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The United Nations and War in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries

Robert Weiner

The United Nations was created in 1945 to prevent another world war. It was designed, as the Preamble to the Charter states, to eliminate the scourge of war. The failure to agree on a permanent UN international army meant that the UN had to improvise in dealing with wars. Peacekeeping, which is not mentioned anywhere in the UN Charter, had to be invented. This study investigates how peacekeeping has evolved through four “generations,” culminating in UN-sanctioned multinational forces consisting of “coalitions of the willing.” The study also stresses how one of the greatest peacekeeping failures of the UN in the twentieth century was its inability to prevent genocide from taking place in Rwanda and Bosnia. After an analysis of the UN’s role in the war against terror, the war in Afghanistan, and the war in Iraq, the study concludes with a discussion of various proposals for reform designed to improve the capacity of the UN to engage in more effective peacekeeping in the twenty-first century.

The United Nations was created in 1945 to prevent another world war. It was designed, as the Preamble to the UN Charter states, to eliminate the scourge of war that had befallen humanity twice in the first half of the twentieth century. The United Nations, as the successor to the failed experiment of the League of Nations, embodied Wilsonian idealism. It represented the liberal internationalist approach to world politics, which offered an alternative model to realism,¹ dealing with the central problem of international relations — the avoidance of world war. From a realist perspective, there were elements in the British government that saw the League as a means of bringing the United States into the security structure of Europe.² France was also interested in using the League as an instrument to resolve its security dilemma vis-à-vis a revenge-seeking Germany in the future. Unfortunately and tragically for Woodrow Wilson, the United States never joined the League of Nations due to the resurgence of isolationist sentiment after the Great War.³

The United Nations was based on the neo-liberal assumption that international institutions could make a difference in preventing and resolving wars in the international system.⁴ The centerpiece of the war-prevention and conflict-resolution system of the United Nations was the philosophy of collective security, which was supposed to offer an alternative method of maintaining international order, in comparison to

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the amoral, Machiavellian, balance of power politics that had led to the collapse of the international system twice in the twentieth century, and had brought untold suffering to humanity.⁵ More importantly, the United Nations was supposed to represent the best impulses of world civilization, in the sense that it would prevent another Holocaust and genocidal slaughter of the innocents, plunging humanity into the dark ages once again.

Collective Security

To accomplish this objective, the central principle upon which the United Nations was based, as had been the League of Nations before it, was that of collective security, to represent the will of the international community to deter and punish acts of aggression committed in interstate conflict. "Evil doers" who committed acts of aggression would be faced with the overwhelming might and righteous wrath of the international community.⁶ It is very important to point out, in connection with this, that the United Nations was not originally designed to deal with internal or intrastate wars, which have emerged as the major form of conflict since the end of the Cold War, but rather was designed to deal with interstate conflicts.⁷ Indeed, article 2(7) of the UN Charter prohibits the United Nations from intervening in matters that fall within the domestic jurisdiction of a state, unless there is a chapter VII enforcement action underway there.⁸ But this article may need to be rewritten and adapted to a new concept of sovereignty that has emerged in connection with the recent trend toward humanitarian intervention (two recent cases being Kosovo and East Timor in 1999), which has been driven by the neo-liberal philosophy that the international community has a responsibility to protect human rights, a responsibility that takes precedence over the traditional Westphalian notion of state sovereignty, which is based on the idea that a government can do whatever it wants to on its own territory.⁹ As Michael Walzer writes, "Humanitarian intervention is a response to acts that shock the moral conscience of mankind."¹⁰ On the other hand, an obstacle to humanitarian intervention stems from the developing nations that object to international intervention in matters that are perceived as falling within the domestic jurisdiction of a state.¹¹

The idea of collective security is based on a number of assumptions, the basic features of which could be attributable to Wilsonian idealism and its precursors. Collective security is supposed to represent the organized will and power of the international community, which in a Manichean sense, from a moral point of view, would personify the forces of good, which would oppose any real or potential aggression, which was depicted as synonymous with the forces of evil. The use of force by the international community in this fashion was collectively legitimized, even though a hegemonic power like the United States could turn a collectively legitimized action to its own national interest, as in the case of the UN "police action" in Korea in 1950¹² or the "coalition of the willing" led by the United States in the Gulf war in 1990-91. The organized power of that nebulous entity known as the "international community," according to the philosophy of collective security, would be superior to that, it was assumed, of any real or potential aggressor(s). Furthermore, it was assumed that the international community would have no difficulty in marshalling an overwhelming amount of force to deter or compel an aggressor to comply with the norms of international law. Even collective security, as idealistic as it was, was in the final analysis rooted in the process of making calculations about the application of the mechanics of power in international politics.

Supposedly, the power of the international community would be sufficient to deter a potential aggressor from making a miscalculation¹³ in engaging in risk-taking behavior that could unleash the dogs of war. It was erroneously assumed that through rational calculation, a potential aggressor would add up the costs and benefits of starting a war and would be deterred by the prospect of having to face the overwhelming force of the mobilized international community. But as numerous studies by political scientists have shown, wars often start because the aggressors either underestimate or overestimate the intentions and capabilities of their opponents.¹⁴ In addition, it is more often the case that a divided and weak international community, rather than deterring aggression, often encourages it because it lacks the resolve and will to deal decisively with aggression, as the reaction of the international community to the wars of the Yugoslavian succession from 1991 onward have amply demonstrated. In 1991, the United States did not believe at first that its vital interests were involved in Yugoslavia, and as a distant, offshore balancer, left it up to the Europeans to deal with the disintegration of that state.¹⁵ On the other hand, the United States was ready to lead a UN-sanctioned “coalition of the willing” against Iraq in 1991, because its policy makers responsible for defining national interest believed that the country’s vital interests were at stake.

According to the theory of neo-liberal institutionalism, it was also assumed that collective security must operate within the framework of international institutions, such as the League of Nations or the United Nations, in order for it to be implemented effectively. International institutions were to constrain the behavior of potential international law-breakers through the application of a series of sanctions (found in article 16 of the League of Nations and article 41, chapter VII, of the UN Charter) ranging from diplomatic actions to economic steps, to the ultimate sanction of the use of force by the international community.¹⁶ Ideally, from the neo-liberal institutionalist perspective, states, by participating in international institutions, would learn to cooperate with one another and resolve their disputes through peaceful means and thereby prevent the outbreak of wars in the first place. Neo-liberal institutionalists believe that there is a direct connection between the domestic source of the foreign policy behavior of a state and the prevention of the outbreak of war.¹⁷ There was faith in the age-old idea of Immanuel Kant expressed in 1795, that if “constitutional republics” would become the prevalent form of government, then international institutions consisting of such states would guarantee “Perpetual Peace,” contrary to Helmuth von Moltke’s notion that “Perpetual Peace is a dream . . . and war is an integral part of God’s ordering of the universe.”¹⁸ As the world experienced various waves of democratization, since the eighteenth century, this notion was also echoed in Wilson’s idea of justifying American participation in the First World War, that is, to make the world “safe for democracy,” and in the post-Cold War Grand Strategy of the United States, of expanding the zone of democracy, and therefore the zone of peace.¹⁹ This is based on the assumption that liberal democracies are less war-prone and have less of a tendency to go to war against each other, although generally speaking, liberal democracies are no less war-prone than non-democracies. The democratic peace theorist argues that it is the internal makeup of a state that matters, and therefore challenges the realist paradigm of world politics.²⁰ According to the democratic peace theorist, liberal democracies have less of a tendency to go to war against other liberal democracies because they are constrained from doing so by institutional or structural factors, such as check and balance systems and a political division of power in the government. There is also a sharing of

cultural factors such as the commonality of democratic values, which inhibit liberal democracies from waging war against each other.²¹ Exceptions to the rule that democracies don't wage war against other democracies, such as Athens versus Sparta, the War of 1812, the U.S. Civil War, and the Spanish-American War of 1898, is explained by the fact that one of the states in each of these cases was not a genuine liberal democracy. Critics of democratic peace theory argue that it does not explain a number of "near misses," such as the United States–British dispute over the borders between Venezuela and British Guyana in 1895. In that instance, it is argued, the United States and Britain drew back from war not because they were liberal democracies, but because of realist power calculations.²² Given the popularity of democratic peace theory after the end of the Cold War, though, it has been the Western liberal model of democracy that has served as the paradigm for the UN's post-conflict peace-building strategy that has formed such an essential component of its comprehensive approach to multidimensional peacekeeping.

Since the ultimate sanction of collective security is force, international institutions needed to set up some kind of an arrangement in which military force could be brought to bear against a recalcitrant lawbreaker, as a last resort, if necessary.

But the League of Nations never set up a permanent international police or military force, even though it did engage in a few ad hoc peacekeeping operations in such places as Vilna, in Lithuania, in the Saar, and in Upper Silesia, and Leticia in Latin America. The idea of collective security by the League's successor was based on the notion that an international institution such as the United Nations would have a robust military force at its disposal to enforce the decisions of the international community, although it was understood from the very beginning that this force would never be used against the permanent members of the Security Council, because such an action could result in the outbreak of a major war. Nonetheless, the framers of the UN Charter were well aware of the fact that a glaring defect that was associated with the League's system of collective security was the failure of the international community to establish a permanent international military force.²³ Furthermore, the League system, based to a considerable extent on following such diplomatic methods as arbitration as outlined in articles 11 and 12 in the Covenant, was too slow and cumbersome in preventing and resolving conflicts. Moreover, the Covenant of the League almost seemed to legitimize war, mentioning it as a recourse open to parties to a dispute if diplomatic efforts at resolution within the framework of the League failed.²⁴ In the case of the League of Nations, by the 1930s, balance of power politics had once again replaced the idea of collective security as the organizing principle of interwar international relations, as the international system (a series of crises such as the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in the mid 1930s, the Spanish civil war in the same time period, the German remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936, the Sudetenland crisis in 1938, the union between Austria and Germany in the same year in violation of the Versailles Peace Treaty, and the German invasion of rump Czechoslovakia in 1939, which attested to all of this) came crashing down in 1939 with the outbreak of the Second World War.²⁵

Consequently, the United Nations was created in San Francisco in 1945 by the international community, identified as the victorious wartime allies (the term United Nations itself was coined in 1942 to refer to the allied wartime coalition formed to defeat the Axis powers), with the purpose of having yet another try at devising a world organization that would maintain stability through collective security in the international system.²⁶ President Roosevelt hoped that the wartime Grand Alliance

between the Soviet Union and the United States would continue to function in the postwar world. The “Big Two,” would operate as the policemen of the world, according to the Rooseveltian scheme of postwar international order. The type of international military force provided to the UN to accomplish this task was based upon the model that had successfully led the Allied wartime coalition to victory in World War II. A permanent military force was supposed to be created as the enforcement arm of the Security Council, drawn from its five permanent members, that would supply national contingents on the basis of agreements that would be negotiated according to article 43 of the UN Charter. The Military Staff Committee, a subordinate unit of the Security Council that consisted of the military representatives of the five permanent members of the Council, was entrusted with the responsibility for drawing up the blueprint for the permanent army. But by 1947, it was clear that the outbreak of the Cold War had made this impossible. Therefore, not only did the United Nations lack the permanent international military force that the founders had envisaged in the agreements, but the agreements themselves were never negotiated.²⁷

Unfortunately, the whole principle of collective security itself was actually embedded in a realist conception of international order, which rested on the idea that the fundamental principle of international relations was that of state sovereignty, with the state functioning as the primary unit of the international system.²⁸ This was reflected in the structure and distribution of power in the Security Council of the United Nations, with each one of its five permanent members being allocated a special voting right known as the veto, which allowed it to protect its national interest. This virtually guaranteed that the United Nations would not function as an effective instrument of collective security.

The failure to agree on the structure and the composition of a robust permanent international military force meant that over the next half a century the United Nations had to improvise in dealing with wars.²⁹ This is because the very term peacekeeping is not even mentioned anywhere in the Charter and during the next five and a half decades the United Nations engaged in over fifty peacekeeping (chapter VI) and enforcement (chapter VII) operations, which encompassed a wide variety of different forms.

Peacekeeping and Enforcement Operations

Peacekeeping or chapter VI-operations usually deal with a conflict situation in which the consent of the host state or states where the force is to be deployed has been secured.³⁰ More often than not, these consent-type forces were mandated under chapter VI, which dealt with peacemaking, within the framework of third-party mediation of a conflict, rather than chapter VII, which dealt with enforcement action, which does not require the consent of the parties to a conflict. There has been a significant upsurge of enforcement operations since the end of the Cold War.³¹ Chapter VII mandates an enforcement operation to go into an area without the consent of the government or parties to the conflict, before a cease-fire or an armistice has been achieved. The enforcement-type operation therefore is far riskier than the traditional consent-type of operation that was the prevalent model of peacekeeping during the Cold War. The consent-type operation usually went into an area after a cease-fire or armistice agreement had already been negotiated, to function as

a kind of buffer force to keep the belligerents apart.³² In contrast, in the post–Cold War age of increased “ethno-political conflict,” placing lightly armed blue helmets into the middle of a vicious civil war and with rules of engagement that only allow them to use their weapons for self-defense (as in the case of the former Yugoslavia) has resulted in situations in which peacekeepers have been attacked with impunity, killed, or taken hostage and stripped of their weapons.³³ States, especially industrialized democratic states, have become increasingly reluctant to expose their troops to this kind of treatment, as “donor fatigue” has set in.³⁴

The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping

UN peacekeeping has undergone a process of evolution from more simple buffer-type forces imposed between belligerents to uphold a cease-fire to more complex multidimensional types of operations that may include the peace-building of failed states. Although it should be stressed that a traditional Cold War peacekeeping force like ONUC, the United Nations Operations in the Congo, (1960–64) in many ways served as a precursor for current operations that find themselves embroiled in a civil conflict in the post–Cold War world.³⁵

The evolution of UN peacekeeping can be divided into four generations: the first generation consisted of the classical or traditional Cold War peacekeeping operation; the second, of transitional operations that were devised as the Cold War was winding down; and the third phase of peacekeeping consisted of complex multidimensional post–Cold War operations that mostly involved humanitarian intervention in civil conflicts, such as the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Rwanda.³⁶ The latest and fourth generation consists of UN-sanctioned multinational forces designed to engage in robust military action under the command of one or more “lead” states, to be followed by a UN peacekeeping stabilization force when it is possible to secure collective legitimation from the Security Council to do so. Further, the evolution of generations of UN peacekeeping does not necessarily proceed in a unilinear fashion, but more traditional forms of peacekeeping can coexist with newer forms.

The first classic peacekeeping operation was UNEF I (United Nations Emergency Force) that was deployed in the Sinai peninsula (from 1956 to 1967), following the Suez Canal war of 1956.³⁷ The next major Cold War UN peacekeeping operation was ONUC. This first Congo operation, strictly speaking, was not a buffer force, but instead intervened militarily in a Congolese civil war. This was done at the initiative of Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld to end the secession of Katanga, the southernmost province of the Congo, a rebellion that had been orchestrated by Belgian economic interests.³⁸ Both the UNEF I and Congo operations also should be seen within the context of the Cold War, as instruments designed to serve Western interests by preventing the Soviets from establishing their influence in the Middle East and Africa. During the Cold War the UN also developed some experience in dealing with the problems associated with resolving ethnic civil conflict when UNFICYP (the United Nations Force in Cyprus) was dispatched to Cyprus in 1964 to function as a buffer between the warring Turkish and Greek Cypriote communities.³⁹ Some analysts believe that UNFICYP, which in 2003 was still in existence, is a good example of a successful UN peacekeeping operation.⁴⁰ It is argued that a quasi-permanent force like UNFICYP can serve as a stabilizing element in protracted conflicts. Other examples of “quasi-permanent” forces created during the Cold War and still in existence, performing this stabilizing function, are UNDOF

(the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force) that was deployed along the Israeli-Syrian border in the Golan Heights in 1974, and UNIFIL (the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon), which was positioned in southern Lebanon in 1978, as well as a small UN observer force in Kashmir.

On the other hand, it can be argued that quasi-permanent peacekeeping forces that become fixtures in protracted regional conflicts may only serve to freeze the conflict by providing the parties to the dispute with an excuse not to find a political solution to it.

In any event, throughout most of the 1980s, there was a freeze in the creation of new peacekeeping operations by the United Nations, in part because the Reagan administration was not enthusiastic about supporting them.

The next stage in the evolution of UN peacekeeping occurred in the latter part of the 1980s with the emergence of what has been dubbed transitional operations, that is, operations that took place in the transition between the end of the Cold War and the post-Cold War period, a much more optimistic view of the role of the United Nations as an instrument of peacekeeping in the international system. The situation changed markedly as a result of the “new thinking” in Soviet foreign policy under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev.⁴¹ The “new thinking” included a greater willingness on the part of Moscow to turn toward the United Nations as an instrument that could be used to resolve regional conflicts, especially those of a Cold War nature.⁴² These peacekeeping forces became more complex and multidimensional. As a result the UN was able to dispatch peacekeepers and observers to terminate wars, oversee elections and promote peace-building, and attempt to promote national reconciliation in regional-type conflicts in Afghanistan, Namibia, Iran and Iraq, Angola, Central America, and (Cambodia) Kampuchea with varying degrees of success.⁴³ But, if there were no peace to keep, peacekeeping did not eliminate the conflicts concerned when wars restarted in the same places. For example, in the cases of Afghanistan and Angola, civil conflict and turmoil were endemic, following the termination of UN peacekeeping operations. Nor did post-conflict peace-building always result in the emergence of a “liberal democracy.” The post-conflict regime established in Cambodia after the termination of one of the UN’s most costly missions can hardly be viewed as democratic. Moreover, the United Nations has, for example, found it very difficult to terminate the civil conflict and promote national reconciliation in Angola, having attempted to do so with a succession of peacekeeping and observer operations.⁴⁴ An end to that conflict was only made possible by the death in 2002 of Joseph Savimbi, the leader of UNITA, the revolutionary movement there. In connection with Angola and elsewhere, the security of observers and peacekeepers has been one of the major problems that the UN has faced in the post-Cold War world, when local warlords, who often function as “spoilers” of cease-fire accords and armistices in internal conflicts, treat the UN with a culture of impunity. The need to secure the safety of UN personnel was underscored by the bombing of UN headquarters in Baghdad on August 19, 2003, resulting in the death of the Secretary-General’s Special Representative.

The third stage in the evolution of UN peacekeeping, following the traditional and transitional stages (although models were developed during these stages that can be used as guidelines for the post-Cold War era) mostly consisted of humanitarian intervention in civil wars, as the end of the Cold War witnessed an outbreak of regional conflicts that had been suppressed by superpower competition. More emphasis in this third generation of peacekeeping was placed on a comprehensive approach, which involved not only peace-keeping but also peace-building.⁴⁵ Peace-

building encompasses such activities as the reconstruction of civil society in a failed or failing state, the demobilization and disarmament of belligerents, the supervision of elections and the promotion of the rule of law (in the case of East Timor, this also involves supervising elections for a constituent assembly to draft a constitution, resulting in the emergence of Timor Leste as an independent state), the reconstruction of a society's shattered wartime infrastructure, assuring the delivery of humanitarian aid, ensuring the protection of the human rights of minorities, and creating tribunals to punish war criminals (transitional justice), safeguarding and facilitating the return of refugees and internally displaced persons, and promoting national reconciliation through the creation of national commissions on Reconciliation and Truth. This certainly represents an extremely ambitious array of tasks for an organization that may not have the resources or the will to carry them out. In post-conflict situations, the task can be summed up as disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, there was an explosion of UN peacekeeping activities that unrealistically raised expectations that the United Nations, having broken free of the Cold War, would now be able to function in the manner that its founding fathers had intended, as a significant actor in the international system, since it would no longer be marginalized by American-Soviet Cold War competition.⁴⁶ This false hope may have been fed by the success of the United States in leading a UN-sanctioned "coalition of the willing" to deal with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990–91 (somewhat similar to what had occurred in Korea in 1950–53), and American triumphalism that a new world order was in the making.

The Clinton administration also initially advocated a policy of "assertive multilateralism," that is, strong support of international institutions like the UN, as a central tenet of its foreign policy. The support of the U.S. "hyper-power" was considered critical to the success of the UN, even though the United States has tended to function as a hegemonic power in its relationship with the world organization at times, that is, use it for purposes to advance its own national interest, rather than the interests of the international community. But the hopes that the United Nations would be able to function as an effective actor on the world stage in the realm of peacekeeping suffered major setbacks in the former Yugoslavia (1991–95) and in Rwanda in 1994, especially as the world organization failed to prevent genocide and ethnic cleansing from taking place. With very limited resources and military advisors, the UN Secretariat was placed virtually in the impossible situation, often in the early 1990s, of having to put UN peacekeeping forces together in an ad hoc and improvised fashion. This usually had to be done within a very short period of time, often driven by the desire on the part of the permanent members of the Security Council to appear to be "doing something" in reaction to outraged international public opinion to genocide and ethnic cleansing.

Rwanda and Srebrenica

In discussing the evolution of UN peacekeeping, two cases stand out among the more than fifty since 1945, and therefore require special attention: the genocide that occurred in Rwanda in 1994, and the massacre of about eight thousand Bosnian Moslems in Srebrenica, Bosnia, in 1995.⁴⁷ Both of these horrific events occurred when the current Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, was the Under-Secretary-General for UN Peacekeeping. They both represented some of the most negative turning points in the post-Cold War history of UN peacekeeping.

One of the greatest peacekeeping failures of the United Nations in the twentieth century was its inability to prevent genocide from taking place in Rwanda. The UN is still wrestling with the legacy of the enormity of this evil, which put to the test the very meaning of the existence of the organization as a factor of justice in world civilization. As former Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali wrote, “the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 was one of the greatest tragedies since the Second World War.”⁴⁸ As an Independent Commission of Inquiry that was set up by Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 1999 to investigate the genocide in Rwanda stressed, “the international community did not prevent the genocide, nor did it stop the killing once the genocide had begun.”⁴⁹ In a short period of one hundred days in 1994, about 800,000 members of an ethnic community known as the Tutsi were slaughtered (along with Hutu moderates) by Hutu extremists.⁵⁰

In terms of the historical background to the civil conflict that took place in Rwanda, it should be pointed out that the Tutsi, long favored by the colonial powers (Germany and Belgium) that had ruled Rwanda, were subsequently overthrown by the majority Hutus in 1959, as periodic bloodbaths marked the relations between the two ethnic groups. The descendants of the Tutsi who had been forced into exile launched an invasion of Rwanda in 1991, and in 1993 the UN became involved in arranging a cease-fire there. It is necessary to point out that the conflict in Rwanda was also caused by the poor state of the political economy of the country, since Rwanda, primarily an agricultural country, was one of the most overcrowded countries on the Continent.⁵¹

The UN Security Council had authorized a UN peacekeeping force for Rwanda, known as UNAMIR (the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda) in 1993, to oversee a peace agreement (the Arusha Accords) that had been negotiated between the two warring ethnic groups there. UNAMIR was entrusted with the mission to set up a secure zone in the Rwandan capital city of Kigali.

The entire UN operation in Rwanda, however, suffered from a distinct lack of political will (perhaps with the exception of the French who wanted to maintain a Francophone sphere of influence in Africa) on the part of the permanent members of the Security Council.⁵² This was especially true of the United States since the debacle in Somalia, when eighteen U.S. soldiers were killed in Mogadishu in October 1993.⁵³ Even though the soldiers were operating under U.S. and not UN command, the United States retreated from its policy of “assertive multilateralism.”⁵⁴ Public opinion and Congress turned against U.S. participation in UN peacekeeping, except under extraordinary conditions especially when the national interest of the country was involved. This, combined with the reluctance of the Pentagon to place U.S. troops under foreign command, resulted in a sharp reversal of the Clinton administration’s policy. A new Presidential Decision Directive (PDD 25) was issued right in the middle of the Rwandan crisis, which sharply constrained the ability of the United States to participate in future peacekeeping operations.⁵⁵ Consequently, we also see a shift in the U.S. position in which Washington evidences a preference for high-risk military operations to be undertaken within the framework of regional military alliances such as NATO, rather than by multilateral institutions such as the UN, thereby for example, setting the stage for the U.S. option to engage NATO rather than the UN in Kosovo in 1999.

This translated into a reluctance to provide UNAMIR with the financial resources and equipment that it needed. General Romeo Dallaire, the Canadian general who was placed in command of UNAMIR, argued that a military force of about forty-five hundred was necessary to properly carry out UNAMIR’s mission, while the

United States proposed the deployment of a UN force of about one hundred. The permanent members of the Security Council, in a clear-cut case that cried out for the need for humanitarian intervention, were even reluctant to use the term genocide, which would acknowledge the planned, systematic extermination of the Tutsi minority.⁵⁶ Indeed, there was even a forewarning that extremist advocates of Hutu power in the inner circle of the president of Rwanda were deliberately planning the extermination of the Tutsis. This was based on information that was received as early as January 1994 by General Dallaire from a highly placed informant in the Rwandan government.⁵⁷ Dallaire believed that if UNAMIR had numbered about 5,000, it would have been possible to prevent the genocide.⁵⁸

The Security Council did not provide UNAMIR with the resources that it needed to accomplish its mission and consequently UNAMIR was unable to protect the civilians and the refugees (as was the case with UNPROFOR — the United Nations Protection Force — a year later in Srebrenica) that sought refuge with it.⁵⁹ Furthermore, the original mandate of UNAMIR also limited its ability to protect people because it was a traditional peacekeeping force created within the terms of chapter VI, and therefore it could not use force except in conditions of self-defense. Additionally, the mandate of UNAMIR was not adjusted to take into account the rapidly changing circumstances in Rwanda. As it became apparent (on April 21, 1994) that mass killings were occurring, the Security Council reduced UNAMIR down to a force of only 270 with a mandate to mediate an end to the dispute.⁶⁰ Moreover, in 1993, the attention of the Security Council was also diverted by the fact that it was overseeing two other major operations in Bosnia and Somalia, where the bulk of UN forces were committed.⁶¹ Because of its setback in Somalia, the United States was not willing to become involved in a much more horrendous war in Rwanda. Therefore, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali believed that the United States shared a considerable amount of the responsibility for the genocide in Rwanda. Given Boutros-Ghali's complaint that the Security Council was paying too much attention to Europe and not enough to Africa, it is not surprising that the United States prevented him from being elected to a second term as Secretary-General.⁶² By the time it was clear that genocide was being committed, the Security Council finally replaced UNAMIR with UNAMIR II, a larger force of about 5,500, which also was a traditional chapter VI force but it never was fully deployed. Later, the Security Council also authorized the French to launch "Operation Turquoise" with a chapter VII mandate that, although designed to serve French interests and influence in the region, nonetheless did save lives.⁶³

In conclusion, the lessons learned from one of the darkest moments in the history of the twentieth century, apart from the obvious lack of will on the part of the United States to commit itself to assertive multilateralism, is the necessity for the UN to possess the political analytical capabilities and an early warning system to detect and act on an impending genocide, and to strengthen its capacity for preventive diplomacy and the prevention of conflicts. But this cannot compensate or substitute for the lack of political will, or the conclusion by a great power that it is not in its national interest to act even in the face of genocide. The Independent Commission of Inquiry created by Secretary-General Kofi Annan concluded that genocide prevention should comprise an essential component of any UN peacekeeping operation (where relevant), and the International Tribunal for Rwanda, with a lot of difficulty, has proceeded to convict individuals for committing genocide there. Thousands of individuals in Rwanda have also been arrested and placed on trial as well, although there is also much to criticize in the application of this model of transitional justice.

One of the most devastating setbacks in the entire history of UN peacekeeping occurred in July 1995, in the former Yugoslavia, with the fall of the city of Srebrenica, Bosnia, to Serbian forces.⁶⁴ In one of the greatest horrors of “ethnic cleansing” (designated as genocide by the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia) that occurred during the wars of the Yugoslavian succession, approximately eight thousand Bosnian men and boys were executed in a brutal fashion, described as “truly scenes from hell, written on the darkest pages of human history.”⁶⁵ This occurred while a Dutch contingent of UNPROFOR (the United Nations Protection Force) was on the scene. Srebrenica, along with several other Bosnian cities and towns had been designated as a safe area by the UN in 1993, based on the model of the safe area created in Northern Iraq to protect the Kurds from the Iraqi government following the Gulf War. The concept of “safe-area” was not clearly defined and could be viewed as an ill-conceived response by the Security Council to international public opinion to “do something.” The application of the concept of the “safe area” in Bosnia was an unmitigated disaster, because the members of the UN did not have the political will to provide UNPROFOR with the resources that it needed to adequately protect the civilians who sought refuge in the “safe areas.” Bosnian Serb forces directly attacked this “safe area” of Srebrenica, as well as the Dutch troops there, with impunity, taking some of them hostages as well. An independent inquiry by the United Nations did not spare the UN itself from sharp criticism for that disaster, one of the major factors that contributed to the withdrawal of UNPROFOR from the former Yugoslavia and its replacement by a robust NATO military force in 1995, as part of the Dayton Peace Accords.

One reason for the failure of the UN to protect the Bosnians, it is argued, is that supposedly the UN never imagined that the Serbs would behave with such barbarism (although atrocities were committed by all sides in the conflict) and cruelty, a brutality that Europe had not seen since the Second World War.⁶⁶ Probably one of the most telling criticisms of the inability of the UN to protect the Bosnians was the UN’s failure to effectively use NATO airpower to stop the advancing Serb troops, as they moved in on Srebrenica.⁶⁷ As UN peacekeeping operations became more complex, the coordination of military with civilian decision-making became more difficult. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General also had to deal with the UN bureaucracy in New York in making a decision to use airpower. Furthermore, Boutros-Ghali, Secretary-General at the time, also writes in his memoirs that the Dutch Minister of Defense vetoed the use of NATO air power because of the fear that the Dutch troops who had been taken hostage by the Serbs would be injured.⁶⁸ In addition, there was a fear that if robust air power were used, it would jeopardize the chances of reaching a peaceful settlement to the conflict. Boutros-Ghali also blames the Americans for encouraging the Bosnians to turn down the Vance-Owen Pact, which called for the division of Bosnia into a number of cantons.⁶⁹ This provided the Bosnian Serbs with an incentive⁷⁰ to attack the “safe areas” that had been designated in Bosnia by the UN Security Council in 1993 (which were poorly conceived and ill-defined concepts in the first place) in order to gain more territory.⁷¹ Furthermore, as the UN’s own investigation pointed out, another reason for the failure in Srebrenica was the institutional ideology of the UN, which stressed the avoidance of becoming involved in a militaristic “culture of death,” since the UN traditionally was supposed to function as an impartial force that was not to engage in war-making.⁷² According to Boutros-Ghali, “the UN forces in the ‘safe areas’ were there as peacekeepers, and they had neither the authority nor the means to do battle with the parties to the conflict.”⁷³ The rules of engagement and mandate of the UN

forces on the scene needed to be changed in order to allow them to engage in robust military action, but neither the will nor the resources of Dutchbat, which consisted of about three hundred combat soldiers at the time, were sufficient.⁷⁴ The Dutch forces were not sufficient to deter the one to two thousand heavily armed Serbs who advanced on Srebrenica, or to prevent the slaughter that took place. But in August 2001, the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia at The Hague convicted Bosnian Serbian General Radislav Krstic of genocide in Srebrenica and sentenced him to over forty years in prison. This was the first conviction for the acts of genocide that were committed at Srebrenica. Former Yugoslavian President Slobodan Milosevic, who was ousted by the Serbs in a revolution in October 2000, was also delivered to The Hague and placed on trial for the crimes committed in Srebrenica, among other charges.

Resurgence of UN Peacekeeping

During the 1990s, after the failures in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, there was a downsizing of UN peacekeeping as the number of blue helmets in the field was reduced from over 70,000 to 14,000. But by 1999 there was a sudden surge in demand for UN peacekeeping, and a willingness on the part of Secretary-General Kofi Annan to meet these challenges as the new millennium dawned. There was a surprising expansion of UN peacekeeping efforts on the part of the Secretary-General that reversed the previous trend in downsizing. In the last few years of the twentieth century, the UN faced a surge in traditional and post-conflict peacekeeping demands in places like Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Southern Lebanon, and Palestine (where the Palestinians unsuccessfully requested that the UN send an international observer force into the occupied territories).⁷⁵

Following NATO intervention in Kosovo, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1244 that authorized the creation of UNIKOM (the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo), and the UN, supported by NATO forces, stepped in to administer the province as a sort of international protectorate, and to prepare it for “substantial autonomy.”⁷⁶ NATO supposedly intervened in Kosovo in 1999 to engage in a humanitarian mission designed to rescue the Albanian minority that was being subjected to horrific ethnic cleansing by Serbian forces.⁷⁷ As the conflict unfolded, there initially were unsubstantiated estimates that as many as 100,000 Albanians had been killed, but a more realistic figure was between 5,000 and 10,000.⁷⁸ Kosovo raised the question of when a humanitarian intervention should take precedence over the traditional notion of sovereignty, and whether a regional military alliance like NATO had an obligation to act when the Security Council could not because it was divided. UNIKOM was given the task of rebuilding civil society, supervising the return of refugees, disarming the Albanian National Liberation Army and incorporating them into a civilian police force, and overseeing elections along with the OSCE (the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) and EU (European Union), backed by the KFOR forces of NATO. But now, four years later, UNIKOM’s peace-building efforts in Kosovo, buttressed by an International Civilian Police force, have been far from successful, as the Albanians there have engaged in their own version of ethnic cleansing of Serbs, and extremist Albanian forces reportedly used Kosovo as a base of operations to launch an attack on the neighboring government of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in 2001. A European Union force was dispatched to Macedonia in 2003 to help maintain the Ohrid peace

agreement that had brought an end to the conflict.

The UN suffered yet another setback in the case of its operations in Sierra Leone, a West African country that had been involved in a devastating civil war since 1992, as various warlords competed with one another for power. UNAMSIL (United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone) was established in 1999, under chapter 7 of the UN Charter, to help implement a peace accord (the Lome Accord) and to take over from a subregional organization (the Economic Community of West African States) and its military arm known as the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group, as well as a small contingent of UN observers that had been dispatched to Sierra Leone previously. In spite of all of the peacekeeping failures, which the UN had suffered beforehand, and with no emphasis on the lessons that should be learned from these failures, initially the deployment of the UNASMIL was a model of what not to do.⁷⁹ Five hundred ill-prepared and ill-equipped UNASMIL peacekeepers were taken hostage in May 1999 by RUF (Revolutionary United Front) rebel forces, and the reputation of UN peacekeeping suffered yet another humiliating setback. This was compounded by the inability of UNASMIL to oversee the return of refugees to Sierra Leone, and the spillover of the conflict to the neighboring state of Guinea. In order to prevent the government from falling, it was necessary for British forces to intervene in Sierra Leone. By 2001, the situation had stabilized to the extent that an expanded UNASMIL and government forces claimed considerable progress in disarming the anti-government RUF, as the government began to reestablish its control over the critical diamond mining areas. In 2003 there were plans to downsize UNASMIL, and it was even possible for it to lend troops for a peacekeeping operation in nearby Liberia.

These new challenges at the end of the millennium called for forms of humanitarian intervention as well as the expansion of or deployment of peacekeeping and peace-enforcement forces of a more traditional nature.⁸⁰ Humanitarian intervention is based on the Annan doctrine of the “two sovereignties,” in which the UN Secretary-General argued that the sovereignty of the individual should take precedence over the sovereignty of the state.⁸¹ This doctrine is based on the need for the international community to intervene within a state to protect the human rights of minorities from gross and massive violations committed against them by their own government.

Besides the more complex and multidimensional humanitarian intervention, the UN also found itself involved in more traditional peacekeeping operations. For example, the UN was called upon to put together a force of about 4000 observers to oversee an armistice and maintain a temporary security zone that had been established between Ethiopia and Eritrea, hoping to help to bring an end to the conflict that had been raging there since 1998.⁸² The Secretary-General also had to quickly expand UNIFIL (the United Nations Force in Lebanon) in 2000, a force that had been deployed in Southern Lebanon since 1978. It was necessary to do this because of the precipitous Israeli withdrawal from the area in 2000, which created a power vacuum right at the Israeli-Lebanese demarcation line, the Blue Line, that had been filled by fundamentalist Islamic groups such as the Hezbollah, raising the danger of increased clashes with Israeli forces, although by 2003, UNIFIL also was downsized.

The Regionalization of UN Peacekeeping

One approach that has developed to compensate for the ineffective peacekeeping

record of the UN, as the UN has found itself overstretched and starved of resources, is the regionalization of peacekeeping.

In the 1990s, as the UN engaged in more complex, multidimensional peacekeeping operations, it found itself increasingly relying on regional and subregional organizations and arrangements to maintain peace and security and restore order in zones of turmoil by stabilizing the spate of regional conflicts (some of them protracted conflicts that had been going on for years) that had erupted at the end of the Cold War.⁸³ Regionalism has always been an important ingredient of the UN system.⁸⁴ According to the UN Charter, regional organizations can act in self-defense, but they must report to the Security Council, and they cannot engage in action without the authorization of the Security Council. NATO, however, which has been involved in a number of peacekeeping operations in the Balkans in the 1990s as it has redefined itself and undergone a transformation from a collective defense to a collective security organization, claims that it is legally not considered a regional organization, but rather is a military alliance, which does not need the authorization of the Security Council to engage in humanitarian intervention.⁸⁵ Peacekeeping by regional and subregional organizations and arrangements has both advantages and disadvantages, as does reliance on “coalitions of the willing” led by regional hegemons. “Coalitions of the willing” (in place of traditional peacekeeping forces) have been led by regional/global hegemons such as the United States in Haiti, France in Rwanda (as well as in the Ivory Coast and the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2003), Russia in the Commonwealth of Independent States, and Australia in East Timor.⁸⁶ More recently, the EU has become more active in out-of-area peacekeeping operations. An EU police force replaced the UN in Bosnia, and an EU force led by France was deployed in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the summer of 2003. This EU mission, which was approved by the Security Council at the end of May 2003, officially terminated its mission on September 1, 2003. This was the first time that an EU mission had been sent outside of Europe.

“Coalitions of the willing,” however, may not be a good solution to the *problematique* of effective peacekeeping, because they seem rather reminiscent of the old colonial practice of dividing the world into spheres of influence, which allow global and regional hegemons to assert their dominance of adjacent geographical areas.⁸⁷ Furthermore, a “coalition of the willing” sent to deal with a conflict in a region can take place outside the framework of an existing regional organization.

But a danger is that reliance on regional as well as subregional organizations may provide regional hegemons with the opportunity to extend their influence in the region with the legitimization and blessing of the international community. Regional organizations must act within the spirit and the letter of the UN Charter and in a manner that does not undermine the primacy of the Security Council as an instrument of peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Nonetheless, the advantage of relying on regional organizations to engage in peacekeeping operations is that regional powers may be more familiar with the local conditions and circumstances that affect the conflict and may have a better understanding of the issues that are involved. But a regional organization may not possess the necessary resources and capacity for peacekeeping. Furthermore, a number of states that donate troops to regional peacekeeping operations are poor, developing countries, and a certain amount of donor exhaustion has set in because the UN has lacked the financial resources to compensate troop-contributing countries in a timely fashion, which results in difficulty in recruiting troops for new peacekeeping operations. In the case of developing countries, the UN could offer its expertise and experience to help them participate in

regional peacekeeping operations. Additionally, some regional organizations may not follow UN norms of behavior, as troops may not be adequately trained, and may engage in behavior that may add to the problems that a country faces (such as engaging in criminal behavior, spreading AIDS), although this is also true of troops from industrial democracies as well. Troops need to be trained in following international humanitarian norms and be sensitized to gender mainstream issues as well, especially since women often are the main victims of civil conflicts. Finally, one of the greatest dangers associated with the trend toward the growing regionalization of UN peacekeeping and peace enforcement is the marginalization of the United Nations, with the trend of increasing reliance on regional and subregional organizations.

Sanctions

What some would consider to be the failure of UN peacekeeping and peace enforcement in the 1990s resulted in an increased reliance on sanctions, which can be seen as a form of coercive diplomacy and which represents a negative form of action that can be used for purposes of both deterring and compelling. For example, a conflict considered to be ended may restart, and efforts at post-conflict peacekeeping may suffer a setback, so it may be necessary to impose or reimpose sanctions on a state or sub-state actor such as the leaders of a revolutionary organization, to attempt to coerce them to comply with a cease-fire or peace agreement that they already signed.

As far as the implementation of collective security is concerned, sanctions are, according to Inis Claude, Jr., “the first line of attack.”⁸⁸ All members of the UN are expected to comply with sanctions, since according to article 25 of the Charter, they are obligated to carry out decisions of the Security Council. The United Nations has discovered in the post-Cold War period, however, that it further needed to refine and improve upon the application of sanctions, in order to deal with the growing “culture of impunity” that characterized the behavior of sundry war criminals and governments, who flouted the norms and the will of the international community. Sanctions constitute the heart of a collective security system of an organization like the United Nations and provide for a graduated series of measures that can be applied against international lawbreakers. Sanctions involve economic measures such as trade and financial restrictions (such as the freezing of the foreign assets of targeted elites and leaders), the interruption of relations with the international community by air and sea (as applied against Libya and Afghanistan), as well as the imposition of travel restrictions on the targeted leaders and their families.⁸⁹ A number of developing countries, however, even object to the use of smart sanctions, because they believe that they are used to advance the hegemonic interests of states like the United States, especially against states identified by Washington as rogue states.

At first, economic sanctions were seen as a relatively humane means of trying to force an international lawmaker to comply with the will of the international community, but in reality the application of economic sanctions against a society can be quite devastating in terms of the effects it may have upon innocent civilians, hence the need for “smart sanctions.” Sanctions can be rather indiscriminate in their effects, a problem that Annan refers to as the “paradox of sanctions.”⁹⁰ But a tyrannical regime may deliberately manipulate the effects of sanctions in order to

gain the sympathy of international public opinion. In the case of Iraq, for example, the UN decided for humanitarian reasons to provide relief to Baghdad in the form of the “oil for food” program, which allowed Iraq to sell its oil abroad under conditions monitored by the UN, to buy food and medical supplies, although some of the income earned from the sale of Iraqi oil was also used to compensate claims against the Iraqi government stemming from the Gulf war.⁹¹ But at times, Iraq withheld the sale of oil as a pressure tactic on the UN, to protest the prolongation of the sanctions regime, which had been in place for over a decade.⁹² After the second Gulf War, the UN made arrangements to phase out the “oil for food” program. Furthermore, in the 1990s in other cases, the UN found that it had to take steps to prevent lawbreaking governments and warlords from profiting from the sale of gems such as diamonds and emeralds, precious minerals such as cobalt and colton, timber, elephant tusks, drugs, and even the looting of banks, as in the case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which provides the resources that permits international lawbreakers to buy the weapons and small arms that allow protracted regional conflicts to continue.⁹³

The UN, therefore, has attempted to apply “smart sanctions” against political leaders and warlords, in such states as Sierra Leone, Liberia, Angola, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, to prevent them, for example, from profiting from the sale of diamonds. For example, in the year 2000, the Security Council held a series of meetings with representatives of the worldwide diamond industry, such as the recently established World Diamond Council (created by the giant diamond company DeBeers), to deal with the global trade in illicit uncut diamonds,⁹⁴ to make it more difficult for such groups as the RUF and UNITA (The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) in Angola to profit from the sale of diamonds.⁹⁵ The way to control the trade in such conflict diamonds is to control their export to the outside world through a system of international certificates of origin.⁹⁶ But there has been some opposition to setting up an international regime that could effectively control the sale and smuggling of such conflict diamonds. For example, India, a major diamond processing center, has argued that any international regime that is set up should not impede the legal diamond trade.⁹⁷ The Russians also were concerned that efforts to deal with this problem could destroy the legal diamond market.⁹⁸ Nonetheless, the Security Council has adopted resolutions that have imposed sanctions regimes on Sierra Leone and Angola to control the export of “blood” diamonds.⁹⁹ South Africa, which is one of the world’s largest centers of diamond mining activities, also initiated a resolution, which was adopted at the fifty-fifth session of the General Assembly, setting up an international certificate of origin scheme in order to be able to tell the difference between conflict diamonds and legitimate diamonds. But it is possible to circumvent the international regime set up to control the flow of conflict diamonds by selling the diamonds through third countries that are not covered by an embargo.¹⁰⁰ UNITA has sold its diamonds through Burkino Faso, and Sierra Leone has through Liberia. To tighten up the sanctions regime in order to prevent such smuggling, the UN has also imposed sanctions against the sale of diamonds from such countries as Liberia, a conduit for the export of such diamonds, and has provided the rebels in Sierra Leone with weapons in exchange. But it is difficult to control the smuggling of diamonds. For example, about \$3 billion worth of diamonds are smuggled into Antwerp, which does a total business of about \$23 billion a year. Besides regulating blood diamonds, the UN has also tried to deal with the looting of a country like the Democratic Republic of the Congo, not only by rebels but by invading armies as well as by multinational corpo-

rations, that may be a factor in the unnecessary prolongation of the conflict there.

Finally, sanctions regimes may be weakened because third states that comply with UN sanctions in good faith may suffer economic damage without being adequately compensated by the international community, as the UN has greatly expanded the number of sanctions regimes that it instituted in the decade following the end of the Cold War. Article 50 of the UN Charter is somewhat ambiguous as to how states are to be compensated.¹⁰¹ In conclusion, the 1990s has been known as the “sanctions decade,” as efforts were made to refine their application because they were used as “blunt instruments” in the past.

The War Against Terror, Afghanistan, Iraq, and UN Peacekeeping

Following 9/11, the UN had expressed its sympathy to the US, and UN Resolution 56/1 condemned the terrorist attacks against the United States. The United Nations urged its member states to take action on the national level to deal with terrorism. A Security Council Committee on Counter-Terrorism was created to monitor the actions that members were taking to deal with terrorism.¹⁰² Members of the United Nations were also urged to ratify the twelve existing so-called sector conventions, dealing with terrorism, that had been adopted by various UN agencies over the past four decades. They deal with such issues as the hijacking of aircraft, attacks against diplomats, the taking of hostages, acts of terrorism on the high seas, and the protection of nuclear materials, among other things. After 9/11, the UN General Assembly also considered the adoption of a comprehensive convention dealing with terrorism. But given the rather controversial nature of arriving at a mutually acceptable definition of terrorism, not every member of the international community was solidly behind the adoption of an omnibus resolution in the General Assembly. By 2003, it still remained to be adopted.

As we have already seen, the inability of the UN to deal effectively with ethnic cleansing and genocide in Bosnia and Rwanda had weakened its role further as an instrument of peacekeeping in the world political system. Moreover, the role of the UN was also marginalized when the United States functioned as a global hegemon in waging the war against terrorism, seeking, if possible, legitimation for its military operations but prepared to act unilaterally or in concert with some of its closest allies in a “coalition of the willing.”

In the case of Afghanistan, a “coalition of the willing” had been sanctioned by a UN mandate in the form of Security Council Resolution 1386(2001) as Secretary-General Kofi Annan had made it clear that the United Nations did not have the resources to put a UN peacekeeping force of blue helmets into Afghanistan. In December 2001, mostly US forces and the British, with the aid of various groups and warlords in Afghanistan such as the Northern Alliance, had temporarily crushed the Taliban and Al Qaeda in the war. After some equivocation about the possibility of restoring the exiled Afghan King Mohammad Zaher Shah to power, a conference was held by the international community in Bonn, Germany, on December 5, 2001. The supposed purpose of the so-called Bonn process was to create a government that could enjoy the support of the diverse ethnic and tribal groups in Afghanistan, especially one of the most important tribes known as the Pashtuns. Most importantly for our purposes here, the Bonn process also called for the creation of an international security force to be deployed in the Afghan capital of Kabul and the surrounding areas. Therefore, in December 2001, the Security Council voted unanimously for

the creation of a multinational force (not a UN peacekeeping force) that was dubbed the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).¹⁰³ The United States, however, opposed giving ISAF the mandate to operate outside of Kabul and its environs, because Washington did not want the force to interfere with its operations in Afghanistan. This provided a model of two separate forces operating in the country. The United Kingdom played a key role in assembling the force, which by mid-August 2003 numbered about 5000.¹⁰⁴ ISAF was to be commanded by a “lead” nation, or nations, that rotated every six months.¹⁰⁵ The force was originally led by the United Kingdom and Turkey, and then by Germany and the Netherlands. It was also considered to be of critical importance that Turkey participate in the force, to underscore the fact that the military action in Afghanistan should not be interpreted as a war against Islam, cast in the mold of Huntington’s war of civilizations. It is important to point out that the ISAF was not a traditional UN force, but fit into the model of a new “generation” of multinational forces, authorized by the Security Council.

In June 2003, the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping argued that ISAF should be expanded throughout the country, which he claimed would be easier to do under NATO command.¹⁰⁶ At the time, it also appeared that the central Afghan government, led by Hamid Karzai, was losing control of some of the regions of the country, for it became increasingly more dangerous for the UN Mission in Afghanistan to operate in parts of the country that had reverted to the control of Afghan warlords, some quite hostile to the United States and to the central government. The growing chaos, as Afghanistan struggled to put together a national army capable of maintaining order, further undermined efforts to hold elections, draw up a constitution, and engage in reconstruction. Moreover, the full amount of the financial aid that had been promised to Afghanistan at the Bonn conference was never forthcoming.

On August 11, 2003, ISAF was placed under the command of NATO, ostensibly to eliminate the difficulties of finding states that were willing to serve as lead states commanding the multinational force.¹⁰⁷ The transformation of ISAF into a NATO force provided the military alliance with a base in central Asia, close to the Caspian Sea and the Middle East.

Iraq

The ability of the United Nations to function as an effective instrument of war-prevention and peacekeeping was seriously tested in the spring of 2003, when the United States launched what it dubbed a preemptive (but really preventive) war against Iraq. The avowed purpose of the war was to engage in “regime change” in order to disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction, which Washington claimed posed a threat to the national security of the United States. Saddam Hussein was demonized and painted as an evil tyrant who had not only used Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) against Iran during the Iraqi-Iranian war (1980-88) but also against his own people. As the United States tried to make the case before the international community, the main rationale for the war was that it constituted part and parcel of the “war against terror.” But the Bush administration was never able to provide the facts to establish that a definitive link existed between Hussein and Al Qaeda.¹⁰⁸ The war against terror was presented by Washington as an unconventional and asymmetrical war that was global and was aimed at destroying Al Qaeda’s terrorist networks and cells around the world, which reportedly were operating in approximately sixty countries. According to Washington, the war against terror was

not to be confined to Afghanistan, but was extended as well to states that the administration claimed were protecting and aiding terrorists. Washington was following the new strategic doctrine of preemption that had been unveiled in the National Security Strategy of September 2002. This replaced the decades-old doctrine of deterrence and containment, which essentially was a Cold War doctrine designed to prevent a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Because the main rationale for the war presented by the United States was the need to disarm Iraq of its WMD that supposedly posed a threat not only to the national security of the United States but to the maintenance of international peace and security as well,¹⁰⁹ an effort was also made to portray the war as a “just war.”¹¹⁰ A U.S. military buildup in the Gulf region in 2002 put tremendous pressure on Iraq to accept the return of a team of reconstituted UN inspectors known as UNMOVIC (the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission), led by Hans Blix as its executive chairman, to replace the inspectors who had to leave Iraq in 1998. The application of U.S. coercive diplomacy resulted in negotiations between Iraq and the UN in Vienna in which the return of the inspectors was agreed to. UNMOVIC was to deal with chemical and bacteriological weapons as well as missiles, while the IAEA would deal with Iraq’s nuclear weapons program. The Bush administration placed an enormous amount of pressure on the Security Council to make an effective system of inspections work, which would ensure that Iraq was in compliance with all of the relevant resolutions that had been adopted by the Security Council since the first Gulf War. In his speech to the United Nations on September 12, 2002, President Bush, in effect, threw down the gauntlet to the Security Council, claiming that Iraq had ignored all of the previous Security Council resolutions adopted over the past twelve years.¹¹¹ This could also be seen as an effort by Washington to buy time until its military forces were ready to attack Iraq. But before launching a “preemptive” strike, Bush was prevailed upon by the Secretary of State Colin Powell to give the UN one last chance before the dogs of war were unleashed.¹¹²

The majority of the international community opposed a war against Iraq. Most of the members of the UN emphasized that every diplomatic opportunity should be exhausted to resolve the crisis, and that war should only be considered as a last resort. Furthermore, in the debate that took place in the Security Council on October 17, 2002, a number of delegates, especially the French, also stressed the broader ramifications of the manner in which the crisis was resolved, not only for the United Nations, but for the entire international system as well.¹¹³ Clearly, the authority and the credibility of the United Nations were at stake, and there was the fear that the United Nations had failed to maintain international order just as the League of Nations had failed as an instrument of collective security in the interwar period.

The “last chance” for Iraq, took the form of the adoption of Security Council resolution 1441 on November 8, 2002, which was the product of about two months of intensive negotiations.¹¹⁴ It stated that Iraq was in “material breach” of previous Security Council resolutions and that “serious consequences” would follow if Baghdad did not cooperate fully with the enhanced and strengthened UN and IAEA inspection teams, which were expected to function in an impartial and objective manner. Resolution 1441 provided the inspectors with unimpeded access to sites such as the presidential palaces, which had previously been off limits. Inspectors also had the right to interview Iraqi experts who had been involved in the development of WMD, although they encountered a fair amount of obstruction from the Iraqi government. Furthermore, Iraq was given thirty days from the date of the

adoption of the resolution to issue a declaration providing accurate information vis-à-vis the status of its programs of WMD. Any falsehood or misrepresentation in the declaration would be considered as a “material breach” and therefore could be followed by “serious consequences,” which were not defined anywhere but everyone assumed that it meant the application of military force.

The United States, although a co-sponsor of the resolution, had been reluctant to bring the matter back to the Security Council in the first place, but the negotiations involved in the drafting of the resolution probably did allow it to buy some further time to continue its military buildup in the region. The unanimous adoption of the resolution was designed to convey to Iraq the sense of unity of the Security Council and the international community. The resolution was also based on the idea expressed by a number of delegations, that all diplomatic means had to be exhausted before military force could be used. France, in particular, stressed that the resolution set up a two-step process that did not include an automatic trigger that would authorize the use of military force.¹¹⁵ According to Washington, though, “material breaches” of Security Council resolutions 678 and 687 had already nullified the cease-fire that had been in place since 1991. According to the French interpretation of resolution 1441, the first step of the resolution defined the conditions that Iraq had to meet, setting up the “rules of the game,” based on full proactive Iraqi cooperation with the inspectors who would report back to the Security Council. The second step would consist of holding another Security Council meeting to consider the course of action in the face of Iraqi material breach and non-compliance, which even the French conceded would not exclude “any alternative.” The Secretary-General hailed the adoption of the resolution as a decision that had strengthened the role of the Security Council and the United Nations in the international system.¹¹⁶ But he also added that “this is a time of trial for Iraq, for the United Nations, and the world.”¹¹⁷

In comparison to the United States and the United Kingdom, the three other permanent members of the Security Council (France, China, and Russia) were opposed to the Security Council adopting a follow-up resolution authorizing the United States to use military force and lead a “coalition of the willing” against Iraq. At the time, the unanimous adoption of resolution 1441 was hailed by most members of the UN as a step that showed the resolve and unity of the international community and strengthened the role and the credibility of the UN as an actor in the international system. In broader terms, it also fit in with the overall strategy of states like France, a grand strategy designed to use UN institutions like the Security Council as part of a plan to construct a multipolar balance of states in the international system to check the power of the United States as a global hegemon.

But from the U.S. point of view, a 12,000-page declaration that was issued by Iraq on December 7, 2002, that purported to comply with the terms of resolution 1441 was not satisfactory. Washington claimed that it was inaccurate, and contained material from previous reports, as the Iraqi government continued to argue that it possessed no weapons of mass destruction

On the other hand, Hans Blix of UNMOVIC seemed to be at loggerheads with the Bush administration on this issue. On January 27, 2003, the Security Council met to consider the reports of Blix and Mohamed ElBaradei, the director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency. For example, Blix stated on January 27, 2003, that the Iraqi declaration contained “a good deal of new information,” that dealt with “missiles and biotechnology.”¹¹⁸ He also focused on some problems that needed to be resolved from the previous war, such as the disposition of such biological weapons

as anthrax and vx, as well as chemical weapon shells.¹¹⁹ Blix also expressed his concern about the production of missiles by Iraq that exceeded the permissible UN range of 150 kilometers¹²⁰ (although Iraq later destroyed some of them). But Blix also stressed that Iraq was cooperating with the UNMOVIC inspectors and that the inspectors should be given more time before there was a rush to war.

Mohamed ElBaradei also flatly stated, in stark contrast to the Bush administration, in his testimony before the Security Council on January 27, 2003, that his “agency had found no evidence that Iraq had revived its nuclear weapons programme since the elimination of the programme in the 1990s.”¹²¹ Given time, the IAEA could provide “credible assurance” that Iraq was not involved in a nuclear weapons program. Furthermore, ElBaradei disagreed with the Bush administration that aluminum tubing that had been purchased by Iraq could be used to construct nuclear centrifuges.¹²²

Nonetheless, on February 5, 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell presented the U.S. case that Iraq was continuing its WMD program in defiance of the international community, and that Iraq was therefore in material breach of resolution 1441, as well as previous UN resolutions that had been adopted on the matter.¹²³ A series of arguments were presented by the Bush administration as to why it was thought necessary to launch a preemptive war against Iraq. Powell argued that “Saddam Hussein was determined to keep his weapons of mass destruction and make more,”¹²⁴ and that the “United States could not take the risk that these weapons would be used against the American people at some point.”¹²⁵

But in March 2003, the United States was unable to secure the adoption by the necessary majority of nine out of fifteen votes, of a draft resolution (co-sponsored by Spain and the United Kingdom) authorizing military action as a follow-up to resolution 1441. This represented an unsuccessful American effort to secure collective legitimation for the launching of a preemptive war against Iraq. A number of leading international lawyers argued that such an attack would constitute a violation of international law and a violation of the obligations it held under the Charter as a member of the UN. For instance, article 2, section 4, of the Charter prohibits the use or the threat of the use of force against a state.¹²⁶

One of the arguments made by the supporters of the Bush administration was that the United States, as a sovereign state, had the right to engage in self-defense. Indeed, article 51 of the UN Charter establishes this right, which gives a state the right of self-defense against an armed attack, but stipulates that this has to be subsequently approved by the Security Council.¹²⁷ But as also stipulated in article 51, self-defense could only be exercised after an armed attack had occurred, as opposed to the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense that was presented by the Bush administration to justify military action undertaken against an imminent threat.¹²⁸

In March 2003, though, there was no evidence that Iraq had been involved in the 9/11 attack on the United States. At least in the eyes of its critics, the United States had not definitively established the existence of ties between Iraq and Al Qaeda.¹²⁹ The Bush administration also argued that Iraq was in material breach of Security Council resolutions 678 and 687.¹³⁰ Washington believed apparently that the charge of material breach provided it with the justification to argue that the cease-fire that had been established in resolution 678 should be considered suspended, and that it could use all means necessary to deal with the breach as called for in that resolution. Spain, which had been one of the staunchest supporters of the Bush administration and one of the co-sponsors of the draft resolution calling for military action as a follow-up to resolution 1441, also argued in the Security Council on March 19,

2003, that resolution 687, legitimizing all means necessary to ensure Iraqi compliance was still in effect and had only been held in abeyance since the adoption of the cease-fire called for in resolution 678.

But the Russian Federation, France, and China plus non-permanent member of the Security Council Germany opposed the use of military force to secure Iraqi compliance.¹³¹ German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, after pointing out that Germany had willingly participated in the “war against terrorism” in the ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) in Afghanistan, raised the question as to whether “the problem which the UN encountered in working towards the disarmament of Iraq, should seriously be regarded as grounds for war with all of its terrible consequences.”¹³² Germany further argued that there was “no basis in the UN Charter for regime change by military means.”¹³³ The German foreign minister concluded that “we do not live on Venus but rather we are survivors of Mars.”¹³⁴ The Russian Federation stressed that resolution 1441 gave “no one the right to the automatic use of force.”¹³⁵ France threatened to veto any resolution that authorized the use of military force against Iraq, stressing that “war can only be a last resort, while collective responsibility remains the rule.”¹³⁶ It is also important to point out that China, another permanent member of the Security Council, opposed the use of military force against Iraq as a follow-up to resolution 1441.

A majority of the members of the UN opposed the war. At a meeting of the Security Council on March 12, 2003, most of the African members of the General Assembly expressed their opposition to the war, unless the use of force was sanctioned by the Security Council. The African states were concerned not only about the fact that the unilateral use of military force would constitute a violation of international law and the UN Charter, but also would have adverse economic consequences for the continent as well. Earlier, on February 3, 2003, the African Union had stressed that “multilateral cooperation was the only option.”¹³⁷ Furthermore, the United States was urged by the European Union, the Non-Aligned Movement, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and the Arab League not to rush into war. Earlier in the debate, Arab states such as Lebanon had emphasized what it considered to be the double-standard that was followed by the United States in tolerating Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons, while advocating the use of military force to disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction.¹³⁸ It should also be pointed out, however, that there were a number of countries, such as Albania, Japan, El Salvador, Georgia, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Latvia, that did support the position of the United States.¹³⁹

Operating under the threat of a French veto, the United States engaged in a frenetic amount of diplomatic activity to gather up the necessary majority of nine votes out of fifteen for a resolution to gain some semblance of legitimacy for military action, by attempting to persuade some of the non-permanent members of the Security Council to vote for it. Spain and Bulgaria were aligned with the United States on this issue, but other non-permanent members such as Mexico, Angola, and Cameroon, aligned themselves with the French position, and would not vote for the adoption of a resolution calling for the use of force against Iraq.

Not being able to secure the adoption of the resolution authorizing the use of force, the United States and the United Kingdom launched the war against Iraq in March 2003 without any authorization from the Security Council. At a Security Council meeting on March 26, 2003, Secretary-General Kofi Annan expressed his “profound . . . sadness” and sympathy for the Iraqi people. In the postwar stage of the crisis, attention was focused on the restoration of the unity of the Security Coun-

cil, which had been fractured by the divisions over the Iraqi war, and in a broader sense to restore the central role of the Security Council as a major actor in the international system in the maintenance of international peace and security. Before the war had been launched, Kofi Annan had warned the United States that it might need the UN later, a prediction that turned out to be quite true. But Annan had stated on August 22, 2003, that UN blue helmets “would not take over from the coalition, since it did not have the resources to do so, but broached the idea of a Security Council mandated force,” a multinational force. The coalition occupying Iraq, which consisted of the United States, the UK, and a few other allied states, would need a UN “umbrella” or mandate to persuade states like France (already somewhat overextended in other UN peacekeeping ventures in 2003), Germany, and Russia to participate in a “post-conflict” stabilization force. This task was complicated by the failure of the Bush administration to initially secure collective legitimation from the UN for going to war.

As resistance to the coalition occupation force in Iraq mounted, the United States found that France, Germany, Russia, India, and Pakistan, were not willing to internationalize an occupation force without Security Council authorization, a timetable to restore Iraqi sovereignty, and a greater role in the administration of postwar Iraq.¹⁴⁰ In the fall of 2003, negotiations were still continuing on the terms and conditions concerning the adoption of a Security Council resolution that would serve as the basis for a multinational force in Iraq. There were some countries that indicated that they would be willing to help the United States in Iraq, including the “new” Europeans such as the former communist states of Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Romania, as well as Spain, among others. But obviously, these countries did not have the military capacity that larger powers such as the “old” Europeans like France and Germany could bring to bear.¹⁴¹ In sum, the effects of the Second Gulf War on the concept of UN peacekeeping might best be summed up by a statement made by Germany at the 4,818th meeting of the Security Council on August 23, 2003, that “peacekeeping by its very nature must remain compatible with the universal role of the UN and the principle of international solidarity.”

The Reform of UN Peacekeeping: Conclusion

The dark memories of Rwanda and Srebrenica have also propelled the United Nations in the direction of finding ways to improve its capacity to engage in peacekeeping.¹⁴² Also, the second Gulf War has again raised the issue of creating a permanent standing force for the UN, as called for in the UN Charter, as discussed in the introductory section of this work. But the members of the UN still would be reluctant to surrender their sovereignty over their military forces to such an international organization. Moreover, there is no desire either to create an international force of mercenaries that could be quickly dispatched to a conflict, a sort of international French Foreign Legion that owed its allegiance to no state but to the United Nations.¹⁴³

Since peacekeeping represents an ad hoc invention, the UN will have to continue to improvise. The best that the UN can do is to deal with more recent reform proposals that have emphasized the need for a greater degree of transparency in making peacekeeping and sanctions decisions (some developing countries believe that the imposition of sanctions against Third World states represent a form of discrimination), more input from the General Assembly that developing countries consider a

much more democratic institution than the Security Council, and more focus on clear entrance and exit strategies when a peacekeeping operation is originally mandated. Furthermore, a blue-ribbon Panel of Experts on Peacekeeping submitted a report in August 2000 (the Brahimi Report) that recommended a number of steps, including strengthening the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations, which has been greatly under-financed and understaffed.

After the second Gulf War, Secretary-General Annan urged that the time had arrived for major institutional reforms in the structure of the world organization. An increase in the number of permanent and non-permanent members of the Security Council, which has been discussed at the UN for years, would certainly democratize and make the Security Council more representative, perhaps generating enhanced legitimacy for its peacekeeping operations. In connection with an expansion of the Security Council, it has been suggested that the Military Staff Committee, which has been mostly moribund since its creation, could be expanded to include more representatives of the Third World, and could then function in an advisory capacity on peacekeeping and peace-enforcement issues. In an effort to improve its capacity to function as a more effective instrument of peacekeeping, the Security Council has undertaken more fact-finding field missions within the past few years to conflict-ridden areas, and has engaged in open discussions on various facets of improving peacekeeping (such as the need to consult more with troop-contributing countries about questions dealing with the renewal of a mandate or the termination of an operation).

The UN has also put more emphasis on the need to prevent conflicts and potential conflicts from developing, before they escalate out of control. It has also been suggested that the Secretary-General should make greater use of his prerogatives under article 99 of the Charter (to bring to the Security Council an issue that threatens the maintenance of international peace and security) although this does carry with it the risk of a confrontation with a permanent member of the Security Council, as Dag Hammarskjöld discovered during the Congo crisis.¹⁴⁴ As the Secretary-General stressed in a recent report on conflict prevention, the responsibility of preventing conflicts rests with the national governments themselves.¹⁴⁵ The preventive deployment of troops based on the model of UNPREDEP (the UN Preventive Deployment Force) in Macedonia — which may have helped to contain the turmoil in Serbia from spilling over into the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia before it was withdrawn — is another possible model for conflict prevention in war-ridden regions of the world.¹⁴⁶ Even though the UN has now realized that it cannot bring peace to an area unless the parties to a dispute want it themselves, it has been suggested that the UN should enhance its capacity to utilize early-warning systems to alert the international community to a crisis escalating out of control. The Department of Political Affairs in the Secretariat has the responsibility of monitoring crises and potential crises and should be able to indicate when a situation is going to escalate into a serious conflict, so that the UN can avoid finding itself caught by surprise as it was in the case of East Timor in 1999 (although the Department of Political Affairs can also be overwhelmed with the amount of information that it has to process.)

The Brahimi report also stressed that the mandates of peacekeeping operations must be clear and not ambiguous (often peacekeeping mandates may be the result of diplomatic bargaining that represents the lowest common denominator that is acceptable to the members of the Security Council). Furthermore, the Brahimi report, as well as other proposals, have stressed that the Security Council should not authorize

mandates that cannot be implemented just to create the impression that something is being done in response to international public opinion

One of the main problems with peacekeeping is that it takes too long to deploy a force. The United Nations has created a rapid reaction force, the Stand-By High-Readiness Brigades (SHIRBRIG), that ideally should move quickly into a conflict situation. But states that have promised to supply troops should be willing to actually allow them to be used for such a force, so that they can be rapidly deployed in a conflict without delay. Furthermore, the agreements called for in article 43 of the Charter, whereby states agree to provide military forces to the Security Council should finally be negotiated, although the United States would probably not participate in the creation of any UN standby force.¹⁴⁷ Other member states of the UN also are not yet ready to surrender their sovereignty over the troops that they contribute to UN peacekeeping operations, which would be entailed in the creation of a UN standing or more permanent type of force. Additionally, more civilian police officers should be on call and available to the UN for service in a peacekeeping operation as suggested by the Brahimi report. Certainly there are practical changes that can be made in the machinery and infrastructure of peacekeeping, although as always in international relations, the critical element in the establishment of sustainable peace is the willingness of the Great Powers to act and to try and go beyond, as Kofi Annan has said, a narrow conception of their national interest and be impelled by a broader, more collective sense that their national interest lies with world society as a whole. Z¹⁴⁸

Notes

1. For the classic statement of the realist approach to international relations, see Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985); also see Robert Keohane, *Neorealism and Its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986).
2. As G. John Ikenberry notes, "Skepticism within the British government remained over the workings of the League of Nations, but most officials saw it as a way to tie the United States into more active involvement in Europe." See G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 143.
3. See William R. Keylor, *The Twentieth-Century World: An International History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 85.
4. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, "The Liberal Agenda for Peace :International Relations Theory and the Future of the United Nations," in *Preferred Futures for the United Nations*, ed. Saul H. Mendlovitz and Burns H. Weston (New York: Irvington-on-Hudson, 1995), 96.
5. For an excellent discussion and critique of the principles of collective security, see Inis Claude Jr., *Power and International Relations* (New York: Random House, 1962), 94-204.
6. See Robert C. Johansen, "Enhancing United Nations Peacekeeping," in *The Future of the United Nations System*, ed. Chadwick F. Alger (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1998), 123.
7. Dennis C. Jett, *Why Peacekeeping Fails* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 169; also see A. B. Fetherston, *Towards A Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping* (London: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 20; also see *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations*, U.N. Doc., A/50/60-S/1990/1, January 3, 1995, 3.
8. Article 2(7) reads: "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic

- jurisdiction of any state or shall require the members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII"; see A. Leroy Bennett, *International Organizations: Principles and Issues* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1984), 458.
9. For example, speaking at the 55th session of the UN General Assembly in fall 2000, President Clinton said: "These conflicts present us with a stark challenge. Are they part of the scourge the United Nations was established to prevent? If so, we must respect sovereignty and territorial integrity, but still find a way to protect people as well as borders." Retrieved from <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/a55/pv.3.pdf>.
 10. Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument With Historical Illustrations* (New York: Basic Books, 1977), 107.
 11. See *Boston Globe*, September 21, 1999, A8.
 12. Fetherston, *Towards a Theory*, 11.
 13. Raimo Vayrynen, "Enforcement and Humanitarian Intervention: Two Forms of Collective Action by the United Nations," in Alger, *The Future of the United Nations System*, 56.
 14. See, for example, John G. Stoessinger, *Why Nations Go to War* (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2001).
 15. As Susan Woodward writes concerning U.S. policy towards the former Yugoslavia, "policymakers were unwilling to commit substantial U.S. resources or any troops to an area no longer of vital strategic interest." See Susan L. Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1995), 158.
 16. Unfortunately, in the case of the League of Nations, the application of economic sanctions was almost diluted immediately after its creation by the adoption of a resolution by the League Assembly in 1921, which left it up to each member of the League to decide whether or not to participate in a sanctions regime. See Bennett, *International Organizations*, 37.
 17. Joshua S. Goldstein, *International Relations* (New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 2001), 199.
 18. As quoted in Arnold J. Toynbee's *War and Civilization* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1950), 16.
 19. For a further discussion of this idea, see Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky, *The Real World Order: Zones of Peace/Zones of Turmoil* (Chatham: Chatham House Publishers, 1996).
 20. Also see Zeev Maoz, "The Controversy Over the Democratic Peace: Rearguard Action or Cracks in the Wall?" *International Security* 22, no.1 (Summer 1997): 162-98.
 21. See James Lee Ray, *Democracy and International Conflict* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1998), 16, 30.
 22. See Christopher Layne, "Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace," in *The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security*, eds. Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995), 326.
 23. Ruth Russell, *The United Nations and United States Security Policy* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1968), 51.
 24. See Seyom Brown, *The Causes and Prevention of War* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 179.
 25. See William R. Keylor, *The Twentieth Century World: An International History* (New York: Oxford University Press), chapter 4.
 26. See Fetherston, *Towards a Theory*, 8; also see Clark M. Eichelberger, *Organizing for Peace: A Personal History of the Founding of the United Nations* (New York: Harper and Row, 1977); also see Robert A. Divine, *Second Chance* (New York: Atheneum, 1967)
 27. For some discussion at the San Francisco Conference of the decision to have members of the UN enter into agreements to provide national contingents to an international force that would be placed under the aegis of the Security Council, see *Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco*,

- 12 (New York: United Nations Information Organization, 1945), 279.
28. Kumar Rupesinghe, "Coping with Internal Conflicts: Teaching the Elephants to Dance," in Alger, *The Future of the United Nations System*, 157.
 29. See Paul F. Diehl, *International Peacekeeping* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 5.
 30. See Dan Lindley, "Collective Security Organizations and Internal Conflict," in *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*, ed. Michael E. Brown (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996), 551.
 31. For a very critical study of the UN role in Somalia, see John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope* (Washington: United States Institute for Peace Press, 1995).
 32. Johansen, "Enhancing United Nations Peacekeeping," 92.
 33. See Meredith Reid Sarkees, Frank Whelon Way, J. David Singer, "Inter-State, Intra State, and Extra-State Wars: A Comprehensive Look at their Distribution Over Time, 1816-1997," *International Studies Quarterly* 47 (2003): 47, 49-70.
 34. Thomas G. Weiss, "The United Nations and Civil Wars at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century," in *The United Nations and Civil Wars*, ed. Thomas G. Weiss (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), 193.
 35. For works about UN operations in the Congo in the early 1960s, see Conor Cruise O'Brien, *To Katanga and Back* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1962); Ernest W. Lefever, *Uncertain Mandate* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967); Ernest W. Lefever, *Crisis in the Congo: A UN Force in Action* (The Brookings Institution, 1965); Linda B. Miller, *World Order and Local Disorder: The United Nations and Internal Conflicts* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967).
 36. For the concept of different generations of peacekeeping, see Karen A. Mingst and Margaret P. Karns, *The United Nations in the Post-Cold War Era* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2000).
 37. For an excellent study of UNEF I, see Gabriella Rosner, *The United Nations Emergency Force* (New York: Columbia University, 1963).
 38. For further insights into Hammarskjöld's role as peacekeeper and peacemaker, see Brian Urquhart, *Hammarskjöld* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972); Leon Gordenker, *The UN Secretary-General and the Maintenance of Peace* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967); Joseph P. Lash, *Dag Hammarskjöld: Custodian of the Brush-fire Peace* (New York: Doubleday, 1961); Emery Kellen, *Hammarskjöld* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1966).
 39. See James A. Stegenga, *The United Nations Force in Cyprus* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1968).
 40. Johansen, "Enhancing United Nations Peacekeeping," 95.
 41. Margaret P. Karns and Karen A. Mingst, "The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping and Peacemaking: Lessons from the Past and Challenges for the Future," in *World Security: Challenges for a New Century*, ed. Michael T. Klare and Yogesh Chandrani (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), 208.
 42. Rupesinghe, "Coping with Internal Conflicts," 161.
 43. For a view that the UN peacekeeping operation in Kampuchea was not that successful, see Janet E. Heininger, *Peacekeeping in Transition: The United Nations in Cambodia* (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1994), 145; for a contrary view, see Lindley, "Collective Security Organizations," 546.
 44. It should be noted that observer operations are somewhat different from peacekeeping operations, although they can work in tandem with peacekeeping operations, or even be incorporated into them. For a comprehensive study of peace observation, see David Wainhouse, *International Peace Observation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1969).
 45. For a critical view that the peace-building strategy followed by the United Nations involves an effort to impose Western liberal values on the states where they take place, see Roland Paris, "Broadening the Study of Peace Operations," *International Studies Review* 2, no.3 (Fall 2000): 27-44.
 46. Also see James N. Rosenau, *The United Nations in a Turbulent World* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992).
 47. For an excellent study of the genocide that was committed in Rwanda, see Philip Gourevitch, *We Wish To Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our*

- Families (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1998).
48. *The United Nations and Rwanda 1995-1996*. The United Nations Blue Book Series, 10 (New York: Department of Political Information United Nations, 1966), 3; for a general discussion of genocide, also see Winston E. Langley, *Encyclopedia of Human Rights Issues Since 1945* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1999), 133-134.
 49. *Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda*. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/News/oss/g/rwanda_report.htm.
 50. Alain O. Destexhe, *Rwanda and Genocide in the Twentieth Century* (New York: New York University Press, 1995), 29.
 51. Gourevitch, *We Wish to Inform You*, 179; also see Matthew Vaccaro, "The Politics of Genocide: Peacekeeping and Disaster Relief in Rwanda," in *UN Peacekeeping: American Politics and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s*, ed. William J. Durch (London: Macmillan, 1997), 369.
 52. L. R. Melvern, *A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide* (London: Zed Books, 2000), 24.
 53. See Samantha Power, *A Problem From Hell: America and the Age of Genocide* (New York: Basic Books, 2003), 332.
 54. Ivo H. Daalder, "Knowing When to Say No: The Development of US Policy for Peacekeeping," in Durch, *UN Peacekeeping*, 54; also see William Shawcross, *Deliver Us From Evil: Peacekeepers, Warlords and a World of Endless Conflict* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000), 25.
 55. Hirsch and Oakley, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope*, 159; also see Edward C. Luck, *Mixed Messages: American Politics and International Organization 1919-1999* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), 190-91. The U.S. had also failed to pay its peacekeeping dues to the UN for a number of reasons including demands that the organization engage in wide-ranging management and budgetary reforms. On December 26, 2000, due to the extraordinary efforts of USUN Ambassador Richard Holbrook, the U.S. and other members of the United Nations finally reached a compromise agreement in which Washington would pay what it owed in return for a reduction in its assessments to the world organization. This replaced the formula for calculating peacekeeping assessments that had existed since 1973 when UNEF II (the second United Nations Emergency Force) had been set up. See Steven A. Dimoff, "General Assembly Reduces U.S. Financing of UN," *The Interdependent* 20, no.4(2001): 10; The financial veto wielded by the U.S. was similar to Soviet behavior in refusing to pay for the financial upkeep of UNEF and ONUC in the 1960s, with the Soviets arguing that these peacekeeping operations were illegal and were designed to advance the hegemony of the U.S. and NATO. See King Gordon, *The United Nations in the Congo* (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1962), 158; also see John G. Stoessinger, *The United Nations and the Superpowers* (New York: Random House, 1965), 90-113.
 56. Gourevitch, *We Wish To Inform You*, 153; also see Andrea Kathryn Talentino, "Rwanda," in *The Costs of Conflict Prevention and Care in the Global Arena*, ed. Michael E. Brown and Richard N. Rosecrance (London: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1999), 159.
 57. Gourevitch, *We Wish to Inform You*, 103; also see Michael Barnett, *Eyewitness to Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), 77-78.
 58. Melvern, *A People Betrayed*, 230; Gourevitch, *We Wish to Inform You*, 150; Talentino, "Rwanda," 55.
 59. Benjamin A. Valentino, "Still Standing By: Why America and the International Community Fail to Prevent Genocide and Mass Killing," *Perspectives on Politics* 1, no.3 (September 2003): 573.
 60. William J. Durch, "Keeping the Peace: Politics and Lessons of the 1990s," in Durch, *UN Peacekeeping*, 14; Gourevitch, *We Wish to Inform You*, 150.
 61. Vaccaro, "The Politics of Genocide," 40.
 62. Daalder, "Knowing When to Say No," 51.
 63. Gourevitch, *We Wish to Inform You*, 158; Vaccaro, "The Politics of Genocide," 38.
 64. For an excellent analysis of the collapse of Yugoslavia, and the role of the international community there, see Susan L. Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Disso-*

- lution After the Cold War (Washington: The Brookings Institution Press, 1995).
65. *Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35: The Fall of Srebrenica* (November 15, 1999), 6. Retrieved from <http://www.un.org/peace/srebrenica.pdf>.
 66. *The Fall of Srebrenica*, 83.
 67. *Ibid.*, 61.
 68. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *Unvanquished: A U.S.-U.N. Saga* (New York: Random House, 1999), 238; also see Jan Willem Honig and Norbert Both, *Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime* (New York: Penguin Books, 1997), 135; also see *The Fall of Srebrenica*, 60.
 69. See Robert Weiner, *Change in Eastern Europe* (Westport: Praeger, 1994), 141.
 70. For the notion that Srebrenica was sacrificed by the Bosnians as part of a deal for the exchange of territory with the Serbs, see David Rhode, *End Game: The Betrayal and Fall of Srebrenica* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 401.
 71. See Boutros-Ghali, *Unvanquished*, 239; also see Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, *Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary Conflict* (Polity Press, 1996), 184.
 72. *The Fall of Srebrenica*, 108.
 73. Boutros-Ghali, *Unvanquished*, 239.
 74. *The Fall of Srebrenica*, 55.
 75. For example, on December 19, 2000, the Security Council failed to adopt a resolution calling for the deployment of an observer force in the Occupied Territories of Palestine by a vote eight in favor and seven abstentions. The governments voting in favor were Bangladesh, China, Jamaica, Malaysia, Mali, Namibia, Tunisia, and Ukraine. See *UN News*, December 19, 2000. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/page_2.html#5.
 76. For more information about Kosovo, see *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo, S/2001/565*, June 7, 2001. Retrieved from <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/report/20001/563e.pdf>.
 77. China called the NATO intervention in Kosovo an "ominous precedent" and a "violation of the UN Charter." For the Chinese position on Kosovo, see http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/page_2.html#35; also see Bates Gill and James Reilly, "Sovereignty, Intervention and Peacekeeping: The View From Beijing," *Survival* 42, no.3(Autumn 2000): 46.
 78. Diana Ayton-Shenker and John Tessitore, eds. *A Global Agenda: Issues Before the 56th General Assembly of the United Nations* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2002), 56.
 79. David M. Malone and Ramesh Thakur, "UN Peacekeeping: Lessons Learned," *Global Governance* 7, no. 1(January-March 2001): 11.
 80. See Margaret P. Karns and Karen A. Mingst, "Peacekeeping and the Changing Role of the United Nations: Four Dilemmas," in *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, ed. Ramesh Thakur and Albrecht Schnabel (Tokyo: United Nations Press, 2001), 215-37.
 81. See Kofi Annan, "Two Concepts of Sovereignty," *The Economist*, September 18, 1999. Retrieved from <http://www.un.org/News/osg/sg/stories/Kaecon/html>.
 82. *New York Times*, April 24, 2001, A4; also see Ayton-Shenker and Tessitore, *A Global Agenda*, 20.
 83. See David A. Lake, "Regional Security Complexes: A Systems Approach," in *Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World*, ed. David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 43.
 84. See Alan S. Henrikson, "The Growth of Regional Organizations and the Role of the United Nations," in *Regionalism in World Politics*, ed., Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 125.
 85. *Ibid.*, 128.
 86. A multinational force, approved by Security Council Resolution 1264 on October 25, 1999, and led by Australia, was deployed in East Timor with the permission of Indonesia. This was followed by the deployment of a multidimensional peacekeeping force consisting of over 8000 troops under the aegis of UNTAET (the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor) authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 1272. UNTAET has been engaged in a process of "Timorization" of East Timor

- by preparing it for independence since 1991, a goal that was accomplished.
87. Louise Fawcett, "Regionalism in Historical Perspective," in Fawcett, *Regionalism in World Politics*, 32; For an argument that favors relying on regional hegemony to maintain order via the creation of "benign spheres of influence" see Weiss, *The United Nations and Civil Wars*, 195.
 88. See Inis Claude Jr., "Collective Security as an Approach to Peace," in *Classic Readings of International Relations*, ed. Phil Williams, Donald M. Goldstein, and Jay M. Shafritz (Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1997), 47.
 89. In the case of the application of sanctions by the UN against the Taliban, see Juan Emilio Ane and Edward Thomas, "New Afghan Sanctions Stir UN Debate," *The Interdependent* 26, no. 4 (Winter 2001): 11.
 90. See "Speech to CNN," June 1, 2001. Retrieved from <http://www.un.org/News/sg/sg/cu/0500.htm>.
 91. Iraq has earned about \$40 billion since the "oil-for-food" program began in 1996. Retrieved from <http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/page2.html#24>; also see Ayton-Shenker and Tessitore, *A Global Agenda*, 44.
 92. *New York Times*, June 4, 2001, A7.
 93. See "The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa," April 16, 1998. Retrieved from <http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/sgreport/index.html>.
 94. The trade in illegal rough diamonds is worth about \$7 billion a year; see *UN Document, A/55/PV.79*, December 1, 2000, 1; also see *New York Times* January 19, 2001, W1.
 95. Retrieved from <http://www.un.org/peace/Africa/Diamond.html>.
 96. "See General Assembly Adopts Resolution on Conflict Diamonds," December 1, 2000. Retrieved from <http://www.un.org/peace/Africa/Diamond.html>; Also see David Cortright and George A. Lopez, *Sanctions and the Search for Security* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, Publisher, 2002), 80.
 97. See *UN Document, A/55/PV.79*, December 1, 2000, 8.
 98. *Ibid.*, 9.
 99. Security Council Resolution 1306, adopted on July 5, 2000, prohibited "the importation of all rough diamonds from Sierra Leone"; also see Ayton-Shenker and Tessitore, *A Global Agenda*, 10; the prohibition was subsequently lifted in 2003 because the UN claimed that Sierra Leone had made progress in efforts to control the trade in illicit diamonds.
 100. *New York Times*, October 28, 2000, A5.
 101. The relevant portion of article 50 reads that a state "which finds itself confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of these measures shall have the right to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of those problems."; see Bennett, *International Organizations*, 467; also see John Strelau, *Sharpening International Sanctions: Toward a Stronger Role for the United Nations* (New York: Carnegie Corporation, 1996), 41.
 102. "Report of the Policy Working Group on the United Nations and Terrorism," Retrieved from <http://www.un.org/terrorism/657273.htm>.
 103. About 30 states had contributed to it by the summer of 2003. For example, Romania, an aspiring NATO member, had made its own "niche" contribution in the form of mountain troops, which it had flown into Afghanistan.
 104. *New York Times*, August 28, 2003, A5.
 105. See Ayton-Shenker and Tessitore, *A Global Agenda*, 99; It is interesting to note that the German Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer, made a point of stressing the participation of his country in the war in Afghanistan, when presenting the position of his government in opposition to the use of military force against Iraq in the spring of 2003.
 106. This would provide NATO with a presence in Central Asia, and meant that yet another multinational force, sanctioned by the UN Security Council, would be controlled by NATO. UN-sanctioned NATO multinational forces have been operating in Bosnia and Kosovo as well. Also see "NATO Considers Limited Deployment of ISAF Troops Beyond Kabul." Retrieved from <http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2003/06/6-SWA/swa-200603.asp>.
 107. See "NATO Takes Command of ISAF." Retrieved from <http://www.rferl.org/>

- newsline/fulltext.asp.
108. See James P. Rubin, "Stumbling Into War," *Foreign Affairs* 82, no.5 (September/October 2003): 48.
 109. Retrieved from <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/sc7536.doc.htm>.
 110. For more on the concept of the just war, see Walzer, *Just and Unjust War*.
 111. Also see Bob Woodward, *Bush at War* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002), 335-36.
 112. See Woodward, *Bush at War*, 346; on September 30, 2001, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said, "Preemption was going to be necessary and probably sooner rather than later." See Woodward, *Bush at War*, 176.
 113. Concern was expressed about "the future of world order, relations between North and South, relations with the Arab world." Retrieved from <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/sc7536.doc.htm>.
 114. Probably, much to the consternation of the United States, an entente of sorts was formed between Mexico and France, which clearly worked together as a team during this process.
 115. See the statement by France at a meeting of the Security Council on October 17, 2002. Retrieved from <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/sc7536.doc.htm>.
 116. See "Secretary-General's Statement on the Adoption of Security Council Resolution 1441 on Iraq." Retrieved from <http://www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=146>.
 117. Ibid.
 118. See "Press Release, SC/7644, 27/01/2003, "Security Council Briefed by Chief UN Weapons Experts on First 60 Days of Inspection." Retrieved from <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2003/sc7644.doc.htm>.
 119. See Ibid.
 120. Ibid.
 121. Ibid.
 122. Ibid.
 123. UN Press Release, SC/7658,05/02/2003, "Briefing Security Council, Secretary of State Powell Presents Evidence of Iraq's Failure to Disarm." Retrieved from <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2003/sc7658.doc.htm>.
 124. Ibid.
 125. Ibid.
 126. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, "The Will to Make It Work," *The Washington Post*, March 2, 2003, B01. Retrieved from <http://www.ASIL.org/slaughter.pdf>; also see Clyde Eagleton, *International Government* (New York: The Ronald Press, 1957), 610.
 127. Article 51 opens with the following sentence: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense."
 128. For example, the notion of anticipatory self-defense as presented by the Bush administration, did not fit the test of immediacy of an imminent attack as elaborated by Secretary of State Daniel Webster in the *Caroline* case in 1837. When the British attacked the *Caroline* on U.S. territory because it was anticipated that it would aid Canadian revolutionaries, an attack from the ship was not imminent, and therefore the British preemptive strike was not justifiable. See Frederick L. Kiurgis, "ASIL Insights: Pre-emptive Action to Forestall Terrorism." Retrieved from <http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh88.htm>.
 129. Some effort had been made to establish that one of the leaders of the hijackers had met with Iraqi intelligence before the attack on 9/11, but this had not been definitely established either.
 130. The phrase "material breach" was drawn from article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. However, the Vienna Convention dealt with multilateral treaties, not Security Council resolutions. The question was raised by critics of the U.S. position as to whether in this regard a multilateral treaty could be equated with a resolution.
 131. Although Germany was a non-permanent member of the Security Council, it carried considerable weight in the international community, because of its position in the international structure of power, especially when aligned with other permanent members of the Security Council. Furthermore, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, the leader of the Social Democratic Party, had campaigned for reelection on a platform that opposed the war, which created a highly visible strain in German-

US relations. Also, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer was a member of the pacifist oriented Green Party.

132. UN Doc., S/PV.4721, March 19, 2003, 4.
133. Ibid.
134. Ibid., 5.
135. Ibid., 7.
136. Ibid., 5.
137. Retrieved from <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2003/SC7687.doc.htm>.
138. For example, see the Lebanese statement on October 17, 2002 .Retrieved from <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/SC7536.doc.htm>.
139. See the statements at the Security Council meeting on March 12, 2003. Retrieved from <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2003/SC7687.doc.htm>.
140. For the French position, which left open the option of participating in a multinational force at some point in the future, see "News Analysis: French Pave Way for Role in Iraq," *International Herald Tribune*, July 29, 2003. Retrieved from <http://www.int.com/articles/10438.html>; the Americans had also hoped for a division of about 17,000 Indian troops. See *New York Times*, July 19, 2003, A1.
141. On July 9, 2003, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld testified before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, where he said that 80-90 countries (with supposedly positive responses from about 30), had been asked to send troops to help. Retrieved from <http://www.msnbc.com/news/936532.asp?cp1=1>.
142. The most recent efforts at reform of UN peacekeeping and enforcement represent the latest in a long history of such attempts; see, for example, Arthur M. Cox, *Prospects for Peacekeeping* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1967).
143. For the suggestion that a kind of UN Foreign Legion should be created, see Carl Kaysen and George Rathjens, "The Case For A Volunteer UN Military Force," *Daedalus* (Winter 2003): 91-103.
144. See Robert Weiner, "The USSR and UN Peacekeeping," *Orbis* 12, no.3 (Fall 1969): 915-30.
145. See *Preventing Armed Conflict. Report of the Secretary-General*. Retrieved from <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/2001/574e.pdf>.
146. For an excellent analysis of preventive deployment in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, see Alice Ackermann, *Making Peace Prevail: Preventing Violent Conflict in Macedonia* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1999).
147. For an earlier proposal for a creation of a UN stand-by force, see Lincoln P. Bloomfield, *International Military Forces* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969), 80.
148. See Alton Frye, *Humanitarian Intervention: Crafting a Workable Doctrine* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., 2000), 90.