Regional Planning and Land Use Localism: Can They Coexist?

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Regional Planning and Land Use Localism

Scott A. Bollens

The potential effectiveness and citizen acceptance of emerging regional and state land use planning programs in New England is examined. To be successful, these programs must find acceptance within a system of historically home-rule, town-based land use governance. This article investigates the interplay between regionalism and parochialism, discusses emerging strategies, and reports on a telephone survey of over three hundred Cape Cod residents that examined local opinion regarding the proposed creation of a regional land use regulatory commission. These citizens were queried about the perceived consequences of greater-than-local land use planning. Although local parochialism was found to be a strongly held attitude, regionalism support was substantial (76 percent in favor), because two perceptions overshadowed local biases — awareness of the regional impact of development and perceived utility of regional land use management. The negative image of a regional government preempting local control was largely overshadowed by the anticipated tangible benefits of regionalism. The transferability of Cape Cod regionalism to other New England areas is discussed.

Regional and state land use planning is emerging in a number of New England and northeastern states, taking its place beside traditionally local planning programs and policies. Such regional efforts in land use planning seek to address more adequately extra-local or regional growth problems, encourage orderly growth and development, plan more efficiently for public utilities, and protect critical natural resources such as water, farmland, and recreational land.¹

For regional planning to succeed in New England, however, it must find its proper relationship to, and acceptance within, a system of historically home-rule, town-based land use governance. This article examines four emerging regional and state land use programs in New England and one in New Jersey, then analyzes more closely the successful push for regional land use planning on Cape Cod, Massachusetts. The Cape Cod case study specifically examines citizen attitudes and perceptions regarding the role of regional governance in urbanizing areas, and the proper fit, if any, between regionalism and

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locally based planning. The potential conflict between regionalism and local parochialism frames this analysis and its conclusions.

Regional and State Land Use Planning in New England

Numerous regional and greater-than-local planning programs have been established in New England since 1988. Three states—Vermont, Maine, and Rhode Island—initiated state land use planning programs that rely in some way on the enhancement of greater-than-local land use planning authority, while a fourth—Massachusetts—has engaged in two efforts aimed at improving extra-local land use planning. Outside New England, a fifth state, New Jersey, also passed major state land use planning legislation.

The Vermont Growth Management Act of 1988 (Act 200 — 24 VSA Chapter 117) encourages local towns to engage in a “continuing planning process” that will lead to a local comprehensive plan consistent with state planning goals. Towns that do not undertake such local efforts will not be eligible to receive their share of available planning funds. Regional planning commissions, established by the legislature in the late 1960s, are to prepare regional land use plans that will integrate and unify the town plans while reflecting state planning guidelines. Regional commissions must also confirm that local plans are consistent with regional plans and statewide planning goals. In addition, Act 200 makes mandatory heretofore voluntary local participation in regional planning commissions. These planning requirements survived a repeal attempt in March 1990 and have been modified through legislative action (Act 280 of 1990 session). Among other changes, these amendments pushed back until 1996 the deadline for local compliance with state goals.

Prior to the 1988 Vermont planning legislation, Act 250 in 1970 (Vermont Environmental Control Act; 10 VSA Chapter 151) created a state and regional regulatory framework in which nine district environmental commissions, whose members are appointed by the governor, review certain development projects having greater-than-local impact. The plans must be consistent with ten legislative criteria involving each development’s impact on environmental resources and capital facilities.

The Maine Comprehensive Planning and Land Use Regulation Act of 1988 (30 M.R.S.A. Section 4960) establishes a cooperative program of local comprehensive planning and land use management among municipalities, regional councils, and the state. The act requires that all towns and cities develop by 1996 a local growth management program consistent with ten state goals. It also mandates state and regional council review of local comprehensive plans and zoning ordinances to assure consistency. Although submission of local growth management programs to the state is voluntary, the act establishes certification as a prerequisite to obtaining discretionary state community development, technical assistance, and open space funds.

The 1988 Rhode Island Comprehensive Planning and Land Use Regulation Act (Chapter 45-22.1 of Rhode Island General Laws) requires each municipality to adopt a comprehensive plan and submit it by 1991 to the state division of planning for approval based on consistency with state legislative goals and the State Guide Plan. If the local comprehensive plan is not in accordance with state goals, the state division of planning has authority to prepare a binding comprehensive plan for the municipality (Chapter 45-22.1-13).

Massachusetts has yet to establish a statewide land use planning program, but two study groups have examined the need for extra-local planning in the commonwealth. The Regional Committee of Blueprint 2000 was appointed by former lieutenant governor Evelyn
Murphy to investigate the special challenges facing Massachusetts regions. The commit-
tee concluded that a “new regionalism” is needed in the commonwealth to empower re-
gions and communities to adopt policies within an overall state policy framework. It
called for increased authority for regional planning and state legislation enabling regional
land use regulatory commissions, such as exists on Martha’s Vineyard. The Special Com-
mission on Growth and Change has examined the possibility of establishing an integrated
comprehensive land use management process at the state, regional, and local levels. Such
a process would include adoption of a statewide growth policy, greater reliance on region-
alism to promote environmentally sensitive development, and the adoption of local plans
consistent with regional and state policies and plans. \(^8\)

Proximate to the region and significant in scope is the 1986 New Jersey State Planning
Act (NJSA 52:18A-16 et al.). It authorized the newly created State Planning Commission
to prepare a preliminary development and redevelopment plan for the state. After prepa-
ration of the state plan, a “cross acceptance” process with counties and municipalities
begins for the purpose of compatibility between local, county, and state plans. The key
participants in this process appear to be the county planning boards, which first negotiate
differences between the state plan and county policies and regulations, then perform the
same process with each of their municipalities. \(^9\) The final state plan, based on negotiated
changes during the cross acceptance, will aim to guide future state, county, and municipal
land use decisions.

Each of these state and regional planning programs imposes certain requirements on
local government and review procedures by regional councils and/or state governments.
Concerns of statewide and regional importance, such as environmental protection, public
facilities siting and expenditures, and housing, are put forth as rationales for mandatory
local participation in these new planning processes. The imposition of this greater-than-
local planning focus is overlaid on a historic pattern of both real and perceived local
autonomy and parochialism in New England. The Cape Cod case study analyzes the na-
ture of this overlay of regionalism upon a foundation of localism.

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**Home Rule and Parochialism**

Local autonomy and home rule in the six New England States are strong traditions that
can be jealously guarded by communities. \(^10\) The New England system of town dominance
over counties, volunteer town boards, and the “tenacious institution” of open or repre-
sentative town meetings is based on the seventeenth-century system of local government in
England, and its local political processes are close to the heart of many as the antithesis of
the corrupt and politically stultifying large city. \(^11\)

The New England town system is strongly rooted in the political theory of the United
States — many small governments run by local, ordinary citizen-legislators. The well-
known Jeffersonian concept of grassroots government run by the people — miniature
replics — has firmly taken hold in the American mind. Although often resembling
cities in the magnitude and diversity of public services offered, New England towns con-
tinue to be perceived as homely, provincial, and the most local form of local government. \(^12\)
“Self-government,” “the government closest to the people,” and “grassroots democracy”
are terms associated with our nation’s past and thus take on special significance in perpet-
uating the idealism of the New England town system of governance. \(^13\) Small-town New
England is at once the keeper of the New England character, the maintainer of its tradi-
tional landscape, and the nurturer of values. However, it can also be highly protective concerning its long-term residents and suspicious of newcomers and new ideas.14

Beyond the image and romanticism associated with local government in New England are legal and programmatic considerations. Of importance here are two items. First, local governments in the region, in general, have more discretion than in other regions of the country. Second, county governments have notoriously weak powers, and regional councils’ policymaking ability has historically been severely limited by local autonomy.

In many New England states, substantial discretionary authority, granted localities by state government, is often referred to as “home rule.”15 Such authority may be provided through either state constitution or statute and can give localities the right to exercise any power or function not otherwise limited by said constitution or statute. In addition to the legal framework of state-local relations in New England, there is the perceived discretionary authority of local government. In an opinion-based survey, local governments in the fifty states were rated as to their discretionary authority in several areas of governance.16 The six New England states were rated as having significantly greater authority in terms of modifying their structure of government and assuming governmental functions than in the United States as a whole. This image of local autonomy should not be overgeneralized, however. In the area of public finance, many New England states — and Massachusetts in particular — have been constrained in their use of local taxes.

Counties in the United States are, in effect, regional governments in that they encompass wide expanses of land and multiple municipalities. Accordingly, debates over extra-local activities and issues often fall logically upon county governments or other regional entities. Following English and colonial practice, counties were originally established to carry out the general policy of the state.17 Outside New England counties have expanded their responsibilities, often delivering services previously considered the sole domain of municipalities.18 Within New England, however, counties remain predominantly a forgotten or restricted form of government. Connecticut and Rhode Island do not have county governments in effect; Massachusetts, Vermont, and New Hampshire have counties with minimal discretionary authority; and Maine’s counties vary widely in their discretionary authority. Finally, regional councils in New England, as in many parts of the country, remain underutilized instruments of policy. Where regional entities are given sufficient authority, as in Vermont, they have often become overburdened through reliance on volunteer members.19 The general rule in New England is that regional planning bodies are mainly involved in technical assistance to member communities, and their policymaking abilities are curtailed by state statute or local prerogative.

It is within this context of New England local government that new regional and state planning initiatives must be situated. Since county and regional governments have little power relative to that of local governments and attachment to home rule principles is very strong, greater-than-local planning will probably succeed in the region only to the extent that it garners the support of citizens in town governments. Currently, most, if not all, of the government tools that can be used in growth management are vested in the local towns. For regional and state growth management and planning to succeed in such a circumstance, it will need to be carried out predominantly by local officials operating at the town level.

The effectiveness of current and future regional planning efforts will then depend on the cognition and perception of local residents as to the appropriateness and desirability of regional solutions to growth-related problems. If local pride and parochialism is indeed a dominant mind-set of New England residents, what factors are conducive to the emer-
gence of regional growth management? How can regionalism and state planning be effective within this context?

The Cape Cod case study examines these questions by surveying resident attitudes and perceptions in a fifteen-town region, which voted for the creation of a new regional land use regulatory commission. This survey attempts to isolate those perceptual and demographic characteristics of local residents which are associated with acceptance of regionalism. Such analysis will inform policymakers and planners involved in the formative or continuing stages of regional and extra-local planning efforts.

The Push for Regionalism on Cape Cod

In response to mounting growth-related problems, two significant growth management referenda appeared on the Cape Cod local ballot in November 1988 and passed by wide margins. The nonbinding referenda included votes on (1) whether to impose a one-year development moratorium and (2) whether to create a regional land use regulatory commission.20

The referenda were put forth as responses to the tremendous and seemingly unplanned urbanization of the Cape. Population growth on Cape Cod, which occurred at breakneck speed, has transformed the Cape from a group of rural villages into a suburban community with growing regional problems. Between 1970 and 1986, the highest rate of population growth in the commonwealth occurred on the Cape (Barnstable County). In that period, the year-round population increased from 96,000 to 170,000. During 1980–1986, Cape population growth represented more than one quarter of statewide population growth. Only Middlesex County (suburban Boston) issued permits for more housing units than Barnstable County from 1980 to 1987.

Such growth on the Cape has led to regional problems of soaring housing costs (over 100 percent increase in four years), traffic congestion (doubling of traffic volume in ten years), waste disposal and groundwater pollution (four landfills cited by state as most threatening to drinking water supplies), and contamination of coastal waters (causing 5,600 acres of shellfish beds to be closed).21 In response, a new Cape Cod regional commission was envisioned as a more effective way of managing Cape-wide growth problems than continued reliance on the myriad and often conflicting regulations of local towns. The responsibilities of such a commission would include the adoption of a regionwide policy plan, encouragement and certification of local government compliance with the regional plan, regulatory review in districts of critical planning concern, and review and regulation of developments of regional impact.22 The regional commission would be intricately involved in planning for the entire Cape Cod region, a responsibility formerly carried forth in a fragmented way by the Cape towns. As such, the regional commission vote involved the basic issue of the place of regionalism within a historic foundation of local autonomy, and dealt with residents’ attitudes regarding the proper relationship between local and regional land use planning.

Survey and Methodology

A telephone survey of 309 registered voters in the fifteen towns of Cape Cod was undertaken from November 28 to December 14, 1988, approximately three weeks after the November 8 ballot questions regarding growth management. The sample frame consisted of 1,800 registered voters randomly selected from a voter contact list. To the extent possi-
ble, efforts were made to assure that several important subpopulations of Cape residents would be adequately represented. Smaller towns and the relatively underpopulated "lower Cape" region were intentionally overrepresented in the sample so that valid comparisons could be made between towns and Cape subregions. Of survey respondents, 30 percent lived on the upper Cape (Bourne, Falmouth, Mashpee, and Sandwich), 52 percent on the middle Cape (Barnstable, Brewster, Chatham, Dennis, Harwich, Orleans, and Yarmouth), and 18 percent on the lower Cape (Eastham, Wellfleet, Truro, and Provincetown).

The overall approach was to develop a sample that would lend itself to valid intergroup comparisons while being as representative as possible of the total Cape population. The survey covered the following areas. (See Appendix A for specific content.)

1. social class/demographic characteristics
2. subjective views of growth and development
3. evaluation of existing governance
4. anticipated consequences of growth management
5. local parochialism/regional propensity
6. town characteristics
7. voting behavior or opinion on local ballot questions

The analysis of data includes univariate tabulations to examine basic patterns and bivariate cross-tabulations and correlations to describe voting contrasts between subgroups of the Cape population. Multiple correlation and discriminant analyses are then undertaken to measure the potency of sets of variables, and specific factors, in contributing to regionalism support.

Of eligible respondents successfully reached, 71.7 percent completed the telephone survey. No political party affiliation or town was significantly overrepresented among those who refused to respond. Females were slightly overrepresented in the completed surveys, but this is not a problem because of the emphasis on intergroup comparisons rather than sample-to-population inferences.

Support for the two ballot questions in the survey (76.5 percent for a Cape Cod commission; 65.7 percent for moratorium) approximates closely the actual voting in the referenda. In addition, the breakdown by political party affiliation (23 percent Democrat; 22 percent Republican; 54 percent independent) is similar to the Cape population. Both these findings provide evidence that the surveyed sample is a representative subsample of the population.

Fifty-seven percent of 309 respondents were employed, while 36 percent were retired. Of those employed, 42 percent were professional-managerial, 21 percent were involved in administrative support, and 17 percent were skilled labor. Other occupational classifications were minimally represented. Male respondents constituted 42.7 percent of the sample, females 57.3 percent.

Perceptions of Quality of Life, Growth Problems, and Town Governance

In making decisions regarding governmental reorganization and regionalism, perceptions of citizens, of their quality of life and growth problems, their feeling of local responsibil-
ity, and their evaluation of existing governance will play a role. We first examine these factors to lay a foundation for the more detailed analysis in the following section.

Respondents viewed the Cape as a very desirable place to live, but perceived trends linked to development that are worsening this quality of life. Three of every four respondents felt that growth and development are making the Cape a less desirable place to live, and over 60 percent feel that there is too much population growth. Residents perceived environmental difficulties as their primary concern. When asked which problem they consider most important to their quality of life, respondents gave the following answers:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problem</th>
<th>Most Important to Quality of Life</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Water quality</td>
<td>41.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amount of new development</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waste disposal</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic congestion</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of affordable housing</td>
<td>11.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of new development</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beachfront development</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When asked specifically about the problems, over 90 percent of the Cape respondents viewed water quality as very important, while 86 percent were extremely concerned about waste disposal. Quality of new development, amount of new development, and traffic congestion were each perceived as very important problems by over 60 percent of the respondents. The two environmental issues also stood out when the respondents were queried about the second most important Cape problem: waste disposal (30.4%); water quality (26.5%); traffic congestion (14.2%).

This issue analysis points to an environmentally focused perception of Cape problems. The more immediately visible characteristics of fast growth — amount of new development and traffic congestion — also rank high as problems, but the environmental consequences of fast growth are most disturbing to respondents.

Citizens were then asked about their specific perceptions regarding development on the Cape. Seventy-seven percent of respondents felt that growth and development are taking away from the traditional Cape appearance (as defined by the respondents). Respondents were indecisive regarding whether developers and builders have unregulated independence. Fifty-five percent agreed that developers and builders "can do most anything they want on the Cape," but 42 percent of those surveyed disagreed with this assessment.

In addition to perceptions of current and future problems on the Cape, residents' degree of local parochialism and evaluation of existing governance on the Cape may influence opinion on growth management solutions. The fifteen towns that govern the Cape range in population from 36,540 to 1,380 (1986 figures). Barnstable County governance is functionally weak and the existing regional body (Cape Cod Planning and Economic Development Commission) is advisory in nature.

Home-rule powers of the towns have predominated over county and regional entities on the Cape and elsewhere in New England. A home-rule, "do it yourself" attitude is apparent in the sample, as 65 percent of respondents felt that decisions regarding land use
within a town’s borders should be purely that town’s responsibility. However, there was also recognition among those surveyed that all land use issues are not easily self-contained within local boundaries. Fully 88 percent of respondents felt that some developments have an impact on more than one town. Despite the presence of a home-rule attitude, then, we will see later that awareness of developments’ regional impact may overshadow local parochialism when citizens consider regionalism as a possible solution to Cape-wide growth problems.

Although respondents are loyal to local governance, the existing system of town government was not perceived as overly successful in controlling new growth and development. Respondents were split concerning whether current town regulations were adequately dealing with new development (49 percent agreed; 46 percent disagreed), but over 80 percent agreed that their town should place additional limits on growth and development. Another problem with existing town governance communicated by 66 percent of the respondents was a perceived lack of cooperation among Cape towns on issues dealing with growth. The regional impact of some developments perceived by respondents is thus not being properly controlled through intertown planning and coordination. Finally, 92 percent of those surveyed stated that the Cape’s environment was not being adequately protected, an especially important viewpoint in light of the significance respondents attach to Cape environmental problems.

Factors Associated with “Regionalism” Support

We next isolate the individual and townwide factors associated with support for regionalism on Cape Cod. Which resident characteristics ameliorate and which exacerbate the potential conflict between regionalism and locally based town planning?

The theoretical literature pertaining to regionalism and governmental integration provides the framework for analysis here. Such literature is often dominated by the debate over the beneficial and adverse impacts of political fragmentation in urban areas. Less research has been oriented to residents’ attitudes toward regionalism and governmental reorganization, and extant attitudinal research regarding governmental reorganization tends to be directed to city-county consolidation in metropolitan areas.

Two of the major hypotheses in this literature are the lifestyle difference and loss of control. The lifestyle thesis states that the greater the perceived lifestyle differences between individuals and towns, the less likely it is that the integration or regionalism proposal would be supported. The loss of control hypothesis points to the fear of losing control of access to governmental decision making as the prime impediment to integration or regionalism efforts. Three different predictors of residents’ attitudes toward governmental reorganization have been put forth — objective characteristics and subjective states of the respondent, evaluation of existing political system characteristics, and anticipated consequences of regional oversight. Within this context, public opinion, especially relating to political attitudes and local orientations, has been found to be a major obstacle to regional government in suburban areas.

Here we test hypotheses from the six categories of individual-specific and townwide characteristics.

1. Social/demographic characteristics. Based on the social class paradigm, people of higher income and education levels and those who own rather than rent housing are expected to be most supportive of regional growth management. In addition, people whose well-being is most directly linked to the prosperity of the local economy will most likely
oppose growth management.30 It is also hypothesized that the fewer number of years an individual has lived on the Cape, the more likely he or she will be to support the moratorium.31

2. Subjective views of growth and development. Greater regionalism support is expected from respondents who perceive a worsening quality of life, adverse effects of development on the Cape, and excessive population growth rate. It has been shown elsewhere that these cognitive and perceptual (as opposed to demographic) variables are important in explaining environmental and growth control concern.32

3. Evaluation of existing governance. It is hypothesized that the more strongly a respondent feels that town land use regulations are inadequately dealing with growth and that the Cape’s environment is not being adequately protected, the stronger will be the person’s support for regional growth management. Such approval is related to residents’ dissatisfaction with local government problem solving.33

4. Anticipated consequences of growth management. Those who perceive that a regional approach will be more effective in dealing with growth than individual towns will more likely support regional planning. Also, less support will come from those who feel that a regional commission will decrease local control over land use decisions.34

5. Local parochialism/regional propensity. Regionalism will more likely be favored by respondents who perceive a regional identity to the Cape and its development problems. Less support will come from those who feel that land use decisions should be purely a local responsibility and those who view development problems as affecting areas outside the respondents’ town borders.

6. Town characteristics. Greater growth management support is expected from residents of towns that have undergone the greatest recent population growth and those who live in the larger towns.35 Residents in these towns will experience the adverse impact of development more directly than those in smaller and slower-growth communities. These hypotheses, however, have not been supported by some.36

For each set of variables, a multiple correlation coefficient was calculated showing the relationship between that set of variables and the dependent variable (regional commission support). The coefficient is simply the correlation between the actual values on the dependent variable and the values on the dependent variable predicted by use of a multiple regression equation containing the specified variables. The multiple correlation coefficients (r) for each set of variables are as follows (** = coefficient statistically significant at 0.05):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Set of Variables</th>
<th>Multiple Correlation Coefficient — Regionalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anticipated consequences of growth management</td>
<td>0.46**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation of existing governance</td>
<td>0.40**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjective views on growth/development</td>
<td>0.31**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local parochialism/regional propensity</td>
<td>0.28**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social class/demographic characteristics</td>
<td>0.26**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Town characteristics</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Variables (27)</td>
<td>0.64**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two sets of variables stand out as the most effective predictors: anticipated consequences of growth management and evaluation of existing governance. Also, objective individual and town factors rank at the bottom in predictive ability.37,38 This shows that
regionalism support is more dependent on cognitive and perceptual factors, especially perceptions regarding local government capability and anticipated effects of regionalism, than on demographic characteristics. It is also important to point out that the set of local parochialism/regional propensity variables, which measure local attitudes thought to be major impediments to regionalism, rates relatively low in predictive ability.

Bivariate cross-tabulations and Kendall tau-b correlations were calculated to examine more closely the link between specific variables and the dependent variable. Significantly more regionalism support came from those who perceived existing town regulations to be inadequate (Kendall tau-b = -0.29; p < 0.01), as shown below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regionalism</th>
<th>Agree (N = 143)</th>
<th>Disagree (N = 139)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support</td>
<td>63.6%</td>
<td>89.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oppose</td>
<td>36.4%</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This table points to the importance of perceptions regarding local government competence. Also, significantly more support for the commission was found among those who favor more town limits on development (tau-b = 0.20), and those who felt that the Cape environment was not being adequately protected (tau-b = 0.27).

Perceived inadequacy of town regulation, however, does not necessarily translate into support for regionalism. Dissatisfaction with local government may not be enough to overcome the communal and grassroots ideology of the respondents. For these individuals the existing system of local government has become the embodiment of certain home-rule values, so that regionalism proposals to change the system are perceived less in terms of greater planning effectiveness than as threats to these values. If this is the case, a logical response by citizens would be to lobby for strengthening local regulations rather than institutionalizing regional land use planning. Thus, other factors must work in combination with perceived inadequacy of existing town governance to stimulate support for regionalism.

For a regionalism initiative to succeed, then, it must overcome the often strong obstacle of local parochialism. Given that fully 65 percent of respondents believed that “decisions regarding land use in my town should be purely my town’s responsibility,” and that 57 percent of all respondents felt that a regional commission would reduce local control over their town’s land use decisions, how was the regional growth management initiative able to garner over 75 percent support?

Parochialism did indeed deflate support for regionalism (tau-b = -0.23; p < 0.01), yet seven of ten “home rulers” supported the regionalism initiative, as the following table shows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land use decisions should be purely local responsibility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regionalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N = 191)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree (N = 99)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oppose</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Assuming a representative sample, support for regionalism by the parochial subpopulation (65 percent of all respondents) was a key to the passage of the referendum. Findings specific to these 191 parochial respondents show that many of them may be ideologically parochial but operationally regionalist when urban growth problems are considered to be extensive.

The overcoming of parochialism occurred because of several factors. First, parochial respondents, like the sample at large, were strongly aware (91 percent) that development projects can have an impact on more than one town, and their awareness was highly associated with regionalism advocacy. Also, 75 percent were keenly aware of the link between Cape development and perceived worsening of their quality of life. The awareness of regional and adverse impacts of development undoubtedly complicated citizen views of local responsibility as local towns were not regarded as isolated islands with the freedom to determine their own growth patterns. Second, most provincial respondents (81 percent) felt that their town should place additional limits on growth and development. However, and of importance to the success of the regional initiative, two of three individuals holding local biases admitted that a regional planning commission would deal with growth and protect the environment better than individual towns. Local and regional land use regulations were thus believed to be complementary, not mutually exclusive, by these parochial citizens.

For the sample as a whole ($N = 309$), the dichotomy between local parochialism and regional awareness is brought out further through examination of the anticipated consequences of a regional land use commission. Approximately 57 percent of the respondents felt that such a commission would reduce local control. On the other hand, 70 percent of respondents believed that a regional commission would deal with growth better than individual towns.

Each of the two anticipated consequences — erosion of local control and improved management of growth — had significant, and opposing, influences on commission advocacy. Those who strongly anticipated loss of local control were significantly less likely to support the commission (60.6 percent support) than other respondents (83.2 percent support); however, substantial support came from both groups. On the other hand, those anticipating improved growth management from a regional government were significantly more likely to advocate a commission than others (88.0 percent compared to 44.3 percent support). Significantly, it was the second perception — that of improved management of growth — which was the stronger consideration when predicting regional opinion. The perceived improvement in growth management by a regional commission was strongly held, regardless of whether or not the individual anticipated loss of local control ($\tau_{b} = -0.08$; not significant), as shown below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commission will manage growth better than individual towns</th>
<th>Commission will reduce local control over your town’s land use decisions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes ($N = 159$)</td>
<td>No ($N = 87$)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>75.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>24.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The negative image of a regional government preempting local control did not have a significant effect on the perception of tangible planning benefits from such a government.
Further, the significant relationship between anticipated growth management improvement and commission advocacy held, whether or not the respondent anticipated erosion of local control.

The variables measuring subjective views of Cape growth and development displayed contrasting relationships to regionalism support. Judgments regarding the specific and negative impacts of growth and development on the Cape were significantly linked to regionalism support. Eighty-two percent of those who felt that growth and development were making the Cape a less desirable place supported regionalism, whereas 58.7 percent of those who anticipated no effect or a positive effect supported regionalism. On the other hand, general impressions regarding the quality of life currently or over time showed no significant relationship to the regionalism initiative. The ability of a respondent to foresee the specific impacts of development on quality of life is thus the important predictor of regionalism support, not the individual's general view of Cape life.

Social class and demographic characteristics showed mixed patterns and, as a whole, were not strong predictors of regionalism support. Household income level displayed no clear relationship with regionalism support (Kendall tau-b correlation = 0.01), and this relationship remained negligible (partial tau-b = -0.07) when statistically controlling for employment status. Thus, application of the social class hypothesis to regionalism support, as found elsewhere, is not warranted. On the other hand, individuals with higher educational attainment levels were significantly more supportive of the regional initiative (tau-b = -0.14; p < 0.01), as shown below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regionalism</th>
<th>Highest level of education completed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Some high school (N = 13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HS diploma/some college (N = 158)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>College degree/advanced degree (N = 122)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support</td>
<td>53.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oppose</td>
<td>46.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support</td>
<td>73.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oppose</td>
<td>26.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support</td>
<td>82.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oppose</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other characteristics, including respondent’s status as owner or renter (tau-b = -0.05), length of residence on the Cape (tau-b = -0.07), and political party affiliation, were not significantly related to regionalism opinion.

Interestingly, regionalism support was bipartisan. Eighty-one percent of both Democrats and Republicans supported the initiative, while the independents (54 percent of the sample) showed less but still strong support for the commission (72.5 percent supported). This Democrat-Republican bipartisanship is consistent with studies elsewhere that have indicated that political party membership may not be an adequate predictor of environmental and growth concern because the two-party system in this country tends to dilute partisan differences.

In terms of job status, employed and retired respondents showed no clear difference in their degree of support for regionalism (tau-b = -0.04; p = 0.55).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regionalism</th>
<th>Employed (N = 170)</th>
<th>Retired (N = 104)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support</td>
<td>74.7%</td>
<td>77.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oppose</td>
<td>25.3%</td>
<td>22.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Regionalism appears not to pose a threat to employed residents, who are more strongly linked to a robust Cape economy than retirees. However, limited evidence from occupational differences shows that a regionalism initiative implies to at least some a probable threat of slow growth. The least supportive occupational group was comprised of skilled laborers (50 percent support) The two largest occupational groups in the sample — professional managerial and administrative support — showed stronger support (80 percent and 73 percent, respectively). Those who could be most immediately and dramatically affected by a slowdown in Cape construction and development — skilled laborers — were most reluctant to support regional governance despite the lack of explicit growth-curtailing language in the regionalism initiative.

Finally, townwide characteristics — 1986 population size and population growth, 1980–1986 — were poor predictors of regionalism advocacy. Those in the large and faster-growing towns were not more likely to support the regional solution. Many of the respondent-specific characteristics and perceptions are better predictors of regionalism support or opposition than townwide demographic factors.

This analysis shows that a regional growth management strategy in New England can be accepted by the citizenry in a multijurisdictional area undergoing strong growth pressures. Overall, residents' cognitive and perceptual characteristics, not their demographic attributes, were important in discriminating between supporters and opponents of the initiative. Such factors include a cognitive linkage between ongoing development and perceived worsening of quality of life, an awareness on the part of the citizenry of the regional impacts of development, and perceived inadequacy of existing town governance to confront emerging problems.

Regional growth management was successful in a home-rule, parochial environment because perceived inadequacy of existing town regulations was linked to the belief that regionalism would be a more effective mechanism than reliance on individual towns. In an atmosphere of local parochialism, dissatisfaction with local government capability does not automatically lead to support for regionalism. Thus, the key belief was that the solution lies not only with stronger local policies but with the creation of a regionwide planning body.

Regionalism advocacy and local parochialism coexisted as ideologically provincial residents became operationally regionalist when faced with mounting Cape-wide growth problems. Awareness of the critical and extra-local nature of these growth problems overcame parochial and protective tendencies. Although most respondents felt that regionalism would result in a loss of local control over land use decisions, over 75 percent believed that a regional commission would manage growth better than individual towns. The negative image of a preemptive regional government was largely overcome by the tangible growth management benefits respondents anticipated from engaging in such an approach.

The Cape Cod experience should not be considered a unique case, but rather one that can be duplicated in other New England areas which have considered or are considering the adoption of a regional or other extra-local planning strategy. Three components of success appear important. First is citizen acceptance of a regional planning strategy, which will be attractive in "special areas" with complex environmental and management qualities. Such areas have been classified by: (1) the inability of existing local authorities to achieve their goals for the area, resulting in frequent management conflicts between jurisdictions; (2) lack of an overall framework for the region as a whole; (3) user conflict
between preservation and development because of the area’s high resource value; and (4) a spatial resource system clearly identifiable by agencies and users.41

Second, regional strategies will probably be effective in places where clearly defined boundaries demarcate the special area from adjacent ones. Such demarcation can increase the sense of regional identity and intertown interdependence

Third, the institutionalization of regional land use planning in New England will undoubtedly be more successful when citizens not only feel that existing town governance is inadequate to address emerging problems, but also when perceived extra-local problems are viewed by the populace as necessitating the creation of a new regional planning body. Inadequacy of existing town governance is not enough in a parochial environment; rather, affirmative and positive recognition of the need for a new and regionwide form of government is necessary for public opinion to support regionalism efforts. Public campaigns by government and supportive interest groups can be important here in explaining to the public the nature of growth problems, their ill fit with existing governance systems, and the benefits of regionalism.

Finally, there is the regionalism approach, which on Cape Cod was successfully “packaged” with a second initiative dealing with a temporary development moratorium. As regionalism represented to developers and other economic interests a less threatening solution than outright growth limitation, this packaging spotlighted the regional strategy as a less confrontational, more rational method of addressing mounting growth problems. Such a two-tier integration of regionalism and limitation can be used elsewhere as a way to push for a regional strategy. For public officials and planners, “ballot box” planning by referendum should not be viewed as an obstacle to their normal day-to-day activities or to comprehensive planning. Instead, town planners and managers should view referenda as opportunities to lobby the public creatively for the improvement of regional land use planning and the expansion of institutional capacity.46
Appendix A
Cape Cod Survey Questions

I. Social Class/Demographic Characteristics

A. Household income in 1988 before taxes
B. Highest level of education completed
C. Employed, retired, or other
D. Current occupation
E. Own or rent residence
F. Live on Cape all year (yes/no)
G. Number of years a permanent resident of Cape
H. Political party affiliation
I. Sex

II. Subjective Views of Growth and Development

A. Growth/development making Cape a less desirable place to live
B. Growth/development taking away from traditional Cape appearance
C. Quality of life on Cape as a resident (very or somewhat desirable; very or somewhat undesirable)
D. Quality of life getting better, staying same, or worsening
E. Population growth too much, just about right, or too little
F. Problem considered most important to quality of life on Cape

III. Evaluation of Existing Governance

A. Town land use regulations adequate for dealing with new development
B. Town should place additional limits on growth
C. Protection of environment adequate, inadequate, too strict
D. There is lack of cooperation among Cape towns on growth issues
E. Developers/builders can do most anything they want on Cape

IV. Anticipated Consequences of Growth Management

A. Regional land use planning commission will reduce local control over your town's land use decisions
B. Regional land use planning commission will deal with growth and protect environment better than individual towns
C. Development moratorium will slow growth rate, halt construction temporarily, halt construction permanently

V. Local Parochialism/Regional Propensity

A. Land use decisions in town should be purely town responsibility
B. Character of town significantly different from other Cape towns
C. Growth issues more critical in other towns than in your town
D. Some development projects have an impact on more than one town

VI. Town Characteristics

A. Population size 1986
C. Location (upper, middle, lower Cape)

VII. Voting Behavior or Opinion on Local Ballot Questions

A. Voted for or support growth moratorium (yes or no)
B. Voted for or support Cape Cod regional commission (yes or no)

Note: Except for social class/demographic and town variables, response categories, unless otherwise indicated, were "strongly disagree," "somewhat disagree," "somewhat agree," "strongly agree."
Notes


8. Special Commission on Growth and Change (Massachusetts), Goal Statement (Boston, July 6, 1989).


20. The moratorium referendum was supported 68 percent to 32 percent, the regional commission referendum 76 percent to 24 percent. More than one year after these nonbinding votes, the Massachusetts state legislature ratified and the governor signed the Cape Cod Commission Act in January 1990, subject to approval by Cape voters. In March 1990, the citizens of Cape Cod ratified the state law (53 percent supported, 47 percent opposed), and a new regional planning and regulatory commission, with an annual budget of $2 million, was established.


27. Fowlkes and Hutcheson, “Citizen Response to Proposals for Metropolitan Governmental Integration.”


34. Ostrom, “Metropolitan Reform.”


37. Discriminant analysis was used to examine the relative power of specific variables to discriminate (classify) observations between support and opposition to growth limitation and regionalism. Within each of the six sets of variables (“group-by-group analysis”), stepwise discriminant analysis was used to isolate significant specific variables. Variables are entered and retained in a discriminant function according to their potency in contributing to the discrimination between supporters and opponents, controlling for effects of other variables in the equation. See note 38. Then, surviving significant variables were entered into one stepwise discriminant analysis (“across-group analysis”). Surviving variables listed below are the most potent discriminators. Standardized coefficients are indexes of the relative contribution/importance of each variable to the discrimination between supporters and opponents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Standardized Canonical Coefficient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regional commission as more effective manager</td>
<td>0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection of environment inadequate</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Your town’s regulations are adequate</td>
<td>-0.32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significance of discriminant function = 0.0001
Explained variance = 0.28


Bibliography


Williams, Oliver P. "Life-Style Values and Political Decentralization in Metropolitan Areas." (Southwestern) Social Science Quarterly 48, December 1967.
