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Producing Space: Block-By-Block Change in a Gentrifying Neighborhood

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PRODUCING SPACE:
BLOCK-BY-BLOCK CHANGE IN A GENTRIFYING NEIGHBORHOOD

A Dissertation Presented

by

JEN DOUGLAS

Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies,
University of Massachusetts Boston,
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

December 2013

Ph.D. in Public Policy Program

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ABSTRACT

PRODUCING SPACE: BLOCK-BY-BLOCK CHANGE IN A GENTRIFYING NEIGHBORHOOD

December 2013

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Directed by Professor Ann Withorn

Gentrification of urban neighborhoods is part of an ongoing restructuring of the city, linked to the emerging occupational structure of the service economy and the remaking of built environments that were created for a production economy. It is the name given to processes in which commodification and reinvestment accompany the in-migration of professional and managerial workers, often displacing prior residents and giving altered spatial form to inequality.

This dissertation is a case study of gentrification in Hyde and Jackson Squares, part of Boston's Jamaica Plain neighborhood. The emergence of gentrification pressures and their uneven distribution within the area is documented and situated in the context of the area's historical development, using a combination of descriptive numeric and qualitative data. A method to observe the block-by-block process of reinvestment and occupational transformation at the

building and street level is tested, with attention to factors that advance and factors that appear to inhibit gentrifying changes. Over a period of decades, professional workers and students are observed to be making their way further into the neighborhood, creating opportunities for real estate actors. As the process advances, other kinds of workers have a sustained presence in housing that is outside the market or has not recently traded. The paper concludes with suggestions for removing housing and land from the speculative market and other strategies to mitigate the housing affordability impacts of neighborhood upscaling.

DEDICATION

To Sibyl

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I have been well supported in the pursuit of this project. Ann Withorn has been an enthusiast and patient encourager of my work for over a decade, and she made it possible for me to return to do this dissertation after many years. Michael Stone's housing and neighborhood expertise, high standard, collegiality, excitement, steady guidance, and commitment of time and energy were indispensable. Miren Uriarte made sure I grasped the neighborhood history while Donna Haig Friedman asked hard questions about my conceptual framework; each of them was generous with enthusiasm and research expertise. In all, I was fortunate to be guided by faculty with deep and long-standing community involvement. Michael Johnson kindly took a chance on me, granting that last extension and imposing that very helpful deadline.

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I am indebted to Kathie Mainzer, Kathy Brown, Helen Matthews, Sue Naimark, Steve Meacham, Jeannette Huezo, Richard Wise, Lanny Johnson, Edwina Cloherty, Kevin Maloney, Hilda George, and others who prefer to remain anonymous—none of whom share any responsibility for any aspect of the project framing nor conclusions—for their time and generosity in sharing reflections, knowledge, and contacts with me during my project planning phase. All these individuals are among the many more to whom I owe a general debt for their moving and shaking as housing activists and neighborhood makers and community organizers. Ken Sazama, Colleen Scanlan, BJ Ray, and Josh Muncey each generously answered questions to help me to understand the business of real estate. Tim Davis provided guidance on data. Thank you to the named and anonymous key informants who helped me grasp aspects of the community planning and community development work, as well as the real estate context, in the study area.

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CHAPTER 1


INTRODUCTION: SUPERMARKETS AND SPACE

On January 14, 2011, the web site of the *Jamaica Plain Gazette* broke the news that some 40–50 employees of Hi-Lo Foods, an independent grocer in the Jamaica Plain neighborhood of Boston, had been given lay-off notices with little explanation and that the store was closing permanently. The Hi-Lo had operated for 47 years at 415 Centre Street in the Hyde Square section of Jamaica Plain, an area named in recent years by a local business group as the “Latin Quarter.” It served as an anchor store for commerce in the neighborhood and a purveyor of food staples from home for Latino and Caribbean shoppers throughout Greater Boston. Rumor had it that a Whole Foods grocery store would be opening in that location. Within five days, this news was “far and away the most popular story ever to appear on the *Gazette* web site” (Taber, 2011c). Although the Hi-Lo had been a “busy” and “successful” store, “they got an offer so high they could not refuse it” (Helms, 2011a). Whole Foods Market, Inc. had taken out a 20-year lease with Knapp Family Trust, the owners of Knapp Foods, Inc., which ran Hi-Lo and owned the building where it operated (Helms, 2011b).

In subsequent media coverage, locals processed the news (Morgan, 2011; Taber, 2011c; Zagastizábal, 2011). Customers and employees of Hi-Lo were reported to be sad, some in tears. One spoke of the Hi-Lo as a place to see old friends as well as to shop for

food. Another had phoned friends in the Dominican Republic to share the news, but they already had heard. A *Boston Globe* story captured the change: “For Jamaica Plain’s eclectic mix of hipsters, affluent professionals, and working-class Latinos, there has been no starker symbol of transformation in their neighborhood than the one announced yesterday: The tumble-down Latino grocery Hi-Lo Foods will close its doors and reopen as a sparkling new Whole Foods Market” (Irons, 2011).

Figure 1.1. Jamaica Plain



Conflict Erupts

The Jamaica Plain Neighborhood Council (JPNC), an elected neighborhood body created by the city to facilitate the participation of residents in neighborhood-level

municipal affairs, called one community meeting, and then a second, to accommodate the substantial response (Shanley, 2011). In total, several hundred people gathered in February 2011 and sat for upwards of two hours in the fixed wooden folding seats at a Hyde Square elementary school auditorium. About 75 of them rose to wait in the long lines that snaked along either side of the room and led to a microphone at the front. Speakers, using either English or Spanish, were worried about the Hi-Lo employees, the potential impacts on the surrounding businesses, where they would shop for the foods Hi-Lo had sold, and the meaning of the change for the neighborhood. At the first meeting, many speakers described the Hi-Lo as a place closely tied up with memories and events in their personal lives. The change was perceived by some as part of a larger series of events that exerted a negative impact on Latinos, or people of color, or people who were not affluent. It was “an attack on us,” “a coordinated effort to make JP serve wealthy interests,” “getting robbed,” and “taking away a people’s culture.” One asked, “how did we let this happen?” while another warned, “if we keep taking it,” everything will be taken. The second meeting, over three hours long, “was almost wholly given over to community comments, and the vast majority. . . were anti-Whole Foods” (Taber, 2011b).

In between the two JPNC meetings, people began to organize. Lines of allegiance were drawn, challenged, blurred, and insisted upon. A group of long-time Latina residents, newer residents and people with other ties to the neighborhood from a mix of backgrounds, many of them queer, began to mobilize against Whole Foods’ arrival under the name “Whose Foods? Whose Community?: The Coalition for a Diverse and Affordable JP.” The key concerns of this group were that Whole Foods would accelerate the pace and extent of rising property values in JP, bring those pressures to the Hyde

Square end of JP in an intensified form, and exacerbate the displacement of low-income residents and people of color that was already perceived to be underway in the neighborhood. Later, counter projects called “JP For All” and “We Are All Whole Foods” formed to support the company’s arrival. The name JP For All suggested that it was Whole Foods supporters who were being marginalized from the neighborhood, while We Are All Whole Foods rejected the assertion that the store served a particular, more affluent, consumer.

City and state representatives of the neighborhood advanced, retreated from, and danced around controversial positions related to the cultural claim of Latinos to the district, on the one hand, and the anticipated impacts an upscale grocer might have on housing affordability, on the other. Just one elected official floated a proposal to create a Whole Foods-supported fund to alleviate potential negative impacts of property price increases on local residents (Jamaica Plain Neighborhood Council, 2011); in response she faced calls for her dismissal from office (Fire Sonia Chang-Díaz, 2011). The mayor’s office praised the company’s decision to locate in Hyde Square and circulated rumors that Whole Foods opponents were from outside the neighborhood. Established neighborhood groups and leaders appeared reluctant or unable to provide leadership on a debate that it was safer to avoid, preferring instead to get involved in the less controversial area of support for the laid-off Hi-Lo workers. One exception was the JPNC, which narrowly passed a highly controversial measure expressing concern about the “fit” between market and neighborhood, formed an ad hoc subcommittee to study the issue, and made half-hearted stabs at negotiating a community benefits agreement.

Throughout, debate raged. In on-line English-language forums, the tone was self-

righteous, strident, and often nasty. Some argued about which supermarket chain would be the best fit (Trader Joes and Market Basket were popular options, e.g., Cormier (2011)). Others defended the rights of private parties to form contracts. The Hi-Lo and its clientele were cast in race- and class-coded language (the store was “dirty,” its products “unhealthy,” e.g., Rosenthal (2011)). High property values were defended. The prospect that a Whole Foods could increase surrounding property values was questioned by some and welcomed by others. “Hipsters” were despised. Doubts were raised about the validity of claims that Whole Foods foods cost more (e.g., Taber (2011a)). People whose lives seemed to require “a bakery for their dogs” were put on the defensive. Just who had the authority and authenticity to speak about Hyde Square and on behalf of Latinos in JP was debated. JP’s “diversity” was lauded. A few Latinos stated that they didn’t need white people to protect them from high rents. Assertions that low-income residents would not be well-served by a Whole Foods Market were attacked as classist campaigns to deny wholesome foods to all people. The specter of decay and vacancy in Hyde Square was invoked to demonstrate a wise understanding of what’s at stake (e.g., Donnellan (2011), Juliette Hannan, speaking on Radio Boston (Chakrabarti & Brooks, 2011)). Whole Foods’ plans for philanthropic activity in the neighborhood were defended as an obvious plus. Some Hi-Lo shoppers cautioned that the Hi-Lo had never been known for good prices nor high wages. The pros and cons of gentrification were vigorously debated (let’s just say that the popular dissemination of Richard Florida’s “creative class” thesis seemed to be in evidence (Florida, 2002), e.g., Inghram (2011)). People who attend meetings to take part in public processes were summarily dismissed as unsophisticates in need of Internet-based redirection. Lists were produced of more important issues to work on than

resisting a Whole Foods in your neighborhood (almost anything else won). “Data” was demanded, “jobs” were applauded, and “hypocrisy” was sniffed out and chastised (do you oppose CVS or Dunkin’ Donuts? should I make arrangements for my state senator to write letters to every “landlord I don’t like?” e.g., Buckingham (2011)). The signification and meaning of the events was denied altogether (as in, “it’s just a supermarket replacing a supermarket,” e.g., Steve Garfield, speaking on Radio Boston (Chakrabarti & Brooks, 2011)). And everyone’s ability to “accept change” was placed under close scrutiny. Thus the residents of the neighborhood grappled with, engaged, and denied in turns the circumstances everyone was a part of and that no one seemed in a position to control.

Whose Neighborhood?

Why did this event touch a nerve? Why was it so polarizing? And why was it felt so personally? What are the circumstances that enabled some claims to 415 Centre Street to triumph over others? Why did the use of that property matter and why did each supermarket trigger such a passionate response? What kind of an outcome could be just, for whom, and why is it appropriate or relevant to pose questions about justice or equity? In short, the Hi-Lo and Whole Foods controversy brought to the fore issues that were simmering in the neighborhood.

For the past several decades, Jamaica Plain has been undergoing a transformation of people and place in one example of a now-widespread phenomenon called “gentrification.” Generally speaking, the term gentrification refers to a mix of phenomena playing out at the scale of the neighborhood: changes to the built environment through the rehabilitation of residential and commercial space; the in-migration of higher-income, highly-educated professional residents; a decline of manufacturing and other industrial

land uses; and aesthetic changes that reveal and celebrate the historical, trendy, artsy, and gritty (or their fetishized simulacra) in various combinations. “The gentrification process involves the purchasing of buildings by affluent households or by intermediaries such as speculators or developers, the upgrading of the housing stock, governmental investment in the surrounding environment, the concomitant changeover in local retail facilities, the stabilization of the neighborhood and the enhancement of the tax base” (Beauregard, 2010, p. 12), along with the displacement of prior residents, often with significant local state supports.

The academic literature on the subject typically begins with Ruth Glass, who coined the term “gentrification” and catalogued the characteristics of its emergence in London in the 1960s. She “identified gentrification as a complex urban process that included the rehabilitation of old housing stock, tenorial transformation from renting to owning, property price increases, and the displacement of working-class residents by the incoming middle classes” (Lees, Slater, & Wyly, 2008, p. 5).

One by one, many of the working class quarters of London have been invaded by the middle classes—upper and lower. Shabby, modest mews and cottages. . . have become elegant, expensive residences. . . The current social status and value of such dwellings are frequently in inverse relation to their size, and in any case enormously inflated by comparison with previous levels in their neighbourhoods. Once this process of ‘gentrification’ starts in a district, it goes on rapidly until all or most of the original working class occupiers are displaced, and the whole social character of the district is changed. (Glass, 2010, p. 7)

Sometimes described as “[t]he *embourgeoisement* of the inner city” (Ley, 2010b, p. 108), in its classic form gentrification is a highly local phenomenon “involv[ing] the transition of inner-city neighbourhoods from a status of relative poverty and limited property investment to a state of commodification and reinvestment” (Ley, 2003, p. 2527). Tightly

linked to shifting patterns of investment and the transition from manufacturing to services, gentrification is one outcome of a “profound economic, social, and spatial restructuring” (Smith & Williams, 2010, p. 10).

In Jamaica Plain, as in many places, gentrification appears to have begun “as a small-scale urban process, pioneered by a new liberal middle class but in which the state was involved from the beginning” (Lees, Slater, & Wyly, 2010a, p. xv). With its abundant greenspace, appealing architecture, and proximity to downtown, Jamaica Plain maintained some middle- and upper-income subareas through the postwar decades of deindustrialization, disinvestment, highway-related demolition, and suburban expansion. As abandonment, deterioration, and declining property values became common in some subareas (including those around Hyde and Jackson Squares), property values for Jamaica Plain as a whole continued to rise (Boston Redevelopment Authority, n.d.-a). Even so, by the 1970s problems of residential property abandonment, arson for profit, empty storefronts and industrial spaces, and poverty were prevalent. As was true in cities nationwide, many who could leave left for the promise of the suburbs, a process that was pushed along for many white residents by Boston’s controversial school desegregation process in the mid-1970s.

Meanwhile, Cubans began to settle in the Hyde Square area in the 1960s, anchoring what would become Boston’s largest Latino neighborhood by the late 1970s. Black residents began entering the neighborhood in substantial numbers during the 1960s, growing from less than 1% of the population of the JP-Parker Hill Planning District in 1950 to 16% in 1970 (and comprising a majority of the residents of color at both time points). One initial concentration of black settlement in the neighborhood was

at the Bromley-Heath public housing project at Jackson Square, the business district adjacent to Hyde Square (Boston Redevelopment Authority, n.d.-a). Young professionals, some identified with left social movements or alternative lifestyle projects, began to arrive in the 1970s (Hirsch, 1998; Parkman Center, 1977). By the 1980s, JP also had a substantial presence of lesbians (Boston Foundation, n.d.). In the course of these demographic changes, JP's prior racial and ethnic residential pattern was complicated and altered, while its multi-class legacy was sustained in old and new forms.

Neighborhood-wide, new and longtime residents—many of them empowered by their successful mobilization in the late 1960s and early 1970s to stop a major highway (Interstate 95) from being built through the center of the neighborhood, and subsequent involvement in a highly-participatory effort (M. M. Gastón, 1981) to design public transportation and greenspace infrastructure in an 8-mile strip of cleared land—created numerous organizations to develop affordable housing, assert tenants' rights and combat slumlording, re-engage banks in local mortgage lending, support small business creation, provide a range of social services, influence land use decisions, facilitate the participation of residents in local governance, and confront youth violence with leadership development and civic engagement programs. Residents fostered multi-cultural neighborhood life through such means as annual festivals, arts programs, community gardens, and bi-lingual community organizations.

At the same time, residents and real estate professionals rehabilitated housing for market rate sales and rentals and converted triple-decker rental units to condominiums. Both the community building and the retail and real estate efforts were part of making JP a desirable neighborhood and community, and they ultimately contributed to rising

housing costs. Despite sustained community action, some of it explicitly “anti-gentrification,” to create subsidized and to preserve affordable private housing using a range of strategies, steady upward movement of rents and sales prices has meant sustained displacement pressures for unsubsidized residents who can’t compete in the new price structure. Those pressures grew after 1994, when the end of rent control unleashed a steep round of rents and price increases throughout Boston.¹ Meanwhile, similar transformation of the commercial spaces had been underway since the late 1970s, with the launch of alternative retail projects with appeal for the professional newcomers—like a bakery café, feminist bookstore, health food store, and vegetarian restaurant—and community pressures to keep out corporate chains.

Today, Jamaica Plain is still known as a multiracial neighborhood, distinguished by its dense web of community-based organizations. But it is also increasingly a place to make a solid real-estate investment, where high house prices have held steady during the sustained downturn (Swenson, 2011). The local culture of progressive activism and public-interest reform exists alongside a growing defense of property values and intolerance of or indifference toward less well-off residents from residents who fear that lower-income neighbors will harm their property and/or property values (e.g., Walker, 2012). Local community organizers find that, as “new residents who don’t necessarily share a commitment to affordable housing move in, we are continually challenged to find new ways to maintain a solid base of support for the housing agenda” (Barnett & Smith, 2004). In an exception to the trend, when Blessed Sacrament, a Hyde Square Catholic church was closed and placed on the market in 2004, anti-gentrification organizing

¹ Average rents increased more than 75% citywide over the 1990s, and went up 64% in Jamaica Plain in the first five years after rents were decontrolled (Boston Tenant Coalition & City Life / Vida Urbana, n.d.).

rescued the campus from a future of luxury condos and enabled its purchase by a community development corporation. Nonetheless, coming out of the housing slump that began in the mid-2000s and peaked amid the subsequent housing-led financial crisis, real estate prices recovered early, prompting a barrage of media attention (e.g., McKim (2013)). There is steady interest from private real estate developers (Mercurio, 2013; Soto-Palmarin, 2013), some of them backed by global-scale institutional investors (e.g., Boston Residential Group LLC (n.d.)).

Figure 1.2. Matchstick Man and Monopoly Man, Mozart Park Mural



These sequential neighborhood challenges, of disinvestment and upscaling, were depicted by community activists in a mural at Mozart Park, located between Hyde and Jackson Squares. When it was originally painted in 1987, scenes from the neighborhood included “Matchstick Man,” a character who symbolized the landlords that burned the buildings they found insufficiently profitable in order to collect insurance money. Matchstick Man was shown running from the orange glow of fire with a fistful of cash.

When the mural was renovated in 2001 by Hyde Square Task Force (HSTF), a youth service and organizing group, they added “Monopoly Man.” Styled after the character from the popular board game, in which players compete to acquire domination of a real estate market, Monopoly Man is shown proudly admiring his acquisitions with the fires literally behind him. Together, they illustrated how the two seemingly different real estate actors had similar consequences for many residents. As a staff person from HSTF put it, “Now we don’t have the case of people being burned out of their houses. . . . They’re being priced out of their houses” (Jesús Gerena, quoted in Shoberg, 2004).

As these real estate trends play out, it is common for community organizations (e.g., Racial Healing and Reconciliation Team, 2012) and neighborhood residents (e.g., Samuels (2011), residents quoted in Taber (2011d) and Ruch (2011)) to speak of “two JPs.” A recent community organization report explained that “in one part of JP incomes are likely to be higher, housing is in good condition, and youth are doing well overall [and] looking to a good future. But, in the other part of JP, where African American and Latino families are heavily represented, incomes are more likely to be low and many young people are struggling in school and dealing with issues of community violence” (Jamaica Plain Coalition, 2010). Some say, however, that it is more accurate to speak of “three JPs” to reflect the distance in social life between the residents of two public housing complexes and everyone else.

These terms flatten the complexities of residents’ lived identities, yet they also reflect broad truths about lines of difference that impact daily life in the neighborhood. Strong and rising real estate values are surely associated with increasingly resourced residents, while the neighborhood’s comparatively large stock of subsidized housing

serves a substantial low-income population. For the most part, there has been little overt conflict between JP's different groups—possibly because people live parallel lives with little interaction across certain kinds of differences, a phenomenon gentrification researchers have labeled “social tectonics” (Slater, 2005, p. 53)). Some suspect that population shifts—specifically, the pricing out of low-income residents, with a pattern of whites replacing people of color— are underway and worsening, prompting others to suggest that no such thing is occurring (Storey, 2012).

Versions of the “two JPs” are expressed across and within the neighborhood's commercial districts. Higher priced restaurants and “specialty stores where unique and higher quality clothing and food convey and reinforce a sense of status” (Beauregard, 2010, p. 11) predominate in some areas, while franchise chains, older Irish bars and restaurants, thrift stores, no-frills ethnic eateries, and corporate pharmacies remain in that mix. In other sections—including Hyde Square, Jackson Square, and the stretch between them—the commercial spaces are primarily occupied by bodegas, small Cuban or Dominican restaurants, take-out pizzerias, dollar stores, check-cashing outlets, and barbershops and salons. Hyde Square, named the “Latin Quarter” in the last decade through a community process initiated by a municipally-backed local business group, has a number of specialty stores that cater to broad and niche Latino consumer tastes, needs, and cultural practices—such as the dress shop specializing in weddings and quinceañeras, the notary public office that advertises immigration-related services, or the car parts shop that sells accessories popular with young men who customize their vehicles. It also features an Irish pub and a growing number of offerings with appeal for subcultures within the gentry—such as a leftist bookstore, bicycle repair shop, tattoo parlor,

alternative video rental store, and an upscale café.

It is in this local context—of concern and dispute over the declining residence of Latinos in the lately-branded “Latin Quarter,” income inequality with an increasingly bipolar distribution, steadily rising housing costs, more vocal homeowner politics, a visible emphasis on certain kinds of consumer “taste” in more parts of the commercial and residential space, the local history and present of community-building and political action—against the backdrop of a well-disseminated common-sense booster ideology in which gentrification is a desirable and only option, that the Hi-Lo – Whole Foods debate took shape. Participants in the debate understood the change to be a watershed moment in the local process of gentrification, regardless of whether these changes were regarded as positive or negative.

What About It?

The Hi-Lo – Whole Foods transition and the subsequent contestation over its meaning for Hyde Square, the Hyde-Jackson Squares area, and the rest of Jamaica Plain provide a visceral introduction to three core elements of this neighborhood-level process.

First, this is a story about uneven development and the drivers of urbanization, with gentrification as one part of the redevelopment and redifferentiation of urban space (Zukin, 1987, p. 141).

Gentrification through a production lens explains the process as a consequence of the uneven investment of capital in certain land uses, its devaluation through use and systematic disinvestment, and the opportunities for profitable reinvestment created by these capital flows. (Slater, 2011, p. 574)

In the assertions that an upscale grocer would be preferable to a vacant storefront is recognition of the area’s recent past decline and worry about whether economic activity

and capital investment could again be withdrawn. This area, however, is on the opposite trajectory. WFM's offer of a price that could not be refused—setting in motion the transition of the property from “tumble down” to “sparkling” (Irons, 2011)—effectively demonstrated and closed a “rent gap,” bringing the realized rent into alignment with the possible rent now attending that geographic location. The anticipated increases in residential housing costs similarly speak to opportunities for professional and lay speculators and developers to realize a gain by driving a change in land use.

Second, this is a story about class and a process of class transformation.

Although it is often equated with neighborhood improvement, in reality gentrification is a process of class transformation: it is the remaking of working-class space to serve the needs of middle- and upper-class people. . . . [W]hen an established working-class residential area becomes attractive to investors, developers and middle-class households, the risk of displacement can become quite serious. (K. Newman & Wyly, 2005)

The supermarket controversy tended to focus on class as status (as in the rarified lives of people whose dogs dine on custom baked goods) or as simple differences in income (as suggested by the perpetually unsettled issue about whether more dollars really are required to obtain Whole Foods foods, or the seemingly intractable problem of lower-income residents who are squeezed by rising housing costs). The literature, however, takes on class in more structural terms. On the one hand are changes in the production realm, and the growing segment of college-educated workers that fill the higher-skill and higher-pay positions in the service economy. Although there is diversity among gentrifiers, and occupational and educational classifications don't have rigid boundaries, it is nonetheless broadly the case that the gentry are predominantly people drawn from “the new middle classes, with professional, technical, or managerial jobs” (Zukin, 1987,

p. 141). The remaking of the neighborhood to meet the consumption habits and social reproduction needs of people in this group is “a process of spatial and social differentiation” (Zukin, 1987, p. 131). On the other hand are regularities in the consumption realm, where differences including race, ethnicity, income, and status are spatialized in distinct housing markets. Indeed, Whole Foods Market, Inc. (WFM) seeks a geographic concentration of college-educated residents as one of its few fixed criteria for siting stores (Whole Foods Market Inc., n.d.).

Third, this is a story about inequality. It reveals the importance of place to social formations, alongside the fragile claim of communities to the places they occupy.

[C]ommunity is a central realm in the organization of the larger political economy. It is where we live, and build many—if not most—of our most significant social relationships. And it is also where labor is produced and reproduced, and where political meanings and understandings of the world take root. These are not, by any means, small components of life. (DeFilippis, Fisher, & Shragge, 2010, p. 168)

In the effort to defend the neighborhood for use by those current occupants who are not well-positioned to compete for higher cost housing is acknowledgement that “*space* is actively involved in generating and sustaining inequality, injustice, economic exploitation, racism, sexism, and other forms of oppression and discrimination” (Soja, 2010, p. 4, emphasis added). Moreover, the local story reveals that the people who work to improve a neighborhood may be priced out. When the fruits of their labor go to market and are captured in monetary terms by real estate actors, the people who created that value may be unable to stay to enjoy it. This aspect of the story raises normative concerns about justice and fairness.

Purposes and Aims

The above three themes inform and motivate a case study of gentrification in Hyde and Jackson Squares. In this project, I strive to set a focused empirical investigation in the context of a well-theorized understanding of the gentrification phenomenon. My desire to understand the local process of revaluation and class transformation comes from having lived in the neighborhood for over a decade, during which time I have been a participant in and observer of the changes that are underway. My purposes are to:

- Determine empirically whether gentrification pressures are present and how they are distributed.
- Situate the distribution of gentrification pressures in relation to the distribution of disinvestment that came prior.
- Pilot a method for investigating gentrifying change at the level of buildings and streets (where it occurs).
- Document a block-by-block process of class transformation in the residential environment, along with associated forms of property ownership, development, and transfer.
- Investigate factors that advance and factors that may inhibit gentrification pressures, including the particular roles of real estate business actors.
- Make policy recommendations that seize the opportunities and respond to the needs revealed at the building level.

I begin with a review of the literature.

PART I LITERATURE REVIEW AND PROJECT DESIGN

In the literature review that follows, I strive to convey “the broad range of processes that contribute” to gentrification (Smith & Williams, 2010, p. 10). Toward that end, the following chapters are provided. I conclude with a summary of the present research project.

- In **What is Gentrification?** I provide a descriptive overview of gentrification, including discussion of the attributes, actors, outcomes, and stages of gentrifying neighborhoods. The overall characterization is of a phenomenon that emerges from a conjuncture of structural and contingent forces (Beauregard, 2010).
- In **When is Gentrification?** I sketch in brief the historical underpinnings of the phenomenon, in particular the transition from industrial to post-industrial urban forms, and the changing structure of the labor market, with a growing portion of professional and managerial workers.
- In **Why is Gentrification?** I situate gentrification processes in critical and structural terms, describing the shape of the city as emerging through an urban process characterized by uneven development. I introduce “the gentrification debates”—production- and consumption-side explanations for the phenomenon—and explain why these perspectives provide important correctives to neoclassical formulations.
- In **The Gentrification Process and the Process of Gentrification**, I describe scholars’ efforts to empirically measure local expressions of gentrification and to observe processes of change at the micro levels where they occur. I conclude by identifying a need for theoretically-grounded work that explores the elements and mechanisms of local change processes—work that explores the gentrification process by attempting to observe a “process of gentrification” (Engels, 1999).

Finally, in **Research Design**, I present my research questions and approach for a case study of gentrification in Hyde-Jackson Squares.

CHAPTER 2

WHAT IS GENTRIFICATION?

Gentrification commonly occurs in urban areas where prior disinvestment in the urban infrastructure creates opportunities for profitable redevelopment, where the needs and concerns of business and policy elites are met at the expense of urban residents affected by work instability, unemployment, and stigmatization. It also occurs in those societies where a loss of manufacturing employment and an increase in service employment has led to expansion in the amount of middle-class professionals with a disposition towards central city living and an associated rejection of suburbia.

—Slater (2011, p. 572)

In the forty years since the publication of Glass’s 1964 article, over a thousand papers, reports, and other printed works have been produced on the subject (Atkinson & Bridge, 2005a, p. 4). Today, gentrification has “become a mass-produced, state-led process around the world” (Lees et al., 2010a, p. xv), both enabled by and an engine of “increasing residential polarization of the city by income, by education, by household composition, and by race” (Marcuse, 2010, p. 342).

This section presents a basic descriptive picture of gentrification. To do so, I use Robert A. Beauregard’s four-part framework of the “agents, inclinations and forces [that] must come together in specific spatial locations” (Beauregard, 2010, p. 20) in order for gentrification to occur: a) the potential *gentrifiers*; b) the *gentrifiable housing*; c) the potentially *gentrified* (current residents who can be re-located); and d) the role of government and industry actors in bringing the other three elements together (Beauregard, 2010, p. 14). I then briefly list and explain some of the common *attributes*

of gentrifying neighborhoods, followed by a review of some of the ways scholars have periodized the phenomenon into *stages*, and ending with a short introduction to the *representations* of such places. In keeping with an introductory approach, many of the subsections below are just the initial overview of issues that are taken up in more depth later in this lit review; where that is the case, the concluding sentence guides the reader to the full discussion.

The Gentrifiers

Who is a potential gentrifier? How do they come “to be located in central cities with reproduction and consumption needs and desires compatible with a gentrification process” (Beauregard, 2010, p. 14)? The potential gentrifiers create the *demand* that is essential to the gentrification process. Potential gentrifiers are a slice of the professional managerial class, “the white collar workers associated with a post-industrial, service-oriented economy” (Brown-Saracino, 2010a, p. 65), who tend to be highly educated (Berry, 2010, p. 46) and hold a professional occupation. They may be childless and/or unmarried well into adulthood, and have lifestyle preferences for certain kinds of conspicuous consumption (Berry, 2010, p. 46)—the “status of being at that shop in that neighborhood and buying that particular brand” (Beauregard, 2010, p. 16). Early gentrifiers were often people in the artistic, education, or public-interest professions, or gay men or lesbians and others living “alternative” lifestyles. While it is accurate in the main to define the gentry by their occupational, educational, and income characteristics, the early phenomenon also had roots in new postwar spatial concentrations of gay men (Lees et al., 2008, pp. 103-106, citing Castells), or in 1970s countercultures (Ley, 1996, pp. 175-221). In many places today, residents of gentrified neighborhoods are as likely to

be employed by multinational financial firms or other corporations.

Why do they choose the city? The reasons vary, but in general terms gentrifiers seek a central location for a combination of practical, cultural, and identity-related reasons. They are drawn to “work, shops, and the cultural activities of the central city, a set of linkages between home, work, and leisure that we will later see to be an important component of the ‘structure of feeling’ for the inner city” (Ley, 1996, p. 38). They tend to be drawn to areas where they will find neighbors from backgrounds both similar to and different from their own. “The apparent contradiction of seeking social compatibility *and* diversity underscores the complexity of middle-class resettlement” (Ley, 1996, p. 38).² The “gentry” are a “residential class who share an identity shaped by locational preferences, stage in the lifecycle, occupation and a social network that crosses national boundaries” (Atkinson & Bridge, 2005a, p. 10). The historical conditions of their emergence will be considered in more detail in subsequent sections, particularly in “When is Gentrification: A Growing Professional Class” and “The Gentrification Debates: Consuming Cities: The New Middle Class and the Marginal Gentrifiers.”

Gentrifiable Places

Where is gentrification likely to occur? How does “‘gentrifiable’ housing” (Beauregard, 2010, p. 14) come to be? Overall, “[w]hat is necessary but not sufficient, is for financial and property interests to foresee the opportunities involved in the transformation of a residential area from low to middle income through investment in

² At the individual and household level, when choosing between different specific cities and neighborhoods, the decision-making will hinge on a range of specific factors that are not necessarily distinct to gentrifiers, with some seeking low-cost rentals and others seeking investment possibilities, and in some neighborhoods proximity to one’s social networks tended to be more highly valued (Ley, 1996, pp. 38–41).

rehabilitation” (Beauregard, 2010, p. 20). Although there are no hard and fast rules for what makes a neighborhood an appropriate site for gentrification, the general guidelines spelled out by Beauregard are as follows:

- **De-valued and attractive residential stock.** There must be a possibility of putting a space to new uses, generally to make profits higher than those currently derived by landlords, homeowners, developers, and other real estate interests. Often the housing stock will be deteriorated as the result of a period of disinvestment, or it may be devalued (and not deteriorated) compared to surrounding areas (Beauregard, 2010, p. 17), or there may be dis-used industrial buildings that can be put to new uses. Frequently the stock will be architecturally interesting, perhaps with attributes considered historic. “The particular parts of the city that investors or gentrifiers head for are determined by their architectural desirability or symbolic value as a landmark location” (Atkinson & Bridge, 2005a, p. 12). Generally, building stock with such features will be clustered in such a way as to enable gradual habitation by a new “community” of people. Once property rehabilitation has become visible in an area, it may spur others to join suit and launch a process of gentrification.
- **Commercial center.** There should also be a viable commercial area with the possibility for transformation for a new category of use(r). These will be “commercial areas with an initial attraction to the early gentrifiers but also with the potential for transformation to the types of shops, restaurants and facilities most compatible with the reproductive decisions and consumption activities of the gentry” (Beauregard, 2010, p. 20).
- **Amenities.** Quality of life features will generally be present, although they will vary in type from location to location. These “unique spatial amenit[ies]” (Beauregard, 2010, p. 20) may include open space, waterfront access, picturesque views, or other attractions. “Access to open space, to leisure and cultural facilities and the general liveability and manageability of the particular urban environment has been significant in attracting gentrifiers” (Atkinson & Bridge, 2005a, p. 11, citing Ley 1996).
- **Infrastructure.** Access to the transportation infrastructure is typically crucial, allowing easy travel to the downtown business areas and jobs (Beauregard, 2010, p. 20).

Overall, “[a]ccess to open space, to leisure and cultural facilities and the general liveability and manageability of the particular urban environment has been significant in attracting gentrifiers” (Atkinson & Bridge, 2005a, p. 11, citing Ley 1996). Amenities,

“whether in the physical environment (views, waterfront access), or the built environment (architecture, streetscape, freedom from through traffic, the character of local shops)” (Ley, 1996, p. 38), are key to making a place “gentrifiable.”

Structure and contingency

In assessing where gentrification may occur, it is important to distinguish between underlying and contingent, as well as between necessary and sufficient, conditions. Neighborhood decline, for example, is a common precursor to gentrification, and was a characteristic phenomenon when the phenomenon was first described. But since not all gentrifying neighborhoods have been previously deteriorated, it cannot be an underlying condition. Similarly, since not all disinvested areas will gentrify, decline itself “is not sufficient for gentrification to occur” (Beauregard, 2010, p. 17). “[T]oo much goes into the immediate causes of gentrification in a particular neighborhood for it to be possible to correlate level of decline with propensity to gentrify” (Smith, 1996, p. 69). Early understandings focused on rehabilitating pre-war housing, leading to controversy about whether in-fill construction in rehabilitating neighborhoods, or new luxury housing in previously non-residential zones, could be considered “gentrification,” but these variants are now widely recognized as part of the process.

As the gentrification cycle advances in one place, it may push subsequent waves of new residents into other places. “[I]n the same way that older elite districts in the inner city³ provided bases for a contagious diffusion process in the 1970s, so areas [that are]

³ “Older elite districts” refers to inner-city areas that were wealthier both before and after the declining conditions many cities faced at mid-century—they were not working-class areas re-made for the varied populations of an emerging professional class, although they may have gentrified in the sense of being re-furbished for a newer wealthy population. Beacon Hill in Boston fits the definition of such an area, as does

advanced in the gentrification cycle themselves act as nodes for subsequent advancing waves of reinvestment” (Ley, 1996, p. 58). For the past couple decades or more, it has been the case that “reinvestment and displacement are processes that are no longer contained within the inner city” (Ley, 1996, p. 70). Even though particular kinds of urban neighborhoods were thought to be part of the underlying or essential attributes of the process, gentrification is now recognized to occur in suburban (Ley, 1996, p. 70) and rural (Brown-Saracino, 2010b, p. 3) locations, bringing this expression of urban process to the countryside. Gentrification is “mutating, so that we now have different types of gentrification such as rural gentrification, new-build gentrification, and super-gentrification” (Lees et al., 2008, p. xxi). Ultimately, these modifications and deviations are useful for helping to focus attention on the underlying attributes of the process, versus its more adaptable and diverse expressions.

The Gentrified

Who is likely to be “gentrified,” in other words, to be relocated by a gentrification process? In order for gentrification to advance, many of the existing residents may need to leave to make way for newcomers (apart, of course, from circumstances in which new residential areas are created where none previously were, such as on Boston’s waterfront). How do existing residents come to be re-locatable? Clearly, the production of gentrifiable housing and gentrifiable people is “interdependent” (Beauregard, 2010, p. 17). Current residents may be tenants who cannot lay an ownership claim, who may have been dealing for years with the challenges of residing in a disinvested location, who may be marginally employed or working in jobs that pay poorly, and/or who may be elderly

Society Hill in Philadelphia (the latter was rehabilitated with a combination of elite resident leadership and substantial public funding (Smith, 1996, pp. 119-139)).

people on fixed incomes. If the area had former industrial uses, the loss of jobs may be one push factor that induces current residents to leave. If many of the prior residents receive public benefits, they may be perceived as people who don't "contribute" to the tax base and the municipality may actively support their eviction or other means of removal. They may be weakly connected to government authorities and have little ability to garner political support for their housing and community needs. "[T]ransition typically occurs first, and over time most deeply, in areas that are of modest income, avoiding at first very-low-income areas" (Dobson & Ley, 2008, p. 2474). High crime, high poverty, and public housing are all likely to be deterrents to middle-class settlement, although in very tight housing markets gentrification pressures may push into these areas.

The main issue in the process of residential succession is the comparative power of the gentrified to the gentrifiers—their relative abilities to lay claim to the space via ownership, to influence municipal decision-makers, or to be perceived by those who make policy decisions and distribute financial capital as desirable and deserving occupants of the space. Also relevant is the degree of community organization and the extent of resistance, if any. "The location of these 'powerless' households in gentrifiable residential areas is not a 'law' of capitalism, which inevitably produces the conditions for gentrification, nor do those potentially gentrified always succumb without a struggle. Instead, the location of economically and politically weak households in certain types of neighborhood at a particular historical time combines with the inner-city location of the potential gentry, among other factors, to produce the conjuncture which is labeled gentrification" (Beauregard, 2010, p. 19).

The extent, consequences, and meaning of displacement are particularly contested

in mainstream and academic discussions of gentrification. Many researchers have looked at the consequences of displacement from the perspective of individual households. Particularly with regard to displaced homeowners, many believe that the higher price the household received for selling in a now-desirable market is more-than-sufficient compensation. Some suggest that levels of household turnover are the same as or even less than they were prior to gentrification, and that prior residents who do stay are able to benefit from the improved conditions and better services that now characterize the neighborhood (Freeman, 2006). Others have accepted some displacement as an inevitability and see it as a positive means to advance social mixing goals, saying that “dispersing and integrating the poor is precisely what is called for” (Lees & Ley, 2008, p. 2382, quoting Elorza's 2007 peer-reviewed “policy proposal to deconcentrate the poor in America”).

In contrast, others stress the loss of affordable housing itself and the decline of the city's recent historical role as a place with low-cost rental housing (Ley, 1996, p. 70), not just the displacement of the particular households that last obtained occupancy at prices a low- or moderate-income household could pay. Those who emphasize the group character of displacement—for example the loss of cultural space that may have been secured through struggle and have historical significance for residents, or the tendency for income to be overlaid with race, ethnicity, and extent of access to political power—are less likely to regard displacement in neutral or positive terms. To this extent, “the right to community is a function of a group's economic and political power [and]. . . community formations are as strong as their political and economic power” (Betancur, 2002, p. 807). A “simple relation of conquest is essential to [gentrification's] workings,”

the conquest being the ability of some to pay to “realise their dreams” and the limits of others’ ability to pay to “hang on to their dreams” (Clark, 2005, p. 262).

A Gentrification Process

How is a process initiated and sustained to bring together the potential gentrifiers, gentrifiable housing, and gentrifiable current residents? It cannot be overemphasized that the way that gentrification unfolds in a given locality will be specific to that place, and that there are no hard and fast rules about the combination of factors or participants, the order of events, or the outcomes. At the same time, some generals do emerge and reveal similarities and kinds of order that are analytically useful.

In no case do cities and neighborhoods “move from a state of decline to renaissance naturally. . . . [A] plethora of key actors are involved in the process of gentrification” (Lees et al., 2008, p. xxiii). The precise participants will vary, but one can anticipate that local government, along with financial institutions and real estate actors, and message- and taste-makers will play a key role in moving the process along. Such boosters can include “redevelopment bodies, local newspapers, ‘city’ magazines, mayors’ offices, real-estate organizations, financial institutions, historic preservationists and neighborhood organizations comprised of middle-class homeowners” (Beauregard, 2010, p. 11). For example, in Park Slope, Brooklyn—a notable site of gentrification in the United States, beginning in the 1960s—a mix of individual and incorporated, private and public, actors, working in specific policy contexts, advanced the neighborhood’s transformation together. The process proceeded with the various efforts of:

- Individuals (“urban pioneers,”⁴ including those who specialized in the restoration of brownstone housing and were called “brownstoners”),
- Formal private associations (like an entity that formed and called itself the Park Slope Betterment Committee),
- Informal social networks (for example, word-of-mouth communication is asserted to have played a key role in establishing Park Slope as a unique geographic concentrations of lesbians (Rothenberg, 1995)),
- Real estate agents (through blockbusting and advertising practices),
- Corporations (including utility companies, who had an interest in stabilizing their neighborhood customer base and whose involvement played a role in encouraging banks to lend in the neighborhood; the early investments by gas companies who saw an opportunity to increase the number of utilities customers can still be seen in Park Slope’s romantically iconic gas lighting in the front yards of many brownstones),
- Public historical societies (that regulated historical or landmark status, through which tax benefits could be accessed),
- Small private lenders,
- Federal funding streams (like a mortgage insurance program targeted for rehabilitating properties),
- Large lenders (but only after passage of the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, when redlining practices were made illegal and banks were assigned legal obligations to invest in the communities where they did business),
- Developers (starting in the mid- to late 1980s, once the process of change had become more visible and more established; their entry coincided with a wave of condo conversions) (Lees et al., 2008, pp. 23-30).

In short, “a matrix of groups, underpinned by state and federal government legislation which encouraged reinvestment in ‘rundown’ neighborhoods, were responsible for

⁴ “Pioneer” is the term given to the first generation of gentrifiers, or to the initial group of gentrifiers in a particular place. Similarly, the 1960s–1970s gentrification that involved rehabilitating older buildings, proceeding block-by-block, is typically called “pioneer gentrification.” This term is widely used, and I follow that convention. Readers should note, however, that a depiction of middle-class people bravely entering urban neighborhoods, which are already inhabited by other people, in order to remake those places in a new image for themselves, is politically charged (not neutral). “The idea of ‘urban pioneers’ is as insulting applied to contemporary cities as the original idea of ‘pioneers’ in the U.S. West. Now, as then, it implies that no one lives in the areas being pioneered—no one worthy of notice, at least” (Smith, 1996, p. 33).

reinvestment in Park Slope” (Lees et al., 2008, p. 23). There, as elsewhere, it is insufficient for conditions to be ripe for gentrification. The production of place is a social process, through which some land uses influence others. For a gentrification process to occur, it must be initiated by “some form of *collective social action* at the neighborhood level” (Smith, 1996, p. 68). Key actors in that process include residents themselves, as well as local governments, financial actors, and real estate professionals.

Municipalities

“[T]he process of gentrification, which initially emerged as a sporadic, quaint, and local anomaly in the housing markets of some *command-center* cities, is now thoroughly generalized as an urban strategy that takes over from liberal urban policy” (Smith, 2002, p. 427). Municipal supports may include the granting of zoning variances or the re-zoning of an area (e.g., from industrial to residential), creating procedures for establishing historical landmarks and/or providing funding for their renovation, targeting an area for federal block grant money, changing rent regulation such that evictions or rental increases are easier to accomplish, providing tax credits for private developers or tax relief for homeowners who remodel properties, targeting code enforcement practices to weaken or enhance the ability of current residents to stay put, implementing policing practices that place long-time residents under suspicion and surveillance as part of protecting new residents, making new investments in amenities like parks and streetlights (Alicia, 2001, p. 190; Atkinson & Bridge, 2005a, pp. 11-12), allocating funds to support small businesses, increasing city services (or decreasing them in areas where the city wants to promote decline and then reinvestment (Beauregard, 2010, p. 19)), or running programs to benefit artists or other “creative” people in the hopes that their presence will

attract more middle-class residents. While most such measures are not specific to gentrification processes per se (some were part of prior urban renewal efforts and each has the potential to be utilized in ways that don't enhance inequities), they are documented in the literature as part of a tool kit of strategies that may initiate or advance gentrifying changes.

More generally, land use is always shaped and directed by the local state. Changes in specific policies, in policy regimes, or in partnerships and institutional structures have all been the focus of gentrification researchers. For example, Slater's (2004) qualitative work in a Toronto neighborhood explored the gentrifying effects of municipal policies to regularize low-income housing for single people. Rose et al. (2013), looked at the "social mix" framework—a policy approach informed by a belief that poverty can be addressed through its spatial deconcentration, with gentrification often seen as the means by which that can be accomplished—in a comparative study of three cities, finding an uneven embrace of the philosophy by local actors that had impacts for its effects. Van Gent used an historical institutional approach to chronicle the growth of a social-rental housing sector in Amsterdam, followed by successive efforts at liberalization "through privatization, decentralization and deregulation" which ultimately "opened the door to the third phase of gentrification" (2013, p. 509).

Some work has also focused on national policy. Several scholars in the U.S. have examined the use of federal funding through HUD's HOPE VI program. While the program's explicit goal is to address severely deteriorated public housing, in places like Chicago it has been used to replace large public housing complexes with mixed-income projects that reduced the number of affordable units; the effort is widely associated with

rising gentrification pressures in the surrounding area (Chaskin & Joseph, 2013; E. Wyly & Hammel, 2000). Overall, scholars recognize that the gentrification process “has become fully and affirmatively incorporated into public policy” (Lees & Ley, 2008, p. 2380)—“in a neo-liberal policy context, gentrification appears to many as an ideal solution to long-term urban decay” (K. Newman & Wyly, 2006, p. 26).

Real Estate and Financial Actors

Real estate and financial actors and their promoters may include “developers, both domestic and professional, real estate agents, financiers, place-marketers and the media” (Shaw, 2005, p. 179), as well as others with an interest in a process of neighborhood change that enhances opportunities for investment and profit. Real estate agents and landlords may play a role in steering potential gentry to the neighborhood (Davila, 2004), negotiating differences of “taste” between sellers (departing working-class populations) and buyers (arriving gentry) (Bridge, 2010), removing the existing residents (through blockbusting practices, rental increases, and evictions) (Betancur, 2002; Smith, 1996), speculating through property flipping and condo conversion, creating symbolic representations of a neighborhood through advertising (Mele, 2010, p. 128), or other practices. Developers may lead the process of tenure change through condo conversions (Lees et al., 2008, p. 13), serve as the implementers and beneficiaries of public programs that subsidize renovations (Mele, 2010, pp. 130-131) or rely on public-private partnerships (Lees et al., 2008, p. 177). “Until revitalizing neighborhoods have been well tested by commercial success, larger companies are frequently too skeptical to enter, and a market niche may well appear for small and innovative entrepreneurs” (Ley, 1996, p. 45). These entrepreneurs are frequently drawn from the resident population, serving a

niche market of which they are a part—“a neighbor, a colleague, of those [they are] building for” (Ley, 1996, p. 46).

Lenders and institutional investors provide capital, while changes to insurance company policies may reduce the risk of such investments. The investment calculus has changed as gentrification has gone global and as securitization has become the norm for mortgage loans. Now potential investors are not just seeking higher returns than they would otherwise realize from their existing local investments; transnational development corporations are choosing investments among a variety of international locations.

A Gentrifying Neighborhood

The core elements described above come together in different places in different ways. Nonetheless, gentrifying neighborhoods tend to share certain features: upward pressure on housing prices, changes in the aesthetic character of residential and commercial spaces, changes to city infrastructure and services, and population transformations.

Housing Prices

Gentrifying neighborhoods are typically characterized by upward pressure on housing prices. There may be different kinds of impacts on renters and homeowners, and varied consequences for different homeowners (by income as well as preferences). The increase in property values may settle at a new high, or may reflect “unsustainable speculative property price increases” (Atkinson & Bridge, 2005a, p. 5). Often there is a loss of affordable housing, particularly in the rental market, which can be exacerbated by zoning changes that eliminate single-room occupancies or other low-cost alternatives (Slater, 2005, p. 45). Thus the rise in property values can be “fortunate for families who

owned homes, but devastating to renters” (Alicea, 2001, p. 191), although homeowners may struggle if their incomes cannot keep pace with rising property tax bills (Alicea, 2001, pp. 191-192) and may find themselves “constantly bombarded and even harassed with requests to sell their home[s]” (Alicea, 2001, p. 192) in an appreciating market.

Aesthetic Characteristics

New styles of consumption will be reflected in the aesthetic character of residences and businesses, as well as the goods and services available. The mix of goods and services available may change, and their costs will likely be greater at the new establishments (Atkinson & Bridge, 2005a, p. 5). The emphasis may be on the artistic, historic, or artisanal, on light and space, and on the visual itself (seeing and being seen), in a “move from seclusion to display” (Bridge, 2010, p. 141). Traces of prior residents may be marked in ways that simultaneously romanticize and erase (sometimes by harkening to a past that predates the current lower-income population), by meticulous restoration of property features or by celebrating the raw, authentic feel of formerly industrial spaces that are now cleared of workers. New businesses may cater to people whose lifestyles evidence “the consumerism and affluence of those unburdened by familial responsibilities and economic stringencies” (Beauregard, 2010, p. 11), including trendy bars, coffee shops, and restaurants. Differences in how groups of residents use space and what activities and types of socializing are normative and acceptable (for example, the differences between barbequing in a park or drinking beer on the street, and dining on the outdoor patio of a trendy restaurant) may also begin to mark out differences between old and new residents. Landmarks and visual markers with importance for the prior residents—such as a mural, the place where one’s mother had her hair done, the

church one grew up attending, the prevalence of flags from immigrant residents' countries of origin (Alicea, 2001)—may be replaced or reduced in the process.

These visible changes typically will be a significant way that neighborhood shifts are communicated, with commercial and residential instances of renovation and change reinforcing each other (Beauregard, 2010, p. 16). “The style of consumption itself becomes crucial to the maintenance of social differentiation” (Jager, 2010, p. 159). Almost anything can be invested with meaning about who the neighborhood is and is not for. For example, in a gentrifying Chicago neighborhood, where both prior and incoming residents were predominantly African American, whether or not a local gas station would continue to provide pay phones became a source of dispute. Poorer residents saw it as obvious that people who could not afford cell phones would need public phones to make calls, while middle-class residents thought it was commonsense that pay phones were used by drug dealers and should be removed (Pattillo, 2007, pp. 91–92).

Other visible changes will be brought about by the municipality. There may be increases in the variety, quantity, and quality of municipal services a gentrifying neighborhood receives—such as trash collection, street cleaning, infrastructure maintenance, street lighting, policing services, or parks and other amenities—with mixed consequences for existing residents. If municipal officials begin to increase the amenities that attract middle-class residents (Atkinson & Bridge, 2005a, pp. 11-12), the response of long-time residents is likely to be mixed. Some may appreciate the quality-of-life improvements and increased security (Freeman, 2006), potentially leading to alliances between “threatened low-income residents” and “wealthier newcomers” (Mele, 2010, p. 130).

Others, in seeing how municipal policies contribute to patterns of advantage and disadvantage, may feel resentment (Alicea, 2001, pp. 190-191). Similarly, an increased police presence in response to the demands of new residents (sometimes driven by their fears or their misunderstandings about the ways that existing residents use public space (Chan, 2007)) may not benefit the whole community (Alicea, 2001; Cahill, 2010, p. 304; Mele, 2010).

Population

These population changes mean that people are negotiating the use of space across differences of income and status, race and ethnicity. Gentrification is frequently a highly racialized process, and the public image is often of a scenario in which affluent whites move into an African American or Latino neighborhood. While racial change may be a frequent and even iconic feature of a gentrifying neighborhood, it is not a defining one. White working-class neighborhoods gentrify (Zukin, 2010, p. 223), gentrifiers may come from any racial or ethnic group, and gentrifying processes of class transformation are occurring in black neighborhoods in Chicago (Pattillo, 2007), Harlem (Freeman, 2006; Taylor, 2010) and elsewhere. Nonetheless, because the postwar pattern in many older cities was of white and middle-class outmigration and in-migration of working-class communities of color, while today's professionals are often disproportionately white, race and racism shapes many local gentrification processes. According to one study of gentrifying neighborhoods in over 20 large U.S. cities, "gentrification is best understood as racialized redevelopment" (E. K. Wyly & Hammel, 2005, p. 32) in just over 20% of cities, in which race-class inequalities play out in the local residential and commercial space (once-majority African American areas were one-seventh, and

previously Latino neighborhoods were about seven percent, of all the neighborhoods in their study).

Scholars debate whether gentrification yields “increased social mix” or the “loss of social diversity” (Atkinson & Bridge, 2005a, p. 5) across differences of income/status and race/ethnicity, and whether any increased diversity is lasting or a short-lived outcome that will decline as the process advances. Some scholars emphasize how “different social groups are brought together by gentrification, and seem to be staying together, making social diversity ‘an issue to be reckoned with rather than dismissed in gentrification theory’” (Slater, 2005, p. 45, citing Demaris Rose 1996). Other work shows that being proximate to one another doesn’t necessarily lead to sharing the same social space, such as Tim Butler’s study of the Islington neighborhood of London (Butler, 2003). Lance Freeman finds mixed results related to racial and income diversity and gentrification. In a national study that “measur[ed] the relationship between gentrification and segregation at the metropolitan scale,” using Census data to examine “the extent to which [gentrification] affects spatial relations between various social groups” (Freeman, 2009, p. 2079), he did find evidence that gentrifying neighborhoods are more diverse (less homogeneous) overall than non-gentrifying neighborhoods. But while gentrification does not appear to *reduce* diversity, the evidence on whether it *increases* diversity is “murk[y],” and “we cannot rule out the possibility that the causal arrow between gentrification and diversity perhaps runs from the latter to the former—greater diversity may lead to gentrification” (Freeman, 2009, p. 2098).

Stages of Gentrification

In its “classic” early form, gentrification proceeds in a block-by-block fashion, as sporadic resident-led uses and reinvestment gradually attract the interest of real estate actors and the broader neighborhood begins to transform. Contemporary gentrification actually unfolds in a variety of ways. It can be a large, municipally-coordinated effort, like on Boston’s waterfront. It may be the work of a small number of real estate actors, who target a location for transformation. However, because the block-by-block progression is relevant to the Jamaica Plain case, it deserves emphasis here.

Phillip L. Clay’s four-stage model, created in 1979 (Clay, 1979), focuses on the *process of change within a neighborhood*. Clay “found that private urban reinvestment had occurred in all of the largest U.S. cities in the late 1970s” (Lees et al., 2008, p. 30), mostly in neighborhoods 75 years old or more, that had working-class residents and where there was some property abandonment. Drawing on research in Boston, Philadelphia, San Francisco, Washington, DC, and other cities, he classified a typical sequence of events. These are described below, along with similar observations made by David Ley, based on his research in several Canadian cities.

- **Stage 1 (“pioneer” gentrification):** “Risk-oblivious” people arrive in small numbers in a neighborhood that has been in a state of decline and renovate properties for their own use, generally using their own labor and without access to mortgage capital, and usually concentrated in a small geographic area. They may include a number of people with skills suited to the task (designers, artists), and commonly will involve people in the artistic and public interest professions. In some cities, the renovators will be gay and the area is becoming a gay enclave. There is no public recognition, and word spreads via the “grapevine.” Clay and others refer to this group as “pioneers” (Lees et al., 2008, p. 31, quoting Clay). Ley found more professionals listed in directory data and property-transfer records, no substantial change in house prices, a modest rise in the number of renovation permits (most of them for fairly low-cost projects), and a decline in the owner-occupancy rate. “Indeed there may be only small income differentials

between pioneers and pre-existing residents, and census data frequently show income change lagging behind educational and occupational shifts in gentrifying areas. This is a middle-class population whose wealth resides in its cultural rather than its economic capital” (Ley, 1996, p. 56). Others have given greater emphasis to the role of the local state in fostering conditions for this style of neighborhood renovation, such as the collaboration between the city of Philadelphia and local elites in launching the initial gentrification of the Society Hill neighborhood (Smith, 1996).

- **Stage 2:** The number of people and their visibility grows; renovations spread to adjacent blocks. Capital is still largely absent, although there may be limited mortgage funding in some places. As vacant properties become more scarce, some displacement may begin. There may be small promotional activities, “small-scale speculators” who renovate a small number of properties for rental or sale, a bit of media attention, and/or efforts to draw new neighborhood boundaries or give the area a new name (Lees et al., 2008, p. 31, quoting Clay).
- **Stage 3:** The process begins to be more deliberate and to exceed the initial group of newcomers. Organizations founded by the first group of newcomers may continue and may be important in shaping what’s next for the neighborhood, but are likely to be augmented by heightened media attention as well as by organizing and collective action among newer residents. The newer residents are likely to be more oriented to housing as an investment. Some of them will actively oppose social service and public housing efforts, demand action to reduce crime, and organize in opposition to the everyday behaviors of the prior working-class population. “Tensions between old residents and the gentry begin to emerge” (Lees et al., 2008, p. 32, quoting Clay). “Succeeding middle-class groups are buying into an inflating market as the neighborhood’s image is reshaped. With greater market power, they are more concerned about the investment potential of their property and protective of potential capital gains” (Ley, 1996, p. 57). The municipality may launch an urban renewal project, investors/renovators will become more numerous, banks will greenline the area, price escalation will increase, and displacement will continue. “The neighborhood is now viewed as safe for larger numbers of young middle-class professionals” (Lees et al., 2008, p. 32, quoting Clay).
- **Stage 4:** Sometimes called “maturing gentrification,” at this stage “rapid price and rent spirals are set off” (Lees et al., 2008, p. 33, quoting Clay) and displacement begins to impact homeowners, not just renters. (Clay’s study compared “incumbent upgrading” to gentrification, finding that rents and sale prices were 80–85% more likely to have increased 50% or more in the gentrifying neighborhoods (Clay, 1979, p. 104).) Ley observed an increased mean value of renovations, soaring house prices, and an increase in owner occupancy rates (Ley,

1996, p. 58).⁵ He also found that as the process advances, middle-income households may be at risk of displacement (Ley, 1996, p. 70). As new residents continue to arrive, more of them are employed in business and management occupations (instead of the earlier artists and public interest professionals). There may be efforts to secure historic designation for the district, “to reinforce the private investment that has taken place” (Lees et al., 2008, p. 32, quoting Clay), speculators may begin to release properties to the market, retail and other commercial activity geared toward the newcomers will emerge, and other neighborhoods within the city will start to see arrivals from the middle-class. “While some controversy emerges, especially related to displacement, relatively little is done to dampen middle-class reinvestment” (Lees et al., 2008, p. 33, quoting Clay).

Many of the observations embedded in Clay’s model continue to be widely noted by gentrification researchers. First is the notion that “*culture attracts capital*” (Bridge, 2010, p. 139) and that “[e]conomic capital becomes more significant than cultural capital as gentrification proceeds” (Bridge, 2010, p. 137). That change plays out in terms of the characteristics of the residents, with a shift in many places from lower- to higher-paid professionals, and/or from public-interest to business professionals. It appears in the real estate realm, with the move from owner-occupant, “sweat-equity” renovation to the production by developers of gentrified-style housing as a commodity. More broadly, as the idea of the gentrified neighborhood and an urban lifestyle becomes mobile and adaptable, “[l]arger and larger amounts of capital follow the gentrification aesthetic” (Bridge, 2010, p. 139). Second, and related, is the tendency toward *a move from emphasis on the use value of the neighborhood to emphasis on its investment value*, with increasing homeowner politics and opposition to low-income residents being common. Finally, though more on the horizon at the time Clay was writing than a core feature of his stages,

⁵ Revealing some of the locally contingent nature of gentrification, in Toronto, a new tax on property speculation coincided with a national downturn in residential sales in the mid-1970s. When a market recovery coincided with repeal of the tax, in combination with the effects of actions by two real estate agencies that had established a strong foothold and active neighborhood promotional campaign, it yielded a boom in which all housing indicators rose (Ley, 1996, p. 58).

is the *tendency for resistance to displacement to decline* because resistance becomes more difficult to sustain over the long periods that are necessary (Cahill, 2010, pp. 132-133; Hackworth, 2007; Hackworth & Smith, 2010).

Representations of Gentrification

Gentrification has become ““not a sideshow in the city, but a major component of the urban imaginary”” (Slater, 2005, p. 39, quoting David Ley 2003). Seemingly neutral and positive terms to describe it began to appear in the mass media and in policymaking circles in the 1970s, and today, “the discursive territory of euphemisms for ‘gentrification’ [is largely] settled, with widespread popular and policy discussion of revitalization, renewal, redevelopment, reurbanization, renaissance, upgrading, a ‘back to the city’ movement and ‘urban pioneers’. The linguistic frontier never closed completely, but the vocabulary of the 1970s proved remarkably durable” (E. K. Wyly & Hammel, 2008, p. 2644). Within and well beyond the neighborhood—in policy, politics, and popular culture—gentrification is “recognized, promoted and celebrated; etched into the public imagination and championed as the process which creates spaces for lavish middle-class consumption and a wider ‘liveability’ in the city” (Slater, 2005, p. 40). Often portrayed through frontier imagery, gentrification representations play off and impose some of the logics of the American frontier, including “pioneers, invisible natives, urban homesteading, myth of upward (though spatial) mobility and the city as a wilderness to be recaptured and tamed” (Beauregard, 2010, p. 12). Sometimes called “gentrification kitsch,” Today, the gentrifiers’ synthesis of the historic, authentic, artistic, modern, and edgy into a new cultural and consumption understanding of the city has escaped the origins of the phenomenon and come to represent a set of generalized

aspirations for a cosmopolitan lifestyle and self.

Representational cues and keywords of the gentry have been generalized to express broader policy goals for cities peopled by the workers in skilled services. Most famously expressed by Richard Florida, the central characters are members of a “creative class” that thrive on “three Ts”—technology (design, telecommunications, and biotech are among the emphases), tolerance (epitomized by an embrace of gayness, but generalizable to other kinds of difference under certain circumstances), and talent (a euphemism for the skills gained through higher education, but also encompassing music and the visual arts). Taking steps to promote the residence of such people in a city (i.e., efforts to create and sustain gentrifying neighborhoods) is said to correlate with a city’s competitive edge in the race to attract economic activity (Florida, 2002). “[A] major *political* strategy” (Smith, 1996, p. 46, emphasis in original), gentrification reflects and creates “patterns of social, spatial, and economic restructuring of the central city” (Zukin, 2010, p. 228).

Having depicted the gentrification phenomenon in broad strokes, we are in a position to dig into the underpinnings of the process.

CHAPTER 3 WHEN IS GENTRIFICATION?

Underlying all of these changes in the urban landscape are specific economic, social and political forces that are responsible for a major reshaping of advanced capitalist societies: there is a restructured industrial base, a shift to service employment and a consequent transformation of the working class, and indeed of the class structure in general; and there are shifts in state intervention and political ideology aimed at the privatization of consumption and service provision. Gentrification is a visible spatial component of this social transformation.

—Neil Smith and Peter Williams (2010, p. 10)

Gentrification was initially understood as rehabilitation of decaying or low-income housing by middle-class outsiders in central cities. In the late 1970s, a broader conceptualization of the process began to emerge, and by the early 1980s, new scholarship had developed a far broader meaning of gentrification, linking it with processes of spatial, economic, and social restructuring. . . . [It] was only one facet of a far broader process linked to the profound transformation in advanced capitalism: the shift to services and the associated transformation of the class structure and the shift toward the privatization of consumption and service provision. Gentrification emerged as a visible spatial component of this transformation.

—Saskia Sassen (2001, p. 261)

The gentrification phenomenon emerges at the conjuncture between certain historical and structural conditions, and the particulars of the very local environments where it takes shape. In this section, I set the gentrification phenomenon in its historical context, telling in brief: the tale of the rise and decline of the industrial city in the late nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries, the sustained growth over that period and into the present of a class of professional and managerial workers, and the emergence and gradual consolidation of the gentrification phenomenon in the second half of the twentieth century.

From the Industrial City to an Urban Crisis

The mid-twentieth century “urban crisis”—the withdrawal of jobs and investment from central cities and their subsequent struggles to cope with poverty, maintain services, deal with a disused or declining physical infrastructure, and generate sufficient revenue—is understood to be the seedbed for the wide-scale emergence of gentrification. This crisis took shape as a consequence of the transition from an industrial to a corporate form of accumulation. Transitions from one stage of accumulation to the next are driven by contradictions within the system of production, while the ways in which these problems are resolved create new spatial patterns of social organization and establish the circumstances out of which subsequent contradictions appear. This “competitive drive for profit” has a profound “impact on spatial organization” (Tabb & Sawers, 1978, p. 14).

The industrial city began to develop between 1850–1870 in the United States. Manufacturing facilities were placed close to water and rail, and working-class residential districts, with large immigrant populations, were clustered in close proximity. Frequently these areas began as industrial suburbs that were then annexed by cities with the support of both industrialists and residents who wanted access to municipal services. The city center typically was a hub for commercial trade (shopping), while more affluent residents availed themselves of new transport options to establish new suburbs where they could live removed from the noise, dirt, and bustle.

Workers began to organize, with strikes becoming frequent by the 1880s and 1890s (Gordon, 1978, p. 47), setting in motion three inter-related changes with spatial consequences. First, industrialists began to locate plants further from the city. Working-class housing, employment, shopping, and manufacturing all began to be scattered across

the broader urban space. Second, as manufacturers removed their operations from the city they withdrew support for the practice of suburban annexation. The re-absorption of wealthy residents back into the central city through political annexation ceased, so “they fled more successfully into separate suburbs” (Gordon, 1978, p. 55). The consequence was a more politically fragmented urban region and a central city that had fewer tax contributions from industry and wealthy residents. Third, with manufacturing locating “anywhere across the urban space” (Gordon, 1978, p. 54), corporations began to separate their administrative and productive functions and create headquarter operations in the downtown central business districts. “Downtown office space in the ten largest cities increased by 3,000 percent between 1920 and 1930. Tall skyscrapers suddenly sprouted” (Gordon, 1978, p. 51) from which the now-decentralized plants could be overseen. Whereas the industrial city had “crammed around its center,” instead “the Corporate City sprawled” (Gordon, 1978, p. 55).

Central city productive capacity was temporarily re-utilized during World War II, such that the more acute consequences of these transformations were not felt until the post-war years. They were severe for the older central cities, half of which “lost between 20 and 40 percent of manufacturing jobs in the two decades after the war” (Fairfield, 2010, p. 246). Much of that work was re-located to the suburbs and the Sunbelt. Meanwhile, residential suburbanization accelerated with massive federal supports for highway construction and mortgage lending, yielding not just “a system of highways and infrastructural transformations, suburbanization” but “the total reengineering” of cities and “whole metropolitan region[s]” (Harvey, 2008, p. 27).

Suburbanization also entailed “a radical transformation in lifestyles, bringing new products from housing to refrigerators and air conditioners, as well as two cars in the driveway and an enormous increase in the consumption of oil” (Harvey, 2008, p. 27), and all of that serving dual purposes: absorbing vast surpluses of accumulated wealth; and gaining a purchase on social stability as newly middle-class homeowners internalized and embraced “the defense of property values” (Harvey, 2008, p. 27). The pull of the suburb was joined by a push from the city. Not only were jobs becoming scarce, but practices like redlining and blockbusting were combining to starve city neighborhoods of capital and set population migrations in motion. White residents, with access to low-cost mortgage capital, headed for the suburbs.

Suburbanization was what David Harvey calls a “spatial fix”—solving a problem of capital accumulation by shifting investment dollars geographically. The consequent devalorization of inner city locations laid the conditions for a later back to the city movement of capital and people. “The urban disinvestment produced by economic change and federal urban policy along with the individual desire for the suburban dream laid the groundwork for gentrification’s appearance” (K. Newman & Wyly, 2006, p. 26).

From the late 1940s through the early 1970s, municipalities, with the aid of federal funds, launched large-scale public works projects to restructure the cities in this new landscape. Federal highway funds were used to build massive roads to transport white-collar workers to and from their suburban residents and their jobs in the central business districts. In the process, city neighborhoods were razed and disrupted, with neighboring districts shut off from one another on either side of the large new structures. Urban Renewal funding also supported the demolition of areas labeled “slums.”

Nationwide, 2,500 neighborhoods in 993 cities were impacted, and a million residents were displaced to other locations (Fullilove, 2005, p. 4). The General Renewal Plan for the City of Boston, designed in collaboration with the city's business elites, aimed not just to redevelop the city's physical space for a service economy and the white-collar workforce it required. It had an explicit goal to reduce the emerging concentration of residents with low incomes and of color (Medoff & Sklar, 1994, pp. 18-20). Targeted neighborhoods included the West End (razed entirely, in part for the construction of luxury high-rise housing), Charlestown, the South End, and Roxbury. "As one area [of the South End] was demolished, families were forced to move on. . . . [M]ost white families went to South Boston, Dorchester and Jamaica Plain. Black and Portuguese families moved to Washington Park, Lower Roxbury, and North Dorchester. Some families have had to move four and more times in the face of renewal pressure" (King, 1981, p. 22).

In part because of protest, in part because of changing federal priorities, and in keeping with a broader policy trend away from large, centrally administered public programs, the urban renewal style of city redevelopment declined as a primary tool. It was joined and replaced by an array of strategies that, together, reshaped urban environments for the service economy and as a place for consumption.

Gentrification in the residential sphere is therefore simultaneous with a sectoral switch in capital investments. . . . Uneven development at the urban scale therefore brought not only gentrification in the narrowest sense but the whole gamut of restructurings: condominium conversions, office construction, recreational and service expansion, massive redevelopment projects to build hotels, plazas, restaurants, marinas, tourist arcades, and so on. (Smith, 1996, pp. 86–87).

In order for residential neighborhoods to gentrify, there must be gentrifiers.

A Growing Professional and Managerial Class

There was rapid growth of professional and managerial workers between 1890 and 1920, coinciding with the labor militancy and increasingly concentrated social surplus described above (Ehrenreich & Ehrenreich, 1977, p. 19). These early generations set about articulating what became Progressive Era social reform ideology, “consciously grasp[ing]” that their role was “to mediate the basic class conflict of capitalist society and create a ‘rational,’ reproducible social order” (Ehrenreich & Ehrenreich, 1977, p. 20), and carving out a set of roles “as technical innovators, social mediators, culture producers, etc.” (Ehrenreich & Ehrenreich, 1977, p. 22) that presaged “the defining characteristics” of the professions: specialized knowledge acquired by lengthy training; ethical standards and “a commitment to public service;” and autonomy (Ehrenreich & Ehrenreich, 1977, p. 26). These are today’s social workers, engineers, health professionals, teachers, accountants, business experts, and the like.

Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich define this group as an objective class: “We define the Professional-Managerial Class [PMC] as consisting of salaried mental workers who do not own the means of production and whose major function in the social division of labor may be described broadly as the reproduction of capitalist culture and capitalist class relations” (Ehrenreich & Ehrenreich, 1977, p. 13). In reality, there is a great deal of variety within the group of professional and managerial workers, in which certain occupational categories (e.g., nurse) are “socially and functionally heterogeneous” in terms of the education they require, the origins a person may have (working-class or “middle-class”), the income they command, and the prestige and authority associated with the work (from menial tasks to supervision) (Ehrenreich & Ehrenreich, 1977, p. 14).

Nonetheless, they characterize the groups within the PMC as “socially coherent,” with their children tending to marry other children of PMC families and to enter PMC occupations, and with a lifestyle “shaped by the problem of class reproduction” that relies not only on continuous effort to train and educate, but also to ensure success in shaping the next generation through consultation with “ever mounting numbers of experts” on all aspects of child-raising and self-fulfillment (Ehrenreich & Ehrenreich, 1977, pp. 28-29).

Professional and technical workers were the fastest growing group of workers through the twentieth century, increasing from 4.4% of workers in 1910 to 23.3% in the year 2000, with particular increases in computer specialists, accountants and auditors, college administrators and professors, engineers, healthcare workers, lawyers and judges, teachers. Contributing factors were “technological development and the growing size and complexity of organizations; rapid growth in healthcare, education, and social services; and the expanded role of government” (Wyatt & Hecker, 2006, p. 38). Managers grew from 6.5% to 14.2% of workers over the century, spurred by “more and larger bureaucratic organizations, some with many layers of managers” (Wyatt & Hecker, 2006, p. 47). Other growing occupational sectors were lower-tier services, clerical, and sales, while declining categories were in crafts, factory operatives, private household service, agriculture, and other kinds of laboring (Wyatt & Hecker, 2006, p. 36). Over the century, there was a tremendous growth in higher education, with college enrollments growing 43 times over and the percentage of the population with a college degree increasing from 2.7% to 25.6% (Wyatt & Hecker, 2006, p. 42).

In Boston, as the city reformed its economy around health care, higher education, banking and money management, research, and technology, “the emphasis on

professional skills and managerial occupations requiring a high degree of education made [it] a predominantly white-collar city, and produced an extraordinary growth in jobs and wages during the 1970s and 1980s. . . brought new residents into the city”(O'Connor, 1993, p. 291). In the post-World War II years, over one-third of all new employment in the city was in such fields, “accompanied by a drastic decline in. . . the type of semiskilled trades that characterized the textile mills and other blue-collar employers” (Bluestone & Stevenson, 2000, p. 67). Between 1950 and 1990, professional and technical employment grew from 12% to 23% of total employment (Bluestone & Stevenson, 2000, p. 68).

The overall growth in this group, and the concentration of professional and managerial work in the central city, created some of the conditions out of which gentrification emerged. Most gentrifiers have been “in the new middle classes, with professional, technical, or managerial jobs” and hence “identified with corporate reinvestment” (Zukin, 1987, p. 141) in the central business district. In six Canadian cities during the 1970s and 1980s, this group rose from 18.2 to 37.9 percent of the population (Ley, 1996, p. 84). While the new middle class is “a group in ascendancy in the inner city, implicating labor-markets, housing markets, urban politics, and the built environment” (Ley, 1996, pp. 10-11), the gentrifying neighborhood remains one site in an uneven urban landscape. The service economy has a two-tier labor market, with a low-paid tier of workers in restaurants, hotels, hospitals, domestic service, personal service, security, retail and other roles. It also has large numbers of part-time and temporary jobs, and high unemployment.

Gentrification in Waves

In the half-century since gentrification first became a feature of urban development, it has gradually consolidated as a phenomenon, been incorporated as a deliberate municipal policy strategy and become implicated in the intensified financialization of housing. This trajectory has been periodized by Jason Hackworth and Neil Smith into a series of waves. Each wave ends with a recession, and each recession is a transitional period out of which the next wave takes shape. In Wave 1, beginning in the 1950s and extending through 1973, gentrification in this period is “sporadic if widespread,” mainly in the northeastern U.S. and Western Europe, and “highly localized,” often receiving significant state support “justified through the discourse of ameliorating urban decline” (Hackworth & Smith, 2010, p. 66). Related efforts during this time are other municipal revitalization projects. It “was sporadic, small-scale, and involved substantial (but often ill-fated) government support for various redevelopment schemes” (Lees, Slater, & Wyly, 2010b, p. 35). The global recession beginning in 1973 depressed housing markets, but had a more “ambiguous” effect on gentrification, which does not seem to have slowed even though “disinvestment intensified in certain U.S. cities” (Hackworth & Smith, 2010, p. 67). In New York City during this period, while rates of abandonment and arson peaked, there was a shift of capital into real estate, “setting the stage for a reinvestment in central city office, recreation, retail and residential activities” (Hackworth & Smith, 2010, p. 67).

Wave 2, characterized by Hackworth and Smith as the period in which gentrification is “anchored,” got underway when the economy began to rebound in the late 1970s and lasted through the late 1980s. In the late 1970s, gentrification “surged as never before” (Hackworth & Smith, 2010, p. 68). Cities began to try to encourage the process,

mainly with *laissez-faire* efforts to stimulate private sector investment (e.g., block grants and enterprise zones). This was the period in which the join between cultural and economic values became more visibly mass-market, marking “the integration of gentrification into a wider range of economic and cultural processes at the global and national scales” (Hackworth & Smith, 2010, p. 68). It was also a peak period of resistance. “Second-wave gentrification. . . unleashed intense political struggles over displacement, homelessness, income inequality, and racial discrimination” (Lees et al., 2010b, p. 35). Then, in 1989, “inner-city residential land markets crashed along with the rest of the U.S. economy” (Hackworth & Smith, 2010, p. 68), and scholars briefly entertained the possibility that the period of gentrification was drawing to a close, or that there might be de-gentrification underway.

Around 1994, gentrification was seen to rebound. “The third wave of gentrification is characterized by interventionist governments working with the private sector to facilitate gentrification” (Shaw, 2005, p. 183). “[T]he local effects of increased state intervention in gentrification should be understood as part of a broader shift in the political economy of the process—and, indeed, ‘a systemic change in the way that the state related to capital’ and urbanization itself” (Lees et al., 2008, pp. 173, 179). Gentrification in this wave is “accelerated” (Slater, 2005, p. 46), and moves “away from its classical referent, the historic built environment of the metropolitan central city” (Lees et al., 2008, p. 130). It is “a purer expression of the economic conditions and processes that make reinvestment in disinvested inner-urban areas so alluring for investors” (Hackworth & Smith, 2010, p. 68). Larger developers are involved, often initiating the process instead of waiting for an area to be transformed by others. The state is also more involved, signaling a move away from mass

consumption (Keynesian policies, including public housing and various kinds of federal redistribution to localities) to privatized consumption (Hackworth & Smith, 2010, p. 69).

That trajectory continued into Wave 4, beginning in 2001, when gentrification was also increasingly “swept up in the general financial transformation of housing” (Lees et al., 2008, p. 179). When the economy went into recession in 2001, a combination of changes to financial industry practices and regulatory policy had altered mortgage lending practices in ways that would enable huge increases in mortgage debt. Consequently, “the years after 2001 funneled enormous flows of capital into housing” (Lees et al., 2008, p. 179).

Greenlined lending in low-income urban areas, federal and municipal policies that encouraged market solutions to urban challenges, state funds to support the removal of public housing complexes (Lees et al., 2008, p. 184) (understood to be gentrification thwarters), and safety net cut-backs (e.g., welfare reform) combined to create more intricate spatial formations. “Disinvestment, reinvestment, and rent gap dynamics are now playing out in more geographically complex patterns, inscribing fine-grained inequalities of class and race in city neighborhoods” (Lees et al., 2008, p. 181). In short, this wave is directly linked to “the consolidation of a powerful national political shift favoring the interests of the wealthiest households” (Lees et al., 2008, p. 183).

Table 3.1. Hackworth–Smith Waves of Gentrification

Wave 1 1950s – 1973	Sporadic, small-scale gentrification, though widespread
Recession / Transition 1973 – about 1977	A shift of capital into real estate; gentrifiers buy property
Wave 2 late 1970s – late 1980s	The anchoring of gentrification, with municipal support consolidating and resistance peaking
Recession / Transition 1989 – about 1993	Gentrification slows
Wave 3 Beginning about 1994	Gentrification is accelerated, with intensified public-private collaboration
Wave 4* 2001 – 2008	Gentrification is one outcome of broader urban transformations wrought by rapidly increasing capital flows into housing

* Wave 4 is an augmentation by Lees et al. (2008, p. 179)

Idealized models and broad trends notwithstanding, it is also the case that the moments and characteristics of gentrification and other efforts at remaking the city combine, in practice, to produce a complex menu of ways the process may emerge and express itself: “Old-school 1950s urban renewal co-exists with classical 1960s Glassian house-by-house renovations, naïve 1970s urban pioneer promotion schemes, double-dealing 1980s festival-marketplace subsidies, hardcore 1990s revanchist public-space policing and 2000s environmental and social sustainability discourses designed to help cities gentrify at the speed of LEED” (E. K. Wyly & Hammel, 2008, p. 2646). Meanwhile, with its dual labor market and the persistent presence of disinvested areas alongside the redeveloped ones, “the post-industrial city [remains] the site of acute inequality” (Ley, 1996, p. 15). These historical particulars unfold around certain structuring features of uneven development and the production and distribution of housing as a commodity. In the next section, I briefly introduce the concept of uneven development, present a perspective on the urban process as being driven by the

production of differentiated residential spaces, and offer an introductory overview of how gentrification scholarship engaged questions about whether housing suppliers or consumers had primacy in driving the phenomenon.

CHAPTER 4

WHY IS GENTRIFICATION?

[T]he negative consequences of gentrification—the rising housing expense burden for poor renters, and the personal catastrophes of displacement, eviction, and homelessness—are not simply isolated local anomalies. They are symptoms of the fundamental inequalities of capitalist property markets, which favor the creation of urban environments to serve the needs of capital accumulation, often at the expense of the needs of home, community, family, and everyday social life.

—Loretta Lees, Tom Slater, and Elvin Wyly (2008, p. 73)

In this section, ingredients for answering the question “why gentrification?” are presented. In the first portion, I provide relevant conceptual building blocks for understanding the city as urban process: uneven development, and the mechanisms of uneven development in the residential environment. In the second, I introduce the “gentrification debates”—rival yet complementary efforts to explain gentrification as either a supply or a demand phenomenon—that animated scholarship on the subject for several decades. Finally, I explain how these structural and critical perspectives serve as a corrective to prevailing neoclassical wisdom on consumer sovereignty and urban land use.

The City as Urban Process

The above cursory history of gentrification’s emergence hints at certain underlying regularities. We can understand urban spatial forms as emerging in dialogue with economic and social conditions. “Cities, like all social reality, are historical products, not only in their physical materiality but in their cultural meaning, in the role

they play in the social organization, and in peoples' lives" (Castells, 1983, p. 302). The mode of accumulation, the extent to which profits are made, the kind of built environment that is necessary to serve the production process, and the processes of contestation through which they come about—these spatial and social processes and outcomes are cities. In this section, relying primarily on work by David Harvey, I discuss two aspects of the urban process: first, the tendency within capitalism toward uneven development, focusing on its geographic expression; second, some of the mechanisms of uneven development in the housing realm.

Uneven Development

The logic of uneven development is that the development of one area creates barriers to further development, thus leading to an underdevelopment that in turn creates opportunities for a new phase of development. Geographically, this leads to the possibility of what we might call a 'locational seesaw': the successive development, underdevelopment and redevelopment of given areas as capital jumps from one place to another, then back again, both creating and destroying its own opportunities for development.

—Neil Smith (1996, p. 88)

Shifting patterns of investment, disinvestment, and reinvestment in the built environment, as revealed in the above cursory review of U.S. cities over the past century-plus, are understood to be linked to inherent instabilities for accumulation in a capitalist economy. First, investment will occur to the extent that it serves accumulation.

"[E]xtensive investment in urban infrastructure of any sort only represents a temporary solution to [the] search for higher profits" (Zukin, 2006, p. 112). A tension emerges between the goal to extract exchange value from the existing built environment, and the ultimate necessity of devaluing those structures as their ability to serve accumulation declines. Investment will cease when it no longer serves the goal of accumulation (no

longer produces a surplus). That may happen for a variety of reasons, including when buildings have deteriorated, if new technology has rendered a prior investment in equipment or infrastructure out-of-date, when the style of an item becomes passé, because surrounding uses have changed and thus diminished the value of the property's location, or as a result of a quest for a lower-cost and more docile labor force in another location. At that point, the property will become devalued. "Capitalism is always creating new places, new environments designed for profit and accumulation, in the process devalorizing previous investments and landscapes" (Lees et al., 2008, p. 51). When investment no longer serves accumulation, holders of capital will seek other opportunities. In the aggregate, these decisions of capital investors create a "see-saw" pattern of investment, disinvestment, and reinvestment. To the extent that the fix is a spatial one—i.e., to the extent that investments are moved from one place to another—it will contribute to an uneven pattern of development.

Second, value is socially created and tied to location. The "material physical infrastructure for production, circulation, exchange and consumption" (Harvey, 1978, p. 113) is fixed in space, lasts for a long time, and tends to absorb large investments. These include investments in productive capacity (buildings and equipment), as well as those in the realm of consumption and social reproduction (housing), with certain kinds of investment serving both (especially public infrastructure like transport, sanitation, utilities, etc.). As reflected in the everyday wisdom that real estate prices are about "location, location, and location," value "is primarily a collective social creation" (Lees et al., 2008, p. 51) that reflects the varied investments of people in that location over time. "[T]he capital invested to develop a place is now anchored there, and thus it is

vulnerable to anything that alters the urban-economic circumstances of that place” (Lees et al., 2008, p. 53).

Third, investment in the built environment is “two-sided.” Investment that begins as “a vehicle for capital accumulation. . . can also become a barrier to further accumulation” until that capital “has lived out its economic life” (Smith, 1996, p. 59). Structures built on land tend to have a very long turn-over period. The current use of land will have been created to enable an owner to capture the maximum amount of potential ground rent in a given moment, but when physical structures outlast their usefulness for accumulation, that will serve as a barrier to new uses that could garner higher rent. For example, undermaintenance may occur when the costs of repairs cannot be recouped in rental payments (whether through rent paid to a landlord, or captured as asset appreciation at resale). “[G]radually the deferred maintenance becomes apparent” (Lees et al., 2008, p. 53) and begins to be part of a neighborhood-level effect.

“Undermaintenance frees up capital that can be invested elsewhere. It may be invested in other city properties, it may follow developers’ capital out to the suburbs, or it may be invested in some other sector of the economy entirely” (Smith, 1996, p. 65). If it becomes impossible to derive a minimum level of profit from a property, it may be abandoned. Abandonment will almost be a neighborhood effect. “[T]he abandonment of isolated properties in otherwise stable areas is rare” (Smith, 1996, p. 67). It is not necessary that a structure be unusable for it to be abandoned (often they are sound), simply that it is no longer profitable. When devaluation leaves behind use value, it may become the groundwork upon which the next cycle of investment is laid.

Fourth, the land values in a given location will always be “the result of identifiable private and public investment decisions” (Smith, 1996, p. 62, quoting Bradford and Rubinowitz, 1975). The undermaintenance and abandonment described above are two examples of private investment decisions. Beyond land owners and developers, the actions of banks and insurance companies are of particular importance, as are the coordinating activities of real estate agents. The practices that cause some areas to thrive and others to struggle can be particularly visible insofar as they function to create racialized uneven development (Gotham, 2002). “Redlining,” now illegal, was a formal practice by lenders and mortgage insurance agencies of drawing a red line on a map around the black residential neighborhoods where they refused to lend and insure mortgages. This disinvestment leads to property deterioration and such practices as slumlording, to extract rent from low-value properties (Smith, 1996, p. 67). In the 2000s, subprime mortgage lending flooded many of the same neighborhoods with loans that stripped borrowers of equity. This quick flood of capital, often called “reverse redlining” (Squires, 2005), ultimately depleted neighborhoods of wealth, causing observers to wonder “whether communities have access to capital or capital has access to them” (K. Newman, 2009, p. 314) and putting the goal of affordable housing in stable neighborhoods further from reach.

The risk of disinvestment can be an opportunity for real estate agents, who have used redlining to inflame fears on the part of white homeowners that in-migrating residents of color would cause a decline in property values. Agents would persuade prior owners to sell at low prices, then flip properties to new incoming owners, sometimes providing alternative forms of credit to fill the gap created by redlining, with high profit

margins for themselves. These “blockbusting” practices played a substantial role in processes of racial transition in urban neighborhoods at mid-century. The process tended to occur in neighborhoods where some level of disinvestment had already taken place, and was often followed by ongoing undermaintenance (in part as a consequence of the minimal resources homeowners may have available for maintenance after purchasing at an inflated price). The roles of financial institutions and real estate actors, as well as those of public policy and the local state, in structuring the differentiated spaces across which development is uneven, have been described by Harvey as having a flexible yet structured relationship to class, race, and ethnicity in the housing realm.

Absolute spaces, class-monopoly rent, and the speculator-developer

I turn now to David Harvey and colleagues’ work on housing and finance in Baltimore in the 1970s. This work, informed by Lefebvre, “laid the groundwork for understanding the importance of land and real estate in the production of space” (Gotham, 2009, p. 358). In full, this work provides a lens through which to see how financial institutions and state policy work together to yield patterns of investment, and to see the urban process as one that is increasingly financialized. Here, however, I focus on key insights related to the project at hand: there is a class nature to the process through which “rent [is] extracted from the community out of the consumption process” (Harvey, 1974, p. 251), and it is visible in the differentiation and uneven development of urban residential space.

To start, it may be helpful to define what “rent” is. It “is a payment made by a user for the privilege of using a scarce productive resource which is owned by somebody else” (Harvey, 1974, p. 240). Thus rent is a transfer payment, “made out of value,” and

made possible/necessary by the institution of private property (Harvey, 1974, p. 240). The everyday term “rent” captures just one of the ways that owners of private property may extract rent from users. Other ways of charging rent include interest payments on mortgage loans or speculative price increases in excess of added value.

Harvey’s review of lending patterns by neighborhood, type of lending institution, forms of rent paid (whether to a landlord, to a bank in the form of interest payments, to another kind of speculator that produces housing, etc.), forms of housing tenure, house price, household income, race, and ethnicity revealed a high degree of regularity across and between neighborhoods. He found that certain institutional types lend in certain house price ranges, and that properties in those ranges cluster in neighborhoods that are distinguished by residents’ racial and income characteristics. He identified six submarkets within Baltimore: i) “the inner city” where transactions were typically in cash and residents are predominantly black tenants; ii) “the white ethnic areas” that were served by local S&Ls and where residents paid comparatively low rents; iii) “the black residential area of West Baltimore” that emerged as a result of installment payment contracts provided as a substitute to denied mortgage capital (Harvey, 1974, p. 245); iv) “the areas of high turnover” where mortgage bankers made loans only with FHA guarantees; v) “the middle-income. . . North-East and South-West Baltimore” where skittish federal S&Ls predominated but threatened to withdraw at the edges (Harvey, 1974, p. 248); and vi) areas where “the more affluent groups” reside and take loans from savings banks and commercial banks without FHA guarantees. Thus the structure of financial institutions was inscribed geographically, and worked through race and ethnicity to carve out housing sub-markets.

He described these sub-markets as “absolute urban spaces within which producers and consumers of housing services face each other as classes in conflict” (Harvey & Chatterjee, 1974, p. 33). Producers of housing and housing services include the full array of landlords, developers, real estate agents, providers of alternative credit schemes, buyers and sellers, and others: “all those individuals and institutions that operate in the land and property markets with a view toward realizing gains through ultimate sale or change in land use. In practice there may be considerable division of labour in this activity, while different institutions operate under different constraints” (Harvey, 1974, p. 242, footnote). Labeled “speculator-developers” by Harvey, they will only produce housing to the extent that it yields a return above some minimum level. This ability to release the units under their command only when “they receive a positive return above some arbitrary level” (Harvey, 1974, p. 241) constitutes a monopoly interest over the land and the semi-permanent human improvements to it. Housing users, in turn, pay the rents asked because they are effectively constrained to live in those areas and to accept those circumstances of ownership and occupation. “Class-monopoly rents can be realized in all sectors of the housing market” (Harvey, 1974, p. 242).

- In some areas of the city, professional landlords confront residents who are structurally constrained “by virtue of their income, social status, credit-worthiness and eligibility for public assistance” to seek housing “in the low-income rental market” (Harvey, 1974, p. 241). The landlords will strive to obtain a minimum return, and will reduce their maintenance of structures if necessary to achieve it—thus disinvestment is situated in a speculative context. Over time, this disinvestment may reduce the number of units available for occupancy, thus increasing scarcity and potentially increasing rents.
- Many middle-income households were induced to move to the suburbs by speculator-developers who not only produced and sold the reality and dream of the suburban property but also were pushed out of the city by land-use changes. At the time Harvey was writing, many may have foregone rent by selling their

urban property at a deflated value. “Cycles of private investment and disinvestment. . . not only raise or lower the exchange value of domestic property; they often exert displacement pressures on renters and homeowners alike” (Davis, 2008, p. 265).

- Upper-income households also will be likely to pay class-monopoly rent to one or more of the actors in the speculator-developer category. In theory, these households have many options, but in practice they are likely to choose a place of residence with particular characteristics. “If their sense of social status and prestige is highly developed, then the producers of housing (who actively promote such thoughts on the part of the buyer) have an opportunity to realize a class-monopoly rent as these consumers vie with each other for prestigious housing in the ‘right’ neighborhoods” (Harvey, 1974, p. 242).

In theory, residents in each of these examples can seek accommodation elsewhere, but that effort will be more successful on an individual basis than on a class one—“they are, for the most part, trapped in this sub-market” (Harvey, 1974, p. 242). And “these social relations achieve a greater stability precisely because communities, differentiated by social relations, become self-replicating” (Harvey, 1974, p. 254).

Speculator-developers perform a necessary and useful function in a capitalist economy. “They promote an optimal timing of land-use change, ensure that the current value of land and housing reflects expected future returns, seek to organize externalities to enhance the value of their existing developments, and generally perform a coordinating and stabilizing function in the face of considerable market uncertainty” (Harvey, 1974, pp. 242-243). Speculator-developers are, “in effect, the promoter[s] of urbanization” (Harvey, 1974, p. 243), and thus the urbanization process itself will function only when some minimum level of class-monopoly rent can be realized. As with the case of the landlord who withholds maintenance until a target rate of return can be obtained (disinvestment), the speculator-developer who cannot secure a desired rate of return will cease to “perform the vital function of promoter, coordinator and stabilizer of land-use

change” (Harvey, 1974, p. 243) (perhaps by holding the land inactive until greater returns can be realized). “In the long-run we find that the geographic structure of the city is continuously being transformed by conflicts and struggles generated by the ebb and flow of market forces, the operations of speculators, landlords and developers, the changing policies of governmental and financial institutions, changing tastes, and the like” (Harvey, 1974, p. 249).⁶

The Gentrification Debates

Is gentrification “a back-to-the city-movement of capital,” or is it a “a back-to-the city-movement of people” (Atkinson & Bridge, 2005a, p. 6)? This question has animated gentrification scholarship for several decades. One group of scholars sought to understand the dynamics of investment and profitability that underpinned rehabilitation, upgrading, and price increases in some city neighborhoods, seeing gentrification as an expression of uneven development. At the center of this production-side literature has been Neil Smith’s “rent gap” theory. Another set of inquiry focused on the demand-side of neighborhood *embourgeoisement*, investigating the in-movers’ origins and their impact on the cultural, commercial, residential, and political environments of the cities in which

⁶ It is outside the scope of this project to examine the policies of the local state in adequate detail, but it is worth mentioning that *speculator-developers require institutional supports if they are to “undertake the task of co-ordinating and stabilizing land-use changes”* (Harvey, 1974, p. 243). Three prerequisites must be met. First, “uncertainty in land-use competition” (Harvey, 1974, p. 243) must be reduced. Regulation in the form of state planning efforts or zoning controls, as well as the creation of infrastructure, are state functions that enable “speculator-developers to form reasonable expectations about the future” (Harvey, 1974, p. 243). Second, there must be mechanisms—designed specifically to attract wealthy people “who can afford to wait for land to ‘ripen’”—that open land to new uses on a speculative basis. These mechanisms commonly take the form of tax incentives. The result is that “only people with sufficient resources” (Harvey, 1974, p. 243) will likely play the role of speculator-developer. Third, speculator-developers must have “mechanisms for expressing their collective class interest” (Harvey, 1974, p. 243). Generally, these mechanisms will be provided through the institutional supports described above. For example, zoning decisions are often manipulated by speculator-developers toward ends that will allow realization of class-monopoly rents. Other kinds of influence, including but not limited to political corruption, may shape the existence and distribution of tax favors or infrastructural supports or otherwise lend support to the activities of speculator-developers.

they took residence. At the center of this consumption-side literature has been David Ley's work on the "new middle class."

After decades of debate, "most gentrification researchers now accept that production and consumption, supply and demand, economic and cultural, and structure and agency explanations are all a part" (Lees et al., 2008, p. xxii) of the phenomenon. To some extent, the contrast is actually "between two interpretations of production[: t]he one looking at changes in the social and spatial division of labour and the production of gentrifiers, and the other looking at the production of the built environment" (Hamnett, 2010, p. 249). The post-industrial, service-oriented city has consequences for both the built environment and for the kinds of workers that are needed, while the concentration of high-skill service employment in the cities gives a spatial dimension to the labor market changes. "It does not matter whether production or consumption is viewed as more important in driving gentrification, so long as neither is completely ignored" (Slater, 2011, p. 575). Below, I briefly explain each.

Producing gentrification: the rent gap

Neil Smith's rent gap model, first presented in a landmark 1979 article, is a conceptual tool for understanding the mechanisms of investment-disinvestment-reinvestment processes in the urban environment. Remember that *rent* is a transfer payment to the owner of a commodity or productive resource, which commands a price because it is scarce and because it is owned by somebody. *Ground rent* (in every day terms, "land value") equals the total returns to the owner based on some combination of the possible uses of the land—it is capitalized (received) "through some combination of tenant payment, entrepreneurial activity, and asset appreciation captured at resale" (Lees

et al., 2008, p. 51). A *rent gap* appears when *potential ground rent* (the rent an owner might be able to capture with a “higher and better” land use) grows sufficiently larger than *capitalized ground rent* (the rent the owner is currently able to capture with the land’s existing use) that the owner is motivated to alter their use of the property.

“Gentrification occurs when the gap is sufficiently wide that developers can purchase structures cheaply, can pay the builder’s costs and profit for rehabilitation, can pay interest on mortgage and construction loans, and can then sell the end product for a sale price that leaves a satisfactory return to the developer. The entire ground rent, or a large portion of it, is now capitalized; the neighborhood is thereby ‘recycled’ and begins a new cycle of use” (Smith, 1996, pp. 67–68).

The rent gap provides a conceptual tool for seeing gentrification as one stage in a larger process of uneven development, and of describing how the investment calculus of landowners in the aggregate drive a process of changes (Beauregard, 2010, p. 13). It “has been one of the most hotly debated themes in the entire study of gentrification” (Lees et al., 2008, p. 61), mainly among scholars working in neo-Marxist traditions. These debates fall into three broad categories. One line of controversy has to do with the difficulty of measuring rent gaps. It has proven difficult to operationalize, because concepts like “ground rent” or “potential rent” do not map directly to data points in existing public or private datasets. Specifying them requires broad contextual understanding of market and neighborhood conditions, as well as of taxation and related rules, over periods of decades. Because of these hurdles, few scholars have embarked on the detailed and complicated projects that are necessary, but their results “do provide qualified support for the rent gap thesis” (Lees et al., 2008, p. 59). Second, the model is criticized for its perceived

determinism, leaving too little room for either human agency or local specificity, reducing “demand side forces [to a] largely epiphenomenal role”(Caulfield, 2010, p. 162). This criticism came mainly from those who perceived demand factors to play the more decisive role in gentrification. Third, the rent gap has limited usefulness as a predictive tool. Indeed, the rent gap “provides only one of the necessary conditions for gentrification and none of the sufficient ones” (Beauregard, 2010, p. 13), and is of little use for anticipating where gentrification will occur. However, the usefulness of the model may not lie with its predictive value in determining specific local outcomes.

Today, these criticisms have receded in importance. Overall, the rent gap construct has played an indispensable role in focusing observers’ attention on the “conditions for profitability” (Smith, 1996, p. 57) as a core element of gentrification processes. It provides a concrete way to conceptually link bigger economic trends with local realities. Ultimately, however, it is not just investment in the built environment that is relevant to gentrification’s dynamics; “the calculus of capital becomes interwoven with the entire range of social and cultural dimensions of individuals’ choices of where and how to live in the urban environment” (Lees et al., 2008, p. 55). That is the focus of the consumption-oriented literature.

Consuming cities: the new middle class

The consumption-related literature sought to explain the constitution of the gentry. In context of: “a laissez-faire state, the rapidly changing industrial and occupational structure. . . (where ‘hippies became yuppies’. . . in the shift toward a post industrial city), welfare retrenchment, a real estate and new construction boom, the advent of postmodern niche marketing and conspicuous consumption, and the

aestheticization and commodification of art and artistic lifestyles” (Slater, 2005, p. 43), this work asked: What explains the resurgent demand by some young professionals for inner-city living? What distinguishes them from their suburban peers? What identity and social reproduction needs does city living satisfy? Do they bring a particular political orientation, and how is that expressed in the way they engaged the urban environment and its governance? What is their role in remaking the city as a space of consumption, and how has the style of their consumption been generalized?

Geographer David Ley’s research on the new middle class in six Canadian cities, conducted over several decades, has been at the center of this scholarship. Ley defined the new middle class as “that segment of the labour-force that lies to a lesser or greater extent between nineteenth-century views of capital and labour, the professional-managerial sector that. . . is a large and heterogeneous category, yet within it lie strata and status groups who have been centrally involved in the remaking of the central city” (Ley, 1996, p. vii). The continued expansion of this group over the second half of the twentieth century, and its disproportionate concentration in cities, was related in part to the central city concentration of white-collar work. Within this broad group, Ley accords particular significance to what he calls “a cultural new class”—including “professionals in the arts and applied arts, the media, teaching, and social services such as social work, and in other public- and non-profit-sector positions” (Ley, 1996, p. 15). This group played a particular role in the “imagineering of an alternative urbanism to suburbanization” (Ley, 1996, p. 15), with a focus on livable, amenity-rich cities with socially-conscious leadership.

His work situated the new middle class at the interstices between labor market, production, and urban planning changes. In the shift from a Fordist to a flexible production model, as “savage deindustrialization” (Ley, 1996, p. 16) gave way to an era of competition and flexible production, he describes a rejection of mass products and a quest for “commodities which offer a denser symbolic aura than the functional products of the mass market;” this “symbolic repertoire of non-standardized products [was] part of the identity formation of members of the new middle class” (Ley, 1996, p. 18). In urban planning, the modern movement “displayed the traits of a kind of urban Fordism” to the extent that “houses became ‘a machine for living in’ and the street ‘a factory for producing traffic’” (Ley, 1996, p. 19). Leaders in this tradition had “[u]topian hopes of progress and social betterment” in mind as they planned “the high-rise apartment and the urban freeway, the container and conveyor belt of the anonymous masses” (Ley, 1996, p. 20). But by the late 1960s the enormous scale of projects that “ignored, indeed often destroyed, symbolic attributes incorporating the valued meanings of vernacular traditions and local cultures” (Ley, 1996, p. 21) in urban neighborhoods yielded new resistance coalitions that “argued for historic memory, design complexity, cultural difference and social justice in the built environment” (Ley, 1996, p. 21). Ley’s case studies revealed that the new middle class “played a significant role in the emergence of these postmodern patterns of consumption and politics” (Ley, 1996, p. 21). Fordism, he argues, “in both manufacturing and urban planning suffered a simultaneous crisis of meaning” and “the new middle class has played a significant role in the emergence of. . . postmodern patterns of consumption and politics” (Ley, 1996, p. 21), with gentrifiers perhaps “the epitome” (Ley, 1996, p. 18) of this role.

Some scholars have criticized Ley and others for insisting too firmly on a set of origins lodged within economic production, while others have produced work which reveals origins of gentrifying neighborhoods beyond class. Demaris Rose urged critical engagement with the “multiplicity of processes” (Rose, 2010, p. 206) that contribute to occupational and income changes of residents in city neighborhoods. She found that urban neighborhoods, with their dense package of amenities, tended to be more suited for single mothers juggling work and child-rearing. More generally, she urged scholars to theorize changing gender roles, lifestyles, and family types among gentrifiers as related to changes in the realm of social reproduction as well as that of production realm, and to see reproduction as “actively reshaping urban space” (Rose, 2010, p. 199). “[T]here is a need to explore in detail the changing patterns of female employment and ‘career ladders’ in white-collar work and how these interact with changing family forms, domestic responsibilities, and life cycles to produce housing and neighborhood consumers with specific packages of needs” (Rose, 2010, p. 206). Her work led to recognition of gentrification as a more “chaotic process” in which “marginal gentrifiers”—such as single mothers working at the low-end of the white-collar wage scale—were significant. Other work exploring the constitution of gentrifiers beyond labor market position focused on the formation of gay spatial communities (Lauria & Knopp, 2010; Rothenberg, 1995).

This literature has been vital for understanding the gentry as they are connected to broader economic and social processes, since “without this group, the whole process ceases to exist” (Beauregard, 2010, p. 14). It has also illuminated a “gentrification aesthetic” (strategies of distinction) and how it goes to market—“the ways in which places once deemed hip, authentic, trendy, and subversive quickly become appropriated,

manufactured, and mass-produced kitsch for higher-earning groups” (Slater, 2011, p. 577). However, from the 1990s on, there has been a drift to less critical, less grounded engagements with the structural contexts in which gentrification unfolds. Sometimes described as a “gentrification of the gentrification debates” (Slater, 2010; Wacquant, 2008), this fascination with the details of the gentry’s lifestyle crowded out critical perspectives and tended to lose sight of displacement as a concern. “[T]he contingency of difference and identity should not blind us to the fundamental importance of class” (Lees et al., 2008, p. 75).

Consumer Sovereignty Models

Both Smith’s rent gap model and Ley’s new middle class thesis provided critical alternatives to “consumer sovereignty” theory, in which consumer agency is seen as the structuring force of urban land use. Emerging from the Chicago School of Sociology, consumer sovereignty models assume that investment capital follows consumers’ preferences. “The mainstream viewpoint holds that the urban crisis is the result of the operation of urban land, job, and commodity markets as they satisfy household preferences and react to various outside stimuli. Even though the results of this process are on occasion deplored, . . . they are ascribed to consumers’ tastes and various inevitable technological and economic forces” (Tabb & Sawers, 1978, p. 6). The model also suggests that a “filtering” process plays out in the distribution of housing, such that higher-income households demand newer housing while aging units gradually become occupied by lower-income households—essentially, this is a model of consumer choice organized to correspond to income (purchasing power) and to play out over time. Thus “a preference for space together with the necessary income constraints provide the

foundation for neoclassical treatments of urban development” (Smith, 1996, p. 56).

Gentrification posed “a major challenge to the traditional theories of residential location and social structure. . . . Such models assumed an invasion and succession movement whereby more affluent households would move further and further out away from the inner city with their old houses being reoccupied by less affluent residents” (Lees et al., 2008, p. xvi). When gentrification began to emerge as a phenomenon, the consumer choices that were seen as a driving force behind suburbanization (people prefer more space) were read again onto the new spatial concentrations of middle-class households in the city (they must prefer short commutes in exchange for less space, while their higher income makes inner-city housing feasible). Such treatments could not account, however, for a simultaneous international social shift in consumer preferences, manifested by the 1970s as pockets of gentrification in downtown neighborhoods of older cities across Europe, North America, and Australia. It was hypothesized that perhaps increased fuel costs might have altered the space-distance calculus for middle-class city dwellers. But if higher fuel costs were the explanation, then the theory could not account for the sustained simultaneous suburban expansion which took place throughout the 1980s (Smith, 1996, p. 55). “Albeit a reversal in geographic terms, the gentrification and redevelopment of the inner city represents a clear continuation of the forces and relations that led to suburbanization” (Smith, 1996, pp. 86–87).

Consumer sovereignty theory has three key limitations. *First, the consumer sovereignty model cannot distinguish between the choices that consumers make and the conditions that structure those choices.* In asserting that endogenous and stable consumer preferences guide urban land use, the model ignores how other actors’ motivations

influence land use decisions and downplays the legal and policy structures that shape options for both producers and consumers.

“[T]o explain gentrification according to the gentrifier’s preferences alone, while ignoring the role of builders, developers, landlords, mortgage lenders, government agencies, real estate agents—gentrifiers as producers—is excessively narrow. . . . It appears that the needs of production—in particular the need to earn profit—are a more decisive initiative behind gentrification than consumer preference” (Smith, 1996, p. 58).

Second, with particular consequences for an understanding of gentrification, consumer sovereignty theory excludes a critical consideration of disinvestment itself, and its relationship to landowners’ quest for profits amid conditions of changing profitability.

Such explanations “have taken for granted the availability of areas ripe for gentrification when this was precisely what had to be explained” (Smith, 1996, p. 57). In contrast, rent gap theory puts the individual consumer preferences of consumer sovereignty theory in their social, cultural and economic context. “Urban growth and neighborhood change proceed with the dynamics of profit and accumulation, and so the calculus of capital becomes interwoven with the entire range of social and cultural dimensions of individuals’ choices of where and how to live in the urban environment. Even the most apparently individual, personal decisions turn out to be bound up with larger social and collective processes” (Lees et al., 2008, pp. 54–55).

Third, more generally, the model conceals its normative posture, describing socially-created outcomes as natural ones. Scholars working in this tradition are able to create empirically accurate predictions to show that low-income households will be constrained to live in housing that is both low-quality and high-cost. What they fail to investigate are the circumstances that generate such unfair and undesirable conditions. In

David Harvey's much-quoted language, if the theory accurately predicts that low-income households are constrained to live in high-cost parts of the city, then "we wish the . . . theory to become not true" (Lees et al., 2008, p. 49, quoting Harvey, 1973). "[E]stimating complex models to show how elite locational preference narrows the options for lower-income households distracts our attention from the fundamental inequalities of class power" (Lees et al., 2008, p. 49).

Rather than taking preferences as a given, gentrification scholars strove to understand distributional consequences: "*Who* stands to profit from these geographies of inequality? *Why* has consumer preference changed in such a way that gentrification has swept across so many cities for nearly forty years" (Lees et al., 2008, pp. 49-50)? These questions, focused on concerns at once structural, moral, and empirical, remain central concerns as I move in the next section to consider how scholars have documented and understood actual gentrification processes.

CHAPTER 5

THE GENTRIFICATION PROCESS AND THE PROCESS OF GENTRIFICATION

Like the broader process of urbanization of which gentrification must be considered a small element, it too is an ongoing process that unfolds over time, as neighborhoods and entire suburbs are gradually transformed. . . . It is therefore common in the literature to find the word “process” readily used as either a prefix or suffix with the term “gentrification” in an attempt to convey something of this ongoing quality. Yet a shortcoming with this practice is a failure to examine from an empirical perspective the actual “process of gentrification” over an extended period of time as opposed to the “gentrification process.”

— Engels (1999, p. 1474)

In the foregoing chapters, I established that both urban decline and gentrification are structural and historical phenomena related to identifiable (dis)investment decisions that leave an uneven spatial imprint. I characterized a housing realm where the ordinary quest of real estate actors for financial returns drives an urban process in which social reproduction—differentiated across income, race, ethnicity, and labor market position—takes spatial form. I described the growth of professional and managerial workers alongside the concentration of white collar employment in central cities, and the lead role of a segment of these workers in defining the cultural and political terms of the *embourgeoisement* (Ley, 1996) of neighborhoods and restructuring of the city as a place for consumption and leisure.

In this chapter, I summarize the efforts of gentrification scholars to observe local manifestations of the process. First, I present the people and property measures that are typically used to identify places where gentrification pressures are present. Second, I

review evidence about factors that may advance and inhibit gentrification pressures at the local level. Third, I discuss the efforts that have been made to observe the varied inputs that work together to create actual gentrification processes. Finally, setting up for the current project, I identify a need for scholarship that builds on knowledge about *the gentrification process* through closer attention to *the process of gentrification* at the local level (Engels, 1999).

Measuring Gentrification: Key Indicators

What are the features that characterize a gentrifying neighborhood? As discussed in prior chapters, we are looking for changes that simultaneously indicate a combination of *class transformation* and *restored profitability*. These will be people and property measures that are at once precise enough to distinguish something particular and well-defined, yet loose enough to allow for the contingencies and variations that are characteristic of a phenomenon that is frequently multiply-determined at the local level. These are summarized in Table 5.1: Criteria for Identifying a Gentrifying Neighborhood and described narratively below. In all cases, neighborhood data should be contextualized by comparison to citywide, metro-wide, and/or suburban data.

The *core people changes* that researchers look for are those that speak to the underlying class transformation: a combination of occupation, education, and income criteria that indicate a growing presence of college-educated workers with well-paying professional occupations, in a location where prior residents tended to work in non-professional occupations and were less likely to hold college degrees. The relative importance of each measure of change will vary by location. In some places, for example, the incomes of the initial newcomers may not be markedly different than those of the

existing residents (these may be the “marginal gentrifiers” of the literature, or people at a stage of life in which their earnings are low relative to their status). In other places, such as those where artists and lower-paid public interest professionals have “proven” a space that undergoes a second wave of gentrification, with higher-income professionals displacing the first group (sometimes dubbed “supergentrification” (Lees et al., 2008, p. 130)), income changes would be important while educational differences might be slight. The factors should be considered in combination, alongside property changes.

Table 5.1. Criteria for Identifying a Gentrifying Neighborhood

Core people variables	Rise in median household income
	Rise in percentage of workers in managerial, professional, or technical occupations
	Rise in percentage of people age 25 and over with a bachelors degree
Additional people variables	Total population
	Race and ethnic changes consistent with local process (often high white in-migration and African-American or Latino displacement)
	Household type: growth in number of unrelated adult households
	In some cases: smaller household size
	In some cases: rise in number of college students
	Age changes
Core property variables	Rise in median rent
	Rise in house prices
	Improved structures, increased improvement activity, new construction
	Increased percentage of condos or numbers of condo conversions
	Decreased percentage of rental units
	Increased volatility of sales
	Increase in mortgage capital (may not be an initial indicator)
	Reduced vacancy
Additional property variables	Decline in tax arrears
	Loss of industrial activity
	Conversion of formerly industrial buildings to residential use

Primary sources: Atkinson and Bridge (2005a), Hammel and Wyly (1996)

Additional sources: Atkinson and Wulff (2009), Bridge (2010), Filion (1991), Hackworth (2007), Ley (2010a) Slater (2005), Smith (1996), Wyly and Hammel (2005)

Additional situational people changes are factors that by themselves do not constitute gentrification, but which in the context of a local gentrification process might help to elucidate the change. Growth in the percentage of college students may be relevant where the phenomenon has a strong student-led component (sometimes called “studentification” (Lees et al., 2008, pp. 130-131)). Race and ethnicity can be examined in neighborhoods where gentrification is also “racialized redevelopment,” with predominantly white in-movers replacing usually African-American or Latino displacees. Age changes can be relevant. Overall, gentrifiers will tend to be younger, but in some places “empty nesters” can be a significant part of an incoming group. In neighborhoods that previously had high levels of property abandonment and vacancy total population will increase with gentrification pressures. In other places, total population may decrease as family households are replaced by one- and two-person households. Finally, altered household composition, with more non-family households, is associated with the phenomenon across locations.

The *property changes* that indicate restored profitability include a combination of price increases in sales and rentals, property upgrading, growth in condominiums and declines in rentals, higher sales volatility, vacancy changes, increases in mortgage capital, and sometimes declining tax arrears. In the cases of price, volatility, and condoization, one looks for increases. Property upgrading and new construction can be observed through field surveys or building permits. Generally one looks for reduced vacancies as a sign of reinvestment, although they may increase at points in a process of change if units are emptied in anticipation of higher-paying tenants. Increases in mortgage capital may lag other evidence of gentrification, since the process frequently begins in places that

lenders consider “risky” for investment. In a very disinvested area, if landlords have withheld tax payments as a way of “milking” a last investment from buildings, there may be a decline in tax arrears as other profitable uses are sought. If the area has been industrial, there may be a decline in industrial uses and some formerly industrial buildings may be converted to housing.

In summary, measuring gentrification requires attention to its core defining features: a process of social change related to the increase in the number of professional and managerial workers and their spatial concentration in the city, alongside the restoration of profitability in the built environment. A deeper understanding of the process in a given location can be gleaned from assessing other relevant and common changes in people and property. It can also be valuable to understand where gentrification pressures are *not* located—especially if areas have features in common with gentrifying neighborhoods—to better understand the opportunities and barriers at local levels.

Factors that Advance Gentrification

Certain locations will be suitable for gentrification—usually with some combination of devalued and attractive housing stock, greenspace or waterfront views or other amenities, well-served by transport systems, with a viable commercial district. But, as discussed above in “What is Gentrification?” such attributes constitute only *necessary*, not *sufficient* conditions for a process to launch. In order for the above transformations to occur, actors at the local level must engage in activities that encourage particular changes. These factors that advance gentrification also have been amply addressed in the preceding chapters, so only a simple summary is provided here.

Table 5.2. Key Factors That Advance Gentrification

Factor	Elements
Gentrifiers	Use “sweat equity” to renovate properties
	Recruit other gentrifiers through social networks
	Obtain historic designation for properties
	Form organizations to advocate for their interests (e.g., building style guidelines, uses of public/open space, community supports for remodeling buildings, etc.)
	Play entrepreneurial roles in a devalued real estate market
	Engage in cultural production (use space for artistic or counter-cultural pursuits), which later serves neighborhood commodification
Real estate actors	Landlords increase rents, condo convert, or sell in rising market
	Brokers navigate between outgoing and incoming populations, including through advertising practices
	Developers build and remodel after area is established for middle-class use
	Property owners engage in speculative practices (holding properties vacant in quest of higher future returns, buying and selling, etc.)
Local state	Demolition and upscale reconstruction
	Targeted property improvement loan programs (sometimes with federal support)
	Tax credits for developers
	Actions to reduce “disamenities” (anti-crime efforts, etc.), provide improved services, or meet the particular service needs sought by incoming gentry
	Institutional support for other goals (historic designation, artist housing, etc.)
	Zoning and permitting actions, e.g., to permit residential conversion of industrial structures
Investors	Broad policy regimes or specific programs that support public-private partnerships, privatization of housing and land, reduction of social (public) housing, deregulation of rents, etc.
	Lenders provide capital (increasingly as perceived risk declines)
	Institutional investors provide capital (only when process is well advanced)
Media	Neighborhood representations positively portray distinctive styles of living

Selected sources: Alicea (2001); Atkinson and Bridge (2005a); Beauregard (2010); Bridge (2010); Lees et al. (2008); Ley (1996); Ley (2003); Mele (2010); Rothenberg (1995); Smith (1996)

Focusing on the residential realm, gentrifiers play roles as residents, active community members, and real estate business people. Real estate actors play a variety of roles that produce space and deliver it to a submarket of users. The local state may actively encourage the process through its own redevelopment programs, by providing funding and institutional supports for others’ development activity, or by withdrawing

supports that inhibited higher priced uses (e.g., rent controls). Investors, particularly lenders, provide capital, while larger institutional investors may become involved as a process advances. Implied in these descriptions of real estate, municipal, and financial actors are contrasting activities: landlords may withhold maintenance, the municipality may reduce services, and investment capital will be withdrawn.

Factors that Inhibit Gentrification

What characteristics may inhibit gentrification processes from taking root in a place that has the features gentrifiers seek, or from advancing in a place where they started? In this section, recognizing that “gentrification is a complex process and does not touch down the same way in each neighborhood” (Walks & August, 2008, p. 2596), I consider evidence from the literature on attributes that may inhibit the advance of gentrification. I draw heavily, though not exclusively, from three sources. Kate Shaw’s review essay summarizes the evidence from “research in Europe, the United States and Australia,” in which she shows that “particular characteristics do slow the process, with the result that the negative effects are not as marked” (Shaw, 2005, p. 168). Two others are case studies of Canadian cities, each of which reports on comparative analyses examining why some neighborhoods gentrify while others don’t (Ley & Dobson, 2008; Walks & August, 2008). These research efforts considered the particular circumstances of neighborhoods that had varying degrees of middle-class in-migration, some of which abutted established gentrified zones, but where more pervasive upscaling had faltered.

Shaw identifies four features, at least two of which were present in those places where gentrification was both comparatively slow in its pace and limited in its extent.

First and foremost was a housing stock not particularly conducive to gentrification. Second was some security in housing tenure. Third was the relative 'embeddedness' of local communities and presence of political activism. Fourth was a local government willing to intervene in the interests of low-income housing. (Shaw, 2005, p. 173)

Additional features have been observed to have impacts in particular places. These include: perceived disamenities, including social attributes that may be disagreeable to gentrifiers; community embeddedness *without* active resistance; other policies of the municipality (beyond housing-related efforts).

First, in-movers will seek to avoid an inappropriate housing stock, as well as other attributes perceived to be disamenities. It is widely recognized that not all types of housing will be conducive to gentrifiers, who prefer housing with historic features or decorative construction, or may be drawn to up-market new construction (Shaw, 2005, p. 175). Some studies have found that housing which is difficult to renovate can attract a gentry more embracing of social mix, whereas new-build condos will attract residents who don't appreciate the old neighborhood and don't care about social diversity (Shaw, 2005, p. 175). Dobson and Ley emphasize housing as a set of signifiers; it must have "socially approved architectural signatures that provide landscapes of distinction" (Ley & Dobson, 2008, p. 2473), while building elements that epitomize mass construction will detract. Walks and August also found that neighborhoods which did not gentrify or did so less than surrounding areas, many houses had external features that mark the "area as both ethnic and working-class" (Walks & August, 2008, p. 2613). Places with active industrial uses also will be less likely to gentrify (Dobson & Ley, 2008, p. 2488).

Places in which the residents are very low-income will be unlikely to experience gentrification pressures. Instead, both gentrifiers, and the developers and real estate

agents who serve that population, are likely to seek an area that has experienced some devalorization (abandonment, disinvestment), but where poverty is less concentrated. “[T]ransition typically occurs first, and over time most deeply, in areas that are of modest income, avoiding at first very-low-income areas” (Dobson & Ley, 2008, p. 2474). The presence of large public housing complexes, for example, is generally a disincentive to gentrification (Dobson & Ley, 2008, p. 2474), while “proximity to an existing elite area” (Ley, 1996, pp. 43–44) is an incentive. A study of new construction using Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) funds found that such units “significantly crowd out nearby new rental construction in gentrifying areas but do not displace new construction in stable or declining areas” (Baum-Snow & Marion, 2009, p. 654). In other words, affordable housing construction can be used to claim space that would otherwise be used for market housing. Related, in places where the public schools are perceived to be of low-quality gentrification may be stalled (Dobson & Ley, 2008, p. 2473).

Certain social uses of the space can inhibit gentrification from advancing, whether having to do with perceptions of safety or of social appropriateness. In Vancouver’s Downtown Eastside, which did not gentrify like the immediately surrounding areas, there were high rates of injection drug use, an active prostitution scene, several shelters for the homeless, a number of single room occupancy (SRO) hotels, and high rates of crime (Dobson & Ley, 2008, p. 2481). In Grandview-Woodland, social housing for people with mental illnesses meant a higher frequency of public behaviors considered disruptive by some (Dobson & Ley, 2008, p. 2490). In general, in areas that are associated with or have higher rates of crime or “disruptive street life” (Dobson & Ley, 2008, p. 2474) gentrification is inhibited. “Only in an overheated housing market will they be selected

once more secure and affordable locations are no longer available” (Dobson & Ley, 2008, p. 2474). Finally, gentrification also may be inhibited by social and cultural practices that are dissimilar to those of the gentry or simply unfamiliar to them. Such factors may function as a kind of side-effect of community embeddedness (discussed below). For example, if a commercial district operates almost entirely in an ethnic group’s language, that may discourage patronage by members of the gentry who do not speak the language. Certain uses of public space for culturally-specific (e.g., festivals) or ordinary (e.g., local practices related to trash disposal) purposes may discourage in-movers or lead to conflict between new and existing populations.

In one neighborhood, where gentrification was “long anticipated,” Dobson and Ley found it had “been stalled by noxious industrial plants, a local left-wing political culture that is tolerant of unpredictable public behavior and poor residents whose presence is sustained by a significant stock of social housing” Dobson and Ley (2008, p. 2481). Despite being less than a kilometer from the financial district, having a devalued building stock, the presence of improving amenities secured through community action (a park, a community center, the closure of liquor store where there had been trouble), and active gentrification pressures at its borders, it has sustained an uneasy equilibrium (Dobson & Ley, 2008, pp. 2481-2486). For another example, in Grandview-Woodland, despite significant and sustained professional interest in area condos and houses, gentrification was stalled for three decades by a combination of noxious industrial uses and competing uses of social space (like a weekly event to distribute food to homeless people, many of whom showed up drunk, after which litter is sometimes left behind).

Second, the existing residents will be more likely to be able to remain in a neighborhood—and hence to inhibit gentrification from displacing them—where they have greater security of tenure or where there is greater “community embeddedness” (Shaw, 2005; Walks & August, 2008). Unsurprisingly, security of tenure overlaps with local policy conditions, specifically: state supports that either distribute housing directly outside of market forces (Walks & August, 2008, p. 2608), or provide tenants with legal protections from unregulated market forces. Homeownership is a key means through which residents can have greater security of tenure.⁷ “It is widely accepted that as gentrification proceeds home-ownership increases, but less noted is the observation that the higher the owner-occupation levels to start with, the lower the likelihood of gentrification gaining a strong hold” (Shaw, 2005, pp. 175-176). One example is the Fishtown neighborhood of Philadelphia, a working-class area where many homeowners resisted selling despite potential profits. Wyly and Hammel report on a group of African American neighborhoods in which class transformation was delayed by “comparatively high rates” (2005, p. 32) of homeownership. “Longevity of tenure, through home ownership, secure private rental, public or community housing, plays a vital role in limiting gentrification. It limits the number of units on the market, reduces attractiveness to higher-income purchasers, minimizes displacement and allows the development of embedded local communities” (Shaw, 2005, p. 177).

Community embeddedness may work in tandem with homeownership in cases where property transfers and rentals occur through networks internal to the community

⁷ High or low rates of homeownership are, like most factors, not a sole determinant of a neighborhood’s likely trajectory. In two inhibited-gentrification neighborhoods that Walks and August studied, the rates of homeownership were similar to the city average and to other gentrifying neighborhoods when those areas began to gentrify.

(Shaw, 2005, p. 179). “[F]requently high levels of homeownership in immigrant areas mean limited turnover, while house sales and rentals often occur within semi-closed ethnic networks, providing a double barrier to middle-class entry” (Ley & Dobson, 2008, p. 2474). In contrast, when property transfers are handled by parties external to the local community, especially when buyers or renters from outside the area are sought, the effect will be to accelerate in-migration of gentrifiers. Arlene Dávila reports that “East Harlem’s real estate is not advertised in *El Diario* or other Latino and local newspapers; it is more likely listed by downtown realtors” (2004, p. 54). In the neighborhoods Walks and August studied, ethnic housing finance capital was common. This community strategy enabled homeownership for individual community members, kept property transfers within the community, contributed to increased rental stock (because of the tendency to subdivide properties and rent out the additional units to co-ethnics), and extended the aggregate community’s control over housing and the business of real estate (Walks & August, 2008, p. 2612).

Third, political mobilization at the community level—whether within the group of existing residents or a collaboration of existing residents and early gentrifiers—can shape the trajectory of gentrification and limit its impacts in many circumstances. Although it is typically difficult for communities to sustain the level of mobilization necessary over the long periods of time for which it can be required (Dobson & Ley, 2008, p. 2477), it is possible for mobilized communities to impact the trajectory of a gentrification process in a given place (Shaw, 2005, p. 178).

Fourth, the local state will generally play a key role in encouraging gentrification through demolition and redevelopment, selective investments in amenities and

infrastructure, withdrawal of tenant protections, public-private partnerships to stimulate private investment, zoning decisions, planning priorities, and other means. They also can act to reduce displacement through affordable housing creation, extending tenant protections, and restricting condo conversions. Ley reports on Canadian cities in which mobilization for “government preservation and enhancement policies [like] loans and grants to aid housing renovation and. . . neighborhood improvements. . . had the effect of facilitating gentrification”(Dobson & Ley, 2008, p. 2476).

Few strategies are surefire. In Toronto and Vancouver, high-rise apartment building construction associated with gentrification was resisted successfully by advocates who pushed for “down-zoning” to require lower densities and hence keep out the high-rises. But in the long run the lower densities were associated with a better quality of life, “thereby improving the attractiveness of districts to those who could afford them” (Dobson & Ley, 2008, p. 2476). While large public housing complexes have tended to serve as a disincentive for gentrification, mixed-income and smaller scale projects may have the opposite effect. In Canadian cities, nonprofit and cooperative housing complexes “were sometimes the first indicator of social upgrading;” in Montreal, they “acted as an *instigator* of private reinvestment in formerly devalued districts” (Ley, 1996, p. 36). Socially mixed housing built in Canadian cities in the 1970s and early 1980s acted “as a location leader, they commonly encouraged imitative reinvestment by the private sector nearby” (Ley, 1996, pp. 36–37). A more recent study of subsidized rental housing found that, contrary to expectations, “the predominant impact is an upgrading effect of lower-value areas” (although that result decreased as the difference between subsidized and market prices increases) (Koschinsky, 2009, p. 319). Researchers have

documented instances in which community activism—including of the anti-gentrification variety—was used, successfully, as a selling point by real estate actors to draw additional gentry to the neighborhood (Betancur, 2002). These outcomes underscore the importance of state action to remove housing from the private market, even as they point to the limits of the strategy (Dobson & Ley, 2008, p. 2476).

Shaw, drawing on her review of community embeddedness, finds a critical lesson: gentrification “*carries its own dynamic*” (Shaw, 2005, p. 182) and “*can be steered*” (Shaw, 2005, p. 182). If the local government chooses to cater to a wealthy populace, that will bring in a constituency that goes on to shape what options are available next. If the municipality takes steps to reduce housing speculation, to create affordable or non-market forms of housing, that may set a different course of options into motion. “A gentrifying demographic will always bring local politics to a critical point” (Shaw, 2005, p. 182).

Table 5.3. Factors That Can Inhibit Gentrification

Factor		Elements	Limits
✓	Impaired housing supply	Small or modest houses and apartments without architecturally notable features or on small lots	In a tight housing market, demand may push into these areas.
		Absence of clearance and upmarket construction (i.e., “urban renewal”)	
		External housing styles understood to be ethnic and/or working-class	
		Absence of formerly industrial buildings that can be converted to residential use	

Table 5.3. Factors That Can Inhibit Gentrification, cont.

Factor	Elements	Limits
Disamenities and perceived disamenities	Active industrial facilities, particularly if there are accompanying noxious odors, noises, soot, etc.	In a tight housing market, demand may push into these areas.
	High crime or perceived high crime	
	Street culture that includes such things as prostitution, drug use, erratic behaviors	
	Public schools that are poorly performing or perceived to be so	
Higher social polarization	High rates of poverty among existing residents, including large public housing complexes	Initial gentrifiers may work together to assert their own cultural practices and normative expectations, sometimes seeking the assistance of the local state (in the case of uses of public space, for example).
	High presence of particular populations, such as homeless people or mentally ill residents (e.g., in areas with shelters or group quarters)	
	High differences in the ability of existing residents and newcomers to compete in the housing market (i.e., a combination of income inequality, low security of housing tenure for existing residents, and weak ability of existing residents to bring political support / policy action to bear on their own behalf)	
	Distaste of potential gentry for ordinary modes of daily living or periodic cultural celebrations of existing residents	
✓ Security in housing tenure for existing residents	Homeownership	Community embeddedness (below) can be as or more important than homeownership alone (they work in tandem).
	Non-market housing for low-income households	
	Protections for users (versus owners) of property, such as tenant protections	

Table 5.3. Factors That Can Inhibit Gentrification, cont.

Factor	Elements	Limits
✓ “Community embedded-ness” of existing residents, especially when it leads to active resistance	<p>Established community institutions</p> <p>A shared / broadly understood sense of self that is tied to place</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bonds of ethnicity and race, including use of public space to carry out cultural practices • Early gentrifiers who regard the choice to live in the city in political terms, have a values commitment to housing affordability, and find self among similarly-oriented people (possibly creating a social milieu in which political action is a normal and expected part of community life) <p>Control over real estate business by residents, such that property transfers and rentals tend to occur within the existing community</p> <p>Ethnic housing finance capital</p>	<p>Shared opponents and shared material interests will not necessarily be sufficient to overcome internal divisions, distrust, and/or racism.</p> <p>Resistance is difficult to sustain over the long periods of time that are necessary.</p>
“Community embedded-ness” of existing residents, cont.	<p>“Internal completeness,” such that most of the business of life can be carried out within the community</p> <p>Adequate employment for existing residents in the vicinity of the neighborhood</p>	
Community organizing	Mobilization to resist to gentrification	Community activism can become part of the marketable appeal of the neighborhood.
✓ Local government intervention for low-income housing	<p>Creation of affordable housing to prevent displacement of existing residents as prices rise</p> <p>Support for rent control</p> <p>Efforts to get housing out of the speculative market (through city or nonprofit purchase of existing housing, in addition to affordable housing development)</p>	Attractive, stable, affordable housing can serve as a location leader in attracting private investment and gentrifiers.

Table 5.3. Factors That Can Inhibit Gentrification, cont.

Factor	Elements	Limits
Other policies of the local state	Explicit support for industrial uses	When environmental disamenities are removed, the market effects may price out the current population so that they are not the beneficiaries.
	Taxes on housing speculation	
	Avoidance of re-zoning of industrial areas for upmarket residential use	
	Avoidance of environmental reforms without regard for their unintended consequences.	

✓: Indicates categories found to be most important in Kate Shaw's (2005) survey of the literature. Neighborhoods where gentrification pressures were inhibited had at least two of these four kinds of features.

Additional sources: Ley & Dobson (2008); Walks & August (2008); Betancur (2002); Dávila (2004)

The Process of Gentrification

Gentrification scholarship has been theoretically rich and empirically far-reaching. As the phenomenon has become a more established part of the contemporary restructuring of the city, researchers have turned their attention to understanding its deep interweaving with neoliberal policy frameworks (e.g., Atkinson and Bridge (2005b); Hackworth and Smith (2010); Rose et al. (2013). In keeping with a process so multiply determined, with so many local-level elements contributing to the production of space and shaping its uses, research has been broad. Thus, ethnographic work has examined such issues as the experiences of incumbent neighborhood residents who are able to remain in place as a neighborhood changes around them (Freeman, 2006) or the particular dynamics between working-class residents and professional in-migrants when both are African-American (Pattillo, 2007). The case study scholarship has addressed too many topics to name here, including: the impact on local processes of educational systems; environmental clean-up efforts; crime; community development struggles; local

real estate practices and networks; the impact of particular municipal programs and policy regimes; ethnic enclaves; and, more rarely, community organizing and resistance.

Despite this diversity of scholarship, gentrification research in recent decades has had increasing difficulty being relevant to either the poor and working-class communities that bear the brunt of displacement and the loss of place-based social ties, or to policy-making. Instead, while “[c]onsumer sovereignty has become urban policy” (Lees et al., 2008, p. 76), researchers were tied up with the consumption-production debates and unprepared to participate in policy shaping. The methodological disputes “displaced attention from those displaced by gentrification” (Lees et al., 2008, p. 77), while there was an uptick in research “anchored in thinly veiled empathetic sentiments for middle-class gentrifiers that serve to blot out any other human agents involved in the process” (Slater, 2011, p. 577). In the past decade there has been some resurgence of interest in displacement, motivated in part by a small number of well-publicized studies suggesting that gentrification benefits the poor (Freeman, 2006; Vigdor, 2002, 2010); those conclusions were complicated or altogether not sustained when the data was re-examined by other authors (K. Newman & Wyly, 2006). A study of the Bay Area aimed to predict where gentrification will occur next—a task that is only recently imaginable, in a time when districts throughout whole urban areas are undergoing the process, as is the case there—by studying the people, property, and transportation infrastructure characteristics of neighborhoods already impacted (Chapple, 2009).

Efforts to document the concrete changes at a local level that operate together to create the effect called gentrification—to track the mechanisms by which reinvestment proceeds and/or population transition actually occurs—have been rare. Neil Smith (1996)

developed a method to track the movement of a gentrification frontier in New York City's Lower East Side, relying on a combination of tax arrearage payments, household utility hook-ups, sales price, and mortgage lending data. This method is best suited for areas with significant vacancies and absentee ownership. Sharon Zukin's (1989) influential study on the New York City "loft living" culture brought together rental and sales data with key informant interviews to classify different kinds of developers and the spaces they produced, and to observe changes in those practices over time. Scholars have mapped the advancement of a gentrification frontier using a combination of Census data and field surveys (e.g., Heidkamp and Lucas (2006)), but without documenting the transactions, moves, or actors that push along the boundaries of change.

A survey of peer-reviewed articles and dissertations on gentrification over the past 30 years yielded scant examples of research to document the mechanisms through which changes were advanced in a gentrifying housing market. One stands out. Benno Engels undertook an examination of a 25-year process of transformation in the suburb of Glebe in Sydney, Australia because he was struck by the absence of research on "the actual 'process of gentrification'" (Engels, 1999, p. 1474), in contrast to the focus on a *gentrification process*. He urged that research "should seek to establish not only how constituent elements of the process unfold simultaneously over time but also how in doing so they influence and change each other to the point where the external appearance of gentrification is itself progressively transformed" (Engels, 1999, p. 1474). After all, "*a gentrified housing market is not pre-given but is created via the purchasing, renting, and selling activities of the different types of agents involved*" (Engels, 1999, p. 1493, emphasis added).

Using available public records—housing data drawn from public records of property transfers, occupation data drawn from the electoral rolls (in a context where voting is compulsory)—along with his own household survey, Engels assembled a picture of “changes in the ownership and tenure structure of gentrifiable housing over a longitudinal period of twenty-five years” (Engels, 1999, p. 1475). He found that earlier working-class and in-migrating white-collar workers had the same reasons for locating in the neighborhood: proximity to work, with the transition between the two groups the result of “CBD labor-market restructuring” (Engels, 1999, pp. 1492-1493). He was able to track the very local impacts of rent control and subsequent decontrol by observing the incentives landlords perceived in each policy period and how their actions in search of financial returns shaped the patterns of owner-occupancy by working-class or middle-class residents. Certain kinds of landlords (with medium-sized operations) were the most influential in shaping residential land use; these actors behaved more strategically, with a more carefully calibrated set of expectations about the present and future. And he observed a transition in population succession. Whereas the first displacees were working-class, as the process advanced professionals were increasingly displacing other white-collar (sales and clerical) workers, and this turnover was often also from renters to owner-occupants. His work revealed the possibilities for “understanding the inner workings of [the] complex residential restructuring process” (Engels, 1999, p. 1493) of a longitudinal approach at the household level.

The Current Study

Returning to the Hi-Lo – Whole Foods transition and the debate over its meaning for Hyde and Jackson Squares, it is clear that the literature offers certain theoretical and

empirical guidance for making sense of the situation. First, gentrification is an historical phenomenon. To the extent that capital was invested elsewhere while cities struggled, and that it returns now only to some parts of the central city, gentrification is one aspect of an urban process characterized by uneven development. The rent gap provides a conceptual tool for understanding the calculus of property owners in the context of changing neighborhood conditions, and speaks to the authority accorded to private property and exchange value, over and above household and community uses of space. Thus I anticipate a relationship between the distribution of gentrification pressures and the distribution of disinvestment effects that came prior.

Second, the population changes in a gentrifying place are one outcome of economic restructuring, the growth of professional occupations, and their concentration in cities. This class process is measurable in the form of changes in the occupations and educational achievement level of residents. Third, the in-migrating and out-migrating groups in residential succession may occupy different “absolute spaces” in the housing market, each with particular forms of housing use and ownership, with the change from one to the other driven by the ordinary actions of brokers, landlords, and developers in search of financial return. Thus to the extent that population changes are occurring, I would anticipate a block-by-block in-migration of professionals, aided by real estate actors that prepare and deliver the space. Fourth, certain empirical factors are well-established. The use of certain Census data to substantiate the presence of the process is routine, and certain aspects—like the way that small entrepreneurial actors tend to pave the way for larger companies and investors—are nearly standard components of the process.

Despite these structural and historical (and occasionally empirical) regularities, gentrification is understood to be a contingent local process, unfolding in each location according to the particulars of the environment. As observed by Engels, the actual residential restructuring process remains mysterious. There is a need for scholarship that elucidates the particular local activities that combine to create the overall effect called gentrification, and which are well-grounded in critical perspectives on the gentrification process. The present study strives to fill that gap. In contrast to the local debate—characterized by animosity, doubt, accusation, and either a posture of resigned inevitability toward or celebratory embrace of upscaling—this project aims to observe changes as they play out through competition between different categories of workers for housing. In addition, the evidence base on inhibitors is more emergent, with conclusions less-settled and in need of testing in additional locations. This project aims to recognize simultaneous processes, in particular the use of the neighborhood in recent decades as Latino cultural space, and the possibility of impacts in the real estate realm. To do so, I use well-established methods to document the presence and distribution of gentrification pressures, and pilot an approach for observing the redevelopment of the neighborhood at the level of buildings and streets.

CHAPTER 6 RESEARCH DESIGN

What have been the mechanisms of accumulation, and their consequences for the social and physical character of the area, as gentrification pressures have moved into Hyde and Jackson Squares? To explore this question, I use a case study design, and combine qualitative, archival, and descriptive quantitative data sources. Research questions, summarized in Table 6.1, are designed to allow substantiation of gentrification pressures, examination of their distribution within the study area, and exploration at the residential building and street level of the factors that have advanced and inhibited gentrifying changes.


Hyde and Jackson Squares are defined using boundaries that are informed by those used by municipal and nonprofit actors during the past 30 years. The study area, shown in Figure 6.1, straddles four Census tracts. The street boundaries are as follows:

- A southern edge at Boylston Street;
- A western edge along Center Street, Perkins Street, and South Huntington Street;
- A northern edge along Heath Street and New Heath Street, Bromley Street, and Heath Street;
- An eastern edge along the Southwest Corridor / train tracks.

These boundaries are imperfect to the extent that they attempt to approximate lived divisions of space with Census boundaries. For example, the block where the Hi-Lo / Whole Foods property is located is omitted because it falls in a different tract. However,

because this block has very little housing (less than 20 units), its exclusion did not impact the study of pressures in the residential environment.

Figure 6.1. Map of Study Area



The audiences for this project include, but are not limited to:

- Neighborhood-based change agents;
- Social justice educators and organizers;
- Gentrification researchers;
- Urban planners;
- Municipal agencies;
- Scholars of urban and community studies.

Table 6.1. Research Questions and Data Sources

QUESTION 1	What is the extent and the geographic distribution of gentrification pressures in the study area?			
RESEARCH QUESTION		OPERATIONALIZED QUESTION	DATA POINTS	DATA SOURCES
1.a. Is there empirical evidence of gentrification in Hyde and Jackson Squares today?	PRESENT in comparison to 2000	PEOPLE: Primary Measures Is there evidence of a growing population of professionals?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • % of workers with professional occupations • % of people age 25+ with a bachelors degree 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Decennial Census data
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Median household income 	
		PEOPLE: Secondary Measures Has the demographic mix in Hyde Square changed in ways consistent with the departure of existing/prior residents?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Racial and ethnic characteristics of residents 	
		PROPERTY Has there been a shift toward owner-occupancy and away from rental units?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Housing tenure 	
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Median sales prices • Median rents 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DND Real Estate Trends reports • Warren Group • Embedded sample building prices (from question 2, below)
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of conversions • Dates of selected recent conversions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Decennial Census data • JPNDC Hyde Square condoization report (Nafici, 2006) • Warren Group

Table 6.1 Research Questions and Data Sources, cont.

QUESTION 1	What is the extent and the geographic distribution of gentrification pressures in the study area?			
RESEARCH QUESTION	OPERATIONALIZED QUESTION		DATA POINTS	DATA SOURCES
1.b. How are gentrification pressures distributed within the study area?	PRESENT	PROPERTY	What is the extent of gentrification pressures—measured as the presence or absence of condo-converted buildings, high or low relative sales volatility, and high or low relative prices—on each street within the study area?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Multiple Listing Service (MLS) Property Information Network (PIN) transactions list • Warren Group Public Records List • City of Boston Assessment Department Real Estate Assessments and Taxes Search
			What other distinguishing features do streets exhibit that may explain the differences they have from one another?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Property types • Presence of subsidized housing
	1960–1985	PROPERTY	What evidence from the past helps to explain the distribution of gentrification pressures in the present?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Locations of housing deterioration • Patterns of “blight” • Trends in property values • Trends in rents • Creation of affordable housing • BRA reports and analyses • MIT Planning Department Theses • CBO studies, proposals, and other documents • City of Boston federal funding proposals • Key informant interviews
		PEOPLE		

Table 6.1 Research Questions and Data Sources, cont.

QUESTION 2		Which factors appear to <i>facilitate</i>, and which to <i>inhibit</i>, gentrification in the study area?		
RESEARCH QUESTION		OPERATIONALIZED QUESTION	DATA POINTS	DATA SOURCES
2.a. What are the property circumstances, actors, and practices that have facilitated the arrival of professionals?	EMBEDDED SAMPLE (ES)	Has condo conversion played a key role in introducing residents with professional occupations?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> History of property ownership and use—at the building level <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Property tenure Condo conversion Vacancy, abandonment, demolition New construction Property transfer Owner characteristics <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Occupation Spanish surname Resident characteristics <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Occupation Spanish surname Broker and broker practices characteristics <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Volume Roles played Clients served 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mass Land Records / Suffolk County Registry of Deeds City of Boston Assessment Department records (1984–) Warren Group Public Records “Assessment and Sales Reports” City of Boston Inspectional Services Department Permit Retrieval System MLS PIN transaction list Corporate Database of the Secretary of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Corporations Division Key informant interviews Annual Resident Listing
		Are certain property ownership characteristics associated with the introduction of residents with professional occupations?		
2.b. Is there evidence of control over housing by Latinos through ownership, or through networks for housing transfers and rentals?	ES & STUDY AREA (SA)	What brokers, landlords, and other real estate actors, playing what roles, are associated with the introduction of residents with professional occupations?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Owner characteristics <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Occupation Spanish surname Resident characteristics <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Occupation Spanish surname Broker and broker practices characteristics <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Volume Roles played Clients served 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mass Land Records / Suffolk County Registry of Deeds City of Boston Assessment Department records (1984–) Warren Group Public Records “Assessment and Sales Reports” City of Boston Inspectional Services Department Permit Retrieval System MLS PIN transaction list Corporate Database of the Secretary of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Corporations Division Key informant interviews Annual Resident Listing
	ES	What are the patterns of property ownership, transfer and rental, by and between people with Spanish surnames?		
2.c. Has gentrification been inhibited by security of housing tenure for existing residents?	ES & SA	Are there networks of Latino-serving brokers, landlords, and other real estate actors that function to establish control over a segment of real estate business within the community?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Owner characteristics <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Occupation Spanish surname Resident characteristics <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Occupation Spanish surname Broker and broker practices characteristics <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Volume Roles played Clients served 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mass Land Records / Suffolk County Registry of Deeds City of Boston Assessment Department records (1984–) Warren Group Public Records “Assessment and Sales Reports” City of Boston Inspectional Services Department Permit Retrieval System MLS PIN transaction list Corporate Database of the Secretary of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Corporations Division Key informant interviews Annual Resident Listing
	ES	Has homeownership provided security of housing tenure for existing residents, whether those there prior to the 1960s or those arriving 1960s–1980s?		
2.c. Has gentrification been inhibited by security of housing tenure for existing residents?	ES & SA	Has non-market housing provided security of housing tenure for existing residents? With what neighborhood and market effects?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Affordable and public housing characteristics <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Location / # of units Developer / manager Year built Ownership structure Qualitative impressions of n’hood & mkt. impacts 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mass Land Records / Suffolk County Registry of Deeds City of Boston Assessment Department records (1984–) Warren Group Public Records “Assessment and Sales Reports” City of Boston Inspectional Services Department Permit Retrieval System MLS PIN transaction list Corporate Database of the Secretary of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Corporations Division Key informant interviews Annual Resident Listing
	ES	Has homeownership provided security of housing tenure for existing residents, whether those there prior to the 1960s or those arriving 1960s–1980s?		

PART II LOCATING GENTRIFICATION

In this section, I present methods for examining and findings about the extent and geographic distribution of contemporary gentrification pressures in Hyde-Jackson Squares, in historical context.

METHODS

- In **Methods for Documenting and Describing Gentrification**, I detail the data sources and project steps used to locate gentrification within the study area.

FINDINGS

- In **A Suitable Site?**, I ask: is there empirical evidence of gentrification in Hyde-Jackson Squares today? and present evidence to determine whether the study area is an appropriate site for an exploration of gentrification.
- In **A Block Group-by-Study Block Process?**, I ask: How are gentrification pressures distributed within the study area? Does the process proceed block-by-block? I present evidence to show that Hyde-Jackson is a differentiated space with regard to gentrification pressures.
- In **Prior Patterns**, I ask: What evidence from the past helps to explain the distribution of gentrification pressures in the present? I briefly situate the contemporary Hyde-Jackson Squares in the history of Jamaica Plain's development and moment of post-industrial crisis, showing that the contemporary spatial formations of the study area in the present emerge out of the unevenly distributed (dis)investment patterns of the past.

CHAPTER 7

METHODS TO DOCUMENT AND DESCRIBE GENTRIFICATION

To establish empirically whether and where gentrification pressures were visible within the study area, I examined five people variables and six property variables. These factors were drawn from the broader set of characteristics to which researchers look when identifying whether a neighborhood is gentrifying, as presented in the lit review, above. The *people* variables included the three core socio-economic measures—income, education, and occupation—that, together, enable identification of in-migration by the higher-income, higher-educated managerial and professional workers who comprise the “gentry.” In situating *occupation* as a “relevant variable” in his work on the role of a “new middle class,” David Ley explains that “the profile of the gentrifier invariably includes designation as a professional or manager. . . . These positions comprise the so-called quaternary occupational sector, symptomatic of advanced urbanism, and include positions at the top of the employment hierarchy, whether measured by income or prestige. This is the middle-class population from which gentrifiers are drawn” (Ley, 1996, p. 83). In this portion of my research, I look for these people in the streets of the study area. Like Ley, I identify them using Census data.

I also looked at two additional kinds of demographic variables with relevance to the setting under study. The first was the racial-ethnic mix in the study area. As a predominantly Latino neighborhood since the mid-1970s, I reasoned that declines in the

presence of Latinos—alongside indicators of changes in the occupational, educational, and income mix—could be one indication of displacement. I also wanted to establish a preliminary understanding of the relative size and distribution of the Latino population in the study area in preparation for my subsequent exploration of factors that may inhibit gentrification, including the “embeddedness” of a cultural community in a place. The second was college enrollment. I knew that college student renters had been forces of gentrification in other Jamaica Plain neighborhoods at earlier times (Draisen et al., 1980), as well as in many parts of Boston, and personal observation led me to wonder if their presence was growing in the study area.

The *property* variables examined—gross rent, tenure, vacancy, sales price, sales volatility, and extent of condoization—are those which enable observation of core attributes of gentrifying changes in the residential environment, including the decline of affordable rental units through condo conversion and rent increases, rising prices and volatility in the ownership market, and changes in vacancy as opportunities for profitable use increase. Several sources of data were brought together to explore these neighborhood characteristics.

Data on most of the people and place factors were available from the Decennial Census and the American Community Survey (ACS), obtained at the block group level. Census block group boundaries, notoriously shifty from decade to decade, were carefully compared. Boundaries within the study area were largely consistent between 2000 and 2010, except that two of the block groups from 2000 within tract 812 had been combined into one block group in 2010. This issue was addressed by combining the year 2000 data from those block groups into one, to be consistent with the 2010 definitions. Because

block group boundary changes from 1990 to 2000 were more significant, I elected to use a prepared summary of 1990 data for a geographic area exactly matching my study area, available from the Boston Redevelopment Authority (Goetze & Johnson, 1993a), and to dispense with the hope of conducting block group-level comparisons back to 1990. Thus, using 2010 block group definitions, the study area is comprised of eight block groups within four tracts. These are tract 812 (block groups 1 and 2); tract 1205 (block groups 1, 2, and 3); tract 1206 (block groups 1 and 2); and tract 1207 (block group 1). (In the text that follows, they are referred to by tract-block group, e.g., 812-1.)

Census data is based on either a complete count of the population (for certain variables, on the “short form,” Summary File 1 (SF1)) or a large sample (12.5%) of the population (for additional variables, on the “long form,” Summary File 3, (SF3)). It was used whenever it was available. Beginning with 2010, the Census long form was discontinued. Instead, the ACS now surveys a sample of people every year. For many variables, the ACS was the only source of recent data. For large geographies (populations of 65,000 or more), each year of data collection yields a new one-year set of data. For smaller geographies, several years of data are combined to produce a sufficiently large sample. Block group data is available only in a five-year “period estimate.” I used the 2007-2011 file, the most recent that is available, reasoning that it straddled the year 2010 and was the closest available approximation of a one decade comparison to 2000 Census data.

Certain limitations of the ACS are worth noting at the outset, because they shaped how I handled the data. First, ACS data are estimates, not counts. They are best understood as portraying the characteristic *distributions* of neighborhood characteristics

over a period of time, not as accurate *counts* of the number of people with a particular characteristic. Thus, in my interpretation of this data, I focus on relative attributes, not on specific numbers. Counts were used to provide a relative sense of quantities across block groups and across time. For example, even though the data indicates 220 employed persons in block group 1205-2 for the period 2007-2011, the actual precise count is assumed to be unknown. Comparing the indication of 220 employed persons in 1205-2 with the 632 in 812-2, I conclude that there may be *more* employed persons residing in 812-2 than 1205-2; I do not conclude that there are exactly 412 more. Or, since 1205-2 went from a count of 364 in 2000 to an estimate of 220 in 2007-2011, while 1205-3 went from a count of 223 to an estimate of 509, I understand that 1205-2 may have experienced a decline in the number of employed persons while 1205-3 may have had an opposite trend. Second, particularly at small geographic levels like the block group, there are large margins of error (MOE), frequently large enough to erase the changes indicated. That information is reported whenever it is available, and is taken into account when drawing conclusions. I paid attention to the margin of error (MOE) for ACS estimates in selecting which block groups I would assign high and low scores, and gave greater credence to values with smaller MOEs. Other ACS data limitations that pertain to specific types of information (U.S. Census Bureau, n.d.-a) are addressed alongside discussion of the impacted topics, below.

Additional property data were obtained from the Multiple Listing Service (MLS) Property Information Network (PIN), a Shrewsbury, Massachusetts-based company (MLS PIN, 2013). MLS is the proprietary information system through which real estate agents list properties for sale (National Organization of REALTORS, 2013). The MLS

PIN company also equips subscribers with additional information about the real estate market, including public records data compiled by the Warren Group. Access was obtained through a real estate agent, and used to acquire two kinds of data. First, I downloaded basic public records information—address, property type, and owner name for all owned properties in the study area, as well as the date and amount of the most recent sale for all properties last transacted in 1988 or later. Second, I downloaded complete transaction data for the years 1998–2012 (the entire available period), representing all property listings with full details (property characteristics, listing and sales dates and prices, and whether the outcome was a sale, cancellation, or expiration). From each resource, I pulled a set of records for all Jamaica Plain addresses and marked the properties that were within my study area. I cross-referenced the two datasets to determine whether MLS was a reliable source of transaction data for my study area, since it is possible (though not the norm) for properties to transact outside this system. I found only a handful of properties that had been transacted since 1998 without going through MLS, enabling me to be confident that the MLS database provided a true picture of transactions in all parts of the study area.

Finally, I drew on a number of supplementary secondary sources. The Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA) produces summaries about Jamaica Plain using Census and ACS data; these were used to provide context for the Hyde-Jackson Squares evidence for the period 1990–present. I obtained unpublished spreadsheets from public relations staff people at the Boston Housing Authority (BHA), which provided unit counts for the large set of public housing complexes at Jackson Square, called Bromley-Heath, and from the Jamaica Plain Neighborhood Development Corporation (Jamaica Plain

Neighborhood Development Corporation, 2012), which listed almost all of the housing developed, owned, and/or managed by a nonprofit affordable housing provider.

Additional published and internal documents were obtained from other city agencies and local community development corporations.

In the historical portion, I drew on the Boston Redevelopment Authority archive, which includes the BRA's own reports as well as a variety of student theses and commissioned research reports on Hyde-Jackson Squares and Jamaica Plain. It is housed at the Boston Public Library and made available digitally through the Internet Archive (archive.org). Additional reports and Masters theses on Jamaica Plain or the study area, produced by students in the MIT Department of Urban Studies and Planning, were also used as historical reference materials.

People and Property: Hyde-Jackson in Jamaica Plain

For the first portion of this exploration—Is there empirical evidence of gentrification in Hyde-Jackson Squares today?—I produced summary data on each of the property and people characteristics for the study area as a whole, contextualized against the backdrop of Jamaica Plain. In addition to bringing together Census and ACS block group data, I calculated median sale price and volume from the MLS records and drew on a secondary source to understand recent condo conversions. In the findings section, I interpret this evidence for each variable, and use it to draw conclusions about the presence and extent of gentrification pressures in Hyde-Jackson Squares. This portion of the process was straightforward and requires little explanation.

Table 7.1. Questions, Variables, and Data Sources

			1990, 2000, and 2010 Decennial Census SF1	1990 and 2000 Decennial Census SF3	2007-2011 ACS	MLS Transaction Records	Public Records (via Warren Group)	Supplemental Secondary Sources
Overview	Total population		✓					✓
	Property types, locations, affordability subsidies						✓	✓
People	Core people variables	Has there been a rise in the median income?	Household income		✓	✓		✓
		Has there been a rise in the percentage of workers in managerial, professional, or technical occupations?	Occupation		✓	✓		✓
		Has there been a rise in the percentage of people age 25 and over with a bachelors degree?	Educational attainment		✓	✓		✓
	Additional people variables	Has there been a decline in the presence of Latinos?	Race and Hispanic or Latino origin	✓				✓
		Has there been an increase in the presence of college students?	School enrollment		✓	✓		✓
Property	Core property variables	Has there been a decline in the percentage of rental units? Have vacancies decreased?	Tenure and vacancy	✓				✓
		Has there been a rise in median rent?	Gross rent		✓	✓		✓
		Is there an increased percentage of condos or a rise in the number of condo conversions?	Condo conversion				✓	✓
		Has there been an increase in house prices?	Sales prices			✓		✓
		Has the volume of sales and volatility of ownership increased?	Sales volume			✓		✓

People and Property: Hyde-Jackson Differentiated

For the next pass—How are gentrification pressures distributed within the study area?—I examined the space at two closer levels of detail. First, in preparation, I familiarized myself with the quantity and location of all of the subsidized housing in the study area by using the BHA and JPNDC public and subsidized housing lists and comparing those to the Warren Group public records (along with some additional sleuthing in the Assessment Department records when I discovered additional properties that appeared to be owned by nonprofits). These were coded in the public records dataset. Each row was assigned a count of units, based on property type (e.g., 1-family, 2-family, 3-family) and augmented by field survey where necessary (e.g., to determine unit counts for multi-family 9+units). I calculated that there are 3,716 total units in the study area, 32% of which are within a public housing development or part of an affordable housing development created by a nonprofit entity. Of units with subsidies,⁸ 67% (n=787) are located at Bromley-Heath, and other concentrations are found in two block groups: 812-2, north of Centre Street, and 1205-1, a two block wide strip that runs between Lamartine and Chestnut from Jackson Square to Boylston Street. The remainder are unevenly distributed throughout the study area. A summary of all residential property types and unit counts is given in Table 7.2, below.

⁸ Subsidized units are those developed, managed, or owned by community development corporations and the Boston Housing Authority. Affordable units created under the city's inclusionary development policy (which requires developments of 10 or more units to include a percentage of affordable units) are not counted here.

Table 7.2. Residential Property Types and Unit Counts in Study Area

Property Type	Subsidized		Unsubsidized	
	# Properties	# Units	# Properties	# Units
Mixed Use – Res. / Comm.	3	95	36	72
1-Family Residence	24	24	202	202
2-Family Residence	8	16	171	342
3-Family Residence	11	33	304	912
Condo Main Building/Parking	3	0	214	0
Condominium	0	22	0	733
Multi-family 4-8 Units	5	24	40	240
Multi-family 9 + Units	10	963	4	38
Subtotal Units		1,177 (32%)		2,539 (68%)
Total Units	3,716			

Second, I came back to the Census and ACS data, this time comparing block groups to one another to observe similarities and differences between them on all of the people factors and two of the property factors (tenure and rents). For each variable, I looked for relative high and low values at two time points—2000 and 2007-2011—as well as the relative high and low extent of change. For example, related to occupation, I asked: Which block groups have the highest, and which the lowest, presence of workers in managerial, professional, and technical occupations as a percentage of the population? In which block groups was there the biggest, and in which the smallest, growth in this group as a percentage of the population? I then assigned high and low scores. To produce accurate interpretations at this stage, it was necessary to be aware of the subsidized housing locations, to distinguish subsidized from market housing development, to accurately understand when less upward pressure on rents or income might be the result of rent-subsidized units for income-eligible households, etc. The results of this variable-by-variable review were placed in a matrix to enable observation and description of clusters of low, middling, and higher gentrification pressures.

Third, against the backdrop of this block group-differentiated study area, I examined the remaining property features—condoization rates, prices, and volumes—at the street level using the MLS transaction data. To do so, I defined “study blocks”—streets, street halves (for long streets), and street clusters (for short neighboring streets)—and coded each with a study block ID in the public records and transaction datasets. For a detailed listing of property types and unit counts for all study blocks, see Appendix A. Because these divisions of space were also intended to structure the selection of an embedded sample from which I would gather data at the building level (see Section Two), certain study blocks were determined to be inappropriate candidates for that up-close examination of gentrification pressures and were eliminated at this stage:

- *Too few residential units.* There were two very small blocks that had fewer than 15 units and no obvious way to merge them with another street. This small number of units would not provide enough depth and variety to support a building-level review.
- *Too few residential buildings.* On eight blocks, the units were contained in 10 or fewer buildings. With so few buildings, I was concerned that there may not be sufficient variety to support a building-level review.
- *Too little variety—whether too few owners or too much influence by a single building.* On one 12 building block, 25% of the buildings were owned by one party. On another, 45% of the units were housed at one property (a brewery that was recently converted to a large condo complex).
- *A predominance of commercial uses.* Because of the difficulty of separating residential activity from influences in the commercial realm, the blocks along Centre Street, where most of the area’s commercial activity is located, were marked for omission. Although commercial influences are relevant to the processes of change under study, they are not the focus of this project.
- *A predominance of single family structures.* In contrast to the study area’s predominantly two- and three-family structures, three blocks had high rates of single family housing (ranging from 46%–87% of buildings). These were excluded in part because of their difference from prevailing structure types, and in part for methodological reasons: this study uses the condo rate as a core measure

of gentrification, and it is not possible to observe that kind of change in a stock that cannot be converted.

- *A predominance of public or subsidized housing.* The area where Bromley Heath is located, a block group on which 73% of units were in cooperative affordable housing, and another with a high percentage of CDC-owned units were all excluded. Also excluded was a block on which CDC-developed units were a smaller fraction (14%) of all units, but where CDC-developed condos were a majority (67%) of all condoized units. These streets, with their strong non-market housing influences, did not allow sufficient opportunity to observe market pressures.

The result was a pool of 22 blocks, with 1,642 units, representing 42% of the total units in the study area and 56% of the units that are not part of the Bromley-Heath public housing complex.

Contextualizing the Distribution of Attributes

In the final section, I draw on secondary sources describing the history of Jamaica Plain and Hyde-Jackson Squares in particular. Apart from published sources, most of these materials are reports found in the Boston Redevelopment Authority collection at the Boston Public Library, either authored by one of their staff members or produced by graduate students at local universities and archived in the BRA collection. Together, they provide an up-close and textured understanding of the historical development of the area.

CHAPTER 8

A SUITABLE SITE?

The first step in a case study of a gentrifying neighborhood must be to determine whether the process is in fact present. Thus, in this section, I use established techniques for answering the question: Is there empirical evidence of gentrification in Hyde-Jackson Squares today? I conclude that the overall picture is of a neighborhood that is clearly experiencing gentrification pressures.

Comparing Hyde-Jackson Squares and Jamaica Plain


Was there a rise in household income?⁹ Possibly.

Looking at the study area as a whole, the picture is consistent with both a high percentage of affordable housing (and its associated low-income thresholds) and recently-emerging gentrification pressures. Median income has stagnated over the past two decades—it declined by 2% between 1990 and 2000, and rose by an estimated 1% from 2000 to 2007-2011. Income at the 25th percentile declined by 20% and again by 22% over this period, while the 75th percentile was fairly steady in the first portion of the period (-2%) and increased by 25% over the second. This trend toward incomes that decline at the

⁹ It is possible that the ACS slightly understates income. A comparison study of income data gathered for ACS 2000 and Census 2000 found that income collected as part of the Census was about 4% higher (U.S. Census Bureau, n.d.-a). The Census speculates that this difference might be due to different time point—the Census gathers income at a specific moment in time (targeting April 1), while ACS data is collected on a rolling basis throughout the year (Posey, Welniak, & Nelson, 2003). A 4% difference in ACS estimates would not substantially alter the observations made here.

lower end, grow less or stagnate toward the middle, and grow at the upper end is also visible neighborhood-wide in Jamaica Plain. I also looked at the study area exclusive of block group 1 in tract 812, to get a better sense of income trends in the portions of the neighborhood where income can float. In this view, between 2000 and 2007-2011, the increase in upper incomes was stronger (+35%), while the median lost ground (-18%) and the lower quartile gained somewhat (+10%).

Figure 8.1. Household Income: Hyde-Jackson Squares and Jamaica Plain Planning District, 1990 - 2007-2011




Figures are in 2011 constant dollars.

*Was there an increase in the presence of managerial, professional, or technical workers?*¹⁰ Yes.

¹⁰ The Census Bureau uses the Standard Occupation Classification (SOC) system, developed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The broad category of workers that was called “Managerial, professional, or technical” until it was recently renamed “Management, business, science, and arts” is an imperfect but best approximation of the segment of occupations “at the top of the employment hierarchy” (Ley, 1996, p. 83) from which gentrifiers are typically drawn. While most of the occupations placed within this category fit that definition, a few—such as food service manager positions (which would typically require a high school education)—may not. Nonetheless, it is the category that gentrification researchers typically use (Hammel & Wyly, 1996; Niedt, 2006).

Managerial, professional, or technical workers have been an increasing presence in the study area over the last two decades. From 1990 to 2000, the percentage share of such workers in the Hyde-Jackson population of employed persons age 16-plus increased by 62%. From 2000 to 2007-2011 it grew by a more modest estimated 19%, even as the population of workers was estimated to increase by 37%. The proportion of service workers also grew in the latter portion of this time period, a phenomenon that had an uneven geographic distribution, as will be explored further below. The proportion of workers in the other categories declined across the entire roughly two-decade period. The percentage share of Hyde-Jackson area workers with management and professional occupations was two-thirds that of Jamaica Plain as a whole in 1990. Over this time period, that gap narrowed to five percentage points.

Figure 8.2. Resident Occupation: Hyde-Jackson Squares and Jamaica Plain Planning District, 1990 – 2007-2011




Was there an increase in the percentage of people age 25 and over with a bachelors degree? Yes.

From 1990 to 2000, of the population age 25 and over, the percentage share of people with bachelor's or higher degrees increased by 39%, followed by an estimated increased of 79% from 2000 to 2007-2011. In 1990, the percentage share of college graduates in Hyde-Jackson was 62% of their share in JP as a whole; by 2007-2011 that gap was estimated to have narrowed to one percentage point.

Figure 8.3. Educational Attainment: Hyde-Jackson Squares and Jamaica Plain, 1990 – 2007-2011


Population Age 25+



Was there a decrease in the presence of Latinos? Somewhat.

As a percentage of Jamaica Plain's population, the presence of Latinos peaked in 1990 at 26%. In that year, Latinos comprised 48% of the Hyde-Jackson population, a presence that remained steady at 48% in 2000. By 2010, there had been a 13% decline in both the number and the percentage share of Latinos in Hyde-Jackson. (This change is also geographically uneven within Hyde-Jackson Squares, as will be explored further below.)

Figure 8.4. Race and Ethnicity: Hyde-Jackson Squares, 1990 – 2010




Was there an increase in the number of college students? Yes.

College students were 10% of the population 18 years and over in 1990, grew by 20% to become 12% of the population in 2000, and are estimated to have grown by 73%

to become 22% of the population in 2007-2011. Although the margin of error is significant, even at the low end of the range the proportion of college students in the population would increase by 32%.


Figure 8.5. College Enrollment: Hyde-Jackson Squares, 1990 – 2007-2011



Was there a decrease in the percentage of rental units? Yes, except for public housing.

When all housing in the study area is considered, from 1990 to 2000 the percentage of both rental and ownership units increased while vacancies declined. Over the next decade, however, 230 ownership and just 57 rental units were added, such that the percentage share of owner-occupied units increased 27% while rentals declined slightly by 3%. The low rate of decline of renter-occupied units is attributable in part to the large reservoir of rental housing at Bromley-Heath, where there are 787 units. With block group 812-1 excluded, the percentage share of owner-occupied units still increases by 27%, but the share of renter-occupied units decreased by 13%.

Figure 8.6. Tenure and Vacancy: Hyde-Jackson Squares and Jamaica Plain Planning District, 2000 – 2007-2011 / 2010



Was there an increase in median rents? Somewhat, with public housing excluded.

Gross rents—a measure of rent that includes monthly utilities, thus standardizing values across units that do and do not include heat or other utilities—declined somewhat for the study area as a whole over the past two decades. Without the Bromley-Heath block group, median gross rent rose an estimated 23% from 2000 to 2007-2011, was higher than Jamaica Plain median gross rent in 2000, and was estimated to remain higher in 2007-2011. It is somewhat perplexing that Hyde-Jackson rents appear to have risen so little, and to still have been higher than the Jamaica Plain amount, because the JP amount was known to be high. Jamaica Plain was one of four neighborhoods outside the central city with the highest increases in asked rents¹¹ from 1995 to 1998. During this period, the median advertised rent for a two-bedroom apartment in the neighborhood increased 42% (while the citywide increase was 82%)(Department of Neighborhood Development, 1999, p. 1), and then continued to increase steadily until 2002. There was a slight drop in 2003, with JP one of two neighborhoods leading in decreases (Department of

¹¹ Asked rents are the advertised prices for vacant units, understood as the market price. Gross rents are what tenants actually pay, including households who may be paying less than market, whether because they have been in their units for a length of time or for other reasons.

Neighborhood Development, 2004, p. 4), and again in 2004 (Department of Neighborhood Development, 2005, p. 4), but increases began again in 2005 (Department of Neighborhood Development, 2006, p. 5).¹² It is possible that two contrary rent realities in Jamaica Plain—comparatively high percentages of public and subsidized housing, with controlled rents, alongside the comparatively high uptick in asked rents—moderate each other to yield the impression of stable median gross rents. As a way of exploring that issue at the study area level, I produced summary data for a third slice of Hyde-Jackson Squares, this time excluding 812-1 as well as 812-2 and 1205-1, the two block groups that have the highest concentrations of subsidized (nonprofit-owned) housing. This strategy is imperfect, of course, to the extent that it excludes changes to market units in the two excluded block groups, but it offers another way of sorting and examining the evidence. As expected, for the five remaining block groups, the increase in gross rents at the median was somewhat higher, at 32%. In summary, it is fair to say that median gross rents in the predominantly market units of Hyde-Jackson Squares rose by about a quarter over the last decade or so, but it is difficult using the available data to make meaning of this change relative to rent trends elsewhere.

¹² Jamaica Plain's ahead-of-the-pack rental increases occurred in the context of overall rising rents. In the late 1990s, rents in the Greater Boston metropolitan area "increased by 25.7 percent from 1995 and 2000" (Euchner, 2002, p. 21). A local institute explained the altered housing costs as a consequence of the changed economy and its production of inequality. Because "universities, hospitals, and mutual fund and other financial services companies all attract high-salaried workers. . . , [o]nce decaying neighborhoods have returned to life, as new homeowners repair front porches, tend to gardens, and undertake gut rehabs of crumbling buildings" (Euchner, 2002, p. 20). Meanwhile, however, those same industries attract "entry-level service workers" (Euchner, 2002, p. 20) some of whom were "undertak[ing] a trek from booming real-estate markets to less vibrant markets" while almost one-quarter were paying over half their income for housing expenses (Euchner, 2002, p. 21). The end of Boston's rent control policy in 1994 left the city much more vulnerable to these market operations.

Figure 8.7. Median Gross Rents: Hyde-Jackson Squares and Jamaica Plain Planning District, 1990 – 2007-2011 / 2010





Figure 8.8. Median Gross Rents: Hyde-Jackson Squares—Three Views, 1990 – 2007-2011 / 2010



Figures are in 2011 constant dollars.

Was there an increase in number of condo conversions? Yes.

To gain a preliminary sense of condo conversions in the study area over the past decade, I relied on the results of a detailed survey of public records for streets in Hyde-


Jackson Squares, commissioned by the JPNDC (Nafici, 2006). For a geographic area predominantly overlapping with my study area (plus a few streets to the north of Heath Street, at the back of Mission Hill), this survey found that 6% of total units had been converted to condos between 2000–2005. As discussed in the block-by-block analysis below, some streets were more heavily impacted. These findings are confirmed by a sharp increase in the volume of condo sales between 2002 and 2005 (see sales volume discussion, below).

Was there an increase in house prices? Yes.

Prices of condos and single family properties rose in Hyde-Jackson Squares from 1998–2011. On its own, however, that information says little about characteristics particular to this area. Prices were rising overall in this period, despite slight declines in the years immediately following the national housing-led financial downturn (Department of Neighborhood Development, 2011, p. 4) (Department of Neighborhood Development, 2013, p. 4). To get a better sense of the relative change in the study area, I used two ways of comparing Hyde-Jackson to Jamaica Plain prices. First, I compared two snapshot moments in time, prices in 1998 and 2011. I found that single family prices in JP increased 58%, as compared to a 138% increase in Hyde-Jackson. Condo prices in Jamaica Plain increased 74% while they increased 97% in Hyde-Jackson. Second, I looked at Hyde-Jackson prices as a percentage of Jamaica Plain prices. From 1998–2003, the median condo price in Hyde-Jackson was less than 100% of the median condo price in JP. From 2004–2011, Hyde-Jackson condo prices were 100% or more of JP of condo prices. The single family picture is a bit more mixed, with Hyde-Jackson prices unsteadily gaining on JP prices through 2006, dropping to roughly half the JP price in


2008–2009, and rising to surpass the JP price in 2011. Overall, this evidence is suggestive of growing price pressures in Hyde-Jackson Squares.

Figure 8.9. Sales Prices: Hyde-Jackson Squares and Jamaica Plain Neighborhood, 1998 – 2011



Figures are in 2011 constant dollars.

Figure 8.10. Sales Prices: Hyde-Jackson Squares as a Percentage of Jamaica Plain Neighborhood, 1998 – 2011



Figures are in 2011 constant dollars.

Was there increased sales volume? Yes.

In the period examined, the biggest change was in the number of condo sales, which grew more than four-fold during the first half of the 2000s. To contextualize the number of Hyde-Jackson sales, I looked at those numbers as a percentage of Jamaica Plain sales for both condos and single families. There was no visible pattern related to single family sales, while the number of Hyde-Jackson condo sales as a proportion of JP condo sales grew unevenly but distinctly over the period.

Figure 8.11. Sales Volume: Hyde-Jackson Squares and Jamaica Plain Neighborhood, 1998 – 2011





Figure 8.12. Sales Volume: Hyde-Jackson Squares as a Percentage of Jamaica Plain Neighborhood, 1998 – 2011



Locating Gentrification in Hyde-Jackson Squares

The above evidence points clearly toward a conclusion that the area of Hyde-Jackson Squares is facing gentrification pressures. There has been a distinct increase in the presence of managerial professional workers as a percentage of the employed population and the share of people 25 years and older who have a bachelor's degree, along with a one-third uptick in college students as a percentage of adults. The income picture is less clear, in that median incomes did not increase, although there is some evidence of an increase in income inequality—i.e., a pattern of greater distance between the upper and lower quartiles. Latinos, almost 50% of study area residents in 1990 and 2000, declined 13% between 2000–2010. Condo conversions, sales prices, and sales volume all increased over the last decade, although rent increases outside of subsidized housing grew by just 23%. In the next section, I examine the extent to which these trends are visible throughout Hyde-Jackson, or how they are distributed unevenly within the neighborhood.

Table 8.1. Summary of the Gentrification Evidence in Hyde-Jackson Squares

People	Was there a rise in household income?	Somewhat, mainly at the upper end.
	Was there an increase in the presence of managerial, professional, or technical workers?	Yes.
	Was there an increase in the percentage of people age 25 and over with a bachelors degree?	Yes.
	Was there a decrease in the presence of Latinos?	Somewhat.
	Was there an increase in the number of college students?	Yes.
Property	Was there a decrease in the percentage of rental units?	Yes, when public housing is excluded.
	Was there an increase in median rents?	Somewhat, when public housing is excluded.
	Was there an increase in number of condo conversions?	Yes.
	Was there an increase in house prices?	Yes.
	Was there increased sales volume?	Yes.

CHAPTER 9

A BLOCK GROUP BY STUDY BLOCK PROCESS?

How are gentrification pressures distributed within the study area? In this section, I examine whether the gentrification pressures documented above are evenly or unevenly distributed within the study area. The same variables considered above are re-reviewed, this time to see whether and how areas within the study area are similar to and different from one another. First, I proceed through all of the people and half of the property variables at the block group level, characterizing each block group on each measure and assigning a “low” (L) or “high” (H) score as appropriate.¹³ While the block group is an imperfect unit—because the boundaries vary in terms of how well they fit divisions of space as they are experienced within the social life of the area, particularly insofar as they run through the middle of streets—it is nonetheless useful for observing the relative concentrations of the attributes in question. Second, I use the MLS transaction data to examine the remaining property variables at the “study block” level, with scores then generalized to the block groups in which the study blocks are located. The result is a set of scores that, together, summarize the distribution of gentrification pressures within the study area.


¹³ The goal of this exercise is to observe factors of change that emerge through operations of housing markets. Thus I do not score block group 812-1, where nearly all the units are part of public housing. (There are ways to gentrify public housing, whether the buildings themselves or the land on which they sit, but those are not the block-by-block processes operating through market mechanisms that are the focus of this project.)

Disaggregating Hyde-Jackson Squares

Rising median income: block group distribution


Income patterns were visible within the study area. The two block groups at the southwestern edge of Hyde-Jackson, south of Centre Street and furthest from the public housing—1206-1 and 1206-2—were distinguished by higher median incomes in 2000 and saw gains into 2007-2011. The sharpest rises were in 812-2, north of Centre Street, in the center of the neighborhood. In the three 1205 block groups, incomes were lower with less increase. There was decline or stasis at the 25th and 50th percentiles, with increases at the 75th percentile in two of them (1205-1 and 1205-3), perhaps suggesting some in-migration of higher earners. Incomes in block group 1207-1 were middling at all three quartiles at both time points.

Figure 9.1. Income Quartiles: Hyde-Jackson Squares by Block Group: Hyde-Jackson Squares by Block Group, 2000 – 2007-2011



Figures are in 2011 constant dollars.

Figure 9.2. Income Summary: Hyde-Jackson Squares by Block Group



Increased presence of managerial, professional, or technical workers: block group distribution

In 2000, one block group, 1206-2, stood out from the pack, with 78% managerial and professional workers. The other block groups had 21–50% such workers. By 2007–2011, the picture changed. Managerial and professional workers were estimated to be the majority in five of the eight block groups. This overall result conceals some differences. Assessing whether a block group had had an increase in the percentage share of managers and professionals involved several moving parts: the in-migration of such workers, the out-migration of other workers, or the larger or smaller proportion of either change.

- In two block groups—1205-2 and 1206-1—the percentage share of professionals rose because the quantity of other workers declined, leaving them with the two highest shares of all the block groups. Those were also the only two block groups in which the total population of workers was estimated to have declined. It could be that professionals with smaller household sizes replaced other workers in other occupational categories with larger household sizes.
- There were four block groups in which both the population of workers and the percentage share of professionals rose. In two of these, professionals emerged as a majority. In two, professionals remained a minority in 2007–2011.

Overall, managerial, professional, and technical workers are pressing in from the southwest, expanding from a strong presence in just 1206-2 to a presence in the five western block groups, both north and south of Centre Street.

Figure 9.3. Workers with Management, Business, Science, and Arts Occupations as a Percentage of Employed Persons Age 16+: Hyde-Jackson Squares by Block Group, 2000 – 2007-2011





Figure 9.4. Occupation Summary: Hyde-Jackson Squares by Block Group



Increased percentage of people age 25 and over with a bachelors degree: block group distribution

College graduates appear to be pressing into the study area in west-east and south-north directions. In the year 2000, block group 1206-2, at the southwestern edge of the study area, was the only block group where a majority (67%) of residents were college graduates. This percentage share was 59% higher than the block group with the next highest share. Coming into the 2007-2011 period, all block groups were estimated to have had increases in their percentage share of college grads, with majorities in four: 812-2, 1206-1, 1206-2, and 1207-1. Block groups in tract 1205 had a combination of lower percentage shares and lower increases. The lowest percentage of college graduates in 2007-2011 was in 1205-3, where just 28% of the population was estimated to have degrees.

Figure 9.5. College Graduates as a Percentage of the Population Age 25+: Hyde-Jackson Squares by Block Group, 2000 – 2007-2011





Figure 9.6. Educational Attainment Summary: Hyde-Jackson Squares by Block Group



Out-migration of Latinos, racial-ethnic patterns: block group distribution


As explained in the lit review, gentrification is not a racial process per se. But in many places it intersects with and complicates racial patterns in housing markets and

labor markets, and Hyde-Jackson Squares appears to be one such place. Over the decade from 2000 to 2010, the total population of Hyde-Jackson Squares was essentially unchanged, moving from 8,149 to 8,147 residents. In that period, as reported above, there was a 13% decline in both the number and the percentage share of Latinos, from 48% to 42% with a reduction of 519 people. That change was part of a pattern of racial-ethnic spatial shifts in the study area. The broad trend is that many Latinos, as well as a smaller number of blacks, left, and their departures made way for incoming white residents, on the one hand, and fewer residents, on the other. On closer examination, this story is differentiated within the study area.

The biggest distinctions were between block group 812-1, where the majority of units are within Bromley-Heath, and the remaining seven block groups. Both the total population decline and the loss in population share of Latinos were moderated by changes in block group 812-1. There, 480 residents were added from 2000 to 2010, of which 468 were Latinos. Looking at the non-Bromley-Heath block groups alone reveals that 987 Latinos and 94 blacks left, representing an outflow of nearly 17% of the total year 2000 population. In their place, 558 whites arrived, along with 25 Asians or Pacific Islanders and 16 people from mixed and other racial backgrounds. This transition yielded an overall population loss of 482 people in the non-Bromley Heath block groups, alongside a 25% decline in the population share of Latinos (and a 31% decline in their number) an 8% decline in the population share of blacks (and a 14% decline in their number), and a 35% increase in the population share of whites (and a 25% increase in their number). In other words, during the decade from 2000 to 2010, smaller households


of white residents replaced larger households of predominantly Latino and, to a smaller extent, black residents.

Figure 9.7. Racial-Ethnic Migration Patterns in Hyde-Jackson Squares: 1,700 People On the Move, 2000 – 2010




As depicted in Figure 9.7: Hyde-Jackson Squares: 1,700 People On the Move, for these population shifts to occur, a minimum of 1,700 people had to be on the move, representing about 19% of the total of the 2000 population plus the newcomers to the area.¹⁴ A number of Latinos equivalent to half the number which departed the seven-block group area arrived at 812-1 (mostly in Bromley-Heath), while the other half left the neighborhood entirely. Three white people departed block group 812-1 and conceivably could have moved to one of the other block groups, meaning that the remaining other 555 new white arrivals would have come from areas outside Hyde-Jackson. Of the 94 black people who left the seven block area, perhaps three were those who newly arrived in 812-1, but the remaining 91 moved elsewhere. In reality, it is likely that the number of people on the move would be larger (for example, because it is unlikely that each of the 468 new Latino residents in 812-1 would have been drawn exclusively from the surrounding neighborhood).

Figure 9.8. Population Share of the Three Largest Racial-Ethnic Groups: Hyde-Jackson Squares by Block Group, 2000 – 2010



¹⁴ As a point of reference, as of 2010, over 10% of people in the United States move each year (Ihrke, 2011).


Figure 9.8. Population Share of the Three Largest Racial-Ethnic Groups: Hyde-Jackson Squares by Block Group, cont.



Intra-neighborhood differences were not limited to those between Bromley-Heath and the rest. Departing Latinos came from all the non-Bromley-Heath block groups, but were not evenly distributed. In the year 2000, four block groups were majority (50–74%) Latino: 812-2, 1205-1, 1205-2, and 1205-3. These areas are further into the study area, away from the direction of arrival of professionals and college graduates. The highest and second highest losses of Latinos as a percentage share of the population (-50%) were in

those block groups at the southwest (1206-2) and northwest (1207-1) borders. But the more “interior” block groups were also impacted, with just one (1205-3, at 58%) remaining majority Latino in the year 2010, along with Bromley-Heath (812-1, at 56%). Two block groups—812-2 and 1205-3—lost just 22% population share of Latinos, but had the highest numeric losses and the highest growth in the population share of whites. The lowest decline in population share and number was in 1205-1 (-2%). In Figure 8.9: Race and Ethnicity Summary: Hyde-Jackson Squares by Block Group, “high” and “low” are used to indicate the relative apparent displacement pressures for Latinos. Overall, the story is one of a compression of blacks and Latinos into fewer spaces in the neighborhood, and of Bromley-Heath serving as a key housing resource for those populations in that context.

Figure 9.9. Race and Ethnicity Summary: Hyde-Jackson Squares by Block Group



Increased presence of college students: block group distribution

Overall, the percentage share of college students in the study area population increased by an estimated 73% from 12% to an estimated 22%. They are well-distributed, with 10–30% per block group. Still, there are some patterns. The highest proportions of college students are at the northwestern edge (1207-1) and two block groups within tract 1205 (1205-1 and 1205-3). The lowest proportion is found in block group 1206-1.

Figure 9.10. College Enrolled Population as a Percentage of the Population Age 18+ Years: Hyde-Jackson Squares by Block Group, 2000 – 2007-2011





Figure 9.11. College Enrollment Summary: Hyde-Jackson Squares by Block Group



Decreased percentage of rental units: block group distribution

In 2000, no block group had less than 60% rentals. In 2010, all but two did. Block groups 1205-1 and 1205-3 emerged with the highest percentages of rentals—in 1205-1 new development for owners occurred with no disruption to rental supply (likely shaped in part as a result of 43–49% non-market units) and in 1205-3 the development and conversion activity was comparatively low. In the other block groups (except for 812-1), a combination of development and conversion pressures reduced the rental supply to

varying degrees. Four themes are presented: a) Bromley-Heath serves as an important reservoir of rental housing in the study area; b) new development was the engine of change in some block groups, on its own or with other factors; c) condo conversions were the source of change in other block groups; and d) some block groups had lower levels of both development and condo conversions. In the block group summaries that follow, the available Census information has been brought together to form a story, while data on affordable housing development helps to round out this picture.

Bromley-Heath makes a distinct contribution to the balance between owner- and renter-occupied housing in the study area. In 812-1, 30 net new units came on line (a 4% increase in total units). All of these went to rentals. In addition, three units went from owner to renter occupancy, while 152 units came out of vacancy. The net result was 185 additional rental units, of which 97–100% were in public housing. (Of the 63 remaining vacancies, 76% were for rent.) This story appears to be about the rehabilitation of vacant publicly-owned units to restore them to use by renter-occupants. When tenure data for the study area including block group 812-1 are brought together, 36% of all units in 2010 are renter-occupied. Without Bromley-Heath, however, the share of rentals is just 27%. Similarly, efforts between 2000 and 2010 to reduce vacancies and bring units back on line as rentals helps to give the impression area-wide of a 38% reduction in the share of vacant units. When Bromley-Heath is omitted from the total, the share of vacancies has actually increased by 22%, led by the high increases in block groups 812-2 and 1206-2.

In three of the block groups where the share of owner-occupied housing units increased, that change involved higher relative amounts of new development. First is 1205-2, the block group that saw the biggest gains in the percentage share of owner-

occupied units (+63%) and had among the larger losses in the share of renter-occupied units (-17%). There, 38 new units were created, for a 16% increase in total units. Of these, six were developed by the JPNDC in three two-family structures, each of which offered one unit for owner occupancy and one for rental.¹⁵ All of the remaining 32 units went to owner-occupants, as did eight that had been vacant and eight that had been rentals, for a total increase of 51 owner-occupied units. Of the 14 remaining vacancies, five were for rent and six were for sale (whereas in 2000, of 22 vacancies, 16 had been for rent and none were for sale). This block group's story is about three sources of fuel for the rise in owner-occupied units, two of which yield losses of rentals and potential rentals: new development, converted rentals, and converted former vacancies.

The second block group with higher levels of development is 812-2, where 37 units were added, for a 10% increase in total units, a 5% increase in the share of owner-occupied units, and a 15% drop in the share of renter-occupied units. Of the new units, 16 were built by the JPNDC as condos (Jamaica Plain Neighborhood Development Corporation, 2012; Oliveira, 2012); those and four others went to owner-occupants. The remaining 17 remained vacant and for sale. Another 15 units went from renter-occupied to vacant and for rent, joining three existing such vacancies. Because these vacancies occur alongside gains in the percentage share of ownership units, they may be related to transitional friction as units are removed from prior uses and prepared for new ones. The overall story here is two-pronged: on the one hand, new development for the ownership market without conversion of rental units to owner-occupancy; on the other hand, an apparent temporary withdrawal of rentals that were being made available (were on offer)

¹⁵ Twenty additional renter-occupied units in this block group are owned by Urban Edge, a nonprofit.

to new occupants.¹⁶ The third is block group 1205-1, where 32 units were added, yielding an 11% increase in total units, with the percentage share of owner-occupied units up by 33% and that of renter-occupied units down by 10%. Of the new units, 29 went to owner-occupants (10 of which were developed by the JPNDC (Jamaica Plain Neighborhood Development Corporation, 2012; Oliveira, 2012)) and three were vacant. There was no change in the number of rental units. Of the 13 total vacancies, five were for rent and one was for sale. In this story, it appears that buildable space is being put to use to develop ownership housing, while existing renter-occupied units are left intact.

Two block groups had higher levels of apparent condo conversion. In block group 1207-1, 49 former renter-occupied units, and one formerly vacant unit were converted. An additional 10 units (a 2% increase in total units) were constructed, all of which went to owner-occupants. Of the 22 units still vacant, 13 were for rent and two were for sale. The net result was a 47% increase in the owner-occupied unit share, and a 19% drop in the share of renter-occupied units. Next was 1206-2, in which 27 rentals were converted to owner-occupancy, and 11 new ownership units were added. With just a 3% increase in total units, there was a 33% increase in the percentage share of owner-occupied units, and a 17% decline in the share of renter-occupied units. Another seven former rentals became vacant (five of which were for rent), for a net loss of 34 renter-occupied units.

Two block groups had lower levels of development and of conversions, though each still evidenced some loss of renter-occupied units. In 1206-1, seven net new units

¹⁶ This area has a concentration of JPNDC-developed two- and three-family housing, and one Urban Edge-owned three family property, for a total of approximately 42 renter-occupied units held by nonprofits. In 2011, the JPNDC would complete development of another 64 new rental units in this block group, as well as several scattered site projects for owner-occupancy. Data is not available to determine what additional development, conversion, or other changes may have occurred, and whether the NDC's substantial contribution of new renter-occupied units yielded a net increase in their percentage share.

came on line, for a 3% increase in total units, 15% increase in the share of owner-occupied units, and a 9% decline in the share of rentals. The seven new units all went to owner-occupants, as did 16 converted units that had been renter-occupied. Two additional renter-occupied units became vacant, for a net loss of 18 renter-occupied units. Of the total 22 vacancies, 10 were for rent and three were for sale. In 1205-3, just five net units were added. This 2% increase in total units was accompanied by a 17% gain in the percentage share of owner-occupied units and a 5% decline in rentals. All five new units went to owner-occupants, along with seven conversions of formerly renter-occupied units. The number of vacancies—the highest of any block group (apart from 812-1) in both 2000 and 2010—was unaltered at 26, of which 20 were for rent.

Figure 9.12. Tenure: Hyde-Jackson Squares by Block Group, 2000 – 2010






Figure 9.13. Tenure Summary: Hyde-Jackson Squares by Block Group

<p>High (conversion): In block group 1207-1, 49 former renter-occupied units, and one formerly vacant unit were converted. These plus 10 new owner units yielded a 2% increase in total units, a 47% increase in owner-occupied unit share, and a 19% drop in the share of renter-occupied units. (2010: 41% owner-occ.; 54% renter-occ.)</p>	<p>High (development): In 812-2, there were higher levels of development, with 37 units added, for a 10% increase in total units, a 5% increase in the share of owner-occupied units, and a 15% drop in the share of renter-occupied units. On balance: new development for the ownership market, with no conversion of rental units to owner-occupancy; alongside temporary withdrawal of rentals in preparation for new occupants. (2010: 37% owner-occ.; 52% renter-occ.)</p>	<p>In 812-1, 30 new units came on line, all rentals, for a 4% total increase. Three units went from owner to renter occupancy, while 152 units came out of vacancy. There was a total increase of 28% in the percentage share of rentals. (2010: 0% owner-occ.; 92% renter-occ.)</p>
<p>High (conversion and development mix): In 1206-2, 27 former renter-occupied units were converted, 11 new owner units were built, and seven rentals became vacant (five of which were for rent) for a 3% increase in total units, a 33% increase in owner-occupied unit share, and a 17% decline in the share of renter-occupied units. (2010: 40% owner-occ.; 57% renter-occ.)</p>		<p>High (development): In 1205-1, there were higher levels of development, for an 11% increase (+32 units), while the share of owner-occupied units went up by 33% and that of renter-occupied units went down by 10% (with no decrease in the number of rentals). It appears that buildable space is being put to use to develop ownership housing, while leaving existing renter-occupied units intact. (2010: 27% owner-occ.; 69% renter-occ.)</p>
<p>From high to middling (with low development and conversion): In 1206-1, seven new owner units were built, 16 rentals were converted, and two rentals became vacant. The result was a 3% increase in total units, a 15% increase in the owner-occupied share, and a 9% decline in the share of renter-occupied units. (2010: 40% owner-occ.; 54% renter-occ.)</p>		<p>Low: In 1205-3, five units were created for owners and seven were converted, for a 2% increase in total units, a 17% gain in the percentage share of owner-occupied units and a 5% decline in rentals. Vacancies were the highest of any block group, and numbered at 26 (same quantity as in 2000). (2010: 25% owner-occ.; 67% renter-occ.)</p>
<p>High (development): Block group 1205-2, where 38 new units were created, for a 16% increase in total units, saw the biggest gains in the percentage share of owner-occupied units (+63%) and had among the larger losses in the share of renter-occupied units (-17%). Three sources of fuel for the rise in owner-occupied units, two of which yielded losses of rentals and potential rentals: new development, converted rentals, and converted former vacancies. (2010: 40% owner-occ.; 55% renter-occ.)</p>		

Somewhat of an increase in median rents: block group distribution

The block groups which had the lowest rents were those in which there was the most subsidized housing. In two of those—812-2 and 1205-1—these comparatively lower rents exist alongside higher development pressures (discussed above). The highest rents in 2000 were found in block group 1206-2, at the southwestern edge. Seemingly upward rental pressures pushed from the west, where the greatest uptick was in 1206-2, and possibly into 1207-2, 1206-1 (where MOEs are larger). The highest increases were in block group 1205-3, which climbed from having one of the lower to one of the higher median gross rents.

Figure 9.14. Median Gross Rent Summary: Hyde-Jackson Squares by Block Group




Study block evidence

For the remaining three property variables, the study block evidence, prepared using public records and MLS transaction data, was used. Findings were then applied to the corresponding Census block group. Figure 8.15, The 22 Study Blocks that were

Assessed for Condoization, Price, and Sales Volume, provides a visual summary of the portion of the study area that was assessed at the study block level.

Figure 9.15. 22 Study Blocks Assessed for Condoization, Price, and Sales Volume



Streets marked by blue lines are part of the 22 study block sample.

Increase in the number of condo conversions: study block distribution

Study blocks that scored high for rates of condo conversion were predominantly located between Boylston and Wyman Streets, in an area encompassing most of block groups 1206-1 and 1206-2, along with portions of 1205-2 (at the east) and 1205-1 (at the southeast). Study blocks that scored low for condoization rates were clustered in and around block group 1205-3. North of Centre Street, there were high areas in block group 1207-2 to the west of Day Street. These findings are largely consistent with those of the JPNDC's 2006 condoization report. Among the streets that they found to be the most impacted by condo conversions as JP's real estate market heated up in 2000–2005 were: Day Street (at the boundary of 812-2 and 1207-1), with 23 units or 22% of stock converted; Kenny Street (in 1207-1, west of Day), with 15 units or 36% of stock

converted; and Wyman Street, with 20 units or 22% of stock converted. Other streets with high numbers (though lower percentages as a share of the number of units) included Boylston, with 20 conversions, and Paul Gore, with 17 conversions.


Increase in house prices: study block distribution

The densest cluster of study blocks with higher sales prices falls within block group 1206-1, between Forbes and Paul Gore Streets. Some of the streets on either side—within block group 1206-2 to the southwest and block group 1205-2 to the east—also stood out for higher prices. In the area of block group 1205-3, study blocks with lower prices are clustered. North of Centre Street, in block group 1207-2, Day Street and the series of dead-end streets that lead to Nira Rock, an “urban wild” (a park), have lower prices, while prices on Evergreen, which stretches up to South Huntington, are higher.

Increase in sales volume: study block distribution

The distribution of sales volumes ran counter to expectations. In block group 1205-3, a section of Mozart Street and neighboring Armstrong Street both had high sales volumes, despite low prices and low condo rates. (One possibility in these areas is where lower-priced multifamily properties are being transacted in higher numbers is that this activity may portend condo conversion or other changes in the use of the properties.) Block group 1206-1, extending south to the southern tip of 1205-1, showed the opposite pattern: these areas scored high for prices and condo rates, but many stretches are marked by lower transaction volumes. In block group 1207-1, there were high volumes of sales along Day Street and the Nira Rock cluster as well as higher prices and high condo rates in the portion closest to Centre Street.


Figure 9.16. Condo Conversions, Sales Prices, and Sales Volumes Across 22 Study Blocks



Hyde-Jackson Squares as a Differentiated Space

When the above measures are brought together, they reveal certain patterns about the location and speed of gentrification's advance, summarized narratively below. See Figure 8.17 and Table 8.1 for visual summaries.

Figure 9.17. Block Group-level Assessment of Gentrification Pressures



- *Gentrification pressures are strongest at the southwestern edge of the study area.*

Block group 1206-2 evidences higher and rising income, the highest concentration of professionals (though declining as a percentage share), a higher presence of college graduates, a higher and growing share of owner-occupied units, the highest rents, a higher condo rate, and the second densest cluster of higher prices.

This block group had a small and declining presence of Latinos.

- *Pressures appear to be moving most strongly into the two northern block groups (despite one having a concentration of affordable housing), each of which had its own mix of features.*

In 1207-1, at the northwestern edge, managers and professionals grew to be a majority (but alongside increases in service workers) and the proportion of college graduates was high and rising. It had the highest presence of college students, high conversion levels (yielding the highest share of owner-occupied units), some upward pressure on rents, higher sales volumes, and the second highest decline in the population share of Latinos. Income, however, moved from low to middling, and sales prices were lower on most study blocks.

In block group 812-2, incomes rose from among the lowest to among the highest, the share of managers and professionals increased to become a majority, the proportion of college graduates grew the fastest to become a majority, the share of college students grew to be the highest, and higher levels of development for owner-occupancy. Rents are still low, perhaps the consequence of a combination of subsidies (33–43% of rentals in 2007-2011) and transitional friction (higher uptick in rental vacancies). Here, the non-market housing exists alongside growing market pressures.

This block group evidences a pattern of racial-ethnic migrations, with the largest decline in the number of Latinos and the largest increase in the percentage of whites.

- *Pressures appear to be least strong in the southeastern block groups, which received the most “low” scores, although there is some evidence of widening income inequality, growing numbers of college student who may be exerting some upward pressure on rents, and housing price and condoization pressures.*

In block group 1205-1, where subsidized units are the highest as a percentage of units, rents remained lower and an increasing share of service workers outpaced that of professionals, and there was the lowest departure of Latinos. It had the highest percentage gain of college students. There was new development of owner-occupied units with low associated decline in renter-occupied units, and little upward pressure on gross rents. Remaining buildable land, in combination with the higher presence of non-market units, seems to have allowed for new ownership housing without negative impact on the supply or cost of rentals. Here, it appears that non-market housing may serve to “hold” existing residents, while comparatively lower-cost market rentals serve as a resource for college students among others. The study block view shows condo rates and sales prices edging into the higher ranks at the southern end, while much of the subsidized housing is in the northern end of this block group.

Block group 1205-3 had lower incomes (with some uptick at the 75th percentile), professionals were a minority, development and conversion pressures were low and resulted in a lower loss of rentals, condo rates were low, and there was the densest cluster of lower prices. This was the only block group outside of 812-1 that remained majority Latino in 2010, despite the second largest decline in the number of Latinos and second largest increase in the percentage share of whites. It is

experiencing lower pressure from the ownership market, but higher upward pressure on rents, the largest percentage share increase of college students, and higher transaction volume on some streets.

- *The middle areas south of Centre Street show signs of changes, but they are more moderate or more multidirectional.*

Block group 1206-1 ranked for its higher incomes and higher share of college grads, with a “watch” score to indicate a growing percentage of managers and professionals. Property variables present a mixed picture, with middling-to-higher condo rates, the densest cluster of higher prices, and low transaction volume. On other measures it was neither among the highest nor lowest. Block group 1205-2 is a place with competing pressures. On the one hand, it had the greatest declines in income, among the lower increases in the percentage share of professionals and managers, and a low to middling comparative presence of college graduates. On the other, it experienced the highest relative amount of development, with the biggest growth in owner-occupied units, a higher loss of renter-occupied units, and middling-to-high condo rates. College students’ percentage share was middling but rising, as were median gross rents. It scored high for a growing percentage of owner-occupied units, higher rents, and larger declines in the population of Latinos, and received a “watch” score for a rising proportion of professionals.


- *Apart from this clear variation within the space, all block groups but 812-1 (Bromley-Heath) and 1205-1 (high percentage of non-market units) had a declining share of rental units.*

The spatial remaking is differentiated, but the overall trajectory is toward a redevelopment of housing for the ownership market.

Table 9.1. Block Group-Level Assessment of Gentrification Pressures

		812-1	812-2	1205-1	1205-2	1205-3	1206-1	1206-2	1207-1
People (Census & ACS data)	Population count(% chg.): 2000 to 2010	From 1,650 to 2,130 (+29%)	From 1,325 to 1,135 (-14%)	From 854 to 824 (-4%)	From 735 to 733 (0%)	From 891 to 774 (-13%)	From 922 to 865 (-6%)	From 695 to 724 (4%)	From 1,077 to 962 (-11%)
	Median Income		H-rise		L	L	H	H	
		Lowest, some decline	Was lower, biggest growth, now higher	Lower	Biggest declines	Lower & dropping, with some upper-quartile rise	Higher & rising	Highest & rising	Middling
	Occupation: % share mgrs. & professionals		H	L	watch	L	watch	H	H
		Lowest; 233% inc. in % share service occ.	Was 2 nd lowest, biggest growth	Lower with lower growth	Lower increase with decrease all other occ.	Lower with lower growth	Lower increase and decrease all other occ.	Was highest, then declined (service & other rose)	Middling with middling growth yields higher
	Education: % bachelor's		H-rise			L	H	H	H-rise
		Lowest & lowest growth	Was 2 nd lowest, biggest growth	Lower, with middling growth	Lower, with middling growth	From lower to near-lowest, w/ near-lowest growth	From highest to second highest (lower growth)	From second highest to highest	Among highest with higher growth
	Race / Ethnicity		H	L	H	H	H		H
From 44% to 56% Latinos		Largest decline # Latinos & inc. white % share	Steady, from 50% to 49% Latinos	Decline of one-third % share Latinos	2 nd largest decline in # Latinos & inc. in white % share; only non-812-1 still maj. Latino	Lower and dropping % Latinos	Lowest and dropping % Latinos	Lower and dropping % Latinos	
Educational Enrollment: % college students			H		H-rise	L		H	
	From 8% to est. 19% college students	From second highest to middling	Higher and still higher (w/ rising pop)	From middling to higher w/ middling increase	Largest % share increase	Lower and declining	Middling to middling, w/ growing %	From middling to highest	

Figure 9.18. A Differentiated Space



In summary, Hyde-Jackson is a differentiated space with regard to gentrification pressures. To comprehend this distribution in social and historical context, in the following chapter I use secondary and archival sources to explain how the neighborhood's vibrant development and period of decline marked the space in ways that shaped the possibilities for gentrification.

CHAPTER 10 PRIOR PATTERNS

What evidence from the past helps to explain the distribution of gentrification pressures in the present? The recent transformations in Jamaica Plain's Hyde-Jackson Squares area are best understood as part of a longer process of historical and economic transformations. Thus, it is worthwhile to begin by briefly establishing certain salient aspects of the past. In the brief story of Jamaica Plain's history presented below, the first portion focuses on the neighborhood as a whole, from its development in the second half of the nineteenth century through its period of crisis at the mid-twentieth century. Distinguishing attributes of the study area are highlighted along the way. The second portion digs deeper into the study area from the moment of crisis forward, using secondary sources written by researchers and other first-hand observers of the period to understand relevant property and demographic characteristics in the Hyde-Jackson Squares area.

Developing Jamaica Plain

Jamaica Plain took shape as an industrial suburb. That is, it reflects the spatial organization of physical infrastructure that served the immediate production needs, as well as the diverse functions necessary to social life, of a local and extra-local manufacturing economy. Jamaica Plain's development included:

- New districts for the factories that made things

- A change in the neighborhood's incorporation and governance status, in the form of a decision in 1873 to join the City of Boston and gain access to municipal services
- Municipal construction of infrastructure, including roads, swamp drainage, systems for water and sewage, public schools and playgrounds, and more
- Transport corridors and systems to move the materials and workers and products, including freight rail through the Stony Brook valley, streetcar service along Centre Street, and elevated rail passenger service along Washington Street
- The arrival of tens of thousands of workers, over half of them European immigrants, to fill the unskilled and semi-skilled positions at the manufacturing plants and in construction; to meet the associated demand in the neighborhood and downtown for workers in skilled trades, lower-level white-collar roles, and professional occupations like banking and law; to serve as teachers and doctors and shopkeepers for the swelling population; to provide the surveying, architectural, insurance, carpentry, and other services crucial to the consequent real estate boom; and so on
- Decades of housing construction, which by its varied structure types and settings sifted worker households by occupation, income, and ethnicity and reinforced their relative positions in labor markets
- New commercial districts for commodity distribution and social exchange
- Various elements of infrastructure for community life, including places of worship, public and private schools, social clubs, parklands, libraries, etc.

This list is not meant to be comprehensive, but to give a broad sense of the elements of the area's urbanization. This development abutted and pressed into the center of an earlier Jamaica Plain, a small settlement on the plains near Jamaica Pond. It completely transformed the Stony Brook valley, where large estates were gradually sold off, subdivided, and developed. The population grew from 2,700 in 1851 to 40,000 in 1910 (von Hoffman, 1994, p. 33).

Industry in Jamaica Plain developed first along the Stony Brook, that runs south-north through the center of the neighborhood. Later-developing plants and districts utilized (and secured expansion of) the railway that also ran along the Stony Brook

valley, and which began operation in the 1830s. Industrial districts formed throughout the neighborhood, first in the Brookside area (soap, beer, leather, oil, masonry, silver plating, carriages, surveying instruments, rubber), spreading to Green Street (chemical dyes, industrial fans), South Street (gasworks, stabling for horse railroad, thread and twine) and other places. Within the study area, Heath Street boasted a concentration of breweries, as well as tanneries, an iron foundry, and other plants. At Jackson Square, along Amory Street, plants produced beer, plumbers' tools, rubber, and auto parts; others performed lacquering, electro-plating, silver-plating, and leather tanning; and there were junk yards (Reiskind, 2006). On Centre Street at Jackson Square the Plant Company factory opened in 1900, an enormous and modern facility that employed 3,000–5,000 workers at a time making women's shoes, while along Bickford Street (alongside today's Bromley Park public housing) there was a bottling plant (Heath, 2005). Ultimately, there was "a chain of factories that extended virtually the length of Jamaica Plain" (von Hoffman, 1994, p. 58), representing a mix of small operations that produced for a local market (among which tanneries and breweries predominated), larger plants that mainly served (inter)national producer markets (like the industrial fans), one large operation that produced for a national retail market (Plant), and the enterprises necessary to this growth and activity (the gasworks, the elements of transport infrastructure, etc.) (von Hoffman, 1994, pp. 55-58).

Jamaica Plain emerged with a populace that was diverse by occupation, income, and ethnicity. Some aspects of the mix emerged from Jamaica Plain's pre- and emerging industrial moments. It had been a "sparsely settled and remote part of the Town of Roxbury" (von Hoffman, 1994, p. xx) from the Colonial era through the mid-nineteenth

century. On large estates stretching into the Stony Brook Valley, and beyond it into the hills toward today's Franklin Park, prosperous landholders developed a thriving agricultural economy that served the Boston market. A small commercial district served locals as well as travelers along the Centre Street corridor ("the highway to Dedham"), some of them transporting wares. From the mid-1700s, grand housing around the pond had provided seasonal suburban leisure for wealthy Bostonians and their families. By the mid-1800s, they were joined by heterogeneous new residents. Some were a kind of suburbanite newly coming into fashion (Stone, 1993, p. 71), the affluent commuter. These were predominantly men in business and the professions who could afford the cost of new transportation options, like hourly stagecoaches, that made it possible to work in the city and live in the suburban countryside. "In 1840 the census categorized 13 percent of the adult male population of Jamaica Plain as working in 'commerce' and 5 percent as working in the 'learned professions' and engineering. In 1850 the proportion of major proprietors and professionals among the working heads of households had risen to 21 percent and 7 percent, respectively" (von Hoffman, 1994, p. 12).

Other groups—the "artisans, shopkeepers, small manufacturers, and laborers [who] foreshadowed a more urban future" (von Hoffman, 1994, p. 4)—had been present in small numbers for several decades, but were growing in number since the 1840s. In response to this growth and the changes it promised, wealthy families in defense of the area's pastoral qualities led a successful 1851 campaign of succession from Roxbury (along with today's Roslindale and West Roxbury). But the effort to forestall an industrial urbanization process was short-lived. In 1873 an alliance of "businessmen, development-minded property holders, and working-class and foreign-born residents"

(von Hoffman, 1994, p. 21) organized a successful vote for annexation to the City of Boston.

Increasingly, the population mix reflected the needs of the emerging industrial economy. A broader resident population (beyond businessmen and professionals) began using rail service to commute for work in the 1850s, and workers also began to commute from other local areas to work within JP. Hourly stagecoaches were replaced by horse-drawn streetcars, and electric streetcar service arrived in the late 1880s to meet the demand for frequent, low-cost rapid transit (von Hoffman, 1994, pp. 31-32). Elevated rail service along Washington Street opened in 1906. To meet the demand for industrial development as well as for housing, landowners subdivided their holdings bit by bit into parcels that were developed by a growing infrastructure of local real estate actors, creating an unplanned mix of developments that served different kinds of workers. And although it was private actors who developed the housing and often planned the streets, the city funded and built the physical roads and related infrastructure (water, sewage).

This diversity of occupation, income, and ethnicity was built into the spatial order of the neighborhood. In historian von Hoffman's language, Jamaica Plain's heterogeneous development "combined the characteristics of gold coast, immigrant quarter, working-class slum, and middle-class suburb" (von Hoffman, 1994, p. 55). As the neighborhood developed, the wealthy inhabitants who had lost the bid to preserve a pastoral space away from the city turned instead to deed restrictions as a means to preserve their Jamaica Plain: "well-to-do districts generally evolved where the wealthy already owned property and wished to preserve their district from alternative land uses or types of residential development" (von Hoffman, 1994, p. 47). Some of the new

residential areas were built to serve a growing population of professionals and others of “the upper middle class, the prosperous commuters” (von Hoffman, 1994, p. 51). Often these were hilly spots with windy roads and either stately or “pleasantly eclectic” housing. Other segments of the new arrivals were “middle class” households including the lower tier of office workers (“businessmen, clerks, bookkeepers” (von Hoffman, 1994, p. 36)), skilled trades workers (“carpenters, masons, roofers, . . . plumbers, gas fitters, . . . and artisans” (von Hoffman, 1994, p. 37)), or local shopkeepers (who served the local economy or commuted into Boston and Roxbury). Housing to serve these workers, predominantly single and two-family structures (von Hoffman, 1994, p. 53), was scattered throughout the neighborhood—located at the edges of the exclusive Pondside district where land was less expensive, situated here and there on streets that had not yet taken on an industrial character, or developed as distinct areas (von Hoffman, 1994, pp. 39, 59). This group became a large portion of the labor force, overtaking the professionals and businessmen that briefly predominated, and continued to grow as a percentage of residents after 1910 (by which point the physical development of the area was largely complete).

Several portions of today’s Hyde Square were “staked out. . . for the middle class,” by “two piano makers, a Boston real estate agent, and a carpenter and a grocer” (von Hoffman, 1994, p. 53), just some of the actors who availed themselves of the real estate opportunities of the area’s development. One example is Oakview Terrace and Belmore Terrace, between Paul Gore and Boylston Streets, then called “Cedar Hill” (block group 1206-2). The area around Round Hill, Edge Hill, and Sunnyside Streets, north of Centre Street (block group 812-2), is another (von Hoffman, 1994, p. 53). There,

“Boston corporation lawyer/banker/philanthropist Robert Treat Paine” (Historic Hyde Square, 2005), a housing reformer, arranged to have 116 single and two-family houses built. His intent was to serve “the substantial workingman” (Boston Landmarks Commission, 1984, p. 18), but it was households within this broad middle-income group that bought them instead. At Jackson Square, the old Bromley Park, a street that ran between Centre and Heath Streets along the railroad tracks, “was lined with brick bow fronted row houses and divided by three rectangular strips planted with trees, grass and shrubs exactly like those town house blocks built in the South End,” although by the late 1890s it had been “converted to tenements for the workers in the growing brewery businesses which were expanding rapidly on Heath Street” (Heath, 1999).


Simultaneously, semiskilled and unskilled workers were drawn by the rapidly growing numbers of manufacturing operations, as well as the many employment opportunities “at construction sites, and on road building and other public works projects” (von Hoffman, 1994, p. 37). Clustered closely to the industrial areas, “working-class residences vigorously expanded up and down the length of the neighborhood” (von Hoffman, 1994, p. 55). Beginning in the 1870s, and becoming popular from the 1890s on, much of this was “triple-decker” housing, with one apartment on each of three floors. These structures were “relatively inexpensive to build,” provided an owner-occupant with two rents to assist with repayment of the mortgage, and “furnished working-class or lower-middle-class families with decent, if modest, living quarters” (von Hoffman, 1994, p. 59). Poorer households “often lived in unhealthy conditions, because their residences were located in marshy lowlands, exposing them to damp rooms or, worse, contaminated water supplies” (von Hoffman, 1994, p. 58), although these conditions were improved

once the neighborhood was annexed to the City, which introduced drainage-sewer and water-supply systems. Within the study area, much of the available detail is about the Heath Street district, which was lined with “dozens of working-class three-decker houses” (Historic Hyde Square, 2005). “By 1872 the Heath Street area had become a working-class district with so many saloons that a Protestant minister, William Bradley, and his wife were inspired to found a mission at the Heath Street railroad station” (von Hoffman, 1994, p. 57).

Von Hoffman researched occupation and national origin by ward and precinct for the year 1910, at the heyday of manufacturing production (duplicated here, see Figure 9.1: Occupational Spatial Distribution in Jamaica Plain, 1910). His findings are instructive. In a place populated almost entirely by people of recent or distant European origin, these districts also coincided with systems of advantage based on national origin. Overall, the percentage of what von Hoffman calls “high white collar” workers correlates positively with the percentage of U.S.-born workers, while high numbers of blue collar workers are found in districts that also have concentrations of Irish residents, the neighborhood’s largest immigrant population (von Hoffman, 1994, p. 41). German residents coming into the neighborhood were often in ascendant positions in skilled work, and hence able to take advantage of the wealth-building opportunities of small property ownership, as reflected in their concentration in some of the middle-income areas within Hyde Square.


Figure 10.1. Occupational Spatial Distribution in Jamaica Plain, 1910

Jamaica Plain ward and precinct boundaries, 1910



(von Hoffman, 1994, p. 40)

**Occupational Groups by Ward : Precinct
in Jamaica Plain, 1910**



(von Hoffman, 1994, p. 41)

Von Hoffman's maps reveal that, at the moment of culmination of industrial development and vibrancy, *the study area is both a mixed-occupation place, and a place with distinct concentrations of blue collar workers and a comparatively small presence of professionals.*

- *Ward 19, Precinct 9 (includes the northern edge of the study area in a strip straddling block groups 1207-1 and 812-2).* In this Heath Street industrial district area, over 50% of residents held "low blue collar" occupations, the highest of any precinct, while the total population of residents with "white collar" occupations was about 25%, the lowest of any precinct. Over 65% of residents were foreign-born, with Irish (over 25%) and German (over 10%) immigrants being the largest groups.
- *Ward 22, Precinct 1 (includes the southern portion of the study area from Boylston Street to Forbes Street, roughly today's block groups 1206-1 and 1206-2).* In this section, abutting affluent Pondside along portions of its southern border, and not abutting the railroad, "high white collar" workers have a substantial presence at around 7%. Situated along the Heath Street industrial corridor at its north and including areas like "Cedar Hill" that targeted middle-income workers, the remaining three worker groups are present in roughly equal numbers.
- *Ward 22, Precinct 2 (from Jackson Square to Day Street, with boundaries similar to today's Census Tract 812).* In this area, the mix of single- and two-family housing for a lower tier of white collar and upper tier of blue collar workers, discussed above, is visible through the higher presence of these occupational groups (together, around 50%), while the proximity to Heath Street and Jackson Square industrial areas is reflected in the over 40% of residents with "low blue collar" occupations.
- *Ward 22, Precinct 5 (south of Centre in a rough triangle made by Lamartine and Forbes Streets, with boundaries identical to today's block group 1205-3).* This area, abutting the train tracks and the Amory Street industrial area beyond them, as well as Jackson Square and the Plant factory, was one of just two in the neighborhood with no "high white collar" workers. The two middle-income groups together comprised just over 60% of residents, with "low blue collar" workers making up the rest.

The concentration of industrial facilities and infrastructure, and of blue-collar worker housing, shaped the trajectory of this area over the subsequent century.

The physical landscape and built environment that was created for the industrial economy is largely still with us, although the economic activity that was at its center has been withdrawn. Deindustrial pressures were felt earlier in New England than in many parts of the county, beginning in the 1920s when textile and shoe producers, seeking escape from unionized workforces, relocated their factories to the U.S. South. These trends worsened with the Great Depression, abated in the early 1940s as production expanded to meet wartime demand and full employment was briefly restored, and resumed in many places as early as the mid-1940s, even before the war's end (Bluestone & Stevenson, 2000, p. 58).

Within this deindustrializing context, Jamaica Plain experienced particular consequences as a result of the Prohibition Era, 1920–1933, when the production of alcohol was outlawed. The concentration of breweries in Jamaica Plain was part of a larger chain of 31 beer-making plants within the 1.5 mile stretch from today's Roxbury Crossing (on the other side of Mission Hill from Heath Street) to Jamaica Plain's Brookside industrial area, all of which ceased production virtually overnight. Some plants were put to alternate manufacturing or manufacturing-related uses (soft drink bottling, wool warehousing). A few re-opened when prohibition ended, notably Brookside's Haffenreffer plant, which "became the last remaining brewery in Boston [until it] closed in 1964" (Reiskind, 1992). For a scattered few, the efforts at reuse persisted over the next 80-plus years (like the Eblana Brewery on Heath Street, where automobile repair machinery was made from the 1960s through at least the 1990s) (Reiskind, 1992). Eventually most would fall into disuse, some of which still sit empty on Heath Street.

Citywide, between 1947 and 1975, “manufacturing jobs decreased from about 112,000 to about 50,000; concomitantly, wholesale and retail trade jobs fell from about 150,000 to 91,000” (M. Gastón & Kennedy, 1987, p. 183). Accounts of the impacts in Jamaica Plain of this broader industrial decline over the decades are sparse and anecdotal, but describe gradual changes in an overall process of disinvestment in the industrial infrastructure. By the 1940s, the Plant factory was no longer used for grand-scale production of women’s shoes, and was being leased to a number of smaller operations where stitching and other work was performed (Goolsky); production ceased altogether in the 1960s. In the mid-1970s the building suffered a spectacular fire, the result of arson, and the land was finally redeveloped with public clean-up funds in the 1990s. It was also in the 1940s that the Green Street stop on the old freight rail line was last used, and its closure led to vacancies in the once-bustling commercial district that had grown up around it (Anonymous-EC, 2012). In the early 1960s, although some 20,000 people were still employed in the district (Boston Redevelopment Authority, 1962, p. 3), only 5,000 were directly employed by manufacturing concerns (Boston Redevelopment Authority, 1965b). Still, the process was a slow one, with active light industrial uses—generally small operations, some of which shared older buildings—continuing into the 1990s in Brookside, Jackson Square, and other areas (Lehmbeck, 1990).

Boston’s population peaked 1950. The city lost 13% of its population in the 1950s and another 8% in the 1960s (Bluestone & Stevenson, 2000, p. 16). Thus, “even before the school desegregation crisis of the 1970s, which has been called a turning point in Boston’s demographic shift, the process of urban depopulation had been under way for a generation” (Bluestone & Stevenson, 2000, p. 16). In JP, these population shifts were

more tempered—8.1% of the population left during the 1950s, with a 2.8% increase in the first half of the 1960s (Boston Redevelopment Authority, n.d.-a, pp. II/1-II/2) (Lewis, Avault, & Vrabel, 1999, p. 26) (Boston Redevelopment Authority, n.d.-b), and an ultimate decline again by 1970. Population losses continued in the city through 1980.

New and Old Spatial Patterns

The long process of the departure of and population had consequences for the physical and social organization of the neighborhood. *Prior uneven patterns of development yielded uneven patterns of devalorization and disinvestment.* In this section, these trends are presented in brief, with an emphasis on the study area. A Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA) report from the mid-1960s documented the changes in Jamaica Plain's housing stock and housing prices over the prior decade. The researchers described a spatial organization of property values in the early 1950s, with the higher value housing clustered to the west of Centre Street (in the area hugging the pond and the parks to its south and north). Deterioration of physical structures was present in the rest of the neighborhood, but was scattered in “no pattern” (Boston Redevelopment Authority, n.d.-a, p. III/1). Over the course of the decade—one in which the city and neighborhood began to depopulate and the withdrawal of industry was steady—two different kinds of trajectories emerged. On the one hand, a “definite pattern of blight” (Boston Redevelopment Authority, n.d.-a, p. III/1) was visible in the formerly industrial areas along the railroad by the early 1960s.¹⁷ While 80.4% of Jamaica Plain's total

¹⁷ In this report, the railroad itself is thought to be the blighting influence alone, while the railroad's location along those areas most vulnerable to the decline of industry is downplayed. Certainly proximity to the railroad was a cause of lower housing values (Norton, n.d.), but the way the issue is handled by the report's authors seems to have been part of an agenda to argue for the interstate highway that was then scheduled to be installed along the same path as the railroad and which, purportedly, would reverse the

housing units were found to be in sound condition, the 15.3% in deteriorating and 4.3% in dilapidated condition were disproportionately found where industry and working-class housing had been concentrated. On the other hand, there had been an intensification of vitality in the already higher-value areas. Although half the total housing in the neighborhood declined in fair market value (Boston Redevelopment Authority, n.d.-a, p. III/2), values increased by 37% in the Pondside and neighboring areas. “Conclusive data has indicated a wide range of diversity in this area which, in order to be valid and useful, must be presented in a sub-area format” (Boston Redevelopment Authority, n.d.-a, p. II/1). These areas are depicted in Figure 10.2.

Two of the four areas where “blight” was concentrated were within the study area. In tract 812 (area 2 on the map in Figure 10.2), between Heath and Centre Streets, deteriorated and dilapidated housing constituted not quite 10% of the total units, even though hundreds of brand new units had been added during the decade at the Bromley Park public housing complex, which accepted its first tenants in 1954 (Boston Housing Authority, 2013). Although physical evidence of deterioration may have consolidated and deepened in this district through the 1950s, those were not the first signs of disinvestment. It had been the target of blight clearance efforts in the early 1940s, when several blocks adjacent to the Heath Street brewery area was razed by the Boston Housing Authority (BHA) in order to construct the Heath Street public housing complex.

blighting conditions: “this area is obviously feeling the effect of a street system inadequate as a means of supporting the area’s modern traffic needs” (Boston Redevelopment Authority, n.d.-a, pp. III-2) and “it can realistically be assumed that until major highway changes are instituted, it is extremely doubtful that any beneficial change in land composition can be established” (Boston Redevelopment Authority, n.d.-a, pp. II-2). There may also have been some influence on property maintenance of the anticipated highway demolition. As one JP resident told a *Boston Globe* reporter in the early 1970s, “‘I had grown up by the railroad tracks. . . and I remembered my friends’ mothers saying they wouldn’t fix up their houses because the highway was coming. That was ten or twelve years ago” (Lupo, 1971b, p. 32).

Identified in 1939 as an area with numerous dilapidated structures, some of which were deemed unsafe, and seen to be “rapidly spreading its blight” (Heath, 2005), a total of 115 buildings including housing, garages, stables, outhouses, and a school were torn down (Heath, 2005) and replaced with a few hundred units of public housing in townhouse-style buildings with accompanying courtyards for family recreation. Available records are less clear about the condition of the housing that was removed to construct the Bromley Park public housing towers, except to say that it may have been occupied at one time mainly by brewery workers, and that it provided housing for many stitchers and bottling plant harness repairers just prior to its demolition (Heath, 1999). The 150 buildings demolished there were mostly housing, but included a bottling plant and a bakery factory. There was also a large parcel that had been vacant for decades (Heath, 2005), although it is unclear why.

In tract 1205 (area 5 on the map), south of Centre Street, where large demolition projects had not occurred, deterioration of the housing stock was even more severe. Over 50% of units were either deteriorated or dilapidated, with vacancies above 6%. Two other tracts on either side of the railroad in the Brookside industrial area evidenced conditions broadly similar to those in the study area districts (Boston Redevelopment Authority, n.d.-a). This distribution of housing value would deepen over the next decade.

Figure 10.2. “A Definite Pattern of Blight”: BRA Jamaica Plain Housing Market Survey, 1962–1965




Table 10.1. Housing Vacancy and Deterioration: Jamaica Plain and Hyde-Jackson Squares, 1950 – 1960

	Jamaica Plain*		Tract 812**		Tract 1205**	
	# 1960	% 1960	1950	1960	1950	1960
Total units	12,548					
Vacant units			<3.5%	3.5%	1%	6.1%
Deteriorated units (all with plumbing)	2,110	15.3%		8.4%		38.5%
Dilapidated units (some lacking plumbing)	1,011	4.3%		1%		13.1%

Sources:

* (Boston Redevelopment Authority, 1965a, p. 9:1). This report’s definition of Jamaica Plain included Egleston Square and the Parkside area between Washington Street and Franklin Park, but excluded the Forest Hills, Woodbourne, and Moss Hill areas. It did not include portions of Mission Hill (as did the BRA’s JP Planning District, until 2011).

** (Boston Redevelopment Authority, n.d.-a, pp. III/2-III/3)

These uneven conditions were altered and deepened by public policy actions that were part of an overall effort to remake Boston for a “New Economy.”

The late 1960s saw the destruction of older factory and warehouse areas near the central city, and the demolition of entire working-class neighborhoods to make way for luxury high-rise housing, government and commercial office towers, the expansion of elite medical and educational institutions, and the development of fancy shopping and entertainment districts. This redevelopment was seen by the ruling class of the city as central to the economic modernization of the region, including the replacement of many of the manufacturing industries with high-technology research and development, service industries (medicine, education, finance, insurance, real estate, and tourism), and the government infrastructure to support all of the above. (McAfee, 1986, p. 409)

Urban Renewal projects in Jamaica Plain were limited. Unlike the West End, the South End, and Charlestown, JP was not targeted for massive demolition and redevelopment. Projects were limited mainly to the construction of a few new school buildings, for which some residential buildings were demolished. In the study area, a couple dozen properties, largely triple-deckers, were demolished to build the Hennigan School on Heath Street (Historic Hyde Square, 2005). More significant to JP’s development was a plan to build an interstate highway along the same path the railroad tracks followed in the Stony Brook Valley, effectively cutting the neighborhood in half. Plans for the highway were first put forth in 1948, with a “Master Highway Plan” from the Massachusetts Department of Public Works. It included an “Inner Belt” eight-lane highway that “would circle the city’s core through Roxbury, the Fenway, Brookline, Cambridge, Somerville, and Charlestown, and would feed into a number of radial roads” (Lupo, 1971a, p. 14). Popular mobilization—cross-neighborhood, multi-racial action by working-class communities in collaboration with young planning professionals—was successful in stopping the highway (M. M. Gastón, 1981), but not before demolition had

“shredded the edge of a dense residential area on the west side of the embankment from Jackson Square southward to Mozart Street” (Bluhm, 1978, p. 55).

Demolition for I-95 reached Jamaica Plain in 1969 (Hirsch, 1998, p. 100). In January 1970, “the governor went on television and in a ten-minute address declared a freeze on property taking along the Jamaica Plain and Roxbury part of the project, and a partial moratorium on the rest of the project, pending the results of a restudy” (Hirsch, 1998, p. 100). The highway demolition cut through the portion of the neighborhood where property conditions already showed the most severe effects of disinvestment. The houses along the even side of Lamartine Street were razed, leaving a rubble-strewn “flat dirt wasteland” (Lupo, Colcord, & Fowler, 1971, p. 9), much of which sat in disuse for well over a decade. During and after the period of demolition, a related source of instability and decay was arson, whether from vandals or from property owners “selling to the insurance company” in an effort to extract value from properties devalued by neighborhood conditions and subsequent redlining.

In the wake of the highway demolition, the patterns of housing value and condition that the BRA had first documented in 1960 became more pronounced. A report from the early 1970s indicated that “houses near Jamaica Pond and in the southwest corner of the district are predominantly worth more than \$20,000” while those “to the east and north of this area are predominantly worth less than \$20,000” (Boston Redevelopment Authority, n.d.-b, p. 13). At the same time, rents were highest in those areas along the Pond and along the boundary with Brookline (Boston Redevelopment Authority, n.d.-b, p. 14). The deepening of distinctions between thriving and struggling areas was in no small part a result of the demolition along the Southwest Corridor, cutting

through districts that evidenced the poorest conditions already. The process was significantly pushed along by the withdrawal of credit. “The whole band of central Jamaica Plain has been recently hard hit by bank lending practices which have placed a fairly tight lid on mortgages and housing rehabilitation money” (City of Boston, 1975, p. II:9). “It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, for some owners or potential buyers to obtain a mortgage or home improvement loan” (Boston Redevelopment Authority, 1975, p. 14).

Within the study area, failure to maintain the Bromley-Heath public housing was also a factor. In 1975, the City of Boston estimated that only 40% of housing units in tract 812 were in good condition (City of Boston, 1975, p. II:9). By 1977, 25% of units at Bromley-Heath were vacant, many with boarded-up windows (Bluhm, 1978, p. 47). In 1980, Bromley Heath was described as “plagued by vacancies, vandalism, crime, and a bad reputation which depresses surrounding property values” (Draisen et al., 1980, p. IV:5). By the time that 1980 Census data was collected, 46% of the 1,523 vacant units in JP were located in the Hyde-Jackson area, with 84% of the 366 boarded up units in this area (Hafrey, 1986). Nonetheless, the lower values in JP’s north and west areas continued to provide “a housing stock that is a vital commodity for lower income homeowners” (City of Boston, 1975, p. II:11).

Incoming populations were unevenly distributed in the neighborhood. As many of the prior residents of Jamaica Plain left the neighborhood—actions that initially reflected the combined forces of job losses in the city and opportunities in the suburbs, and which were pushed along in the mid-1970s by white resistance to school desegregation—new residents arrived. One transformation was in the racial mix of residents. From the 1950s

through the 1980s, Jamaica Plain transformed from a predominantly white, ethnically mixed population to one that was racially and ethnically diverse. Along the way, it maintained the diversity of occupation and income that had been its characteristic over the past century.

Significant black settlement in JP began in the 1950s. Northern Jamaica Plain is situated along one of the corridors for Black and Puerto Rican migration out of the South End (Boston Redevelopment Authority, 1964, p. 14), a pattern that began in the late 1950s after Urban Renewal projects razed large areas of housing and subsequent rising housing costs left many additional households priced out (King, 1981, p. 26). “Blacks who once dominated Boston’s South End have migrated to Roxbury, Jamaica Plain, and outside communities like Brockton” (Euchner, 2002). This “trek from booming real-estate markets to less vibrant markets” (Euchner, 2002) continued for decades, as those Bostonians were joined by growing numbers of African Americans moving to Boston from the U.S. South and other locations, and arrivals from Haiti and other Caribbean countries. By 1970, 58% of residents in Census Tract 812 were black, a majority of whom lived at Bromley-Heath. This tract was one of the areas in JP where black residents were concentrated (Boston Redevelopment Authority, n.d.-b, p. 4). Black residents in private housing were concentrated along the areas where Roxbury and Jamaica Plain meet, into Mission Hill at the north and Egleston Square at the south. In 1970, 11% of JP’s residents were black; by 1977 the population had grown to 15% (Boston Redevelopment Authority, n.d.-a, pp. III:2-III:3); (Bluhm, 1978, pp. 22-23, 137-138); (Boston Redevelopment Authority, n.d.-b, p. 4).

Table 10.2. Race and Ethnicity in Jamaica Plain, 1950 – 1980

	1950	%	1960	%	1970	%	1980	%
Total population	58,015		53,568		47,767		39,210	
Hispanic or Latino ¹⁸						9% ¹⁹	7,803	20%
Not Hispanic or Latino								
Asian or Pacific Islander ²⁰							677	2%
Black or African American	546	1%	2,680	5%	6,858	14%	7,145	18%
White	57,469	99%	50,888	95%	40,120	84%	23,087	59%
Two or more races								
Some other race ²¹					744	2%	498	1%

Sources: Decennial Census data for 1950–1970 (Boston Redevelopment Authority, n.d.-b, p. 4) and 1980 (Hafrey, 1986) were taken from Boston Redevelopment Authority reports. These numbers are meant to give a sense of changing racial and ethnic composition in the neighborhood, more than to nail down precise quantities of persons in each category, because neighborhood boundaries are not entirely consistent. These boundaries are: the neighborhood for 1980; unclear for 1950–1970.

Latinos first began to arrive in Jamaica Plain in the 1960s. The early arrivals were predominantly Cuban, “of middle-class origins and with professional and business backgrounds” who led “in the revitalization of the business district” (Bluhm, 1978, p. 23). In the late 1970s, Cubans were about 40% of the Latino population in JP. Puerto Ricans constituted most of the remaining 60%, though a small percentage were from the

¹⁸ People who are Hispanic or Latino may be of any race.

¹⁹ As of 1970, the population of the Census tracts in and surrounding the study area were approximately 9% Latino (Bluhm, 1978, pp. 137-138). Because 1970 data that parses Latinos and non-Latinos by race is not readily available, in that year Latinos are concealed within the white, black, and some other race categories. The percentage is included as a way of addressing that issue, although it means that all percentages in that year add to more than 100%.

²⁰ In 1990, the Census offered a single racial category called “Asian and Pacific Islander.” Beginning in 2000, respondents were asked to make one or more selections from two lists of Asian and Pacific Islander origins, which were then combined to make two categories: “Asian” and “Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander.” For the tables presented here, these categories have been combined to enable comparison between 1990 and subsequent years (Grieco, 2001, pp. 1-2).

²¹ A count of Native Americans in 1980 and 1990, and one of American Indian and Alaska Native in 2000 and 2010, was less than 1% of the population in each year and has been combined with “Some other race” for the reporting here.

Dominican Republic and Central American countries. In 1970, Census Tract 1205 was the densest location of Latino settlement in Jamaica Plain, at 28% of total residents, with Latinos also residing in all the surrounding tracts as well as north into Mission Hill and south into the area between Washington Street and Franklin Park (Bluhm, 1978, pp. 137-139). By 1977, residents in tract 1205 were estimated to be 65% Latinos (Boston Redevelopment Authority, n.d.-a, pp. III:2-III:3); (Bluhm, 1978, pp. 22-23); (Boston Redevelopment Authority, n.d.-b, p. 4). Latinos led the commercial revitalization of Hyde Square, bringing it from vacancy rates of almost 25% to “near complete occupancy (including many stores with specialty goods for the Spanish speaking population” (City of Boston, 1975, p. II:9). By the late 1970s, Hyde Square was “the largest Hispanic population center in Boston” (Bluhm, 1978, p. 12). Latino migration to the area continued over the next decade, with many of the arrivals in that period coming from the Dominican Republic and others from Central and South America [cite].

Also coming into the neighborhood by the late 1960s were young professionals. Many of the early arrivals became involved in neighborhood affairs through the mobilization against the interstate highway. One organizer who had grown up in JP “discovered her greatest support among the new arrivals in town. They were young couples. . . who were committed to putting down roots in the city and wanted an intact community in which to do so. The newcomers weren’t to be found in the churches and felt no fealty to the old political ward tradition. If the old rules didn’t work, they believed they needed to take the process into their own hands” (Hirsch, 1998, pp. 97–98). As more young professionals arrived through the 1970s, the highly participatory planning process for development of the Southwest Corridor continued to be a vehicle through which

many become involved in community development issues (Reiskind, 2013). Their presence was highlighted in a 1975 City proposal for funding through the federal “Urban Homesteading” program, which sought to stabilize neighborhoods by placing residents in abandoned properties at low or no cost and connecting them with bank financing for repairs. The City clearly saw their presence as a boost to the program, saying “replacement buyers are still plentiful in Jamaica Plain. The area is becoming increasingly popular to the so-called ‘modernizers’” (City of Boston, 1975, p. II:11).

In 1977, when the Parkman Center for Urban Affairs undertook a study of “Young Professionals and City Neighborhoods” in Boston, they convened a focus group of people from neighborhoods including Jamaica Plain (Parkman Center, 1977, p. 3). Participants were a highly mobile group, “constantly. . . totaling up the pluses and minuses of their living situations,” with the choice to reside in a particular house or neighborhood just “one decision in a lifetime of choosing where and how to live” (Parkman Center, 1977, p. 17). A Jamaica Plain couple was described who had first renovated a house in East Boston, spent several years fixing up a house in the South End, and finally “discovered this little jewel, the oldest house on its street” that they were renovating in Jamaica Plain (Parkman Center, 1977, p. 4). In the same year, some housing improvements just south of the study area, along Lamartine and Chestnut Streets south of Boylston, were identified as “the results of incipient gentrification” (Bluhm, 1978, p. 64). Incoming professionals settled throughout much of the neighborhood, but also concentrated in certain areas like Sumner Hill (discussed further below), giving a spatial character to their presence.

These property and population trends were visible in the relationship of Hyde-Jackson Squares to the rest of Jamaica Plain, and in very local gradients of difference within the Hyde-Jackson area. Two studies of property conditions in the area around Mozart Street were conducted in the late 1970s. The first, an analysis of and recommendations for development of housing in the Jackson Square area, is a Master's thesis written in 1978 for the MIT Master of City Planning Program, but prepared as a consulting project for the Jamaica Plain Neighborhood Development Corporation (JPNDC). The JPNDC was then a new group engaged in community engagement to determine ways of meeting housing, employment, and other community development needs. For the study, graduate student Robert Bluhm collected property evidence in a stretch within the study area—along Lamartine from Centre to Mozart Street, where highway demolition occurred on both sides of the street, at a time when the tall railroad embankment remained in place—that was hard-hit by multiple forces of disinvestment. His area had boundaries roughly similar to block group 1205-3 plus the northern half of 1205-1. He described it as having “suffered the most severe residential instability and disinvestment of any within the Jamaica Plain stretch of the Corridor” (Bluhm, 1978, p. 55), and his analysis revealed steep gradations in housing value and condition surrounding the stretch.


- *Values.* For properties transacted in 1975–1977, average prices were lowest “closest to the embankment” (roughly, the few blocks west of Lamartine and south of Centre), increased by 21% moving west toward Hyde Square, and increased another 42% moving south to Boylston Street.
- *Vacancy.* Vacancy rates of over 10% were observed in 1970 in the narrow strip between Lamartine and Chestnut along the demolished corridor, which dropped to 3% in most of the portions of tract 1205 that are west of Chestnut (Bluhm, 1978, p. 66).

- *Access to capital.* At a time when 52–64% of residential sales in Jamaica Plain had mortgages, just one-third of the purchases in the streets between Mozart, Lamartine, and Centre used a mortgage, and only one in eight of those on Mozart Street.
- *Abandonment.* Abandonment was present, with the area surrounding “parcel 65,” a cleared set of lots at the corner of Hoffman and Lamartine, described as “probably the worst section of the Jamaica Plain Corridor” (Bluhm, 1978, p. 68). Behind it, on Chestnut Street, stretching to Wyman, there were four abandoned structures, one of which had had a fire (Bluhm, 1978, p. 68).
- *Owner-occupancy / absentee ownership.* Residential structures in the dozen blocks surrounding Mozart Street were 55% owner-occupied, compared to 59% of those in Hyde Square’s tract 1205 as a whole and 74% for all of JP (Bluhm, 1978, p. 62, using BRA data). Moving from tract 1205 into tracts 1206 and 1207, the rate of owner-occupancy grew somewhat higher.

Despite the clear concentration of devalorization in this small area, it was still part of a more complex local picture. A city survey found that building conditions had improved “substantially” in the area north of Green Street between 1974 and 1977, with only 10% of buildings showing deterioration, 50% showing no change, and 40% being improved. Improvements were happening even along the cleared strip of land bordering tract 1205 in the study area, and were the more common direction of change with the exception of Mozart Street, where more properties were deteriorated (Bluhm, 1978, p. 64). Bluhm perceived the area to be “highly salvageable by small scale redevelopment at modest cost” (Bluhm, 1978, p. 71), pointing to promising “evidence of grassroots interest in and commitment to the area” (Bluhm, 1978, p. 71) in the form of support for a community farm at one of the cleared parcels, a recently-organized committee (formed out of the NDC membership drive) that had been successful in pressuring the city to demolish two abandoned buildings that were beyond repair, as well as a strong majority of owner occupancy. The possibility of tying the area more closely to neighboring areas in tract 1206 and part of 1204 that were “also heavily Hispanic” and had “higher

homeownership, better building conditions, and a steadier upgrading of the stock” was also seen as offering some promise for improvements (Bluhm, 1978, p. 70).

Figure 10.3. Vacant Parcels and Owner Occupancy Along Lamartine Street, 1978



The areas marked with thick outlines were vacant. The areas north of Lamartine (which runs through the middle of this image) are along the bottom edge of the triangle that forms block group 1205-3. At the time this image was produced, one of those parcels had been put to use as a community farm, a portion of which remains today as a community garden (Bluhm, 1978, p. 26).



Each black dot indicates an owner-occupied structure (Bluhm, 1978, p. 63).

The second study, a comparative assessment of displacement pressures in three housing submarkets, was prepared in 1980 for the Jamaica Plain Coalition to Stop Displacement. This group was formed in response to a perceived uptick in requests for

tenant assistance from households losing their low-cost rentals to gentrification and speculative pressures, at a time of rising rents city-wide. “Between 1976 and 1982, about 80 percent of the [rent-controlled] apartments were decontrolled. In areas undergoing gentrification, such as Jamaica Plain, rent increases of 300 percent to 500 percent over a few years’ time became common” (McAfee, 1986, p. 411). The Coalition commissioned a report from a team of graduate students in urban planning at MIT and Harvard. The core of the team’s research was a profile of people and property in three housing submarkets: Sumner Hill, an area east of Centre Street that had earlier been a wealthy preserve with large Victorians on large, leafy lots; what they called “St. Rose,” the area between South Street and the Arborway; and what they called the “Mozart triangle,” which included the streets in the triangular area formed between Mozart, Priesing, and Lamartine Streets. Based on an assessment of transaction data and resident characteristics from 1974 to 1979, and a 1980 snapshot of property conditions and qualitative impressions, their findings illustrate how prior residential patterns, gentrifying changes, ongoing disinvestment, and emerging speculation were giving spatial form to the neighborhood.

- *Sumner Hill.* Their study “substantiate[d] the generally held belief that Sumner Hill has experienced gentrification. Visually, one can observe this change by noting the number of homes that have fresh coats of paint. . . . Demographically, one finds an increased number of professionals and a corresponding decrease in the presence of laborers and tradesmen” (Draisen et al., 1980, p. II:6). The change was most pronounced in the transacted buildings, where young professional owners replaced elderly and blue-collar owners, and where student renters tended to replace elderly and retired tenants (Draisen et al., 1980, p. II: 23). Owner occupancy increased.
- *St. Rose.* In this area, upward pressure on rents was created by a new group of renters with the capacity to pay more per household than had been charged for rent in that area previously. Drawn by the larger spaces and lower rents than in

downtown Boston, as well as the proximity to the Green Line, “many are music students, graduate students, and upwardly mobile young people. Few, if any are long-term Jamaica Plain residents. They are in their twenties and early thirties” (Draisen et al., 1980, p. 12). Transacted buildings had high percentages of professional owners (Draisen et al., 1980, p. 14), and new owners were typically charging higher rents. The report was careful to note that the substantial amount of transaction activity in the St. Rose area remained mixed, with many transactions occurring between buyers and sellers with similar occupational characteristics. Thus the area continued to have owners and tenants with diverse occupations, even as “the increasing rents. . . placed low and moderate income households under great pressure” (Draisen et al., 1980, p. II: 24), with most units “no longer affordable” (Draisen et al., 1980, p. II:9) to them.

- *Mozart Triangle*. This area was the only one in which owner-occupation decreased substantially (Draisen et al., 1980, p. II: 22), to 30% (in comparison to the neighborhood-wide average of 50%). The decline was a combined result of more new absentee-owners of transacted properties and former owner-occupants of non-transacted properties who had moved from the area (Draisen et al., 1980, p. II: 21). Market rents were low, at levels similar to rent-controlled units (Draisen et al., 1980, p. II: 22). Property conditions were described as “poor” (Draisen et al., 1980, p. 17). The number of professional occupants declined, and there was no evidence of students moving in, nor of new student owners of properties (Draisen et al., 1980, p. II: 17); new property buyers were “in traditional working class occupations” (Draisen et al., 1980, p. II: 17). There was evidence of speculative activity on Chestnut and Mozart Streets, with multiple transactions of several properties, perhaps related to “the new mass transit stops under construction, as well as the proximity of strong real estate markets nearby” (Draisen et al., 1980, p. II: 18).

The three areas were compared directly along property and population variables.

While all three areas lost residential structures, the losses constituted nearly a quarter of the stock in the Mozart triangle, and a small percentage in the other two areas (Draisen et al., 1980, p. II: 27).

The researchers found that the occupation data provided “perhaps the clearest indicator not only of the social distance between the two areas in 1974, but also the degree to which it had widened by 1979” (Draisen et al., 1980, p. II: 20), because of the concentration of professionals and students in two of the three areas. While their research did not uncover a “consistent or simple model of neighborhood transition from one

combination of owners and renters to another,” it did reveal gentrifying pressures that had pushed rents above those affordable by low- and moderate-income households, and depicted the uneven and complex nature of changes in the neighborhood (Draisen et al., 1980, p. II: 24).

Table 10.3. Property and People in Three Micro-Areas, 1980

		Sumner Hill		“St. Rose” Area		“Mozart Triangle”	
		1974	1979	1974	1979	1974	1979
Property	No. of Structures	155	145	182	180	202	152
	No. of Units	281	287	402	428	445	349
	No. of Vacant Units	28	13	41	28	54	41
People— Occupation	At Home	186	139	237	137	183	238
	Retired	147	78	52	47	32	32
	Student	89	96	92	117	46	51
	Clerical	69	69	109	108	44	36
	Laborer	35	32	45	58	67	42
	Trade	51	38	42	43	35	29
	Profession	61	81	108	96	13	10
	Artist	9	8	4	5	0	0
Source: (Draisen et al., 1980, pp. II:26-II:27). Occupation was not available for every resident in each area.							

Past Becomes Present

Returning to the gentrification mapping with this historical context in mind, the differences across the study space appear less as arbitrary collections of attributes and more as the outcome of a sequence of transformations. Most relevant for the next portion of this project are the east-west differences in the area south of Centre Street. Starting at the east, from the historical record, I learn that the northern portions of block group 1205-1 and much of block group 1205-3 provided more blue-collar housing, were hard hit by disinvestment as industry withdrew and the highway demolition led to abandonment, vacancy, and deterioration. Proximity to Bromley-Heath, which fell into disrepair, was

another source of blight. Nonetheless, the remaining housing provided a low-cost resource that was in demand by incoming populations, majority Latino, who made a commitment to the area. Further west, into 1206-1 and particularly 1206-2, are areas that had been somewhat more affluent since their initial development, and which were somewhat more shielded from the sources of decline and instability. These areas emerged with a property stock in somewhat better condition, and somewhat less absentee ownership. In the next section, I investigate the factors that may have advanced and inhibited gentrification pressures in these streets over the subsequent 35 years.

PART III

MAKING SPACE: ADVANCING AND INHIBITING GENTRIFICATION

In this section, I present methods for examining and findings about the circumstances associated with the advance or inhibition of gentrification pressures within the study area, and the mechanisms of those changes or the lack thereof.

METHODS

- In **Methods for Observing Block-by-Block Change at the Building and Street Level**, I detail the data sources and project steps combined in a unique method for observing gentrifying changes at the micro levels where they occur.

FINDINGS

- In **Street Stories**, I ask: What are the property circumstances, actors, and practices that have advanced gentrifying changes—are certain property ownership histories associated with the introduction of such residents? has condo conversion played a key role? what brokers, landlords, and other real estate actors are involved? playing what roles? What are the property circumstances, actors, and practices that have inhibited gentrifying changes—has homeownership by prior residents provided a more secure claim to the space? did channels of housing exchange among local Latinos serve to slow change pressures? have disamenities operated to limit demand by in-migrating professionals? I use building-level evidence to understand what property and people changes occurred when, and how they advanced or inhibited gentrification pressures.
- In **Space Shapers**, I ask: I contextualize the building-level evidence with first-hand accounts of the neighborhood from real estate actors.

CHAPTER 11

METHODS TO OBSERVE A PROCESS OF CHANGE

The preceding section demonstrated that gentrification is occurring in the residential areas around Hyde and Jackson Squares, and that gentrifying pressures are unevenly distributed with a pattern of advance from west to east and north to south. Even at the fairly small scale of the block group, however, the actual process of block-by-block change remains somewhat mysterious. In order for the changes I documented to be visible, a mundane series of small changes have to occur: some people must move out and other people must move in, building ownership need to change hands, legal forms of building tenure have to be changed. Such changes don't result only from actions of residents, they will be a consequence of the activities of the brokers, landlords, and developers who shape and direct property uses. In Section Two, I look more closely at these changes, digging into the details of buildings and streets. First, I examined people and property at the building level within an "embedded sample" comprised of three streets where gentrification pressures are high, moderate, and low. Second, I conducted interviews with key informants to contextualize and explain the building-level data.


Selecting the Embedded Sample Streets

I selected three streets, drawn from the pool of 22 study blocks, to serve as an "embedded sample" for closer observation at the building level. To review, these blocks contained 1,642 units, representing 42% of total units in the study area and 56% of units

that are not part of the Bromley-Heath public housing complex. Since the focus of this phase of data collection was on residential properties, the goal was to identify blocks that appeared to have comparatively high, and comparatively low, gentrification pressures in the present, as measured by a combination of: a) current condo rates; b) recent price levels and price changes; and c) recent transaction volume and volume changes.

The current condo rate was calculated as the percentage of condoizable units that had been condo-converted. “Condoizable units” were defined as any unit in an unsubsidized multifamily property (see Figure 10.1). This measure yielded a snapshot of the extent of condoization on the 22 candidate blocks as of the end of 2012, using data drawn from the public records dataset. The median condoization rate for units was 25% (with a high of 57% and a low of 6%), while that for buildings was 27% (with a high of 59% and a low of 5%). Eleven blocks with condo rates above the unit median ($> 25\%$) were given a “high” score. Blocks with rates below the median were divided into two groups, to better enable isolation of those blocks which had very little condoization at all, not just low relative condoization. Seven blocks with the lowest unit condo rates—of 6–11%—were assigned a “low” value. Four blocks with “middling” condo rates closer to the unit median—of 17–22%—were given no value. Table D.1.: Condo Rates in 22 Selected Study Area Blocks, in the appendices, summarizes these results.

Figure 11.1. Calculating the Condoization Rate



Recent sales price data, drawn from the MLS transaction dataset, were examined to identify study blocks where prices were higher and/or where price increases had been greater. To do so, two challenges of the data had to be addressed. First, the property type classification system in the MLS transactions data included a catch-all multi-family category, such that two-family, triple-decker, and large multi-family structures were lumped together. Thus, meaningful comparisons were possible only for condos and single family structures and in practice, condo prices became the primary data, given the comparatively small presence of single family structures. Second, the volumes of annual transactions in a given property type for a single year for single block were low and frequently zero. To address this limitation, I compared sales figures across study blocks in three ways: first, using a simple average of condo prices across all years (rendering any change over time invisible, but preserving comparison between the geographic areas); second, by looking at changes in condo prices across clusters of years, from 2004–2006 (“period 1”) to 2007–2009 (“period 2”) to 2010–2012 (“period 3”);²² and third, using a

²² Because the recent period includes the finance-led downturn that began with the collapse of subprime mortgage lending in 2007 and intensified with the broader finance-driven downturn in the fall of 2008, the

simple average of single family prices, when available. As with condo rates, I marked study blocks with high scores or low scores, leaving middling scores blank. The median condo price was \$361,248 and the median single family price was \$456,839. In a first pass, I assigned high scores to blocks that had average condo prices above the median and low scores to those with below-median prices. In a second pass, blocks with an above-median condo price and a below-median single family price had their scores changed to “middling.” Table D.2: Sales Prices and Price Changes in 22 Selected Study Area Blocks, in the appendices, summarizes these results.

Sales volume data, also drawn from the MLS transaction dataset, were compared to identify study blocks that had high and rising numbers of sales, on the one hand, and low and stable or low and declining numbers of sales, on the other hand. The number of transactions was examined separately for three property types—condominiums, single family buildings, and multi-family buildings—by looking at the number of transactions on its own and as a percentage of the number of unsubsidized properties of that type. Sales volumes declined for all property types during the nine years examined, likely owing to the overall decline in housing market activity (even though the overall trend for prices was upward). The median number of condo sales was 13, while the median rate of condo sales as a percentage of the number of unsubsidized condo units was 95%. The median number of multifamily sales was three, while the median rate of multifamily sales as a percentage of the number of unsubsidized multifamily properties was 19%. I first assigned high, low, and middling values to each study block for each property type.

These determinations were subjective assessments based on a combination of the number

past nine years were chosen in order to capture periods before, during the peak of, and subsequent to the downturn.

and percentage of sales and whether those values were above or below the median. I then assigned a single score to each study block by evaluating the property-specific scores.

See Table D.3: Number of Sales in 22 Selected Study Area Blocks, in the appendices.


Next, the high, low, and middling scores for these three measurements were combined, presented below as Table 10.1: Decision Matrix for Embedded Sample Selection for Embedded Sample Selection. This matrix arrays the study blocks from the highest to the lowest extent of gentrification pressures. In a final step, I considered these study block rankings in context of two concerns. First, I sought streets with high, medium, and low scores that would reflect the north-south and west-east movement of change observed in Chapter 8. Second, I looked for streets with sufficiently similar stock to enable meaningful comparisons.

I observed that Paul Gore Street, at the south, had high scores for both of its study blocks, Forbes Street, moving east, had a high score for one of its study blocks and a low score for the other, and Mozart Street, yet further east, had low scores for both of its study blocks. These three streets have comparable property stock, mainly two- and three-family buildings, while each runs in a roughly north-south direction. Both Paul Gore and Mozart span the distance from Centre Street to Lamartine Street, while Forbes runs from Centre to Chestnut. These three streets were selected as the embedded sample within which I collected and analyzed evidence of people and property changes at the building level.

Table 11.1. Decision Matrix for Embedded Sample Selection

Study Block		# Units	HIGH SCORES			LOW SCORES			SCORES SUMMARY		
			Price	# Sales	Condo-ization	Price	# Sales	Condo-ization	High	Low	Rank
12	Paul Gore St: from Centre to midpoint, w/ Paul Gore Ter	108	1	1	1				3	0	H1
1	Boylston St: from Centre St to midpoint	81	1		1				2	0	H2
17	Sheridan St: from midpoint to Chestnut St	68	1		1				2	0	H2
18	Chestnut St: from Boylston St to Wyman St, w/ Roslyn Pl	77	1		1				2	0	H2
21	Forbes St: from Centre St to midpoint	81	1		1				2	0	H2
23	Wyman St: from Centre St to midpoint	63	1		1				2	0	H2
13	Paul Gore St: midpoint to Lamartine St	80	1		1		1		2	1	H3
2	Boylston St: midpoint to Lamartine St	92			1				1	0	–
5	Oakview Ter, Belmore Ter	90	1						1	0	–
9	Danforth St	31			1		1		1	1	–
15	Cranston St, Termine Ave	72	1						1	0	–
16	Sheridan St: from Centre St to midpoint	76	1				1		1	1	–
24	Wyman St: midpoint to Lamartine St	56							0	0	–
22	Forbes St: midpoint to Chestnut St	50	1				1	1	1	2	L3
27	Mozart St: midpoint to Lamartine St	48		1		1		1	1	2	L3
33	Armstrong St	49		1		1		1	1	2	L3
43	Evergreen St	60	1				1	1	1	2	L3
72	Day St: from Arcola St to Centre St, w/ Bynner St: from Day to Creighton St, w/ Mark St	135			1	1	1		1	2	L3
26	Mozart St: from Centre St to midpoint	48				1		1	0	2	L2
71	Nira Ave, Grotto Glen Rd, Arcola Ave, Kenney St, w/ Day St: from Minden St to Arcola St	153				1	1		0	2	L2
28	Chestnut St: from Wyman St to Centre St	76				1		1	0	2	L2
32	Priesing St	48				1	1	1	0	3	L1
Sum			12	3	10	7	8	6	27	23	

Figure 11.2. Embedded Sample: Three Streets



Selecting the Sample of Buildings

All sampled properties are two- or three-family residences. Single family and mixed commercial/residential properties were excluded from the sample because they are so few in number, while I steered away from larger multi-family properties when other choices were available, because they can be rather different from one another depending on the number of units. I employed two methods of sample selection on the streets:

- **Condo-converted buildings.** In keeping with my effort to observe and understand forces and outcomes of gentrification, I focused on a form of property consistent with that transition: the condo-converted multifamily. Thus the first pass was to identify and sample such buildings. On Paul Gore, a longer street with more buildings and a higher percentage of condominium structures, I did preliminary research to learn the time point of conversion and get an introductory sense the owner who advanced the change, then drew a selection of buildings that would enable me to observe the evident variety. A full description of those varied moments and actors is part of the findings presented below. On Forbes and

Mozart, where there are fewer condoized buildings, I included all of them in my sample.

- **Buildings occupied by non-professionals.** To glean insight into inhibitors of gentrification, I sought out buildings that have been occupied in recent years by people who hold other-than-professional occupations. Using Annual Resident Listings (ARL) over the past five years, I identified buildings in which the most recent occupational information was for residents who did not hold professional occupations. I included all such buildings on each street, with two exceptions: a one six-family on Paul Gore and a nine-family on Mozart. In recent years of the ARL, many occupations are listed as “unknown,” so it is likely that there are more such residents than I was able to identify, but there is no better available source of occupational data at the building level.

The result was a sample that hovers above and below 40% of the available properties on each street.

Table 11.2. Building Sample Selection

Street	Building Type	Population				Sample			
		Not Condo'd	Condo'd*	Total		Not Condo'd	Condo'd*	Total # (%) Sampled	
Paul Gore Street	2-F	2	2	4	56	1	2	3	23 (41%)
	3-F	22	24	46		3	16	19	
	MF 4+	5	1	6		1	0	1	
	SF	2	—	—	3	—	—	—	—
	Mixed Use	1	0	—		—	—	—	
Forbes Street	2-F	8	2	10	42	2	2	4	16 (38%)
	3-F	21	8	29		4	8	12	
	MF 4+	3	0	3		0	—	0	
	SF	6	—	—	6	—	—	—	—
Mozart Street	2-F	8	0	8	34	1	—	1	13 (38%)
	2-F Subsidized	3	—	3		1	—	1	
	3-F	17	5	22		6	5	11	
	MF 4+	1	0	1		0	—	0	
	SF	1	—	—	2	—	—	—	—
	Mixed Use	1	0	—		—	—	—	

* “Condo’d” reflects the status of buildings as of December 31, 2012.

Goals for Data Collection at the Building Level

I collected data on buildings with the hope of observing forms of building use and transfer, alongside networks of real estate actors that worked together to serve particular

groups of residents, and hence glean insight into how a slow process of transformation may be pushed along or thwarted. The strategy was straightforward: to look for the things that advance and constitute gentrification, to look for the things that are thought to inhibit or slow it, and to observe trends within and across the three streets. The questions that guided my data collection are summarized in Figure 11.3, below.

Table 11.3. Investigating People and Property at the Building Level

Property	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What was the form of ownership? Who was the owner? Was the building owner-occupied or held by a landlord? If a landlord, what sort—real estate dabbler, small operation, or a person with a larger operation for whom this is their business? Has the building been converted to condominiums? If so, when was the master deed filed? By what kind of actor? • What is the transaction history? Has the building been held for a long period by a small number of owners? Has it been frequently transacted? In what moments? Were the owners in those transactions otherwise active in speculative property ownership? Were the transactions between people with Spanish surnames? • Who facilitated property transfers, with what consequences? Was a broker was involved in moving the property to condo conversion? • Did the building suffer from neglect, abandonment, vandalism, or fire during the decades when disinvestment was most severe? Was the owner cited for failure to maintain the property? Did the City take action to stabilize the property? Did community actors intervene?
People	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What were the occupations of residents? Did residents hold professional occupations? • Did residents have other characteristics of gentrifiers? Were households comprised of people in their twenties with all different surnames, some of whom were students? • Were residents Latinos? Did residents have Spanish surnames?

My purpose in collecting data on property ownership, transactions, and brokerage was to observe the actors and forms of ownership of each building, and to see whether property patterns coincided with people patterns. In particular, I wanted to know whether

the condominium was associated with the in-migration of professionals, whether there were patterns in building transaction histories that relate to patterns of current ownership form and resident occupational profiles, whether there were particular actors who advanced changes, and whether there were distinct spheres of real estate business serving the existing and the incoming residents. Together, the history of decline (or lack thereof) of buildings on a street provided insight into the very local impacts of the neighborhood's period of disinvestment. I gathered data on resident occupation in order to document whether the prior population had non-professional occupations, to identify the in-migrating professionals, and to observe whether housing ownership and tenure differed between the two groups.

I had two purposes for examining patterns of housing transfer, ownership, and use among Latinos. First, as mentioned in Section One, the literature suggests that within geographically-defined cultural communities—particularly those where the business of daily life is conducted in a language different from that of the surrounding majority group—if the business of housing operates through networks internal to the community than the residential space may be less open for use and exchange by people outside the community. Because the subareas that had the strongest evidence of gentrification pressures tended to have the lowest presence of Latinos and vice versa, it seemed appropriate to continue to explore the potential influence of this sort of “community embeddedness.”

Second, I was aware that the majority of the local population of Latinos do not hold professional occupations, and face a potential displacement risk as a result of professional in-migration, as perhaps evidenced in the departure of almost 1,000 Latinos

from the neighborhood over the decade between 2000 to 2010, simultaneous with the increases in gentrification pressures. Occupational data on the Greater Boston area in recent decades indicates that a comparatively small percentage share of Latinos work in managerial, professional, or technical occupations. A 1995 study found of Greater Boston shows just 12% of Latinos (men) and 9% of Latinas held such positions, and that the most common occupations for both Latinos and Latinas were in production and service, followed by construction and transportation labor for men and administrative support work for women (Bluestone & Stevenson, 2000, pp. 296-298). An analysis of 2000 Census data found somewhat higher shares of metro Boston Latinos in management and professional work, with about 20% of men and 27% of women in such positions (McArdle, 2004, p. 9). Moving closer to the study area—probably the more relevant level, given the very local nature of the processes of change under study—ACS data for the Census tracts in and around Hyde-Jackson show that a somewhat higher proportion of Latinos in the study area are professionals, at an estimated 28% in 2007-2011. Nonetheless, this figure is well below the 67–68% of residents in some block groups who hold professional jobs.

Data Sources

Data on **property and property owners** was derived from three public sources:

- From the **Suffolk County Land Records** I gathered information about each building: the dates of transfer, prices paid, and the dates of the “master deeds” that convert a building to a condominium ownership structure. These documents allowed observation of the *market* exchange of a property, and frequently enabled insight into the *social* exchange of a property within a family or other set of relationships. Land Records also allowed observation of building distress: evidence that a building was newly constructed on land previously vacant or abandoned, tax lien foreclosures by the City, deeds for abutting vacant parcels that homeowners purchased cheaply from the City, or bills from the City for work

performed under a Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program to secure properties. Sometimes they revealed unexpected information about surrounding property conditions. (For example, I learned about histories of arson and abandonment because some sample buildings were held by people who also owned abutting vacant lots.)

- I used the **City of Boston Assessing Department** records to determine whether a building is owner-occupied in the present, to see citywide holdings of a property owner in the present, and for its comprehensive annual statement of property value (providing dollar amounts that are comparable across time, even if assessed values and sales prices may differ). It was also a helpful cross-reference for the Land Records, which were inconsistently organized.
- I searched the **Permit Records of the City of Boston Inspectional Services Department** for documentation of building distress. I looked for citations filed against property owners because the building was found open to the elements or vandalized, a pattern of citations for unsafe building conditions, permits to board up a structure, or permits related to repair work following a fire.

Data on **people** came from three public sources:

- Massachusetts General Law requires that all cities and towns conduct a census of residents age 17 and over. The **Annual Resident Listing of the City of Boston** includes each person's name, address, date of birth, and occupation.
- **Suffolk County Land Records** were rich sources of information about property owners—for example, I could distinguish individuals for whom landlording was a business from those who dabbled in property speculation, from those who owned a couple of properties in the very local area and lived in one of them, etc.
- Additional data on property owners came from the **Corporations Division of the Secretary of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts**, which offers an online database of all corporate entities established within Massachusetts. Those records were useful for revealing the individuals behind the limited liability companies (LLCs) that own and develop properties.
- I used the **MLS transaction records** to observe who brokered transactions.

To provide context that would allow me to interpret the above data, I also conducted interviews:

- **Key informants** were primarily real estate agents, but also included municipal planners, community development actors, and housing activists. Their insights helped to make sense of data I had gathered, and informed data collection by guiding my attention to certain mechanisms of change.

Two resources were used to categorize and code data. First, the Census Bureau's 2010 Occupation Code List (most current version) includes 539 codes for classifying occupations within six broad categories. I used these guidelines to categorize the occupational data gathered from the Annual Resident Listing (ARL). The objective of classifying occupation was to distinguish people in professional and managerial work from other kinds of workers. These categories are:

- **Management, business, science, and arts.** This category was called “managerial, professional, and technical” in the several decades prior to 2010. In the stories below I refer to it as “management,” “professional,” “arts professional,” “business professional” and the like, all of which are meant to indicate this overall category in a more readable way than would be the case if I repeatedly stated the full title. This category includes managers from a wide variety of industries (including managers of work performed within service, sales and office, and other occupational categories), people in computer, engineering, and science professions, a wide variety of work that falls within education, legal, community service, arts, and media realms, and healthcare providers and related technical work.
- **Service.** Service occupations encompass diverse kinds of functions, including healthcare support (like aides, assistants, lab workers), protective service (police, corrections, security, lifeguards), food service (cooks, waiters), building and grounds maintenance (janitors, maids, landscaping) and personal care providers (everything from childcare to lobby attendants to embalmers).
- **Sales and office.** Sales and office workers perform a range of customer service (retail sales, real estate broker) and back office and administrative support (switchboard, payroll, bill collector, desk clerk, library assistant, mail carrier, data entry) functions.
- **Natural resources, construction, and maintenance.** The natural resources component of this category includes farming, fishing, and forestry occupations. Construction work (all the building trades, roadway and railway construction, building inspectors) also includes extraction work (blasters, mining). Maintenance occupations represent all the kinds of repair (electronics, automotive, aircraft, heating and air conditioning, equipment etc.). In the stories below, I will sometimes refer to portions of this category by simply “construction” or “maintenance” for readability.
- **Production, transportation, and material moving.** Production jobs include machine operators, pattern makers, laundry, sewing, machinists, etc.

Transportation occupations range from pilots to bus drivers to parking lot attendants. Material moving positions include a variety of functions necessary to moving goods and maintaining the equipment necessary to do so (packers and loaders, vehicle cleaners, truck and tractor operators). Jobs within this category are referred to as just “production” or “transportation” in the stories that follow.

- **Military specific occupations.** This category includes four kinds of work specific to military service.

As a supplemental resource, I drew on explanatory information available from the Bureau of Labor Statistic’s Occupational Outlook Handbook, which describes the duties and required training for most jobs (www.bls.gov/ooh/), in order to accurately categorize occupations that were described differently in the ARL than in the Code List. In discussing occupation in the chapters below, I present the specific job title with the primary occupation code in parenthesis, or the reverse.

Second, I used the Census List of Spanish Surnames to identify residents who may be Latinos. While common, the use of surname to identify ethnicity is an approximating strategy, to the extent that lists can only capture names commonly associated with ethnic identification, may not represent common names from different national backgrounds equally well, and can only yield a best guess about the self-identification of the individuals categorized. There is some evidence that Spanish surname lists perform more accurately in geographic areas that have higher density Latino populations (Ritzwoller et al., 2008, p. 16).

Time Period

I sought to establish the history of a building over a period of several decades. Ideally, I wanted to trace a building’s ownership back to at least the mid-1970s, when the scars of the highway demolition were still recent, mortgage capital was scarce due to redlining, there were ongoing outflows of many of JP’s then-longtime population, Latino

migration to Hyde Square and surrounding areas had begun and was intensifying, and small numbers of young professionals had moved in and joined the highway resistance but had not yet had a transformative impact on the neighborhood. Conveniently, the electronic Land Records go back to 1975. Permit Records extend further back in time. I viewed all permits and building citations issued between mid-1960s, because I had reason to believe that disinvestment intensified in the years leading up to the highway demolition (Hirsch, 1998), and 1989. This end point was selected to cut a wide swath around the early 1980s, because I observed in the Land Records that few properties were being demolished as unsafe or seized for tax lien foreclosure after that time.

Key Informant Selection and Interview Processing

Key informants were mainly people with expert personal knowledge of the real estate environment on the embedded sample streets. I started with the transaction data, looking for brokers that had done among the highest numbers of transactions in the study area *and* had brokered sales on one or more of the sample streets. There was a fairly small number of actors. Looking over the 15 years of transaction data, I set my sights first on the 14 brokers who had been the listing or the sales agent for at least 15 study area sales, of which at least one was within the embedded sample. Then, as I gathered land records data and conducted the initial interviews, I identified other candidates who appeared to be playing key roles as property owners or condo converters, whose involvement in local property transactions appeared to span moments and actors (e.g., from 1980s speculation to 2000s condo conversion), or who were straddling both private and community realms in some way (e.g., a broker who also sat on the Housing and Development Committee of the Jamaica Plain Neighborhood Council, a developer whose

work had intersected on two occasions with JP Neighborhood Development Council projects, a real estate attorney who has been involved with housing organizing and affordable housing development). Ultimately, it proved difficult to secure appointments with real estate actors, for two main reasons. First, I was making cold calls. Efforts to work through my slim list of personal contacts in the real estate realm stalled once people learned a bit more about the content of the research. Second, based on feedback from a couple of candidates, I gleaned that some people seemed to be reluctant to engage with or made angry by the topic of my research, or that they perceived the project as judging and criticizing them.

In addition, to help me understand some of the context, I spoke with a housing organizer who had gotten her start on Forbes Street, a former real estate developer for the JPNDC, a former agent with Urban Edge's brokering division, the former JP Planner from the Boston Redevelopment Authority (for her familiarity with community planning and leadership development), and the current JP Planner (for her familiarity with current private development activity and the associated goals of the agency). A complete list of interviewees is included in Appendix F.

Interviews lasted from one to two hours in length and were held at coffee shops, offices, and homes. Interviewees were consented and given the option to participate confidentially or under their own names. Each interview was recorded and a written version was produced that was a combination of notes and word-for-word transcription. I began coding with a thorough and complex coding sheet, which I ultimately used to guide the creation of a short list of inductive codes. That code list is provided in Appendix F.

CHAPTER 12

STREET STORIES

If gentrification pressures are strongest on Paul Gore Street, middling on Forbes Street, and weakest on Mozart Street, what accounts for those differences? I investigated attributes that constitute gentrification's advance. I documented the arrival of residents with professional occupations and the conversion of buildings to condominiums, with attention to the roles that were played by residents themselves and real estate actors. I also sought out evidence of what might inhibit gentrification on a street. I documented the persistent presence of residents with other than professional occupations, looked for evidence of "community embeddedness" in real estate transactions among Latinos, and noted blighting conditions. Each of the streets tells a story.

Paul Gore Street

Paul Gore Street, four-tenths of a mile long, runs between Centre and Lamartine Streets. Situated in the southern portion of the study area, it has two community gardens. Seventy-eight percent of the residential buildings are three-family structures (46 buildings), along with a handful of two-family (4), multifamily (6), and single family (2) buildings, for a total of 188 units. Twenty-seven buildings have been condo-converted, representing 44% of the units and 48% of the buildings that are "condoizable," resulting in 81 condominium units. Condo conversions on Paul Gore occurred across two boom and bust cycles in the broader housing market, as summarized in Figure 12.1. The street

was one of the places within Jamaica Plain where a burst of condo-conversion activity occurred during the 1980s, which resulted in the conversion of 10% of the neighborhood-wide housing stock to condominiums (Barnett & Smith, 2004). This activity on Paul Gore, however, was atypical for the study area, where condo conversions were not substantially present until the early 2000s (apart from a small number on Boylston Street, one block to the south).

Figure 12.1. Building Sample Selection

Wave 1, late 1984–January 1989. The first period began with the first master deed on the street, filed in October 1984, although that early conversion just portended the burst of condoization activity that would take off two years later (and it would be four years before the units in that first building sold). In the two-and-a-half years between December 1986 and January 1989, 11 buildings were converted.

Slowdown 1, mid-1989–early 2004. The 15 years from early 1989 through early 2004 saw little conversion activity, with just five master deeds filed.

Wave 2, mid-2004–mid-2008. The pace picked up again in the second half of the 2000s, when one conversion in mid-2004 gave way to eight more between 2005–2008.

Slowdown 2, 2009–2012. From 2009–2012, there was just one conversion.²³

I gathered data on a sample of 23 buildings. These included 18 of the 27 buildings that have been condo-converted, along with five buildings chosen because residents in the present had occupations other than managerial and professional ones. Patterns of ownership and occupancy over the past several decades portray a process of change

²³ Over the period chronicled here, Boston went through two boom and bust cycles in housing markets. A condo conversion wave kicked off in the late 1970s (McDonough, 2000, p. 94), and sharp property price escalation began in 1984. Prices increased over 140% through 1988, followed by a decline (Case & Shiller, 2003, pp. 302-303) through the early 1990s. Citywide, in the year 2000, still 80% of the condominium stock had been converted in the mid- to late-1980s, although a new wave of conversions got underway in 1997 (and Jamaica Plain was one of four neighborhoods with where conversions of two- and three-family structures were initially concentrated) (Department of Neighborhood Development, 2000, p. 1). A bubble that grew through the early 2000s began to burst in 2005, ahead of the 2007 collapse of the subprime mortgage market and 2008 finance-led downturn, with a 19% decline in prices by 2009 (Bluestone, Billingham, & Herrmann, 2009, pp. 6-7). In JP, the drop in prices and volume was more moderate.

toward a condominium ownership structure, alongside the in-migration of residents with professional occupations. See Appendix E for a list of the Paul Gore sample buildings.

Did condo-conversion introduce residents with professional occupations on Paul Gore Street?

Condo conversion was not the origin point of the arrival of residents with professional occupations in most cases. While all of the converted properties did come to be fully or partly occupied by professionals, there was only one case in which the condo conversion itself marked the moment of occupational transition. In 1986, a 25 year-old consultant (professional), who had recently flipped a North End condo for quick gain but had no other real estate dealings, purchased 55 Paul Gore Street from the elderly occupants who had owned the building since the late 1950s. Pre-conversion tenants were a clerk (sales and office), factory worker (production), manager (can be any category) and housewife, while post-conversion owners were a social worker, attorney, musician, teacher (professional) and student. In addition, there were several landlord-owned buildings where residents had had a mix of occupations (discussed below), but only professionals and students remained post-conversion.

Through what circumstances did professionals arrive on Paul Gore Street?

A small number of people in professional, business, and management occupations lived on Paul Gore Street before the start of this story. As presented in the prior section, Jamaica Plain had long been a mixed-class, mixed-occupation place, with a pattern of residential settlement that was distinctly marked by occupation and income but not rigidly so. Paul Gore is situated just blocks from areas that were zoned for industry, with one end directly opposite the railroad tracks, and it also runs alongside the hilly Oakview

and Belmont Terraces, which had been occupied in earlier decades by more white collar workers and upwardly mobile tradespeople. For example, at 41-R Paul Gore, a buyer (management, business) and secretary (sales and office) owned and occupied the building from 1962–1975, then sold it to a laborer. At 35 Paul Gore, a retired accountant (professional) and his mother were the remaining residents of a family who had owned the building since 1956.

There was only one building in which the initial occupational resident transition occurred as a result of a condo conversion. In most cases, a transition began during the period when the building was owned as a multifamily, so that the greatest number of professionals initially came to the street as renters. Some lived in buildings owned by landlords for whom property investment was their business. Three of four such properties stand out because their ownership was more volatile than other buildings in the sample, with each frequently traded between landlords. The three-family at 100 Paul Gore had among the earliest presence of students and professionals. It changed hands six times from the early 1970s through the mid-1980s. Residents during that period were predominantly young people in group living situations who were students and people with mixed occupations, alongside the occasional plumber (construction) and housewife. In 1976, for example, there were several students, an architect (professional), an assistant manager and a clerk (sales and office), one guard (service), and three bus drivers (transportation), all between 24 and 27 years of age with different surnames. At 40 Paul Gore, frequent ownership transitions may have been related to the tenant turnover, but the occupational transition was gradual. It began in 1980, when two social workers (professionals) and a student replaced a machinist and operator (production), waitress and

hotel worker (service), and chauffeur (transportation), only to be replaced two years later by two factory workers (production), an attendant and a guard (service), followed by a drift in the late 1980s toward student tenants and an eventual settling on management, business, and other professionals (musician, genealogist, business, project manager, teacher) by the mid-1990s.

In the condoized building sample, there were just three cases in which people with professional occupations became tenants of owner-occupants who had in construction, transportation, or production jobs (and, in a fourth case, a person grew up in a building with construction, production, or service workers, then bought the building and married a teacher). Far more common, however, was for their introduction to follow an ownership transfer of a multifamily building to professional owner-occupants or to small-time landlords. This kind of transition within multifamily buildings went on from the late 1970s through the late 1990s. In some instances the change was swift and in others it was more gradual. In 1982, after a social worker bought the three family at 91 Paul Gore, a counselor, two administrators, another social worker, a manager (professionals), a clerk (sales and office), and two students moved into units where previously a guard and a hospital worker (service), a laborer, factory worker, and stitcher (production), and a secretary, clerk, and postal worker (sales and office) had lived. The three-family at 23 Paul Gore, was purchased by a photographer (professional) in 1982, a social worker (professional) in 1986, and an artist-professor couple (professional) in 1995. A chauffeur (transportation) and a laborer (perhaps production or construction) are among the occupants in that period, as the mix slowly moves toward students and on to professionals (nurse, copywriter, reporter, archivist, consultant) with some residents in

sales and office jobs. In 1997, a woman who went on to be a science teacher bought 11 Paul Gore from a retired couple whose tenants over the prior 20 years had been in service (policeman), production (operator), and construction (contractor, roofer) occupations. She filled the building with a teacher, physician, administrator, manager (management and professional) and a carpenter (construction).

Some professionals appear to have located on Paul Gore Street as part of a social or lifestyle project, and pursued condo conversion as a way to divvy up a group-owned building among the participating individuals and couples. While land records and occupational listings only very partially illuminate the relationships of such households, they document some aspects of the circumstances. The three-family at 15 Paul Gore was the home of a group of couples and individuals who held it in cooperative ownership through the 1980s. Purchased first by one member of the group in 1978, numerous deeds over the subsequent decade-plus document the evolving ownership structure as other residents bought in and were bought out. They were a combination of public interest (social worker, teachers) and other (lawyers) professionals and people in production and construction occupations (laborer, carpenter), although the carpenter went on to be an Emmy-winning documentary filmmaker. They converted to a condominium ownership structure in 1992. One unit is still held by a member of the early group and the other units were sold to owners who came to stay (trading less frequently than other condos on the street). The three family at 38 Paul Gore was owned by another such collective—a mix of professional and other occupations with a dual emphasis on manual labor and public interest work, in this case also a mix of gay and straight couples—who lived together for five years before buying as a group (in 1985) from the one of them who had owned (since

1979). They converted to a condo structure in 1987. Here too, one of the couples still remains, but the other units have been traded several times.

Table 12.1. Forms of Occupational Transition in Condo Converted Buildings on Paul Gore Street

PAUL GORE STREET				
Post-conversion residents	Presence of professionals	Ownership form at transition	Transition description	# of Bldgs.
Some or all post-conversion residents hold professional occupations.	There was no transition: prior residents were professionals	Multifamily	An accountant (professional) and owner-occupant who grew up at the property inherited it and rented to college students.	1
	Some of the prior residents were professionals		A buyer (professional) owner-occupied the property from the early 1960s through the mid-1970s and then sold the property to a laborer.	1
	The building underwent a transition to residents with professional occupations.	The initial transition occurred as a result of condo conversion	The building was converted and flipped.	1
		The initial transition occurred when the building was a multifamily.	An owner-occupant in construction, transportation, or production rented to tenants with professional occupations.	3
			Owner-occupants with professional occupations bought the building and the residents turned over all at once.	4
			A group of people, professionals and laborers, owned and occupied the building in a cooperative living arrangement.	2
			Professionals and students arrived following an ownership transition, but the owner's occupation was unknown.	1
			A landlord building had tenants with a mix of occupations and the conversion removed non-professional occupations.	3
			A person grew up in a building where residents were in construction, production, or service work, then bought the building and married a teacher.	1
			Owner-occupants with professional occupations bought the building and residents turned over gradually.	2
Post-conversion occupations are unknown.				

Note: One building fits into two categories (it was owned by professionals in early years, and later went through a transition from a laborer to professionals).

What actors advanced condo conversions on Paul Gore Street?

I identified four types of condo converters on Paul Gore. These are defined in Figure 12.2. The most common type was a professional with little or no other real estate business involvement who came to the conversion after owner-occupancy (a “resident” converter) or who pursued it as a little foray into the real estate business (a “dabbler” converter).

Figure 12.2. Converter Types

Resident. The bulk of master deeds were filed by residents themselves. Resident-led conversions were overwhelmingly pursued by professionals, with just one case of a non-professional owner-occupant converting a property. I defined “residents” as people who did not have other real estate business dealings. I defined “professional” resident converters as those who had professional occupations in the majority (some ownership groups were mixed).

Real estate dabblers. For a number of filers of master deeds, the conversion appeared to have been a chance to dip a toe into the real estate business. I termed these people “dabblers.” Some of them had one or two other property dealings, some had none. Residents and dabblers were often quite similar, in that several dabblers resided elsewhere in Jamaica Plain and, when occupational data was available, they tended to be professionals.

Landlord-converters. In some cases, an individual with a small number of investment properties—from three to a dozen properties in and beyond the neighborhood—filed the master deed. These landlord-converters were distinct from dabblers in that they had more extensive real estate dealings. Some of them were involved in one or more other conversions.

Developers. Developers are individuals or firms that specialize in property construction and rehabilitation, and who purchased Paul Gore buildings to rehabilitate, convert, and sell. A variant is the **brokered developer**, usually a partnership between a real estate agent and developer, although sometimes a broker-developer is a single person plays both roles.

While professional residents and dabblers led the way, they also appear to have prepared the street for the later arrival of developers. In Wave 1, professional residents completed one-third of conversions, while dabblers (often people with a professional occupational profile) advanced another third. During Slowdown 1, these two groups were the only parties converting Paul Gore properties. Dabblers were again active during

Wave 2, while professional resident-led conversions waned and brokered developers appeared on the scene.

Table 12.2. Converter Types on Paul Gore Street across Four Periods

Period	Converter Type	Pop.	Sample
WAVE 1: Late 1984–January 1989	Resident (professionals)	4	3
	Resident (non-professional)	1	1
	Real Estate Dabbler	4	2
	Landlord-Converter	3	2
		12	8
SLOWDOWN 1: Mid-1989–Early 2004	Resident (professionals)	4	2
	Real Estate Dabbler	1	1
		5	3
WAVE 2: Mid-2004–Mid-2008	Resident (professionals)	1	1
	Real Estate Dabbler	4	3
	Landlord-Converter	1	1
	Brokered Developer	3	2
		9	7
SLOWDOWN 2:* 2009–2012	Real Estate Dabbler	1	0
		1	0
	TOTAL	27	18

* Ideally, the sample would include properties from each period, but missing occupational data made it impossible to sufficiently tell the story of the one Slowdown 2 property.

These individuals and their conversions are summarized in Table 12.3: People with Professional Occupations who Filed Master Deeds. Only one master deed was filed by owner-occupants with other than professional occupations. At 68 Paul Gore, an electrician (construction) and housewife had owner-occupied the building since 1975 and rented to professional tenants through the 1980s (a member of the clergy in 1981, a physician in 1984). They converted the property in 1989, kept one unit for their own residency, and sold the other two.

Table 12.3. People with Professional Occupations who Filed Master Deeds on Paul Gore Street

Period	Converter Type	Street #	Converter Occupation	Year Bought	Year Converted	Conversion marked occupational change?	Converter led the occupational change?
Wave 1	Real Estate Dabbler	55	Consultant	1986	1987	Yes	Yes
	Resident (professionals)	27	Artist, entertainer	1987	1987	No	In part
		38	Teachers, director, carpenter, lobbyist	1979	1987	No	Yes
		91	Social worker	1982	1988	No	Yes
Slowdown 1*	Resident (professionals)	15	Teachers, social worker, clerks, health worker, laborer, carpenter	1978	1992	No	In part
		37	Producer, scientist, physician's assistant, graphic design and medical assistant	1985	1995	No	In part
Wave 2*	Real Estate Dabbler	11	Science teacher	1997	2004	No	Yes
		41-R	Attorney, architect	2000	2006	No	In part
	Resident (professionals)	40	Educator	1985	2005	No	In part
		70	Photographer, consultant	1996	2000	No	Yes

* Occupational information was not available for two dabblers, one in Slowdown 1 and the other in Wave 2.

The evidence from the building sample suggests that some of those with professional occupations who became involved with Paul Gore properties were already residing in the neighborhood. Some arrived as renters, like the artist and “entertainer” who lived at 27 Paul Gore Street. For 20 years, the property had been held by a family

that included a laborer (perhaps production or construction) and a chauffeur (transportation). By the late 1970s, they were retired and renting one of their units to a clerk (sales and office) and the other to a laborer and housewife. In 1983, the clerk is replaced by a physician. In 1986 the arts professionals replaced the physician, and the following year they purchased the building and converted it immediately. They lived in one unit for two years before selling. They sold the other two into the speculative market: each traded twice for 30% gains within six months before landing with students and professionals (podiatrist, nurse).

Several came from different parts of Jamaica Plain, some of whom appeared to have been involved in a longstanding practice of property ownership in the neighborhood, of owning one or two additional two- or three-family properties within a few blocks of the one in which one lives. Five examples will suffice. First, the science teacher who bought 11 Paul Gore in 1997, described above, was living in a triple-decker she owned just three blocks south. Seven years later, she would move 11 Paul Gore into a different kind of ownership and circulation by filing a master deed and selling the units as condos, but she retained the other building as a multifamily investment property even after she moved to Maryland. Second, the architect and attorney who bought 41-R Paul Gore in 2000 and converted it in 2006 had both live and work connections to the neighborhood. They had owned and lived in neighboring 43 Paul Gore since 1997, which they still hold as an investment property although they have moved to Wellesley. The architect is the principle of a small firm based in JP center, which has an ongoing partnership with another JP-based business that develops, owns, and manages nonprofit office spaces in the neighborhood. Third, a couple who was living just outside the study

area on Perkins Street bought a Lamartine Street triple-decker in the early 1980s and 40 Paul Gore in 1985. They held both for close to two decades, then converted them. Fourth, in a slightly different twist on these examples, the photographer and consultant who converted 70 Paul Gore Street in 2006, after owner-occupying for seven years, bought and moved into a single family on Sunnyside Street, joining the wave of professionals which flowed into block group 812-2 in the period since 2000.

Who were the real estate business actors on Paul Gore? Playing what roles?

Professionals also came into the Paul Gore residential space because real estate actors were preparing it for them. The building evidence offers only very partial glimpses into some of those roles, but it is possible to piece together a few stories. One example is of an individual who played a role in connecting condo converters and/or professionals and students with multifamily property ownership. I first noticed this individual because he had owned three condo-converted properties on Paul Gore and one on Forbes Street. I researched him to learn more, and discovered that he was active in speculative property ownership during the boom years from 1981–1986, mostly in JP, where he traded 12 properties. He held each for a period lasting between a few months and three years and sold them for 125–238% of his purchase price. He never filed any master deeds personally, but in five cases he sold to the converting owner and in three other cases he sold to people who sold again to a converting owner within three years. Of the properties in my sample, one of those converting owners was a resident whose occupation was educator (professional), the others were dabblers who owned a handful of other properties and had filed one other master deed each. (In one other case, on Forbes Street, he sold to an undergraduate, the first of two such owners, who stocked the building with

students and a couple of professionals.) In summary, the Paul Gore properties that passed through this individual's ownership were on the move, being traded between dabblers, landlords, and other speculators. He acquired them and passed them along to condo-converters, some of whom lived in the buildings for a length of time prior to conversion.

Some of the real estate actors are local residents that are similar to dabblers, with a somewhat deeper involvement in a range of small-time property-related activity. For example, 35 Paul Gore Street was converted and flipped in 2007–2008 by an individual who is the owner-occupant of a property in the Pondside area and the proprietor of a JP bakery on South Street (with specialties in cupcakes and vegan offerings), housed in a mixed commercial/residential building which he also owns. He flipped three multifamilies in the late 1990s and early 2000s (selling each for 150–205% of his purchase price), and converted two other properties in the neighborhood in 2001 and 2007.

In Wave 2, broker-developers were active on Paul Gore Street. Two properties were part of my condo sample, while the third came up in an interview: together these portray the three kinds of brokered developments described by interviewees. First, in some cases, individuals may have ongoing partnerships with each other, like the agent I interviewed who has an ongoing relationship with two small development companies. She explained to me that “on Paul Gore, there was a multi-family on the market as a three-family and then I worked with my developer to buy it and then turned it over to condos” (RE1 [Interviewee], 2013). That turned out to be the three-family at 23 Paul Gore, where indeed the interviewee had represented the buyer of the multifamily (which

was an LLC affiliated with the interviewee's developer partner) in 2007 and handled the listings to sell the units in 2008.

In other cases, developers and brokers function more like independent agents, relying on reputation and relationships to bring deals together. As interviewee Peter Phinney,²⁴ a broker, explained,

an agent finds the deal, finds a piece of property that might be suitable for a developer. So you see a piece of land, and you hear it's for sale or it might be for sale, you call your developer guys. . . . Usually the developers have no loyalty to any one agent, just whoever brings them a deal gets the end sales. . . . The agents themselves kind of become little mini celebrities in these little towns. You could be anywhere, but your loyal clients come to you. . . . [W]e'd give them lots of design advice, layout, you know, what was selling today and all the rest of it. . . . You develop a working relationship and if it's good and you've been successful then sometimes they bring you stuff that you haven't found. . . . If they find it on their own, they still need a broker to sell it. (Phinney, 2013)

That was the case with the building at 1 Paul Gore / 418 Centre Street, a new construction project outside my building sample group that was developed in 2002–2006. A developer who had been involved over the years with projects along Jamaica Pond and elsewhere scouted this opportunity and contacted Phinney, who put together pricing info and represented the project to the investors that the developer had assembled. Phinney found himself managing a situation after Oriental de Cuba, the restaurant across the street, suffered a firebombing in 2005—"when investors have just dropped several million dollars based on your say-so, and the say-so of the developer you're working with, and there's a huge violent act across the street, it isn't particularly good"—but a personal visit from Mayor Menino and a rehabilitation loan from the City to the restaurant reassured everyone. Phinney's work appears in the Forbes Street story as well.

²⁴ Names of real estate actors are used to make it easier to follow the story, except in cases where interviewees have requested anonymity.

Finally, “there are some guys, there are developer-brokers too” (Phinney, 2013), like Scott Johnson, the person at the center of the team that converted 75 Paul Gore. This property had been owned for nearly three decades by an owner-occupant when it was sold in 2002, at a below-market price with financing from the seller, to an individual who grew up in the building and his wife, a teacher. Occupants of this building over the years had worked in construction (electrician, constructor), production (factory work, laborer), and sales and office (store worker, clerk) occupations. Five refinance mortgages from a subprime lender stripped the new owners of much of the property’s equity, and they sold to a small development firm in 2008. One of the two principals of that firm was Scott Johnson, whose brokerage team (“The Residential Group”) is the most active in the study area, with involvement in 48 sales in the past 12 years. served as the buyer’s agent on when his development firm purchased the building. His firm and a partner development firm completed an upscale rehabilitation of the units in under a year.²⁵ The Residential Group handled both the purchase of the multifamily and sale of the units. They also appear in the Forbes Street story.

What are the circumstances of Paul Gore Street buildings where occupants without professional occupations live?

The Paul Gore sample included five buildings where people who have other than professional occupations reside. All of the buildings turned out to have a mix of resident occupations, though in most cases it was some or all of the owners who held the service, construction, or office occupations. At 24 Paul Gore there is a two-generation household

²⁵ One of the principals of the other firm resides at the luxury condo development in a former school building on Wyman Street (between Forbes and Mozart Streets), a project brokered by Phinney with units sold by Johnson, in the mid-2000s. Companion construction of new condos on Forbes Street was part of that project and is discussed below as part of the Forbes Street story.

in a building inherited from a third generation, purchased in 1968, where owners included a nurse's aide (service) who previously worked as a waitress (service) and an accountant who previously lived with a manager (management and professional); in earlier years a family member had been a cook. Since 1985, their tenants have tended to be people with professional occupations (manager, programmer, nurse, buyer, graphic designer). Prior to that, tenants had transportation (shipper), sales and office (salesman), or construction (carpenter) occupations. At 98 Paul Gore are two sisters, a cook and a manager, who bought the building in 1978 and have owned and operated a Hyde Square diner since 1983. For decades they rented to a photographer who was in his 90s when he left and was replaced by students. At 110-112 Paul Gore is a three-generation household. The oldest generation—a factory worker who was later an operator and eventually a roofer (construction) who became disabled, and a housewife—bought in 1968. One son is a manager, and two grandchildren (or perhaps a grandson and his wife) are a nurse (professional) and a laborer (production or construction). A different pattern exists at 59 Paul Gore Street, where one of the owners is a teacher (professional), while their tenants have held a mix of occupations, including sales and office (grocer, secretary, teller, clerk, receptionist, administrative assistant), production (engraver, laborer), transportation (driver), and professional (social worker, teacher, counselor).

Three of these buildings had owners who have dabbled in other multifamily property ownership, mostly long-term. One is owned by a family that has owned another Paul Gore multifamily for decades, but also bought and sold three others on the street in the 1980s. Their two remaining properties serve as family assets, as evidenced by deeds transferring ownership from what appears to be parents to children. The women who run

the local diner own the building in which it is housed, and previously owned a South End property along with another family member. The teacher and her partner have owned a small commercial/residential block on Green Street in JP since the early 1990s.

These buildings share several common characteristics. They are owner-occupied multifamilies, and they were last transacted prior to 1980. To the extent that owner-occupied multifamily properties have been a key housing resource for people who do not hold professional occupations, it appears to be because they did not come into circulation. Of all 38 buildings that were ever sold since 1980, 25 (66%) have been condo-converted, 10 (26%) are held by landlords, and just 2 (5%) are owner-occupied multifamilies.

Table 12.4. Decade of Last Sale on Paul Gore Street: All Multifamily Properties With Current Ownership Form

Decade last sold	Current ownership form			Total
	Owner-occupied multifamily	Landlord-owned multifamily	Condo-converted	
1950s	1	—	—	1
1960s	3	1	—	4
1970s	7	4	2	13
1980s	—	6	11	17
1990s	1	4	5	10
2000s	1	1	9	11
2010s	—	—	—	—
Total	13	16	27	56

Source: Suffolk County Land Records

Four of five of them are also four of the only five multifamily purchases made since the mid-1960s by owner-occupants who were neither Latinos nor professionals. The 24 sample buildings were transacted approximately 77 times in total from the mid-1960s on (the earlier ones having been pieced together from notes about prior sales on deeds of sale within my 1975–present focus). For 72 of these transactions, the purchasers fall into one or more of three groups: landlords, dabblers, or flippers (people with a business

interest in real estate, who held buildings as rentals or converted them to condos); Latinos (professionals in three cases, other kinds of workers in the remainder); or people with professional occupations. There were just five total purchases by buyers who had neither a Spanish surname nor a professional occupation and who went on to occupy the building. Thus the majority of the current owners of properties where non-professionals live, all of whom bought prior to or very early in Paul Gore's gentrification process, were bucking the prevailing demographic trends from the time that they initially purchased their buildings.

Table 12.5. Relationship between Five Decades of Paul Gore Population Migrations and Current Residence by Non-Professionals

Address	Year Current Owner Purchased	Year Converted	Building is One of Five Total Purchases Since mid-1960s by Buyers Who Are Neither Real Estate Business People, Latinos, Nor Professionals	Building is One of Five Total Addresses Where Some or All Current Residents Have Non-professional Occupations
23	N/A	2008	Yes.*	No. Building was sold again and ultimately condo converted.
24	1969	—	Yes.	Yes.
59	1970	—	No. Owners have Spanish surname.	Yes.
98	1978	—	Yes.	Yes.
106	1979	—	Yes.	Yes.
110-112	1968	—	Yes.	Yes.

* A 1978 purchase by a carpenter and a clerk who sold four years later.

Were there patterns of property exchange among Latinos on Paul Gore Street?

Using Spanish surname to identify property owners who may be Latinos, there does not appear to be or to have been a distinct sphere of property exchange for sale or rental among Latinos on Paul Gore Street. The building evidence, summarized in 11.6,

shows that Latinos were buying properties on Paul Gore in the 1970s, with 11 of the 24 properties owned at some point by people with Spanish surnames. There were just three trades between people with Spanish surnames, one of which appears to have been a sale within a family. While it was often the case that owners with Spanish surnames had tenants with Spanish surnames, there were also numerous instances where Latinos rented from owners who were not Latinos (like at 15 Paul Gore prior to 1978), when immigrating professional owner-occupants who were not Latino bought from Latinos and continued to rent to the existing Latino tenants (as was briefly the case at 37 Paul Gore, from about 1985-1987), where landlord-owned buildings had a mix of tenants who were and were not Latinos (like at 40½ Paul Gore in the late 1970s and 1980s), and of Latinos renting to non-Latinos (like at 91 Paul Gore before 1982, 68 Paul Gore before 1989, or 59 Paul Gore through the present). Today, of the 31 multifamily and single family buildings (not condo'd), people with Spanish surnames own nine (29%).

Most of the buildings that circulated into ownership by people with Spanish surnames in the 1970s were sold back into the multifamily market, and Latinos made few purchases after that decade. Latinos were infrequently involved in condo conversions, playing a role in just two of the 19 converted buildings in my sample: one was at 68 Paul Gore, the only non-professional resident conversion; the other was at 15 Paul Gore, where the group that held the building cooperatively was a mix of people including Latinos. Latinos have played a small role in the condo trade overall. In the two cases just mentioned, the converting owners retained one or more units for their own occupancy, so that between those two buildings there were three condos owned by people with Spanish surnames. Beyond these three, out of all 122 transactions ever of the total 56 condos in

Table 12.6. Paul Gore Street Multifamily Transfers and Buyers with Spanish Surnames

Ownership Form Today*	Street No.	Pre-1975	1975–1979		1980s	1990s		2000s	2010s		# transfers between sellers & buyers with Spanish surnames	Stayed until?
		Ttl # Sales # Buyers with Spanish surname	Ttl # Sales # Buyers with Spanish surname	Ttl # Sales # Buyers with Spanish surname	Ttl # Sales # Buyers with Spanish surname	Ttl # Sales # Buyers with Spanish surname	Ttl # Sales # Buyers with Spanish surname	Ttl # Sales # Buyers with Spanish surname	Ttl # Sales # Buyers with Spanish surname	Ttl # Sales # Buyers with Spanish surname		
CC	11	1				1						
CC	15	1	1	1								present (one unit)
CC	20	1						1				
CC	23	1	2		2	1		1				
MF	24	1										
CC	27	1			2							
CC	35	1						1				
CC	37	1	1			1						1995
CC	38	2	2	1	1						1	1979
CC	40	1		1	3							
CC	40½	1		2	1	3						1979
CC	41-R	1		1	1	1	3	1			1	1999
CC	49-51	1					3					
CC	55	1			1							
MF	59	1	1									present
CC	68	1		1	1							2002 (one unit)
CC	70	1			1	1						
CC	75	2	1					2	1		1	2008
CC	91	1		1	1							1988
CC	95	1			1							
MF	98	1	1	1								1978
CC	100	2		3	1	2						1979
MF	106			2								
MF	110	1										

Source: Suffolk County Land Records

* CC=condo-converted; MF=multifamily

the Paul Gore sample, there were just six purchases by buyers with Spanish surnames.

Today, of the 81 condominium units, people with Spanish surnames own four (5%). To

the extent that Latinos have had distinct practices in the Paul Gore residential space, it

was that so many entered and left the multifamily market, and so few own or live in condos or condo-converted their buildings. Some Latinos did join those who were putting down roots in the multifamily market, a realm in which owners often dabble in other multifamily ownership in the surrounding area. These are not the characteristics associated with a gentrification-inhibiting effect.

Was there evidence of neglect, abandonment, vandalism, or fire on Paul Gore?

I examined the Land Records and the Permit Records for evidence of disinvestment and decay of the 23 buildings in my Paul Gore sample and found very little. At 23 Paul Gore, a complaint was made to the Mayor's Office of Public Service in 1979 that the porches were unsafe, and the owner was required to make repairs. At one other, 106 Paul Gore had come into ownership by HUD in 1978, and it was over a year before it was transferred to new owners.

I was surprised when my data turned up so little evidence of other buildings with similar issues. Recalling the historical evidence of greater property distress along the railroad tracks, I decided to scan the permit history for just the addresses between Chestnut and Lamartine that were not in my sample. I discovered that blighting conditions on Paul Gore appear to have been confined to a small number of buildings in that stretch, at the end of the street which falls within block group 1205-1, in buildings that fell outside my sample because they are a single family, a six-family, or torn down. The single family property at 133 Paul Gore was cited for being unsafe and boarded up with CDBG support in 1977; later that year it was placed with new owners for less than \$1,000 through an Urban Edge project to match vacant buildings with occupants. A six-family at 135-137 Paul Gore was cited in 1978 for being "unsafe and dangerous" and

again in 1980 because it was “vacant and being vandalized.” The multifamily property at 146-152 was cited repeatedly in 1975–1976 for being “unsafe and dangerous” due to unrepaired fire damage, being open to the elements, and extension cords being used in place of permanent wiring.

Several of the buildings at this end of the street appear to have been part of the holdings of some of the individuals in “a whole cabal of investors in the ‘70s that operated in the neighborhood” (Johnson, 2013). For example, the property at 135-137 Paul Gore, which had been vacant and unsafe for a time, circulated through the ownership of one such landlord, mentioned by an interviewee, “who owned a bunch of property. They would buy these triple-deckers cheap, they would rent them out, often times to students. . . . you put three, four students, and it was cheap housing for them” (Johnson, 2013). The building evidence also showed this individual in networks with one of the many owners of 100 Paul Gore, a building that had among the earliest presence of student renters—he received several of that owners’ other holdings to avoid foreclosure. And at 146-152 Paul Gore, the landlord owner went on to become the target of a 15-year tenant organizing campaign and was sentenced by a judge to reside at the decrepit property until it could be brought up to code. Ultimately, the organizing succeeded in wresting the building from the landlord and the JPNDC acquired the property, demolished it, and erected the Nate Smith House, a 44-unit affordable housing complex for seniors named after a local resident (www.jpndc.org).

Overall, Paul Gore had little evidence of property deterioration and abandonment. To the extent that these issues were present, they appeared to be confined to a particular area of the street, one which was closer to the railroad path along which blighting

conditions had been identified by the 1960s, where highway demolition would later intensify those problems, and where landlords who specialized in run-down rental properties had ownership of several. At two of the three impacted buildings, community action was brought to bear. In one instance, that action restored private investment in and occupancy of the property. In another, it yielded a community-controlled asset that provides housing on an income-eligible basis.

Summary: Paul Gore Street

On Paul Gore Street, most professionals arrived as renters. It was professionals themselves that played the greatest roles in introducing more professionals and converting properties to condominiums. Developers arrived on the scene in the 2000s to advance upscale condo conversions, one of which was made possible by prior subprime lending activity (equity stripping). These actors have sophisticated, small-scale local operations. Multifamily owner-occupancy appears to be a crucial housing resource for residents with non-professional occupations, but this form of ownership was last viable prior to 1980. Transactions post-1980 were likely to set a property on a course for landlord ownership or condo conversion, with condoization the main outcome. The search for a distinct realm of property exchange among Latinos, that might inhibit the immigration of professionals, was a question poorly suited to the Paul Gore environment, in which both Latinos and professionals (some of whom were the same people, though most were not) were coming onto the street at the same time (even though arrivals of Latinos began first), and housing transactions between the two groups were common. Blighting conditions were concentrated in a short stretch close to the railroad tracks / highway

demolition and do not appear to have exerted a strong influence on the remainder of the street.

Forbes Street

Forbes Street, three-tenths of a mile long, runs between Centre and Chestnut Streets. It is situated in the middle portion of the study area, south of Centre Street. It has a community garden and a small public playground. Sixty percent of the residential buildings are three-family structures, while 21% are two-family, 13% are single family, and a handful are multifamily (3) buildings, for a total of 131 units in 48 structures. Ten buildings have been condo-converted or were developed as condos in the first place, representing 22% of the units and 24% of the buildings that are “condoizable” and yielding 28 condominiums. The first condo conversion on Forbes Street was filed in 2002.

I gathered data on a sample of 16 buildings, including all 10 that have a condominium ownership structure and six others that were chosen because residents in the present had occupations other than managerial and professional ones. See Appendix E for a list of the Forbes Street sample buildings. Data collection on Forbes Street condo conversions suffered from the data limitations present in the more recent years of the Annual Resident List, in which up to 50% of occupational data was sometimes missing. As a consequence, I relied more on the full picture of the household, looking, for example, to distinguish family households from ones in which residents were in their 20s and 30s with some students.

Did condo-conversion introduce residents with professional occupations on Forbes Street?

Condo conversion—and equally, condo creation—has played a substantial role in introducing residents with professional occupations to Forbes Street, although there are more condo dwellers with non-professional occupations here than on Paul Gore. This development has occurred over the past decade. Of the ten buildings with a condo ownership structure, nine underwent a transition to residents with professional occupations. In six cases—four of which were new construction—the moment of transition was the condo creation. For example, at 75-77 Forbes Street, the units in a new two-family were purchased by a civil engineer and a consultant (professionals), and a graduate student. At 76-78 Forbes, the first unit owners of a converted building worked in advertising, research, and software engineering (professionals). At the tenth building, 37 Forbes Street—the exception—the purpose of the conversion appears to have been related to management of a family asset. Both units of that two-family are owned and occupied by the same people who previously owned them in common as a multifamily prior to the conversion. Residents include an inspector (likely production, construction, or transportation) and a medical assistant (service).

While most post-conversion buildings had professional occupants, frequently those were not their only occupants. At 24, 26, and 28 Forbes, occupational data is sparse, but in the case of six units, there appear to be professionals (including a teacher). These three new triple-deckers were built at the former site of a playground of private school, while the school itself (on neighboring Wyman Street) was developed as luxury condos. The project's size and the fact that it required a zoning variance triggered the

Table 12.7. Forms of Occupational Transition in Condo Converted Buildings on Forbes Street

FORBES STREET				
Post-conversion residents	Presence of professionals	Ownership form at transition	Transition description	# of Bldgs.
Some or all post-conversion residents hold professional occupations.	The building underwent a transition, but the post-conversion occupational picture is mixed.	The initial transition occurred as a result of condo conversion.	A prominent local developer rehabbed and converted the building.	1
	The building underwent a transition to residents with professional occupations.		An owner-occupant in a sales and office occupation converted the building.	1
			A new building was constructed on land that was not previously residential.	3
			A new building was constructed on vacant residential land.	1
		The initial transition occurred when the building was a multifamily.	Owner-occupants with professional occupations bought the building and the residents turned over all at once.	2
	A landlord bought the building and the residents turned over all at once.		1	
Post-conversion residents have service or other kinds of occupations	There was no transition.	—	A family changed its ownership structure from multifamily to two condos; there was no change in the occupants or owners.	1

City's inclusionary development policy, which requires a percentage of units to be offered at prices consistent with affordability guidelines. These affordable units were placed one each in the new triple deckers, and none of them were purchased by professionals. One was bought by a restaurant manager (service), another by a legal secretary (sales and office), and the third by a family whose occupations include mail carrier and administrative assistant (sales and office) and waitress (service). Some other

converted buildings also presented mixed occupational profiles after the unit sales. At 20 Forbes Street, one unit owner is a researcher (professional) and another is a writer (professional), while the third is a firefighter (service). At 17 Forbes, a teacher (professional) bought one unit and a caterer (service) purchased another (data is missing for the third unit).

Through what circumstances did professionals arrive on Forbes Street?

Condo conversion has been the most common means of introducing professionals into Forbes Street residences. It wasn't the only, however. Of the ten condo converted buildings, three underwent a resident transition prior to conversion—two with a new owner-occupant, the other with a new landlord. The earliest instance of an owner-occupied transition was at 43-45 Forbes Street, which made a shift in 1985 from being traded among landlords to being owner-occupied by students. The property speculator discussed above, who played a role in passing three Paul Gore properties to a converting owner, sold this building to the first of two owners who were undergraduates, each of whom lived in the building and rented to mainly students and some professionals (architect, councilor). It was owned after that by a social worker (professional) and then had a period of residents with a mixed of professional (program assistant, data developer, actor) and sales and office (retail manager, shipping/receiving) occupations in the 2000s.

At 15 Forbes Street, a transition appears to have occurred following the 1998 purchase by a new owner-occupant. Previous residents had had jobs including driver (transportation), painter (construction), domestic (service), and clerk (sales and office). Most occupation data for the new residents is missing, but they are people in their 20s and 30s in group living households with a range of surnames, although residents in the

owner's unit may include his brother or other relative. At 20 Forbes Street, the change occurred following a 1999 sale to a new landlord. Going back two decades residents at that address had such occupations as cleaner, cook (service), driver (transportation), maintenance (construction and maintenance). After the ownership change, there were students in age-clustered units, professionals (teacher, social worker, accountant), and a store manager (sales and office).

Professionals and students have occasionally been tenants at multifamily buildings in my sample. As was common on Paul Gore, one of these had a professional owner-occupant: the two-family at 94 Forbes Street was owned from 1980 to 1996 by a broker (sales and office) who was later a consultant (likely professional) and married a director (likely professional). They rented to a mix of professionals (manager, counselor, coordinator) and sales and office workers (clerk, salesperson), and sold to a likely professional (assistant director). In other instances, the presence of such residents has been more fleeting. An artist lived at 9 Forbes in 1985, a group of students was at 90 Forbes for a period in the mid-1980s, a teacher rented at 7 Forbes in the 2000s, and students have rented a unit at 72 Forbes Street since 2005.

What actors advanced condo conversions on Forbes?

On Forbes Street, the first three conversions were pursued by residents and a later one was the work of dabblers. At 76-78 Forbes, the converting owner had been living at the property prior to his purchase, and appears to have decided to dabble in real estate. He bought the building in 2002 with a one-year loan from the long-time owner and converted it immediately. In the other two cases, conversion appears to have been pursued to alter the property relationships among people already residing in the buildings. At 15 Forbes,

the owner-occupant filed the conversion in 2003, after five years of holding the building as a multifamily. The third case, presented above, was that in which a family filed the master deed to alter the ownership structure among themselves while keeping both units.

As shown in Table 12.8, the bulk of the Forbes Street conversions have been the work of real estate business people. At 43-45 Forbes, dabblers bought the building in July, filed the master deed in August, and had sold all three units by October. The converting owners, a couple in their mid-30s, one of whom is a musician whose jobs have included clerical work for a youth arts organization (sales and office), were living just outside the study area when they bought this building, which had been traded among student and professional owner-occupants since the mid-1980s.

Table 12.8. Converter Types on Forbes Street

Forbes Street Period	Comparison: Paul Gore Period	Converter Type	No.
WAVE 1: 2002–2010	SLOWDOWN 1: Mid-1989–Early 2004	Resident (non-professional)	2
		Resident (professionals)	1
	WAVE 2: Mid-2004–Mid-2008	Brokered Developer	4
		Real Estate Dabbler	1
	SLOWDOWN 2: 2009–2012	Landlord-Converter	1
		Brokered Developer	1
		TOTAL	10

Who were the real estate business actors on Forbes? Playing what roles?

Three broker-developer teams and one landlord/converter-developer team were active in condo development and conversion on Forbes Street. These players appeared on this street in the 2000s, around the same time they first made an appearance on Paul Gore, but on Forbes they continued their work into the market slowdown of recent years.

Most of their work proceeded with little public attention outside the real estate realm, but one project encountered community opposition.

Moving chronologically, the first developer-initiated condo project was at 75-77 Forbes Street, where two neighboring vacant parcels were owned by two different Sheridan Street abutters. The developer owns an excavation and construction business, based in Jamaica Plain, and has been involved with loft development and condo conversion projects in other Boston neighborhoods. He (or perhaps his broker) appears to have scouted the opportunity, because the land sales were not listed in MLS. He first entered into a formal agreement with each of the owners, then sought a permit from the City, and then purchased the parcels. After development, the units were listed by Peter Phinney in 2004.

The next project was the trio of triple-deckers constructed at the back of the Wyman Street school. The developer, from New York State, was connected with the opportunity by Peter Phinney. Phinney guided all aspects of the project, from handling the listing to sell the school, to making the connection with the developer, to guiding the project itself. He recommended ways to build relationships with abutters and other community members, suggested a local architect to design the Forbes Street triple-deckers (a resident of Oakview Terrace, one block north of Paul Gore), and consulted on all aspects of design (Phinney, 2013). Because of a complication that emerged mid-project, Scott Johnson's team ended up handling sales for most of the units in 2007–2009.

This is the project that attracted the attention of advocates for affordable housing, in response to which the developer offered concessions, and then was spared from making good on those deals. When the school was first listed for sale, the JPNDC

attempted to acquire it but was outbid. Housing advocates, concerned about the impact of luxury units on prices, then shifted gears and demanded concessions (Faigel, 2013).

Additional affordable units were requested and promised, then substituted with preferential financing for first-time homebuyers after the developer feared that income-eligible buyers would not qualify for mortgages in a tight lending environment (Zagastizábal, 2007), but ultimately that plan seems never to have materialized (in that none of the unit buyers obtained financing through what was to have been the participating lender in that program). Nonetheless, the promises made along the way seem to serve to dampen community opposition.

At 20 Forbes Street, the 2009 conversion was one in a series by local landlord Stephen Williams. Williams, who lives just outside the study area, got his start in JP property speculation in the period from 1979 through the early 1980s. He settled into long-term ownership of multifamily properties, some of which he has held for as long as 33 years. In 2001, he began to convert and sell his holdings, dispensing of five buildings in this manner so far. Within the study area, one other conversion was on Boylston Street (in 2010), and he still owns two multifamilies near Paul Gore Street. He appears to have an ongoing partnership with prominent local broker Karen McCormack, who handled the unit sales at this building and several of his others.

The last developer-led conversion on the street was at 17 Forbes. The developer was Patrick McKenna, who is associated with a contracting company, a property management company, and a series of LLCs. He and the LLCs own numerous properties in Roxbury, Dorchester, Brighton, Jamaica Plain, and other parts of Boston, and have converted at least 10 buildings. He is playing a growing role in and around the study area,

where he did another conversion in 2011 on Sheridan Street (between Paul Gore and Forbes), rehabilitated two properties on Mozart and neighboring Armstrong in 2010–2011, and kept them as multifamilies, and owns three others within a several block radius. McKenna purchased 17 Forbes in 2009, gave it an upscale rehab (per the listing descriptions), and filed the master deed in 2010. Brokering in this instance is a bit less clear, since the multifamily sales (i.e., buyer’s) and condo listing (i.e., seller’s) agents are two different parties, but the unit sales were listed by Scott Johnson’s team.

In addition to this evidence from the building sample, the transaction records revealed two other actors who are staking out opportunities on Forbes Street that were made possible by recent foreclosures. The three family at 34 Forbes Street had been owned since 1987 by a long-time resident when it went into foreclosure in 2011. Without ever being listed on MLS, the bank owner sold the property to one of the LLCs of Fred Starikov, who has performed dozens of condo conversions in various neighborhoods, including Jamaica Plain. He is one of the co-owners of City Realty Group, a large landlord and brokerage company, which has been the target of recent protests by City Life, a Jamaica Plain-based tenant organizing group, for buying up foreclosed properties and raising rents to levels above what current occupants can pay.²⁶ This actor appears in the Mozart Street story as well. Another foreclosure at 35 Forbes Street created an opportunity for a different developer. It was purchased by the Isalia LLC after a 2011

²⁶ In 2012, one of City Realty Group’s employees was photographed “giving the finger” to demonstrators from the Chelsea City-Wide Tenants Association and City Life outside a City Realty Group office. The photograph was publicized through local media, in response to which Starikov personally wrote an angry and lengthy defense of his company and their business practices. The protests have had at least one success, stopping a no-fault eviction of a tenant and securing a reduction in the rent City Realty sought for her unit (chelseacollab.org). Although the post-2012 trajectory of embedded sample street buildings is beyond the scope of this project, I note that 34 Forbes Street was converted to condos in the spring of 2013.

foreclosure. Isalia also bought another study area property after a 2010 foreclosure, and is the owner of five multifamilies in JP in total.

What are the circumstances of Forbes Street buildings where residents without professional occupations live?

Residents without professional occupations are found in both landlord-owned and owner-occupied buildings on Forbes Street. These buildings have two common characteristics. First, as was the case on Paul Gore, the buildings were all purchased prior to a particular year, although that year is more recent than for Paul Gore buildings: five of the six buildings in my Forbes Street sample were purchased by the current owners prior to 1990, on a street where two-thirds of buildings have been transacted since that time. This circumstance distinguishes these properties from those where professionals reside. Second, at the same five, all or a majority of residents have had Spanish surnames for decades, while about 50% of residents at the sixth have had Spanish surnames. This characteristic is not particular to these buildings, because it was also the circumstance at several of the condo-converted buildings prior to their transition.

Just one such building, at 7 Forbes, is landlord-owned. The landlord, a couple, lives in West Roxbury, but owns several properties in the study area. They purchased 7 Forbes in 1966, the three-family at 54 Mozart sometime before 1975, and a three-family on Wyman (between Forbes and Mozart) in 1987. Tenants at 7 Forbes over the past two decades have held service positions (cleaning, cleaner, maintenance, security) or worked in sales and office roles (clerk), while one was a professional (teacher). There have been several instances of tenants who stayed longer than a decade. This landlord does not have

a Spanish surname, but many of their tenants do, and they co-owned a vacant parcel for a time on Mozart Street with a couple who had a Spanish surname.

All of the buildings that are or have been owner-occupied appear to be owned by Latinos, using Spanish surname, none of whom have had other Suffolk County property holdings. Two of those properties have been occupied by families. At 72 Forbes Street, two couples purchased in 1984 and lived there for decades. Of that original group, two people now hold the building, in recent years as landlords. The owners were in sales and office (secretary, executive assistant) and service (cook) jobs. In 2005, one of their units filled with tenants who do not have Spanish surnames (it appears to be group living by young people with occupations unknown). The couple who owns the three-family at 90 Forbes, one of whom is a housekeeper (service), bought it in 1976. Their tenants in recent years have been a babysitter, cleaner, and lunch monitor (service), a clerk (sales and office), and a medical technician (professional). The two-family at 104 Forbes Street has been held by the current owners since 1982, one of whom works as a food servicer (service) and formerly was a distributor (material moving). They have had their own family members in their second unit in most years—students, a carpenter (construction), a supervisor (unclear)—and as of 2005, it appeared that three generations were in residence. At 94 Forbes, the picture is a little different. The current owner-occupant is a professional (assistant director) with a Spanish surname who bought the building in 1996. Her tenants have a mix of surnames and occupations, including security (service) and ward clerk (sales and office).

Residents with other than professional occupations are also found in one of the condo-converted buildings, at 37 Forbes Street. This property is situated on one of the

parcels that had become vacant and City-owned. It was purchased in 1980 by the abutter at 35 Forbes, who held it for eight years before requesting permits to construct a new two-family building for the purpose of housing for his son and daughter. They are the ones who held the building in common at first, and eventually converted to a condominium ownership structure.

Although these properties with service, sales and office, and other kinds of workers were all purchased prior to 1990, multifamily owner-occupancy remained a viable option on Forbes for purchases made through the 1990s. The highest percentage of landlord-owned buildings were last purchased in the 1990s, but buildings continued to be purchased by landlords into the 2000s (one of which was condo converted in 2013, while another is held by a developer who does condo conversions; neither is part of the sample).

Table 12.9. Decade of Last Sale on Forbes Street: All Multifamily Properties With Current Ownership Form

Decade last sold	Current ownership form			Total
	Owner-occupied multifamily	Landlord-owned multifamily	Condo-converted	
1960s	1	1	–	2
1970s	3	2	–	5
1980s	3	3	1	7
1990s	7	6	3	16
2000s	1	3	6	10
2010s	–	2	–	2
Total	15	17	10	42

Source: Suffolk County Land Records

Were there patterns of property exchange among Latinos on Forbes Street?

Of all 32 non-condoized multifamily buildings on the street, 11 (34%) of owners have Spanish surnames. As on Paul Gore, Forbes had an early period in which Latinos

purchased properties. On Forbes, that period extended further into the 1980s, and more of those who bought in the 1970s and 1980s stayed over the long-term than did Latino property owners on Paul Gore. Buyers with Spanish surnames made 50% of property purchases in the 1970s and 29% of those in the 1980s, but just one purchase in the 1980s and one in the 1990s. Transfers between people with Spanish surnames were rare—just four of a total of 58 transfers.

Table 12.10. Forbes Street Multifamily Transfers and Buyers with Spanish Surnames

Ownership Form Today*	Street No.	Pre-1975	1975–1979	1980s	1990s	2000s	2010s	# transfers between sellers & buyers with Spanish surnames	Stayed until?
		Ttl # Sales # Buyers with Spanish surname	Ttl # Sales # Buyers with Spanish surname	Ttl # Sales # Buyers with Spanish surname	Ttl # Sales # Buyers with Spanish surname	Ttl # Sales # Buyers with Spanish surname	Ttl # Sales # Buyers with Spanish surname		
MF	7	1							
MF	9	1		1					
CC	15	1	1	1	1				1998
CC	17	1	1			2	1	1	2009
CC	20	1	1	1	2				1982
CC	37	1	1	1					
CC	24					1			
CC	26					1			
CC	28					1			
CC	43-45	1	1	5	1	1			1980
MF	72	2	2	1	1			2	present
CC	75-77	1		1	1	1			
CC	76-78	1		2	2	1		1	2002
MF	90	1	1						present
MF	94	2	1	1	1	1			present
MF	104	1		1	1				

Owners of sampled buildings with Spanish surnames tended to have tenants with Spanish surnames—as was the case for five of six buildings in the multifamily group, and for four of the condoized buildings prior to conversion (15 Forbes, 17 Forbes, 20 Forbes,

and 76-78 Forbes)—suggesting the possibility that there has been a realm of rental housing transaction internal to the local Latino community. Latinos are thinly represented as owners of single family housing and of condos. Just one of the current owners of the six single families has a Spanish surname. The 28 condos on the street have transacted 39 times in total; just three buyers have had Spanish surnames.

Was there evidence of neglect, abandonment, vandalism, or fire on Forbes?

The building evidence on Forbes Street gave substantial indication of distressed conditions—more so than either of the other streets. Seven of the 16 buildings in my sample were directly impacted, involving fifteen lots that had been residential as of the 1960s.²⁷ Between 1968–1982, the records reveal one emergency razing, three likely razings, one fire, one certain and one possible instance of vandalism of a building left open, one building in distress following a foreclosure, and one lesser instance of disrepair. In addition, the building that had been at the site of today’s community garden was bank-owned and razed by the City in 1977. These conditions were distributed along the length of the street. An interviewee who lived on Forbes Street in the late 1970s and 1980s described how she got involved with community organizing when she began to clean up the vacant lots on the street, where she found illegal dumping to be common, and to organize her neighbors to press landlords to remedy poor building conditions (CA3 [Interviewee], 2013). The last razing at a sampled parcel was in 1977, and there were no citations for vacancy and abandonment after 1982. By 1996, all but one vacant lot had been placed with private owners (the last one was developed as a community

²⁷ There are fifteen residential lots because 13 of 16 sample buildings are on lots that have been residential since the 1960s, and two of the sample buildings involve two lots (one is attached to the vacant parcel next door, while another is a new two-family built on what used to be two lots).

garden in the 2000s). It is perhaps notable that sales volatility declined notably in the 1990s, with 13 (31%) of the remaining 32 multifamilies last sold in that decade.

Table 12.11. Property Distress, Abandonment, Vandalism, or Fire on Forbes Street

Ownership Form Today	Street No.	Description	Summary
MF	7	—	—
MF	9	—	—
CC	15	In 1976, the building was cited for being unsafe: “Windows and doors broken, building being vandalized.”	Unsafe, vandalized
CC	17	—	—
CC	20	In the spring of 1980, the building was cited several times for being unsafe and dangerous: “building is gutted by fire; roof is in danger of collapse.” And separately: “Vacant building fire damaged and open to public.” By December 1982, repairs had been made and the complaint was closed.	Fire, vacant
CC	24	N/A (was a schoolyard)	—
CC	26	N/A (was a schoolyard)	—
CC	28	N/A (was a schoolyard)	—
CC	37	The City acquired this land through a tax lien foreclosure in 1968. In 1978 it was sold for \$400 as a vacant parcel to the owner-occupant of a property across the street. It traded another time before coming to rest with the current owner. The records do not indicate how the parcel became vacant.	Vacant parcel
CC	43-45	—	—
MF	72 and 70	This property was cited in 1972 for rotting porches.	
		The building at 72 Forbes has been attached to the land at 70 Forbes Street ever since 1996, when the owners of 72 purchased 70 from the City for \$500. ²⁸ The lot had been vacant since 1977, when the City performed an “emergency take down” of a building that had gone through foreclosure and been purchased by the owner-occupants of 76-78 Forbes. They reimbursed the City for the razing, but later went into tax arrears on the parcel. The City took possession of the land in 1986.	Razed, tax lien foreclosure
CC	75-77	These two lots were vacant for several decades, although the property and permit records do not say why. The City acquired one in 1968 and the other in 1975; they were sold cheaply in the 1980s to two different abutters on neighboring Sheridan Street.	Vacant parcels, City-owned

²⁸ A few years later they sold half of the lot back to the City, and there is now a playground at the location.

Table 12.11. Property Distress, Abandonment, Vandalism, or Fire on Forbes Street, cont.

CC	76-78	In 1977, the Mayor’s Office of Public Service placed a request with Inspectional Services to investigate a report that this building “is abandoned and open to elements. Kids are going into bldg. and abutters are fearful of fire.” The records are silent on the outcome of that investigation.	Possibly abandoned
MF	90	—	—
MF	94	This property was HUD-owned when it was acquired by the Ecumenical Social Action Committee (ESAC) in the early 1970s, as part of a project to acquire distressed properties and place them with new owners. ESAC remodeled the building in 1971 and sold it in 1972 to the people who were living there as tenants (CA5 [Interviewee], 2013).	Foreclosed, distressed
MF	104	—	—

Summary: Forbes Street

While in-migration of professional residents as tenants and multifamily owners drove a series of changes on Paul Gore, on Forbes those residents filtered in later and more unevenly. The bigger drivers of occupational transition and condo conversion have been real estate actors, including developers, developer-broker teams, and landlords. Longtime ownership of multifamilies by both occupants and landlords has been a factor in the continued availability of housing for people with other than professional occupations. There may have been a distinct realm of rental housing exchange among Latinos, but property transfers between Latino owners were rare. Property distress and abandonment were sources of instability through the 1970s and into the 1980s, while some of the resulting vacant parcels opened opportunities for profitable development in the 2000s.

Three broadly-defined trajectories are suggested by the Forbes Street building evidence, even though not every single building fits the trends. The first trajectory is of multifamily buildings that have been occupied over a period of decades by people with

Spanish surnames who have service, sales and office, and construction or production occupations. Many of these were owned by people with Spanish surnames, although others were landlord-owned. The second is of buildings that appear to be on what we might call a “Paul Gore trajectory.” These buildings fell out of the first course (i.e., they once were occupied by Latinos who held non-professional jobs) when they came into possession by student or professional owner-occupants or a landlord who serves that population, and then slid along to an eventual condo conversion. The third path is an emerging one, charted by developers who see opportunities in properties that have more varied starting points—a multifamily previously owner-occupied by Latinos (some of which have been loosened from their occupants by foreclosure), vacant residential land, and land that had been in non-residential use—and transform it quickly into an upscale product. The occupational mix among the condo owners, who are mostly but not all professionals, appears to be partly the result of inclusionary development guidelines to create housing affordability, and could also be evidence of the transitional nature of the second and third paths.

Mozart Street

Mozart Street, three-tenths of a mile long, runs between Centre and Lamartine Streets. It is situated in the eastern part of the study area, south of Centre Street. At the corner of Mozart and Centre Street is a park with playgrounds and a basketball court. At the corner of Mozart and Chestnut is a mixed use building with a small bodega on the first floor. Sixty-one percent of the residential buildings are three-family structures, while 31% are two-family and a handful are single family (1), multifamily (1), or commercial/residential (1) buildings, for a total of 100 units in 36 structures. Three

buildings are subsidized housing—two are two-families that are part of a limited equity affordable co-op, and one is a two-family created for owner-occupancy with certain resale restrictions. Five buildings have been condo-converted, representing 13% of the units and 12% of the buildings that are “condoizable.”

I gathered data on a sample of 13 buildings, including all five that have a condominium ownership structure and eight that were chosen because residents in the present had occupations other than managerial and professional ones. See Appendix E for a list of the Mozart sample buildings. As was the case on Forbes Street, because condo conversions are recent and because the Annual Resident Listing data on occupation becomes more thin in recent years, I relied more on the full picture of the household to understand these recent arrivals to the street.

Did condo-conversion introduce residents with professional occupations on Mozart Street?

On Mozart Street, three (with a fourth yet to be determined) of the five buildings that are condo-converted were first home to people with professional occupations after the building’s purchase by the converting owner. However, in each case those residents were introduced in a brief rental period prior to the conversion and unit sales. Thus the conversion opportunity appears related to the introduction of residents with professional occupations, even though it is not precisely at the moment of condo purchase that professionals first arrive.

At 55 Mozart, a new group of tenants—including a career counselor and a housing consultant (likely professionals)—arrived following an ownership transition, replacing a technician (perhaps production) and a clerk (office). With that property the

new owners also acquired the vacant parcel at 53 Mozart Street, where they constructed a new three family and initially rented the units to an engineer, a teacher, and a researcher (professionals), two students, and a hotel manager (service). A gradual transition began at 72 Mozart following the 2004 sale to the converting owner, with new occupants who appear to be young people in group households, eventually replaced by professionals (physician, teacher) and a student after the conversion. Previously, tenants at this property had held service (domestic, maintenance) positions, with many housewives and people “at home” as well as students in family households.

At 66 Mozart Street, the former owner lost the property to foreclosure, and all prior occupants left. It is unclear whether it underwent an occupational transformation prior to the conversion, because missing data conceals the residents’ occupations in recent years, but previously they were in sales and office (several clerks), service (custodian, maintenance), and production or construction (laborer) occupations. The building was sold to local developer Fred Starikov, who had filed a master deed and begun renovations as of the end of 2012.

Table 12.12. Forms of Occupational Transition in Condo Converted Buildings on Mozart Street

MOZART STREET				
Post-conversion residents	Presence of professionals	Ownership form at transition	Transition description	# of Bldgs.
Some or all post-conversion residents hold professional occupations.	The building underwent a transition to residents with professional occupations.	The initial transition occurred when the building was a multifamily.	A real estate broker-developer couple constructed a new three-family and owner-occupied it as a rental, bringing in tenants who were professionals and students.	1
			A real estate broker-developer couple bought the building and the residents turned over all at once.	1
			A new landlord bought the building and the residents turned over gradually.	2
The outcome of the conversion is unknown.	—	—	The building was renovated and units have not been listed.	1

Through what circumstances did professionals arrive on Mozart Street?

As presented above, most residents with professional occupations arrived initially as tenants in buildings soon to be condo-converted. In one case, however, a transition of both people and the physical property appears to have started prior to the purchase of the building by the converting owner. The three-family at 74 Mozart had eleven different owners from the early 1970s through the late 2000s. For most of that period, residents had service (custodian), construction (carpenter, laborer), and transportation (driver) occupations. In 2004, a new owner-occupant purchased the building, having responded to an ad that described the property as having “great potential” and being “perfect for condo conversion.” During his tenure, a shift began in which new residents in some units did not have Spanish surnames, whereas all prior residents did, but missing data renders any occupational aspect of this change unclear. By the time he sold to the converting owner, it was a “completely updated 3 family in [the] fashionable Hyde Square area,” yet “priced to move.” The units in this building went on the market but didn’t sell.

What actors advanced condo conversions on Mozart?

All of the Mozart Street condo conversions were the work of people in the real estate business.

Table 12.13. Converter Types on Mozart Street

Mozart Street Period	Comparison: Forbes Period	Comparison: Paul Gore Period	Converter Type	No.
WAVE 1: 2002–2012	WAVE 1: 2002–2012	SLOWDOWN 1: Mid-1989–Early 2004	Hybrid RE Actor	1
		WAVE 2: Mid-2004–Mid-2008	Hybrid RE Actor	1
			Landlord-Converter	1
		SLOWDOWN 2: 2009–2012	Hybrid RE Actor	1
			Developer	1
			TOTAL	5

Unlike Paul Gore and Forbes, where the real estate actors who were predominantly active in the years since 2000 are people with established local operations, the actors on Mozart Street were a more motley crew. Four of the five do not have a focused JP operation, and several of them appeared to face difficulties with their Mozart Street projects. The three-family at 55 Mozart Street was purchased in 1999 by a couple whom I’ve termed “hybrid real estate actors” because they do a little bit of development, a little bit of landlording, and a little bit of conversion. One of them is a real estate agent and the other a general contractor, and they have owned a handful of properties in different Boston neighborhoods. They renovated that structure, and filed the master deed in 2002. They also constructed a new three-family on the abutting parcel at 53 Mozart, waited until 2009 to convert it. They lived there during some of the intervening years, and made an unsuccessful attempt to obtain a permit to convert an attic space to a fourth unit, saying they would suffer financially if the request was denied. A different hybrid

actor converted 72 Mozart in 2008, after holding the building as a landlord for four years. He is a real estate broker who works outside JP, has dabbled in speculative trading of condos in various places, and owns a handful of multifamily properties in other neighborhoods. The Mozart property was his only conversion.

A landlord-converter filed the master deed for 74 Mozart Street in 2007. She is the principal of a half-dozen LLCs, each named for a property, none of which are in Suffolk County. Whatever her plans were when she converted 74 Mozart, they appear to have been thwarted. None of the units sold after being listed in 2007 and again in 2010. She resorted to offering them again in 2012 with a companion financing offer for people with credit difficulties, and simultaneously listed the whole building for sale as a multifamily. Ultimately, she emptied the building of tenants and it was purchased as a multifamily by another LLC in 2012.

The fifth actor is more sophisticated. Prominent small-scale developer Fred Starikov purchased 66 Mozart Street after a foreclosure in 2012. We first met him on Forbes Street: the buyer of foreclosed properties who has attracted opposition from housing activists (he is labeled a developer here because he operates a development business of which this venture appears to be part, despite his other kinds of real estate dealings).²⁹

²⁹ In addition to these five properties, there are other stirrings of real estate interest on the street. For example, going over the property records, the name of a familiar owner caught my eye: Glenshane LLC, a company of Patrick McKenna, whom we first met as the converter of 17 Forbes Street. He owns both 62 Mozart and 20 Armstrong Street, just around the corner. The Mozart Street property was renovated in 2010–2011 but is still held as a multifamily. The Armstrong Street property was converted and Scott Johnson’s team listed the units, but they didn’t sell.

What are the circumstances of Mozart Street buildings where residents without professional occupations live?

The Mozart Street properties in which some or all of the residents had other than professional occupations portrayed a varied set of circumstances for multifamily property ownership on the street. Several were family assets, owned for decades. Some of those assets were just one part of family and property relationships. Some were part of an individual's small holdings of a small number of properties in a few block radius, a practice that is visible in the land records since well before the time period under study here. Some are the sole long-time holdings of their owner-occupants. Other properties have been frequently traded, some by a sequence of owner-occupants and others by landlords and speculators. Another such property is held as part of a larger affordable housing coop in which each owner-occupant has a share.

As recently as the 2000s, Mozart Street multifamilies were still being purchased by new owner-occupants (see Table 11.14), including buyers with non-professional occupations. That option largely dried up on Paul Gore Street after the 1970s, and appears to have been viable on Forbes just through the 1990s. But the majority of these recent Mozart Street buyers have not had Spanish surnames, and it may be telling that so few of the buildings were candidates for my sample of households without professional occupants.

Table 12.14. Decade of Last Sale on Mozart Street: All Multifamily Properties With Current Ownership Form

Decade last sold	Current ownership form				Total
	Owner-occupied multifamily	Landlord-owned multifamily	Condo-converted	Co-op	
1960s		1			1
1970s	2				2
1980s	4	3			7
1990s	3	2	2	2	9
2000s*	8	3	1		12
2010s	1	1	2		4
Total	18	10	5	2	35

Source: Suffolk County Land Records

* One of the transfers in the 2000s was between family members for less than market price.

Portions of my investigation led me into networks of familial and financial property relationships. The owners of 38 Mozart Street, ultimately spouses, purchased the building in 1982, at which time one of them was living at 34 Mozart Street and the other at 11 Priesing Street, just around the corner, which he co-owned with another family member. They or their family members have lived at 38 Mozart continuously since then, and have transferred ownership of it amongst themselves for amounts of \$1 or “less than \$100”—to one family member in the late 1980s, another in 1992, and back to the first purchasers in 1994. Later, in 2006, at which time the one owner was living in Puerto Rico, he gave the Priesing Street property to another couple for \$1. Meanwhile, he co-owned a building for a time with yet another family member a few blocks away on Minden Street (near the northern edge of block group 812-2). He also purchased a vacant parcel of land next to his Mozart property, on Armstrong Street, buying it from someone who co-owned other properties with a third person, and then made a two-year mortgage loan to that third person a few months later. Residents’ occupations at 38 Mozart Street

are partially concealed by missing data, but they have included a clerk (sales and office), driver (transportation), sander (construction), people who are “at home,” and students in family settings. Their tenants have worked in sales and office (clerks), production (operator), and service (maintenance) positions, or been housewives, students, or at home. These owners and occupants have all had Spanish surnames, with the exception of one tenant in the 1980s.

Similarly, 44A Mozart Street is a three-family that has served as a family asset for almost four decades. Initially purchased sometime prior to 1975 by a married couple and another family member, it has been occupied continuously by an extended family along with other tenants. The couple’s occupations were grocer (sales) and laborer (production), while other residents have been in production (operator, laborer), service (housekeeper), and sales and office (clerk) work. In 2007, at which time the married original owners were living in Puerto Rico, the building was transferred to what appeared to be their son for a well below-market price (an amount that was about 30% of the assessed value at the time). Those original owners also owned 57 Mozart, another three-family across the street, from 1988–2003 and lived at the address for at least some of that time. For a short while, they co-owned a vacant parcel of land with the owners of 56 Mozart, whom we first met in this story as the longtime owners of 9 Forbes Street. The third original owner and his wife also owned the building next door to 44A Mozart Street, at 30 Armstrong Street, from 1975–2007³⁰ as well as a property on Creighton Street (toward the middle of the study area). These owners and occupants all have Spanish

³⁰ They sold the three-family at 30 Armstrong to Isalia LLC, which upscaled and condo-converted it. We first met Isalia LLC on Forbes Street, as the recent purchaser of a building that had become bank-owned.

surnames, and most residents over the decades appear to have been part of the same family.

Two buildings have been the only property holdings of their owner-occupants. The three-family at 51 Mozart was purchased in 1984 by a laborer (production or construction). Most recent tenants have been in service (cook, custodian, cleaning, cleaner) or sales and office (one clerk) positions, along with housewives and students living in family households. One resident in 2010 worked in management (possibly professional). At 28 Mozart, which sits adjacent to the basketball court at Mozart Park, is a three-family that was also purchased in 1984. The owners are a clerk (sales and office) and a housewife who lived at the property for about 25 years, although they now hold it as landlords. In the main, their tenants have been in non-professional kinds of occupations since the 1980s: sales and office (clerk, cashier), service (housekeeper, hospital worker, janitor, chef), and transportation (chauffeur) positions. But this building also opens a little window onto some of the diverse efforts that were made to stabilize the neighborhood and community: during the 1990s a group of nuns resided in one of the units as part of their community involvement efforts, deliberately positioning themselves near the park because it had become known as a hot spot for conflicts among local youth (Wright, 2005). The group included the legendary Sister Virginia Mulhern from nearby Blessed Sacrament, whose support for housing development and tenant organizing motivated many residents to get involved in community projects. These were professionals—a teacher, a social worker, an advocate in one year and a program director in another. With the exception of the nuns, the owners and residents in this building had Spanish surnames.

The largest group of buildings on Mozart are owner-occupied multifamilies purchased in the 2000s. Three of these are in the sample. The buyers are varied, but the buildings share a similarity: they have been transacted regularly over the years, mostly among people with Spanish surnames. Just one of the current owners appears to be Latino. The triple-decker at 49 Mozart was purchased in 2000 by an owner-occupant who does not have a Spanish surname and who has a profile broadly consistent with some of the early residents and dabblers we met on Paul Gore—he is a real estate agent who owns three properties and converted one other with a colleague—except that he has not led the building through a transition to professional residents. Tenants during his ownership have worked as a restaurant manager, housekeeper, and janitor (service) and a hearing officer (possibly professional). They have been a mix of Latinos and others. This building was previously traded among landlords—three who owned a couple of other properties within a few block radius (two of them with Spanish surnames), and one who was Roslindale-based.

The triple-decker next door, at 45-47 Mozart Street, was last sold in the year 2002 to an owner-occupant. As of the late 2000s the residents' occupations included cashier (sales and office) and two cleaners (service). The current owner does not have a Spanish surname, but the prior four did—the first a landlord who still owns about a dozen of the properties he bought in the immediate and surrounding areas in the 1970s and 1980s, the next a family who passed the asset amongst themselves for “\$1 plus love and affection,” and two other owner-occupants. The third instance, a two-family at 65 Mozart Street, was purchased in 2005. The current owner works as a cleaner (service), as does one other resident, while a third is employed at the Patriots parking area (service). He is the seventh

owner since the early 1970s, and the sixth in a row with a Spanish surname. Two of the exchanges were between family members (involving two different families).

In addition to these properties that are in the market, there is one in social ownership. At least some of the residents in the two family at 88-90 Mozart Street work in other than professional occupations. In one unit are two childcare providers (service), having recently replaced a resident who worked in maintenance (service). This building is part of Stony Brook Gardens, a 50-unit limited equity affordable co-operative housing project developed by Urban Edge in the early 1990s, comprised of several two-families, a three-family, and row-housing, and intended for low- and moderate-income residents. The building that used to be at 88 Mozart Street was torn down by the City in 1977, after being boarded up for a year and a half. The land sat vacant until Urban Edge developed it in the early 1990s. It occupies the majority of the large block bounded on four sides by Mozart, Chestnut, Hoffman, and Lamartine, land that was identified by Bluhm in the late 1970s as a combination of vacant, formerly industrial, and bearing distressed structures.

Finally, one property outside my building sample (excluded because it is a larger multifamily) was described in an interview. At the nine-family at 39-43 Mozart, tenants in recent years had largely “unknown” occupations, but included two security guards (service) and a secretary (sales and office). Owner Christ Stamatatos, whose family runs a diverse set of real estate operations in various Boston neighborhoods—landlord of dozens of multifamilies, a brokerage firm handling sales and rentals with an office in JP Center, a property management company, and a construction company—used the building as an example when he described his local real estate investment operation, which seemed to involve a combination of public subsidy, personal relationships, and operating within a

particular niche in the market. Of this particular building, he explained that he takes “subsidies, a lot of subsidies there,” and that in one of the units, “that lady’s been there I think 20 years before I bought it. And she stayed there afterwards, since then, for another 15 more years now. I went to school with her daughter” (Stamatos, 2013).

Were there patterns of property exchange among Latinos on Mozart Street?

Clearly, much of the story of multifamily exchange of buildings in which people with other than professional occupations live is also a story about property ownership by, transfers between, and owner-tenant relationships among a local community of Latinos. As summarized in Table 12.15, Latinos were buying Mozart Street properties in the 1970s and 1980s, and owned nearly all of those in the building sample at some point. Transactions between people with Spanish surnames were common, occurring at 50% of sampled buildings, with one to five such transfers each. Consistent with the Paul Gore and Forbes Street evidence, Latinos have not been in the Mozart Street condo market. Of the 15 condos on Mozart Street, nine of which have sold ever, there have been 12 transactions, none involving buyers with Spanish surnames.

In four of five instances, the people and property histories of the buildings that have been condo converted have visible differences from the sampled multifamily buildings, all having to do with circulating outside the local Latino networks:

- In two cases, transfers were not between Latinos. The two buildings at 72 and 74 Mozart—separately owned properties that are physically part of the same six-family structure—were passed back and forth between people who did and did not have Spanish surnames over a course of 11 transfers each from the early 1970s to their conversions in the late 2000s.
- In one case, owners with Spanish surnames were only briefly present. The building at 55 Mozart Street was owned by Latinos in the late 1970s, but not since

1980; the only listed residents for most of the subsequent two decades were the two owner-occupants, neither of whom had Spanish surnames.

- In one case, the property never did circulate among Latino owners. The land at 53 Mozart Street had been the site of a house where Latino tenants lived in the early 1980s, but it had been bank-owned for seven years by the time of its 1982 fire. From there it joined the path of its abutter at 55 Mozart.

Table 12.15. Mozart Street Multifamily Transfers and Buyers with Spanish Surnames

Ownership Form Today*	Street No.	Pre-1975		1975–1979		1980s		1990s		2000s		2010s		# transfers between sellers & buyers with Spanish surnames	Stayed until?
		Ttl # Sales	# Buyers with Spanish surname	Ttl # Sales	# Buyers with Spanish surname	Ttl # Sales	# Buyers with Spanish surname	Ttl # Sales	# Buyers with Spanish surname	Ttl # Sales	# Buyers with Spanish surname	Ttl # Sales	# Buyers with Spanish surname		
MF	28	1	1			2	2							2	present
MF	38	1				1	1								present
MF	44	1	1							1	1			1	present
MF	45	1	1			2	2	1	1	1				3	2002
MF	49	2	1			2	1	2		1					1981
MF	51	1				1	1								present
CC	53	1				1		1							
CC	55	1	1	1	1	1		1							1980
MF	65	1		2	2	2	2			2	2			5	present
CC	66	1	1			1	1					2		1	2011
CC	72	1	1	2	2	3	2	2		2				4	1989
CC	74	1	1			2	1	4	2					2	2004
MF	88			1				1							

The fifth converted property, until recently, was similar to the multifamilies reviewed above. But a foreclosure, occurring at just the moment when real estate interests were starting to seek new opportunities on the street, created an opening for a different actor to dislodge the building from its existing use context, and may set it on a different course.

- The three-family at 66 Mozart Street had been owned since 1983 by someone who is the owner of part of a commercial block on Centre Street in Hyde Square, and owns a Hyde Square auto parts store. Over the years, tenants at 66 Mozart all had Spanish surnames and worked in service, office, or production occupations.

Was there evidence of neglect, abandonment, vandalism, or fire on Mozart?

The building evidence on Mozart Street revealed substantial property distress and abandonment, although less of it than I found on Forbes Street. In addition, as I researched the Mozart Street property owners, their stories led to other instances of property distress in the surrounding neighborhood. For example, the former owners of 45-57 Mozart had owned 11-15 Ashley for a time (around the corner, near Chestnut Street), and ended up being billed by the City in 1978 for the cost of razing the structure.

Table 12.16. Property Distress, Abandonment, Vandalism, or Fire on Mozart Street

Ownership Form Today	Street No.	Description	Summary
MF	28	—	—
MF	38	This building had a fire in 1984. In April 1984, a permit was requested to board it up, and in August 1984, a permit was obtained to repair the front wall and roof and remove debris.	Fire
MF	44A and 54	The building at 44A was damaged in 1979 by a fire at 54 Mozart, the abutting property.	Fire, Razed
		54 Mozart suffered a fire in 1979, after which it was cited for being open and vacant, and ultimately razed by the City. It came into City possession as a tax lien foreclosure. The fire also damaged the other abutting property, at 56 Mozart Street.	
MF	45-47	—	—
MF	49	—	—
MF	51	—	—
CC	53	The former structure on this parcel suffered a fire and was razed by the City in 1982. The City acquired it in a tax lien foreclosure the same year.	Fire, Razed
CC	55	—	—
MF	65	—	—
CC	66	—	—
CC	72	—	—
CC	74	—	—
MF	88-90	The former structure on this parcel was boarded up by the City in 1976 and razed in 1977.	Razed

The last fire³¹ at sampled properties was in 1984, and by the early 1990s most of the vacant Mozart Street parcels between Chestnut and Centre Street had been placed in ownership with abutters. Outside the sample, however, I am aware of one additional property at the corner of Chestnut and Mozart (with a Chestnut address) that was not developed until 2005. Two more vacant parcels on Mozart Street between Chestnut and Lamartine were developed in the early 1990s, and one was developed in 2005. It is notable that the vacant parcel at 53 Mozart went to private hands and was later developed for condominiums, while the vacant parcel at 88-90 Mozart remained in City ownership until a nonprofit secured it for social housing development.

Summary: Mozart Street

On Mozart Street, small-time real estate actors have begun to carve out condo-conversion opportunities in a housing market that, in recent decades, has largely served Latino residents with service, production and transportation, construction and maintenance, or sales and office occupations. The entry points have been properties that already were trading outside of this local community, or which slipped out of a community network through a foreclosure. These buildings become home to professional residents. These initial forays by more occasional actors appear to be opening space for the more sophisticated development actors who have begun to work on Paul Gore and Forbes. There are more buildings in which people with other-than-professional occupations reside than on the other two streets, but, consistent with the other cases, most of those buildings are owner-occupied multifamilies. Substantial blighting conditions

³¹ I am referring to the last of the fires in this period of disinvestment, so far as the permitting records reveal. There was a fire at 49 Mozart in 2011, but I have no evidence to suggest it was other than an isolated event.

were present, some in buildings stabilized by owners who stayed over the long-term, others creating vacant parcels. In at least one case, a landlord who specializes in low-cost rental housing with state subsidy is providing long-term stability to at least some residents with non-professional occupations. The limited equity co-op represents a different kind of trajectory—a re-use of space that moved land from industrial purposes and the scars of demolition, and that is protected from the changes presently working their way through housing markets.

Advancing and Inhibiting

The building evidence presented here speaks to different realms of use and transaction within the study area. It reveals certain attributes related to *advancing* gentrification. From Paul Gore Street we learn that the presence of professionals seems to lead to the presence of more professionals, and that when these individuals are present they may take the lead in transforming the available housing for use by others like them. On all three streets, students and professional workers arrived ahead of the condominium, but the buildings at which professionals appear tend to go on to be condoized, while those that are condoized tend to attract the professional. Thus, the condo and the professional worker have a close association, even if not every last condo is occupied by a professional. Developers became active on all three streets in the 2000s, with sophisticated developer-broker teams working on Paul Gore and Forbes and more occasional players getting started on Mozart, although more sophisticated players were starting to be visible there too. On all three streets, equity stripping or foreclosures appear to have played a role in dislodging buildings from multifamily owner-occupancy and

making them available to developers. On Forbes and Mozart, buildable land was part of the opportunities for developers.

Table 12.17. Advancing Gentrification

Key Factors	Paul Gore	Forbes	Mozart
Professional In-migration	Professionals and students arrived as renters and multifamily owner-occupants	With new construction, condoization played a key role in introducing professionals & students	Professionals arrived as renters in about-to-be condo-converted buildings
Condo conversions	Start 1984 By 2013, 44% of units condoized	Start 2002 By 2013, 22% of units condoized	Start 2002 By 2013, 13% of units condoized
Real estate actors	1980's to 2004, most conversions by professional residents or dabblers. Developers in 2000s.	Developer-broker teams played large role in condo development	Real estate business people with occasional connections to the neighborhood
Blighting conditions	—	Two vacant parcels became development opportunity	One vacant parcel became development opportunity

The factor that appeared to be most associated with *inhibiting* gentrification on all three streets was long-time multifamily owner-occupancy. The advance of price and conversion pressures from south to north was visible in this regard: most owner-occupied multis were purchased on Paul Gore in the 1970s, on Forbes in the 1990s, and on Mozart in the 2000s. Mozart Street has over 50% owner-occupancy of these non-converted multifamily structures. Also present in the places where conversions were less advanced were varying degrees of housing exchange among Latinos. Mozart Street had the most substantial evidence of such, with tenant-owner relationships among and housing transfers between people with Spanish surnames present until recently in most buildings. Forbes has substantial property ownership by and rental exchange between Latinos, but

less transacting between. Buildings that had been converted had fallen out of that realm of exchange. Mozart was the only street where the condo-converted buildings had distinctly different ownership histories involving non-Latinos. Other inhibiting factors were forms of subsidized housing, including rental vouchers, units that are part of a permanently affordable co-op, and condos made available through the City’s inclusionary development policy.

Table 12.18. Inhibiting Gentrification

Key Factors		Paul Gore	Forbes	Mozart
Multifamily owner occupancy	1950s	1	—	—
	1960s	3	1	—
	1970s	7	3	2
	1980s	—	3	4
	1990s	1	7	3
	2000s	1	1	8
	2010s	—	—	1
Latino property transactions (“community embeddedness”)		No pattern of transactions among people with Spanish surnames.	High Spanish surname percentage among owners, but little transacting between.	High Spanish surname percentage among owners, and much transacting between.
Blighting conditions		Limited and concentrated, with little street-wide impact	Most substantial of the three streets, street-wide. Stabilized by mid-1990s.	Substantial and street-wide. Stabilized by mid-1980s. One vacant parcel used for development of social housing.

In the following chapter, this evidence is set in the context of the perspectives of actors who have been involved with advancing changes.

CHAPTER 13

SPACE SHAPERS

The street stories revealed the growing role of gentry-serving real estate business actors on all three streets. In this chapter, we hear directly from some of those individuals. Interviewees spoke about the changes in property values in the area, the differences between the sample streets, and the movement of value from south to north. They described their own work to push those changes along, and that of colleagues, even as they characterized change as stemming from an inevitable force. They acknowledged the declining viability of the owner-occupied multifamily, and described the steps they take to get more of them into circulation for condo development. Interviewees perceived that the main inhibitors to their work were crime and the perception of crime, particularly related to the Bromley-Heath public housing. Most of them operate outside the social orbit of the existing working-class and Latino residents. Although they perceived that those populations would yield the space to incomers, the change was largely characterized as an improvement.

From “Very Desirable” to “A Little Tougher”

Interviewees distinguished between the sample streets in the language of desirability and value. I was told that “Paul Gore is probably one of the nicer streets out of all three. Paul Gore nicer, Forbes being okay, and Mozart being not the nicest” (RE4 [Interviewee], 2013). Paul Gore “was always considered the transition street from the

good part of Jamaica Plain to the tough part. . . . It just happened that way. But if you go down. . . Sheridan was a nice little street and it was always a nice little street. You get further along to Wyman and Forbes, they're a little tougher" (Johnson, 2013). To a lesser extent, differences were portrayed as an attribute of the physical environment, in that both Forbes (RE1 [Interviewee], 2013) and Mozart (RE4 [Interviewee], 2013) were seen as "tight" with smaller front and side lots. Prior to the recent introduction of the new-build condos, "Forbes was known as nothing but multifamily stuff, no one wanted to live on Forbes" (Phinney, 2013). "Forbes, Wyman, and Mozart have been a little bit behind on the resurgence" (RE1 [Interviewee], 2013). One explained that an "a condominium on Forbes Street does not share the same price on Mozart Street," saying that an identical unit might garner \$400,000 on Forbes and perhaps \$320,000–330,000 on Mozart. "Mozart is not as desirable, but again, it is coming. It is growing in that direction" (RE4 [Interviewee], 2013). The JP Planner, herself a Wyman Street resident, was cheered by the recent development but lamented living so close to Mozart Street, which she characterized as "sketchy." She got to know one of the Wyman Street developers through a project review process (part of her job duties), and asked him whether he wouldn't consider doing some development on Mozart. He told her "Mozart isn't ready" (Mercurio, 2013).

"This Will All Go Aw. . . ."

Changes to the area were described as inevitable, especially insofar as they were driven by client demand. Speaking of the boom that grew into the mid-2000s, one explained, "I won't say we were order takers at the time, but in many ways you do, during a good market that's what you are. You're just handling a demand that exists,

you're not necessarily creating it" (Phinney, 2013). Clients were starting to seek housing to the north of Paul Gore because of the rising price pressures to the south. "This area is so well sought-after, Boylston and Paul Gore, that some people can't afford to go there, so they go to the next best, and you know, brand new condominium on Mozart Street, why not? It's expanding towards Jackson Square on Centre Street" (RE4 [Interviewee], 2013). "I think right now, you know, people would buy into Forbes more so than ever before, because Forbes might be still a little bit more affordable than other streets, a little bit more, little being very relative" (RE1 [Interviewee], 2013).

The in-migration of these condo seekers was contrasted with out-migration of Latinos. "I do get a good amount of Spanish buyers, either they know me or know someone I know, so I do get a lot of Spanish buyers. Most of them are not looking in Jamaica Plain because unfortunately they can't afford in Jamaica Plain. They would love to be in Jamaica Plain but they can't. So I show them properties that they can afford in other areas" (RE4 [Interviewee], 2013). Rattling off some figures about the high prices the townhouses on Wyman were garnering, in the context of explaining that one might try to complete marketing of a property before the summer, when there is more outdoor socializing and noise on predominantly Latino streets, one started to say "This will all go aw. . . ." and then caught herself, stating instead, "This theory will continue to change as more, unfortunately, as the demographics change and as more new things come up, that will probably change" (RE1 [Interviewee], 2013). An interviewee who was involved with running homebuying classes in Spanish in the 1990s, for a program called Latino Comprando Casas, explained that most graduates at that time were not able to purchase properties in the neighborhood (CA3 [Interviewee], 2013).

Each interviewee mentioned specific development projects that they perceived to be creating new opportunities for real estate business further north. These efforts too had a sense of inevitability, or that they mattered and didn't matter all at once. Forbes is now seeing "more investment. . . than before," and "you've got the school they developed on Forbes and Wyman, where they built the new threes on there, plus they made the school into condominiums too. That was nice" (Stamatos, 2013). Yet "the values are what they are. You're not going to change them by building something like that. That's not going to make a major market change" (Stamatos, 2013). At the time (mid-2000s), those units "took forever to sell" (Phinney, 2013)—that was when "nobody was looking at Armstrong Street and Mozart as a big homerun" (Phinney, 2013)—but things have changed. "I drove down Wyman the other day, and there's like three new developments that are being built. The entire focus has changed with the rise in prices in the neighborhood" (Johnson, 2013). "Lamartine and Chestnut Ave just got condominiums. Towards the end of Chestnut Ave is brand new buildings going up" (RE4 [Interviewee], 2013) not far from "all these high-cost condos that are on Armstrong Street that have just sold" (RE1 [Interviewee], 2013).

Phinney described how the movement of value had traveled along Centre Street, starting from a few earlier pockets that were clustered near JP Center (along Jamaica Pond, Moss Hill, Sumner Hill). As of the late 1990s, he saw the "nexus of value" spanning the distance from the Monument at Centre and South Streets, to Centre Street and Spring Park Avenue (which is one block south of the study area). He felt a personal connection with pushing that boundary north in the early 2000s, related to a project just opposite Spring Park where an old funeral home was developed into condos. "I sold out

12 of those units and that was a big deal. And then it [higher values] just kept marching right up the street. You could just see it go kind of one line at a time,” he explained, chopping his hand along the map moving north on Centre Street to illustrate. In the mid-2000s, when Phinney was brokering a new-build mixed use building at the corner of Paul Gore and Centre, he watched as someone who “was a player in all these developments as a money guy and a developer” pursued an “interesting outlier” condo conversion at a six-family on Estrella Street, between Mozart and Jackson Square. “Yeah, he just kind of believed in that area. And he did well with them. Couldn’t believe it” (Phinney, 2013).

The public-private partnership to develop Jackson Square, now underway with one building complete and another in progress, and the JPNDC’s development at the Blessed Sacrament church campus, on Centre Street between Hyde and Jackson Squares—both of which are a mix of retail and residential construction—was another emphasis. “Jackson Square. . . has got a lot of new development lately with JPNDC building a lot of new buildings there and everything. So that’s definitely helping, you know, a little mix to the area” (Stamatos, 2013). The Blessed Sacrament project was described as knitting together a neighborhood the interviewee perceived to be fragmented. “You know, there’s a disconnect between Hyde Square and Jackson Square still. So as you create more stores and more streetscape and more people walking about it just creates more of a neighborhood. So that if you live behind Blessed Sacrament and you want to have a cup of coffee you have options, because those options create more people moving in, and more people out and about create better neighborhoods” (RE1 [Interviewee], 2013).

“The Way the Market Works”

The building evidence showed that multifamily owner-occupancy appeared to be a dwindling option within the study area, but that it was viable more recently on Forbes than Paul Gore, and more recently on Mozart than Forbes. Interviewees confirmed this perception. “I still think that there are still dreams of people that really want to own and rent and have homeownership, but the developers now, especially, Paul Gore being the most desirable, Forbes being second, and third being Mozart, would snag and probably outspend any end-user” (RE1 [Interviewee], 2013).³² While there are “tons” of “investors” buying multifamily properties to rent, there are “not as many” purchasing for their own occupancy (RE4 [Interviewee], 2013). Brokers and developers perceive a tremendous lack of “inventory,” and are alert to any possible “opportunities.” “If you’re selling stuff for four, five hundred [thousand dollars] a unit, developers will come in, they’ll buy up a triple-decker and convert it. That’s just the way the market works” (Johnson, 2013). My interviewee who has done the most work with multifamilies over the past 15 years named the price pressure created by the conversion option, such that a conversion becomes the only financially feasible thing to do with a building that transacts. “You end up having more and more owner-occupants [referring to condo buyers] coming in, they want to buy in that area, and then the multis become sort of over-priced” (Stamatos, 2013).

Agents had different approaches to advising sellers of multifamilies, but confirmed the that the developer’s lead would be the one to follow. The agent who grew

³² Although about 50% of the multi-unit structures on Paul Gore have not been condo converted, more than one of my interviewees perceived that the whole street had been turned. “I’ll say Paul Gore is all mostly right now condo every single house over there right now more or less. I bet you there’s not too many multis left, which is kind of rough, you know” (Stamatos, 2013).

up in Hyde Square expressed a degree of bewilderment about the changes taking place. “If I would have known that this was a condo market—future, to come—I think we all would have told our sellers, ‘You should convert.’ It’s the developer that said, ‘Hey, condo market, it’s popping up everywhere, someone tried it here, seemed like they did well, why don’t I?’” (RE4 [Interviewee], 2013). He now explains to his sellers, “you do have the option if you want to do it, convert it to condominiums. It’s what’s going to happen, why don’t you do it? . . . You could probably profit an extra hundred to two hundred thousand dollars easily, without doing major construction. You’re not going to sell them for top price, you’re going to sell them at a reasonable price, where the new homeowner can say ‘I love the old character’ or ‘I’m going to rehab it’” (RE4 [Interviewee], 2013). The agent who has an ongoing partnership with developers doesn’t mess around with those kinds of conversions. She has in mind a particular property condition that is required (from her perspective, it is a set of standards that is driven by buyers), and she only works with sellers who will do that work. “So the roofs need to be new, and the kitchens and the baths and the plumbing and the electric all need to be updated. . . . So if the seller can’t handle it and is not really a contractor type, then they’d be better off selling it as a multi-family to someone else who can do that” (RE1 [Interviewee], 2013).

Agents also use various strategies to get properties into circulation. The effort is partly about stimulating the movement of the housing between populations of users. Part of the reason it is difficult to get people to part with their multifamilies is that the property can be more valuable to use than to sell. One gave an example that perhaps a property owner could sell a three-family near Mozart for \$600,000, but pointed out that

condos are going for that much in many parts of the neighborhood (RE4 [Interviewee], 2013). Their situation may be that “‘my whole family’s living here, three generations, I’m keeping my house, I want to stay here’” and that is a different scenario than “the people that are selling and moving, either have you know, job changes, so there’s a lot of movement out of JP because there’s movement in for the hospitals and then they move out when they have advancement. They stay two or three years and then they get new jobs and they go out” (RE1 [Interviewee], 2013). Sending letters to homeowners is a common outreach strategy, and involves targeting an area, researching it, and reaching out to the people you think might be ready to sell. One agent uses a bilingual letter, folding it so the Spanish side is visible when mailing to people with Spanish surnames, hoping to find Latino sellers who want to work with a Latino agent (RE4 [Interviewee], 2013). Another doesn’t send such letters, priding herself on not needing to get business in this manner, but explained how she is “sure that every real estate agent is mailing to the homeowners that are renting to try to get them to sell their buildings. . . . ‘We have a buyer. Do you want to sell?’ Or ‘The market’s hot. We have developers. Do you want to sell?’” She knows that “some of our developers would probably like me to do that, and try to drum, but I just don’t” (RE1 [Interviewee], 2013). One uses ads in community newspapers encouraging people to call and talk about selling (Stamatos, 2013).

“Some Markets that Other People Mind Working In”

One broker/landlord offered insight into forms of housing ownership and transaction for the population that is not incoming professionals. Although his offices are located in JP Center, his business is focused on owning and brokering sales of multifamilies, making him distinct from the other brokers. “I like multis. I know a lot of

landlords too. . . . I guess some brokers maybe concentrate more on condos, the high end market and all that kind of stuff. I really don't mind working more aggressively in some markets that other people mind working in." He was reluctant to characterize those markets or his clients, but spoke about his business in rental subsidies by way of example.

Well, you've got Section 8 tenants, some people don't want to deal with Section 8 tenants. I love Section 8 tenants, I don't mind. Like I said, if you provide a good product, they come in there, they like the product, they'll stay there, stay there for a longer time than most cash market tenants. . . . They pay a decent amount of rent. I don't see no difference to be honest. . . . And there's a need for it too. So I deal with a lot of shelter programs, a lot of other different scattered site programs. (Stamatos, 2013)

He also rents to cash tenants at prices lower than many. In a review of "recently rented" listings at the JP Rentals agency (www.jprentals.com), going back to July 2013, I found one-bedroom units on Boylston Street within the study area that were signed for \$1,500–1,700/month and two-bedroom units a little further into Hyde Square that were leased for \$2,000–3,500/month. My interviewee looked up some numbers and told me he was receiving \$1,300 for a fully remodeled unit in the area north of Centre Street (at the edge of block group 812-2 that's closest to Bromley-Heath) and \$1,600 for a four-bedroom unit on Mozart Street where new tenants had signed a lease a few weeks prior to our interview.

Beyond producing housing for low-income tenants, he also described himself as a provider of housing for local Latinos, although he is not Latino. He speaks Spanish and explained, "I do a lot of business with the Latino population" (Stamatos, 2013).

Currently, he or his family partners own three multifamilies within the study area and at least a half-dozen within a couple blocks of it. In recent years, he has been selling off his

local holdings, including one on Forbes, but he perceived the pace of change to be slow.

“The condo crowd is coming in now, more or less. That doesn’t matter. Latino market’s there. It’s not, I don’t think it’s going too far, you know what I’m saying, it’s not going to move, realistically, over night or anything” (Stamatos, 2013).

“Nobody Liked Jackson Square”

Crime, and perceptions of crime, figured prominently in several of the real estate agents’ stories, often connected to perceptions of Bromley-Heath. In the 1980s and 1990s, Hyde-Jackson struggled with significant issues of violence related to drug trade and conflict between youth gangs. Sustained community mobilization, service provision, and leadership development / civic engagement programs have interrupted those problems significantly (www.hstf.org), although in comparison to other parts of Jamaica Plain there continues to be more gun violence in the area. Here, my purpose is not to tease out the distinction between actual crime and perceptions of crime. Instead, I focus on conveying the meanings that perceived risk of violence has for the real estate actors I interviewed and the clients they serve.

Several interviewees focused on the Orange Line, the subway line that travels through the middle of the neighborhood in the location where the old railroad had been and where the highway had been planned to go. It makes four stops in Jamaica Plain. One is at Jackson Square, adjacent to Bromley-Heath public housing. Another, at Stony Brook Station, is just beyond the southeast corner of the study area, on Boylston Street. Jackson Square, and its proximity to public housing, was described as a disamenity. “You know, I think Jackson has definitely had a little bit of a *down* influence on price. I think people want to be walking distance to Stony Brook. I think the perception of Jackson and you

know of Bromley Heath has been negative for folks” (RE1 [Interviewee], 2013). She goes to lengths to be able to tell buyers that a property is close to Stony Brook Station. “When you’re at Forbes, you can still say you’re close to Stony Brook. When you’re at Mozart it’s starting to become gray” (RE1 [Interviewee], 2013). Another, describing perceptions in the late 1990s and early 2000s, felt that “what people wanted to be near at the time was the 39 bus, ‘cause people didn’t really think of the Orange Line as a great option. Nobody liked Jackson Square. . . . Stony Brook was really iffy at the time” (Phinney, 2013).

People who had been in the neighborhood over several decades had a range of personal experiences of crime and danger. A community organizer recalled a climate of fear and suspicion in the early 1990s, stating that “no one would walk down toward Jackson Square,” and describing how she found residents on nearby Wise Street living behind big metal fences with dogs when she went door-to-door to mobilize people for the community planning process that resulted in the JPNDC’s Hyde Square Co-op scattered site housing (CA3 [Interviewee], 2013). Another said, “I got robbed [near Jackson Square], a number of people had been mugged, you know, we all knew someone, it just wasn’t a great spot” (Phinney, 2013). One had avoided the area. “When I came here in the ‘80s, you wouldn’t walk anywhere around, I mean JP was pretty scary. So you know. And now we’re pretty established, you know. . . . It goes a little further afar” (RE1 [Interviewee], 2013). An agent who grew up in Hyde Square had a more specific sense of times and places that did and didn’t feel safe—nighttime at the end of a particular street that had poor lighting, Mozart Park unless you could catch a moment at the playground when gang-affiliates were elsewhere, etc.—and stated that he would walk anywhere,

although “there are a lot of people that have been told, ‘Oh Jamaica Plain, be careful. Don’t walk out at night.’ . . . I hear it from everybody and anybody” (RE4 [Interviewee], 2013). One agent recalled a specific incident related to a listing. “I remember showing something on Mozart, and the girl was bringing her dad by to see if it was okay, and some guy had been shot on the street two days before and there was a big death memorial right next to the house [laughs a bit]. It was a little challenging, right. . . . Might have been 2009” (Phinney, 2013).

Still, prior to the recent housing market downturn, Phinney perceived a shifting set of possibilities for upscaled and public housing to coexist. “It was developing into a thing like the South End where no one cared, that you know you could spend a million dollars next to Cathedral housing project in the South End. Nobody even thinks twice. But here,” pointing to the Hamden Auto Parts building, on Heath Street directly across from Bromley-Heath, where he had almost brokered a loft development project, “Heath Street [public housing] still made a difference” (Phinney, 2013). (That project still hasn’t gotten off the ground, although the building owner was nearly ready to schedule an exploratory meeting with the BRA earlier this year and then postponed (Mercurio, 2013).)

Remaking Space

With the interview evidence, certain additions can be made to the list of advancing and inhibiting factors. There are actors who actively remake the space for an in-migrating population of professional workers. Brokers actively pursue properties that can be transformed from one kind of use (multifamily) to another (condos). They build upon one another’s efforts, so that each development may create an opportunity for the

next. Recent community development efforts—larger buildings with a mix of retail and residential—pursued through public-private partnerships, were seen to play an important role in drawing more demand to the area, and expanding the areas of redevelopment further toward Jackson Square. Even though those projects include affordable units, they were perceived to add commercial space sociability that would contribute positively to real estate values.

There also have been actors who serve the prior population with low-cost housing for cash and subsidy payment. A glimpse of this realm of real estate business was provided through the one interviewee whose business is not focused on the condo crowd. He works as part of networks of property owners which produce low-cost housing for tenants with and without housing subsidies, and which has had a focus on serving Latinos in the local area. He may eventually sell these holdings into the emerging market, but for now this housing serves as an inhibiting factor. Also inhibiting the demand from professionals is the fear of crime, the perceived association between crime and Bromley-Heath, and the proximity of that public housing to the subway station.

PART IV MAKING SENSE

In this section, I consider the relevance of this research for gentrification scholarship and neighborhood action.

- In the **Discussion**, I assess the contribution of my methodology and findings to the literature, and address the limitations of my study.
- In **Conclusion and Recommendations**, I consider my findings in light of a “Right to the City” framework, and make recommendations for neighborhood action and further research.

CHAPTER 14 DISCUSSION

This project was intended to navigate between a critical understanding of gentrification as an expression of urban process and a grounded local observation of the mechanisms through which it actually occurs. I wanted to produce an understanding of the neighborhood that insisted upon the well-established structural and historical underpinnings of the process. Thus I attempted to construct a project that rests centrally on the core theoretical insights of the literature: gentrification is a process of class transformation, and it is a “spatial fix” to the extent that profitability is restored by moving capital investment from one place to another. Without this theoretical and historical backdrop, one is ill-equipped to confront the prevailing neoliberal logics supporting privatization, deregulation, and deconcentration of the poor, alongside the well-established beliefs in private property, the rights of owners to speculate, and the commonsense experience that upscaling constitutes betterment. I set the gentrifying changes in Hyde-Jackson into the context of the area’s earlier patterns of development and disinvestment, looked for in-migrants in professional occupations alongside a revalorization of the residential space, and sought to understand housing submarkets in terms of real estate actors who produce space for a particular class of users.

I also was aware that gentrification research needs to be relevant to neighborhoods, in part because it happens in neighborhoods, but also because structural

issues of spatial formation and spatial injustices can't be addressed in some abstract sense; action has to occur within some place. Gentrification operates in a distributional context that is unjust in the way it allocates resources, chances, and all the social and psychological attachments of house, home, and community. It extends and deepens, updates and revises, and normalizes injustices that play out through space. My hope was to see if I could observe a local process of change both consistent with the structural underpinnings—getting out of the commonsense logical loop about whether gentrification is good or bad—and concrete enough to disaggregate real transformations into component parts. I wanted to see if changes that sometimes feel like a force of nature, for which no one seems responsible, could be observed as concrete actions by real people at actual addresses.

Contributions

First, I used established methods to document a process of change. The use of Census data on people and property to observe a dual process of class transformation and property revaluation is common in the field. Elements of the existing body of knowledge about gentrification processes were confirmed. Second, I used simple techniques—relying primarily on publicly-available data—to observe the elements of a process of change in a specific place. Although there is no one way that gentrification pressures advance, aspects of the situation observed in Hyde-Jackson confirm common expressions of the process as summarized in the literature:

- Gentrifying changes are proceeding block by block.
- There is a process of class transformation, as measured by occupational, educational, and income characteristics. It is a change from some people to other people; it does not occur as a result of “incumbent upgrading.”

- There is a simultaneous process of revaluation of the housing stock: a marked decline in the percentage of rental housing; a distinct association between the condominium and the professional worker; and an overall rise in price and volatility.
- Resident-led change appears to have attracted the interest of developers, and the work of niche real estate actors appears to have led the way for entry by larger companies.
- Real estate agents and developers actively remake the space. Particular actors serve particular niches in which occupation, types of property ownership and use, and to some extent ethnicity loosely coalesce. To this extent, where transactions embedded in the local Latino community had a spatial concentration, it appeared possible that they exerted an inhibiting effect on the advance of gentrifying changes. Longevity of tenure is a limit to the work of the change-makers (Shaw, 2005, p. 177).
- Subsidized housing matters for its residents and for the neighborhood, even though the results on balance are mixed. It is a critical resource for lower-income people in non-professional occupations, but it mainly serves its occupants. Spillover effects for keeping market housing affordable are tenuous. Affordable housing construction appears to have successfully squeezed out the development of new market housing and yet improved the area in ways that enhance its market value.

The project also produced knowledge particular to the study area. The study findings. . .

- Restate everyday knowledge in the language of, and using the evidence base of, the expert. Locals are well aware that gentrifying pressures in the area move from south to north and west to east, that some of the streets with a stronger Latino character have turned later, and that there has been an acceleration of real estate revaluation over the past decade.
- Speak to questions raised in the neighborhood debate I introduced at the outset: Are property values rising, and is that related to a population change? Is displacement of Latinos underway? Is public and other subsidized housing associated with lower property prices in the surrounding area? And the findings clarify poorly-understood aspects of the transformation: namely, it has a class characteristic.
- Do not answer what affordable housing developers might like to know most: How can we produce useful housing interventions for low-income residents as nonprofit developers are priced out and community support declines?

- Provide information to answer related questions: What is the pace and distribution of change? How has prior social housing production mattered for residents and the neighborhood? What remaining opportunities are there to take action for housing affordability? Who are the actors that are most central in advancing the process of change into new areas of the neighborhood? What are their strategies?

At the very local level, the *information* content—where developers are active, what opportunities may exist to preserve lower-cost rentals, etc.—of the findings may have applicability for housing and community development efforts. At a somewhat broader scale, a variety of neighborhoods may have housing stock and ownership patterns, proximity to more established gentrified zones, and transport access that are sufficiently similar to Hyde-Jackson to render the findings useful. And the lessons from the study area about the roles played by early gentry, the active space-making by real estate agents, the onset of developer activity, the declining viability of multi-family owner occupancy, the importance of utilizing publicly-owned vacant space for social housing, and the like may be useful to others in a range of neighborhoods.

The main contribution of the project, however, is *methodological*. Observing change at the level of buildings and streets enables a tactile, nuanced, and textured understanding of the forces of change. It also restores the earlier critical bent of gentrification scholarship, which concerned itself with the harms of displacement to households and communities. In a moment when consumer sovereignty has become public policy, illuminating the distributional consequences of gentrification pressures, and anchoring them to concrete instances of change, may be regarded as an intervention.

Limitations

Like all research, this project had certain limitations. First, there were two data limitations that would impact project replication. The Annual Resident Listing is an imperfect data source, with many blank values for occupation and age in the editions from more recent years. Overall, it seemed long-term residents tended to provide more complete information, while transient residents did not. If that trend is typical for such information sources, it could present a challenge for identifying the more transient gentry population. Also, MLS is a proprietary data source, available only to licensed real estate brokers. It is necessary to have a relationship with an MLS subscriber to obtain this data.

Second, issues of race and racism figure strongly in the Hyde-Jackson housing market, with implications for the pattern and duration of disinvestment and subsequent unfolding of gentrifying effects. The concentration of housing abandonment in sections of the study area should be explored with a more deliberate eye toward understanding the factors that resulted in the predominantly white prior population being replaced by a majority Latino and African-American population over the space of two decades. As intimated in the real estate agent interviews, fear of the public housing, with its predominantly black residents, has continued to influence patterns of real estate demand through the present. These housing dynamics are distinct from and inextricably intertwined with the class process underway in the environment, as well as with the factors of community embeddedness I examined. A more thorough treatment of the study area would explicitly examine that interplay.

Third, there were certain substantive limitations arising from the structure of the research process. These could be addressed with a more iterative research design that

includes opportunities to fold feedback from one round of data collection into the design of substantive rounds. For example, I learned on Paul Gore Street that professionals and students tended to arrive as renters. My data collection strategy—focused on condos on the one hand and non-professionals on the other—excluded buildings where professionals lived as tenants. Due to a tight timeframe, I did not adjust the project design. However, capturing such buildings in the sample could have yielded insights into the operations of landlords, perhaps including a glimpse into the competing options of joining the local cadre of slumlords versus developing the space for the incoming and higher rent paying gentry. Similarly, a project like this ideally would be pursued in a dynamic exchange with neighborhood actors, with built-in opportunities to share findings, hunches, and emerging theories with key informants and incorporate their responses into subsequent data collection. I benefited from some exchange of that nature between the housing data and the interviews with real estate brokers, but there is room for expansion.

Fourth, the development of resident and building profiles may raise privacy issues within a community. For example, certain financial information that many consider private, like a foreclosure, could be revealed. Or, in a testament to the social and emotional value of housing, people's relationships with their parents and children and spouses and others are visible in the trail of deeds that document gifts and exchanges. In addition, there could be push back from people who are negatively disposed toward being named as an agent in a process over which they may feel little control, or to discover that others assign meanings to their actions which they did not intend (e.g., perhaps the social worker who seized the opportunity to supplement her comparatively low professional salary with proceeds from a condo conversion will feel defensive when her move is

situated as part of a process of class transformation). These concerns could be mitigated through appropriate data handling protocols and collaborative planning with community members, in order to reach locally acceptable compromises about the level of personal detail shared and strategies for the concealment of individual identities.

Finally, researchers should be cautioned that there is a lot of noise in data at the building level, and everything looks interesting. I found that it was important to triangulate information among multiple data sources and to draw conclusions cautiously.

Future Research

Future research is needed which looks simultaneously at three realms that work together to produce space: the tactics and outcomes of community action; the mundane operations of city government at the building level; and the operations of the local housing submarkets.

- *Community action.* In *Street Stories*, we encountered properties that had been rescued from abandonment and placed with stable owners, buildings that had suffered fires and neglect and were restored to secure dwellings, building shells that were brought to the attention of city authorities and razed, vacant lots that became home to cooperative housing, and slumlord-held buildings that were seized and replaced with socially-held elder housing. In each of these events are relationships between producers and consumers of housing, and between public interest professionals and usually working-class residents. A more full treatment of the transformation of property and people would sample and document these events at the building and street level, and contextualize the findings through interviews with leaders and participants.
- *Municipal action.* Planners at the Boston Redevelopment Authority are kept continually busy reviewing small project proposals and helping developers navigate city processes (Mercurio, 2013; Soto-Palmarin, 2013), as are the volunteer members of the JP Neighborhood Council. These projects include proposals by developers and reinvestment by owner-occupants and landlords. These projects should be sampled and documented, with close attention to how mundane city rules (building standards, zoning, etc.) advance or inhibit gentrifying changes activities. This evidence should be contextualized through

interviews with city employees and JPNC members, and any documentary evidence that states municipal goals for the area.

- *Housing submarkets.* In addition to the street sample approach taken for this project, other researchers may wish to explore other relevant aspects of the evidence base, such as: particular kinds of housing actors over time (e.g., how the earlier network of “slumlords” entered and exited the market and the trajectory of their buildings); the impact of a particular event (e.g., a building sample drawn around the Whole Foods); the impact of forms of non-market housing (a building sample drawn around the public housing and the co-ops, with a comparison group at distance from those factors); or the role of finance (particularly the local sources of capital for small-scale development). Examples given here are relevant to Hyde-Jackson, while other foci might be relevant in areas with different kinds of housing stock, real estate actors, or population dynamics.

Beyond these research-oriented next steps, the insights of the project have applicability for action at this and other local levels. Those recommendations are the focus of the concluding chapter.

CHAPTER 15

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The evidence presented in Parts II and III tells the story of a gradual process of change, unevenly distributed within the study area, and advanced block-by-block. Census, ACS, and transaction data showed growing price pressures, a decline in rental units, and a decline in owner-occupied multifamily buildings alongside the in-migration of residents with higher education and professional and managerial occupations and the out-migration of other residents over the last decade or so. These changes were also racial/ethnic shifts, with Latinos predominating among the departures and whites making up the majority of the arrivals. Of two Census block groups with concentrations of subsidized housing, more people with non-professional occupations remained in one of them, but in the other there was a strong shift toward higher-earning professionals with college degrees. The building evidence has revealed that professionals appear to set a dynamic in motion, but that their arrival is related to real estate actors preparing the space for their residence, while real estate actors who served the prior population may play a declining role. The presence of some professionals seems to lead to the presence of more of them, and to condoization of the building stock, while condos largely (though not exclusively) have served people with professional occupations. Price rises and competition from investors have appeared to result in the declining viability of

multifamily owner-occupancy, a circumstance that had taken shape on Paul Gore by 1980, Forbes by 2000, and not yet on Mozart Street. Overall, with the exception of public and other subsidized housing, it appears that in Hyde-Jackson housing for the in-migrating group is replacing housing for the out-migrating group, most often through the transfer of units from one to the other. The result has been fewer housing options for those who are not in a position to compete in the new prices structure.

These outcomes at the local scale can be understood in context of broader trends in the economy:

- Continuing occupational shifts — in the Boston Metro region, the workforce overall has “remarkably high levels of education” and yet there is still demand for more such workers to fill positions in industries like professional and business services, education, and health services, yet there is also a large share of the labor force with less than a high school education (Clifford, 2012);
- Rising income inequality — such that “incomes are distributed less equitably in Metro Boston than in 85% of the metro areas in the US” (Metropolitan Area Planning Council, 2011), in a context of growing national income inequality;
- An ongoing and worsening housing affordability crisis — with recent data showing that nearly 40% of renter households were paying greater than 50% of their incomes on rent (City of Boston, 2009, p. 9), amid recent austerity cuts to key subsidy programs (Woolhouse, 2013).

These outcomes can also be understood to emerge as a consequence of underlying structural issues, specifically:

- Uneven development — leading to the disruption of community and loss of housing security, whether from disinvestment or investment;
- Commodity status of housing — that tend to prioritize “private windfalls” from property ownership, over the “social resource” of housing that provides shelter, well-being, and a place in the community (Stone, 2006, p. 240);
- Residential differentiation — the “absolute spaces” that constrain households from locating just anywhere in the residential space, the opportunities these housing markets create for extracting rent, and their mutually constitutive relationship with place-based social formations.

Thus, the gentrification pressures moving further into Hyde-Jackson Squares over the past decade can be understood as a spatial expression of these distributional inequities and land market realities, with consequences for housing and community. As such, gentrification in Hyde-Jackson is cause for public concern and action.

There are many and meaningful steps that local and citywide actors can take, and yet the formulation of policy proposals to address and limit gentrification is fraught with challenges. The origins of the process—at scales beyond the local—mean that there are no easy solutions to the loss of housing affordability and the disruption of community that it creates. “It is a difficult and ambiguous question the extent to which problems *in a spatially defined community* are *community problems*—given that so much of what produces communities are relations and decisions that exist well beyond any single community. And thus, this is the contradiction of the centrality and marginality of the community in capitalism” (DeFilippis & Saegert, 2008, p. 3).

I begin by reviewing the “best practices” that are currently in circulation, along with a cursory summary of the relevant local work. Together, that information yields an understanding of the available strategies and their local-level possibilities and limits. I then introduce ways of thinking more broadly about the political framework for action, in particular, the idea of a right to the city. Using that concept, I propose a set of priorities for policy and practice that each aspire to one or more of the “transformative demands” for housing and land use future research that have been enumerated by the Right to the City network. Finally, I make suggestions for future research.

Mitigating and Managing

The expert wisdom on mitigating and managing gentrification pressures comes in part from the academic literature and in part from reports produced at policy think tanks and as commissioned studies for concerned municipalities. Although these sources vary somewhat in their concrete recommendations, depending on the options available in a given local circumstance or the perspective of the authors on gentrification, the picture that emerges is of a fairly stable set of recommended “best practices.”

Table 15.1. Wisdom on Managing and Mitigating Gentrification

Priority	Strategy	Technique applied in H-J?
Create affordable housing	Use inclusionary zoning policy	✓
	Preserve public housing	✓
	Preserve affordability in perpetuity	✓
	Limited equity housing co-ops (LEHCs)	✓
	Build on public land	✓
	Community land trusts (CLTs)	Planning now underway
	Community land banking	
Create funding sources for affordable housing	Create and utilize linkage programs (downtown developer fees to support neighborhood development)—in Boston this is the Neighborhood Housing Trust	✓
	Pass special-purpose property tax assessment for affordable housing (in Massachusetts, this could be done via the Community Preservation Act)	Effort didn't pass
	Utilize federal tax credits	✓
	Utilize state housing trusts	✓
Disincentivize speculation	Tax land and buildings separately (split-rate taxes)	
	Plan early to address rising land values and rents when planning transit development	
Preserve low rents	Pass or maintain rent control	Lost in 1994
	Assist residents to obtain rental supports (vouchers)	Unclear
Preserve homeownership of existing residents	Provide tax reductions for seniors	
	Provide repair and weatherization loans and grants	Somewhat

Table 15.1. Wisdom on Managing and Mitigating Gentrification, cont.

Priority	Strategy	Technique applied in H-J?
Support homeownership and build assets	Offer homeownership education and counseling programs	✓
	Offer state encouragement of nonmarket and ethnic forms of finance	
	Create programs for residents to build individual development accounts (IDAs)	
Organize	Engage community residents in planning to influence their individual and collective future	✓
	Conduct health impact assessments of planned development, including estimates of displacement	
	Organize tenants, use existing legal rights against evictions	✓
Provide employment and employment supports	Build employment skills of existing residents	✓
	Maintain existing industrial areas, resist their conversion to upscale housing	✓
	Support local businesses (technical assistance, trainings, façade improvement, etc.)	✓
	Run job creation programs	✓
Intervene in housing transfer	Use nonprofit forms of housing transfer to bypass speculative real estate activity	✓
Restrict condominium creation	Impose a temporary moratorium on condo conversions and construction, using the time to create more equitable land use plans (e.g., develop new land use controls or lay plans for affordable housing construction)	

Sources: Action! and PolicyLink (2006); Atkinson and Wulff (2009); Centers for Disease Control (2009); Davis (2006)Economic & Planning Systems (2004); Galster, Levy, Sawyer, Temkin, and Walker (2005); Levy et al. (2006); Ley and Dobson (2008); Kennedy and Leonard (2001); NeighborWorks America (2005); D. K. Newman (2008); Pollack, Bluestone, and Billingham (2010); Stone (1989); Walks and August (2008)

This small practice-oriented literature not-infrequently lauds Jamaica Plain as a case example of a model neighborhood, citing its diverse mix of neighborhood stabilization, affordable housing development, and community building efforts. NeighborWorks America said, “In none of the other cases has there been a more comprehensive approach to community development than in Jamaica Plain. The organizations use community building and community organizing to create greater

community cohesiveness, develop and train community leaders as well as give residents a voice in areas that they may have otherwise been silent” (Neighbor Works America, 2005). Much of this work has been concentrated within the study area, including:

- *Community organizing.* Numerous organizations are or have been engaged in community organizing about housing, housing rights, displacement, and gentrification in particular. City Life / Vida Urbana began working in the neighborhood in the 1970s, organizing against absentee landlords, poor conditions, arson, and other threats to adequate, affordable housing. They were one of the lead groups in the Coalition to Stop Displacement, formed by 1980s. City Life was also a crucial partner to the JPNDC; it connected the NDC’s work more closely to resident mobilization while the NDC would take responsibility for rehabilitation and management of buildings when City Life campaigns were successful in wresting them from irresponsible owners.
- *Co-op housing.* Two sizeable housing co-ops, in which residents own a share and participate in governing the entity, were built during the 1990s. The Hyde Square Co-Op, a 43-unit project on Walden and nearby streets (block group 812-2), was developed by the JPNDC and completed in 1994. Stony Brook Gardens, a 50-unit limited equity affordable co-operative in the block between Lamartine and Chestnut, Mozart and Hoffman Streets (block group 1205-3), was developed by Urban Edge and completed in the early 1990s.
- *Community planning and leadership development.* The Hyde Square Co-Op was the result of an extensive door-knocking and participatory planning campaign. A plan to redevelop parcels around Jackson Square, many of them still vacant from the highway demolition, involved dozens of organizations (along with the City and private “partners”) in a planning process that lasted more than a decade.
- *Economic development.* In the mid-1990s, the JPNDC partnered with a private developer and the Bromley Heath Tenants Association to clean up the large contaminated site where the Plant shoe factory had been (block group 812-1) and build a supermarket and a community health center on the site (Galster et al., 2005, p. 35). Participatory planning secured compromises for bodega owners who were concerned about the impact of the supermarket on their businesses and established a Community Benefits Agreement with the supermarket company.
- *Community cohesion.* There have been many projects to engage and involve neighborhood residents in community. For example, a “Campaign of Conscience” after the end of rent control in the mid-1990s encouraged private housing owners to sign agreements to keep rents reasonable. A dormant Hyde-Jackson Merchants’ Association was re-engaged by the JPNDC, which provided technical support to members to strengthen their small businesses at the moment that the supermarket was being developed.

These significant accomplishments are to be celebrated. Still, as shown empirically in this project, those efforts have not arrested the process, while aspects of the work may have enhanced neighborhood life in ways that contributed to the growing desirability of its housing market. For at least a decade, neighborhood and community efforts in Jamaica Plain have had to confront a contradiction inherent to their work: the hard-won gains to clean up the neighborhood, rein in the worst practices of slumlords, use vacant lots for housing or other community purposes, and build attractive, stable housing for low-income residents redound to the location. These improvements are not just enjoyed by residents in the form of greater safety, security, and recreation, they go to market. Nice neighborhoods may become pricey neighborhoods, and the people who worked to create the improvements may not be able to stay to enjoy them. Those fortunate enough to have some security of tenure—whether in one of the co-ops, in public housing, as a homeowner who has avoided foreclosure, or because their tenant-landlord relationship is also a personal one—may have an opportunity to take advantage of the increased amenities and services in the neighborhood. Others may face being priced out. Related, CDCs find themselves priced out of many development opportunities. Cheap properties are no longer available, most city-owned land has been developed, and they are outbid when they go up against for-profit developers (Barnett & Smith, 2004; Swenson & Ney, 2006). Is the neighborhood simply at the mercy of these market forces, constrained to observe their block-by-block progression? What to do?

Working Within a Place

DeFilippis, Fisher, and Shragge urge that community actors recognize “the limits of local work and the need to build an analysis that connects local work with wider

social, economic, and political forces” (DeFilippis et al., 2010, p. 169). In practice, they suggest, that means working “within a place,” not just “about a place” (DeFilippis et al., 2010, p. 169). If our goal is to arrest gentrification in Jamaica Plain by setting aside some land for co-op housing and securing public support to redevelop key buildings into permanently affordable rentals—a vision distinctly oriented just within a place—we may find those objectives frustrated and perhaps even believe that community efforts don’t work. If, instead, our goal is to be one site among many in a broad effort to bring land under community control, and to pursue that project in a way that builds democratic engagement and understanding of the root causes of housing instability and displacement—an approach that necessitates working within a place—we can understand local efforts for their transformative potential.

Scholars and activists have proposed a number of frameworks for laying claim to shelter and location. A *Right to Housing* can be grounded in a moral obligation of humans to one another, given the importance of adequate shelter to all aspects of human physical well-being. Housing is also seen to be core to the identity and status of the person in the society (Stone, 1993, pp. 14-16). Chester Hartman explains that “because housing is so central to one’s life, it merits attaining the status of a right. It is at the core of one’s social and personal life, determining the kinds of influences and relationship one has and access to key opportunities and services (education, employment, healthcare). Housing also is an outward sign of status and affects the health and well-being of the surrounding community” (Hartman, 2006, p. 179).

Earlier, in an influential 1984 piece based on his work with displacees in San Francisco, Hartman had proposed a *Right to Stay Put*. Responding to the “deleterious

influence of neoclassical land theory on urban policy and planning. . . and conventional cost-benefits thinking in housing policy,” resulting in “urban policies that favor middle-class settlement at the expense of housing affordability” (Slater, 2011, p. 577), Hartman described “displacement costs as emotional, psychological, individual and social” (Slater, 2011, p. 581). A Right to Stay Put recognizes the importance of place to all the social connections that make individual lives work. More recent scholarship has echoed his claim that there are individual and public health consequences associated with displacement (Centers for Disease Control, 2009) and life in a “country of movers” where “no one is allowed to dwell” (Fullilove, 2005, p. 234).

Recognizing the uneven geographical distribution of opportunity (Briggs, 2005), David Imbroscio (2004) proposes a *Right to Place* (see also Stone (1993, pp. 317-319)). He situates this right as the twenty-first century addition to a gradual establishment of rights over centuries, extending classic work by British social theorist T. H. Marshall and augmented by Herzog, that described this history in England: the right to personhood in the seventeenth, civil rights in the eighteenth, political rights in the nineteenth, and social welfare rights in the twentieth century (Imbroscio, 2004, pp. 575-576). Such rights would establish the right of individuals to choose where to live, including both “the ability to enter and exit” a place and “the ability to continue to live where one currently resides” (Imbroscio, 2004, p. 576). His hope is that a Right to Place could be approached initially as a “normative yardstick for policy making” (Imbroscio, 2004, p. 581) instead of a new Constitutional right. To illustrate, he describes the scenario of a plant closing. Without a Right to Place, workers may have no ability to remain in a location where there are now insufficient jobs. With a Right to Place, eminent domain could be used to by the local

state to seize the plant (with compensation for the owners) and continue its operation as a “public, nonprofit, or worker-owned entity” (Imbroscio, 2004, p. 582).

What these strategies have in common is that they recognize that the value of housing and neighborhood cannot be contained solely by its exchange value. They recognize that place has meaning for individuals and communities, and reject the notion that these social forms should yield to the disruptive priorities of profit-makers. Each of these is an effort to defend “the use values of neighborhood and home, versus the exchange values of real estate as a vehicle for capital accumulation” (K. Newman & Wyly, 2006, p. 31).

Perhaps the most comprehensive such formulation is of a *Right to the City*. The concept, first articulated by French philosopher Henri Lefebvre, expresses the urban inhabitant’s right to *participation* in decisions about the use of space, and *appropriation* of space through its occupancy, use, and creation (a concept distinct from property ownership) (Brown, 2010). “Producing urban space, for Lefebvre, necessarily involves reproducing the social relations that are bound up in it. The production of urban space therefore entails much more than just planning the material space of the city; it involves producing and reproducing all aspects of urban life” (Purcell, 2002, p. 102). When people refer to a right to the city, they are speaking about a right to influence and direct urbanization itself, to seize a measure of control over the flow of capital and the shapes it yields for human community.

The right to the city is far more than the individual liberty to access urban resources: it is a right to change ourselves by changing the city. It is, moreover, a common rather than an individual right since this transformation inevitably depends upon the exercise of a collective power to reshape the processes of urbanization. The freedom to make and remake our cities and ourselves is, I want

to argue, one of the most precious yet most neglected of our human rights.
(Harvey, 2008, p. 23)

Lefebvre's vision of a "struggle for democratic urban governance" (Leavitt, Roshan Samara, & Brady, 2009) has "unified a global struggle to roll back the commodification and privatization of urban space" (Brown, 2010) and been written into at least one statute (a Brazilian law pertaining to urban land access and equity). Still, it is understood as more of "an opening to a new urban politics" than a "completed solution" (Purcell, 2002, p. 99).

In the United States, a Right to the City (RTTC) national network formed in 2007 and now has 43 member groups that organize in 13 cities to "build a united response to gentrification and displacement in our cities." The network's goal "is to build a national urban movement for housing, education, health, racial justice and democracy" (Leavitt et al., 2009). As one step in making that vision concrete and action-oriented, an RTTC subcommittee has specified five kinds of "transformative demands:"

- a) solutions that put people's needs over profit
- b) social ownership of land and housing
- c) democratic control (including democratic control of social housing and democratic oversight of private housing)
- d) scalable and adaptable to replication in other places (without which one has not surmounted the limits of local action)
- e) consciousness-building (so that participants and the larger public can build an analysis of the operations of housing and land markets and the root causes of displacement) (Right to the City, n.d.).

"Most housing organizing in the United States has not incorporated an explicit ideology as a vehicle for fostering critical consciousness, providing a framework for shaping and evaluating strategies, and projecting a coherent vision of the future" (Stone, 1993, pp. 305-306). These demands attempt to do just that, by establishing guiding priorities to

navigate between “transitional demands” (in other words, immediate action on a campaign or project, for example a project to produce housing) and the larger goals embodied in the Right to the City vision. As such, they provide a set of touch points for actors who wish to pursue local work while recognizing the opportunities and limits of local action. They have guided the policy and practice proposals that follow.

What Next for Neighborhood Action?

Despite the limits of local action on gentrification, there are opportunities to take meaningful action at the neighborhood level and to connect that work with broader goals for housing and community. In making the recommendations that follow, I have incorporated three priorities. First, I have attempted to seize the particular opportunities that emerge from my data, namely, that:

- Owner-occupied multifamily housing serves as a key resource for residents with other than professional occupations;
- Non-market housing—including public housing, non-profit rental housing, limited equity coops, and owner-occupied units with resale restrictions—serves as a key resource for residents with other than professional occupations;
- Real estate actors drive change when they prepare the space for different categories of users.

Second, I aim to situate strategies into the broader context of transformative demands for a right to housing and a right to the city. Thus, the remedies emphasize social ownership, democratic control, and consciousness-building. Following each recommendation below, I indicate which transformative demand would be addressed. Third, I build on the work that has long been underway in the neighborhood. In addition to the above-referenced best practices for mitigating and managing gentrification, the proposed remedies are informed by two frameworks for a comprehensive approach to housing—Michael Stone’s “Shelter-poverty in Boston: Problem and Program” (1989); and John Emmeus Davis’s

four-pronged goals for city and state action in the context of a “devolution” framework (2006)—and DeFilippis et al’s six-part wisdom for radicalizing community (2010).

1. **Augment and preserve social housing.** The first priority is to get housing and land out of the speculative market. While some certainly benefit from increased private investment (e.g., homeowners who bought low and sell high), not everyone does (McAfee, 1986). Thus I recommend strategies to augment the supply of social housing. “Social housing” describes a range of ownership structures, all of which have the effect of removing housing from the speculative market, ideally permanently. Following Stone, social housing must meet each of three criteria: “it is not owned and operated for profit; it cannot be sold for speculative gain; and it provides security of tenure for residents” (Stone, 2006, p. 241). The owning party can be public or private, incorporated or individual, so long as the three criteria are met. Within and around the study area, there are ways that the supply of social housing can be augmented, and there is also a need to preserve the existing supply of such housing.

A. **Preserve owner-occupied multifamily housing as a low-cost housing resource by restructuring it as social housing.** I propose two options for removing the existing housing stock from speculative trade and holding it in social ownership in perpetuity. Each creates a form of re-sale restricted owner-occupied housing, the first through shared equity and the second through limited equity.

- **Community Land Trust.** A community land trust establishes a shared-equity structure in which a trust is established to hold and manage parcels of land “in nonspeculative ownership in perpetuity,” while individuals are granted rights

to use the land for “lifetime or 99-year tenure” (Stone, 2006, p. 253). Owners have autonomy in how they use the land, but the trust may establish certain ground lease terms intended to “enhance affordability, security of tenure, resident ownership and nonspeculative transfer of houses in perpetuity” (Stone, 2006, p. 253). Rules are set to ensure that ownership and rental of properties is affordable within certain income limits, and to set guidelines for capturing asset appreciation at sale. The land trust concept is rural in origin (Stone, 2006), but it is a growing trend in affordable home ownership (Curtin & Bocarsly, 2008), with 250 in operation nationwide, including Boston’s Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative’s Dudley Neighbors, Inc. and the Commonwealth Land Trust (National Community Land Trusts Network, 2013).

The goal is to get land out of the speculative market and manage its use for community benefit, with active community participation and leadership in determining what is beneficial and democratic oversight of the trust by a community entity. One benefit of the land trust is that additional land parcels can be added over time, through purchase or donation. The launch of such a project locally would require initial coordination by neighborhood-based entities, a planning process with significant community participation, extensive fundraising, and establishment of entities to hold and manage the land and to ensure ongoing community oversight. Land acquisitions could include vacant parcels, abandoned or disused parcels, or existing structures. Several community groups in Jamaica Plain—including staff from the

JPNDC, Egleston Square Main Streets, and JP New Economy Transition (JP NET)—have been meeting over the past couple of years to consider this possibility and identify possible funding partners. Here too, the challenge is the initial acquisition in a high-cost market.

Transformative demands: a), b), c), d), e)

- **Create an Equity Conversion and Homeownership Opportunity Program (ECHO).** A strategy exists that can enable a homeowner to receive payment of a portion of their equity in the property without having to move out, using Community Preservation Act, Housing Trust Fund, and other funding sources, in exchange for a long-term affordability restriction to ensure that subsequent buyers meet an income standard set to match that of the current owner (Stone, 2002). Using state standards for affordable homeownership programs, participants in the program would receive a payment of the portion of their house value that exceeds the maximum affordability price for the property. The money could be paid out in a lump sum, as an income stream from an annuity, or some combination of the two (perhaps allowing for property repairs and the annual payment of property taxes). At sale, the homeowner would receive the remaining portion of the value, and the property would be sold to an income-eligible buyer. In a multi-unit structure, there would also need to be restrictions on the rent that may be charged. To implement this approach in Jamaica Plain today would require significant fundraising commitment because of the high property prices already present in the neighborhood; using the embedded sample streets as an example it might

mean that Paul Gore and Forbes Street properties would not be eligible, while some of those on Mozart Street would be. However, there are areas adjacent to the study area—moving southeast toward Egleston Square, or moving west across Columbus Avenue into Roxbury—where property prices are still lower now and can be expected to rise.

Transformative demands: a), b), c), d), e)

- **Expand Boston’s inclusionary development policy (IDP) to include small-scale developers.** Through this program as it is currently structured, projects of 10 or more units that require zoning variance must provide 13% of units at a price set to be affordable within certain income limits. Where these units are condos, they are permanently deed restricted, such that owners may not take more than 5% profit upon sale. This well-regarded program captures some of the benefits of development when that development occurs at a single larger site. It could make a bigger impact by better targeting the scale of development that is occurring at the neighborhood level, which tends to be in buildings of two to six units. As demonstrated in the building evidence, there are numerous actors who make a business of developing new and upscale rehabilitating existing structures into condos. They may or may not require variances, but they do go through a public process to complete the conversion. In addition, a BRA employee explained to me that nine-unit projects are “the magic number” (Mercurio, 2013) for many developers, to avoid triggering the IDP obligation. In an expanded program, all units of a single developer within a set period of time, regardless of neighborhood, would be added together.

The existing standard of ten units could apply, so that, for example, the developer who typically converts three-family buildings would incur an obligation to produce an affordable unit in the fourth such project. To make such a program work, it will be necessary to carefully specify how projects are counted, since individual developers tend to pursue particular projects under different LLCs.

Transformative demands: a), b), c), d)

B. Preserve existing social housing. Just as CDCs have faced opposition in recent years to the construction of new affordable housing in some parts of Jamaica Plain (Swenson & Ney, 2006), there is a risk that existing affordable housing—particularly that of the much-maligned high-rise, public variety—could be vulnerable.

- **See “Organize,” below.**

Transformative demands: a), b), c), d), e)

2. Bolster funding sources for nonspeculative housing. Additional revenues from the sources named below could be added to the City of Boston’s Neighborhood Housing Trust Fund, which uses “linkage” funds (fees paid by the developers of large commercial projects in the city) to support affordable housing.

- **Real estate transfer taxes.** Transfer taxes are a type of tax that is assessed each time a property changes hands. In gentrifying markets, where a segment of condo buyers holds their units for short periods, such a tax would capture a fee at each transfer.

Transformative demands: a), b)

- **Speculation tax.** There is little (if any) simple speculative buying and selling in JP's overheated real estate market, where "there are no deals" left (Stamatos, 2013) . To appropriately target the circumstances, a speculation tax would focus on developers who purchase, upscale, and sell within fairly short windows, as well as those who hold properties as rentals for a few years while they wait for prices to rise.

Transformative demands: a), b)

3. Support current low-income and elderly owners to remain in place.

- **Property tax exemption.** There are existing mechanisms to provide categorical exemptions (e.g., for residency) as well as hardship relief from property taxes. These should be expanded to reduce pressures on low-income and/or elderly owners of properties as prices rise.

Transformative demands: a), d)

- **Targeted homeowner education.** A range of programs exist through the City and through utility providers (with federal dollars) for grants, loans, and rebates for home improvement and weatherization. It may be beneficial for a CDC to conduct targeted outreach to longtime owner-occupants of multifamilies, many of whom are likely to be elderly, to share information and provide assistance in accessing such funding. This outreach could be the first step in relationship building with homeowners who could participate in the ECHO program.

Transformative demands: a), d), e)

4. Introduce equity as a core policy and program concern.³³

- **Create and implement ongoing trainings for city planners.** Consider developing a series of trainings for planners to learn to see and incorporate equity concerns in their planning. Some planners bring a focus on participatory planning and leadership development, but most lack the tools to evaluate the political content of their encouragement of upscaling private investment (Soto-Palmarin, 2013). Organizations capable of guiding such a project include Metropolitan Area Planning Council's MetroFuture and Sustainable Communities projects and United for a Fair Economy's popular economics education team, which were in talks about creating workshops in 2011 (the effort stalled).

Transformative demands: d), e)

- **Develop an Equity Impact tool, with measurements and thresholds for use in planning processes.** As the small-scale production of space for more affluent users leads to interest by larger and more distant actors, the limits of existing community planning tools becomes more apparent. During the summer of 2012, 449 units of high-cost and luxury housing were being considered as part of three different several proposed projects within and just outside the study area, some of them advanced by neighborhood-based actors and others the work of larger developers backed by global-scale capital. One such project, on South Huntington (block group 1207-2), proposed to

³³ Equity planning is rare in the planning field, but approaches have been developed and tested (see Brenman and Sanchez (2012); Metzger (1996); Williams and King (2013)), most extensively in Cleveland (Krumholz & Forester, 1990).

introduce about 160 high-cost units behind a wall of 24-hour security (a gated community), and to anchor the legitimacy of such an effort in the 30-ish affordable units required by Boston's inclusionary development policy (along with compliance with certain green building standards, a bus stop redesigned at the developer's expense, and his personal enthusiasm for bicycling). Neighborhood organizations walked the proposal through the available community review processes—historic considerations, environmental impacts, traffic impacts—none of which had capacity to address equity impacts on the neighborhood. The JP Neighborhood Council should consider convening a process to bring together the many organizations that participate in planning to develop, standardize, and begin implementing an Equity Impact approach, drawing on available models (e.g., perhaps using a Gini coefficient).

Transformative demands: a), c), d), e)

- **Establish higher-order objectives against which instrumental community development goals can be assessed.** Local CDCs and housing advocates might use Right to the City's list of transitional demands to establish a tiered set of standards for their work that would make the connections between local action and extra-local objectives explicit, and help to navigate their multiple and complex roles. At present, housing actors are vulnerable to supporting efforts that are not only likely to decrease housing affordability in the area, but

which symbolically deploy small numbers of affordable units to legitimize those efforts.³⁴

Transformative demands: a), c), d), e)

5. Organize.

- **Educate and engage incoming populations.** Take the wisdom that “particular demographics generate their own momentum, and can be steered,” but a “gentrifying demographic will always bring local politics to a critical point” (Shaw, 2005, p. 183) to heart. Plan proactive and targeted campaign to engage new residents in embracing life with the existing community. For example, a suitable target might be new residents of the high-cost rental building now being constructed in between Bromley-Heath in Jamaica Plain (787 units) and Urban Edge’s Academy Homes I across the street in Roxbury (202 units), which appears to be marketed to young professionals (see Figure

³⁴ Two examples will suffice. First, it would appear that aspects of some of the institutional infrastructure to serve community have been put to use in serving the accumulation effort, through neoliberal modes of planning that force community organizations into partnership with profit-making entities. The redevelopment of Jackson Square, described below, may be one such project. Along with plans for significant affordable housing development, if funding can be secured, public land was provided to a private developer who used it for high-cost rentals. Second, the combination of insufficient funding, a policy framework that may mandate public-private partnerships (i.e., introduce profit-making priorities into community development), rising land costs, and the challenges of maintaining an organization can overwhelm mission. The JPNDC recently found itself unable to make good on promises to community members that it and a private partner would develop a church for housing. The absence of sufficient public monies and the complexity of the structure yielded a circumstance that seemed to demand luxury units if the numbers were to add up. The NDC initially pulled away from public scrutiny to negotiate a deal with private entities and then re-engaged, genuinely contrite about their departure from community process but defensive about their excellent work elsewhere on the church campus, the necessity of doing something fundable, and the risk to other affordable housing development if the organization could not exit from the financial drain of the church project. It seemed at times as though the organization felt it had no choice but to become an instrument of discipline for the community about the need to accept high-end development, and to frame such acceptance as necessary for affordability.

14.1).³⁵ Components might include posters in the lobby, events that foster social exchange between incoming and existing residents, or trainings.

Organizations

Figure 15.1. “Jamaica Plain’s Newest Rental Community” at Jackson Square

225 1, 2 AND 3 BEDROOMS
NOW LEASING
CLICK HERE FOR MORE INFORMATION

FOR MORE INFORMATION CALL (617)-293-0946.

225 Centre is Jamaica Plain's newest rental community ideally located for easy access to shopping, restaurants, and major Boston employers.

Located in the heart of Jackson Square, with the MBTA Orange Line, Columbus Avenue, and the Southwest Corridor Park bike path steps away from 225 Centre's front door, residents have a variety of commuting options to anywhere in greater Boston.

RENTS STARTING AT:
1 BEDROOM: \$1,700
2 BEDROOM: \$2,200
3 BEDROOM: \$2,850

FEATURES & AMENITIES LOCATION PHOTOS

Source: 225centre.com

with the capacity to contribute to such an effort might include the Hyde Square Task Force, the Boston Tenant Coalition (which already has launched a “Faces and Places” campaign to educate the broader community about what affordable housing is and why it’s good for the neighborhood), or the people involved with the long-running

³⁵ The building is one result of the decade-long public-private planning process for mixed-income transit-oriented development on numerous parcels in the area of Jackson Square, several of which were still vacant from the highway demolition in 1969–1970. “A joint venture between The Community Builders, Inc. and Mitchell Properties, 225 Centre Street has received tremendous support from city, state and local officials and community stakeholders. The project will use \$2.3 million in state issued low-income housing tax credits, \$2 million in Department of Housing & Community Development (DHCD) program subsidies and another \$503,988 in federal low-income housing tax credits. The new mixed-use/mixed-income building will feature 103 rental units, including 35 affordable units. . . . Ten of the affordable rental units will be reserved for extremely low-income families” (The Community Builders Inc., n.d.).

weekly summer barbeques that aim to facilitate interchange between residents of JP's South Street public housing and the surrounding private housing.

Transformative demands: c), d), e)

6. Research, network, track, and monitor. Although community organizations have tended to “focus their work on winning short-term gains or finding limited ways to ameliorate social conditions. . . , social analysis as well as its dissemination through political education are critical” (DeFilippis et al., 2010). The following are suggestions for building the empirical knowledge of the neighborhood in ways that will support a more grounded and accurate political understanding of how the space is produced and used.

- **Take a broad view of affordable housing.** Some recent scholarship (Freeman, 2006) has made headlines because of findings that existing residents are less likely to exit their housing in gentrifying neighborhoods (due to a combination of appreciation for amenities and inability to afford a different unit in the new price structure). Yet others' investigation of those same neighborhoods revealed that less than 7% of those who remain obtain their housing in the unregulated rental market (K. Newman & Wyly, 2006, p. 41). To the extent that the goal is to enable current residents to remain in place, it is relevant to know what makes that possible. On the embedded sample streets, one property where tenants have rental vouchers opened a window onto a larger reality worth exploring in the neighborhood: that landlord owns numerous other properties, and described himself as one of

many local landlords who have a specialty in accepting vouchers. He also has sold several of his study area holdings over the past decade, suggesting that there is a risk that he and others may turn their properties to more profitable uses as the neighborhood changes. This privately-owned for-profit housing is serving a community purpose and its erosion would limit or remove the ability of some current residents to stay put.

Transformative demands: a), e)

- **Get to know the local real estate players.** Affordable housing actors would be wise to make it their business to develop a clear-headed understanding of the roles played by local real estate actors—as individuals, in their categories (provider of voucher housing, stimulator of multifamily sales, landlord converting holdings to upscale condos, buyer of foreclosed properties, rental agent for students, etc.), and through what networks (who partners with whom). Although it may be true that some are cold-hearted (i.e., slumlords) while others are kind (well-intentioned brokers or developers, perhaps even involved with affordable housing development or community affairs), we can leave it to others to determine who is and is not a nice person. What is important to understand are the roles of these actors in preparing and delivering the residential space for different categories of users.

Transformative demands: d), e)

- **Prevent foreclosures.** Recognize that foreclosures of multifamily properties constitute key opportunities for small developers in JP's "hot" market, where real estate actors complain of insufficient "inventory." Piggyback on City

Life's routine research work to track foreclosure notices and reach out to homeowners, and connect struggling borrowers with their Bank Tenant Association.

Transformative demands: a), d), e)

- **Establish a rental increase registry.** Design a way for neighbors to share news of rental increases, as both an information gathering and an organizing tool. House it at one of the CDCs, the JP Neighborhood Council, the United Multicultural Association, or another community-based organization. Create stickers that merchants and residents can post in windows to indicate their commitment.

Transformative demands: d), e)

Closures and Openings

We began with a neighborhood debate over the replacement of the Hi-Lo supermarket with a Whole Foods Market. The story served as an entry point to raise questions about a process of class transformation in the residential environment around Hyde-Jackson Squares. With the evidence of that transformation in hand, and to the extent that the event is symbolic of the changes underway in the residential realm, it is fair to say that the replacement of Hi-Lo with Whole Foods is a victory for some neighborhood residents and a loss for others and their ways of living and being. Some were called upon to make a personal and collective sacrifice—in the immediate sense of the loss of the market, and to the extent that it symbolized the out-migration of its customers and other working-class residents—to enable realization of a higher rent from

the property at 415 Centre Street. For others, the event served the social function of claiming space for their already-assembling consumer base. Despite this clear trajectory, the process of change was revealed to be partial and in process (not complete), with social housing making a difference for those who occupy it, and with the long history of progressive community organizing and action providing opportunities for expanding social housing and social control of development and maintaining some measure of social diversity.

APPENDIX A
STUDY AREA PROPERTY CHARACTERISTICS

Table A.1. Residential Structure Types and Unit Counts by Study Block

Study Block	Description	CONDO-MINIUM		# Single Family	MULTI-FAMILY BUILDINGS				TOTAL UNITS	SUBSIDIZED UNITS		Why Excluded from Embedded Sample
		# Condo Units	# Condo'ed Bldgs.		# 2-Family	# 3-Family	# Multi-family (4+ units)	# Mixed Use		#	%	
1	Boylston St segment: between Centre and St Peter Sts	35	12	1	9	9			81			
2	Boylston St segment: between St Peter and Lamartine Sts	31	9	4	6	7	4		92			
3	Centre St segment: between Paul Gore and Boylston Sts	8	3		2	1	1	1	23			Commercial realm predominates
5	Oakview Ter and Belmore Ter	19	9	4	8	15	1		90			
6	Saint Peter St	3	1			8	3		45			10 buildings or less

Table A.1. Residential Structure Types and Unit Counts by Study Block, cont.

Study Block	Description	CONDO-MINIUM		# Single Family	MULTI-FAMILY BUILDINGS				TOTAL UNITS	SUBSIDIZED UNITS		Why Excluded from Embedded Sample
		# Condo Units	# Condo'ed Bldgs.		# 2-Family	# 3-Family	# Multi-family (4+ units)	# Mixed Use		#	%	
7	Beecher St					2	5		36			10 buildings or less
9	Danforth St	10	3	7	1	4			31			
10	Lamartine St segment: between Centre to Boylston St	14	4	8		2	3		123	75	73%	73% units are CDC-owned
11	Centre St segment: between Forbes/Creighton and Paul Gore Sts	3	1		1	8		12	53			Commercial realm predominates
12	Paul Gore St segment: between Centre and St Peter Sts, and Paul Gore Ter	61	20	1	2	12	1		108			
13	Paul Gore St segment: between St Peter and Lamartine Sts	20	7	1	1	11	4		80			
15	Cranston St and Termine Ave	13	5	10	14	5	1		72			
16	Sheridan St segment: half the addresses from Centre St to middle	14	5	11	9	9	1		76			

Table A.1. Residential Structure Types and Unit Counts by Study Block, cont.

Study Block	Description	CONDO-MINIUM		# Single Family	MULTI-FAMILY BUILDINGS				TOTAL UNITS	SUBSIDIZED UNITS		Why Excluded from Embedded Sample
		# Condo Units	# Condo'ed Bldgs.		# 2-Family	# 3-Family	# Multi-family (4+ units)	# Mixed Use		#	%	
17	Sheridan St segment: half the addresses from middle to Chestnut St, and Sheridan Pl	19	11	4	9	5	2		68			
18	Chestnut St segment: between Boylston and Wyman Sts, and Roslyn Pl	29	10	7	9	1	4		77	8	10%	
20	Centre St segment: between Walden and Forbes/Creighton Sts	29	3			9		8	101	29	29%	Commercial realm predominates
21	Forbes St segment: half the addresses from Centre St to middle	23	8		2	14	2		81			
22	Forbes St segment: half the addresses from middle to Chestnut St	5	2	6	6	7	1		50			
23	Wyman St segment: half the addresses from Centre St to middle	31	7	2	3	8			63			

Table A.1. Residential Structure Types and Unit Counts by Study Block, cont.

Study Block	Description	CONDO-MINIUM		# Single Family	MULTI-FAMILY BUILDINGS				TOTAL UNITS	SUBSIDIZED UNITS		Why Excluded from Embedded Sample
		# Condo Units	# Condo'ed Bldgs.		# 2-Family	# 3-Family	# Multi-family (4+ units)	# Mixed Use		#	%	
24	Wyman St segment: half the addresses from middle to Lamartine St	13	5	5	7	8			56			
25	Bolster St	3	1	3	1	1			11			15 units or less
26	Mozart St segment: half the addresses from Centre St to middle	6	2			11	1		48			
27	Mozart St segment: half the addresses from middle to Lamartine St	9	3	1	11	6		1	52	6	12%	
28	Chestnut St segment: between Wyman and Centre Sts	12	3	5	4	17			76	18	20%	
29	Centre St segment: between Lamartine and Walden Sts	3	1	2		4		6	59	30	51%	Commercial realm predominates
30	Buckley Ave and Johnson St			1	1	6	1		25	4	16%	10 buildings or less
31	Estrella St and Wyman Pl	8	3	1	2	4			25			10 buildings or less
32	Priesing St	3	1		12	7			48			

Table A.1. Residential Structure Types and Unit Counts by Study Block, cont.

Study Block	Description	CONDO-MINIUM		# Single Family	MULTI-FAMILY BUILDINGS				TOTAL UNITS	SUBSIDIZED UNITS		Why Excluded from Embedded Sample
		# Condo Units	# Condo'ed Bldgs.		# 2-Family	# 3-Family	# Multi-family (4+ units)	# Mixed Use		#	%	
33	Armstrong St	3	1	3	2	13			49	2	4%	
34	Ashley St	3	1	2		7			26	2	8%	10 buildings or less
39	Wise St			1	2	5	1		26	9	35%	10 buildings or less; 30% of buildings are social service-owned
40	Perkins St segment: between Centre and So Huntington St	3	1		1	1		1	10			15 units or less
41	S Huntington St segment: between Heath and Perkins Sts	51	5		1				53			10 buildings or less (85% of units are in three buildings)
42	Heath St segment: half the addresses between S Huntington and New Heath Sts, from middle to New Heath St	58	2	4	3	3	3		123	34	28%	45% of units are in the 240 Heath St building
43	Evergreen St	4	2	4	7	5	1		60			

Table A.1. Residential Structure Types and Unit Counts by Study Block, cont.

Study Block	Description	CONDO-MINIUM		# Single Family	MULTI-FAMILY BUILDINGS				TOTAL UNITS	SUBSIDIZED UNITS		Why Excluded from Embedded Sample
		# Condo Units	# Condo'ed Bldgs.		# 2-Family	# 3-Family	# Multi-family (4+ units)	# Mixed Use		#	%	
44	Bynner St segment: between So Huntington and Day Sts	15	2	3	2	1			25			10 buildings or less
45	Heath St segment: half the addresses between S Huntington and New Heath Sts, from S Huntington St to middle	84	3		1				86	6	7%	90% of units are in the 251 Heath St building
54	Creighton St	24	4	2	2	10	3	1	116	52	45%	CDC-developed condos are 67% of all condos
57	Minden St and Schiller St	9	2		7	11		3	62	14	23%	30% of buildings are CDC-owned
67	Bickford St, Horan Way, Heath St segment: from New Heath St to Southwest Corridor, New Heath St, and Parker St (the Bromley-Heath housing developments and bordering streets)						6*	1	850	842	99%	Nearly all units are BHA-owned

Table A.1. Residential Structure Types and Unit Counts by Study Block, cont.

Study Block	Description	CONDO-MINIUM		# Single Family	MULTI-FAMILY BUILDINGS				TOTAL UNITS	SUBSIDIZED UNITS		Why Excluded from Embedded Sample
		# Condo Units	# Condo'ed Bldgs.		# 2-Family	# 3-Family	# Multi-family (4+ units)	# Mixed Use		#	%	
71	Nira Ave, Grotto Glen Rd, Arcola Ave, Kenney St, Day St segment: between Minden and Arcola Sts	26	9	9	12	20	4	2	153	24	16%	
72	Day St segment: between Arcola and Centre Sts, Bynner St segment: between Day and Creighton Sts, and Mark St	39	13	1	1	23	4		135	6	4%	
73	Round Hill St segment: between Day and Gay Head Sts, and Edge Hill St	3	1	45	2				52			94% of buildings are single family houses
74	Sunnyside St and Westerly St		1	23	6	3	2		50			66% of buildings are single family houses
75	Gay Head St, Arklow St, Round Hill St segment: between Gay Head and Walden Sts, and Walden St	12	4	25	12	11			94	16	17%	48% of buildings are single family houses
Totals		755	219	206	179	315	59	36	3,716	1,177	32%	

Source: MLS PIN data processed by the author.

*Some of these properties include more than one building.

APPENDIX B
A SUITABLE SITE?: BACK-UP TABLES

Table B.1. Total Population: Jamaica Plain and Hyde-Jackson Squares, 1950 – 2010

Jamaica Plain Planning District							
	1950	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2010
Total population	58,015	53,568	47,767	39,210	41,193	38,074	39,897
Hyde-Jackson Squares							
				9,174	8,546	8,149	8,147

Jamaica Plain sources: Decennial Census data for 1950–1970 (Boston Redevelopment Authority, n.d.-b, p. 4), 1980 (Hafrey, 1986), 1990 (Goetze & Johnson, 1992), 2000 (Selvarajah, Goetze, & Vrabel, 2003), and 2010 (Melnik & Borella, 2011) were taken from Boston Redevelopment Authority reports.

Hyde-Jackson sources: Decennial Census data for 1990 (Goetze & Johnson, 1993a) taken from Boston Redevelopment Authority reports. Decennial Census data for 2000 and 2010 are author calculations.

Table B.2. Household Income: Jamaica Plain and Hyde-Jackson Squares, 1990 – 2007-2011

	1990		2000		2007-2011	Change	
	current \$	constant \$*	current \$	constant \$		1990 to 2000	2000 to 2007-2011
Jamaica Plain							
25th percentile	\$14,375	\$24,741	\$19,362	\$25,292	\$19,621	2%	-22%
median	\$29,864	\$51,397	\$41,524	\$54,241	\$54,898	6%	1%
75th percentile	\$50,208	\$86,409	\$73,304	\$95,754	\$106,956	11%	12%
Hyde-Jackson Squares: all							
25th percentile	\$14,046	\$24,173	\$14,757	\$19,277	\$15,114	-20%	-22%
median	\$27,936	\$48,078	\$35,959	\$46,972	\$47,551	-2%	1%
75th percentile	\$47,550	\$81,835	\$61,236	\$79,991	\$100,298	-2%	25%
Hyde-Jackson Squares: except 812-1 (Bromley-Heath)							
25th percentile			\$22,150	\$28,934	\$31,776		10%
median			\$42,884	\$55,965	\$45,629		-18%
75th percentile			\$66,830	\$87,298	\$117,819		35%

Hyde-Jackson Squares sources: Decennial Census data for 1990 (Goetze & Johnson, 1993a) taken from Boston Redevelopment Authority reports. Decennial Census data for 2000 and ACS 5-year data for 2007-2011 are author calculations.

Jamaica Plain sources: Decennial Census data for 1990 (Goetze & Johnson, 1993b) and 2000 (Selvarajah et al., 2003), and ACS 5-year data for 2007-2011 (Melnik, Gao, Kalevich, & Wong, 2013) are taken from Boston Redevelopment Authority reports.

* Constant dollars are for 2011.

Table B.3. Resident Occupation: Jamaica Plain and Hyde-Jackson Squares, 1990 – 2007-2011

	1990		2000		2007-2011			Change in % share	
	#	%	#	%	Est.	%	MOE	1990 to 2000	2000 to 2007-2011
Jamaica Plain									
Employed persons 16 years and over	20,906		19,757		23,776				
Management, business, science, and arts	8,682	42%	11,035	56%	13,879	58%		34%	5%
Service	4,050	19%	2,904	15%	4,006	17%		-24%	15%
Sales and office	5,425	26%	4,001	20%	4,451	19%		-22%	-8%
Natural resources, construction, and maintenance	1,054	5%	715	4%	526	2%		-28%	-
Production, transportation, and materials moving	1,695	8%	1,102	6%	914	4%		-31%	31%
Hyde-Jackson Squares									
Employed persons 16 years and over	3,946		3,339		4,562				
Management, business, science, and arts	1,090	28%	1,490	45%	2,417	53%	±334	62%	19%
Service	1,159	29%	664	20%	1,093	24%	±285	-32%	20%
Sales and office	1,066	27%	698	21%	730	16%	±244	-23%	-
Natural resources, construction, and maintenance	236	6%	209	6%	163	4%	±444	4%	43%
Production, transportation, and materials moving	394	10%	278	8%	159	3%	±285	-17%	-

Table B.3. Resident Occupation: Jamaica Plain and Hyde-Jackson Squares, 1990 – 2007-2011, cont.

Jamaica Plain Sources: Decennial Census data for 1990 (Goetze & Johnson, 1993b) and 2000 (Selvarajah et al., 2003), and ACS 5-year data for 2007-2011 (Melnik et al., 2013) taken from Boston Redevelopment Authority reports.

Hyde Square Sources: 1990 (Goetze & Johnson, 1993a) numbers are BRA calculations of Census data for an area the BRA called “Hyde Square” that precisely matches the boundaries of my study area. Decennial Census data for 2000 and ACS 5-year data for 2007-2011 are the author’s calculations.

The Census occupational classifications changed significantly with the 2000 Census. 1990 figures have been converted to the 2000 coding scheme using the Census “crosswalk” available from http://www.census.gov/people/io/methodology/occcross_menu.html (August 9, 2013). 1990 (converted) and 2000 data is expressed in terms of the 2010 categories (which combined “Farming, forestry, and fishing” and “Construction, extraction, & maintenance” into “Natural resources, construction, and maintenance occupations”); the replacement in this year of “Management, professional, and technical” with “Management, business, science, and arts” is a change to the title, not a major alteration of the occupations categorized under it. Modest additional changes were made in 2010 to how occupations are placed within categories, and no crosswalk is available. The change creates certain limitations that should be noted: there could be some overstatement of service occupations (pertaining to flight attendants) or some understatement of management (pertaining to fundraisers, transport security workers, and funeral directors). For my purposes, the impact of these limitations is likely to be slight (to the extent that management and professional occupations have a growing presence in the neighborhood, there may be some concentration of fundraisers, but I have no evidence to suspect that there are particular concentrations of workers in the other impacted categories).

**Table B.4. Educational Attainment: Jamaica Plain and Hyde-Jackson Squares, 1990
– 2007-2011**

	1990		2000		2007-2011		Change	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	1990 to 2000	2000 to 2007-2011
Jamaica Plain								
Total population 25 years and over	28,715		26,147		25,877			
Less than high school diploma	6,460	22%	4,888	19%	2,876	10%	-17%	-46%
High school grad, GED, or alt.	5,651	20%	4,268	16%	3,986	14%	-17%	-15%
Some college	5,654	20%	3,564	14%	2,914	10%	-31%	-26%
Associate's degree	1,200	4%	1,034	4%	824	3%	-5%	-27%
Bachelor's degree or higher	9,750	34%	12,393	47%	15,277	53%	40%	12%
Hyde-Jackson Squares								
Total population 25 years and over	4,812		4,876		4,935			
Less than high school diploma	1,809	38%	1,355	28%	825	17%	-26%	-40%
High school grad, GED, or alt.	1,168	24%	1,044	21%	710	14%	-12%	-33%
Some college	665	14%	1,064	22%	707	14%	25%	-17%
Associate's degree	170	4%			131	3%	29%	-42%
Bachelor's degree or higher	1,000	21%	1,413	29%	2,562	52%	39%	79%

Jamaica Plain sources: Decennial Census data for 1990 (Goetze & Johnson, 1993b) and 2000 (Selvarajah et al., 2003), and ACS 5-year data for 2007-2011 (Melnik et al., 2013) taken from Boston Redevelopment Authority reports.

Hyde-Jackson sources: Decennial Census data for 1990 (Goetze & Johnson, 1993a) taken from Boston Redevelopment Authority reports. Decennial Census data for 2000 and ACS 5-year data for 2007-2011 are author calculations.

Table B.5. Race and Ethnicity: Jamaica Plain and Hyde-Jackson Squares, 1990 – 2007-2011

	1990		2000		2010		# Change		Change in % Share	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	1990 to 2000	2000 to 2010	1990 to 2000	2000 to 2010
Jamaica Plain										
Total population	41,193		38,074		39,897					
Hispanic or Latino	10,568	26%	8,642	23%	8,764	22%	-18%	1%	-12%	-3%
Not Hispanic or Latino										
Asian or Pacific Islander (alone)	2,126	5%	2,526	7%	3,150	8%	19%	25%	29%	19%
Black or African American (alone)	7,655	19%	6,346	17%	5,368	13%	-17%	-15%	-10%	-19%
White (alone)	20,626	50%	19,369	51%	21,402	54%	-6%	10%	2%	5%
Two or more races ³⁶	--	--	995	3%	945	2%	--	-5%	--	-9%
Some other race	204	0%	196	1%	268	1%	-4%	37%	4%	30%

³⁶ These racial categories are not precisely comparable between 1990 and the other years. Prior to 2000, the Census instructed respondents to "Fill ONE circle for the race that the person considers himself/herself to be" (U.S. Census Bureau, n.d.-b). A new method of categorization was introduced with the 2000 Census, in which respondents were asked to "Mark [X] one or more races to indicate what this person considers himself/herself to be" (U.S. Census Bureau, n.d.-b). In all years, respondents were asked to make a separate selection about whether they were of Hispanic origin (Grieco & Cassidy, 2001).

Table B.5. Race and Ethnicity: Jamaica Plain and Hyde-Jackson Squares, 1990 – 2007-2011, cont.

	1990		2000		2010		# Change		Change in % Share	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	1990 to 2000	2000 to 2010	1990 to 2000	2000 to 2010
Hyde-Jackson Squares										
Total population	8,546		8,149		8,147					
Hispanic or Latino	4,075	48%	3,931	48%	3,412	42%	-4%	-13%	1%	-13%
Not Hispanic or Latino										
Asian or Pacific Islander (alone)	139	2%	238	3%	275	3%	71%	16%	77%	18%
Black or African American (alone)	2,151	25%	1,463	18%	1,372	17%	-32%	-6%	-29%	-6%
White (alone)	2,066	24%	2,258	28%	2,813	35%	9%	25%	15%	25%
Two or more races	--	--	209	3%	206	3%	--	-1%	--	-1%
Some other race	115	1%	50	1%	69	1%	-57%	38%	-54%	38%

Jamaica Plain sources: Decennial Census data for 1950–1970 (Boston Redevelopment Authority, n.d.-b, p. 4), 1980 (Hafrey, 1986), 1990 (Goetze & Johnson, 1992), 2000 (Selvarajah et al., 2003), and 2010 (Melnik & Borella, 2011) were taken from Boston Redevelopment Authority reports.

Hyde-Jackson sources: Decennial Census data for 1990 (Goetze & Johnson, 1993a) taken from Boston Redevelopment Authority reports. Decennial Census data for 2000 (SF1) and ACS 5-year data for 2007-2011 are author calculations.

Table B.6. School Enrollment: Hyde-Jackson Squares, 1990 – 2007-2011*

	1990		2000		2007-2011			Change in % Share	
	#	%	#	%	Est.	%	MOE	1990 to 2000	2000 to 2007-2011
Total population 18 years and over	6,063		5,993		6,517				
Enrolled in college*	615	10%	748	12%	1,404	22%	±419	23%	88%

Sources: Decennial Census data for 1990 (Goetze & Johnson, 1993a) taken from Boston Redevelopment Authority reports. Decennial Census data for 2000 and ACS 5-year data for 2007-2011 are author calculations.

* This data was not available for Jamaica Plain for each time point, and thus is excluded from the presentation.

** For 2007-2011 data, the option was “In college or graduate school.”

Table B.7. Housing Tenure and Vacancy: Jamaica Plain and Hyde-Jackson Squares, 1990 – 2010 / 2007-2011

	1990		2000		2007-2011*				Change in % Share	
	#	%	#	%	Est.	%			1990 to 2000	2000 to 2007 - 2011
Jamaica Plain Units										
Total	17,200		16,536		18,346					
Owner-occupied	4,590	27%	5,025	30%	11,355	62%			14%	104%
Renter-occupied	11,087	64%	10,723	65%	5,822	32%			1%	-51%
Vacant	1,523	9%	788	5%	1,169	6%			-46%	34%
	1990		2000		2010		# Change		Change in % Share	
	#	%	#	%	1990 to 2000	2000 to 2010	1990 to 2000	2000 to 2010	1990 to 2000	2000 to 2010
Hyde-Jackson Square Units: all										
Total	3,318		3,156		3,326		-162	170		
Owner-occupied	631	19%	679	22%	909	27%	48	230	13%	27%
Renter-occupied	2,072	62%	2,144	68%	2,201	66%	72	57	9%	-3%
Vacant**	615	19%	333	11%	216	6%	-282	-117	-43%	-38%
Hyde-Jackson Square Units: except 812-1 (Bromley-Heath)										
Total			2,372		2,512			140		
Owner-occupied			675	28%	908	36%		233		27%
Renter-occupied			1,579	67%	1,451	58%		-128		-13%
Vacant			118	5%	153	6%		35		22%

Table B.7. Housing Tenure and Vacancy: Jamaica Plain and Hyde-Jackson Squares, 1990 – 2010 / 2007-2011, cont.

Jamaica Plain sources: Decennial Census data for 1990 (Goetze & Johnson, 1993b) and 2000 (Selvarajah et al., 2003), and ACS 5-year data for 2007-2011 (Melnik et al., 2013) taken from Boston Redevelopment Authority reports. Margin of error data for 2007-2011 is not presented here because it was not part of the BRA's report.

Hyde-Jackson sources: Decennial Census data for 1990 (Goetze & Johnson, 1993a) are taken from Boston Redevelopment Authority reports. Decennial Census data for 2000 and 2010 are author calculations.

- * ACS 2007-2011 5-year data on tenure and vacancy is presented because the 2010 Decennial Census SF1 data on these topics was not part of any BRA 2010 report on Jamaica Plain. Nonetheless, Decennial data for 2010 were used for the Hyde-Jackson Squares tenure and vacancy presentation because that data source provides a complete count of all units.
- ** Of the vacancies in all of Hyde-Jackson in the year 2000, 77% are "for rent" and 68% are in the Census Block Group where the majority (about 97%) of units are at Bromley-Heath. In 2010, vacancies appear to be more distributed across blocks, and 56% are "for rent."

Table B.8. Median Gross Rent: Jamaica Plain and Hyde-Jackson Squares, 1990 – 2007-2011

		1990		2000		2007-2011
		curr. \$	const. \$	curr. \$	const. \$	curr. \$
Jamaica Plain		\$618	\$1,064	\$808	\$1,055	\$1,233
Hyde-Jackson Squares	All Block Groups	\$614	\$1,057	\$779	\$1,018	\$951
	Except Block Group 812-1			\$898	\$1,172	\$1,447
	Except Block Groups 812-1, 812-2, and 1205-1			\$924	\$1,208	\$1,593

Sources: Decennial Census data for 1990 (Goetze & Johnson, 1993a) taken from a Boston Redevelopment Authority reports. Decennial Census data for 2000 and ACS 5-year data for 2007-2011 are author calculations.

* Constant dollars are for 2011.

Table B.9. Median Sales Prices: Jamaica Plain and Hyde-Jackson Squares, 1990 – 2011

	Jamaica Plain		Hyde-Jackson Squares		H-J Price as a % of JP Price	
	Single Family	Condo	Single Family	Condo	Single Family	Condo
1998	\$323,967	\$190,014	\$244,032	\$181,703	75%	96%
1999	\$384,494	\$217,053	\$257,018	\$141,277	67%	65%
2000	\$423,322	\$266,658	\$346,524	\$229,327	82%	86%
2001	\$560,697	\$296,878	\$460,225	\$256,041	82%	86%
2002	\$536,017	\$338,201	\$441,576	\$293,533	82%	87%
2003	\$592,702	\$368,099	\$430,489	\$340,960	73%	93%
2004	\$601,636	\$379,213	\$500,148	\$399,875	83%	105%
2005	\$585,447	\$377,958	\$523,140	\$376,191	89%	100%
2006	\$592,207	\$366,713	\$527,292	\$370,129	89%	101%
2007	\$537,050	\$365,416	\$438,499	\$374,274	82%	102%
2008	\$539,586	\$351,904	\$298,585	\$358,836	55%	102%
2009	\$566,127	\$339,623	\$272,897	\$343,797	48%	101%
2010	\$505,398	\$342,197	\$458,017	\$368,520	91%	108%
2011	\$510,858	\$330,960	\$581,796	\$357,243	114%	108%
% change 1998–2011	58%	74%	138%	97%		

Jamaica Plain source: Warren Group.

Hyde-Jackson Squares source: MLS data processed by the author.

All figures are in year 2011 constant dollars. Readers should bear in mind that Hyde-Jackson figures are based on much smaller numbers of annual sales.

Table B.10. Sales Volume: Jamaica Plain and Hyde-Jackson Squares, 1990 – 2011

	Jamaica Plain			Hyde-Jackson Squares				H-J Volume as a % of JP Volume		
	SF	Condo	All	SF	Condo	MF	All	SF	Condo	All
1998	101	321	596	4	9	11	24	4%	3%	4%
1999	97	347	615	7	22	20	49	7%	6%	8%
2000	84	373	635	11	22	19	52	13%	6%	8%
2001	98	317	522	5	38	10	53	5%	12%	10%
2002	94	321	523	10	29	8	47	11%	9%	9%
2003	85	390	605	6	48	11	65	7%	12%	11%
2004	102	493	724	8	75	20	103	8%	15%	14%
2005	95	592	811	5	97	15	117	5%	16%	14%
2006	83	465	637	11	68	14	93	13%	15%	15%
2007	82	482	663	7	75	13	95	9%	16%	14%
2008	63	373	495	5	63	12	80	8%	17%	16%
2009	69	374	496	5	72	6	83	7%	19%	17%
2010	67	363	487	9	74	9	92	13%	20%	19%
2011	54	302	427	3	59	4	66	6%	20%	15%

Jamaica Plain source: Warren Group.

Hyde-Jackson Squares source: MLS data processed by the author.

APPENDIX C
BLOCK GROUP BY STUDY BLOCK?: BACK-UP TABLES

Table C.1. Income Tables: Hyde-Jackson Squares by Block Group, 2000 – 2007-2011


Part 1 of 3							
Tract - Block Group	Total households		25 th Percentile				
			2000		2007-2011	2000 to 2011	
			curr. \$	const. \$	Est. curr. \$	\$ chg	% chg
812-1	560	801	\$4,667	\$6,096	\$5,673	-\$423	-7%
812-2	381	327	\$17,089	\$22,323	\$34,931	\$12,609	56%
1205-1	282	401	\$28,571	\$37,321	\$12,279	-\$25,042	-67%
1205-2	218	201	\$30,865	\$40,318	\$14,486	-\$25,832	-64%
1205-3	262	252	\$12,624	\$16,491	\$13,518	-\$2,973	-18%
1206-1	355	255	\$24,843	\$32,451	\$37,527	\$5,076	16%
1206-2	354	409	\$31,851	\$41,606	\$64,048	\$22,442	54%
1207-1	418	437	\$20,000	\$26,125	\$33,481	\$7,357	28%
Study Area	2,830	3,083	\$14,757	\$19,277	\$15,114	-\$4,163	-22%
Study Area: Exc. 812-1	2,270	2,282	\$22,150	\$28,934	\$31,776	\$2,842	10%

Part 2 of 3						
Tract - Block Group	Median					
	2000		2007-2011	2000 to 2011		
	curr. \$	const. \$	Est. curr. \$	\$ chg	% chg	MOE
812-1	\$9,333	\$12,192	\$11,979	-\$213	-2%	\$5,646
812-2	\$30,547	\$39,903	\$104,107	\$64,204	161%	\$85,092
1205-1	\$50,294	\$65,697	\$43,413	-\$22,284	-34%	\$26,068
1205-2	\$46,842	\$61,188	\$60,195	-\$993	-2%	\$28,022
1205-3	\$35,606	\$46,511	\$47,214	\$703	2%	\$58,673
1206-1	\$52,755	\$68,912	\$96,023	\$27,111	39%	\$53,974
1206-2	\$52,105	\$68,063	\$100,762	\$32,699	48%	\$14,355
1207-1	\$37,778	\$49,348	\$70,363	\$21,015	43%	\$17,365
Study Area	\$35,959	\$46,972	\$47,551	\$579	1%	
Study Area: Exc. 812-1	\$42,844	\$55,965	\$45,629	-\$10,336	-18%	

Table C.1. Income Tables: Hyde-Jackson Squares by Block Group, 2000 – 2007-2011, cont.

Part 3 of 3					
Tract - Block Group	75th Percentile				
	2000		2007-2011	2000 to 2011	
	curr. \$	const. \$	Est. curr. \$	\$ chg	% chg
812-1	\$27,297	\$35,657	\$25,957	-\$9,701	-27%
812-2	\$57,980	\$75,738	\$131,025	\$55,287	73%
1205-1	\$66,249	\$86,539	\$109,753	\$23,213	27%
1205-2	\$75,297	\$98,357	\$84,953	-\$13,404	-14%
1205-3	\$49,087	\$64,121	\$100,734	\$36,614	57%
1206-1	\$76,934	\$100,497	\$124,754	\$24,258	24%
1206-2	\$72,451	\$94,640	\$137,996	\$43,356	46%
1207-1	\$59,478	\$77,694	\$89,116	\$11,422	15%
Study Area	\$61,236	\$79,991	\$100,298	\$20,307	25%
Study Area: Exc. 812-1	\$66,830	\$87,298	\$117,819	\$30,522	35%
Sources: Author calculations of Decennial Census data for 2000 and ACS 5-year data for 2007-2011.					

Table C.2. Income Graphed: Hyde-Jackson Squares by Block Group, 2000 – 2007-2011



Figures are in 2011 constant dollars.

Table C.3. Resident Occupation: Hyde-Jackson Squares by Block Group, 2000 – 2007-2011

Part 1 of 2																	
Tract-Block Group	Employed persons age 16+			Management, business, science, and arts							Service						
				2000		2007-2011		2000 to 2007-2011			2000		2007-2011		2000 to 2007-2011		
	2000	2007-2011	% chg.	#	%	Est.	%	Est. chg.	MOE	Est. chg. in % of pop.	#	%	Est.	%	Est. chg.	MOE	Est. chg. in % of pop.
812-1	223	590	165%	46	21%	123	21%	77	± 73	1%	35	16%	308	52%	273	± 135	233%
812-2	517	632	22%	157	30%	413	65%	256	± 152	115%	107	21%	76	12%	-31	± 54	-42%
1205-1	410	631	54%	156	38%	301	48%	145	± 132	25%	131	32%	270	43%	139	± 159	34%
1205-2	365	220	-40%	142	39%	148	67%	6	± 67	73%	97	27%	55	25%	-42	± 51	-6%
1205-3	223	509	128%	80	36%	206	40%	126	± 96	13%	94	42%	105	21%	11	± 81	-51%
1206-1	548	428	-22%	274	50%	293	68%	19	± 126	37%	89	16%	21	5%	-68	± 23	-70%
1206-2	482	779	62%	374	78%	432	55%	58	± 126	-29%	14	3%	99	13%	85	± 83	338%
1207-1	571	773	35%	261	46%	501	65%	240	± 143	42%	97	17%	159	21%	62	± 134	21%
Hyde-Jackson Squares	3,339	4,562	37%	1,490	45%	2,417	53%	927		19%	664	20%	1,093	24%	429		20%
Hyde-Jackson, except 812-1	3,116	3,972	27%	1,444	46%	2,294	58%	850		25%	629	20%	785	20%	156		-2%

Table C.3. Resident Occupation: Hyde-Jackson Squares by Block Group, 2000 – 2007-2011, cont.

Part 2 of 2													
Tract-Block Group	Sales and office							Other*					
	2000		2007-2011		2000 to 2007-2011			2000		2007-2011		2000 to 2007-2011	
	#	%	Est.	%	Est. chg.	MOE	Est. chg. in % of pop.	#	%	Est.	%	Est. chg.	Est. chg. in % of pop.
812-1	72	32%	103	17%	31	± 73	-46%	70	31%	56	9%	-14	-70%
812-2	130	25%	127	20%	-3	± 99	-20%	123	24%	16	3%	-107	-89%
1205-1	67	16%	35	6%	-32	± 43	-66%	56	14%	25	4%	-31	-71%
1205-2	62	17%	0	0%	-62	± 134	-100%	64	18%	17	8%	-47	-56%
1205-3	49	22%	115	23%	66	± 76	3%	0	0%	83	16%	83	
1206-1	108	20%	95	22%	-13	± 49	13%	77	14%	19	4%	-58	-68%
1206-2	75	16%	165	21%	90	± 110	36%	19	4%	83	11%	64	170%
1207-1	135	24%	90	12%	-45	± 66	-51%	78	14%	23	3%	-55	-78%
Hyde-Jackson Squares	698	21%	730	16%	32		-23%	487	15%	322	7%	-165	-52%
Hyde-Jackson, except 812-1**	626	20%	627	16%	1		-21%	417	13%	266	7%	-151	-50%

Sources: Author calculations with Decennial Census data for 2000 and ACS 5-year data for 2007-2011.

* The "Other" category combines "Natural resources, construction, and maintenance" and "Production, transportation, and materials moving."

Table C.4. Educational Attainment: Hyde-Jackson Squares by Block Group, 2000 – 2007-2011

Tract-Block Group	Total population age 25+		Less than high school diploma		High school grad., GED		Some college		Associate's degree		Bachelor's degree or higher							
	2000 #	2007 - 2011 Est.	2000 #	2007 - 2011 Est.	2000 #	2007 - 2011 Est.	2000 #	2007 - 2011 Est.	2000 #	2007 - 2011 Est.	2000		2007-2011 Est.			2000 to 2011		
											#	%	Est.	%	MOE	Est. chg.	Est. % chg. in #	Est. chg. in % of pop
812-1	764	993	351	422	249	284	106	151	25	85	33	4%	51	5%	± 33	18	55%	19%
812-2	719	582	195	0	200	88	145	151	36	0	143	20%	343	59%	± 67	200	140%	196%
1205-1	557	774	162	172	111	95	109	139	27	0	148	27%	368	48%	± 137	220	149%	79%
1205-2	427	322	131	30	143	42	42	66	10	42	101	24%	142	44%	± 50	41	41%	86%
1205-3	504	474	188	132	92	119	95	92	15	0	114	23%	131	28%	± 65	17	15%	22%
1206-1	663	449	157	5	74	8	145	30	11	4	276	42%	402	90%	± 106	126	46%	115%
1206-2	571	659	37	0	64	54	57	25	30	0	383	67%	580	88%	± 103	197	51%	31%
1207-1	671	682	134	64	111	20	142	53	69	0	215	32%	545	80%	± 108	330	153%	149%
Hyde-Jackson Squares	4,876	4,935	1,355	825	1,044	710	841	707	223	131	1,413	29%	2,562	52%		1,149	81%	79%

Sources: Author calculations with Decennial Census data for 2000 and ACS 5-year data for 2007-2011.

Table C.5. Race and Ethnicity: Hyde-Jackson Squares by Block Group, 2000 – 2010

Part 1 of 3																		
Tract - Block Group	Total population				Hispanic or Latino							Asian or Pacific Islander alone						
	2000	2010	2000 to 2010		2000		2010		2000 to 2010			2000		2010		2000 to 2010		
			# chg	% chg	#	%	#	%	# chg	% chg	Chg in % share	#	%	#	%	# chg	% chg	Chg in % share
812-1	1,650	2,130	480	29%	718	44%	1,186	56%	468	65%	28%	28	2%	40	2%	12	43%	11%
812-2	1,325	1,135	-190	-14%	797	60%	534	47%	-263	-33%	-22%	34	3%	43	4%	9	26%	48%
1205-1	854	824	-30	-4%	425	50%	402	49%	-23	-5%	-2%	18	2%	26	3%	8	44%	50%
1205-2	735	733	-2	0%	506	69%	345	47%	-161	-32%	-32%	9	1%	11	2%	2	22%	23%
1205-3	891	774	-117	-13%	660	74%	448	58%	-212	-32%	-22%	32	4%	26	3%	-6	-19%	-6%
1206-1	922	865	-57	-6%	292	32%	190	22%	-102	-35%	-31%	32	3%	22	3%	-10	-31%	-27%
1206-2	695	724	29	4%	112	16%	58	8%	-54	-48%	-50%	19	2%	34	5%	15	79%	92%
1207-1	1,077	962	-115	-11%	421	39%	249	26%	-172	-41%	-34%	66	6%	73	8%	7	11%	26%
All	8,149	8,147	-2	0%	3,931	48%	3,412	42%	-519	-13%	-13%	238	3%	275	3%	37	16%	16%
Exc. 812-1	6,499	6,017	-482	-7%	3,213	49%	2,226	37%	-987	-31%	-25%	210	3%	235	4%	25	12%	21%

Table C.5. Race and Ethnicity: Hyde-Jackson Squares by Block Group, 2000 – 2010, cont.

Part 2 of 3														
Tract - Block Group	Black or African American alone							White alone						
	2000		2010		2000 to 2010			2000		2010		2000 to 2010		
	#	%	#	%	# chg	% chg	Chg in % share	#	%	#	%	# chg	% chg	Chg in % share
812-1	810	49%	813	38%	3	0%	-22%	39	2%	36	2%	-3	-8%	-28%
812-2	217	16%	149	13%	-68	-31%	-20%	227	17%	357	31%	130	57%	84%
1205-1	151	18%	107	13%	-44	-29%	-27%	230	27%	260	32%	30	13%	17%
1205-2	40	5%	45	6%	5	13%	13%	174	24%	311	42%	137	79%	79%
1205-3	53	6%	80	10%	27	51%	74%	122	14%	193	25%	71	58%	82%
1206-1	60	7%	50	6%	-10	-17%	-11%	504	55%	563	65%	59	12%	19%
1206-2	36	5%	27	4%	-9	-25%	-28%	512	74%	586	81%	74	14%	10%
1207-1	96	9%	101	10%	5	5%	18%	450	42%	507	53%	57	13%	26%
All	1,463	18%	1,372	17%	-91	-6%	-6%	2,258	28%	2,813	35%	555	25%	25%
Except 812-1	653	10%	559	9%	-94	-14%	-8%	2,219	34%	2,777	46%	558	25%	35%

Table C.5. Race and Ethnicity: Hyde-Jackson Squares by Block Group, 2000 – 2010, cont.

Part 3 of 3														
Tract - Block Group	Two or more races							Some other race						
	2000		2010		2000 to 2010			2000		2010		2000 to 2010		
	#	%	#	%	# chg	% chg	Chg in % share	#	%	#	%	# chg	% chg	Chg in % share
812-1	44	3%	39	2%	-5	-11%	-31%	11	1%	16	1%	5	45%	13%
812-2	43	3%	48	4%	5	12%	30%	7	1%	4	0%	-3	-43%	-33%
1205-1	24	3%	24	3%	0	0%	4%	6	1%	5	1%	-1	-17%	-14%
1205-2	2	0%	12	2%	10	500%	502%	4	1%	9	1%	5	125%	126%
1205-3	15	2%	13	2%	-2	-13%	0%	9	1%	14	2%	5	56%	79%
1206-1	34	4%	29	3%	-5	-15%	-9%	-	0%	11	1%	11	—	—
1206-2	14	2%	15	2%	1	7%	3%	2	0%	4	1%	2	100%	92%
1207-1	33	3%	26	3%	-7	-21%	-12%	11	1%	6	1%	-5	-45%	-39%
All	209	3%	206	3%	-3	-1%	-1%	50	1%	69	1%	19	38%	38%
Except 812-1	165	3%	167	3%	2	1%	9%	39	1%	53	1%	14	36%	47%

Sources: U.S. Census Bureau data for 2000 and 2010.

Table C.6. Educational Enrollment: Hyde-Jackson Squares by Block Group, 2000 – 2007-2011

Tract-Block Group	2000			2007-2011				2000 to 2007-2011	
	Total pop. 18+ years	Enrolled in college #	%	Total pop. 18+ years	#	Enrolled in college %	MOE	Est. % chg. in #	Est. chg. in % enrolled
812-1	964	79	8%	1,560	298	19%	±208	277%	133%
812-2	945	163	17%	696	118	17%	±171	-28%	-2%
1205-1	623	118	19%	960	264	28%	±171	124%	45%
1205-2	598	59	10%	351	94	27%	±152	59%	171%
1205-3	614	31	5%	574	109	19%	±72	252%	276%
1206-1	763	96	13%	500	50	10%	±32	-48%	-21%
1206-2	646	84	13%	929	189	20%	±105	125%	56%
1207-1	840	118	14%	947	282	30%	±183	139%	112%
Hyde-Jackson Squares	5,993	748	12%	6,517	1,404	22%	±419	88%	73%

Sources: U.S. Census Bureau data for 2000 and ACS 5-year data for 2007-2011.

Table C.7. Tenure and Vacancy: Hyde-Jackson Squares by Block Group, 2000 – 2010

Part 1 of 3											
Tract-Block Grp.	TOTAL units				OWNER-occupied units						
	2000	2010	2000 to 2010 chg.		2000		2010		2000 to 2010 chg.		
			#	%	#	%	#	%	#	% chg.	Chg. in % share
812-1	784	814	30	4%	4	1%	1	0%	-3	-75%	-76%
812-2	381	418	37	10%	135	35%	155	37%	20	15%	5%
1205-1	302	334	32	11%	62	21%	91	27%	29	47%	33%
1205-2	232	270	38	16%	57	25%	108	40%	51	89%	63%
1205-3	296	301	5	2%	62	21%	74	25%	12	19%	17%
1206-1	394	401	7	2%	139	35%	162	40%	23	17%	15%
1206-2	343	354	11	3%	102	30%	140	40%	38	37%	33%
1207-1	424	434	10	2%	118	28%	178	41%	60	51%	47%
Hyde-Jackson	3,156	3,326	170	5%	679	22%	909	27%	233	34%	27%
H-J, except 812-1	2,372	2,512	140	6%	675	28%	908	36%	233	35%	27%

Table C.7. Tenure and Vacancy: Hyde-Jackson Squares by Block Group, 2000 – 2010, cont.

Part 2 of 3											
Tract- Block Grp.	TOTAL units				RENTER-occupied units						
	2000	2010	2000 to 2010 chg.		2000		2010		2000 to 2010 chg.		
			#	%	#	%	#	%	#	% chg.	Chg. in % share
812-1	784	814	30	4%	565	72%	750	92%	185	33%	28%
812-2	381	418	37	10%	234	61%	219	52%	-15	-6%	-15%
1205-1	302	334	32	11%	230	76%	230	69%	0	0%	-10%
1205-2	232	270	38	16%	153	66%	148	55%	-5	-3%	-17%
1205-3	296	301	5	2%	208	70%	201	67%	-7	-3%	-5%
1206-1	394	401	7	2%	235	60%	217	54%	-18	-8%	-9%
1206-2	343	354	11	3%	236	69%	202	57%	-34	-14%	-17%
1207-1	424	434	10	2%	283	67%	234	54%	-49	-17%	-19%
Hyde- Jackson	3,156	3,326	170	5%	2,144	68%	2,201	66%	57	3%	-3%
H-J, except 812-1	2,372	2,512	140	6%	1,579	67%	1,451	58%	-128	-8%	-13%

Table C.7. Tenure and Vacancy: Hyde-Jackson Squares by Block Group, 2000 – 2010, cont.

Part 3 of 3											
Tract-Block Grp.	TOTAL units				VACANT units						
	2000	2010	2000 to 2010 chg.		2000		2010		2000 to 2010 chg.		
			#	%	#	%	#	%	#	% chg.	Chg. in % share
812-1	784	814	30	4%	215	27%	63	8%	-152	-71%	-72%
812-2	381	418	37	10%	12	3%	44	11%	32	267%	234%
1205-1	302	334	32	11%	10	3%	13	4%	3	30%	18%
1205-2	232	270	38	16%	22	9%	14	5%	-8	-36%	-45%
1205-3	296	301	5	2%	26	9%	26	9%	0	0%	-2%
1206-1	394	401	7	2%	20	5%	22	5%	2	10%	8%
1206-2	343	354	11	3%	5	1%	12	3%	7	140%	133%
1207-1	424	434	10	2%	23	5%	22	5%	-1	-4%	-7%
Hyde-Jackson	3,156	3,326	170	5%	333	11%	216	6%	-117	-35%	-38%
H-J, except 812-1	2,372	2,512	140	6%	118	5%	153	6%	35	30%	22%

Sources: U.S. Census Bureau data for 2000 and 2010.

APPENDIX D
STUDY BLOCKS: SCORING THREE PROPERTY VARIABLES

Table D.1. Condo Rates in 22 Selected Study Area Blocks

	Study Block	UNITS			BUILDINGS			Score
		# Condo Units	# Condo-izable* Units	UNIT CONDO RATE	# Con-verted Buildings	# Condo-izable Bldgs	BLDG. CONDO RATE	
1	Boylston St: from Centre St to midpoint	35	80	44%	12	30	40%	high
2	Boylston St: midpoint to Lamartine St	31	88	35%	9	26	35%	high
5	Oakview Ter, Belmore Ter	19	86	22%	9	33	27%	
9	Danforth St	10	24	42%	3	8	38%	high
12	Paul Gore St: from Centre to midpoint, w/ Paul Gore Ter	61	107	57%	20	34	59%	high
13	Paul Gore St: midpoint to Lamartine St	20	79	25%	7	22	32%	high
15	Cranston St, Termine Ave	13	62	21%	5	25	20%	
16	Sheridan St: from Centre St to midpoint	14	65	22%	5	24	21%	
17	Sheridan St: from midpoint to Chestnut St	19	64	30%	11	27	41%	high
18	Chestnut St: from Boylston St to Wyman St, w/ Roslyn Pl	29	62	47%	10	22	45%	high
21	Forbes St: from Centre St to midpoint	23	81	28%	10	36	28%	high
22	Forbes St: midpoint to Chestnut St	5	44	11%	2	16	13%	low

Table D.1. Condo Rates in 22 Selected Study Area Blocks, cont.

	Study Block	UNITS			BUILDINGS			Score
		# Condo Units	# Condo-izable* Units	UNIT CONDO RATE	# Con-verted Buildings	# Condo-izable Bldgs	BLDG. CONDO RATE	
23	Wyman St: from Centre St to midpoint	31	61	51%	7	38	18%	high
24	Wyman St: midpoint to Lamartine St	13	51	25%	5	20	25%	high
26	Mozart St: from Centre St to midpoint	6	48	13%	2	14	14%	low
27	Mozart St: midpoint to Lamartine St	6	47	13%	3	19	11%	low
28	Chestnut St: from Wyman St to Centre St	12	71	17%	3	24	13%	low
32	Priesing St	3	48	6%	1	20	5%	low
33	Armstrong St	3	46	7%	1	16	6%	low
43	Evergreen St	4	56	7%	2	15	13%	low
71	Nira Ave, Grotto Glen Rd, Arcola Ave, Kenney St, w/ Day St: from Minden St to Arcola St	26	120	22%	9	43	21%	
72	Day St: from Arcola St to Centre St, w/ Bynner St: from Day to Creighton St, w/ Mark St	39	128	30%	13	40	33%	high
		Median		25%	Median		27%	

* "Condoizable" refers to unsubsidized multi-family buildings and the units they contain.

Table D.2. Sales Prices and Price Changes in 22 Study Area Blocks, 2004–2012

	Study Block	CONDOMINIUMS			SINGLE-FAMILIES		Score
		# Sales	Ave. Sales Price	Price Change	# Sales	Ave. Sales Price	
1	Boylston St: from Centre St to midpoint	36	\$400,147	-			high
2	Boylston St: midpoint to Lamartine St	23	\$395,413	+	4	\$438,175	
5	Oakview Ter, Belmore Ter	18	\$484,533	+	1	\$715,000	high
9	Danforth St	9	\$478,906	-	3	\$388,500	
12	Paul Gore St: from Centre to midpoint, w/ Paul Gore Ter	46	\$372,198	+	1	\$480,000	high
13	Paul Gore St: midpoint to Lamartine St	13	\$378,196	+			high
15	Cranston St, Termine Ave	10	\$416,300	+	1	\$414,000	high
16	Sheridan St: from Centre St to midpoint	12	\$454,792	+	4	\$483,750	high
17	Sheridan St: from midpoint to Chestnut St	24	\$384,642	+	2	\$705,000	high
18	Chestnut St: from Boylston St to Wyman St, w/ Roslyn Pl	25	\$378,592	+	2	\$483,500	high
21	Forbes St: from Centre St to midpoint	26	\$356,596	+			high
22	Forbes St: midpoint to Chestnut St	4	\$407,750	+	4	\$453,250	high
23	Wyman St: from Centre St to midpoint	27	\$395,250	+	2	\$554,750	high
24	Wyman St: midpoint to Lamartine St	14	\$398,599	+	4	\$392,750	
26	Mozart St: from Centre St to midpoint	7	\$281,786	-			low
27	Mozart St: midpoint to Lamartine St	3	\$216,667	-	1	\$425,000	low
28	Chestnut St: from Wyman St to Centre St	12	\$315,458	-	2	\$250,250	low
32	Priesing St	3	\$261,333	-			low
33	Armstrong St	5	\$244,900	-	1	\$335,000	low
43	Evergreen St	9	\$436,044	-			high

Table D.2. Sales Prices and Price Changes in 22 Study Area Blocks, 2004–2012, cont.

Study Block		CONDOMINIUMS			SINGLE-FAMILIES		Score
		# Sales	Ave. Sales Price	Price Change	# Sales	Ave. Sales Price	
71	Nira Ave, Grotto Glen Rd, Arcola Ave, Kenney St, w/ Day St: from Minden St to Arcola St	33	\$291,936	-	1	\$215,000	low
72	Day St: from Arcola St to Centre St, w/ Bynner St: from Day to Creighton St, w/ Mark St	45	\$306,476	-	1	\$575,500	low
Average			\$361,248		Average	\$456,839	

Table D.3. Number of Sales in 22 Study Area Blocks, 2004–2012

Study Block		CONDO							SINGLE FAMILY							MULTI-FAMILY							Score
		# Condos (Unsubsidized) # Sales	2004–2006 # Sales	2007–2009 # Sales	2010–2012 # Sales	TOTAL# Sales: 2004–2012	Total Sales as % of # Condos	Score	# SFs	# Sales 2004–2006	# Sales 2007–2009	# Sales 2010–2012	TOTAL# Sales: 2004–2012	Total Sales as % of # SFs	Score	#MFs (2+ units, unsubsidized) *	# Sales 2004–2006	# Sales 2007–2009	# Sales 2010–2012	TOTAL# Sales: 2004–2012	Total Sales as % of # MFs	Score	
1	Boylston St: from Centre St to midpoint	35	14	10	12	36	103%	H	1	0	0	0	0	0%	L	18	0	2	0	2	11%	L	
2	Boylston St: midpoint to Lamartine St	31	8	4	11	23	74%	–	4	2	0	2	4	100%	H	17	1	0	1	2	12%	L	
5	Oakview Ter, Belmore Ter	19	8	2	8	18	95%	–	4	0	0	1	1	25%	–	24	0	1	0	1	4%	L	
9	Danforth St	10	4	1	4	9	90%	L	7	0	1	2	3	43%	–	5	0	0	0	0	0%	L	low
12	Paul Gore St: from Centre to midpoint , w/ Paul Gore Ter	61	17	17	12	46	75%	H	1	0	0	1	1	100%	–	15	0	3	0	3	20%	–	high

Table D.3. Number of Sales in 22 Study Area Blocks, 2004–2012, cont.

Study Block		CONDO							SINGLE FAMILY							MULTI-FAMILY							Score
		# Condos (Unsubsidized) # Sales	# Sales 2004–2006	# Sales 2007–2009	# Sales 2010–2012	TOTAL# Sales: 2004–2012	Total Sales as % of # Condos	Score	# SFs # Sales	# Sales 2004–2006	# Sales 2007–2009	# Sales 2010–2012	TOTAL# Sales: 2004–2012	Total Sales as % of # SFs	Score	#MFs (2+ units, unsubsidized)* # Sales	# Sales 2004–2006	# Sales 2007–2009	# Sales 2010–2012	TOTAL# Sales: 2004–2012	Total Sales as % of # MFs	Score	
13	Paul Gore St: midpoint to Lamartine St	20	7	3	3	13	65%	L	1	0	0	0	0	0%	L	16	0	0	0	0	0%	L	low
15	Cranston St, Termine Ave	13	3	4	3	10	77%	L	1	1	0	0	1	10%	L	20	1	2	1	4	20%	H	
16	Sheridan St: from Centre St to midpoint	14	5	0	7	12	86%	L	1	1	2	1	4	36%	L	19	0	1	1	2	11%	L	low
17	Sheridan St: from midpoint to Chestnut St	19	9	6	9	24	126%	H	4	1	0	1	2	50%	–	16	2	0	1	3	19%	L	
18	Chestnut St: from Boylston St to Wyman St, w/ Roslyn Pl	29	8	9	8	25	86%	H	7	1	1	0	2	29%	L	12	2	2	1	5	42%	H	

Table D.3. Number of Sales in 22 Study Area Blocks, 2004–2012, cont.

Study Block		CONDO							SINGLE FAMILY							MULTI-FAMILY							Score
		# Condos (Unsubsidized)	# Sales 2004–2006	# Sales 2007–2009	# Sales 2010–2012	TOTAL# Sales: 2004–2012	Total Sales as % of # Condos	Score	# SFs	# Sales 2004–2006	# Sales 2007–2009	# Sales 2010–2012	TOTAL# Sales: 2004–2012	Total Sales as % of # SFs	Score	#MFs (2+ units, unsubsidized) *	# Sales 2004–2006	# Sales 2007–2009	# Sales 2010–2012	TOTAL# Sales: 2004–2012	Total Sales as % of # MFs	Score	
21	Forbes St: from Centre St to midpoint	23	4	13	9	26	113%	H	0	0	0	0	N/A	–	–	18	4	1	1	6	33%	H	
22	Forbes St: midpoint to Chestnut St	5	2	0	2	4	80%	L	6	2	0	2	4	67%	H	14	0	0	0	0	0%	L	low
23	Wyman St: from Centre St to midpoint	31	10	9	8	27	87%	–	2	2	0	0	2	100%	–	11	2	0	1	3	27%	H	
24	Wyman St: midpoint to Lamartine St	13	11	2	1	14	108%	H	5	2	2	0	4	80%	H	15	2	0	0	2	13%	L	
26	Mozart St: from Centre St to midpoint	6	3	4	0	7	117%	–	0	0	0	0	N/A	–	–	12	3	1	0	4	33%	H	
27	Mozart St: midpoint to Lamartine St	6	0	2	1	3	50%	L	1	1	0	0	1	100%	–	16	5	1	3	9	56%	H	high

Table D.3. Number of Sales in 22 Study Area Blocks, 2004–2012, cont.

Study Block		CONDO							SINGLE FAMILY							MULTI-FAMILY							Score
		# Condos (Unsubsidized)	# Sales 2004–2006	# Sales 2007–2009	# Sales 2010–2012	TOTAL# Sales: 2004–2012	Total Sales as % of # Condos	Score	# SFs	# Sales 2004–2006	# Sales 2007–2009	# Sales 2010–2012	TOTAL# Sales: 2004–2012	Total Sales as % of # SFs	Score	#MFs (2+ units, unsubsidized)*	# Sales 2004–2006	# Sales 2007–2009	# Sales 2010–2012	TOTAL# Sales: 2004–2012	Total Sales as % of # MFs	Score	
28	Chestnut St: from Wyman St to Centre St	12	6	2	4	12	100%	–	5	0	2	0	2	40%	–	21	1	3	1	5	24%	H	
32	Priesing St	3	2	1	0	3	100%	L	0	0	0	0	N/A	–	–	19	0	0	1	1	5%	L	low
33	Armstrong St	3	3	1	1	5	167%	H	3	0	1	0	1	33%	L	15	4	3	4	11	73%	H	high
43	Evergreen St	4	2	3	4	9	225%	H	4	0	0	0	0	0%	L	13	1	0	1	2	15%	L	low
71	Nira Ave, Grotto Glen Rd, Arcola Ave, Kenney St, w/ Day St: from Minden St to Arcola St	26	15	14	4	33	127%	H	9	0	1	0	1	11%	L	34	3	2	3	8	24%	H	high

Table D.3. Number of Sales in 22 Study Area Blocks, 2004–2012, cont.

Study Block		CONDO							SINGLE FAMILY							MULTI-FAMILY							Score
		# Condos (Unsubsidized)	# Sales 2004–2006	# Sales 2007–2009	# Sales 2010–2012	TOTAL# Sales: 2004–2012	Total Sales as % of # Condos	Score	# SFs	# Sales 2004–2006	# Sales 2007–2009	# Sales 2010–2012	TOTAL# Sales: 2004–2012	Total Sales as % of # SFs	Score	#MFs (2+ units, unsubsidized)*	# Sales 2004–2006	# Sales 2007–2009	# Sales 2010–2012	TOTAL# Sales: 2004–2012	Total Sales as % of # MFs	Score	
72	Day St: from Arcola St to Centre St, w/ Bynner St: from Day to Creighton St, w/ Mark St	39	24	11	10	45	115%	H	1	0	1	0	1	100%	–	27	7	1	0	8	30%	H	high
Sum:		430	167	123	121	411			87	13	11	10	34			381	39	23	20	82			
Median:						13	95%						1	38%						3	19%		

* This count of unsubsidized multi-family properties includes only those which are currently held as multi-families. It differs from the count of total multi-family buildings presented in the Condo Rate table, which included condo-converted buildings (because that depicted all *potentially* condoizable structures, whether converted or not).

APPENDIX E
LIST OF SAMPLED BUILDINGS

Table E.1. Paul Gore Street Building Sample

Address	Year Converter or Current Owner Purchased	Prop. Type	Year Converted	Converter Type
11	1997	3F	2004	Real Estate Dabbler
15	1978	3F	1992	Professional Resident(s)
23	2007	3F	2008	Brokered Developer
24	1969	3F	–	–
27	1987	3F	1987	Professional Resident(s)
35	2007	3F	2008	Landlord-Converter
37	1985	3F	1995	Professional Resident(s)
38	1985	3F	1987	Professional Resident(s)
40	1985	3F	2005	Real Estate Dabbler
40½	1985	3F	1988	Landlord-Converter
41-R	2000	2F	2006	Real Estate Dabbler
49-51	1996	3F	2000	Real Estate Dabbler
55	1986	3F	1987	Real Estate Dabbler
59	1970	4F	–	–
68	1975	3F	1989	Non-professional Resident(s)
70	1996	3F	2006	Professional Resident(s)
75	2008	3F	2008	Brokered Developer
91	1982	3F	1988	Professional Resident(s)
95	1985	3F	1987	Real Estate Dabbler
98	1978	3F	–	–
100	1980	3F	1984	Landlord-Converter
106	1979	3F	–	–
110-112	1968	2F	–	–

Table E.2. Forbes Street Building Sample

Address	Year Converter or Current Owner Purchased	Prop. Type	Year Converted	Converter Type
7	1966	3F	–	–
9	1984	3F	–	–
15	1998	3F	2003	Professional Resident(s)
17	2009	3F	2010	Brokered Developer
20	1998	3F	2009	Landlord-Converter
24	2004	3F	2007	Brokered Developer
26	2004	3F	2007	Brokered Developer
28	2004	3F	2007	Brokered Developer
37	1980	2F	2003	Non-professional Resident(s)
43-45	2005	3F	2005	Real Estate Dabbler
72	1984	3F	–	–
75-77	2003	2F	2004	Brokered Developer
76-78	2002	3F	2002	Non-professional Resident(s)
90	1976	3F	–	–
94	1996	2F	–	–
104	1982	2F	–	–

Table E.3. Mozart Street Building Sample

Address	Year Converter or Current Owner Purchased	Prop. Type	Year Converted	Converter Type	Subsidized?
28	1984	3F	–	–	–
38	1982	3F	–	–	–
44A	2007	3F	–	–	–
45-47	2002	3F	–	–	–
49	2000	3F	–	–	–
51	1984	3F	–	–	–
53	1999	3F	2009	Hybrid RE Actor	–
55	1999	3F	2002	Hybrid RE Actor	–
65	2005	2F	–	–	–
66	2012	3F	2012	Developer	–
72	2004	3F	2008	Landlord-Converter	–
74	2007	3F	2007	Landlord-Converter	–
88-90	1992	2F	–	–	Yes

APPENDIX F
INTERVIEWEE LIST AND INTERVIEW CODING

Table F.1. Key Informants

Category	Interviewee*	Description	Date
Real Estate Actor	RE1	Broker	May 7, 2013
	Christ Stamatatos	Broker	May 6, 2013
	Peter Phinney	Broker	May 9, 2013
	RE4	Broker	July 23, 2013
Community Actor	Jen Faigel	Former affordable housing developer, JPNDC	May 11, 2013
	CA3	Housing organizer	May 11, 2013
	Arthur Johnson	Real estate attorney, JPNDC board member	July 26, 2013
	CA5	Worked with Urban Edge	July 30, 2013
Municipal Actor	Marie Mercurio	JP Planner, BRA	May 3, 2013
	Ines Soto Palmarin	Former JP Planner, BRA	May 28, 2013

* Interviewees who requested that their names be kept confidential are identified by their participant codes.

Table F.2. Interview Coding Schema

Topics	Actors	Features
Community action Organizing Protest Affordable housing	Agencies Agents Franchises Absentee landlords Developers The City	Amenities City parks Community development and profitability Transport Urban and/or edgy
Populations Demographics “People” Displacement		Disamenities Crime Public housing Violence Urban and/or edgy
The market Demand Opportunities	Activities Brokerage Condo conversion Development Getting listings / stimulating sales Social brokering Social changey Functions of gay Race/space	Study area specifics /embedded sample streets
Finance sources Capital Cash, lots of Investors		

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