that Duffey was being groomed for the job. A confident and charming individual, he had served as chancellor at Amherst since 1982. For these eight years, he had been an effective campus leader as well as a national spokesman for public higher education. His gracious manner and personal charm put everyone at ease. But more important were his close political ties with Governor Dukakis. They were best friends. Duffey had skillfully used his relationship with the governor to help the university during the early stages of the fiscal crisis. While Duffey waited in the wings, his reputation soared while Knapp’s plummeted. However, Duffey was seen by some faculty as being smooth but indecisive.

Born in 1932, Duffey, the son of a West Virginia coal miner, was ordained as a Southern Baptist minister at the age of eighteen. He graduated from Marshall University and received a doctoral degree from the Hartford Seminary in 1969. While still in divinity school, Duffey entered politics in Connecticut and campaigned for Eugene McCarthy during the 1968 presidential campaign. In 1970 he ran unsuccessfully for the U.S. Senate, losing to Republican Lowell Weicker. Six years later he worked in Jimmy Carter’s presidential campaign, which led to a job in the state department. He then served as chairman of the National Endowment for the Humanities.

The trustees sensed that other schools might lure Duffey away before Knapp officially stepped down, a prospect that worried them. In 1989, word of Duffey’s candidacy at Northeastern University had appeared in the local press, which put the trustees on notice. He was then considered for the presidency of the University of Delaware. Reading these newspaper stories, some trustees questioned Duffey’s loyalty, especially since the fiscal situation turned sour at the university. Others contemplated taking unilateral action and putting him in office without any faculty participation or consultation.

Rumors about Duffey leaving to accept a job elsewhere continued to circulate and heightened the trustees’ anxiety. The trustees assiduously courted Duffey and informally asked him to become president. It was common knowledge that he wanted to be near his wife, Anne Wexler, an influential Democrat who worked as a lobbyist in Washington. The couple had what is known as a commuter marriage. The trustees now made it convenient for him to travel there on long weekends. To make things even more attractive, they agreed to boost the president’s salary to $130,000.
No word was said of any search during the fall of 1989, which aroused suspicion in some faculty members. Those at Amherst surmised that board chairman Gordon Oakes was not anxious to conduct a full-scale search. Others speculated that Oakes and the rest of the trustees were ready to cut a deal. Although the Amherst faculty for the most part was favorably disposed toward Duffey, they were distressed that a national search was not being undertaken and because they were not being consulted. As in the cases of Bob Wood and Franklin Patterson, they feared that the trustees would make a preemptive strike and announce their selection as a fait accompli.

As things turned out their fears were well founded. By the time the trustees met on February 22, 1990, they had definitely made up their minds. Joe Duffey was their choice to succeed Knapp. At this meeting, Knapp, in a gracious gesture, stepped aside for the sake of the university and announced his plans to retire effective on March 16, a date he deliberately chose for symbolic reasons. March 17, Evacuation Day in Suffolk County, celebrates the anniversary of the British troops evacuating Boston. On this satirical note, the trustees accepted Knapp’s resignation and announced that they were consolidating the positions of university president and chancellor at Amherst.

Some faculty, however, were not pleased with the idea of Duffey. A few of them from the Boston campus attended the trustee meeting to protest his appointment. They pleaded their case, but to no avail. It was already a done deal. Still, they argued that such a move would favor the Amherst campus and penalize Worcester and Boston. As an alternative, they asked the trustees to create a rotating presidency among the three campus chancellors. Moreover, they urged that their chancellor, Sherry Penney, be given proper consideration. In response to their pleas, Chairman Oakes flatly rejected the idea of a rotating presidency. While expressing understanding for their concerns, he replied, “A university cannot be run by committee. It needs a strong leader and a strong spokesman. Chancellor Duffey is the candidate we want to see in the presidency.” If the trustees then voted unanimously to approve Duffey as the new president, resulting in the decision to continue with the leadership he had already demonstrated.

With the consolidation of the two positions, Duffey in effect wore two hats, serving both as president of the university and chancellor of the Amherst campus. This was a throwback to the situation that had existed prior to 1969. Quickly taking on the board of regents, Duffey, who had earlier remained silent on the issue, began to speak out. He strongly criticized the regents for its excessive centralization and blamed the agency for the stifling regulation of public higher education. After laying off many of Knapp’s staff, Duffey operated mainly out of Amherst and was hardly ever seen at 250 Stuart Street in Boston. Moreover, he relied heavily on his provost, Richard O’Brien, to run things on campus.

Duffey’s stay was stormy and short. With the deepening of the economic recession, the budget ax continued to fall and other emergency fiscal measures were quickly put in place. To add to his troubles, Duffey’s good friend Michael Dukakis was about to leave the governorship. Having declared that he would not seek reelection, Dukakis was the lamest of political lame ducks whose power and influence had waned substantially. Without a forceful party leader at the helm, the Democrats in the state were in political disarray. Neglect of public services and evasion of costly financing of programs were the result. For all practical purposes, state government had become paralyzed.
In the fall of 1990, Republican William Weld, a Yankee Brahmin, was elected governor, defeating his Democratic opponent, John Silber, who was on leave as president of Boston University, in a bitter and closely contested election. Once in office, Weld called for draconian budget cuts in higher education and the possible closing of state colleges.8 Naturally, his announced plans did not sit well with the educational establishment.

Shortly afterward, Randolph Bromery, Franklyn Jenifer's replacement as the interim chancellor of the board of regents, suddenly resigned in protest.9 Three days later, both Bromery and regents chairman Paul Tsongas questioned Weld's commitment to public higher education.9 At about the same time, a few other senior administrators announced that they were leaving Massachusetts to take jobs elsewhere.

Under these chaotic circumstances, the morale of the dejected faculty reached its lowest point. Suffering from four years of severe budget cuts, the faculty had become battered and discouraged. The fiscal picture continued to deteriorate as impending layoffs became inevitable. Student tuition rates and mandatory fees were raised repeatedly to offset the budget shortfalls. In the crisis atmosphere created by these setbacks during the winter of 1991, a sense of gloom and doom pervaded the university. Internal disaffection increased. With little possibility of state finances being put on a sound footing, the situation was dire.

In the best of all possible worlds, Duffey would have been motivated to improve the situation, but he did not have the resources to do so. Depressed in spirit, he decided that it was time for him to move on. On March 1, 1991, the local press broke the story that he had been chosen as president of American University in Washington.10 The UMass trustees were somewhat surprised by this news. Many of them were upset, because they felt that Duffey had used his one year in office to further his own career. Viewed in this context, they felt put down, hurt, and angry, because they realized that they had been exploited by him. While his resignation did not take effect until June 30, his quick exit was not appreciated.

Given the energetic courtship of Duffey, it is certainly understandable that the trustees might have harbored such feelings. After all, they had spent their entire political capital in bringing him aboard. In their eyes, he had jumped ship precisely when they needed him most to lead the university out of the crisis. In fairness, it should be pointed out that Duffey had devoted nine years of service to the institution. Upon calmer reflection, the trustees later acknowledged the overall contribution he had made.11

A Politicized Search

No sooner had Duffey announced his resignation than a search for his successor began within a few weeks. The trustees met to discuss the issue on March 21 at the medical school in Worcester. At this meeting, they decided to separate the two positions of president and chancellor at Amherst and conduct separate searches for each post. It was further decided to retain the Boston location for the president's office. Since Duffey had spent most of his time at Amherst, there was some concern that it might be relocated there. When the question of an interim president was discussed, trustee Thalia Zervas promptly expressed her belief that the person so designated not be eligible to become a candidate for the permanent position. Other trustees disagreed, but the matter was left unresolved for the moment. Chairman Oakes asked for volunteers to serve on the presidential search committee. Nine trustees expressed their willing-
ness to be appointed. They included Judith Baker, James Carlin, Lawrence DiCara, Michael Foley, Robert Haynes, Gordon Oakes, Mary Reed, and Thalia Zervas. The ninth, James O'Leary, former general manager of the MBTA and an alumnus of UMass/Boston, chaired the presidential search committee.53 The composition of the search committee came under immediate attack. Once again, no provision was made for faculty participation. Unlike the Duffey episode, however, the faculty was at least consulted. Deeply devoted to the university, Chairman Oakes was nervous about how to go about conducting a search that would avoid the blunders of the previous time. Prior to the search, he addressed the faculty senate at Amherst on March 14. Five days later, a few Boston faculty members visited him at his business office in Springfield to discuss their concerns. They were particularly disturbed by rumors that Joe Duffey might be grooming a successor. Word had it that he wanted to slip Thomas O'Brien into the position as quickly and quietly as possible. A capable administrator, O'Brien was dean of the School of Management at Amherst. He was well connected in Republican Party circles, supposedly having close ties with Governor William Weld and having previously worked in the Frank Sargent administration.

In any case, the Amherst faculty were furious at their exclusion from the search committee. On April 22, Professor Arthur Kenney, board faculty representative, wrote a letter to William Searson, the trustees' lawyer, protesting the fact that the faculty had not been accorded full membership on the search committees. He complained that the board had failed to comply with the precepts of the Wellman report.54 So again the search began in a not uncommon atmosphere of suspicion between faculty and trustees.

On the same day that Kenney wrote his letter, the search committee met with senior administrators and faculty leaders from the three campuses. In anticipation of the pending merger under the Saxon Commission plan, their counterparts from SMU and Lowell were also invited. Everyone was asked to respond to a series of questions prepared by search chairman James O'Leary. These ranged from the qualifications and experience needed for the presidency to recommendations for the interim position.55 Early in the search, the trustees decided to bar the interim president from eligibility for the permanent position, following the precedent they had set in 1977 when Franklin Patterson had been named interim president. At the outset, the search committee asked themselves the question: Who would be the ideal candidate under these circumstances? They concluded that it would probably be a retiring president who was familiar with a multicampus system. Hence they initially drew on a ready-made list of retired presidents and other high academic officers who could be counted on to manage well in an interim presidency without desiring the permanent post. They reviewed some twenty-five biographical sketches, including those of people like David Saxon, the chair of the MIT Corporation and president emeritus of the University of California; Derek Bok, the retiring president of Harvard; and Greg Adamian, the retiring president of Bentley College. Most of the prospects came from within Massachusetts.

After considering the biographical material, the search group narrowed its list to five candidates. Almost immediately, their names were leaked to the press by an unknown source. The list included David Bartley, president of Holyoke Community College, Randolph Bromery, former regents chancellor, William Hogan, president of the University of Lowell, Thomas O'Brien, dean of the School of Management at Amherst, and Sherry Penney, chancellor at Boston. Penney was the only female candidate, and with Duffey's expected departure, she was the most senior administrator at the university. She followed academic protocol in that she waited to be drafted rather
than actively campaign for the interim post. Penney allowed her name to go forward after several faculty members urged her to follow this course.56

The news of Bartley’s candidacy caused considerable consternation in some quarters. A Massachusetts native, he was viewed as a local candidate. The son of Irish working-class parents, Bartley was born in Holyoke in 1935. He had come up the hard way. His father, who worked at the local gas company, died when he was a freshman in high school. At the time, there were no pension or death benefits, so young Bartley knew what it meant to grow up poor. Before going to UMass on a basketball scholarship, he had attended Holyoke Junior College.57

In many ways, Bartley presented a paradox. On the one hand, he had impressive political credentials, having served as speaker of the Massachusetts House of Representatives from 1963 to 1975 and as secretary of finance and administration in the Ed King administration. On the other hand, he had proved himself to be an able administrator as president of Holyoke Community College and chairman of the public college presidents council. Unquestionably, he was the most visible and the most outspoken advocate for public higher education in the state. Furthermore, he had written a position paper in which he outlined his views on the future of UMass.58

The paradox extended to Bartley’s academic qualifications. A graduate of UMass/Amherst, he had obtained four degrees from his alma mater — a bachelor of arts, a master’s, an earned Ed.D., and an honorary doctorate. To drive home the point, Bartley was highly touted in the press as being a “quadruple Minuteman,” but his opponents were not impressed. They pointed out that he was president of a community college, not a major college or university. Since he did not come from the university world, they argued, he would not carry much weight with the faculty. Measured by the rigorous standards of the academy, Bartley did not pass the litmus test of quality, at least in the minds of some trustees.

Trustee James Carlin, who had supported Weld in his bid for the governorship, lobbied hard in behalf of Bartley and was his main sponsor. The supporters of Bartley argued that the former speaker could serve them well in the competition for state funding. In their minds, no one could match Bartley in terms of his familiarity with Massachusetts higher education and his knowledge of state politics and the budgetary process. These assets, as well as his personal relationships with various political and business leaders, made him an attractive candidate for president. With the devastating budget cuts that the university had suffered in recent years, Bartley’s supporters were afraid that its premier position within the public higher education system would be jeopardized. They therefore wanted someone who could work well with the legislature and would stay in the presidency longer than Joe Duffey had. Since the university and its medical center received a great deal of federal money, they contended that Bartley’s local Massachusetts ties would be very useful in securing such funding.

Bartley, playing to localist sentiment, steadfastly refused to accept the idea that this was a temporary appointment. He apparently believed that if he got the job, he could provide dramatic leadership that would make people forget about its being temporary. Given the original instructions to the search committee regarding the interim nature of the appointment, a few people wondered about the wisdom of his stance. This clumsy strategy eventually backfired and helped to seal his fate. Having gone this far, however, Bartley did not pull back. He was prepared to fight for the position in the face of mounting opposition.
Bartley's detractors then launched a smear campaign to discredit his candidacy. Some trustees felt that he was administratively qualified to do the job; others did not. Those in the latter category attacked him on various grounds. A prevalent theme in complaints about Bartley was his Democratic political connections. His opponents went after him for having once worked for conservative Governor King, who in the late 1970s was the most powerful symbol of opposition to Dukakis's liberal policies. This implied that Bartley was politically incorrect. Castigating him in these terms was a mode of communication that played well at the political extremes. It is useful to keep in mind that most of this smear activity occurred outside the board of trustees.

But the pressure to back away from Bartley grew almost irresistible. His adversaries wanted someone with an extensive background as a teacher and scholar as well as an administrator. In their view, Bartley did not meet these criteria. Prior to his political career, he had taught at a junior high school in Springfield and coached athletics at Holyoke Catholic High School. More serious was that Bartley had no scholarly record whatsoever. According to one trustee, committee members were attempting to measure him by the same standards that Harvard had recently used to measure Neil Rudenstine, its new president. They downplayed Bartley's legislative accomplishments, which were substantial. Four members of the search committee (Baker, DiCara, Oakes, and Zervas) preferred to go with a retired university president who was familiar with operating a multicampus system. Publicity about all of this buffeted people on both sides.

The search was filled with traps and surprises. On May 15, the same day that the UMass trustees were able to slide around the awkward problem of appointing an interim chancellor as permanent chancellor of the medical school, the trustees of Cape Cod Community College named former state senator Richard Kraus its new president. Kraus was not an Irish politician, but he was well connected politically. He was a liberal Dukakis Democrat with Harvard credentials. The Kraus affair muddied the waters by suggesting that a double standard existed. The anti-Bartley forces, however, pointed out that being named to head a community college, even a particularly notable one, as Cape Cod Community College is, was not the same as heading a major university. By the same token, they contended that naming a community college president to become secretary of education (as Weld had in appointing Piedad Robertson) was quite different from appointing a person with this kind of background to head a “public Ivy” university like the one at Amherst.

Governor Weld finally intervened. In early May, he wrote a letter to the trustees asking them to delay their appointment of a president until they had conducted a national search. Weld was stalling for time. Bartley surmised that these tactics were an effort to derail his candidacy. In retrospect, he was correct in his appraisal.

At this point, the search committee hired the executive recruiting firm of Korn/Ferry International, which was directed to identify three to five out-of-state candidates. But Massachusetts's fiscal troubles had been widely publicized, making it difficult for the firm to attract good candidates. It initially approached John Brademas, the president of New York University, but Brademas declined. In the face of mounting pressure to appoint someone from Massachusetts, the search firm was able to persuade three out-of-state prospects to apply. They were Elbert K. Fretwell, former chancellor of the University of North Carolina at Charlotte, James Norton, interim chancellor of the University of Maryland, and Lawrence Pettit, former chancellor of the University System of South Texas.
Fretwell was a highly respected administrator generally recognized for leadership talent. His slender six-foot-seven frame and urbane manner made him a commanding figure. Academicians typically are not fond of any administrators, but they are more willing to accept people with orthodox backgrounds as top executives. Fretwell’s prestigious credentials (Wesleyan, Harvard, and Columbia) were accompanied by his real accomplishments, evidenced in his scholarship and his reputation as an academic administrator. Before going to North Carolina, he was president of SUNY College at Buffalo, one of the reasons, perhaps, he so actively and successfully sought national visibility. He had been a member of both the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education headed by Clark Kerr and its successor commission. Local custom in North Carolina had forced Fretwell to retire at age sixty-five, but he is not the retiring type. On the contrary, he is full of vigor and energy. Besides, he was no newcomer to the political realities of higher education in Massachusetts. In the summer of 1986, Fretwell had been a finalist in the search for a chancellor to the board of regents. As a result, he was battle-tested and combat-hardened, but according to him, hardly any scar tissue remained.61

In more ways than one, the current search was an almost identical replay of the fierce power struggle that had taken place in 1986. Many of the same themes resurfaced, especially with regard to issues of class, ethnicity, and quality. In the earlier encounter, Governor Dukakis had strongly opposed the selection of James Collins, a lawyer and a nonacademic. The governor immediately intervened in the dispute and soon removed Collins from office.62 Anyone comparing the events that transpired in 1986 and 1991 cannot help but notice the amazing similarities between the two searches. In fact, Bartley and Collins shared a great deal in common. Both came from Irish working-class backgrounds and were native-son candidates. Both were former state representatives and graduates of UMass/Amherst. Their experiences were incredibly similar.

So the search committee went back to its list of eight — the five in-state candidates and the three from out of state. They interviewed all of them one by one. As a gesture of good will, Alan Solomont and Robert Karam, who chaired the board of trustees at Lowell and SMU, respectively, were invited to sit in on these interviews. Both were adamantly opposed to Bartley.63 The presidents of Lowell and SMU would probably not have agreed to enter a joint university system under the leadership of a man who was, in hierarchical terms, “below” them. Sherry Penney, the chancellor at Boston, presented a special problem. Her departure from her current post would cause instability at the Boston campus. The trustees were sensitive to this issue. Careful not to get caught in the political crossfire, she wisely stepped aside so as not to create the appearance of blocking Bartley. Most trustees felt that neither Randolph Bromery nor Thomas O’Brien interviewed well. To some, Bromery appeared tired and burned out, while O’Brien came across as arrogant. After the interviews, both were eliminated from further consideration. Desiring to remain eligible for the permanent position, William Hogan took himself out of contention, withdrawing from the search.

Politics continued to play a major role in the search. To counteract his opposition, Bartley got powerful people to support his candidacy, chief among them former governor Frank Sargent, Senate president William Bulger, and House speaker Charles Flaherty. In the print and electronic media, Bartley was endorsed by David Nyhan, a Boston Globe columnist, and James Coppersmith, the station manager of local WCVB-TV, Channel 5.64 The UMass Alumni Association at Amherst also endorsed Bartley,
who obtained the backing of other prominent people. For example, Ronald Perry, the athletic director at Holy Cross, reportedly contacted trustee Ronald Teixeira, formerly a basketball athlete at Holy Cross, and convinced him that Bartley was a worthy candidate. These bold steps taken by Bartley were calculated to bolster his declining fortunes.

In addition, Speaker Flaherty played subtly upon the ethnic and class issue by alluding to Yankee elitism and snobbery. He contrasted Weld’s Harvard education and upper-crust social background to Bartley’s UMass schooling and blue-collar working-class upbringing. The patrician governor stood out as a symbol of privilege and wealth. Commenting on the anti-Irish bias involved, a spokesperson for Flaherty said, “It’s clear that the only obstacle to David Bartley is not his qualifications, but his ethnicity. And the speaker is extremely angry and disappointed.”

As the search process reached its climax, the discord among the trustees became more intense. It was now strictly a political contest, with the pro-Bartley forces pitted against the anti-Bartley camp. Those seeking to influence the trustees against Bartley played upon the bifactionalism within the state Democratic Party by portraying the power struggle as a King versus Dukakis fight. This representation was overdrawn and somewhat exaggerated. Only two trustees — James Carlin and James O’Leary — had previously worked in the King administration. In point of fact, all the trustees had been appointed by Dukakis. Yet the negative symbolism surrounding King was a powerful statement that was used to discredit Bartley.

Hardball politics was the order of the day as the crucial vote neared. Massive pressure and threatened resignations were brought to bear against Bartley. Three trustees — Chairman Gordon Oakes, Judith Baker, and Thalia Zervas — threatened to resign if the board appointed Bartley. This last prospect had a powerful appeal, blunting, temporarily, Bartley’s momentum. His opponents, who wanted anyone but Bartley, were forceful in their activism and mobilization of power. The battle became increasingly nasty; both sides acted excessively.

On May 31 the search committee met for six hours to discuss the finalists. Mary Reed was absent. At this point, they narrowed their short list to three, namely, David Bartley, E. K. Fretwell, and James Norton. After their lengthy discussion, there was a clear lack of a consensus candidate. In trying to arrive at their recommendation, the dynamics of the search committee led to a 4 to 4 deadlock. Carlin, Foley, Haynes, and O’Leary supported Bartley. Four days later, on June 4, the situation remained the same except that Mary Reed threw her support to Bartley. Thus, the search committee recommended Bartley to the full board with a 5 to 4 vote. Meanwhile, trustee William Bowman made a commitment to James Carlin that he would vote for Bartley. So on the evening before the climactic meeting of the board, the Bartley forces appeared to have the necessary votes to win.

On June 5, the time for a decision had come. Realizing that there was a delicate balance of power among the trustees, the anti-Bartley forces pulled out all the political stops. They sounded the alarm and summoned two trustees who had not planned to attend the meeting. Alice Huang flew in from New York and Richard Huguenin arrived from South Deerfield. After giving a brief report about the search, trustee O’Leary suggested that the board go into executive session to discuss the reputation and character of the candidate who was being recommended. Tension tightened as they engaged in an intense debate over Bartley. Some argued that he did not have experience in managing a large public institution. Others attacked him on the grounds
that he was insensitive to the Hispanic community in Holyoke. One trustee declared that she could never support anyone who had served in the Ed King administration. Still others contended that if Bartley were appointed president, the university would be held up to public ridicule by journalists like Howie Carr, who writes for the Boston Herald. Carr had nothing but contempt for politicians and patronage politics. In rebuttal, the pro-Bartley forces argued that the former speaker knew the Massachusetts political scene better than any of the other candidates and therefore was best suited to win state support for the university.

These points were driven home as the trustees hotly debated their differences. After this lengthy and at times acrimonious discussion, the trustees voted while still in closed session. The vote was close. On the first ballot, the Bartley nomination was defeated by a slim majority (10 to 9). Whatever the reason, William Bowman reneged on his commitment to Carlin and switched his vote to Fretwell. Pressured by both sides, Angus McQuilken and James Canina, the student trustees from Amherst and Boston, changed their minds at the last minute and turned to Fretwell. By contrast, John Walsh, the Worcester student trustee, kept his word and stayed with Bartley.

Much to everyone’s surprise, the trustees overturned the recommendation of their search committee by the narrow margin of one vote. On the second ballot, the vote to elect Fretwell as president was unanimous. He was offered a contract with a flexible term of “no less than six months and no longer than two years.” Fretwell’s salary was set at $123,500. Reporter Phyllis Coons of the Boston Globe, who attended the trustee meeting, described it as a “bare-knuckle political battle complete with grudges, threats, and last-minute arm-twisting.”

The pro-Fretwell forces rejoiced in the outcome, but their victory turned out to be short-lived. Again the secret ballot came back to haunt them. Again the press played a major role as the vigilant defender of the state’s open-meeting law. This time the Boston Globe filed a complaint with the state attorney general that the trustees had violated the statute.

Three weeks later, on July 1, Attorney General Scott Harshbarger responded to the complaint and ruled that the board was in violation. These violations included failure to notify the candidates of a discussion of their character and reputation while in closed session and taking a vote in secret. He therefore invalidated Fretwell’s election and ordered that the June 5 votes pertaining to the interim position be rescinded and revoted in open session. A dismayed Gordon Oakes attempted to put a positive spin on things by saying, “Nobody was intent on violating any open meeting law. If there was any violation, it was only because people were not aware of the technical requirements.”

The next act in this drama took place on July 9 as the board met to comply with the attorney general’s order. At this final showdown, a few more wrinkles had been added to the scenario. Since the original vote on June 5, trustee Alice Huang had resigned, and three new student trustees had been elected to the board. Desperate to stop Bartley at all costs, Governor Weld appointed and swore in Daniel Taylor as a trustee that same morning. Taylor, who formerly served on the board of regents and was identified in the press as a Dukakis loyalist, replaced Alice Huang.

Although the terms of trustees William Bowman and Richard Huguenin had also expired, they had not yet been replaced and were therefore eligible to vote. To add to the drama, the new Boston student trustee resigned the day before her term was to begin. She had returned home to India because of an illness in her family. Appar-
ently there was no provision in the student governance constitution for anyone to succeed her. All of which meant that the outcome was still in doubt when the board met to revote.

Like the previous meeting, this one was filled with tension and suspense. Dismayed at what was happening, trustee William Bowman set the tone of the meeting with a statement that appeared in the morning press. He was quoted as saying, "To bring in somebody from out of state and then invite him to go back home — we would look ridiculous. We'd be the laughingstock of the nation." After a few preliminaries, trustee Lawrence DiCara moved to rescind the votes taken on June 5 and to ratify the agreement confirming Fretwell as interim president. At this point, trustee William Mahoney offered a motion to substitute the name of Bartley for Fretwell. By a 9 to 9 vote, with Chairman Oakes casting the deciding vote, the Mahoney motion was defeated. Mary Reed, who had previously voted for Bartley, now switched her vote. She felt that they had made a contract with Fretwell and should not back out of it. The board then voted on DiCara's original motion, which was passed unanimously. Sober second thoughts prevented them from remaining deadlocked. It began to dawn on everyone that their efforts to find a president might end in abysmal failure. Putting aside their personal differences, they voted to approve Fretwell.

Fretwell's confirmation was a tremendous relief for Gordon Oakes. Because he believed that Fretwell was the best person for the job, the days since the attorney general's ruling had quite possibly been more agonizing for him than for Fretwell. Now Oakes could put his mind at ease. His choice had prevailed.

The next day, Fretwell received an unexpected dividend, praise of his appointment by the Boston Globe. Its editorial read: "It wasn't easy or even very pretty, but the UMass trustees did the right thing yesterday in reaffirming their decision to appoint E. K. Fretwell as interim president of the school. Bartley might have done well, but to the outside world the appointment of a man steeped in local politics would have sent a discordant signal. On that basis alone, Fretwell, an outsider with big-time experience as an academic manager, was the superior choice." On this positive note, the latest chapter in the ritual of presidential succession at UMass was concluded.

A day later, on July 11, 1991, Governor Weld signed into law the historic piece of legislation creating the new five-campus university. In the end, the power of those who favored the Saxon Commission plan had prevailed over the power of those who favored the regents, who were now defunct.

A Comparative Analysis

In retrospect, it is clear that these five presidential searches carry different meanings for the different participants and observers. Indeed, the activity surrounding each search has served as a barometer of how the trustees, faculty, students, and alumni feel about their institution, revealing their aspirations and their misgivings. To quote McLaughlin and Riesman again: "Like perhaps no other event in the life of an institution, the search for a president reveals the politics, protocols, and promise of the American academic enterprise." Even more revealing is the distribution of power among the major players, including the governor and legislative leadership. Depending upon how this power gets played out, the outcome will be influenced accordingly.
As happens regularly, because of the culture of the state, the search becomes political, no matter what committee structure or procedural safeguards are employed. Consequently, the key to a successful search depends to a large extent on the "representativeness" of the process and the participation of all parties-at-interest. For the search to be considered legitimate, it must include the major stakeholders within the university community. Exclusion of faculty members from search committees, as we have seen, has frequently caused antagonism to the searches. Such antagonism tends to generate suspicion and mistrust, which in turn undermine the effectiveness of the incumbent.

Because of the brevity of their terms and the lack of stakeholder participation in their eventual appointment, both Franklin Patterson and Joseph Duffey were handicapped in establishing their legitimacy. To some extent, this was also true of Robert Wood, who found himself in an embarrassing situation through no fault of his own. In his case, however, UMass astounded itself, for the flawed search produced an altogether unexpected outcome. Wood was a topflight choice for president. The late Joseph Healey was probably correct in his assessment when he said, "We got the right guy, but the wrong way." Given this mood, Wood was literally the right person in the right job. Yet he was never able to overcome the perceived illegitimacy of his presidency, at least not at Amherst. On the other hand, David Knapp was the product of a procedurally flawless textbook search in which the trustees followed both the letter and spirit of their governance document. As a result, Knapp was not only assured a smooth transition, but was also more readily accepted by the entire university. This contrast illustrated an important lesson that the trustees had learned.

It is also worth noting that the presidents who have become the most effective leaders have been men of driving ambition and fierce concentration who pursue their goals relentlessly. Wood was such a personality and in a different way so was Knapp. Wood set his sights on achieving national recognition for the university and spared no one, including himself, in his drive to get there. His determination never flagged. Knapp pursued his goal of a first-class university in a much different way. His academic experience, his conciliatory tactics, and his capacity to persuade all help account for his tangible achievements. Neither Patterson nor Duffey remained in office long enough to realize their dreams. Both of them were insiders who parlayed that advantage to the top. They were both short-termers and their mundane records reflected as much. Because Duffey left so soon, he did not live up to expectations.

In the search that produced Fretwell, the trustees acted throughout as if it was a political contest between the King and the Dukakis forces. In what turned out to be a clamorous and public spectacle, it seemed clear enough that the emphasis was on power and conflict. But in this King versus Dukakis, Irish versus non-Irish, or whatever, combat, how did the concerns of faculty get factored into it at all? Their concerns seem to have gotten lost in the heat of battle. Similarly, what about the students for whom this political issue might not be salient? Their interests also got buried. Both students and alumni were represented on the board of trustees. The faculty, who were not even represented on the search committee, were in effect disenfranchised.

The decision rested between a consummate political insider versus an academic insider from out of state. In a judgment call that was much too close for comfort, the trustees opted to go with Fretwell. He now faces a formidable task, because the university is in a very delicate position. Fretwell's tact and diplomacy will be sorely
tested as he works out the new relationships of the five-campus university. Hopefully, he will be able to play a major role in rebuilding the strength of academic departments that have been decimated by the terrible losses sustained during the past few years. Although it is still too early to know for sure whether Fretwell will succeed in this endeavor, the prospects for the university look promising. The new institutional configuration should give it a stronger voice locally as well as a stronger national presence. As an interim president, Fretwell, too, will be a short-terms, and we ought not to expect more than he can possibly deliver in the allotted time frame.

The treatment David Bartley received should not be ignored or dismissed lightly. If he was the product of a virulent localism, he was also the victim of a political smear. Did the trustees hurt their own cause in rejecting him? Answers to this question have remained highly partisan and extremely sensitive politically. It is not possible to measure precisely the political damage that resulted from the dispute and the negative publicity that accompanied it. Suffice it to say that residual animosities still linger in some powerful quarters. To overlook that resentment is, in my judgment, a mistake. Fortunately, Bartley behaved decently, made no attempt to get back at anyone, and accepted his defeat graciously.

Why did all this happen? The easy explanation is to blame it on trustee collusion and politics as usual. The true answer is more complex. For one thing, Bartley's candidacy had been in the works for some time. Like his predecessor David Knapp, Fretwell was a late entry, brought in from the outside as the prescribed antidote for the local front-runner. Many of the key participants liked Fretwell, whose particular abilities matched their specific needs. The mobilization of the pro-Fretwell trustees would seem in part to reflect a campaign to discredit Bartley, who by all accounts is a decent man, but whose effectiveness locally might have been partially blunted by lack of recognition nationally and in Washington. For some of the trustees, or those who tried to persuade the trustees, the national issue was more important than what Howie Carr might write or say on his daunting talk show. Surprisingly, Governor William Weld comes off rather well in the outcome. Why did he care so much? His role would suggest more interest in public higher education than he had indicated earlier.

In hindsight, the Bartley supporters felt that their man could do more for the university than any outsider. His rejection disappointed both the Amherst alumni and the Irish legislative leaders, if for no other reason than that one of their own had been rejected. The class distinctions and the issues of ethnicity and elitism merely exacerbated their resentment. It is striking, of course, and David Bartley is the most recent illustration of what might be thought of as a certain antagonism toward Catholics. This is all the more surprising when one considers that Massachusetts has a very high proportion of Catholic citizens whose offspring attend public colleges in equally high numbers. In the university as in society, as our cultural cleavages have widened, they reflect divisions that run deep and have importance for the future.

In the aftermath of the battle, Alan Lupo, a Boston Globe columnist, referred to the whole affair as "UMass's self-inflicted wound." His attack on the candidacy of E. K. Fretwell for its elitism and snobbery is a powerful column by a man who is not an Irish Catholic. As Lupo argues:

The University of Massachusetts trustees seem to have gone out of their way to alienate state legislators whose cooperation is crucial to the university's future . . . Those trustees reflected the elitist concerns of some faculty who worried that they might look bad in the eyes of their peers in Cambridge or elsewhere if they
picked a community college president as their leader. It is a job for an educator, all right, but it is also a job for a good politician, somebody who knows the political culture of the state and its players.15

Even making allowances for its parochialism, Lupo’s argument, in my opinion, does have some merit. First of all, UMass is not Harvard, and vice versa. The two institutions are very different in nature and serve very different academic missions. Second, there is ample evidence to suggest that “good politicians” have gone on to become effective university presidents. Terry Sanford at Duke University, John Brademas at NYU, and Lamar Alexander at Tennessee come readily to mind. It is also interesting to observe that three of the five modern UMass presidents (Wood, Patterson, and Knapp) were all political scientists or professional students of politics. One who was not, Duffey, had been a theologian and a professional politician before becoming president. For that matter, Fretwell, who served a stint as the U.S. vice consul to Czechoslovakia, is an academic politician in the best sense of the term. The point is that the political element is an essential aspect of the job. Public figures who are proven leaders should not be automatically excluded from consideration simply because they have devoted part of their careers to public service. Surely, there is a life after politics. One must be able to look beyond mere partisanship and determine what is in the best interests of the whole institution.

Given what has happened to UMass in recent years in terms of fiscal deprivation, one can reasonably argue that the political pedigree of a president may be as important as his or her academic credentials. It was certainly true of both Wood and Duffey. In reality, Duffey’s political connections with Dukakis were valued more highly by the trustees than his academic discipline in theology. Some would contend that modern presidents, in matters that really count, still need to act essentially as Robert Wood did but would never openly acknowledge it.

Today the complexities of university life increasingly demand a president who can operate and feel comfortable in both the political world and the academic world. This is especially true at a land-grant university, which depends so much on public funding. To cling to the idea that the office of president is primarily an executive one is to continue a criterion that neither tells us what a university president does nor what he should do. To be a president requires an understanding of history, of culture, and of human nature and a capacity to exert sufficient intellectual and moral energy to bind together people of diverse interests and commitments. He or she must be able to inspire, inform, encourage, and embolden all those who have a stake in public higher education.

Having pointed this out, I hasten to add that I do not assume that professional academics lack the necessary political skills. This study suggests otherwise. But the culture of the academy is vastly different from the culture of Beacon Hill. In order to be effective, a president must be able to operate in both spheres. Equally important, I think the involvement of the Massachusetts political leadership in these searches has gone beyond what is desirable. As we have seen, the intervention by governors tends to provoke a counterintervention by legislative leaders. It is precisely at this juncture that political interference destroys the integrity of the search process and robs the institution of its autonomy.

As mentioned earlier, the search mechanism formulated in the Wellman report is the only adequate method yet devised for permitting significant participation in the choosing of a new president. Because it provides representation for the major stakeholders and is a practical way of doing things, I value highly its function of resolving
basic conflicts of interest. Not even the strongest advocates would claim that it does all these things completely satisfactorily, but no one has yet provided any substitute for assuring faculty and students that they will have some say in the outcome. That maximum involvement is going to be difficult is no reason to turn back from it.

It is particularly encouraging to note that the trustees have already agreed to embrace the principles of the Wellman report in conducting the upcoming search for a permanent president. At its meeting on June 5, 1991, the board approved a resolution calling for a search committee that included “voting representatives from each of the campuses.” This policy should go a long way toward ameliorating some of the problems that have plagued recent searches.

Reviewing this history, one is struck by two things. First, the title “president” is about all that has remained constant about the position. Second, one cannot help but observe that several UMass presidents have gone on to other presidencies, beginning with Kenyon Butterfield in 1924. A change in governors and regents or a shift in political winds can make life untenable for a president. Still and all, it is perhaps a compliment to the University of Massachusetts — or even to the searches that produced them — that these presidents are considered desirable “catches” by other institutions. By looking back, we look ahead, identifying what is worthwhile to preserve from the past by way of predictive value and carry it into the future. If our capacity to predict the probable effectiveness of presidents is not very imposing, we can at least be sure that the quality of our picks over the past two decades has been top grade. 

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**Notes**

1. This figure is arrived at by including in the count Paul A. Chadbourne, who served two separate terms, the first in 1866–1867, the second in 1882–1883, and William P. Brooks, who served as acting president from 1905–1906.

2. A few Jewish candidates have been courted for the post in recent years, but none have been selected. This is illustrated by the finalist positions of Marilyn Gittell and James Vorenberg in 1978. The same is true of recent Catholic candidates like finalists David Bartley and William Hogan in 1991.

3. For a perceptive analysis of such searches, see Judith Block McLaughlin and David Riesman, *Choosing a College President: Opportunities and Constraints* (Princeton: Carnegie Foundation, 1980), 21. On a personal note, I owe a special debt of gratitude to these authors. In many ways, I have profited from their work and from their correspondence.


6. Ibid., 14.


8. For more on this, see McLaughlin and Riesman, *Choosing a College President*, 65.


14. Interview with Ernest Lynton, July 30, 1991. Lynton, who served as vice president for academic affairs under Robert Wood, provided me with much information about the personality and leadership style of Wood. I am, of course, solely responsible for the interpretation of Wood’s presidency.

15. See Report of the President’s Committee on the Future University of Massachusetts.


17. Insights about the work of this group were obtained from retired professor Thomas N. Brown, who served on the Wellman committee. Interview, June 11, 1991.


20. For insights on how President Wood was perceived at the Amherst campus, I am indebted to Professor Lewis C. Mainzer. Interview, July 9, 1991.

21. Interview with Lynton.

22. Interview with Mainzer.


25. Interview with Franklin Patterson, June 14, 1991.

26. While William P. Brooks served as the first acting president of the university from 1905–1906, Patterson was the first so-called interim president. In legal terms, the difference between the two titles is more than just a matter of semantics.

27. Memorandum of the Ad Hoc Committee on Search Process, July 1, 1977.


29. Interview with Professor Richard Lyons, June 18, 1991. He served on the search committee as the faculty representative from the Boston campus.

30. Interview with Mainzer.


32. McLaughlin and Riesman, Choosing a College President, 79.


34. Interview with David Knapp, July 1, 1991.

35. Again, Ernest Lynton’s rich experience in UMass academic administration and his association with both Knapp and Wood made him an invaluable source of insights and information.

36. Interview with Knapp.


38. Interview with Lynton.

40. Interview with Sandra Elman, July 27, 1991. Professor Elman, who served as associate director of the Saxon Commission, interrupted her own work frequently to advise me.

41. Interview with Knapp. See also News and Views, UMass/Boston, March 23, 1990, 2.


47. For more on this, see Joseph S. Slavet et al., “After the Miracle: A History and Analysis of the Massachusetts Fiscal Crisis,” monograph published by the John W. McCormack Institute of Public Affairs, May 1990.


52. See the trustee resolution passed at the meeting of June 5, 1991. Minutes of this meeting, 10.


56. Interview with Chancellor Sherry Penney, June 18, 1991.

57. See David Ellis, “David Michael Bartley: The Speaker or Rising to Power from Holyoke” (mimeograph), 1–10.


63. Martha Weinberg, who at the time was a trustee at the University of Lowell, sat in for Solomont when he couldn’t make the meetings. She, too, was adamantly opposed to Bartley for much the same reasons.

68. Strangely enough, the minutes of the trustee meeting for June 5, 1991, do not give either a vote tally or a roll call on this motion. Hence there is no way of confirming the reported unanimity of the trustee vote.
74. McLaughlin and Riesman, Choosing a College President, xxxvi.
75. Lupo, “UMass’s Self-inflicted Wound.”

ERRATA

With regard to Richard Hogarty’s article, “Searching for a UMass President: Positions and Leadership, 1970-1991,” footnotes 66 and 67 were printed incorrectly. They should read as follows:

Chairman Gordon Oakes has taken exception to this statement. He claims that he never actually threatened to resign and that he was misquoted in the press. Oakes defended his position by saying: "I told the news media that I would have trouble working with Bartley if he became president." Interview with Gordon Oakes, September 23, 1991.

Minutes of the meeting of the Board of Trustees, June 5, 1991.