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Meanings and Typologies of Duboisian Double Consciousness within 20th Century United States Racial Dynamics

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MEANINGS AND TYPOLOGIES OF DUBOISIAN DOUBLE CONSCIOUSNESS WITHIN 20TH CENTURY UNITED STATES RACIAL DYNAMICS

A Thesis Presented

by

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ABSTRACT

MEANINGS AND TYPOLOGIES OF DUBOISIAN DOUBLE CONSCIOUSNESS WITHIN 20TH CENTURY UNITED STATES RACIAL DYNAMICS

June 2012

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Americans still have more work ahead before we can come together and laugh together as a race-conscious people. This thesis is about the sad and painful work we need to do so we can heal and rejoice as a truly free and equal partnership of all our various communities. To tie ourselves together through and after our healing of our racial conflicts, we will share a special intimacy, a human connection, where our shared culture, our partnership, (overlapping with our primary cultures) includes our high proficiency at understanding how we appear to each other. This new cultural understanding and partnership is explored in this thesis as the conception of, "Multilateral double consciousness," which is derived from W.E.B. DuBois' (1903) conception of African American double consciousness. In the first of three sections of

this thesis, the Introduction and Literature Review explain and explore some general, historical and literary meanings of DuBoisian double consciousness as a political position of oppression. Second, the Methodology and Findings sections offer evidence of seven typologies of DuBoisian double consciousness within twenty six African American works of fiction and non-fiction. These examples of double consciousness reveal some degrees of personal harm caused by double consciousness. They demonstrate that the prevalence of the problem deserves far more attention, especially from academia, than it has received. Last, the third section of this thesis includes the Discussion and Conclusion. The Discussion extends the focus to consider how white Americans can learn to see themselves as white, and see their whiteness, from perspectives of people of color. That would situate double consciousness as a shared burden and a shared gift. All Americans would be equally situated to negotiate their identities and relations on fair and transparent terms. The Conclusion shows how race and colorblindness are hidden ideologies. It also shows how they can help reveal the meanings and functionings of hidden ideologies more generally. The Conclusion ties in DuBoisian double consciousness and Multilateral double consciousness to their brother-concepts of ideology in Marxian philosophy.

DEDICATIONS

Lilia Bartolome
Glenn Loury
Ajume Wingo
Calvin Hernton
Akwazi Osei
Pavlos Kouvaris

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER Page

CHAPTER Page

CHAPTER Page

CHAPTER Page

.

LIST OF TABLES

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

A Definition of Race and its Link to Double Consciousness

To help reveal the social meanings of race and to help expose the racism of "colorblindness," the meaning of race in this thesis is based on Glenn C. Loury's[i] (2002) explanation of race in *The Anatomy of Racial Inequality*. Loury establishes,

> In this book, I use that term [of race] to refer to a cluster of inheritable bodily markings carried by a largely endogenous group of individuals, markings that can be observed by others with ease, that can be changed or misrepresented only with great difficulty, and that have come to be invested in a particular society at a given historical moment with social meaning. (pp. 20-21)

The complexion of one's skin, the texture of one's hair and the shapes of one's features are inheritable, easy to see and hard to change or disguise. These markings are used and reproduced by people to separate themselves and others into categories that they

[i] Glenn Loury is a professor of social sciences and economics at Brown (http://www.econ.brown.edu/fac/Glenn_Loury/louryhomepage/). Earlier, at Boston University, Professor Loury was the mentor and professor of the writer of this thesis.

contrive for their own purposes of organization, identity, control and power. Loury emphasizes, “Moreover, what is ‘essential’ here is that these physical traits are taken to signify something of import within an historical context” (2002, p. 21).

Race is formative of individuality and identity as it is a position within which and by which individuality and identity is situated to develop and function. However unique and autonomous an individual may feel, she depends on her social context for that individuality and identity to exist. One’s race is, or races are, part of that social context (which also includes one’s class, religion, nationality, cultures, in some ways gender, etc) and part of the individuality and identity derived from that social context.

These social categories of race, Loury writes later,

> are among the structures in our social environment to which meanings about the identity, capability, and worthiness of their bearers have been imputed. I repeat: “Race” is all about embodied social significance… [Bodily markings are] signs from which cues of identities are drawn, and upon which indices of belongingness are inscribed. As we encounter one another in social space, we perceive the physical markings on one another’s bodies and go on to play our respective parts, enacting scripts written long before we were born… Here we enter the territory of *racial stigma*, of dishonorable meanings socially inscribed on arbitrary bodily markings, of “spoiled collective identities.” (2002, pp. 58-59)

Insignificant biological differences are endemically imparted with social meanings. Race means historical, institutionalized, deliberate, unintended, covert and ongoing social ascription of inferiority and superiority based on physical markings connoted as, in this case, “Black,” and, “White.” This is the meaning of race that is used and explored in this thesis. The collective black burdens and white privileges of these

ascriptions or projected identities are explored through consideration of DuBoisian double consciousness.

DuBoisian Double Consciousness

W.E.B. DuBois' notion of double consciousness is an important, but controversial, concept in African American Studies. It is important because it reveals, or actually is, the condition of African Americans being forced to try to maintain and develop their own self-definitions while enduring hostile and negating identities that are imposed by the outside white supremacist society through the racism of many white Americans. These conflicting and even overlapping self-defined identities and projected identities contribute to unique positions and experiences of African American people. This is the general operational definition of double consciousness suggested by the research of this thesis. However, such an operational definition is highly speculative because the meaning, experience and condition of double consciousness is not fully revealed by DuBois. Nor has the concept of black double consciousness been developed and defined thoroughly and clearly since DuBois discussed the concept.

Double consciousness continues to be considered by leaders in the field of African American Studies, including those discussed in the Literature Review section of this thesis (Allen, 2003; Andrews, 2003; Hathaway, 2005; Krasner, 1995; Rucker, 2002; Shaw, 2004). However, the work on the meaning, or meanings, and roles of double consciousness do not yet comprise a comprehensive and specific debate with consensus on what is being argued, what DuBois means and how these arguments and meanings

(first) could or could not pertain to or help explain racial struggles of African Americans and (second) could lead to new views and understandings of racial struggles that reveal under-explored interracial dynamics in the US. Given this incompleteness of double consciousness debate, theory and exploration, I believe that further exploration of DuBoisian double consciousness would significantly contribute to the development, thoroughness, rigor, flexibility, clarity and depth of academic debate, self-awareness, critical thinking, border crossing and social interaction in general[ii].

Double consciousness is important to study because there seems to be evidence of it in canonical and lesser known African American literature and non-fiction. This evidence is seldom explicit, so it can appear not to represent double consciousness. That can make double consciousness difficult to notice and easy to miss. However, as someone interested in African American literature, critical thought and multicultural education, I want to look more closely at a conception of double consciousness and determine if and how it is represented in African American literature. By identifying and exploring the usually implicit evidence of African American double consciousness in the literature, I hope to contribute to a meaning and discussion of the concept that will help all Americans, and especially teachers, to become more familiar with racial dynamics, tensions, positions and relationships within which we participate, but that we might not always notice and understand.

[ii] Anita Hoya Patterson's (1997) *From Emerson to King* is a profound study of double consciousness in American psychology, thought, literature and politics. It was not read or used in this thesis, though, as this thesis is written in preparation for further study including Patterson's book.

W. E. B. DuBois (1965) provides a definition of *double consciousness*. In his 1903 book, *Souls of Black Folk*, DuBois defines double consciousness as African Americans being forced to view themselves through the hostile and imposed perspectives of white Americans, while also maintaining their own self-defined views of themselves. Double consciousness refers to African Americans being able to "see" themselves through (and look from) their own individual and "black" perspectives while also "seeing" themselves through (and looking from) the perspectives of dominant white culture. This kind of double consciousness results from the subjugation of African Americans. DuBois says,

> After the Egyptian and Indian, the Greek and Roman, the Teuton and Mongolian, the Negro is a sort of seventh son, born with a veil, and gifted with second-sight in this American world,- a world which yields him no true self-consciousness, but only lets him see himself through the revelation of the other world. It is a particular sensation, this double consciousness, this sense of always looking at one's self through the eyes of others, of measuring one's soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his twoness,- an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder. (1965, p. 214-5)

DuBois is explaining that as oppressed people, African Americans have been forced to develop a dual perception of who they are as human beings and as blacks who are positioned as racially inferior in a white supremacist society. Dubois explains that as a subordinated people, African Americans must be ever cognizant of whites' negative and racist perceptions that typically involve (often rationalized and denied) contempt towards them as "deficient" and "less than." In this historical context, being an

“American” means African Americans have to be integrated, assimilated or marginalized for subordination and invisibility instead of their being included as full citizens on their own equally negotiated terms. Who one is personally and who one is publicly in mainstream white society can be uniquely contradictory for African American people. This is what Dubois laments and reveals.

DuBois sees that African Americans can be Americans without the subordination part. By illuminating how the “strength” of African Americans keeps them “from being torn asunder,” he highlights that despite the efforts of whites to completely subordinate African Americans and impose negative and racist identities, most African Americans find alternative schemas to these inferior definitions and strive to retain views of themselves that are more self-defined, humane and accurate (1965, p. 215).

CHAPTER 2

RESEARCH QUESTION

This thesis will review many classic texts of African American literature to search for implicit or explicit examples of double consciousness. The goal and purpose of this literature review will be to discover whether or not the authors write of situations where African Americans are forced to view themselves from the perspectives of whites while trying to maintain their own personal perspectives. If such situations are found, then they will serve as implicit or explicit examples of DuBoisian double consciousness.

1. **Does African American writing illustrate DuBois' concept of double consciousness?** Pursuing this question involves situating Richard Wright (through his novels, *Native Son* and *Black Boy*) as an ideal example of implicit discussions of double consciousness in African American writing. Then, other writings can be considered to explore whether or not they provide other examples of double consciousness.

CHAPTER 3

AFRICAN AND AMERICAN CONTEXTS OF DUBOISIAN DOUBLE CONSCIOUSNESS

DuBois reveals that African Americans are "gifted with second sight," which could be a positive (or perhaps ironic) ability and agility to view themselves and their position from multiple perspectives. Maybe the gift of second sight, or the positive gift of multiple perspectives and irony, is sabotaged because it is a position (or, "Fulcrum" (James, 2007 pp. 311-12)) by which the white world imposes contempt and pity as obstacles to "true self consciousness" (1965, p. 215).

DuBois does not define self consciousness. This imprecision, along with the indefinite meanings of double consciousness, makes DuBoisian double consciousness difficult to explore conceptually and, likely, personally. However, looking back and beyond the African peoples' experiences in the Americas, Tony Menelik Van Der Meer (2004) shows how a part of Yoruban culture (that was brought to the Americas by enslaved Africans) can provide a grounding or foundation for an Afro-centric meaning of self consciousness. This foundation offers essential life-guidance for individuals to

develop their senses of self; and the foundation connects seamlessly with DuBoisian double consciousness.

In Yoruban culture, Van Der Meer explains, "Ifa," is the "system of divination where thousands of sacred stories live that can inform a person of matters involving their past, present and future" (Van Der Meer, 2004, p. 198). Within the system of Ifa are the principles of good character, or, "Iwa Pele." However, Van Der Meer continues, in this world where corruption and racism hides itself with false claims to democracy,

> [O]ne's development of good character is a revolutionary act. This act requires structural changes in our personalities; it's an action which improves on the internal weakness within us while at the same time struggling with the vestiges of colonialism that have shaped our internalized racial oppression and our dehumanization (Van Der Meer, 2004, p. 198).

Good character as a revolutionary act is a powerful idea. As Van Der Meer describes it, Iwa Pele seems to involve looking at and seizing or ameliorating the overt and covert practices and damages of racism. (Interesting to explore too that this Iwa Pele and its exposure of racist conditionings could be developed by anyone, even white Americans who have perspectives that are unknowingly shaped by whiteness. Whiteness and double consciousness is pursued later in this thesis.)

"Ori," is another part of Ifa. Ori is the part of us that knows and leads us in the direction of life that is the right one for ourselves according to ourselves. Van Der Meer does not go into it extensively, but what he explains of Ori is enticing and provocative. "Ori, or ipori, is our inner head" (Van Der Meer, 2004, p. 199). Perhaps this is the deep and definite sense of what is and is not "right for me." Then, perhaps Ori would be the sense that "knows" what is right for me. The *Ifa Literary Corpus* explains,

Every man's Ori is regarded as his personal god who is expected to be more interested in his personal affairs than the other gods who are regarded as belonging to everybody… Whatever a man's Ori has refused to approve cannot by any other god. (Van Der Meer, 2004, pp. 199-200)

This notion is strong. One's Ori seems to overrule any identity or motivation involving one's personal affairs. It may be a clarity of who one is and what one is about beyond ordinary awareness. Ori development is closely connected with Iwa Pele. Van Der Meer explains,

> [I]t is the inoculation with the principles of good character through Ifa that enables one to internalize a healthier set of "ideas and values… [I]t is through this [Yoruban] cultural framework that one develops a sense of self…" (Van Der Meer, 2004, pp. 201-202)

Although Ifa can instill good character and a healthy sense of self, Van Der Meer emphasizes, the power of American pop culture and materialistic values focuses especially on African Americans as resources to exploit for profit (Van Der Meer, 2004, pp. 201-202). Blacks, like others each in their unique and similar ways, are trapped in a psychological, political, cultural and economic ideology of capitalistic imperialism, neo colonialism, or euphemistically, globalism. Recourse to obsession with money (and recourse to the negation of the black self by the system of Western globalism) could be a recovery or rebirth of earlier Yoruban cultural foundations of self and character. Van Der Meer (2004) quotes Amil Cabral (a revolutionary leader of Guinea and Cape Verde (Van Der Meer, 2004, p. 198)), as saying,

> A people who free themselves from foreign domination will be free culturally only if, without complexes and without underestimating the importance of

> positive accretions from the oppressors and other cultures, they return to the upward paths of their own culture, which is nourished by living reality of its environment, and which negates both harmful influences and any kind of subjection to foreign culture. Thus it may be seen that if imperialist domination has the vital need to practice cultural oppression, national liberation is necessarily an act of culture. (2004, p. 201)

A rebirth of one's own culture can negate harmful influences from, and subjugation by, a foreign culture. With this strategy of rebirth and with some parts of Yoruban culture that can be reborn, some of the difficulties of DuBoisian double consciousness can be addressed. One problem of double consciousness, as mentioned earlier, is that the gift of second sight, or the positive gift of multiple perspectives and irony, may be sabotaged because it is a position (or, "Fulcrum" (James, 2007 pp. 311-12)) by which the white world imposes contempt and pity as obstacles to "true self consciousness" (1965, p. 215). Perhaps Ifa, especially Iwa Pele and Ori, can provide immunity to the imposition of obstacles to self consciousness. Through Ifa, perhaps, it would not matter to blacks' senses of self what white people think or do because Ifa would be the source of the deeper sense of self and identity that would be impervious to the racist projections of white Americans and institutions as well as the consequential dynamics of black invisibility.

Van Der Meer directly links Ifa to the self definition side of DuBoisian double consciousness. He says,

> It is important that we are clear and come to grips with this dichotomy of either accepting the values and beliefs of "cultural oppression" or focusing on the cultural principles that aid us in our liberation against domination. This choice is reflective of what W.E.B. Du Bois expressed… about the dilemma of African

> Americans confronted with "double consciousness." (Van Der Meer, 2004, p. 201)

Perhaps, then, Ifa is a source or meaning of self consciousness that could serve as a source of self definition and an established starting point for consideration of DuBoisian double consciousness. This would reverse the direction of the exploration. It would lead from self consciousness to double consciousness because it would start with a definition of self consciousness from Yoruban culture. However, DuBois neither discusses Yoruban culture nor explains self consciousness. There is no such conceptual grounding for his exploration. In this nebula, DuBois does identify double consciousness as the absence of true self consciousness.

In DuBois' writing, self consciousness is what develops from a reconciliation of double consciousness as a position of negation. He is seeking to determine and develop what fills a void (self consciousness) by first identifying and defining the void (double consciousness). DuBois is defining an actual, but yet unexplained, existence (involving self consciousness) from a position of non-being (involving double consciousness). That is why double consciousness is first defined negatively, as the absence of self consciousness. Then, with that background of negativity, within that void of DuBoisian double consciousness, the meanings of self consciousness can be seen as they fill in their absence.

As a negative meaning, double consciousness arising from the absence of self consciousness may involve black Americans' being forced to continually see themselves through the perspective of the dominant and negating external white community and

broader culture. As an absence of self consciousness, double consciousness could be one's being forced to always look at oneself through the eyes of others. The double consciousness might be the duality of perspectives, a duality of senses of self, that is imposed when one's own sense of self is contradicted by a negating projected identity.

DuBois' double consciousness connects with the double consciousness model of his Harvard PhD professor, William James. They share an awareness of, and concern for, the negation of the self that occurs when one's intrinsic sense of identity and being is not recognized by other people and other communities. DuBois says,

It is a particular sensation, this double consciousness, this sense of always looking at one's self through the eyes of others, of measuring one's soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity.

Here, DuBois explains that African Americans are defined externally and treated with contempt because of those judgments. Always having to look at themselves through the eyes of others (i.e., white people of a white supremacist society) means that the whites never have to look at blacks, or themselves, through the eyes of African American people. How blacks see themselves and whites is not reflected back through and by the broader American society and mainstream culture. Blacks then receive no recognition of their self definitions except from themselves and their own communities.

James helps to show the severity and suffering of such a position by saying,

> A man's Social Self is the recognition which he gets from his mates. We are not only gregarious animals, liking to be in sight of our fellows, but we have an innate propensity to get ourselves noticed, and noticed favorably, by our kind. No more fiendish punishment could be devised, were such a thing physically possible, than that one should be turned loose in society and remain absolutely unnoticed by all the members thereof.

James is not suggesting a mere hypothetical situation. Knowingly or not, he is actually describing the double consciousness position of African Americans that DuBois knows, articulates and explicates. How one sees himself is not recognized and reflected back by others in the community. This makes one unnoticed and invisible. DuBois, like James, sees that people cannot live healthily this way. DuBois, however, seems to notice how these conditions do exist for blacks where James leads in other directions (of how people choose between selves, or identities and ways of behaving, that are available to them for different situations).

This bifurcation is interesting. James is white so he can easily explore choices between recognized selves, but DuBois is debarred from such pursuit. His blackness is defined exogenously as excluded from participation in negotiation of who one is and whom each other is at such psychological depth of the two scholars. The exogenous definition of blackness as exclusion from negotiation of self and other, then, might be a pillar of the DuBoisian double consciousness burden.

Double consciousness as a result of such deep and thorough exclusion from identity negotiation may be a historical determination, a destiny, for possibly all of the Americans who are socially ascribed as black. Through a pre-existing racial hierarchy and through the corresponding denial of one's sense of self, history can both shape a person's racial and national identities and concurrently set a person at odds with his/her identities and history. In this way, double consciousness is a result and example of the ongoing institution of American racism.

However, helping to introduce the relationship between the individual and the historical production of self; senses of self; and individuality, Tommy Lott says DuBois "proposed to resolve the dilemma of double consciousness by appealing to a revisionist analysis of the concept of race that eschews a biological essentialist account of race identity" (in Pittman, 1997, p. 166). Explaining DuBois' meaning, Lott (in Pittman, 1997) writes,

> African-Americans must *invent* a conception of themselves that will contribute to their social elevation as a group. [DuBois'] revisionist notion of race was therefore proposed at the outset of something African-Americas must self-consciously adopt for political purposes. We can notice that he did not fail to acknowledge the social construction of the concept of race when, in his citation of the eight distinct racial groups, he qualified his reference with the phrase, "in the sense which history tells us the word must be used." (Pittman, 1997, p. 168, emphasis in original)

Lott explains that DuBois is proposing to revise meanings of race for collective political power. Appropriating their negation this way would introduce African Americans into actual negotiation over terms of a debate from which they have been barred. Who is oneself within a community? Who decides? Why? How? How is one's putative autonomy actually perniciously insidious? By emphasizing identity with the libratory history of blackness, rather than the identity of inferiority, DuBois and Lott help reveal, a new sense of self as agent might help overrule the effects of negation from the outside white community.

The issue of choosing one's identity is explored and presented by James, but he does not address the racial inequalities in identity choice that concern DuBois. James

explains that people can select their preferred representation of themselves according to the social situation they are in and the people they are with. He says,

> Properly speaking, a man has as many social selves as there are individuals who recognize him and carry an image of him in their mind… [H]e has as many different social selves as there are distinct groups of persons about whose opinion he cares. He generally shows a different side of himself to each of these different groups… We do not show ourselves to our children as to our club-companions, to our customers as to the laborers we employ, to our masters and employers as to our intimate friends. From this there results what practically is a division of the man into several selves; and this may be a discordant splitting, as where one is afraid to let one set of his acquaintances know him as he is elsewhere; or it may be a perfectly harmonious division of labor, as where one tender to his children is stern to the soldiers or prisoners under his command. (294)

James explains "a division of the man into several selves; and this may be a discordant splitting." He mentions fear of letting one group know oneself as another group knows oneself. Perhaps double consciousness includes this fear and separatism. If black Americans are forced to keep their self definitions separate from their ascribed identities, then each identity needs its own venue or world. Maybe the possible intrusion of one world into the other causes fear because it might risk a confusion or conflict of selves. This suggests that one person may have to be two different people for two separate groups that must be kept separate. However, in DuBois' work, a merging of selves can occur through Black Nationalism and Pan Africanism. In this model, black unity supersedes the systems, structures and splits that DuBois and James explain.

For DuBois, the focus is on how African Americans can redefine themselves and blackness to merge the "discordant splitting" between their self definitions and the negation and invisibility from the white community.

DuBois says,

> The history of the American Negro is the history of this strife—this longing to attain self-conscious manhood, to merge his double self into a better and truer self. In this merging he wishes neither of the older selves to be lost. He would not Africanize America . . . He would not bleach his Negro soul . . . He simply wishes to make it possible for a man to be both a Negro and an American, without being cursed and spit upon by his fellow, without having the doors of Opportunity closed roughly in his face.
>
> This, then, is the end of his striving; to be a co-worker in the kingdom of culture . . . (1965, p. 215)

By redefining and revising meanings of race and/in history, conflicts between projected negations and self definitions can be removed as psychological and social obstacles to the merging of people's being both black and American on their own terms and in their own ways in their broader American culture and society. DuBoisian self consciousness, this way, is revealed in his meaning of, "Merging." Self consciousness develops from, and simultaneously helps develop, amelioration of the conflicts between self defined and racially projected identities of double consciousness.

When the internalized projected identities in one's consciousness are negating of that consciousness, then one might be conscious of one's own negation. If so, no wonder DuBois would want to minimize the impinging impressions of racial inferiority. Through Black Nationalism, DuBois asserts, a strong community can help people grow and live healthily, uninhibited by the outside white world of imposed identities and obstructions. Manning Marable explains this kind of environment in his saying,

> Du Bois supported the battle to win political reforms and greater "personal liberty" for blacks, but only as "the second great step toward a better adjustment" of race relations. He did not advocate "social equality," but favored "a social

> equilibrium," that would permit blacks and whites to "develop side by side in peace and mutual happiness. (1986, p. 37)

DuBois advocates social equilibrium, not superficial equality within an environment of deeper nefarious impingements of inferiority. Then, self awareness could develop with positive projections from the community to the person. Merging self and projected definition might then lead to self consciousness instead of double consciousness.

Within this model is a primacy of self and consciousness of self. DuBois is focusing on the personal level of self consciousness. In a related, but different, way, two writers in Political Sciences help reveal meanings or levels self consciousness that can connect with DuBoisian self consciousness. John Rawls[iii] and Isaiah Berlin[iv] indicate that a democracy must respect and protect a boundary of individuality that each person has and is without question.

Rawls says,

> Each person possesses an inviolability [security from violation, profanation, assault or trespass; unassailable (http://www.merriam-webster.com/ dictionary /inviolable)] founded on justice that even the welfare of society cannot override. For this reason justice denies that the loss of freedom for some is made right by the greater good shared by others. (1999, p. 3)

[iii] Rawls' *A Theory of Justice* is a leading text of political theory in the field of Political Science.

[iv] Berlin, like Rawls, is a leading theorist in Political Science. His notion of negative freedom is related to positive freedom which "is involved in the answer to the question, 'What, or who, is the source of control or interference that can determine someone to do, or be this rather than that?'" (Berlin, 1969, pp. 121- 122)

This inviolability relates to self consciousness and double consciousness. The self that is inviolable has the right to freedom from negating racial stigmas impinged by the outside world. This reasoning supports DuBois' concern with social equilibrium as a condition for racial equality. Otherwise, without equilibrium, blacks could integrate unequally into a society and culture that continues to impose negating identities and positions. That would only provide a shallow impression of equality. Without the social equilibrium and Black Nationalism of DuBois' model, double consciousness (resulting from negating social impingements) prevents a merging of self definition and socially projected identity into self consciousness.

Similar to this freedom from harassment, Berlin defines the concept of negative freedom as,

> involved in the answer to the question, "What is the area within which the subject- a person or group of persons- is or should be left to do what he is able to do or be, without interference by other persons?" (1969, pp. 121- 122)

Both Rawls and Berlin emphasize the right of people to be left alone to a fair degree. Inviolability without interference means people's being left alone within equal and negotiated social norms to be who they are, do what they choose and have a sense of self and an awareness of self that is untrammeled by others. This kind of self consciousness might be the sense of self and awareness of self that DuBois is saying is usurped by double consciousness. The self consciousness enabled and protected by respect and justice through Rawls' and Berlin's models is quite different from DuBois' saying, "It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking

at one's self through the eyes of others, of measuring one's soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity" (1965, p. 215).

This violation of negative freedom and security is a strange sensation, perhaps, because African Americans are within two contradictory positions and perspectives at the same time. They are native-born members of, and socialized by, their country that then subjects them to the violations and interferences it guarantees against. Self consciousness as a sense and awareness of who one is and as an entitlement to equal respect could be severely impacted by such a position and perspective of double consciousness[v].

Consistent with self consciousness as inviolability and negative freedom, to `DuBois self consciousness seems to mean merging, or ameliorating, the conflicts imparted by white society between the black position of being American and/or African American (or uniquely self-defined) and the position of being subjugated (or uniquely other-defined). He says,

> The history of the American Negro is the history of this strife—this longing to attain self-conscious manhood, to merge his double self into a better and truer self. In this merging he wishes neither of the older selves to be lost. He would not Africanize America . . . He would not bleach his Negro soul . . . He simply wishes to make it possible for a man to be both a Negro and an American, without being cursed and spit upon by his fellow, without having the doors of Opportunity closed roughly in his face.
>
> This, then, is the end of his striving; to be a co-worker in the kingdom of culture . . . (1965, p. 215)

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[v] Indeed, many groups and persons might have their own positions, perspectives and experiences of double consciousness. This thesis is to help illuminate a conception of unique African American double consciousness and to contribute to further and multicultural exploration of double consciousness. For example, how does white inviolability and negative freedom depend on the conflation of individual with white? Whites can feel no conflict, or relationship at all, between their being individuals and white. Theirs is a privileged relationship between their race and sense of self while blacks, in terms of double consciousness, are burdened with struggle between racial position and sense of self.

DuBois may be arguing that blacks should be left alone to define themselves; to define what being American means; and to define what American means to them in equilibrium and negotiation with (not with the interference from) whites. In this sense, self consciousness might not only be an internal sense of self. It might also be a liminal space including an internal sense of self that is socially recognized and accepted. Then, at such a threshold, the psychological and social realms of all Americans could be overlapping, positive, healthy, contributing and consistent. Who we are (all of us) would develop mutually, cooperatively and critically through mutual exploration and negotiation of who we think we are and who we are thought to be. Exploration of double consciousness can help expose these dynamics and possibilities by introducing a conceptualization of how who we are is shaped by who we are to each other.

Perhaps some of these ideas could relate to the experiences, positions, identities and perspectives of Richard Wright. He illuminates,

> Being a Negro living in a white Western Christian society, I've never been allowed to blend, in a natural and healthy manner, with the culture and civilization of the West. This contradiction of being both Western and a man color creates a psychological distance, so to speak, between me and my environment. I'm self-conscious. I admit it. Yet I feel no need to apologize for it. Hence, though Western, I'm inevitably critical of the West. Indeed, a vital element of my Westernness resides in this chronically skeptical, this irredeemably critical, outlook. I'm restless. I question not only myself, but my environment. I'm eager, urgent. And to be so seems natural, human and good to me. Life without these qualities is inconceivable, less than human. In spite of myself, my imagination is constantly leaping ahead and trying to reshape the world I see (basing itself strictly on the materials of the world in which I live each day) toward a form in which all men could share my creative restlessness. Such an outlook breeds criticism. And my critical attitude and detachment are born of my position. I and my environment are one, but that oneness has in it, at its very core, an abiding

> schism. Yet I regard my position as natural, as normal, though others, that is, Western whites, anchored in tradition and habit, would have to make the most strenuous effort of imagination to grasp it. (1995, p.49)

DuBoisian Double Consciousness and Unilateral Black Double Consciousness

Based on my understanding of DuBois' meaning of African American double consciousness, I have developed a tightly related conception of unilateral black double consciousness. [vi] My conception of black unilateral double consciousness emphasizes the fact that DuBoisian double consciousness is a particular and unique position for African Americans that white Americans can impose unilaterally. In other words, whites do not have to have racial double consciousness, or, "Whites need not understand or live in the black world in order to thrive" (Gates & West, 1996, p. 86). However, blacks must continually grapple with whites' racist views of them as lazy and stupid (Krasner, 1995); ignorant (Hathaway, 2005); and untrustworthy (Andrews, 2003) while they struggle to maintain their humanity. The development of this double consciousness only on the part of subordinated groups highlights the asymmetrical power relations between blacks and whites.

[vi] Unilateral double consciousness is my own concept, but it is based on DuBois' broader observation of double consciousness. Unilateral double consciousness is an elaboration of double consciousness because it introduces a distinction that emphasizes the one-sidedness of the hidden inequality faced by blacks. DuBois focuses on how blacks are forced to have double consciousness, but the concept of unilateral double consciousness includes focusing on how and why whites are privileged not to have to contend with racial double consciousness.

As superordinates in a white supremacist society, whites do not have to see themselves through black perspectives (Kincheloe, 1998; Yancy, 2004). This is why unilateral double consciousness is a form of racial inequality. Black people are forced to embrace contradictory identities, or a negation of self-definitions, while whites do not have to discern how they are seen by and as others. As subordinates, African Americans bear the burden of developing double consciousness, second guessing and enduring the white oppressor's perceptions and expectations of blacks.

However, discussion of this burden and the unequal burden that is placed on African Americans is ignored, as though the problem is not there at all. For example, Christopher Edley Jr. (1996, pp. 108-109) criticizes how "colorblindness" focuses on intentional discrimination and therefore draws attention away from more hidden and subtle forms and methods of discrimination. He distinguishes between testing for discrimination as an "intent," and as an "effect" (Edley, 1996, p. 109). Imposing and maintaining the condition of unilateral double consciousness on African Americans, even when not done intentionally by white Americans, has the effect of maintaining unequal racial positions and burdens on African Americans because of their subordinate racial position. Edley helps show that it is a white privilege and a form of oppression for whites to frame their perspective and sense of justice on their own intentions as a distraction (to whites) from the effects of how they treat, and project identities onto, African Americans.

This introduction has presented five related aspects of double consciousness that help to illuminate the concept and its scope, causes, functions and effects. The five aspects are:

1. African Americans are forced to try to maintain and develop their own self definitions while enduring hostile and negating identities that are imposed by the outside white supremacist society through the racism of many white Americans. This is the primary meaning that serves as a foundation for the next four aspects of double consciousness. In overlapping but varying ways, all five aspects of double consciousness involve conflicts and contradictions between peoples' being black and human; people's being black and American; and people's being human and American.
2. Double consciousness is a forced position of conflict between dual perceptions of how African Americans identify themselves as being human beings and black Americans. The assault of negating projected identities from the outside white supremacist community challenges people's meanings of being both black and American by confronting their very humanity. The positive meanings of blacks' being people who are American and African American, or however they choose to define themselves, are contradicted by the negative meanings of their being positioned as inferior and less human, or less than human, within American society. This is about more than conflicts between social identities and positions. It is also about conflicts between black people being recognized (by themselves and others) as human and their being considered and treated (by themselves and

others) as less than human. It is about differences between being organically human and being socially less than human.[vii]

3. The "gift of second sight" (DuBois, 1965, p. 215) is a positive gift when it provides an ability to view oneself and others from multiple perspectives. According to DuBois (1965, p. 215), second sight is part of self-consciousness that comes from African Americans' using their multiple perspectives to define who they are, what being American means and what America means to them. However, this gift can be corrupted and turned into a burden on blacks when it is corrupted by white superordinates who use the multiple perspectives of blacks to contribute to the shattering, not synthesizing, of the senses of self and group that the gift of second sight provides.
4. Contributing to blacks being forced to see themselves through the negating perspectives of white outsiders, whites do not have to see themselves through black perspectives. It is the unilateral imposition of double consciousness by whites with no recourse for blacks that makes unilateral double consciousness a form and practice of white supremacy.

[vii] Aimee Cesaire, an anti-colonialism leader from and of Martinique in the Mid-Twentieth Century, explains,[T]he colonizer, who in order to ease his conscience gets into the habit of seeing the other man as an animal, accustoms himself to treating him like an animal, and tends objectively to transform himself into an animal. It is this result, this boomerang effect of colonialism, that I wanted to point out. (1972, p. 20) From this quote, the racism of the white colonizer can be generalized to include the racism of the American white supremacist. In both cases, whiteness dehumanizes all people by sacrificing our sense of organic humanity for categories of social design. Class, religion, nationality and often culture are other categories that pervert our non-rational sense, understanding and awareness of organic humanity.

5. Even if whites do not intend to impose or reinforce black unilateral double consciousness, their inattention to this problem has the effect of maintaining and perpetuating the racial struggles of blacks that can then be blamed on the victims because the source of the problem, the projected identity itself, is not recognized and addressed openly, honestly and deliberately.

CHAPTER 4

DOUBLE CONSCIOUSNESS IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT: RECONSTRUCTION, POST-RECONSTRUCTION AND THE WASHINGTON/DUBOIS/GARVEY DEBATE

In the years after the U.S. Civil War, how would white society and people adjust or not adjust to the change from African Americans being situated as sub-human to their being free, by law, from that position? How would these freedmen fit in, how would they be allowed to fit in, now that they were free?

To help adjust the nation to black freedom and equality, Congress amended the U.S. constitution. Congress passed and ratified the Thirteenth Amendment in 1865 (prohibiting slavery); the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 (granting citizenship and due process and equal protection by law to all people born or "naturalized" in the U.S.); and the Fifteenth Amendment in 1869 (the right of all citizens, regardless of "race, color or previous condition of servitude," to vote) (Smith, 1979, pp. 51-3, 152).

These were not only changes in laws. They were changes in meanings of humanity and identity. The transition of property to humanity (the recognition of African

Americans as human, free, individual and equal) might have raised confusing and upsetting uncertainties for whites about what it means to be white, human, free, individual and equal or, on the other hand, black. Perhaps blacks threatened to expose to white people their own contradictions between their organic senses of people's humanity and their socially contrived white beliefs about people's humanity. Perhaps for such a reason African Americans were concurrently free and excluded in U.S. society and culture. Perhaps the whole issue of the threat was avoided by whites through or by their hate.

Franklin and Moss write,

> There was no question of their status as free persons, but conflict arose over the possible distinctions between [black] and white people… A barrier to the solution of these pressing postwar troubles was the legacy of hate that was inherited from a generation of bitter intersectional strife. (1988, p. 204)

African Americans' freedom from slavery was only part of an ongoing and continuing struggle between freedom for all and humanity, equality and individuality for only the whites and their accepted others. Emancipation changed only the status of African Americans from property to not property. To many whites, blacks were still not human, not equal and not individuals, but now they were also not property any longer as well. The end of the war did not change the hearts and minds of those who had fought the war. Franklin and Moss explain, "As surely as the struggle between 1861 and 1865 was civil war, so was the conflict from 1865-1877 [Reconstruction], with as much bitterness and hatred, but less bloodshed" (1988, p. 227).

During Reconstruction, when the nation was reorienting and rebuilding after the Civil War, Congress superseded Presidents Lincoln and Johnson's moderate means of adjusting society to black freedom, humanity, equality and individuality (Franklin & Moss, 1988, pp. 204-7). Then,

> [T]he Freedmen's Bureau was established. With officials in each of the Southern states, the bureau aided white refugees and freedmen by furnishing supplies and medical services, establishing schools, supervising contracts between freedmen and their employers, and managing confiscated or abandoned lands, leasing or selling some of them to freedmen. (Franklin & Moss, 1988, p. 208)

This federal bureau, however, was opposed by the Black Codes. These were local laws that maintained control of black people by whites. Black Codes included limitations on where African Americans could live; the imprisonment of blacks who quit their jobs; and the prohibiting of blacks from testifying in court about whites (Franklin & Moss, 1988, pp. 205-206). Also,

> Numerous fines were imposed for seditious speeches, insulting gestures or acts, absence from work, violating curfew, and the possession of firearms. There was, of course, no enfranchisement of blacks and no indication that in the future they could look forward to full citizenship and participation in a democracy. (Franklin & Moss, 1988, p. 206)

In addition to the Black Codes, blacks were refused membership in unions and then used as scabs to break strikes. This divided labor force, and its animosity within itself, kept the workers so preoccupied with their racial conflicts that they could not unite and present some power to their managers (Franklin & Moss, 1988, pp. 214-215).

Even with the Black Codes and racist labor force during and around the 1870's, African Americans were elected to state government offices in South Carolina, Mississippi, Louisiana, Alabama, Georgia, Florida and Virginia (Franklin & Moss, 1988,

pp. 218-220). However, white southerners were developing organizations including the Ku Klux Klan in order

> to do by extralegal or blatantly illegal means what had not been allowed by law: to exercise absolute control over Negroes, drive them and their fellows from power, and establish "white supremacy." Radical Reconstruction was to be ended at all costs, and the tactics of terrorist groups were the first step of Southern white leaders toward achieving this goal (Franklin & Moss, 1988, p. 226).

Many white Americans wanted positions, relations and dynamics to return to the ways they were before the Civil War. Ending Reconstruction meant returning African Americans to their earlier status of sub-human with as little interference from black freedom as possible. In addition to terror, there were economic and political ways this re-subjugation of blacks, the ending of Reconstruction and start of Post-Reconstruction, was done.

Economically, in the 1860's-70's, African Americans could often find work only on plantations as they had done under slavery. As freedmen, they may have had contracts about what they would do for work and how much they would be paid, but the contracts could be disregarded by the white employers with no recourse for the black workers. Other African Americans worked as sharecroppers by growing crops on the land of white people. These "freedmen were allowed from one quarter to half of the cotton and corn; they were also provided with a house, fuel, and in some cases with food" (Franklin & Moss, 1988, p. 212). However, as with the plantation workers, the freedom of the African Americans was often resented by the whites for whom they worked. There was a new hostility from whites toward blacks, and toward blacks being free, that developed with Postbellum U.S. (Franklin & Moss, 1988, pp. 212-213).

Politically, also in the 1860's-70's, "once the Negro was disenfranchised, everything else for white supremacy could be done" (Franklin & Moss, 1988, p. 212). Everything else included the prohibition of intermarriage; segregation of blacks and whites in transportation, "hotels, barer shops, restaurants and theaters… [and] schools" (Franklin & Moss, 1988, p. 238). This African American disenfranchisement was accomplished by several forms of corruption. Intimidation and threat of violence was used by whites to keep blacks from voting. Also, polling locations were changed secretly; ballot boxes were stuffed; insurmountable bureaucracies were contrived; unaffordable poll taxes were charged; education achievement and property ownership was required, and voting districts were arranged to prevent black majorities (Franklin & Moss, 1988, pp. 232, 236). Ultimately,

> By 1898, the pattern for the constitutional disenfranchisement of blacks had been completely drawn. In subsequent years other states followed the lead of Mississippi, South Carolina, and Louisiana. By 1910, blacks had been effectively disfranchised by constitutional provisions in North Carolina, Alabama, Virginia, Georgia, and Oklahoma (Franklin & Moss, 1988, p. 237).

The Jim Crow laws of racial segregation were then passed and black and white separatism in the Postbellum U.S was institutionalized. This tragic direction into unequal segregation utterly contradicted the praise of the U.S. in sociologist Alexis De Tocqueville's saying, in 1848,

> It is through political associations that Americans of every station, outlook, and age day by day acquire a general taste for association and get familiar with the way to use the same. Through them large numbers see, speak, listen, and stimulate each other to carry out all sorts of undertakings in common. Then they carry these conceptions with them into the affairs of civil life and put them to thousands of uses. (1988, p. 524)

Political associations of shared interests and goals help empower and unite people over the issues of democracy while also opening possibilities of associations beyond politics in areas of civil life. This, though, is a political development (leading to civil and cultural developments) from which African Americans were debarred by their being kept out of unions and disenfranchised by the white supremacists of Post Reconstruction. These associations remained only for whites even more strongly after the Civil War ended. Being excluded from those associations is not what one thinks of as being free.

This was the racially divided historical context of humanity and sub-humanity within which DuBois was born (in 1868) and within which he became an African American scholar and activist. This was also the world of Booker T. Washington, who was born into slavery about twelve years before DuBois was born. The debates between these two leaders, and between DuBois and Marcus Garvey, help show how African Americans faced their new struggles with being Americans, as before, but now out of slavery and into segregation and second class status.

Booker T. Washington was born into slavery, in 1856, and dreamed of going to school. Freed by the Emancipation Proclamation, he enrolled in school and later founded the Tuskegee Institute in 1881 (http://www.nps.gov/archive/bowa/btwbio.html). Washington asserted a reasoning that blacks would improve their condition most by taking whatever position they were allowed by whites and then working so successfully and masterfully at their industrial, agricultural and menial jobs that white people would respect blacks. Such accommodation; hard and successful work; and white recognition

and respect would, according to Washington, help to improve racial relations and help lead toward more racial equality. Washington says,

> Our greatest danger is that in the great leap from slavery to freedom we may overlook the fact that the masses of us are to live by the productions of our hands, and fail to keep in mind that we shall prosper in proportion as we learn to dignify and glorify common labour and put brains and skill into the common occupations of life; shall prosper in proportion as we learn to draw the line between the superficial and the substantial, the ornamental gewgaws of life and the useful. No race can prosper till it learns that there is as much dignity in tilling a field as in writing a poem. It is at the bottom of life we must begin, and not at the top. (1965, p. 147)

Washington makes some very practical points. He talks about the fact that most African Americans were forced to accept menial industrial and agricultural work. He seems to have considered that a reality from which to start. He continues by pointing out that material success for blacks and improvement of racial relations would come from how well African Americans would put their intelligence and ability into the work they had to do. Other aspirations, including the poetic and the political, were not considered appropriate to Washington before blacks had "started" (again) at the bottom of society.

This accommodation, and the outlook or consciousness it is, is already contrary to DuBois' intent to help the Talented Tenth, the black middle class, lead the masses in struggle for equality. The depth of this difference is more than just militancy against moderation. Each position includes a view of itself as reaching a profound level of sophistication. The depths of the differences may reveal different consciousnesses that might be involved with double consciousness. Washington shows his depth and consciousness in his saying, probably as criticism of DuBois,

> The wisest among my race understand that the agitation of questions of social equality is the extremest folly, and that progress in the enjoyment of all the privileges that will come to us must be the result of severe and constant struggle rather than of artificial forcing. No race that has anything to contribute to the markets of the world is long in any degree ostracized. It is important and right that all privileges of the law be ours, but it is vastly more important that we be prepared for the exercises of these privileges. The opportunity to earn a dollar in a factory just now is worth infinitely more than the opportunity to spend a dollar in an opera-house. (1965, p. 148)

Conversely, but the same in depth, DuBois says, criticizing the limits of vocational education that Washington accepts,

> The function of the university is not simply to teach bread-winning, or to furnish teachers for the public schools or to be a centre of polite society; it is, above all, to be the organ of that fine adjustment between real life and the growing knowledge of life, an adjustment which forms the secret of civilization. Such an institution the South of to-day sorely needs. She has religion, earnest, bigoted: -- religion that on both sides the Veil often omits the sixth, seventh, and eighth commandments, but substitutes a dozen supplementary ones. She has, as [Washington's speech in] Atlanta shows, growing thrift and love of toil; but she lacks that broad knowledge of what the world knows and knew of human living and doing, which she may apply to the thousand problems of real life to-day confronting her. The need of the South is knowledge and culture, -- not in dainty limited quantity, as before the war, but in broad busy abundance in the world of work. (1965, p. 268)

Washington and DuBois are disagreeing on a very fundamental position within the world. Education, knowledge and developed application of the world's knowledge to immediate life were part of DuBois' view of how African Americans could improve their position and condition. Washington argues that blacks (and likely but only implicitly, whites) were not ready for such a position for African Americans. Perhaps this debate is part of the meaning of double consciousness. Perhaps Washington was proposing a strategy blacks and whites could share that might be effective just because it expected

little for and from each party except toleration and the giving of each a very small chance. This implants the whites' imposed side of double consciousness while suspending or disregarding self-definition on one's own terms. To this DuBois says no. DuBois thoroughly distinguishes and contrasts the self-defined and imposed identities and positions. DuBois is demonstrating the kind of inviolability and negative freedom that Rawls and Berlin would advocate several decades later. Perhaps the debate involves whether blacks should wait for recognition from whites when whites are ready or assert their humanity whether or not whites are ready. DuBois explains and objects that,

> It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at one's self through the eyes of others, of measuring one's soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. (1965, p. 215)

This problem, though, could be very hard to confront with deeply personal and interpersonal intensity when Washington's support was so great for his saying,

> To those of my race who depend on bettering their condition in a foreign land or who underestimate the importance of cultivating friendly relations with the Southern white man, who is their next-door neighbour, I would say: "Cast down your bucket where you are" - cast it down in making friends in every manly way of the people of all races by whom we are surrounded. Cast it down in agriculture, mechanics, in commerce, in domestic service, and in the professions. (1965, p. 147)

Perhaps Washington was accepting and tolerating double consciousness as a necessary burden African Americans seemed to him to have to just bear and tolerate. Perhaps DuBois was facing double consciousness as an obstacle and foil to one's feeling

at ease within oneself and within one's communities.[viii] If so, it could have been within and about this conflict of consciousnesses that DuBois pursued his career as a scholar-activist. Ron Goodwin[ix] says,

> [DuBois'1905] creation of the Niagara movement signaled that blacks would no longer accept social and political mistreatment quietly. Within [five] years the Niagara movement grew into the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). (http://modern-us-history.suite101.com/article. cfm/the realization_of_ a_ dreamhttp://)

It was through his work as editor of *The Crisis*, the magazine of the NAACP, that DuBois helped lead toward the Harlem Renaissance (the 1920's movement of cultural creativity and political criticism); expose contradictions of American freedom and racism; and critically evaluate the work of his African American and white American opponents (Rucker, 2002, p. 37). [x]

In addition to his challenges from Washington and his legacy (Washington passed in 1915), DuBois faced conflicts with a new African American leader in the 1920's, Marcus Garvey, and his Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA). Tony Martin[xi] explains,

> Convinced that black people must seek salvation first as a race, Garvey set himself the task of doing this through the principle of nationhood.[xii] He believed

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[viii] See review of Vernon Andrews' article and his conception of, "Lightness," in this literature review.
[ix] Goodwin teaches history and he is a PhD student at a university in Texas.
[x] Rucker's piece is discussed in more detail as the first article in the next section, the Literature Review.
[xi] Tony Martin is one of the founders of the Africana Studies Department at Wellesley College where he now is professor emeritus.
[xii] Mary Frances Berry and John W. Blassingame explain, Black nationalism is the belief that black people share a common culture and world view, have a common destiny, and have had a common experience: slavery, oppression, colonialism, and exploitation. Racial solidarity is perhaps the most basic form of black nationalism. Presuming no movement, program, or ideology, it is simply a feeling that black people, because of their common descent, color, and condition, should act in unison. A higher and different level of consciousness is cultural nationalism, the view that all black people share a common lifestyle, aesthetic, and world view, often expressed in a distinctively black idiom in literature, art or music. Religious

> that black people should be brought into one active community encompassing the whole black universe. By belonging to this Pan-African community…black people could rely on the force of an overwhelming majority, even in areas, such as the United States, where they were a minority. (1986, pp. 41-42)

In the early 1900's, many African Americans moved from the country and the south to northern cities. There, the masses of people were increasingly interested in separatism (Berry & Blassingame, 1982, p. 409) instead of trying to integrate or assimilate into the white society, culture and economy. This was the spirit, activism and immediacy that Garvey shared and helped develop into nationalism.

Garvey was born in Jamaica in 1887. Like Washington, he was interested in education. However, economic difficulties required Garvey to leave school and learn the printing trade when he was fourteen. When Garvey was twenty-five, in 1912, he moved to England where he worked as a printer and learned about European colonization of Africa (Cronon, 1987, pp. 4-15). Garvey came to the US in 1916. Garvey built with and on the public support for separatism through his founding and leading the UNIA. The UNIA organized and unified people in the first African mass movement (Berry & Blassingame, 1982, p. 409).

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nationalism, a specific component of cultural nationalism, is the belief in a special black religious cosmology, including the idea that the deity is black. The highest expression and form of black nationalism is Pan-Africanism. In its broadest sense, Pan-Africanism is the belief that African peoples share a community of interests. Whether they are in Jamaica, Barbados, the United States, Canada, Uganda, Sweden or Spain, blacks must unite in a common struggle for liberation. In a narrower sense, Pan-Africanism refers to the unity of African nations on the continent for mutual progress. (1982, p. 388).
Berry is a professor of American Social Thought and a professor of History at the University of Pennsylvania. She was the head of the Civil Rights Commissions of Presidents Carter, Reagan and Clinton. Blassingame was a professor of History, African American Studies and American Studies at Yale.

The black nationalism of the UNIA focused on pride in, and celebration of, people's being African Americans; on their developing economic self sufficiency; on freedom of Africa; and on African Americans' returning to Africa. Garvey called for black patronage of black businesses in the US and for black support of the Black Star Steamship Line, which would bring African Americans to Africa. Garvey emphasized that white racism was so entrenched in white American society that "it was futile to appeal to their sense of justice and their high-sounding democratic principles." With parades and uniforms to celebrate its work, the UNIA appealed highly to the masses of African Americans and gained widespread support (Franklin & Moss, 1988, p. 320).

There were similarities between the works of Garvey and DuBois. Both men supported black nationalism, but Garvey was considered in general, and by DuBois, to be sensationalistic, dishonest and ineffective. Franklin and Moss explain, "DuBois was especially critical of Garvey and called the UNIA 'bombastic and impracticable'" (1988, pp. 320-321). Garvey did, however, gain much support from the general black population that saw the work of DuBois and the NAACP as elitist.

DuBois struggled against Washington's accommodation; Garvey's sensationalism; and his own debates over struggle for equal integration versus his considerations of black separatism and nationalism. This variance of perspectives and positions could likely have influenced DuBois' development and experience of the double consciousness conflicts between how DuBois saw himself and how he was seen and positioned by the people and perspectives of the broader white (and perhaps black) community.

PART I

LITERATURE REVIEW

This section reviews the few papers and analyses that examine DuBois' concept of double consciousness. Each review includes an overview of the article or chapter, the author's definition of double consciousness, the author's position regarding the usefulness of the term and discussion of double consciousness within the context of each article.

As mentioned earlier, the classic meaning of black double consciousness was provided by W. E. B. DuBois in *The Souls of Black Folk*, in 1903. In these essays, DuBois writes to a white audience about the unequal social position of African Americans in the US, and of the psychological, spiritual, and emotional struggles they face within themselves and within a white racist American society. It is in this book that DuBois introduces his conception of double consciousness (DuBois, 1965, pp. 214–215).

DuBois explains that as a subordinated people, African Americans are forced to view themselves from, and as, the racist and negative perspectives of the outside white

society. Historically, hegemonic representations of African Americans have been deficit based (Delpit, 1995; Jordan, 1994) and naturalized (Ignatiev, 1995; Kincheloe, 1998, pp. 103-104; Roediger, 1999). In this history, blackness continues to be defined by white mainstream society as naturally inferior to whiteness.

Dubois' claim that African Americans are "gifted with second sight" suggests that possessing their simultaneous awareness of their self defined and imposed meanings of blackness can constitute a gift and/or a burden. The gift is a meta-awareness of American society that reveals a critical view of democratic principles that are contradicted by practices of discrimination and oppression (see Ellison, 1994; Jordan, 1994). However, in addition to double consciousness or meta-awareness being a gift, DuBois indicates that it can also be a burden because it forces people to "always look at [themselves] through the eyes of others, of measuring [their] soul[s] by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity" (1965, p. 215).

Since DuBois' discussion of the concept of double consciousness in 1903, it has not become a subject of widespread exploration, but it is discussed by some recent writers (Allen, 2002; Andrews, 2003; Hathaway, 2005; Krasner, 1995; Rucker, 2002; Shaw, 2004). These authors mention and briefly discuss double consciousness before segueing into their particular research topics.

The first article in this literature review is Walter Rucker's (2002), "'A Negro Nation Within the Nation': W.E.B. Du Bois and the Creation of a Revolutionary Pan-Africanist Tradition, 1903-1947." This article provides the broadest overview of DuBois' life's work and how double consciousness can fit into that framework. In the next article,

in the second article of this literature review, David Krasner (1995) considers how double consciousness is experienced and revealed (as a clear and obvious distinction between self definition and imposed identity) in 1900's black theater. A similar meaning of double consciousness is then shown in Rosemary Hathaway's (2005) article about Barbara Neely's circa 1992 novel, *Blanche White, Undercover in Plain Sight*. Then, in the fourth article, a shift to a more subtle and nuanced treatment of double consciousness is led by Vernon Andrews (2003). He explores how complicated double consciousness can be because personal and social positions and identities overlap too much for there to be a clear distinction between how one sees oneself and how one is seen by others. Article five, "'Two Warring Ideals'": Double Consciousness, Dialogue, and African American Patriotism Post-9/11," by Todd C. Shaw, situates and considers double consciousness within the context of patriotism after 9/11. This treatment implicitly includes the overlaps between personal and cultural positions and perspectives introduced by Andrews. In the sixth and last article, "Double consciousness, The unsustainable argument?" Ernst Allen raises challenging questions and ideas that help move the double consciousness debate forward.

CHAPTER 5

LITERATURE REVIEW ARTICLE ONE:

WALTER RUCKER'S, "'A NEGRO NATION WITHIN THE NATION': W.E.B. DU BOIS AND THE CREATION OF A REVOLUTIONARY PAN-AFRICANIST TRADITION, 1903-1947"

In, "'A Negro Nation Within the Nation': W.E.B. Du Bois and the Creation of a Revolutionary Pan-Africanist Tradition, 1903-1947," Walter Rucker (2002) spans most[xiii] of the history of DuBois' career. He begins by explaining double consciousness as a dual frame of self-reference, or twoness, as discussed in the introduction to this thesis above. Although Rucker does not explicitly link double consciousness within the content of his article, the connection is implied by the focus on double consciousness in the article's introduction and by DuBois' struggles within dualities shown in Rucker's writing. The

[xiii] Although Rucker refers to DuBois' "early career," as focused on double consciousness, his article covers the time from the publishing of *Souls* in 1903, through the Fifth Pan African Conference of 1947 (Rucker, 2002). That was almost all of DuBois' long career. In the 1950's, DuBois expanded his focus from concern with colonialism of Africans and subjugation of African Americans to concern with colonialism and subjugation of all people (Broderick, 1959, pp. 199- 226). In 1960, DuBois chose to leave the United States and become a citizen of Ghana. DuBois lived in Ghana until he passed in 1963.

article is a historical overview highlighting significant work, strategies, positions, transitions and perspectives of DuBois.

Rucker begins by implicitly explaining double consciousness as a position and then as a perspective. As a position, Rucker refers to DuBois' saying,

> It is a peculiar sensation, […] this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at one's self through the eyes of others, of measuring one's soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. (Rucker, 2002, p. 37)

Explaining DuBois' message, Rucker writes,

> Rooted in a series of historical paradoxes, black life in North America is full of tragic irony--the enslaved in the land of freedom, the poor in the land of prosperity, the persecuted in the land of justice and the despised in the land of opportunity. (2002, p. 37)

Double consciousness as a position is paradoxes of African Americans being excluded from privileges, opportunities, entitlements and advantages of their own country. The closely related implication of double consciousness as perspective is revealed by Rucker's continuing,

> Yet, as Du Bois contends, it is from the very position of debasement that blacks "born with a veil, and gifted with second-sight in this American world" have the ability to see America in its truest form while simultaneously lacking any real sense of self-consciousness. (2002, p. 37)

The view of the US as being different from the democratic, free and equal way it claims to be is one part of double consciousness as perspective. The other part is blacks having such second sight, but not having "a sense of self consciousness" (Rucker, 2002, p. 37). Second sight might be similar to today's term, "Critical thinking," since both involve alternative views of mainstream views and positions. However, when that critical

sight is not part of an inviolable sense of self and self consciousness, then the critical view, the self defined part of double consciousness, could be contradicted by the projected identity and position of negation. This may be DuBois' exploration or a way to inquire about his exploration of double consciousness as an ongoing process throughout his life and work. Referring directly to double consciousness, Rucker says,

> At the dawn of his long career as scholar and activist, Du Bois posed the problem of double consciousness and, in his words, sought to "make it possible for a man to be both a Negro and an American without being cursed and spit upon by his fellows...." He would ultimately dedicate much of his early career to resolving this particular issue as well as addressing and combating white supremacy, European imperialism, and the continuing degradation of Africans around the world. (2002, p. 37)

However, in the rest of his article, Rucker does not focus specifically on how meanings, issues and considerations of double consciousness might be part DuBois' work as a scholar and activist. Evidence of double consciousness as an ongoing theme for DuBois is implied, though, in Rucker's article and pursued in the following discussion of his article.

After beginning his article with a discussion of double consciousness, Rucker introduces a broader context of DuBois' debates with Booker T. Washington, Marcus Garvey, black nationalism and socialism. Rucker then discusses the history, challenges and successes of the Pan African Conferences. By reviewing these discussions, the implied meanings of and connections with double consciousness can be sought.

First, Rucker explains DuBois' model of the, "Talented tenth," and DuBois' rivals, Booker T. Washington and Marcus Garvey. Rucker says,

> *The Souls of Black Folk* was essentially Du Bois first call to battle. In this classic expression of black thought, Du Bois concludes that the principle problem facing blacks in America--the ubiquitous color line--could only be properly addressed through the rise of a "talented tenth." This group of educated elites would serve as a vanguard, leading the black masses into social protest and ceaseless agitation against injustice. (2002, p. 37)

The Post-Reconstruction black middle class was economically and socially separated from the broader black community, yet also positioned to develop class and race consciousness, as well as self consciousness, that could help lead struggles for justice and equality (Rucker, 2002). However, the development of this self consciousness (and race and class consciousness) was disrupted by the powerful rivalry DuBois faced in the accommodationist, Booker T. Washington. Rucker explains,

> It was in Washington's appeals for industrial education and his surrender of demands for civil and political equity that Du Bois saw one of the greatest threats to the rise of the talented tenth and the creation of a mass movement to fight for civil rights and political empowerment. (2002, p. 37)

Rucker then shows that a mass movement was organized, but not by DuBois and the middle class. Rather, it was Garvey who motivated, united and inspired the masses. The agreement between DuBois and Garvey was in their shared goals of nationalism and independence for Africans and African Americans. The conflict was in how they each pursued the goals. Rucker quotes DuBois as saying, “[Garvey’s] dreams of Negro industry, commerce and ultimate freedom of Africa are feasible; but his methods are bombastic, wasteful, illogical and ineffective and almost illegal” (2002, p. 38).

DuBois objected to the “methods” and “tactics” of Garvey’s sensationalism and his questionable use of his finances. However**,** Rucker continues, DuBois later wrote, “A Negro Nation Within the Nation,” in 1935, which combined some of Washington’s

calling for self reliance and Garvey's calling for separatism and nationalism (Rucker, 2002, p. 38). Rucker says,

> The contention of this essay is that by combining the views and approaches of his two arch rivals--Booker T. Washington and Marcus Garvey--Du Bois effectively created a model for the community-control black nationalism that Black Power advocates of the mid to late 1960s would passionately argue for. When combined with his earlier and later pronouncements for Pan-Africanism, Du Bois' conceptualization of "self-segregation" became the basis for a revolutionary Pan-Africanist tradition that would be espoused later by the likes of Malcolm X, Kwame Nkrumah [the first president of Ghana in 1957], and Kwame Ture [who changed his name from Stokely Carmichael, under which he wrote, *Black Power*, with Charles Hamilton]. (2002, p. 38)

Rucker then explores some of the contradictory perspectives in which DuBois is seen. He shows how Molefi Asante[xiv] considers DuBois to be Eurocentric because of his upbringing in New England and his academic background at Harvard and in Germany. However, Rucker points out that DuBois was greatly influenced by his studies and participation in Southern black culture at Fisk University in 1885, a historically black university in Nashville that was founded in 1866. Also, at Harvard (where he was the first African American to earn a PhD in 1895), DuBois considered Black Nationalism and rejected the belief that blacks should acquiesce to, or accommodate, the social, economic and political terms of white people (Rucker, 2002, p. 39). Perhaps Rucker is implying that nationalism can correspond to self definition while accommodation can apply to

[xiv] Asante is a founder and professor of African American Studies at Temple University. He also founded and edits, *The Journal of Black Studies.* Asante developed the concept of, "Afrocentricity." He explains, "Afrocentricity… assert[s] the central role of the African subject within the context of African history, thereby removing Europe from the center of the African reality. In this way, Afrocentricity becomes a revolutionary idea because it studies ideas, concepts, events, personalities, and political and economic processes from a standpoint of black people as subjects and not as objects, basing all knowledge on the authentic interrogation of *location.*" (http://asante.net/articles/1/afrocentricity/)

projected identity. If so, perhaps Rucker is showing that the debate over assimilation, integration and separatism is a debate of double consciousness. Perhaps the nationalism/assimilation duality corresponds to the self-definition/ascription duality as two forms of double consciousness.

It may have been within, around and between these positions and perspectives of double consciousness that DuBois became a leader of the six Pan-African conferences from 1900- 1947. Introducing this movement, Rucker quotes and then explains,

> In 1900… DuBois notes, "Let the nations of the world respect the integrity and independence of the free Negro states of Abyssinia [Ethiopia], Liberia, Haiti, and the rest, and let the inhabitants of these states, the independent tribes of Africa, the Negroes of the West Indies and America, and the black subjects of all nations take courage, strive ceaselessly, and fight bravely, that they may prove to the world their incontestable right to be counted among the great brotherhood of mankind." This announcement was an unmistakable call for drastic social change and an end to European exploitation in Africa and the Diaspora. (2002, p. 40)

At the Pan African Conference[xv], Rucker explains, DuBois had to reject African American self segregation because it was too similar to Washington's accommodation. Both strategies of self segregation and accommodation reinforced disenfranchisement, legal subjugation and sub-standard education of black Americans. Instead, a broader and international movement (in the scope of Garvey's UNIA) seemed necessary for DuBois to envision a truly empowered widespread movement. Then, there could be cooperating power between blacks within and outside the US to pressure the US and European colonizers of Africa to end their oppression and domination (Rucker, 2002, p. 40).

[xv] In 1900, the earliest Pan African Conference was held in London. In 1919, the next conference, called, "The First Pan African Conference," was held in Paris. That was actually the second conference. Finally, the last conference was the called, "The Fifth Pan African Conference," but there were a total of six conferences.

The next conference, named, “The First Pan African Conference,” was held after World War I, in 1919. Then, DuBois was more concerned with the relationships between racial oppression in the US and colonialism in Africa. President Wilson had emphasized the need for nations’ autonomy, but he excluded colonized peoples from such recognition and denied them such freedom. The conference accepted this rule by the colonizers, but called for more fair and equal treatment by the occupying forces. The later conferences, starting with the Second Pan African Conference of 1921, would more aggressively insist on independent African nations and equality of participation in government and all economic and social opportunities (Rucker, 2002, p. 42).

After the First Pan African Conference, there was shift from a more accommodationist position, or consciousness, of to a call for self-sustaining self-reliance in the Second Pan African Conference. Perhaps this shift is a struggle with double consciousness on a global scale. Perhaps DuBois rejects toleration of subjugation and perhaps he rejects hope that peace first will lead to justice later. Perhaps these two issues of rejection and toleration of subjugation (and of rejecting imposed identity and accepting positions of negation) are two recurring themes in meanings of African American, or DuBoisian, double consciousness in the US and in the broader world.

The Third Pan African Conference, in 1923, is not mentioned in Rucker’s article. The third conference faced many difficulties and had little success. It came after the shift to more assertive calls for African independence. Little actual progress had been realized from the second conference. The NAACP had denied financial support for the third conference. When the third conference was held, representatives of only thirteen

countries attended. In the previous conference, thirty countries had been represented (Broderick, 1959, pp. 131-132).

Rucker does look into DuBois' efforts with Socialism after his visit to the Soviet Union in 1926. DuBois became increasingly disappointed with assimilation of the black middle class (the Talented Tenth that he had hoped would lead and help liberate the general population) and their alienation from the majority of blacks. He also, or perhaps therefore, focused more on economic improvement of African Americans without the talented tenth. For these reasons, DuBois was interested in the Socialist Party, but he was reluctant because he felt the Socialists were not thorough enough about racism in the US. DuBois' grass-roots orientation became a common strategy he shared with aspects of both Washington's accommodation and Garvey's nationalism (Rucker, 2002, p. 40-41).

However, Rucker explains, DuBois became distanced from the NAACP when he became interested in focusing more on black economic development. Rucker says,

> In a series of Crisis editorials in 1934, Du Bois made plain his notion of self-segregation. In the April 1934 edition, he wrote that blacks should "Organize our strength as consumers; learn to cooperate and use power as producers; train ourselves in methods of democratic control....Run and support our own institutions." (Rucker, 2002, p. 41)

This turn from integration to nationalism led to DuBois' leaving the NAACP. It was at this time, in 1935, that DuBois published, "A Negro Nation Within the Nation." A main point of this writing is that land redistribution after the Civil War had been required for African Americans to thrive in America through independence from the mainstream white community. DuBois also argues that Washington's accommodation depends too much on tightly rationed white inclusion of blacks and mobility of blacks in mainstream

businesses. Instead, DuBois calls for mutually supporting black businesses and black communities. Rucker notes that similar nationalism would be espoused and developed later by Ture, Nkrumah and Huey P. Newton (a leader of The Black Panther Party) (Rucker, 2002, pp. 41-42).

DuBois' socialism and Black Nationalism might connect to double consciousness as an effort to end struggle between the two positions of blacks' striving to thrive in their country and white resistance to black attempts to integrate and/or assimilate. Nationalism, self segregation and self sufficiency might lead to cohesive self definition, true self consciousness and self determination in psychological, economic and political terms.

Near the beginning of DuBois' socialism and Black Nationalism strategies, the Fourth Pan African Conference was held in 1927 (one year after DuBois visited the Soviet Union). This conference did not yet suggest revolution, but "the demands of each successive Congress became less conciliatory to European imperialism and more insistent on self-determination and autonomy for Africans" (Rucker, 2002, p. 44). The demands included black representation in government; black rights to their countries' lands; better education; African development according to the interests of Africans, not the colonizers; an economic system to benefit the general population rather than the rich; equal treatment between people regardless of race; removal of US troops from Haiti and autonomy there; and prevention of whites from taking all the land of South African native people (Rucker, 2002, p. 44).

The demands and orientation of this fourth conference are similar to, and likely shaped by, DuBois' direction toward Black Nationalism, separation from white

domination, self determination and self definition. Perhaps this direction leads from the political struggle to the personal struggle. By taking the land, rule and economic development, perhaps DuBois was suggesting African Americans and Africans could have the space, time and conditions to pursue their strivings to act, feel, think, be and live with inviolable self consciousness that would be free from hindrance by US and European whites.

The Fifth Pan African Conference, in 1945, reached the revolutionary level to which the earlier conferences had led. World War II had ravaged European countries and greatly weakened their abilities to maintain their empires. DuBois and several African leaders, including Nkrumah and Jomo Kenyatta (who would become the first prime minister of Kenya in 1963), had become strong enough to wrest increasing autonomy from the colonial occupiers (Rucker, 2002, p. 45). Rucker quotes DuBois as saying,

> Africans themselves began to demand more voice in colonial government and the Second World War had made their cooperation so necessary to Europe that at the end actual and unexpected freedom for African colonies was in sight. (Rucker, 2002, p. 45)

Rucker explains that Pan Africanism had succeeded. In 1960, DuBois attended the inauguration of Nkrumah as the first prime minister of Ghana and the inauguration of Abubakar Tafawa Balewa as the first prime minister of Nigeria. He then became a citizen of Ghana where he lived until he passed in 1963 (Rucker, 2002, p. 45).

Through a combined struggle of African and African American leaders, widespread people of the African Diaspora had all helped unite Africa for Africans. Then, extending beyond Africa, Pan Africanism and Black Nationalism was strengthened

back in the US during the Black Power movement of the 1960's-70's (Rucker, 2002, p. 45). This determination for explicit political and economic autonomy may be implicitly coupled with determination for inviolable self consciousness on the personal level. This connection is not made by Rucker, but he quotes Nkrumah as asserting at the Fifth Pan African Conference,

> We affirm the right of all colonial peoples to control their own destiny. All colonies must be free from all foreign imperialist control whether political or economic.... We say to the peoples of the colonies that they must fight for these ends by all the means at their disposal.... (2002, p. 44)

Similarly, at the conference DuBois says,

> Yet if the Western world is still determined to rule mankind by force, then Africans, as a last resort, may have to appeal to force in the effort to achieve freedom, even if force destroys them and the world. We are determined to be free....We demand for Black Africa autonomy and independence.... We will fight in every way we can for freedom, democracy and social betterment. (Rucker, 2002, p. 44)

People's fighting by all means for the human right to control their own destiny can likely include their fighting "to attain self-conscious manhood [and personhood], to merge a double self into a better and truer self" (DuBois, 1965, p. 215). Perhaps Black Nationalism and Pan Africanism was a way DuBois fought and led against the wide world systems and very personal positions of blacks' having their own senses of self while enduring the negations and replacements of those senses of self. DuBois says,

> In this merging he wishes neither of the older selves to be lost. He would not Africanize America . . . He would not bleach his Negro soul . . . He simply wishes to make it possible for a man to be both a Negro and an American, without being cursed and spit upon by his fellow, without having the doors of Opportunity closed roughly in his face.
>
> This, then, is the end of his striving; to be a co-worker in the kingdom of culture . . . (1965, p. 215).

After beginning with double consciousness as the introduction to his article, Rucker presents a history of DuBois' concept of the talented tenth; his relationships with the activisms of Washington and Garvey; and his leading the Pan African Conferences. Although Rucker does not discuss double consciousness after his introduction, implicit evidence of double consciousness can be found in his writing.

First, when Rucker (2002, p. 37) discusses double consciousness explicitly in the introduction, he shows the possibility of African Americans having second sight (or perhaps a critical view of putative democracy in the US) while not having a true self consciousness (or perhaps an inviolable sense of self). Second, this duality is implied later when Rucker (2002, p. 39) discusses DuBois' interest in Black Nationalism at Fisk and Harvard. Third, double consciousness may be suggested on a global scale through Rucker's (2002, p. 42) writing about DuBois' call for increasing African and African American independence as the Pan African Conferences proceeded. Fourth, Rucker (2002, pp. 41-42, 44) implies that the Fifth Pan African Conference helped to link the political and economic independence of Africans and African Americans with increasingly strongly self defined identities that link struggles with double consciousness as a political position with double consciousness as a personal struggle.

CHAPTER 6

LITERATURE REVIEW ARTICLE TWO:

DAVID KRASNER'S "PARODY AND DOUBLE CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE LANGUAGE OF EARLY BLACK MUSICAL THEATRE"

David Krasner's[xvi] (1995), "Parody and Double Consciousness in the Language of Early Black Musical Theatre," is a literature review of African American stage theater about twenty years before the Harlem Renaissance[xvii] of the 1920s. Through the early 1900's, African Americans collectively and consciously developed a self definition of the New Negro. Central to this concept was African Americans' rejection of negative and misrepresentative images of themselves and assertion of their own messages on their own terms and in their own ways (Krasner, 1992, p.317).

[xvi] Krasner is a professor of performing arts at Emerson College.

[xvii] The Harlem Renaissance was a period of African American literary and artistic creativity in the 1920's. It was a result of increasing black migration to northern cities, post-war prosperity and critical evaluation of continuing racial inequality that led to a new self-definition of African Americans on their own terms and rejection of earlier imposed positions and definitions (Franklin & Moss, 1988, pp. 324-27). The Harlem Renaissance was an organic, artistic and intellectual cultural movement of critical social evaluation and exploration of black and white integration as equals (Locke, 1925).

Krasner begins his article by introducing a general meaning of New Negro. He then focuses on the musical, "Coontown," as an example of parody and double consciousness.

First, Krasner explains the historical background and meaning of the concept of double consciousness as a subject of DuBois' writing in relation to pre-Harlem Renaissance theatre. Quoting DuBois, Krasner shows that double consciousness is how "the black actor or actress had to effect a public self through what DuBois called a tertium quid, often performing as a 'clownish, simple creature, at times even lovable within its limitations, but straitly foreordained to walk within the Veil'" (1995, p. 317). In other words, to perform for a white audience, the actor had to adhere to roles that maintained the imposed identity and negation of African Americans.

Krasner discusses how African Americans exposed, parodied and challenged this position "by employing what Henry Louis Gates Jr. calls 'signifyin(g).' For Gates, signifyin(g) defines a "uniquely black rhetorical concept" that uses a word in a way that draws attention to the word and reveals new meanings or a new significance of the word (1995, p. 319)[xviii].

The term that is signified is, "Coon," [xix] in the Bob Cole production, "A Trip to Coontown." Signifyin(g), "Coon," means repeating the term often and with a sense of

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[xviii] This spelling of signifyin(g), with the, "G," in parentheses is not explained by Krasner. It might be spelled this way to emphasize a black vernacular pronunciation and the particular meaning the word has as a form of social criticism.

[xix] Coon is a derogatory term for an African American person. "A coon is a black actor or actress, who takes roles that stereotypically portrays black people. They think they have made it but they are slaves to the same images. It comes from the term baracoons (a cage), where they used to place Africans, who were waiting to be sent to America to be slaves. They had no idea of this, so some of them were even eager waiting in the baracoons." (http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=coon)

irony that illuminates a double meaning to people (other African Americans) who appreciate the parody. The double meaning of the repeated ironic use exposes the absurdity, insult and projected identity of the racist term. Perhaps this signifyin(g) is a message of self definition; rejection of imposed negation; and a part of the meaning of the New Negro.

In the play, "a dead swell gentleman of color" saves his earnings and takes his lady out for a fancy date. He then undergoes a transition into futility and despair because all the nice places maintain, "No coons allowed" He and his date cannot get in anywhere. So frustrated, he raises his voice and is thrown to the ground, humiliated in front of his lady. From his high hopes for a swell date, the term, "Coon," brings the gentleman to disappointment and embarrassment.

That could be the man's double consciousness of looking forward to his date (as self definition) and his experience (or ascription) of rejection and humiliation by the white world. The term, "Coon," is what initiates and executes the man's torment. Focusing on that term helps illuminate that the term is not descriptive of a type of person, but rather is a verbal weapon of mainstream society. Put differently, the word and its meaning is not the person, but it is used to impose an identity and position that is contrary to the person. Catching that word in action through signifin(g) exposes a severe assault of white America on black America.

Krasner says,

> This element of parody could be powerful. It was, for instance, used to great effect in Bob Cole's production of A Trip to Coontown (`-1901)… "No Coons

> Allowed!," … dramatizes the duality of black life in America, and creates a parody of racism:
>
> No coons allowed No coons allowed This place is meant for white folks that's all We don't want no kinky-head kind So move on darky down the line No coons allow'd in here at all. (1995, p. 318)

"Coon," is given a double meaning through Cole's signifyin(g) the term. It is encountered so much as the man descends into anguish that its racist role is emphasized. No longer are black people portrayed as, "Coons." Rather, those who project the derogatory meaning are portrayed negatively. The actors are showing the audience that they see their own negation and they even mock it in acting it out in front of the audience.

Krasner helps show that the African Americans' displaying double consciousness are quite able to redefine and renegotiate and outright reject racist identities imposed on whites by blacks. The display of double consciousness in theater was evident before and through the Harlem Renaissance and involved some degree of individual meta-level-critical evaluation of both African American self defined and white imposed racist black identities. In this way, African American signifyin(g) was a strategy for maintaining their humanity, indirectly opposing racist representations of blacks, while participating in theater in ways that whites approved. Such signification necessarily involves double consciousness on the part of the black actor or trickster because the irony requires interplay between the projected identity and one's own self-definition. When the negative meanings of words such as "coon" or 'tar baby" and general subordinated social positions of African Americans are revealed and parodied, the harmful meanings can become increasingly ridiculous and questionable to African Americans. This play with inferior

black positions; unequal racial power relationships; and words and meanings is a form of black exposure, opposition and reversal of those positions and dynamics.

Krasner's discussion of double consciousness focuses on the resistance and oppositional strategies that African Americans have developed over time and across contexts (in this case, the theater context) to oppose whites' inaccurate and racist representations of them. The resistant and oppositional behavior is displayed in implicit and "hidden" ways so as not to incur the wrath of dominant culture whites. Krasner shows that by thinking critically about their position, African Americans have developed forms of opposition within the dynamics of oppression they face. Dubois highlights the burden and gift of double consciousness as a type of African American meta-awareness of white racist views of blacks. Krasner demonstrates one way this awareness was used to subvert and resist oppression.

Krasner demonstrates that this type of "resistant" signifyin(g) occurs in early-1900s theater, but he does not develop the theory of double consciousness into a broader model of racial dynamics beyond the scope of early-twentieth-century theater and the following Harlem Renaissance. Some questions are evoked, but not pursued, by Krasner. How do the dynamics between black theatre and white audiences reveal the limitations and opportunities for interracial dialogue about self definition, imposed identity and mutually negotiated identity during and after the Harlem Renaissance? Was the Harlem Renaissance the apex or the end of such pursuits? No, it was not. This literature review and the whole thesis will show that after the Harlem Renaissance, there continue to be

many African American writers who explore and struggle with conflicts between self definitions and imposed identities.

CHAPTER 7

LITERTURE REVIEW ARTICLE THREE:

ROSEMARY HATHAWAY'S, "THE SIGNIFYIN(G) DETECTIVE: BARBARA NEELY'S *BLANCHE WHITE, UNDERCOVER IN PLAIN SIGHT*"

For example, Rosemary Hathaway[xx] shows how signifyin(g) and double consciousness are related in, "The Signifyin(g) Detective: Barbara Neely's[xxi] *Blanche White, Undercover in Plain Sight*" in *Critique* (2005, pp. 320–332).[xxii] In this book review, as Krasner does in his piece on early-twentieth-century theater, Hathaway refers to Gates to define, "Signifyin(g)."

[xx] Hathaway is a professor of English at West Virginia University.

[xxi] "Neely is a novelist, short story writer and… a host of Commonwealth Journal, a radio interview program" from UMass Boston. (http://www.blanchewhite.com/biography.html)

[xxii] Hathaway explains how, in 1992, Neely's Blanche White, a young black woman, is wrongfully convicted by a North Carolina court of writing bad checks. She escapes and takes a job as a domestic for a wealthy white family so she can use that role and stereotype to hide from the judicial system. In so doing, Hathaway explains, Blanche employs "triple- or even quadruple- consciousness" as a black, female and working class navigator between her own identity and the stereotypes she is burdened with, but also exploits as weapons and defenses of her own. (Hathaway, 2005, p. 321) In this way, double consciousness is related to signifyin(g) when the self defined identity reflects on, exposes and parodies the imposed identity.

Hathaway says,

> To Gates, Signification is "black double-voicedness,"… Blanche enacts this trope through the free play she engages in with her white employers' stereotypes about her and her awareness of the power and protection afforded by the gap between [Blanche's identity and how she is seen, defined and treated by others]. (2005, p. 323)

As Krasner (1995, p. 3) explains, "For Gates, signifyin(g) defines a 'uniquely black rhetorical concept… by which a second statement or figure repeats, or tropes, or reverses the first,'" so too does Hathaway refer to Gates to explain how Neely's Blanche uses her self-definition to reverse, or expose and contradict, the identities imposed from the outside white society. By playing with the term, "Coon," as Krasner explains, and by playing with white employers' stereotypes, as Hathaway explains, African Americans at the beginning and end of the twentieth century are shown to use double consciousness as a source of empowerment that is employed by signifyin(g).

Part of this relationship between double consciousness and signifyin(g) involves the concept of, "Passing." [xxiii] Blanche's double consciousness and her signifyin(g) enable her to pass in an unconventional way. Blanche has dark skin, so she passes not for a white, but for an obsequious and submissive maid. This "passing in reverse- as the stereotypical black woman domestic" (Hathaway, 2005, p. 324) is not about Blanche making her blackness invisible in the traditional sense of passing. Rather, given her dark complexion and subordinate status as a servant, whites do not perceive her as intelligent

[xxiii] "Passing" traditionally refers to light-skinned blacks' crossing the color line because they appear white to whites (or at least, they are more visually pleasing to whites because they resemble whites) (O'Toole, 2002).

so Blanche is "invisible" to the whites because she is ascribed with the white stereotype of insignificant blackness. Blanche is not noticed as a full human being and she uses this invisibility to her own advantage since her intention is to "use her marginality as a disguise" (Hathaway, 2005, p. 324).

The signifyin(g) is Blanche's using her self-definition as the contradiction to the imposed identity from the white society. In this way, signifying can be a way double consciousness is used as a form of opposition. Hathaway says,

> Neely's Blanche […] appears to "stay in her class" by doing her employers' bidding, while carrying out her own subversive agenda below the surface. Because no one Blanche is "investigating" knows that she is being transgressive, or even thinks her capable of such complexity, what she can gain by doing so is increased exponentially. (2005, p. 325)

Blanche uses her hidden status, her reverse-passing, to gain access—as an intimate, but also as an invisible support person of the family[xxiv]—to problems and vulnerabilities of the white family, which the family members do not think Blanche has the capacity to understand. The link to double consciousness lies in the fact that reverse-passing and signifyin(g) require that Blanche know how she is seen from white perspectives, while also knowing how she sees herself. Blanche knows that the whites view her as below them, but she also sees that her position affords her opportunities to learn secrets of the white family that the family thinks are beyond her understanding. With both of these identities and positions under her own control—and unknown to the whites who project their own ignorant and dehumanizing views of African Americans to

[xxiv] "…Grace [the employer of Blanche] appears in the kitchen, flashing what Blanche describes as her 'Mammy save me' eyes, wanting sympathy for her marital troubles…" (Hathaway, 2005, p.325)

her—Blanche's possession of double consciousness allows her to create her own agency out of a position of subjugation. In this way, double consciousness is not solely a burden; this awareness can also be used to resist oppression and also to strategically maneuver around and manipulate whites in power with whom blacks must contend. Hathaway explains,

> Blanche is both the detective figure [learning about the white family] and a potential suspect [as] she is also the only one aware of her own "passing." This powerful awareness makes her able to exploit her employers' perceptions of her and maximize her power as a detective. (2005, p. 326)

In this sense, then, Blanche is an undetected detective. She can explore the white family from the inside because the family does not think she has the abilities to understand them. By underestimating the intelligence and humanity of Blanche, the white family situates Blanche in two positions which lead to two perspectives that comprise double consciousness and that Blanche can use to secretly exploit those who are exploiting her.

Hathaway (2005, p. 321) says,

> Bonnie Plummer[xxv] argues that the Blanche novels enact a sort of DuBoisean "double-consciousness," as the term has been applied specifically to African American detective fiction by Stephen Soitos[xxvi] in his study *The Blues Detective*.

Hathaway (2005, p. 332), again quoting Plummer, continues in her endnote to this passage,

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[xxv] Plummer is a professor of English and theater at Eastern Kentucky University.

[xxvi] No biographical information at all was found in extensive and seemingly exhaustive Internet searches for Stephen F. Soitos. Perhaps Soitos defies his being investigated.

> Soitos claims that blues detectives are those who "are double-consciously aware of their blackness in relation to white society. By using the trickster qualities of masking, they make their detection work" (35-36).

The issue of double consciousness and how this position or condition can be used by black Americans is, in itself, a negotiation or even a covert negotiation of who is whom, who is designated or ascribed as whom and how such designations and ascriptions can be subverted and used to the advantage of those who are intended to be silenced, dehumanized and negated by their position of having contradictory consciousnesses or identities. In a way of appropriating and manipulating a negative projected identity, ascription of inferiority can actually be made liberating when the invisibility created by the negative identity is not internalized as a submission to inferiority, but is employed as a position from which African Americans can be self defined in social relations with people who do not notice, recognize or accept such self definition. This is how invisibility can be turned around from a form of silencing to a form of empowerment. Hathaway explains,

> Combined with the double irony of her name, the child Blanche nearly withered under insults about her color until a wise aunt told her that the taunts stemmed from the other children's jealousy: "Some people got night in 'em, some got morning, others, like me and your mama, got dusk. But it's only them that's got night can become invisible. People what got night in 'em can step into the dark and poof—disappear! Go any old where they want. Do anything." (2005, p. 320)

Projected identity leading to double consciousness is sublimated from a form of negation to a form of agency because the agency disguises itself behind the putative negation and therefore creates an empowering role for mistaken identity. This dynamic is

between people very intimately. We can be mindful of this intimacy together and with Blanche White too.

There is a limitation, however, to the critique and agency of sublimation of negation to power through signifyin(g). The limitation is that there is a particular advantage and disadvantage to signifyin(g)'s so clearly distinguishing between self definition and projected identity. The advantage and disadvantage is that signifyin(g) situates self definition as pure, autonomous and impervious to projected identity.

In so situating itself, self definition empowers because it puts itself as the resource that disguises agency behind projected identity, as shown by Blanche's sense of self that uses her being negated as power to go unnoticed and free among others. This resourcefulness of self definition is its agency and empowerment through its distinguishing itself from projected identity.

However, something is missed, or mistaken actually, with the advantages of the agency brought with the distinction between self definition and projected identity. The distinction is not really accurate. The self defined and the projected identity cannot truly be distinguished as signifyin(g) asserts. That is the disadvantage of signifyin(g) as agency. The empowerment it enables prevents awareness of how the self defined and projected identities are so entwined that they cannot be realistically distinguished.

Awareness of that entanglement is indeed a level of agency far more critical and empowering than signifyin(g), but that awareness and agency is actually prevented by signifyin(g)'s sense of empowerment that defines itself as critical and therefore forestalls pursuit and apprehension of the empowerment gained from recognizing and exploring

how the self defined and projected identity are too entwined to be critically distinguished. The agency of signifyin(g) becomes a form of liberation that is still a trap because of the form of liberation it provides.

For example, Plummer says, “The awareness of her ‘otherness’ gives the black detective a different perspective on events in the case and may allow this black detective to recognize clues or evidence that a white would not” (1999, p. 82). From where does the awareness of her otherness derive? Who is it whom is aware of her otherness? That identity (and everyone’s inner most sense of identity), however it seems to be self defined, develops in and from the social environment just as the projected identity develops in and from the social environment. Both the self defined and projected identities are products of socialization, conditioning, culture and other external influences. There is really no self that is autonomous. Realizing that may rightly seem disempowering from a perspective that depends on signifyin(g) as a sense of agency. However, realizing that there is no self that is autonomous is much more empowering in a different and more critical and reflective way.

CHAPTER 8

LITERATURE REVIEW ARTICLE FOUR:

VERNON ANDREWS', "SELF-REFLECTION AND THE REFLECTED SELF: AFRICAN AMERICAN DOUBLE CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE SOCIAL (PSYCHOLOGICAL) MIRROR."

When self defined identity and projected identity are both seen as culturally derived, new forms of agency can be identified and acquired through new questions and explorations of meanings of double consciousness. Vernon Andrews (2003) helps show how the limited or mistaken agency of signifyin(g) can be conceptualized and surmounted through exposure and exploration in his article, "Self-Reflection and the Reflected Self: African American Double Consciousness and the Social (Psychological) Mirror." This is an article of seven narratives through which Andrews shows how he navigates, negotiates and wrestles with how he sees himself, how he is seen and how he can identify, share and discuss these views in liberating and empowering ways. In his narratives, Andrews reflects on some of his earlier experiences and situations and notices or remembers conflicts between perspectives.

The underlying theme of the article is captured in Andrews' saying,

> the distinctions between the personal and the cultural often become blurred beyond recognition as authors narrate action, dialogue, emotion and self-consciousness revealed through action, feeling, thought and language (2003, p. 60).

Andrews is helping to show how the personal or self defined identity and the projected or cultural identity cannot be so realistically separated as they appear to be with signifyin(g). Before considering Andrews' insightful exploration of the blurring of the cultural and personal, a caveat at this point is needed to provide an operational definition of culture for this thesis. Although Andrews does not define culture in this article, E.B. Tylor (a British Knight and anthropologist writing in 1871) explains,

> Culture or civilization, taken in its wide ethnographic sense, is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society. (Tylor 1871, in McGee & Warms 2000, p. 27)

John McGee and Richard Warms paraphrase Clifford Geertz, (all of whom are anthropologists) by saying,

> [Culture is] a shared code of meanings that is acted out publicly...culture is not a mental model, but exists between people, created by their social actions. (McGee & Warms, 2000, p. 503)

These definitions emphasize culture as a public code of meanings (or public understandings of social expectations and consequences for behaviors or actions) and culture as a sense of whole (perhaps a sense of being at-home to some degree) acquired from a society. Missing is discussion of these codes and wholes between societies. Cultures are not only social systems of their own people, but are also defined by and in relation to other cultures through their "contact," "differences" and mutual "challenges"

(Fuentes, 1988, p. 93). Lilia Bartolome shows how these defining inter-cultural interactions and relations occur and how they are political. She says,

> In reality, values placed on [cultural forms of] language and literacy practices reflect the greater society's socioeconomic and political hierarchy. That is, the language and literacy practices of dominant cultural groups are usually deemed more valuable and desirable than those of groups that are socially, economically and politically less powerful. (Bartolome, 1998, p. 19)

This hierarchy, and therefore politics, of cultures can be developed and reproduced in ways that are subtle to the point of invisibility. When that happens, cultural domination and subjugation can function without even seeming to be political at all. Donaldo Macedo explains[xxvii], "It is through the manipulation of language that the ideological doctrinal system is able to falsify and distort reality, making it possible for individuals to accommodate to life within a lie" (1994, p. 39).

An explanation of how language is manipulated and how that leads to life within a lie, in this case a lie of cultural domination and subjugation that is not recognized as such, is provided by Lisa Delpit. She says,

> There are codes or rules for participating in power; that is, there is a "culture of power." The codes or rules I'm speaking of relate to linguistic forms, communicative strategies, and presentation of self; that is, ways of talking, ways of writing, ways of dressing, and ways of interacting…The rules of the culture of power are a reflection of the rules of the culture of those who have power… If you are not already a participant in the culture of power, being told explicitly the rules of that culture makes acquiring power easier… Those with power are frequently least aware of- or least willing to acknowledge- its existence. Those with less power are often most aware of its existence. (1995, pp. 25-26)

[xxvii] Macedo references Vaclav Havel (1988), whose piece, "The Power of the Powerless," stimulates insight not just into, but also of, ways political and ideological systems (including Western "democracy" and capitalism) trap people mentally and/or physically.

When those of the culture of power (those teachers and others who are of white middle class mainstream [and academic] discourse) are not aware of their position of rationing; denying access; or denying explanation of the codes and rules of dominant culture, then they can perpetuate the sense, the lie, of the mainstream culture's superiority and the lie of minorities cultures' inferiorities. In that way, culture is highly, but invisibly, political.

Delpit provides a perspective, approach or strategy of how people, especially those of superordinate cultural positions, can intervene in our own conditionings. She says,

> We all interpret behaviors, information, and situations through our own cultural lenses; these lenses operate involuntarily, below the level of conscious awareness, making it seem that our own view is simply "the way it is." Learning to interpret across cultures demands reflecting on our own experiences, analyzing our own culture, examining and comparing varying perspectives. We must consciously and voluntarily make our cultural lenses apparent. Engaging in the hard work of seeing the world as others see it must be a fundamental goal for any move to reform the education of teachers and their assessment. (1995, p. 151)

This identifying of our own cultural lenses through seeing the world as others see it is also a meaning of exposing hidden ideology (or exposing a system of thought that we do not realize we are held within). The exposure of hidden ideology and the illumination or invisibility of culture as political hierarchy is both personal and social. No one is so pure as to be free from the politics of culture. Bartolome shows how the personal and political/cultural are so deeply and subtly entwined that they cannot be separated even though we may like to believe that we are critical of, and above, that.

She says,

> If the sociocultural and political reality is one in which teacher and learner are antagonistic toward each other- if the teacher *unconsciously* or consciously resists mentoring students perceived as deficient and if students, in turn, reject the devaluation of their existing language and literacy skills and the imposition of the dominant culture's language and literacy practices- very little teaching and learning will take place… [I]t is also necessary to acknowledge the impact of political and ideological realities on culture formation and maintenance; any discussion of linguistic-minority students' language and literacy practices must take into account the larger sociopolitical context in which these practices have developed and in which teacher and student negotiate the maintenance of primary discourses and the acquisition of the dominant culture's secondary discourses. (1998, p. 21) (Emphasis added)

There is a social realm broader than, but including, the personal from which the personal derives and within which people interact with each other under shared or conflicting systems of norms, histories, politics, beliefs, values and traditions. The individual is not legitimately separable from the cultural and political environment even if that environment lies by leading us to think we are autonomous. Living such a lie means having a sense of distinction between the personal and cultural/political when the truth is that we are far more conditioned than we are conditioned to notice. We are conditioned to think of ourselves as individuals and to not notice that we are impartible from the cultural/political/collective.

Returning now to Andrews, his article helps to further illuminate how the personal and the cultural/political cannot be distinguished even though people can be unaware of how who they are as people (and as putative individuals) is shaped, or determined, by their cultures and by dynamics and positions between cultures. The article's underlying theme is captured in Andrews' saying, "[T]he distinctions between

the personal and the cultural often become blurred beyond recognition as authors narrate action, dialogue, emotion and self-consciousness revealed through action, feeling, thought and language" (2003, p. 60).

When Andrews says, "[A]uthors narrate action, dialogue, emotion and self-consciousness," then he is already showing the blurriness of the personal and the cultural. The narration is of a mixture of personal and cultural that cannot be sorted out. Distinctions cannot be made between personal and cultural aspects or elements of actions, dialogues, emotions or self-consciousness. Narrating those events is narrating events that are themselves blurrings of personal and cultural. The narration is "revealed through action, feeling, thought and language" because the blurred personal and cultural is what reveals, becomes or informs the narration that is claimed as personal.

This blurring of the personal and cultural ties back into the caveat about culture. The dynamics between the personal and cultural are between one's own culture(s) and other cultures, including the political hierarchy, rules of inclusion or exclusion and positions of superiority and inferiority of people within those cultures and politics. All that is part of the narration that is itself cultural and political even if it seems to be just personal. That is how the personal, cultural and multicultural are blurred beyond distinction.

Andrews shows how, and in what ways, his personal views, and those of others, are actually reflections of positions, attitudes, values, beliefs, relations and dynamics that were and are imparted to him, as they are to everyone, through systems or meanings he

learned from his culture. These personal views deriving from their cultural systems or meanings is what blurs the distinction between the personal and the cultural.

As an introduction to all seven narratives and the first one in particular, Vernon Andrews is an African American man who, when writing this article in 2003, is an assistant professor of American Studies at the University of Canterbury in New Zealand. In the early 1990's, he was studying for his PhD in Sociology at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. There, once a semester, Andrews and other social psychologists from Sociology met over lunch with social psychologists from Psychology to present, share and discuss their research (Andrews, 2003).

Narrative One: "White Like Me"

In the first narrative, "White Like Me," Andrews is at the lunch. Hearing one presentation, he wonders about how or if the study could be generalized to the broad public or only to specific racial and class populations. He asks the presenter, "Could you give me the racial breakdown of the subjects you surveyed?" Then Andrews writes, "My question was nervously misinterpreted as, 'Why didn't you include African Americans and other racial groups in your survey?'" Andrews is not concerned whether there should be more black people in the survey. Rather, he is saying that if the subjects are white, mostly middle class, UW-Madison students, then should the results be generalized to that demographic rather than generalized without such qualification? Andrew says, "Whites, by implication, were non-racial. By further implication, white students were "the norm" and thus broadly generalizable beyond the scope of the data" (2003, p. 61). This insight is

an example, but also a criticism, of Plummer's saying, "The awareness of [his] 'otherness' gives the black detective a different perspective on events in the case and may allow this black detective to recognize clues or evidence that a white would not" (1999, p. 82).

As an example of Plummer's detective, Andrews' awareness of his otherness is a perspective that illuminates clues or evidence of negation and misrepresentation (through generalizing and norming beyond the scope of data) that whites miss because their sense of their racelessness (their sense that they are just individuals, not "white" or part of a "white" collective) comes from, and makes invisible, the over generalized identity they project onto themselves. In this way, Andrews has the double consciousness that signifyin(g) provides because he uses self definition to expose, manipulate and reject the projected identity of whites onto themselves and others as the norm. He uses self definition to reject black exclusion from having their say about their place in the erroneously and unexamined universalized scope of data.

In this way, by identifying the implication of racelessness as whiteness, Andrews is exposing blackness as excluded from racelessness. When whites are raceless and "just individuals" because they are white, their being individuals depends on their socialization, which is a blurring of the personal and cultural position for them that is revealed by the black detective, like Andrews. Blacks too have a blurring of the personal and cultural position because their being individuals is contradicted by their not being raceless, which they would have to be white to be.

The personal self definition, not just of blacks but of whites and everyone too, is not pure, autonomous and impervious to culture, but is imparted from the culture that differentially and therefore corruptly ascribes positions of individuality through racelessness to some by ascribing positions of mass anonymity through racialness to others. Blacks have a blurring of the personal and cultural, or socialization, because their being individuals is contradicted by their not being raceless, which they would have to be white to be. (Whites too have a blurring of the personal and cultural in their own way because their individuality derives from their racelessness, which they get from their history and social position that gives them a fallacious sense of autonomy and independence from that history and social position.) The personal and the cultural that are so clearly distinguished with signifyin(g) become entwined and impossible to realistically separate when there is exposure of the ways the cultural (including ascribed individuality, ascribed anonymity and projected identities) shapes, informs and determines the sense of the personal and the self definition. This elusive entwining creates blurriness of the cultural and personal for and between everyone.

At the level of critique of signifyin(g), double consciousness clearly distinguishes the personal from the cultural. At the deeper level of Andrews' inquiry, double consciousness explores how neither consciousness, and no consciousness at all, can be truly claimed as personal, pure and autonomous from the cultural conditionings, including racelessness and racialness, that shape and determine the sense of individuality with which people feel distinguished from or entrapped in the cultural. There are entirely

different relationships between the personal and the cultural for blacks and whites. There are entirely different reflections of the cultural on, or as, the personal. Andrews says,

> My experiences discussed herein account for only a miniscule amount of the many errors in judgment many black folk make when we carry the double burden of trying to assess white social signs through an "American" lens while also trying to assess (possible) white racist signifiers through a "black" social lens. (2003, p. 61)

Andrews' saying, "[A]ssessing white racial signs through an 'American lens while also trying to assess (possible) white racist signifiers through a 'black' social lens," seems to mean that double consciousness involves blacks' have to acquire and use the norm (or signs or a set of meanings) that is defined by and for whiteness to mean individual while blacks also have to maintain their own perspective from which to expose and confront parts of those meanings (or signifiers) that are identifiably racist.

Narrative Two: "Social Lenses and Mirrors"

In his first narrative, Andrews reveals the blurring of the personal and cultural. In his second narrative, "Social Lenses and Mirrors," he provides an approach to using the impartibility of personal and cultural perspectives to identify and explore that blurriness itself. The blurriness is actually positive because it means we have to figure out together how we see ourselves, each other, and how we see each other seeing us.

Andrews says,

> [S]ocial psychologists can add to scientific knowledge by including "the racial other" in future theorizing in the field. Past theory is fraught with gaps in analysis and could benefit by scholars revisiting our most sacred texts. (2003, p. 63)

Andrews is suggesting a return to sacred (perhaps canonical) texts with the inclusion of the racial other in the theorizing. The theory is incomplete because it requires more inclusion of the racial other to show how individuals, or senses of individuality, are constructed through group positions, dynamics and interactions.[xxviii] With awareness that we are being created by others according to their reactions and responses to our presentations of ourselves to them, and with this awareness as a meaning of socially situated conduct, the way Andrews seeks to include the racial other in revisiting canonical texts can be considered. Andrews says,

> [T]he following discussion is an initial visitation of works in social psychology highlighting situated social conduct [or focusing on how we are being created in the minds of each other] and how these discussions might shift and grow in light of African American situated identity, double-consciousness and the reflected social self[xxix]. (2003, p. 63)

Socially situated conduct, the reflected social self and double consciousness are conceptions of the overlaps, blurrings and impartibility of the personal and cultural identities, positions and dynamics between people. Andrews is saying he will return to texts that focus on these overlaps and consider how their dynamics might be developed and illuminated through exploration of African American situated identity, double-

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[xxviii] In order to explore how Andrews goes on to explain the inclusion, it is necessary to first define the key Social Psychology concept he uses of, "Socially situated conduct," or, "Situated social conduct" (2003, p.64). Andrews uses both terms seemingly interchangeably. Jack Katz, a professor of sociology at UCLA, is not discussed explicitly by Andrews, but Katz can help explain that socially situated conduct involves "tak[ing] account of how one's actions are likely to shape how the other will see oneself… So long as a person knows he or she is being known by another, it will be impossible not to be involved in shaping the other's image of who one is and what one is doing" (Katz, 1996, p.574). As we interact with each other, we are creating ourselves in each others' minds. We can have awareness of our creating who we are to others.

[xxix] Similar to socially situated conduct, the reflected social self conceptualizes the blurring of the personal and cultural. Sharon K. O'Dair, a UC Berkeley professor, explains, "According to the interactionists, the self is constructed socially… the individual is creature and creator of society." (O'Dair & Danson, 1985)

consciousness and the reflected social self. In this way, Andrews is using the impartibility of personal and cultural perspectives to identify and explore their own overlapping blurriness. The framework of blurriness as background is a perspective from which to return to the texts.

To begin this inquiry, Andrews discusses Charles Cooley's[xxx], "The Looking Glass Self," published in 1902 (the year before DuBois' *Souls* was published). Andrews says, "Cooley, in the citation below, summarizes the interaction between the individual mind, the social 'Other,' and socially situated conduct:"

> So in imagination we perceive in another's mind some thought of our appearance, manners, aims, deeds, character, friends, and so on, and are variously affected by it. . . . The thing that moves us to pride or shame is not the mere mechanical reflection of ourselves, but an imputed sentiment, the imagined effect of this reflection upon another's mind. . . . We always imagine, and in imaging share, the judgments of the other mind. (2003, p. 64)

The other's view of us, or our surmise of that view, both of which are mutually socially conditioned or informed, affect how we choose to behave, how we expect others to behave and, therefore, those conditioned views become part of who we are and who we think we and others are even if we mistakenly claim our identities as self defined. Identity, even one's own identity, is not (or not predominantly) self defined. The self that defines itself as self defined comes from the cultural background. The ways we see ourselves are shaped by ways others, including "racial others," see us and by the ways we see each other. Realizing that is acquiring the framework or orientation with which to

[xxx] Cooley was a professor of sociology at the University of Michigan who taught the school's first sociology course in 1899. (http://www.asanet.org/page.ww?name=Charles+H.+Cooley&section)

return to canonical texts with the inclusion of "the racial other" in the theorizing. Andrews explains,

> If we accept Cooley's picture of imaginative social interaction, then we believe that people constantly interact with the real or imagined images of ourselves reflected back to us; thus, how we correspondingly act is tempered by how the social "other" might view our social actions. (2003, p. 64)

Within this framework, Andrews introduces how racial identities and positions, even when they are not noticed, function as a part of socially situated conduct, the reflected self and double consciousness. He says,

> As many members of racial and ethnic groups in America can attest, the "other" in the social institution is often white and often in a power position. While this institutional dynamic does not problematize Cooley's construction, at the least, race and power problematizes *how people in the "out" racial group situate themselves and "reflect" on how to behave in social settings*. This phenomenon of shifting cultural lenses on a daily, hourly or moment-by-moment basis by black people was first noted by W.E.B. Dubois at the turn of the 20th century and is often referred to as "double consciousness." (2003, p. 64) (Emphasis added)

Double consciousness involves "how people in the 'out' racial group situate themselves and 'reflect' on how to behave in social settings" (Andrews, 2003, p. 64). For example, Andrews explains that historically African Americans have often been at risk if they made eye contract with white Americans. Blacks' avoiding eye contact with whites for that reason, though, has been misconstrued by whites as blacks being suspicious (2003, p. 65). This is a dynamic of blacks having to take the risk of making eye contact with whites or appearing suspicious to whites for not making eye contact. It requires blacks' conjecturing how they appear to whites and behaving accordingly in order to shape that image and protect themselves from how the whites might create their image of

the blacks in their minds. That is double consciousness, socially situated conduct and reflected social self. Another example is Andrews' saying,

> A black athlete in professional or collegiate sport must at many points in social time choose the racial audience that she "imagines." Whose behavior does she reflect? Whom does she try to please when her audience is predominantly white in the stadium and, in her imagination via the television camera, black at home in her family? African Americans constantly confront this dilemma of audience choice from multiple perceived audiences. (2003, p. 65)

Black athletes have to juggle perspectives right during the game and then choose how to behave and respond. Of course, everyone does this in all sorts of venues when we monitor and regulate our self presentation and when we negotiate who we are to others and who they are to us, as is done in socially situated conduct. The focus here is on racial dynamics within what Andrews calls, "Cognitive dissonance," of African Americans. He explains,

> The cognitive dissonance about "Americaness" suffered by many African Americans has its roots in how we perceive ourselves versus how our [white] American brethren perceive us. While African Americans may no longer be "torn asunder" by our continued "twoness" in contemporary society, as Dubois might say a century ago, we are always at one and the same time trying to imagine we fit "Americaness" in the face of constant reminders by real (and imagined) others that we don't quite fit in. (2003, p. 65)

Inferring from Andrews' use of the term, cognitive dissonance seems to refer to the mental conflict between African Americans' self-perceptions and how they are perceived by white Americans. In this way, cognitive dissonance can be considered a part or synonym of double consciousness. DuBois seems to have alluded to the term and concept, but at his time the discipline of social psychology had not yet coined the term. In

linking the concepts of cognitive dissonance with double consciousness, Andrews is helping to advance consideration of the concept of double consciousness.

With this introduction of cognitive dissonance helping to conceptualize twenty-first century black double consciousness, Andrews ends his second narrative and prepares for his third narrative. To recapitulate and repeat, Andrews' first narrative is about how whiteness is an individuality-affirming personal identity within and from the cultural background. For African Americans, and perhaps all people of color, though, the culture they share with whites is an exclusive and negating white norm through which they must construe and define individuality while also being prepared to identify and face the meanings or signifiers of the culture that are more blatantly racist. This is a form of double consciousness for blacks when they are defining themselves personally within a shared interracial culture that negates them. The generalizing of whiteness, and specifically white racelessness, as the norm that enables or debars individuality, or that racially rations individuality, is the interracial context of double consciousness that Andrews reaches by exploring how self definitions and projected identities are too entwined to be separated instead of his staying at the mistaken distinctions of the more rudimentary level of signifyin(g).

Then, in his second narrative, Andrews contextualizes the racial rationing of individuality within the Social Psychology concept of socially situated conduct. To reiterate and repeat for the second narrative, the other's view of us, or our surmise of that view, both of which are mutually socially conditioned or informed, affect how we choose to behave, how we expect others to behave and, therefore, those conditioned views

become part of who we are and who we think we and others are even if we mistakenly claim our identities and each others' identities as self defined. Identity, even one's own identity, is not (or not predominantly) self defined. The self that defines itself as self defined comes from the cultural background. The ways we see ourselves are shaped by the ways others, including racial others, see us and by the ways we see each other. For whites this relationship between self and other, or blurring of the personal and cultural, can be unrecognized because the cultural position of white racelessness makes whites feel that their individualities are self defined instead of their being, or being from, cultural positions. For blacks, though, who are not raceless because they are not white, being an individual is contradicted by their collective anonymity to whites within their shared culture with whites. That leads to cognitive dissonance and double consciousness.

Narrative Three: "Scotland, Kilts, and the Camera Man: Black to the USA"

In his third narrative, "Scotland, Kilts, and the Camera Man: Black to the USA," Andrews explores cognitive dissonance and double consciousness within some interpersonal interactions between himself and white people.

Andrews explains and assesses one whole situation (in a necessarily extensive quote) by saying,

> As part of research I am conducting on the British roots of sportsmanlike conduct, I visited England, Wales, and Scotland for six weeks in 1999 to cover the Rugby World Cup and to collect data from various sources… One afternoon, I decided to visit Windsor Castle… On my way back to my hotel I…asked a passing gentleman if he'd mind taking my photo with the Castle in the background. He replied, "As long as you take my photo with my camera also." "Sure," I said, noting his American accent…

> After the photo, the tourist returned with my camera and I set it down next to my research bag on the bridge's bench. As he gave me his camera, he had apparently noted my American accent also, which does tend to stick out in the British countryside. He stared me right in the eye and, with serious concern tempered by a sly grin, said, "Now you aren't going to run away with my camera, are you?" I was so shocked at the question and implication of my latent criminality that later I was surprised I was able to gather together a coherent response. I looked him back in the eyes and said, "Sir, I don't think my university would take kindly to its professors stealing cameras." He gave me the camera along with a sheepish grin, backed for his photo, and returned to say, "I was just kidding." Sure he was.
>
> More likely, I had activated a stereotypical schema about black men. As many rap artists like KRS-One, L.L. Cool J., Ice Cube, and Chuck D. note, black men are always considered suspects. Others have noted that black men are stereotyped as dangerous…
>
> [However,] Gaertner and Dovidio[xxxi] note that whites are consciously concerned with maintaining an egalitarian and non-prejudiced self-concept even if they hold negative sentiments toward African Americans. (2003, p. 66)

The image the white tourist creates of himself in the mind of Andrews contradicts the image the white tourist wants to create. What happens then? The white tourist claims to be joking. He makes the whole thing unreal to himself and expects affirmation through Andrews' socially situated conduct, whatever the hurt and burden to Andrews.

Similar responses from other whites comprise a consistent pattern of experiences for Andrews. He says,

> And for white associates I have related this story to, the advice is, understandably, that I should "shake it off—he was just being a jerk." Another white person commented, "Everybody needs to be concerned about theft when traveling abroad," the point being that caution should always be one's guide when dealing with the unknown. I understood the general reasoning in both white responses above, but reasoned that they failed to see, feel or understand my hurt as a (relatively) young black American male cast forever and always as the criminal suspect.

[xxxi] Samuel Gaertner is Director of Social Psychology at the University of Delaware. John Dovidio is a professor of psychology at Yale.

> Gaertner and Dovidio note that discrimination is most likely to occur when nonracial justifications for discriminatory behavior are available. It would appear that, for better or for worse, other whites also look to find nonracial justifications for the actions of other whites so as to diffuse racial angst of blacks and possibly to further cement their own status as egalitarian and non-prejudicial. (2003, pp. 66-67)

Andrews and Gaertner and Dovidio may be inquiring whether sometimes white people may try to be equal-minded and may want situations to be racially equal when they are not. In other words, perhaps white people want to have a fair and equal outlook and perspective as the one that defines and explains situations including, for example, the one between Andrews and the cameraman. Perhaps they can think they are contributing to peaceful conditions and relations by sharing their fair and equal outlook and perspective. All that can become an image, though, or a form of socially situated conduct, that they share and by sheer force of quantity make the norm that everyone else has to tolerate even though it is not actually the way things are (or are seen by blacks) between black and white Americans. An even more dubious possibility is that whites might be less concerned about being fair and equal and more concerned with negating or denying white supremacy (and its white privileges of racelessness and individuality as well as its black burdens of mass anonymity and double consciousness) while it continues, and for it to continue, to function in actuality, but outside public discourse. If so, this might add tremendously to the cognitive dissonance and double consciousness that Andrews is discussing.

Narrative Four: "Black Pacifica: New Zealand and African American Bodies"

Andrews' fourth narrative, "Black Pacifica: New Zealand and African American Bodies," is about another interaction with a white person. This one is earlier in 1999 than the interaction over cameras with the white American in England. It happens in Wellington, the capital of New Zealand, with a kind and respectful fifty year old New Zealand man who is a house painter. They meet when Andrews is in Wellington for a conference and is trying to find his way walking to Te Papa Museum. He sees the painter preparing to leave his work site and asks for directions to the museum. The directions, though, are complicated and Andrews starts to walk off without a very clear understanding of the way. Andrews wonders whether this white man is trying to help or make him more lost. Then, the man offers Andrews a ride which he accepts. They talk about rugby on the way into town. Andrews explains his thoughts and feelings by saying,

> On the ride I had the amazing experience of lightness. I was experiencing trust by another individual who had white skin but did not know me. Call me deprived, but I had never experienced this level of trust and confidence from a white stranger in America. No doubt there are many who might have trusted me. *But the amazement was that I reflected in the moment how I had constructed myself as a criminal.* I actually said to myself, "Why does this man trust me?" (2003, p. 69) (Emphasis added)

In terms of double consciousness, Andrews sees himself as being defined as a criminal in the minds of others and then he "internaliz[es]" that definition even though Andrews knows he is honest and law-abiding (Andrews, 2003, p. 69). He seems to be saying that an imposed identity becomes one self definition that contradicts who he feels he really is as a person. Then, Andrews is in the social realm of how people create themselves and are created in the minds of others, meaning he is in socially situated

conduct, with the struggle of two identities. Andrews seems to be explaining this by saying,

> When I am in the social milieu of whiteness, my imaginings of the white other's interpretations of my black body and its threat cause me to attempt to reflect a docile persona in order to achieve some desired result…Gradually, over a period of years, I have been able to bring to the fore a calm in social interactions that does not bear the weight of American racism. I have always wondered what the unbearable lightness of whiteness was—to walk outside and wave at neighbors, to ride elevators without having others cringe, to walk through a store with a backpack and not worry about being checked, and to test drive a car without leaving identification behind. (2003, p. 70)

Andrews carries the weight, the burden and double consciousness, of projected and internalized identity, while enabling himself to "bring to the fore a calm in social interactions." He still is debarred, though, from "the lightness of whiteness." This is a lot of work without much relief, or lightness, for African Americans. Aware of this, though, Andrews explains,

> Many African Americans have stopped trying to please the imagined white other in media situations, preferring instead to send a "shout out" to the brothas and sistas backstage… [M]any youth simply don't care to have their cultural norms take a "back seat" on the bus of public presentation any longer. The imagined authoritative white public other is for many African Americans in the hip-hop generation losing its fear factor. (2003, p. 71)

As blacks assert their own norms, reject the authority of white norms and disregard their seeming threatening to whites, there are complicated positions, dynamics and interactions between black and white Americans even though, and because, they are not discussed between blacks and whites, or between whites, perhaps at all. This further complicates double consciousness within socially situated conduct because everyone is participating in the conduct, but it is not discussed. In his fifth narrative, providing

something to discuss, Andrews gives a glimpse of his experience of some positions, dynamics and interactions between himself and a white waiter who provides good service to Andrews at a restaurant.

Narrative Five: "Fat Bob"

In this narrative, "Fat Bob," Andrews is driving from Wisconsin to California in 1994. In Nebraska, at a stop for coffee, he enters the restaurant and orders a cup. Andrews is waiting a long time and wonders why. He thinks of stories of waiters "sabotaging customers" and becomes concerned about the quality of his coffee. Andrews decides he will accidentally knock over the cup when it comes to then get a refill. Then, though, as Fat Bob, the waiter, comes with the coffee, he says goodbye to Jimmy and Tiny, two black customers who seem to be old and close acquaintances or friends of Fat Bob. Serving Andrews' coffee, he explains that the reason for the delay was his brewing a fresh pot. Because of Fat Bob's closeness to Jimmy and Tiny and the fresh coffee, Andrews understands that African American customers are not assaulted by this white waiter (2003, p. 72).

To consider this situation, Andrews introduces the, "Social mirror," saying,

> [I]n many a cross-racial scenario, the social mirror is beyond foggy. The social mirror is not solely our own construction; we reflect at any given moment our personal collective experiences, in addition to the experiences of others of our group as told through stories. In addition, we reflect what we have heard other whites say and feel about us, in addition to what has been done to us over many years. (2003, p. 72)

We reflect, perhaps presenting and demonstrating, our experiences and those we share with our groups. That seems applicable to anyone. Also, Andrews seems to be saying that African Americans present and demonstrate what whites have said about and done to them and the legacy of that history. He says, "This is all put into the mix of how we think about our situation or our lives or our skin color at any given moment in any given space" (2003, p. 72). This could be a form of double consciousness with the reflections of one's own experiences and those of one's group as one perspective while the reflecting of what others have said and done is another perspective.

Stereotypes can be held by both blacks and whites about each other, but the sources of the stereotypes, including the cultural positions, from which they derive, are much different. Andrews says,

> African Americans are also prone to stereotype, though admittedly more out of crosscultural fear than out-group disdain. Given the many horrific acts by white supremacist groups, the police, and the U.S. government over the years toward African Americans, it should never come as a surprise when black folk overreact to what they perceive as a racial slight in a public setting. (2003, p. 72)

Interactions can be sensitive between whites and blacks. Whites can be sensitive to being considered racist while blacks can be sensitive to be treated in racist ways. Andrews' discussion of the cameraman and the findings of Gaertner and Dovidio shows a sensitivity of whites in their seeking non-racial rationales for racially-based beliefs, positions, behaviors and treatments while feeling strongly, or perhaps to feel strongly, that they are being fair, equal and individual. In fact, white racelessness as a state of mind is a non-racial rationale for the racial base of white individuality within which a sense of

fairness and equality functions and is held with such insidious conviction. A form of sensitivity of African Americans is explained by Andrews' saying,

> I want here to highlight that there is a cumulative effect of stress on the individual from having to decipher and react to one's race in the social milieu. Black males, I believe, carry a significant amount of stress once in adulthood from reactions to their perceived "threat" in interracial settings to the social order and from having to sort out, as above [at the coffee stop], any number of social scenarios where race plays a factor. (2003, p. 73)

Within and between these sensitivities, there are unequal adaptations and accommodations due to unequal power distributions. Because they are a subjugated minority, blacks have to adjust to and accommodate white sensitivities far more than the other way around. Whites can actually use their sensitivity to their own hurt feelings to coerce blacks into silently tolerating the suspicion and non-racial rationalizations from whites who become upset as a defense when these and other forms of racism are exposed and addressed (see Williams, 1991, p. 64; Gates, 1992, p. 38; Loury, 2002, pp. 68-69). That defense from exposing and addressing racism can become a norm, a sort of collective denial and taboo, while whites becoming upset can be how they enforce their norm and make it non-negotiable. And they might not even consciously or admittedly realize that.

Narrative Six: "Whose Norms are Watching You?"

One way the inequality of adaptation can happen below a surface of apparent equality is shown by Andrews in his sixth narrative, "Whose Norms are Watching You?" In the sixth and seventh narratives, Andrews does not focus on specific situations as

much as he considers general dynamics of interracial interactions including those that he has discussed in his earlier five narratives. A most crucial observation in the sixth narrative is that whites can often or mostly be within their own cultural norms. Even when they participate in events and communities of African Americans or people of color in general, the broader outside culture is white in the US. Conversely, as Andrews explains,

> In a mixed setting how do we [African Americans] continually shift and decide which group is the true social mirror? The choice of audience to reflect is a daily situational contestation with professional and non-professional African Americans who are always and constantly in cross-cultural settings and interactions. Whose norms do you choose? Who is watching? Whose imagination do you reflect? (2003, p. 73)

This continual deciding and shifting between social mirrors is black double consciousness as accommodation and enabling of the broader norm of white racelessness. It is a particular dialectic or even a symbiosis of white privilege and black burden.[xxxii] The personal and social identities and positions we hold and are held by are so entwined within and between races (as historical positions and social conditionings) that individuality, blackness and whiteness; and how we see ourselves and each other; and how we expect to be treated and how we expect others to let us treat them can only be explored all together in holistic and mutually defining ways.

Helping to show part of this broad perspective, Andrews explains how there is an, "Acceptable situational conformity," (2003, p. 74) that is a way African Americans have

[xxxii] Andrews notes that all people do the "cultural dance" of adjusting to and participating in the norms of other cultures when necessary or desired. (Andrews, 2003, p. 73-4) However, it is the specific uniqueness of black and white interactions that helps illuminate black double consciousness and white racelessness too.

developed as individuals and a group to interact with the outside white mainstream. This seems like double consciousness as it negotiates self definition, identity as part of African American culture on the one hand and on the other hand the images and expectations projected from the outside white mainstream. Andrews says,

> While there is a general norm of black resistance and racialized intragroup pressure in social settings not to conform to white norms, there is also a general level of acceptable conformity in mixed social settings. This acceptable situational conformity varies by individual actor, assessor, and social setting. In general, the posture, diction and level of real or feigned subservience are allowed to shift toward the white norm in order to get the job done and pay the bills, so to speak. Most African Americans calculate that there is no escaping some level of assimilation in order to advance economically… African Americans over the years have by necessity had to be far more conscious of the imaginations of whites than the other way around. And thus, through the act of reflection on how we as blacks "should" behave, we have become increasingly, if not defiantly, socially conscious of white "others." (2003, p. 74)

This difference between black and white consciousness of each other is profound. Blacks have to navigate a historically hostile mainstream that has denied their individuality while providing a sense of autonomous individuality to whites who have not had to notice how that sense of racelessness comes from the same historical and social source as black negation and double consciousness. This distinction between black double consciousness and white racelessness emerging from the same shared social and political history of race leads to different choices of behaviors and different influences on those choices. In other words, there are connections between choices of how to behave and social influences on those choices.

Narrative Seven: "Situations and Contexts"

Andrews explains some connections between choices of how to behave and social influences on those choices in his seventh, and last, narrative, "Situations and Contexts,"

> Conduct becomes situated activity when it is anchored outside the self and constrained by presumed "monitoring" by others…We choose specific behaviors in every sociocultural situation and in so doing imply to others our situated identity or our persona in the given social context. (2003, p. 75)

Presumed monitoring, our surmise of how others are interpreting and understanding our conduct, is an influence on how we choose to behave. That could be how "conduct… is anchored outside the self." For examples, Andrews refers to such situations as seeing an ex-lover in a café; breaking norms with family members and with people at work; and whether female Olympic athletes who choose to primp for, and retake, their photos. How people choose to behave can be influenced by the responses they can anticipate to receive from others.

The influences and expected responses should be equal for everyone. However, Andrews has already shown how this is not the case. Andrews says in his sixth narrative, "African Americans over the years have by necessity had to be far more conscious of the imaginations of whites than the other way around" (2003, p. 74). Presumed monitoring between blacks and whites is different and unequal because blacks have to be more conscious of how whites see them than the other way around. Whites do not have to have presumed monitoring about their whiteness, but blacks have to have presumed monitoring about their blackness. In this way, Andrews' sixth and seventh narratives combine. The sixth narrative reveals the inequality that blacks have to attend to the

negative images ascribed from the white mainstream while whites have racelessness ascribed onto themselves by their own mainstream. Then, Andrew's seventh narrative introduces presumed monitoring as a social practice of considering how others will interpret our behavior. That presumed monitoring is unequal because it requires African Americans to get double consciousness from their ascriptions while white ascriptions function as privileges of raceless individuality that are kept invisible (and that keep whiteness-as-individuality invisible) because they are not discussed.

Discussion and Conclusion

In this section, Andrews leads his inquiry in a new and profound direction. He explains that he will not focus on racial differences, but will talk within the context of how "[t]he similarities among diverse people along various social axes in society outweigh our differences" (2003, p. 77). This does not mean that the similarities negate the racial differences, as colorblind proponents mistakenly assert. Rather, Andrews reveals how common abilities shared between (at least) black and white Americans can help illuminate racial differences so they can be better understood as social formations and institutions that shape who we are.

Specifically, Andrews focuses on the common ability of whites to develop and share a view of themselves, and develop and share a view of themselves as whites, from the perspectives of their African American brethren. Andrews brilliantly explains,

> I want to emphasize, then, that it is fine to say what you think in social settings with African Americans. But also think about what you say, and if called upon to self-reflect, be willing to step outside the norm of whiteness, white rules, white

> manners and white hegemony to be able to take the imagined position of the social/racial/cultural/gendered other. Part and parcel of the ability of African Americans to redefine interracial social spaces as appropriate venues for the enactment of blackness might be the dual ability for whites to exhibit double consciousness about multiple meanings of the social acts of non-whites. (2003, p. 77)

Andrews calls on white Americans to "take the imagined position of the [socially situated] other" (2003, p. 77). Although he does not emphasize the significance of this white recognition of their own ability to have a sense of otherness, the change in white people and in social dynamics would be profound. White double consciousness would give white Americans a new way to view how they, blacks and other people of color are positioned in relation to each other as members of socially positioned groups. The next article in this literature review, "'Two Warring Ideals'": Double Consciousness, Dialogue, and African American Patriotism Post-9/11," by Todd C. Shaw,[xxxiii] helps show what views are possible and observable when whites too see themselves, and see themselves as whites, from the perspectives of African Americans and all people of color.

[xxxiii] "Todd C. Shaw is an assistant professor of Political Science and African American Studies at the University of South Carolina, Columbia." (Shaw, 2004, p. 20)

CHAPTER 9

LITERATURE REVIEW ARTICLE FIVE:

"'TWO WARRING IDEALS'": DOUBLE CONSCIOUSNESS, DIALOGUE, AND AFRICAN AMERICAN PATRIOTISM POST-9/11," BY TODD SHAW

Shaw's study of intraracial and interracial dialogue shows different meanings of patriotism; how these forms of patriotism are expressed in racially mixed and non-mixed dialogues; and how perspectives across racial lines can be unknown and misunderstood (Shaw, 2004). These views explicitly reveal black double consciousness. They implicitly help reveal how whites can have their own double consciousness when studying dialogue. Then, the possibility opens for a true dialogue (one that is equal) about who we are and who we are not to ourselves and each other. This multilateral double consciousness would change the discussions Shaw observes and it would change some of the interactions between Andrews and white people. Dialogues, interactions and dynamics would become more transparent and comprehensible with multilateral double consciousness as a meta-view of ourselves, each other and who else we each might also be. With "the dual ability for whites to exhibit double consciousness about multiple

meanings of the social acts of non-whites" (Andrews, 2003, p. 77), the black burden of accommodating the conflicts between, and blurrings of, self defined and imposed identities and positions would shift through multilateral double consciousness to equal negotiations and explorations of who we and each other are and why.

Invested and Iconoclastic Patriotism as Double Consciousness

Shaw begins his article by explaining DuBois' conception of double consciousness and relating double consciousness to two meanings of American patriotism within the context of discussions about America's first experience as the recipient of terrorism on September 11, 2001.

> American racism imposed an identity dilemma upon African Americans and affected their expressions of patriotism. On the one hand, moments of crisis and racial opportunity have led leaders such as Frederick Douglass during the Civil War, Du Bois before World War I, and Al Sharpton after 9/11 to embrace a faith that the Black gifts of labor, loyalty, and culture might one day be rewarded with full racial equality (Levine, 1997; Lewis, 1993; Sharpton, 2003). This is called *invested patriotism.* On the other hand, moments of racial retrenchment have led leaders such as Paul Robeson and Du Bois during the 1950s and Martin Luther King, Jr. during the Vietnam War to believe that Blacks must reject traditional forms of patriotism and instead display devotion by fundamentally challenging American racism (Marable, 1990). This is called *iconoclastic patriotism.* These two poles mirror the "American" vs. "Black" duality of double consciousness, though both depart from the assumptions of traditional symbolic patriotism. (Shaw, 2004, p. 20) (Emphasis in original)

Double consciousness is seen as the dual identities of invested and iconoclastic patriotism. Invested patriotism is faith that mainstream America will recognize and reward the contributions of African American people, culture and work. Iconoclastic patriotism is the challenging of the whole of America together to actualize its principles

and values of freedom and equality. Shaw situates iconoclastic patriotism as a black identity and he situates invested patriotism as an American identity for African American people.

Shaw focuses on whether and how African Americans feel more invested patriotism or more iconoclastic patriotism in discussions of patriotism after 9/11. He inquires into which forms of patriotism are held by African Americans through their conversations with all black groups, black and white groups and with multiracial groups. Shaw says,

> Therefore, this article explores how the Black expression of the above forms of patriotism depends not only upon the larger racial climate of the times, but more specifically, upon whether the conversational context for their expression is All-Black, Biracial, or Multiracial. As detailed later in this article, America after 9/11 represented a unique opportunity for American solidarity across racial and cultural lines. The *de jure* barriers of racial segregation DuBois lamented at the turn of century no longer existed and the terrorist attacks prompted Americans to symbolically unite. While African Americans seemed as eager as other Americans to display traditional signs of loyalty and patriotic attachment, the next section of this article will discuss why considering the racial dynamics of dialogue is necessary to any exploration of how African Americans express concepts as controversial as patriotism. (2004, p. 21)

Legalized segregation, the Jim Crow era during which DuBois wrote *Souls*, has ended and 9/11 was an opportunity and motivation for Americans of all races and cultures to unite. Patriotism, though, is not the same for everyone. Nor is it the same when expressed around different people. Shaw illuminates some of the controversies and complications of patriotism and race in America. He explains that many African Americans had been highly critical of George W. Bush as president. “However,” Shaw says, “On the surface, September 11th appeared to have changed everything” (2004, p.

21). On the surface, 9/11 led many Americans to express their feelings and patriotism by flag waving and by increased support for Bush as president. There have also been feelings that "the attacks caused [black Americans] to look beyond [their] normal ambivalence toward America and instead see [themselves] as 'full-fledged American[s]'" (Shaw, 2004, p. 21). Shaw asks,

> So what has become of W.E.B. Du Bois's metaphor of double consciousness in which the "the veil" of race and racism persistently divides Black America from White America? To put it in DuBoisian terms, did these attacks induce such a level of political trauma that African Americans decided, at least for a while, to fully identify as Americans and thus trump the salient group identity of Black? (2004, pp. 21-22)

So race would not matter anymore because blacks would identify so strongly with America? Would that identification instantly overrule the whole history and legacy of white exclusion of blacks from full first class citizenship? What one meaning of, "American," would be so inclusive, unanimous and strong to eradicate all divisions, conflicts and hierarchies within the rubric of, "American?" Could 9/11 be such a comprehensive positive cure for race in America? To help consider such questions, Shaw explains,

> This article will first theorize the relevance of the perennial double consciousness debate, the differing forms of patriotism emanating out of this debate, and then the construction of contemporary Black conversational contexts, especially within this post-segregationist era. (2004, p. 22)

Theoretical Framework

Shaw will discuss how the double consciousness debate is currently relevant; the invested and iconoclastic patriotisms that emerge from the debate; and the current

contexts of black discussions that develop from or with double consciousness and patriotism. First, Shaw explains DuBois' perspective that African Americans have always been vital to the productivity, development and success of American society. Also, the African American struggle for freedom is truly American in its values, determination and contributions. These positive meanings of, "African American," however, have not been appreciated because negative ascriptions of blackness have relegated African Americans to second class status. This duality of service to America without recognition from mainstream America is part of double consciousness and the way double consciousness connects with patriotism. Invested patriotism, Shaw explains, "Is rooted in the Black experience and leans toward the American pole of the double consciousness dilemma." Iconoclastic patriotism is "the assertion that Blacks display devotion to America by fundamentally challenging and transforming its traditional interpretations, identities, and practices; otherwise America will remain irredeemably flawed by racism." Did 9/11 end this conflict between African American contributions to America and the necessity of African Americans to "challenge and transform [America's] traditional interpretations, identities, and practices?" (Shaw, 2004, p. 23).

Shaw helps to show how these conflicts have not been so simply eradicated. He mentions, "Bonilla-Silva[xxxiv] argues that a 'new racism' and accompanying 'racial structure' has emerged" (2004, p. 25). Although Shaw does not elaborate on this new racism and racial structure, he could likely be referring to Bonilla-Silva's saying,

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[xxxiv] Eduardo Bonilla-Silva is an Associate Professor of Sociology at Texas A&M.

> [W]hites do not see or interpret their own racial segregation and isolation as a racial issue at all. This blindness is central for understanding their views on a host of racial matters. Recognizing whites' lack of realization that race matters in their lives, combined with their limited interracial socialization, helps decipher the apparent contradiction between their stated preference for a colorblind approach to life (which corresponds to their stated preference of their perception of how they live their own lives) and the white reality of their lives. (Bonilla-Silva, 2003, p. 116)

Bonilla-Silva, Andrews and Shaw together help reveal that double consciousness is not only a blurring of the personal and cultural, but it includes a constant racial negotiation between us all, including whites, even though we might not notice. Who people are, including for example the form of patriotism they express, depends on who they are talking to and how they are interacting. In this framework, double consciousness is interactive between people. Shaw contributes another dimension to double consciousness and the blurring of the personal and cultural. His study explores how the racial composition of discussion groups combines with cultural, in this case racial, influences people may not notice to inform whether African Americans express more invested or iconoclastic patriotism. Shaw says,

> One way we can understand how people politically interpret the world and those in it is to listen as they talk about politics. Sociologists, linguists, and other social scientists have long suspected that given the ways in which each of us is shaped by communities of norms, customs, and beliefs—not to mention language patterns and dialects—there are discernible routines to and outcomes of conversation. (2004, p. 26)

There could be patterns of how conversations proceed and where they lead. Such patterns could be social conditionings developed from the ways people are shaped by their communities. Shaw pursues how evaluating conversations can reveal these patterns

of conditionings. These patterns of conditionings occur within and through conversations that include the often unnoticed racial negotiations of who people are. Shaw explains,

> Talking with others can reinforce, challenge, or hold in abeyance preexisting expectations, interpretations, and memories. It can help to create community where none existed or further alienate persons already occupying divergent social locations. So how do the dynamics of a political dialogue about the War on Terrorism and American patriotism change based upon whether a group is All-Black, Biracial, or Multiracial? (2004, p. 26)

To introduce how views, and therefore who people are, are shaped through conditionings and dialogue, Shaw begins by explaining findings of research about conversations between African Americans. He then writes of research about conversations between African Americans and whites; and briefly mentions that there are complicated dynamics within multiracial conversations as well.

African American Dialogical Interactions

Between African American speakers, Shaw says, "[Melissa] Harris-Lacewell[xxxv] concludes dialogic interaction serves to hash out the particular ideological conclusions participants will reach… [T]he dialogic process is fundamental to African American political interpretation" (2004, p. 26). The term, "Dialogic interaction," suggests an exchange through and with language including verbal, gestures, body language, eye contact and touch or physical proximity. All of these forms of communication are related to and interactive with language in dialogical interaction.

[xxxv] Harris-Lacewell is an Associate Professor of African American Studies and Politics and Princeton.

It is dialogical interaction that, "[S]erves to hash out the particular ideological conclusions participants will reach." The term, "Ideological conclusion," indicates a system or pattern of thought (including one that is not noticed by its user) that leads back to itself in a tautology of thinking within terms that perpetuate their own reproduction and monopoly at the expense of awareness of other perspectives and at the expense of awareness of the tautology itself. That is how a conclusion can be ideological (Shaw, 2004, p. 26).

Returning to the assertion that, "[D]ialogic interaction serves to hash out the particular ideological conclusions participants will reach," the point is that the ideological systems and patterns of thought and their conclusions are influenced by the various forms of language and communication of dialogical interaction. Ideology, then, is affected and influenced by its interactions with different, similar and the same ideologies. If so, a broader generalization to all people could develop from Shaw and Harris-Lacewell's explaining that, "[T]he dialogic process is fundamental to African American political interpretation."

If this is the case, then ideology may not be entirely impenetrable and impervious[xxxvi] (Shaw, 2004, p. 26).

[xxxvi]Norman Fairclough says, "[I]deologies are generated and transformed in actual discursive events… [D]iscursive restructurings arise from contradictions in social practice which generate dilemmas for people, which they try to resolve through mixing available discourse conventions in new ways the mixtures being realized in heterogeneities of form and meaning in texts." (1995, p. 25)
Karl Mannheim says, "It seems inherent in the historical process itself that the narrowness and the limitations which restrict one point of view tend to be corrected by clashing with the opposite points of view. The task of a study of ideology, which tries to be free from value-judgments, is to understand the narrowness of each individual point of viewand the interplay between these distinctive attitudes in the total social process" (1936, p.81).

Although this exploration of ideology can be broader than African American dialogical interaction, and although that is important to the exposure of ideology, Shaw investigates how uniquely African American dialogic processes inform African American people's political interpretations or ideological conclusions. Shaw emphasizes,

> To be sure, notions of group collectivity have been defined in widely divergent ways. Discursive historical gatherings, ranging from the 19th-century Negro Conventions or Reconstruction Constitutional Conventions to Black political assemblies in the late 20th century, provide evidence that collectivity or solidarity have been valued if contested concepts for many who have claimed a "Black" racial self-identity. (2004, p. 26)

Shaw seems to be saying that these negotiations and developments of collectivity and solidarity have been part of the meanings African Americans have chosen and inherited about what it means to be African Americans. If so, black views, like invested and iconoclastic patriotism and other forms of double consciousness, are socially constructed within black dialogical interaction as well as in interracial interactions. The ways these interactions occur and result are unique, as Shaw shows above, between African Americans, but the conceptual model (of views being socially constructed

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Similarly, but in concrete context, Lilia Bartolome says, "The juxtaposing of ideologies should help teachers to better understand if, when, and how their belief systems uncritically reflect those of the dominant society and thus maintain unequal and what should be unacceptable conditions that so many students experience on a daily basis." (2004, p. 98)

A crucial aspect of ideological dynamics and ideological conclusions is that they can often function unnoticed by people who are within, and therefore trapped by unawareness in, ideology. That is what defines, "Hidden ideology," and what distinguishes hidden ideology from the much more simple and common understanding of ideology as a known system of thought or position. Awareness or exposure of hidden ideology reveals and apprehends our conditionings enabling us to no longer identify those conditionings and contents of consciousness as who we are. Rather, with awareness and exposure of hidden ideology, we can identify as the awareness. That is actually no identity, no ego, no self, no psychological state, no individuality, at all. Beyond double consciousness and race itself, that is pure consciousness.

through dialogical interaction) can be generalized. Shaw shows how the model can be generalized in his discussion of interactions between black and white Americans.

African American and White American Dialogical Interactions

Shaw begins by discussing the research of Anne Rawls[xxxvii] that suggests that blacks tend to be more forthcoming with their views than whites in informal conversation (2004, p. 27). Then, referring back to Bonilla-Silva,[xxxviii] Shaw says,

> If [his] assertions about the race-neutral and covert terminology of "new racism" are valid, then White apprehension about not being considered as racist may strongly inhibit their revealing candid sentiments during political discussions with Blacks. Such conversations are then likely to be polarized or very subdued. (2004, p. 27)

Put together, there would be a dynamic of discourse interaction where blacks would be more open and whites would be more reserved. Perhaps Andrews gives an example of this discourse interaction in his saying,

> By the hyper-critique of past actions and white behaviors in interracial environments, it might be easy for white students, professors and others to adapt a "say nothing, do nothing" approach in ambivalent interaction scenarios. (2003, p. 77)

If so, then white double consciousness, as Andrews[xxxix] suggests, would be a way for whites to change how they reach their ideological conclusions. That might change the

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[xxxvii] Anne Rawls is Associate Professor of Sociology at Bentley.

[xxxviii] Bonilla-Silva says, [W]hites do not see or interpret their own racial segregation and isolation as a racial issue at all. This blindness is central for understanding their views on a host of racial matters. Recognizing whites' lack of realization that race matters in their lives, combined with their limited interracial socialization, helps decipher the apparent contradiction between their stated preference for a colorblind approach to life (which corresponds to their stated preference of their perception of how they live their own lives) and the white reality of their lives. (Bonilla-Silva, 2003, p. 116)

interaction from one with white withdrawal to one of mutual open exchange of how we see ourselves and each other; and how we evaluate our own and each others' views; and, in terms of the generalized conceptual model, awareness of how our views are being socially constructed through dialogical interaction.

Multi-Racial Dialogical Interaction

Shaw briefly addresses interracial dialogical interaction in broad and general terms. He points out that to DuBois, "the 'veil' of race is a fluid curtain that engenders many forms of unequal double-ness" within and between different socially defined and politically positioned racial groups (Shaw, 2004, p. 27). Shaw suggests that the diversity of racial and ethnic groups and interactions can "lessen the stresses upon the Black-White polarity" (2004, p. 27).

Conclusion and Hypothesis of Theoretical Framework

Shaw's study and assessment of the literature leads him to anticipate that all-black groups discussing post-9/11 patriotism would have "the most varied and nuanced expressions of double consciousness and invested versus iconoclastic patriotism." He conjectures that biracial groups would have more distinct expressions of either invested

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[xxxix] Andrews suggests that whites "think about what you say, and if called upon to self-reflect, be willing to step outside the norm of whiteness, white rules, white manners and white hegemony to be able to take the imagined position of the social/racial/cultural/ gendered other. Part and parcel of the ability of African Americans to redefine interracial social spaces as appropriate venues for the enactment of blackness might be the dual ability for whites to exhibit double consciousness about multiple meanings of the social acts of non-whites." (Andrews, 2003, p. 77)

or iconoclastic patriotism. In multiracial groups, Shaw expects a variety of expressions of invested and iconoclastic patriotism (Shaw, 2004, p. 27).

Research Sample

Shaw advertises his study, "War on Terrorism Student Dialogue Study," to students at a large Midwestern public university. Sophomores and Juniors identifying themselves as "Black, White, Arab, Asian, or Latino/a black, white are chosen to participate. Their compensation is $20.00 for their 90 minute participation. Most of the "87 participants—42 men, 45 women; 46 Black/African American, 26 White, nine South Asian/Pacific Islander, five Latinos, and one Arab/Middle Eastern student--" are 20 year old Political Science majors in their Junior year" (Shaw, 2004, pp. 27-28).

Shaw continues,

> Seventy percent of the 46 Black participants reported attending high schools and growing up in communities that were predominantly Black or predominantly minority, only a third went to mostly White schools and only about 22% said they grew up in mostly White communities. Yet, even despite these tepid signs of formal integration, the continuing social divisions of race are evident in that 61% of Black participants and 64% of White participants said their four closest friends were of their same race (2004, pp. 27-28).

Findings and Discussion

"The format for each group was that the research team:" Shaw explains,

> (1) administered a pre-test survey; (2) asked focus group members to read two articles about the War on Terrorism—one pro-war article presumably written by a White male moderate named Jonathan who lived in Scarsdale, New York, and the other was an anti-war article presumably written by a Black female liberal named Shelia who lived in Washington, DC (both articles were actually authored by the lead researcher); (3) asked each group to have an unfacilitated, open-ended group discussion for 30 minutes ("suggested questions" were provided) in which only a student monitor was present to video record; and then (4) administered a post-test survey. (2004, p. 28)

All-Black Discussion Group.

In the all-black discussion group, the "members agree upon iconoclastic reinterpretations of what ought to constitute American patriotism and compassion for others" (Shaw, 2004, p. 30). This sharing of iconoclastic patriotism seems to differ from the earlier thought that "one might expect All-Black focus groups to display the most varied and nuanced expressions of double consciousness and invested versus iconoclastic patriotism" (Shaw, 2004, p. 27). For example, Shaw explains that the first speaker compared current racial profiling to the internment of Japanese American people during World War II. Both practices are considered forms of overt institutionalized racism that iconoclastic patriotic proponents of American democracy can fight for the good of the people and the country. Shaw says, "The introductory comment concerning the Japanese internment camps was a seamless, uncontested contribution in the dialogue" (Shaw, 2004, p. 31). Shaw uses, "BM," to refer to, "Black man," "WM," to refer to, "White man," "BF," to refer to, "Black woman," etc. An excerpt of the discussion is,

> Akintunde (BM): The first [author] was comparing it [September llth] to World War II and like the Japanese bias in this country. He was saying that it was not as bad as that—the numbers don't match up, as though discrimination against Muslims is okay because of the numbers. I didn't see what he was trying to do in this paragraph.
>
> Janette (BF): I hate this slogan, "God Bless America." Why can't we bless everybody, all nations? Why does it just have to be Americans or America? It's such a cliché.
>
> Akintunde (BM): You see flags everywhere. Cars, windows, my mom had one on there.

> Janette (BF): They didn't have one up there before that, you know?
>
> Harold (BM): The first one [article] you can take from the standpoint of the majority of White people, because he's never been discriminated against. He doesn't see the problem, while the second you can take as the perspective of Black people. So she's been discriminated against; she knows how it feels. So she can relate... He has no reason to have any hatred, I mean, bias toward the country, because it's been good to him. (2004, p. 31)

There is consensus even to the point of shared understanding of Harold's comment about how many white people cannot notice or understand discrimination because they have never experienced discrimination. There is also agreement with Janette about all the flag waving and how the slogan of, "God Bless America," blindly leaves out a lot of people who should also be blessed. These views comprise a shared iconoclastic patriotism that challenges America to reach its higher potential.

Biracial (black and white) group.

The biracial, black and white, discussion went significantly differently. This group too discussed racial profiling and Japanese American internment. Shaw reports that "there was an incremental struggle for even basic agreement on the comment about the Japanese internment camps" (2004, p. 31). At first, though, there is consensus in opposition to racial profiling; discrimination and violence against Moslems in the US; and criticism of the veracity of how the American media covers violence against Moslems. Even when Cindy, a white student, claims progress of American justice since Japanese internment camps of World War II, Ben, a white student, remarks that racial profiling is still occurring and Cindy agrees with that. At this point, all participants, black and white,

present iconoclastic patriotism. Then, though, as Derrick and Tonya, both black students, provide more thorough explanations of their positions, Ben changes from opposing to supporting racial profiling.

Shaw reports,

> Derrick (BM): To me internment camps were more to make the Americans on the West Coast feel safer because there was a general paranoia in that area about Japanese Americans. The government felt it was necessary then. If they felt it was necessary now, they would have done it. It just wasn't necessary.
>
> Tonya (BF): And you know, I don't think there's exactly what we would call today internment camps in relation to what happened before because in the second article it pointed out that a lot of Arab Americans have been kind of confiscated and put aside. They've been arrested and held and detained with no charges against them and that may be the new internment.
>
> Ben (WM): [To Tonya] Well, those are the people "suspected" of something, right? You're talking people having to wear ID's? Those may just be people who have dissent. I don't know. (2004, pp. 31-32)

For Ben, there is no longer a need for his opposing the policies and practices of America as a form of patriotism. He returns to the mainstream and claims later “he noticed a ‘racial stance’ or divide between the Black and White participants” (Shaw, 2004, pp. 32-33). How does Ben’s change illustrate a way dialogical interaction can shape or change ideological conclusions and connect to double consciousness? Shaw suggests that race ultimately divides people initially in agreement about “agreement about the emptiness of symbolic or "blind" patriotism” (Shaw, 2004, p. 32), but the connections between the data and the concepts of patriotism, dialogical interaction, ideological conclusions and double consciousness not explored in the article.

Nor does the article thoroughly explore exactly how these demonstrations of black iconoclastic patriotism is and demonstrates double consciousness. It can be inferred, perhaps, that the discussions illustrate that both all-black and biracial discussion groups reveal black propensities toward the iconoclastic side and away from the invested patriotic side of double consciousness (when double consciousness is defined as challenging America or having faith in America to become equal and just for everyone).

Multi-racial discussion group.

There is very little information about the multi-racial group in the article. What is written is a summary that is clearest as a direct quote.

Shaw explains,

> Although not seamless, the Multiracial (Black, White, Latino, and Asian participants) dialogue more subtly grapples over basic agreement. Throughout their conversation, the participants voice implicit and explicit feelings of double consciousness—Black and American, South Asian and American, Jewish (or identifying with Israel) and American. Overall, the group deliberated about symbolic, invested, and iconoclastic forms of patriotism and reasons for the 9/11 attacks. Conceivably this is why participants reported on their post-test surveys that they thoroughly enjoyed hearing the different perspectives of their group members even though were clear ideological differences. (2004, pp. 34-35)

Conclusion.

The brief summary of the multi-racial discussion group is how the article ends. The article and the rather abrupt ending opens many questions about how double consciousness can be defined, expressed and studied. Shaw does point out, “Yet, the ultimate goal was to build theory, as opposed to test theory, by considering how

conversational settings construct shared meanings" (2004, p. 28). Indeed, there is more to wonder about double consciousness as it is further explored.

For example, how can the data from Shaw's study define more clearly how iconoclastic and invested patriotism are forms of double consciousness? How can the data and meanings of patriotism apply to Shaw's conceptual models of ideological conclusions and dialogical interactions? There is a language, and even a discourse, developing from Shaw's writing that might combine with Andrews' ideas of, and experiences with, socially situated conduct; the blurrings of the personal and the cultural; and white double consciousness. These could be significant advancements of understandings of meanings and functions of double consciousness.

CHAPTER 10

RECAPITULATION OF THE INTRODUCTION, THE LITERATURE REVIEW AND THE CONCEPT OF DOUBLE CONSCIOUSNESS

So far, the introduction, the historical context and the first five articles of the literature review can help outline a general meaning of double consciousness. The introduction, history and the first literature review article ("'A Negro Nation Within the Nation': W.E.B. Du Bois and the Creation of a Revolutionary Pan-Africanist Tradition, 1903-1947," by Walter Rucker (2002), suggest a meaning of double consciousness that develops from DuBois' observations of the positions and perspectives of self defined and imposed identities of African Americans; DuBois' struggles with his observations and goals; with his debates with Washington and Garvey; and the implicit theme of double consciousness that can be seen in Rucker's writing about DuBois' Pan Africanism.

The introduction of this thesis defines DuBoisian double consciousness as a dual and antagonistic frame of African Americans' self-reference that develops within the negation and racism blacks experience in mainstream American society. The introduction

also indicates that double consciousness can be an assault on the positive meanings of peoples' being African Americans.

Then, the historical context section shows how this conception of double consciousness (as dual frame of reference and assault) can be seen in DuBois' debates with Washington and Garvey. With Washington, the conflict may have been over whether ascribed identities and positions should be tolerated and accepted as means to better ends. Washington may have believed that patience with whites would lead to improved race relations while DuBois argued for self-assertion whether or not others were, or are, ready.

DuBois and Garvey may have had similarities if they can both be seen as addressing double consciousness. Both leaders were concerned with helping their followers develop proud and healthy black identities and reject the negative projected identities from the outside white society. Garvey, however, reached out directly to the masses while DuBois focused early on the talented tenth and later on nationalism as Pan-Africanism, both of which could have been, and can be, considered elitist.

In these ways, double consciousness might be more of an empirical observation rather than a theoretical position of DuBois. Perhaps double consciousness is more of a condition than an idea. Indeed, the articles following Rucker help show how double consciousness can be found as a condition that other African American people experience.

In the second article of this literature review, "Parody and Double Consciousness in the Language of Early Black Musical Theatre," David Krasner (1995) shows evidence

and meaning of double consciousness in early Twentieth Century African American theater. This period was around the time of Washington's passing; the increasing popularity of Garvey; and just before the Harlem Renaissance of the 1920's. In Krasner's depiction, signifying on double consciousness is a verbal debate over whose definitions of African Americans will prevail. People use their own self definition, as Krasner (1995) shows in, "A Trip to Coontown," and signifyin(g) to withstand and rebuff the ascribed identities.

A different use of signifyin(g) is shown in the third article, Rosemary Hathaway's (2005), "The Signifyin(g) Detective: Barbara Neely's *Blanche White, Undercover in Plain Sight.*" There, instead of signifyin(g) verbally parodying ascribed identities on stage, Blanche White keeps her intelligence and awareness of her invisibility quiet so she can watch, think and learn about the white people without their knowing they are being observed. This kind of invisibility empowers Blanche White to work as a domestic (who is also an undercover, because she is invisible, detective) and expose the truth about the family's crime.

In Krasner and Hathaway's articles, there is conscious conflict between self defined and projected identities. Perhaps the conscious parts of double consciousness are just the tip of an iceberg? The next two articles pursue more oblique depths where there are overlaps between self defined and imposed identities. Then, the distinction between identities is less clear and what to parody by signifyin(g) is less clear.

In, "Self-Reflection and the Reflected Self: African American Double Consciousness and the Social (Psychological) Mirror," Andrews (2003) talks about seven

of his own situations through which a theme is the blurring between his own identity and projected identity. Andrews says,

> the distinctions between the personal and the cultural often become blurred beyond recognition as authors narrate action, dialogue, emotion and self-consciousness revealed through action, feeling, thought and language (2003, p. 60).

The blurring could occur because even a self defined identity is socially constructed, just as an imposed identity is socially constructed. All of Andrews' narratives share how blurry is the distinction between self definition and ascription involved in his "carrying the double burden of trying to assess white social signs through an 'American' lens while also trying to assess (possible) white racist signifiers through a 'black' social lens" (2003, p. 61).

Andrews then situates his inquiry within the concept of socially situated conduct. That reveals how all people imagine how they are seen and defined by others and how they act according to those anticipated perceptions. Andrews says,

> [R]ace and power problematizes *how people in the "out" racial group situate themselves and "reflect" on how to behave in social settings*. This phenomenon of shifting cultural lenses on a daily, hourly or moment-by-moment basis by black people was first noted by W.E.B. Dubois at the turn of the 20th century and is often referred to as "double consciousness." (2003, p.64) (Emphasis added)

At this point in Andrews' writing, a connection can be made between Andrew and Shaw's writings. Perhaps one way African Americans may socially situate themselves (as Andrews explains) involves their choosing (as Shaw explains) invested or iconoclastic patriotism. Shaw also shows that African Americans' situating themselves in either (or

perhaps a combination of) invested or iconoclastic patriotism can depend on the racial composition of their immediate conversants.

Andrews and Shaw are opening and revealing (not resolving and concluding) the blurriness between self definition and ascription in terms of DuBoisian double consciousness. In fact, although there is a connection between their observations of double consciousness, both writers reveal that more work is needed to explore and clarify experiences and meanings of double consciousness.

For example, Andrews conceptualizes double consciousness as "shifting cultural lenses on a daily, hourly or moment-by-moment basis by black people" (2003, p. 64), while Shaw says, "These two poles [of invested and iconoclastic patriotism] mirror the 'American' vs. 'Black' duality of double consciousness" (2004, p. 20). Perhaps double consciousness is difficult to apprehend because it can be conceptualized in so many ways and everyone is unique in terms of identity and individuality. Perhaps double consciousness is also difficult to apprehend because peoples' own broader social contexts, situations, dynamics and interactions influence how they all, not just African American people, experience and think about their personal, shared, chosen and ascribed identities as well as their "socially situated conduct" (Andrews, 2003).

Double consciousness might seem like an untenable concept at a level of such individuality and personal specificity. However, there is a different direction of inquiry that can illuminate double consciousness more clearly in a different and more generalized way. In this other direction, there is a connection between the American conditions of black double consciousness and white supremacy. None of the articles address this

connection directly, but a student at Northwestern University, Kortney Ziegler, has already made connections between double consciousness and white supremacy.

CHAPTER 11

WHITE SUPREMACY AND BLACK DOUBLE CONSCIOUSNESS:

FROM KERNER TO BAKKE

In her blog, Ziegler writes, beginning by quoting DuBois,

> "the Negro is a sort of seventh son, born with a veil, and gifted with second-sight in this American world,–a world which yields him no true self-consciousness, but only lets him see himself through the revelation of the other world. It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at one's self through the eyes of others, of measuring one's soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity."
> –W.E.B. Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folks (1903)

Then, she explains her own experience and view of double consciousness by saying,

> even though du bois wrote those words over a hundred years ago, i still see blacks as living in this false consciousness. there is always an influence to identify as an "american," while constantly being reminded we are not "american." and most importantly, we are not african, and we were never allowed to be. our fragmented identity is in a sense, in limbo–where denying a connection to blackness provides some sort social economic and political mobility, while embracing blackness, still does not allow us to control how others see us. in both cases, we are left as disembodied souls–a paradox of race.

With this introduction, she connects double consciousness and white supremacy.

> for me, and ostensibly other blacks, it is impossible to ignore the negative constructions of blacks as subhuman, less than, not enough and never will be. the racial attitudes of white superiority, imply by default, that blacks are not able to feel any pain. we are `"strong" black women, or we are "strong" black men, and so forth. so, when i for example, discuss my experiences of pain, people question it because since i know "how the system works," how could it possibly affect me…

White supremacy is dehumanization by negating African Americans' ability to feel pain because they should know how the "the system," white supremacy, "works." Blacks are expected by mainstream white people and society to accept their dehumanization. This raises the question of where that ability to feel pain is supposed to go and where it does go. She explains,

> i also do not want people to think that black people, or other folks of color do not have loving healthy relationships with one another–that is not the case. but it is safe to argue that we share an internal rage and anger towards the structures of white dominance, and this rage is played out in many ways–specifically for me, in the ways that i mentioned in my last posting. but most importantly, in ways that harm ourselves and others that look like us. (Ziegler, 2006)

Is playing out rage on other blacks a part of a negative internalized ascription of inferiority? Is that part of double consciousness? If so, where exactly does that ascription come from? If it comes from white supremacy, how does that happen?

A. Leon Higginbotham Jr. (1996)[xl] provides a meaning of white supremacy by first situating it at, and also as, a part of the origin of the US. He explains,

[xl] Higginbotham was an African American Ivy League law professor, a Chief Judge of the US Court of Appeals and a recipient of several prestigious awards for his book, *In the Matter of Color* (Higginbotham, 1996, back flap).

> When this nation was being born, one important circumstance… was its theoretical commitment to the principles of human freedom and equality. But another equally significant circumstance- as evidenced by the genocide of Native Americans and the enslavement of African Americans- was the dedication to the doctrine of white supremacy…
>
> [O]ur nation was founded explicitly, prospered implicitly, and still often lives uneasily on the precept of black inferiority and white superiority. Indeed, that precept helped to legitimize slavery in America and served to justify the segregation of African Americans in this nation long after slavery had been abolished. To this day, the premise of black inferiority and white superiority remains an essential element of the "American identity," mesmerized as we still are by race and color. (1996, p. 8)

Higginbotham continues by explaining how the manumission of slaves freed them from their status of property, but the mainstream belief that "African Americans were not quite altogether human," could not be just wiped away as slavery laws could be changed. Instead, "'inferiority' spoke to the state of the mind and the logic of the heart." Nor did the 1960's civil rights laws to end Jim Crow segregation eradicate the cultural and personal views that whites were superior and blacks were inferior (Higginbotham, 1996, p. 9).

Other than law and the meanings and conditions it can create and change, there are stolid personal views (Kovel, 1988) and cultural traditions (Loury, 2002) by which Americans are conditioned (or unknowingly condition themselves) by race. These views, traditions and conditionings can be difficult to change. They can actually be difficult to acknowledge even in the abstract because one of those views, traditions and conditionings is that Americans have rational thought and can be critical of their own thinking. It is in this nebulous realm of unnoticed conditionings shaping belief in rational thought and views considered to be based on rational thought that "'inferiority' [speaks]

to the state of the mind and the logic of the heart." White supremacy (and later double consciousness) is a precise, but grotesque, case of hidden ideology.

Beyond the surface of law and what it can do, white supremacy and black inferiority are deeply ensconced in, and actually formative of, American identities, relations, views, thoughts and behaviors. Just how deep and subtle is white supremacy (and then how does white supremacy connect to black double consciousness)? The meanings and complexities of white supremacy beyond the range of legal remedies to unjust laws can be explored through one example from the late civil rights era (in 1968) and through another example from the post civil rights era (in 1978). In this context, evidence of Higginbotham's assertion of the symbiosis of US culture and white supremacy can be pursued through a search for covert or unnoticed white supremacy within society and within people. A connection of white supremacy and double consciousness can then be sought.

First, Howard Manly (2008), a reporter for The Bay State Banner (an African American newspaper from Boston), wrote, "An Unfilled Prescription for Racial Equality." This article discusses the Kerner Report of Lyndon B. Johnson's presidency in 1968. The Kerner Report was written by the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. This commission was a group of leaders (including senators, mayors and activists) who were appointed by President Johnson to study and answer three questions about the racial riots of the 1960's. What were the problems leading to the riots? Why were the riots happening? What could be done to correct the problems causing the riots?

Manly adds, “Illinois Gov. Otto Kerner Jr., the commission’s chairman, went a step further, asking his colleagues to ‘probe into the soul of America’” (2008). Kerner’s meaning might be similar to Higginbotham’s meaning of the mind and heart. This suggests a more psychological, sociological, philosophical and spiritual problem and treatment of white supremacy than just that of legal legislation. The report does not explicitly explore all these areas, but it looks back at the white community to see that cultural and historical conditionings of the mainstream and from the mainstream were implicated in the riots.

Explaining the findings of the report, Manly quotes Massachusetts Senator Edward W. Brooke. He was one of the 1968 commission members and the author of, *Bridging the Divide*, a book that was published in 2008, just before Manly’s article (Manly, 2008). Quoting Brooke, Manly writes,

> “We pointed out that Negro frustration grew out of under-representation in the political system, the police, the media and all aspects of American life,” Brooke wrote. “We concluded that ‘*White racism is essentially responsible’ for the explosive violence* that engulfed many cities and declared that *‘race prejudice has shaped our history decisively; it now threatens to affect our future*.’” (2008) (Emphasis added)

In more detail, the Kerner Report says,

> We have visited the riot cities; we have heard many witnesses; we have sought the counsel of experts across the country. This is our basic conclusion: Our nation is moving toward two societies, one black, one white--separate and unequal.
>
> Reaction to last summer's disorders has quickened the movement and deepened the division. Discrimination and segregation have long permeated much of American life; they now threaten the future of every American.
>
> This deepening racial division is not inevitable. The movement apart can be reversed. Choice is still possible. *Our principal task is to define that choice and to press for a national resolution.*

> To pursue our present course will involve the continuing polarization of the American community and, ultimately, the destruction of basic democratic values. The alternative is not blind repression or capitulation to lawlessness. It is the realization of common opportunities for all within a single society.
>
> This alternative will require a commitment to national action--compassionate, massive and sustained, backed by the resources of the most powerful and the richest nation on this earth. *From every American it will require new attitudes, new understanding, and, above all, new will…*
>
> *What white Americans have never fully understood but what the Negro can never forget--is that white society is deeply implicated in the ghetto. White institutions created it, white institutions maintain it, and white society condones it…*
>
> It is time to make good the promises of American democracy to all citizens-urban and rural, white and black, Spanish-surname, American Indian, and every minority group.
>
> Our recommendations embrace three basic principles:
>
> * To mount programs on a scale equal to the dimension of the problems:
> * To aim these programs for high impact in the immediate future in order to close the gap between promise and performance;
> * To undertake new initiatives and experiments that can change the system of failure and frustration that now dominates the ghetto and weakens our society.
>
> These programs will require unprecedented levels of funding and performance, but they neither probe deeper nor demand more than the problems which called them forth. There can be no higher priority for national action and no higher claim on the nation's conscience.
>
> (http://www.eisenhowerfoundation.org/docs/kerner.pdf) (Emphasis added)

A large part of defining the choice and resolution of national and racial division or unity involves Americans' developing "new attitudes, new understanding, and, above all, new will." This requires white Americans' understanding what has been obvious to African Americans, "that white society is deeply implicated in the ghetto. White institutions created it, white institutions maintain it, and white society condones it." The programs, initiatives and experiments to "change the system of failure and frustration that now dominates the ghetto and weakens our society" would work only with the new attitudes, understandings and wills of white Americans who learn that and how white

society, institutions and people create and maintain the second class status of African American people. New laws and new programs as well as new attitudes, understandings and wills would be needed. One change would involve new and more interactions between whites and people of color. Specifically, in, "Chapter 17, Recommendations for National Action," the report states,

> We support integration as the priority education strategy; it is essential to the future of American society. In this last summer's disorders we have seen the consequences of racial isolation at all levels, and of attitudes toward race, on both sides, produced by three centuries of myth, ignorance and bias. It is indispensable that opportunities for interaction between the races be expanded. (http://www.eisenhowerfoundation.org/docs/kerner.pdf; http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/6546)

What kinds of new attitudes, understandings and wills would be required to make expanded opportunities for interactions between Americans in schools more healthy, democratic and edifying of how whiteness is implicated in racial disadvantage? In other words, how could schools help bring all students, and all people, together to explore, understand and eliminate white supremacy within self and society cooperatively? Tragically, and with severe perpetuation of racial disadvantage and division, such questions raised by The Kerner Report were never explored, developed, pursued, tested and answered. A holistic and frank exploration and treatment of white supremacy on personal, social and institutional levels, as framed by The Kerner Report, was forsaken. Quoted by Manly, Brooke explains,

> In retrospect, I can see that our report was too strong for [President Johnson] to take. It suggested that all his great achievements — his civil rights legislation, his antipoverty programs, Head Start, housing legislation, and all the rest of it — had been only a beginning. It asked him, in an election year, to endorse the idea that white America bore much of the responsibility for black rioting and rebellion.

> However true that might be, the message was politically too hot to handle. So the Kerner Commission Report gathered dust while America's racial problem grew worse. (Manly, 2008)

Here, though, after the beginning, is where interracial inquiries into racial inequality could, and still can, seek the new attitudes, understandings and wills that are needed for Americans to interact constructively and equally across color lines. A cultural meaning of white supremacy is attitudes, minds, hearts and wills of many white Americans. Senses of superiority and projections of inferiority from enough white people situate such white supremacy as a core element of mainstream America and beyond the reach of law. When that racial hierarchy is so naturalized, even well- meaning and fair-minded people can participate unknowingly in the maintenance and perpetuation of white supremacy as a cultural tradition and a "state of the mind and the logic of the heart" (Higginbotham, 1996, p. 9). That covert white supremacy, beyond the range of law, is a source of the projected identities of African Americans that lead to double consciousness.

In other words, the content of white supremacy and the projections of negating ascriptions of blackness can be in and among us even though the existence, concept and awareness of (seeing or really looking at) white supremacy is abhorrent to us. Seeing that could be an important step toward the kinds of changes in understandings and wills recommended by the Kerner Report. Charles Silberman explains that it is necessary for Americans to look critically at, and act critically on, their own views, perceptions, images and conditionings. He says,

> The American Negro has been subject to a system designed to destroy ambition, prevent independence, and erode intelligence for the past three and a half centuries. Hence, nothing could be more foolish or more damaging to the Negro

> cause, than to refuse to face the harsh reality of what three hundred fifty years of white oppression have done to Negro personality and behavior. Uncomfortable as we all may find the truth, the truth is that the "nigger[xli]" with which Baldwin is obsessed, the "Sambo[xlii]" of Southern folklore, was a reality and to a considerable extent still is. Not for all Negroes, certainly, and not in all places- but for enough Negroes, in enough places, over a long enough time, that the Negro cannot move into the main stream of American life unless he is able to destroy the image of his own mind and in the mind of the white. That image stems directly from slavery. A hundred years after its abolition, Negroes are still bound by its effects on their minds and spirits.
>
> So are white Americans- even those whose fathers or grandfathers arrived long after slavery had ended. European immigrants acquired the racist attitudes of the native-born even before they acquired citizenship. Slavery was "the congenital defect" with which this nation was born; the depth and persistence of racist attitudes among white Americans go back to slavery, whose shadow is still very much with us. (1964, p. 77)

How is the shadow of slavery still with us? How does the exclusion and consequential double consciousness described by Silberman, Baldwin and DuBois persist even after laws have been passed to prohibit overt discrimination? Writing in 1970, Joel

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[xli] Baldwin (1981) explains his meaning of, "Nigger," in his story of John Grimes (an African American boy growing up in 1950's Harlem) and his father in, *Go Tell It on the Mountain.* Baldwin writes,

[John's father] said that white people were not to be trusted, and that they told nothing but lies, and that not one of them had ever loved a nigger. He, John, was a nigger, and he would find out, as soon as he got a little older, how evil white people could be…

This [white or mainstream] world was not for him. If he refused to believe, and wanted to break his neck trying, then he could try until the sun refused to shine; they would never let him enter. In John's mind, the [white] people and the [downtown New York City] avenue underwent a change, and he feared them and knew that one day he could hate them if God did not change his heart. (1981, pp. 36-7)

Similarly, remembering his own first experience of double consciousness, DuBois (1965) writes,

In a wee wooden schoolhouse [in Great Barrington, Massachusetts], something put it into the boy's and girl's heads to buy gorgeous visiting cards- ten cents a package- and exchange. The exchange was merry, till one girl, a tall newcomer, refused my card, refused it peremptorily, with a glance. Then it dawned on me with a certain suddenness that I was different from the others; or like, mayhap, in heart and life and longing, but shut out from their world by a vast veil. (1965, p. 214)

[xlii] "The image that is usually associated with the 'Sambo' is that of a happy-go-lucky, clueless, head-scratching black man. The voice is usually high and the syntax elementary." (http://www.answers.com/topic/sambo-racial-term)

Kovel[xliii] explains that "aversive racism… is revealed in a pronounced willingness to undertake social reform via remote, impersonal means, and by a corresponding reluctance to engage in any kind of *intimacy* with black people" (1988, p. 55) (Emphasis added). This is still one way, as Higginbotham explains in 1996, "To this day, the premise of black inferiority and white superiority remains an essential element of the 'American identity,' mesmerized as we still are by race and color" (p. 8)." Specifically, writes Glenn Loury,[xliv]

> "[D]iscrimination in contact" refers to the unequal treatment of persons on the basis of race in the associations and relationships that are formed among individuals in social life, including the choice of social *intimates*, neighbors, friends, heroes, and villains. It involves discrimination in the informal, private spheres of life (2002, pp. 95-96). (Emphasis added)

Aversive racism and discrimination in contact are covert forms of racism and white supremacy as identity and private spheres of life that continue to project identities of inferiority onto African Americans. These ascriptions continue to force blacks to struggle between their own self definitions and the negations they experience from the broader, mainstream white community. In this way of aversive racism and discrimination in contact, the shadow of slavery and white supremacy as an attitude (as a state of mind and logic of heart), continues to perpetuate black double consciousness. For white people to see that problem, even though overt discrimination is illegal, would require a change in understanding and will for which the Kerner Report called, but for which America is still waiting.

[xliii] Kovel is a "Professor of social studies at Bard College." (http://www.joelkovel.org/joelkovel.html)
[xliv] Loury is a professor of Social Sciences and Economics at Brown. (http://www.econ.brown.edu/fac/Glenn_Loury/louryhomepage/cvandbio/GL%20BIO%2006.pdf)

Helping to indicate the depth of white supremacy and double consciousness, both Kovel and Loury state problems of intimacy between black and white Americans. Perhaps they are echoing the message of Langston Hughes in, "Impasse."

> I could tell you,
> If I wanted to,
> What makes me
> What I am.
>
> But I don't
> Really want to—
> And you don't
> Give a damn. (1989, p. 85)

Hughes seems to be showing a distance and antagonistic indifference between African Americans and white Americans. There sounds like a hostile intimacy in the distance and indifference Hughes describes.

Another kind of disconnected intimacy is shown by, "The Vet," of Ralph Ellison's, *Invisible Man,* saying,

> "You see," he said turning to Mr. Norton, "he has eyes and ears and a good distended African nose, but he fails to understand the simple facts of life. *Understand.* Understand? It's worse than that. He registers with his sense but short-circuits his brain. Nothing has meaning. He takes it in but he doesn't digest it. Already he is—well, bless my soul! Behold! A walking zombie! Already he's learned to repress not only his emotions but his humanity. He's invisible, a waking personification of the Negative, the most perfect achievement of your dreams, sir! The mechanical man! . . . *Poor stumblers, neither of you can see the other.* To you he is a mark on the scorecard of your achievement, a thing and not a man; a child or even less—a black amorphous thing. And you, for all your power, are not even a man to him, but a God, a force." (1989, pp. 94-95) (Emphasis added)

Unlike the mutual invisibility the Vet reveals, Richard Wright sounds unilaterally intimate with the white girls of, *Black Boy,* in ways that the girls cannot fathom because

of their known or hidden blindness to their privilege of ignorance (which is unavoidably present to Richard). Richard says,

> I wished that Negroes, too, could live as thoughtlessly, as serenely, as they . . . They knew nothing of hate and fear, and strove to avoid all passion . . . *They lived on the surface of their days* . . . For these poor, ignorant white girls *to have understood my life* would have meant nothing short of *a vast revolution in theirs*. And I was convinced that *what they needed to make them complete and grown-up* in their living was the inclusion in their personalities of *a knowledge of lives such as I lived and suffered containedly*. (Wright, 1993, pp. 319-320) (Emphasis added)

What could be this revolution in their lives? What are white people missing about black people and themselves?

Perhaps these and other kinds of intimate disconnection are what Hughes is addressing in, "Down Where I Am:"

Too many years
Beatin' at the door—
I done beat my
Both fists sore.

Too many years
Tryin' to get up there—
Done broke my ankles down,
Got nowhere.

Too many years
Climbin' that hill,
'Bout out of breath.
I got my fill.

I'm gonna plant my feet
On solid ground.
If you want to see me,
Come down. (1989, p. 50)

What does Hughes mean by, “Come down?” In response to a college paper written about that question, Calvin Hernton[xlv] wrote on the paper, “Maybe to ‘come down’ means to ‘get down,’ to be truly human, which is the greatest risk anyone can take” (Personal communication, 1989). This could be risky if it means being open to other people as equals and both different from and the same as oneself regardless of how they seem at first or from a distance.

“Coming down” could also be risky if it means looking at kinds of intimacy that are uncomfortable to see and habitually ignored, as illuminated by Kovel, Loury, Hughes, Ellison and Wright. What would happen, what would be possible, if there was looking at and discussing these kinds of intimacies together across racial lines? Learning about and understanding each others’ perspectives would include learning about and understanding how each person sees the other as a racial other across the color line. By seeing how they see and are seen, people can learn more about who they and others are.

This view would likely be more recognizable to many African Americans than whites if African Americans are already familiar with white views that are parts of double consciousness. The view of oneself as racial, as white, and as racial other would be new for white Americans who were not accustomed to seeing themselves as they are seen by others. Coming down to that view of oneself would truly be being human and it would be the risk, the greatest risk, of exposing vulnerabilities and aversions to social dynamics

[xlv] Professor Hernton was a highly esteemed Professor of African American Literature at Oberlin College in the 1980’s.

and interactions that might be very personal, sensitive and guarded while also being covert aspects of white supremacy.

However, introducing whites to their own double consciousness or "multilateral double consciousness" (MDC[xlvi]) and an interracial discussion at that level of inquiry might be a form of equal integration where, as James Farmer[xlvii] states, "Two proud parties meet, each having something to contribute" (reference needed). Then, dialogue could be or become equal because MDC involves all parties recognizing and negotiating how they see each other and who they are to each other and themselves. MDC could equalize dialogue by sharing, politicizing and negotiating collectively double consciousness in some and absence of double consciousness in others. Otherwise, black double consciousness and white privilege of ignorance is maintained and reproduced as a unilateral black burden of covert (or denied) white supremacy

Perhaps this is why Andrews says,

> I want to emphasize, then, that it is fine to say what you think in social settings with African Americans. But also think about what you say, and if called upon to self-reflect, be willing to step outside the norm of whiteness, white rules, white manners and white hegemony to be able to take the imagined position of the social/racial/cultural/gendered other. Part and parcel of the ability of African Americans to redefine interracial social spaces as appropriate venues for the enactment of blackness might be the dual ability for whites to exhibit double consciousness about multiple meanings of the social acts of non-whites. (Andrews, 2003, p. 77)

[xlvi] MDC is a concept I developed by connecting DuBoisian double consciousness with my reading African American literature and non-fiction and considering how I might be seen as white from those perspectives.
[xlvii] Farmer was a leader of The Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) in the 1960's.

Whites could expose and surmount their unrecognized racially shaped perspectives by viewing themselves race consciously as white and by viewing their whiteness from the perspectives of African Americans and many other people of color. This MDC would be a race conscious shift from "colorblindness."[xlviii]

[xlviii] Critical meanings of "colorblindness" can be explored as Leslie Carr discusses Supreme Court Justice Harlan's dissent in the 1896 Supreme Court ruling of Plessey v. Ferguson, which upheld "separate but equal" segregation of blacks and whites (1997, 114). He reveals how Harlan's argument for integration and "colorblindness" is intended to maintain, not stop, racism and white supremacy. Carr says,

The best way [according to Harlan] to maintain the domination of the White nation is to follow the color-blind constitution in all matters of law. Harlan, a former slave owner, felt that the "separate but equal" argument was a subterfuge that permitted the *public* degradation of an inferior people… To him, it was a *gratuitous* degradation but, more important, it was one that weakened the whole society by degrading the state, the bourgeois state. (1997, p.116) (Emphasis added)

White supremacy, even in Harlan's strategy over a hundred years ago, is best protected by keeping it out of view and behind a façade of just colorblind constitutional law. Separate but equal treatment is gratuitous degradation in this view because it calls attention to the oppression Harlan wants to maintain less conspicuously and less consciously. The white nation, the unofficial aggregate that benefits from and maintains black oppression, needs to hide behind an insidiously legitimized just state so it can operate undetected. The putative just state, according to the actual role of "colorblindness", exists not to protect blacks, but to protect the privacy and efficacy of intentional and unintentional white supremacists. Stokely Carmichael and Charles Hamilton explain,

Racism is both over and covert. It takes two, closely related forms: Individual whites acting against individual blacks, and acts by the total white community against the black community. We call these individual racism and institutional racism. The first consists of overt acts by individuals, which cause death, injury or the violent destruction of property. This type can be recorded by television cameras; it can frequently be observed in the process of commission. The second type is less overt, far more subtle, less identifiable in terms of *specific* individuals committing the acts. But it is no less destructive of human life. The second type originates in the operation of established and respected forces in the society, and thus receives far less public condemnation than the first type. (1967, p. 4)

Does this mean white colorblind people can be intentionally racist and innocent too because they have figured out a clever way to oppress by naturalizing white privilege so it is invisible or at least not discussed in too much depth or across color lines? Perhaps one's own "colorblindness" is not so deliberately oppressive, or perhaps it is a white privilege to not look too far outside one's racial perspective or to look too closely at race, including one's own, and what that really means. For example, by not looking outside and at their own deliberate thoughts about what race means or does not mean to them, colorblind people open wide the opportunities in a purported just society for what Bonilla-Silva calls, "New racism." He says, "'[N]ew racism' practices… are subtle, institutional, and apparently nonracial… Whether in banks, restaurants, school admissions, or housing transactions, the maintenance of white privilege is done in a way that defies facile racial readings. Hence, the contours of color-blind racism fit America's 'new racism'" (Bonilla-Silva 2003, p. 3). This covert racism might be more prominent since civil rights legislation ended deliberate Jim Crow, but rather than being new it seems quite similar to methods of subtle oppression explained by Carmichael and Hamilton over forty years ago.

Paraphrasing and elaborating on Eduardo Bonilla-Silva[xlix], Shaw says,

> If Bonilla-Silva's (1999) assertions about the race-neutral and covert terminology of "new racism" are valid, then White apprehension about not being considered as racist may strongly inhibit their revealing candid sentiments during political discussions with Blacks. Such conversations are then likely to be polarized or very subdued. (2004, p. 27)

White fear of being racist and consequential evasion through “colorblindness” can be a form of and maintenance of white supremacy. There are profound differences between on one hand, “think[ing] about what you say, and if called upon to self-reflect, be willing to step outside the norm of whiteness, white rules, white manners and white hegemony to be able to take the imagined position of the social/racial/cultural/gendered other,” and on another hand, “White apprehension about not being considered as racist may strongly inhibit their revealing candid sentiments during political discussions with Blacks.” Perhaps it is not even what white people say, don’t say or think that can be racist. Perhaps the white supremacy (historical, covert and deeply embedded in socially situated behavior) leading to black double consciousness is the very position of whites’ not having to step outside of their whiteness and see it and themselves as others do. This kind of self awareness could lead to conscious and deliberate choices of socially situated behavior and attention to how such behavior is shaped by conditionings people had not critically evaluated or even noticed as conditionings that contradict their sense of rational thought, critical thought, free will, choice, equality, open mindedness, agency and justice.

How can people think critically about covert white supremacy and their continued perpetuation of it through “colorblindness” even after the advances and repeals of civil

rights legislation? MDC, and the views it accesses and illuminates, can be a penetrating approach to dialogue about such a question and a transition from colorblind racism.[1] Supreme Court Justice Harold Blackmun says, dissenting in the 1978, US Supreme Court case, "Regents of the University of California v. Bakke," where Affirmative Action advances of the 1960's were repealed and white privilege was reinforced,

> I suspect that it would be impossible to arrange an affirmative-action program in a racially neutral way and have it successful. To ask that this be so is to demand the impossible. In order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of race. There is no other way. And in order to treat some persons equally, we must treat them differently. We cannot -- we dare not -- let the Equal Protection Clause perpetuate racial supremacy. (Powell et. al., 1978)

Referring to Blackmun's dissent, Cornel West said, in a public speech, "We must go through race, not beyond race" (Cambridge Forum, early 1990's, personal communication). Blackmun and West are concerned that racial differences are real social dynamics that have developed through American history. Although they understand that race has no biological essence, they disagree with colorblind advocates who think that race and racial differences should be ignored in order to pursue equality between people. Equality does not mean, "Sameness," especially within a history, sociology, politics, economics and psychology of covert white supremacy. Blackmun is saying that people must be treated according to their racial differences in order for them to be treated equally. West is saying that those differences must be accepted, explored and understood in order for people to be treated equally. This going through race means entering a social,

[1] As exactly and concretely as currently possible, the development and experience of such dialogue and transition is explored in the Discussion section of this thesis.

historical and philosophical intimacy with which Kovel and Loury may be concerned. Seeing the differences between racial positions means seeing oneself and others within those positions. This view is both personal and social/historical. This potential of MDC seems propitious, but the concept of double consciousness is still controversial. To explore one such controversy, an operational definition of double consciousness, based on the previous discussion, will be this thesis' meaning of double consciousness throughout the inquiry.

CHAPTER 12

OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF DOUBLE CONSCIOUSNESS

In this thesis, DuBoisian double consciousness refers to African Americans' struggles between their own self definitions and the negative and ascribed identities projected knowingly or unknowingly onto them by the US white supremacist society and people of that society. This is the interpretation of double consciousness that is used in the next and last discussion of this literature review.

CHAPTER 13

LITERATURE REVIEW ARTICLE SIX:

ERNEST ALLEN JR.'S, "DU BOISIAN DOUBLE CONSCIOUSNESS: THE UNSUSTAINABLE ARGUMENT"

Ernest Allen Jr.'s,[li] "Du Boisian Double Consciousness: The Unsustainable Argument," is an inquiry into the validity and study of DuBoisian double consciousness. Allen introduces an overview that he will discuss the meaning of DuBoisian double consciousness; discuss why the concept was not developed; and "argue in this essay, that Du Bois' formulation of double consciousness was little more than *double sleight of hand*" (2003, p. 25). However, there is no operational definition of double consciousness at the beginning of, or developing through, the article. This, in and of itself, creates an amorphous status of the concept of double consciousness. Concurrently, Allen focuses more on what double consciousness is not and how it has been misunderstood[lii], rather

[li] Allen is a Professor of Afro-American Studies at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. (http://www.umass.edu/afroam/)

[lii] In endnote #2, Allen says, "From the 1960s onward, virtually every academic writer who has interpreted the notion of 'two souls' as a broad-based cultural dilemma has failed to cite specific passages in Du Bois that support such an interpretation. The fact that segments of his work can be read as such does not mean

than on what it could be. He seems to be intending to disparage the whole notion of double consciousness. However, through the discussion, Allen does mention, support and add to the components of the operational definition of double consciousness in this thesis. He says,

> Confronted with a sinister engineering of signs and mores designed to fix the social and political inferiority of Afro-Americans in perpetuity, black self-respect was severely put to the test, with seeds of despair and self-doubt finding extremely fertile ground. (Allen, 2003, p. 34)

A few pages earlier, Allen says,

> [D]eep down at the roots, of course, this [double consciousness] was not so much a conflict over ideals as a conflicted deliberation concerning the actual ability of black people to hold ideals—that is, a question ultimately turning upon the recognition of black folk as human beings. (2003, p. 32)

Both of these statements share a common meaning with double consciousness as African Americans' struggles between their own self definitions and the negative and ascribed identities projected knowingly or unknowingly onto them by the US white supremacist society and people of that society (the operational definition of double consciousness in this thesis). This conflict, though, does not seem to be what Allen considers DuBois' meaning of double, or divided, consciousness. He says,

> If black physicians were beset by existential agony in the late Nineteenth Century, perhaps its source might more readily be found in the respect or esteem denied them by the dominant population as well as by their own people (the latter manifestation constituting a form of internalized white supremacy) *rather than* a divided consciousness on their own part. (Allen, 2003, p. 34) (Emphasis added)

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that Du Bois himself conceived them that way." (2003, p. 40). It is likely that some writers would have cited chapter 7, especially the first paragraph, of *Dusk of Dawn* and it is unclear why Allen would maintain that the paragraph and chapter can not situate double consciousness as "a broad-based cultural dilemma."

Could not this be double consciousness if, “Rather than,” were changed to, “With,” or, “As part of,” so the sentence read,

> If black physicians were beset by existential agony in the late Nineteenth Century, perhaps its source might more readily be found in the respect or esteem denied them by the dominant population as well as by their own people (the latter manifestation constituting a form of internalized white supremacy) [*with or as part of]* a divided consciousness on their own part. (Allen, 2003, p. 34)

Then, the denial of respect and esteem from whites and blacks as aspects and effects of white supremacy could be part of double, or “divided,” consciousness as argued in this thesis. Allen also explains,

> From the formation of the Niagara Movement in 1905 onward, of course, Du Bois’ own protest activities were set in motion for the long term. Another revelation for Du Bois and other middle-class Black Americans in general, was that in after being forced into segregated communities during the last quarter of the Nineteenth Century, they discovered recognition in and of themselves: a renewed sense of mutual self-respect, collective self-esteem, and black-on-black solidarity cutting across class lines. Although neither outward protest nor the rise of inner group-based mutual esteem were able to change the dominant character of Nineteenth Century social relations or material conditions, they contributed nonetheless in many ways to the overall mental health of the race. Most importantly, in the process of mutual recognition so necessary to identity formation, African Americans were not unilaterally dependent on whites for their individual as well as collective sense of self. (2003, p. 35)

Clearly Allen is in agreement with the idea that African Americans have faced conflicting and harmful messages about who they are and whether they are equal to other people within and outside their own communities. This and the other quoted passages suggest that Allen could be in favor of the concept of double consciousness although he writes that he is opposed. Allen does not present these passages together in his article so he does not appear to contradict himself, but he does seem to acknowledge the reality, although not the name, of double consciousness. This raises a question of whether Allen

is arguing against the whole concept of double consciousness or against the way it has been studied and understood.

Misreadings of Double Consciousness

In this first section of his article, Allen is concerned with shortcomings and vagaries of studies of double consciousness. Although Allen states that he rejects the concept, the issue of how double consciousness has been studied leads to another way evidence used against double consciousness can also support double consciousness. Allen says,

> Although it is possible to conceive of an African American double consciousness in a broad anthropological sense—many have done so over the past several decades, and, stripped of its historical context, Du Bois' work can certainly be *read* in such a manner today—that is emphatically *not* how Du Bois himself viewed the matter. Rather, his concerns appear far narrower, focusing instead on what he considered as conflicts engendered by (unspecified) double thoughts, (equally unspecified) double strivings, (vaguely defined) double aims, and (comparatively well articulated) double ideals, a subject to which we shall return. In late 19th Century America, however, *there existed no concept to express the kind of cultural conflict that many of today's academics have tried to impose upon Du Bois' earlier views of the world*. (2003, pp. 25-26) (Emphasis added)

Here, Allen asserts that many scholars have misinterpreted DuBoisian double consciousness by contextualizing it in broad cultural terms that do not fit the vague (but narrower) thoughts, strivings and aims to which DuBois was referring. Similarly, just as later anthropological and cultural impositions "strip [DuBois' meaning of double consciousness] of it historical context," so too is it a mistake to associate DuBoisian double consciousness too closely with any of its antecedent or contemporary conceptions of double consciousness.

Allen explains,

> Widely differing concepts of double consciousness, antagonistic ideals, and psychic despair were all, so to speak, "in the air" at the turn of the Nineteenth Century, thereby providing a number of overlapping and sometimes mutually incompatible paradigms for Du Bois to draw upon while executing his own unique take on them. Not only Goethe, but Emerson, James, Henry David Thoreau, Robert Louis Stevenson, George Eliot, and scores of other Nineteenth Century literary figures engaged the drama of the divided self through literature or psychological discourse. Apart from Goethe's Faust, one also finds in Du Boisian two-ness, for example, echoes of the internally competing psychic states in the medical model of double consciousness elaborated by James and others, where one's social selves became separated from one another. But we also should emphasize that *in no ways might Du Boisian double consciousness be reduced to the content of any of its predecessors.* (2003, p. 28) (Emphasis added)

DuBoisian double consciousness is unique and different from any earlier or later forms or meanings of double consciousness. Indeed, DuBois does seem to be concerned with a uniquely African American subjugation to American white supremacy. Complicating this specificity is the difficulty that there was no mainstream language or discourse available or developing with which double consciousness could be illuminated. There could have, however, been conditions and dynamics of black conflicts with white supremacist projections without concepts and explanations to identify, name and critically evaluate those conditions and dynamics. Just because something is not named, that does not mean it is not there. The absence of language and discourse to expose and address double consciousness does not necessarily argue against the possibility of double consciousness. Rather, this absence might mean that DuBois was pursuing dynamics and conditions of white supremacy that were, and still are, beyond the mainstream language of the time and inaccessible to or through the dominant discourse or dominant ideology.

Does this mean DuBoisian double consciousness is synchronically isolated between a past and future, neither of which can really embrace and claim the concept? Maybe not. A vastly different situation might be revealed by the problem posed by Allen's writing. Perhaps the problem is not with the concept of double consciousness at all. The problem might be with our ability to see, comprehend, identify, assess and discuss double consciousness and the white supremacy from which it derives. Then that would mean that we, mainstream Americans, are missing a political, social and psychological dynamic that is there while we claim it is not there only because we cannot or will not see that it is there. That would be covert white supremacy as a hidden ideology.

As Loury (2002) shows we are still practicing a form of, "Aversive racism" (Kovel, 1970), could we today be in a language and discourse, an ideology, with DuBois that keeps hidden the ongoing dynamics and double consciousness DuBois was trying to clarify? Are we still not seeing covert white supremacy and double consciousness that has been here between blacks and whites, but never thoroughly enough explored? Are we in history, and are we the history of tomorrow, this way without noticing? If so, would not discovering all that be edifying, empowering and interesting?

Even if double consciousness is untenable, at least our putting our heads together about race across racial lines could help us see, really look at, how we connect, misconnect, disconnect or ignore each other. Even if that does not succeed completely by leading to more recognizing and more being recognized, at least it would be helpful for all people to see that their perspectives, identities, views, memories, feeling, thoughts- in

fact all of one's contents of consciousness- all of who their selves are to them- and even their selves themselves- are conditionings.[liii] By raising issues of being stuck in a language, discourse and ideology,[liv] Allen adds a tremendous dimension to double consciousness while he overtly argues against the reality or studies of double consciousness.

For example, one way Allen raises an issue of being stuck in a language, discourse and ideology is by his saying,

> Sensing little "cultural" identification at all with the lives of the mass of black folk, the so-called Talented Tenth accepted as "universal" a set of values which by the 1930s would be ultimately acknowledged by Du Bois, Carter G. Woodson, and others as thoroughly Eurocentric. (2003, p. 26)

What did, "Eurocentrism," mean in the 1930's? Allen says,

> Historian Willard B. Gatewood Jr. describes the overriding set of values that governed the behavior of the educated black elite at the turn of the century: "Reared in homes that placed a premium on middle-class values and a Victorian code of behavior, they then often attended schools and colleges in which white New England faculties stressed the same kind of virtues and pieties. The pattern of education found at Oberlin, Fisk, Atlanta University, and Howard also prevailed in numerous other schools, black and white, throughout the nation; the objectives, ideologies, and even faculties were strikingly similar.
>
> The curricula devoted virtually no attention to the cultural heritage of Africa, but emphasized Anglo-Saxon or American culture. The educational experience of the

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[liii] "Colorblindness" can lead to our seeing race as a conditioning. Race consciousness and exploration of double consciousness as part of white supremacy can recognize that every person is conditioned beyond the range and capacity of "free" conscious choice to be his/her race, culture, class and in some ways gender. Instead of only seing just the particular conditionings, our seeing conditioning itself can help us realize that our very self itself is a conditioning. Awareness of our being conditioned, of our being our conditionings, is who we really are.

[liv] Explaining Karl Mannheim, Paul-Albert Emoungu says, "Ideologies refer to complexes of ideas and thought patterns of socially privileged groups are 'in full accord with the existing order' and whose modes of thought are incongruent with social reality to which they are directed (e.g., Black Education). Ideologies function unwittingly to protect the status quo by catering to vested interests of these groups" (1979, pp. 43-4).

> black upper class, then, conspired to mold it into a replica of middle- and upper-class white
>
> America. Its values, style of living, and patterns of behavior, collectively known as 'respectability' and highly prized in the black community, bore a remarkable resemblance to those of 'respectable' white Americans. Elite blacks were educated to take a paternalistic view toward blacks less fortunate than themselves, in much the same way as the well educated, white New England teachers and professors had often manifested toward them." (2003, p. 26)

Around the same time, in the 1930's, Karl Mannheim[lv] reveals,

> Once we recognize that all historical knowledge is relational knowledge, and can only be formulated with reference to the position of the observer, we are faced, once more, with the task of discriminating between what is true and what is false in such knowledge. The question then arises: which social standpoint vis-à-vis of history offers the best chance for reaching an optimum of truth? In any case, at this stage the vain hope of discovering truth in a form which is independent of an historically and socially determined set of meanings will have to be given up…Thus the ideological element in human thought, viewed at this level, is always bound up with the existing life-situation of the thinker. (1936, pp. 79-80)

The mainstream values of the early 1900's, including the meanings and prizes of, "Respectability," were part of an ideology within which African Americans, and all Americans, were differently submerged within their different "life-situations." These conditionings of the Talented Tenth and other Americans and the exposures of these conditionings by Gatewood and Mannheim indicate that DuBois was inquiring into a realm that was not part of mainstream thought. Rather, it was quite penetrating of mainstream thought. In fact, Gatewood, Mannheim and DuBois may suggest that what is now called, "Postmodern," can be traced back at least to African American struggles and their critical thinking of the 1930's. Dick Hebdige says,

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[lv] Although connections are made between DuBois and Mannheim (Dennis, 1977; Emoungu, 1979; name, yr?), they do not explicate the Eurocentrism of the 1930's as forms of ideology as explained by Mannheim.

> [M]odernism is discarded by some critical postmodernists as a Eurocentric phallocentric category which involves a systematic preference for certain forms and voices over others. What is recommended in its place is an inversion of the modernist hierarchy- a hierarchy which… places the metropolitan centre over the "underdeveloped" periphery, western art forms over Third World ones… (1996, pp. 177-178)

This hierarchy includes the "values, style of living, and patterns of behavior" (Allen, 2003, p. 26) of white mainstream society that dominated all Americans in the 1930's. Subverting this hierarchy and its conditionings by bringing awareness to double consciousness may have been an un-apprehended and unarticulated goal of DuBois even before the discourse of postmodernism was available to help identify, name, explore and address the problems he might have been seeing.

What was available at the time was Mannheim's insight, "[T]he ideological element in human thought… is always bound up with the existing life-situation of the thinker (1936, pp. 79-80)." If double consciousness is a struggle between self defined and imposed identities, and if both identities are socially constructed as well, then the appeal and denial of, "Respectability," could have been part of the torturous conflicts for African Americans in the 1930's.

Helping to explain these conflicts by discussing the genre of the, "Protest Novel" (many books of which were written before and in the 1930's - 1940's) Berry and Blassingame explain,

> The terrain covered by the black novelist is a white-controlled world devoid of justice and sanity where ordinary and heroic Afro-Americans face dehumanization. Outraged and embittered, the black characters assert their humanity and resist white cultural dominance. The black novel is an exposure of white oppression, violence, and economic and sexual exploitation. Although

> blacks wrote many kinds of fiction, their greatest artistic achievement was the protest novel. (1982, p. 363)

Berry and Blassingame also refer to actual real-life dynamics around which these protest novels were written. They say,

> In their fight for equality, blacks also had to deal with the conservatism of whites. While blacks wanted complete equality and a revolution in race relations, a 1942 poll revealed that six out of ten whites felt that Afro-Americans were satisfied, that their status would not improve after the war, and that blacks were completely responsible for the own plight. Such diametrically opposed views set the stage for violent racial conflicts like the riot which occurred in Detroit in 1943. It left thirty-four blacks and whites dead and had to be quelled by the National Guard. In spite of the fact that riots occurred in 1946 in Tennessee, Alabama, and Pennsylvania, the foundation had been laid for the civil rights revolution. (Berry and Blassingame, 1982, p. 384)

The fights over respectability in the 1930's- 1940's involved blacks asserting their humanity and, or by, resisting the white cultural dominance of views that blacks were satisfied with their inferior positions and that they were responsible for their being oppressed by whites. By viewing this dynamic as a violent conflict between white supremacist ascription and black self definition, the issue of respectability can be seen as a struggle with double consciousness for African Americans. What could have been done instead of the rioting and killing?

Mannheim illuminates,

> It seems inherent in the historical process itself that the narrowness and the limitations which restrict one point of view tend to be corrected by clashing with the opposite points of view. The task of a study of ideology, which tries to be free from value-judgments, is to understand the narrowness of each individual point of view and the interplay between these distinctive attitudes in the total social process (1936, p. 81).

This clashing, but also embracing, of other views that can show that the narrowness and the terms of one's own views (e.g., of respectability, self and other) is both an exposure of ideology and is possible through multilateral double consciousness. Together, even today, by seeing ourselves as racial as we are seen by others, we can expose our values, perspectives, identities, projections and expectations. We can expose our submersion in those conditionings whether we are black, white, male, female, etc. We can change that some people are more privileged than others and that some are more privileged in some ways than others. We can make such changes because we can see that we are all equal in our ideological submersion itself and in our being comprised of our conditionings. When our being so conditioned is exposed, how we are conditioned (our conditionings themselves) and the resulting hierarchies are illustrated too. Then the conditionings and hierarchies lose their legitimacy and authority internally first within the hearts, minds and spirits of Americans. Then society would change. Seeing that, though, for many people, may take going through (not beyond) race; new understandings; new wills; and new kinds of contacts as called for by the Kerner Report, Loury and` Blackmun. This is one direction in which a study of double consciousness, Eurocentrism, white supremacy and ideology can lead. However, such an inquiry is forestalled by Allen even before it can start. He says,

> [A]ny suggestion that members of the tiny, educated elite among Afro-Americans were somehow torn between the values of, on the one hand, upper- or middle-class whites and, on the other, those of black sharecroppers, domestics, and other working people (that is, as one might say today, between a Eurocentric and an Afrocentric cultural orientation) is, quite simply, a proposition unsupported by the evidence. (Allen, 2003, p. 26)

There may not be clear evidence of African Americans being torn between black and white values. However, evidence has been presented that and how, "It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at one's self through the eyes of others, of measuring one's soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pit" (DuBois, 1965, p. 215).

Allen continues by discussing what double consciousness is not by first explaining ideas of differences between black and white people and how those ideas did not fit DuBois' conception of double consciousness. Allen says,

> Western thinkers of the 18th and 19th Centuries commonly assumed that each nationality or race (the terms were commonly interchanged) was enamored of specific traits, generally differing in kind from those of others… And it is true that Du Bois occasionally drew salient contrasts between what he perceived as African American character traits and those of the dominant American population. But he held such differences to be *complementary* rather than incompatible in nature, specifically rejecting the thought that any kind of warring incongruities existed between them. (2003, pp. 26-27)

Allen then describes some of DuBois' ideas of differences between black and white Americans in the 1920's. To DuBois, blacks had a more "sensuous, tropical love of life" whereas whites had more "cool and cautious New England reason." Allen emphasizes that these differences were not what double consciousness meant to DuBois. To DuBois, the differences were complimentary and mutually beneficial. Therefore, these differences were not the conflicts of double consciousness. Allen also shows how this mistaken meaning of DuBoisian double consciousness has been presented as DuBoisian double consciousness in academic publishing (Allen, 2003, p. 27).

Double Consciousness: Literary and Medical Expressions

Next, Allen considers how DuBoisian double consciousness has been erroneously combined with other forms and conceptions of division of or within self. Surveying the intellectual landscape of the time, Allen explains,

> [T]he growing fascination with the subject of the double and the divided self in Western Europe and the United States throughout the Nineteenth Century had mostly to do with formidable physical and spiritual dislocations experienced by individuals at the hands of modernity: industrialization, urbanization, and corresponding cultural changes befitting new modes of social organization. Often drawing upon oppositional constructs inherited from early Christianity, such expressions might assume, as with Paul or St. Augustine, a tension between the flesh and the sacred, or between nature and spirit, respectively. Or perhaps a theme rather common to Romanticism: a counterposing of the quotidian to the ethereal, of everyday life to thoughts of the sublime. (2003, p. 28)

Allen situates DuBoisian double consciousness within the intellectual frameworks and models of the day that "DuBois [drew] upon while executing his own unique take on them" (2003, p. 28). DuBois was exposing and addressing a particularly African American double consciousness with which white Americans also had a particular relationship. This specificity of DuBoisian double consciousness is not explicit in Allen's writing, but he may imply that DuBois was referring to a conflict between ascribed and self defined identities.

Alternative Source of Anguish: The Agony of Misrecognition

However, instead of looking into the specificity of DuBoisian double consciousness, Allen generalizes where he might have explained just what DuBois could have meant by "Double consciousness." Then, though, Allen does bring in a promising

meaning of the term, but he takes it right away by stating that such a meaning is not the meaning of double consciousness. In this opaque realm, Allen says,

> However formulated, what all of these diverse expressions of double consciousness—including that of Du Bois—held in common was a sense of unresolved *angst*. Whether African Americans actually suffered a strain of double consciousness is a matter yet to be determined here. But it is essential to point out that an altogether different and powerful source of psychic distress in the souls of black folk could be found in a process of *misrecognition*, or disrespect encountered on a daily basis—that is, in the general refusal on the part of whites to acknowledge the humanity of blacks… [Their] despair was an expression of the anguish experienced by African Americans who could not help but have internalized at least some of the negative sentiments that white society held towards them. (2003, p. 28)

Now, the angst of DuBoisian double consciousness is what it has "in common" with other forms of double consciousness, but the dehumanization, "misrecognition," "disrespect" and other sources of black "psychic distress" are "altogether different" from DuBoisian double consciousness. Is not the angst actually and directly about the dehumanization, misrecognition, disrespect and other sources of black psychic distress that comes from white refusal to acknowledge that blacks are humans? How can angst and experience be separated so the angst is part of a general double consciousness while the sources of such angst are not part of double consciousness? In other words, instead of distinguishing dehumanization, misrecognition, disrespect and other sources of black psychic distress from double consciousness, could they be parts of the double consciousness DuBois was trying to apprehend and reveal? Allen seems to be defining DuBoisian double consciousness while also claiming that the term cannot be tenably defined.

The Agony of the Divided Self: Three Arguments

Allen then explicitly raises the question of what double consciousness meant to DuBois. He says,

> The question before us is how Du Bois himself defined double consciousness. But quickly we discover that our quest for answers tends to be *frustrated* by enigmatic references, seductive prose largely lacking in analytical fortitude, as well as inadequate examples. Contributing to this evasive quality as well were the *multiple expressions of Afro-American duality* given attention in his work. Between 1897 and 1900 Du Bois elaborated three altogether different scenarios—two of which were ultimately incorporated into *Souls*—where black folk were described as being irreparably torn between their Negro-ness and their American-ness. (Allen, 2003, p. 29) (Emphasis added)

The initial frustrations and the multiple expressions of Afro-American duality do not have to debilitate the entire subject of DuBoisian double consciousness. Rather, perhaps the frustration means we are still not seeing what DuBois was trying to apprehend and reveal. Then, instead of interrogating DuBois we could inquire with him and with his helping us get started. As an example of the frustration and multiple expressions of African American duality, Allen focuses on three examples from the early years of DuBois' long career (in 1897- 1900, when DuBois was 29- 32 years of age), "where black folk were described as being irreparably torn between their Negro-ness and their American-ness" (Allen, 2003, p. 29). First, Allen says,

> Take Du Bois' "Conservation" essay, for example: "Am I an American or am I a Negro? Can I be both? Or is it my duty to cease to be a Negro as soon as possible and be an American? If I strive as a Negro, am I not perpetuating that very cleft that threatens and separates Black and White America? Is not my only possible practical aim the subduction of all that is Negro in me to the American? Does my black blood place upon me any more obligation to assert my nationality than German, or Irish or Italian blood would? (2003, p. 29)

A question in some ways very much like the last one is still at the core of America's race debate. Today, though, we might ask, does the sociocultural significance of race place upon blacks any more need for them to define, develop and assert their African American identity than a German, or Irish or Italian ethnic background would? And Allen might agree with this linkage between now and then because he refers to this passage as showing "the existence of fundamental *political* differences at the heart of the issue" (2003, p. 29). Perhaps the political differences between blacks and whites could still derive from the ongoing hidden struggles with covert white supremacy and resulting double consciousness for African Americans.

Second, Allen suggests that "DuBois comes closest here to advancing the proposition that black folk were experiencing what we might denote today as 'cultural conflict" (2003, p. 30) by quoting DuBois as saying,

> From the double life every American Negro must live, as a Negro and as an American, as swept on by the current of the nineteenth while yet struggling in the eddies of the fifteenth century,—from this must arise a painful self-consciousness, an almost morbid sense of personality and a moral hesitancy which is fatal to self-confidence. The worlds within and without the Veil of Color are changing and changing rapidly, but not at the same rate, not in the same way; and this must produce a peculiar wrenching of the soul, a peculiar sense of doubt and bewilderment. Such a double life, with double thoughts, double duties, and double social classes, must give rise to double words and double ideals, and tempt the mind to presence or revolt, to hypocrisy or radicalism. (Allen, 2003, p. 29-30)

Allen goes on to say that DuBois "superimposes" the double life of African Americans on their "anguished feelings of inadequacy generated during times of rapid social upheaval… in late Nineteenth Century American life." How and why there is superimposition rather than overlap and perhaps symbiosis between black double

consciousness and social changes is not clarified in the article. However, in general these first two meanings of double consciousness are shown by Allen to include both "political" and "cultural" aspects, but they are not synthesized into a whole (Allen, 2003, pp. 29-30).

Third, Allen discusses in detail DuBois' saying,

> It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at one's self through the eyes of others, of measuring one's soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his two-ness,—an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder. (Allen, 2003, p. 30)

And Allen analyzes,

> The passage in "Strivings" cited above contains a juxtaposition of two modes of purported psychic turmoil which Du Bois insisted on treating as a single phenomenon—two agonies dwelling in one, as it were. Here the source of internal conflict is unclear: does the disturbance in black folks' psyches reside in the *internalization of contemptuous ideas* which the world has of them? or is it rather to be located in sets of *conflicting thoughts, strivings, and ideals* which they simultaneously hold? (2003, p. 11).

The first psychic turmoil is shown to be the anguish of having to see oneself as unrecognized and disdained by others. The second turmoil is "a tortured clash of thoughts, strivings, and ideals in the minds of Negro Americans seeking to affirm both their American and Negro identities." These turmoils are mutually exclusive to Allen (2003, pp. 30-31) He says,

> But there exists, as we say, a perilous "disconnect" between the two sections of Du Bois' text: one the one hand, an anguish resulting from one's humanity having been systematically denied; on the other, a tortured clash of thoughts, strivings, and ideals in the minds of Negro Americans seeking to affirm both their American and Negro identities. The first stems from the refusal of whites to recognize blacks as human beings; the second, from their refusal to acknowledge

> blacks as American citizens while at the same time holding them to the responsibilities of citizenship. Although the second disclaimer is assuredly rooted in the first, they are not the same thing. Yet here the resulting, distorted consciousness and *Angst* associated with one type of experience is haphazardly merged with the corresponding anguish of yet another. (2003, p. 31)

Whites refusing to "acknowledge blacks as American citizens while holding them to the responsibilities of citizenship" is, according to Allen, a "perilous disconnect" from the refusal of whites to "recognize blacks as human beings" (2003, p. 31). Why is there such a disconnect between white refusal to recognize blacks as humans and white refusal to recognize blacks as American citizens? Allen grants that the latter refusal is rooted in the former, but he does not explicate why, then, the association between the two is haphazard. Rather than their association being haphazard, are not the two anguishes two overlapping aspects of white supremacy and consequential black double consciousness? Allen maintains that these two anguishes cannot be overlapping in his saying,

> This creative and indiscriminate mixing of oranges and tangerines allowed Du Bois to transform an acknowledged social problem— that of securing recognition and concomitant self-respect for Afro-Americans in general—into a far more esoteric one involving resolution of the supposed double consciousness of the Talented Tenth. Touted on the one hand as a phenomenon experienced by all Afro-Americans, the manner in which this double consciousness became a problem uniquely identified with the educated elite occurred by way of a second maneuver: Du Bois' selection of a narrow set of examples to illustrate his argument. (2003, p. 31)

DuBois, though, was addressing the masses of blacks in addition to the middle and upper classes. Manning Marable[lvi] explains that even before publishing *Souls*,

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[lvi] Marable is Professor of History and Political Science; Director of the Institute for Research in African American Studies; and Professor in The Department of International and Public Affairs at Columbia.

DuBois was concerned with Philadelphia's forty thousand African Americans whose economic hardship was attributable to racial prejudice and discrimination. In 1897 Philadelphia, as in the broader society, "thousands of black young adults, denied educational and vocational opportunity, had been unable to develop [Quoting DuBois], 'fully the feeling of responsibility and personal worth.'" Marable also writes, beginning by quoting DuBois,

> "The Negro who ventures away from the mass of his people and their organized life finds himself alone, shunned and taunted, stared at, and made uncomfortable." Du Bois's assessment of the Negro middle class was critical yet hopeful. The black "aristocracy" did not exhibit a clear race consciousness, a political and social commitment to uplift the masses of poor blacks. The Negro elite usually consumed more than it produced, and it had not begun to generate a program to accumulate capital and to initiate economic enterprises that could employ black workers. "The better classes of Negroes," Du Bois commented, "should recognize their duty toward the masses… Implicitly, Du Bois was expressing the kernel of his famous "Talented Tenth" thesis, developed several years later. (Marable, 1986, p. 26)

The denial of black humanity and the denial of black citizenship combined in 1897 to undermine the efforts of all classes of blacks to develop feelings of responsibility and personal worth. DuBois is talking about different particular problems facing the elite and the thousands of regular people, but class is not a decisive factor of their being burdened with conflicts between ascribed and self defined identities in general. Nor are the social and personal realms of identity and position, as explored by Andrews (2003) (in "Self-Reflection and the Reflected Self: African American Double Consciousness and the Social [Psychological] Mirror"), so separable as Allen situates them in his saying,

> This creative and indiscriminate mixing of oranges and tangerines allowed Du Bois to transform an acknowledged social problem—that of securing recognition and concomitant self-respect for Afro-Americans in general—into a far more esoteric one involving resolution of the supposed double consciousness of the Talented Tenth. Touted on the one hand as a phenomenon experienced by all Afro-Americans, the manner in which this double consciousness became a problem uniquely identified with the educated elite occurred by way of a second maneuver: Du Bois' selection of a narrow set of examples to illustrate his argument. (2003, p. 31)

Even if DuBois did focus more on the elite than the masses, there is still evidence that the black general population of 1897 was facing struggles between ascribed and self defined identities. These struggles have been shown in this thesis in the earlier discussions of Marable (1986) and of Krasner's (1995) article ("Parody and Double Consciousness in the Language of Early Black Musical Theatre"), on signifyin(g) in black theater, specifically in Bob Cole's 1897 production of, "Coontown."

Also, Allen does not tie in the personal and social levels of double consciousness with his earlier examples of political differences (in his discussion of DuBois' asking, "Does my black blood place upon me any more obligation to assert my nationality than German, or Irish or Italian blood would?") and the cultural changes of the late Nineteenth Century (Allen, 2003, pp. 29-30). If he did, perhaps a more cohesive meaning of double consciousness would emerge as a struggle between ascribed and self defined identities.

Warring Thoughts, Strivings, Ideals: How Defined?

In this next section, Allen explains that DuBois' writing is unclear about the meanings of, "Warring thoughts, aims, strivings and ideals" (2003, p. 31). Allen continues by showing how "Du Bois' references to 'thoughts' are much too broad to be

meaningful to any discussion of double consciousness, as are those of 'stirrings.' Du Boisian 'aims' are also vague…" (2003, p. 31). He then explains that the ideals of African Americans are actually the same as those of white Americans by quoting DuBois as saying,

> If now once this great ground principle is fixed, that negroes are men,—an indivisible part of that great humanity which works and aspires,—then what are the ideals of life that interest them in common with other men? To ask that question is to answer it. They are the same. They, with all men, strive to know and to do, to organize and to dream, to fight in that great battle of the west in the glow of the setting sun. (Allen, 2003, pp. 31-32).

With unclear meanings of terms and with common ideals between black and white Americans, Allen raises the question, "If such conflict [between black and white ideals] cannot be demonstrated, if no warring ideals can be produced, what does that fact portend for the existence of double consciousness?" (2003, p. 32). Allen's article then goes in two contradictory directions. First, he presents a case against double consciousness, but then he ends the paragraph with good evidence that double consciousness is a conflict between ascribed and self determined identities. Continuing from the previously quoted passage, Allen writes,

> Du Bois circumvented this little difficulty by inventing what I have variously termed *lesser* ideals and *compromised* ideals: ideals in name, but lacking the moral authority of his more frequently invoked ethical standards such as Goodness, Beauty, and Truth. What Du Bois was attempting to accomplish by portraying Afro-American double consciousness as rooted in conflicting white and black ideals, it seems, was to infuse the concept with a heightened sense of moral authority. But deep down at the roots, of course, this was not so much a conflict over ideals as a conflicted deliberation concerning the actual ability of black people to hold ideals—that is, a question ultimately turning upon the recognition of black folk as human beings. (2003, p. 32)

The ultimate question is whether white Americans can, will and do recognize African Americans as human beings. This raises questions of what recognition is and is not, but that is not the subject of the article. The immediate issue is that his own concluding idea of recognition does show the conflicting ideals for which Allen is searching. The point seems to be about black people's ideal, like everyone's, of being treated as human beings, but also their having to live with less as such a shared ideal of equality, striving, organizing and dreaming is being compromised by others in their daily lives.

This idea, though, seems quite similar Allen's conceptions of lesser and compromised ideals, but the conclusions are different. Allen's meanings are that,

> The ideals mentioned in the above examples include not only the universals of Work, Sacrifice, Knowledge, and Beauty but the *lesser* ideal of seeking white recognition or respect (characteristically expressed in negative form: that of avoiding white misrecognition or disrespect) as well as what can only be viewed as a *compromised* ideal: the embrace of quackery or demagogy. The claim that one is torn between competing ideals suggests the existence of equally attractive alternatives on either side, and the difficulty or impossibility of choosing between them. (Allen, 2003, pp. 32-33)

One ideal is the universals and the other is avoiding white misrecognition and disrespect. Self definition would certainly be a universal ideal and white misrecognition would be an ascribed identity. In this way, Allen does not necessarily argue against double consciousness as he says he does. Allen says these ideals must be equally attractive and therefore impossible to choose between. Why? They do not have to be equally attractive to be part of one's conditionings. People can be torn between ideals, identities, conditionings and positions even though they do not like or notice what they

are torn between or how they are so torn. If so, there would be no "little difficulty" of shared universal ideals that Allen says DuBois "circumvented" (2003, p. 32). Rather, as Allen rightly says, the "question ultimately turning upon the recognition of black folk as human beings" (2003, p. 32) would be about the double consciousness of ascribed and self defined identities. Looking at double consciousness this way situates all people within or as our conditionings. It opens a direction of inquiry into what it means to recognize and to be recognized across, and even within, racial lines in a white supremacist society.

Examples of Double Consciousness

Allen introduces and explains four examples of double consciousness that he will critique and evaluate. He says,

> In Du Bois' first illustration… one of the principal goals is to avoid "white contempt," while the other invokes the universal ideals of individual work and sacrifice, and their implementation in the service of the poorest, most contemptuously held strata of African Americans. So where is the Negro/American counterpoint? How can we possibly read this as a struggle between substantive Negro and American ideals? If the task of uplift is determined to be the Negro ideal, how do we categorize the avoidance of reproach by whites? (2003, p. 33)

Perhaps African Americans' having to live with and avoid racism is a result of the ascription side of double consciousness. If so, there would be universal principles shared by all Americans. For African Americans, though, there would also the unique burden of widespread, restrictive and deadly systemic racial contempt. If so, perhaps the Negro/American counterpoint involves one's being part of a society from which one is

misrecognized, excluded and dehumanized. The counterpoint might be about African Americans,' like everyone's, being conditioned to believe in one's individuality and identity, but then having that individuality and identity excluded, denied, or not recognized by the same society from which it develops.

Discussing his second example of double consciousness, Allen says,

> The dilemma of the "Negro lawyer or doctor" consisted of adhering to, on the one side, a compromised if not benighted ideal—that of shoddy and unprincipled service— and on the other, in the face of white reproach, of working and sacrificing to acquire skills which would never be put to the test. But if work, sacrifice, or the securing of skills constituted American ideals, did that perforce mean that quackery and demagogy were their Negro counterparts? (Actually, if and where such negative behaviors actually existed, they likely signified the end-collapse of a debilitating process rather than the representative dynamics which Du Bois sought to describe. (2003, pp. 33)

Perhaps in this example there are two ideals at war, but not exactly as suggested in the article. The ideals could be, "Being," and, "Being recognized as one's being." Being a good doctor or lawyer could be part of a self definition while not being recognized that way could be a part of a projected ascription. Then this might be a meaning of double consciousness.

Continuing from his second example of double consciousness, Allen says,

> [T]hirdly, [there is] the conundrum of the "would-be black savant... confronted by the paradox" that although whites possessed the knowledge needed by his people, the knowledge capable of teaching whites (presumably that blacks too were human) was an unknown quantity to [DuBois]. (2003, p. 32)

And later,

> The third example was an observation rather than the representation of a practical dilemma, a paradox centering on types of knowledge rather than an expression of the clash of white and black aims. In a passage which might have been written yesterday, Du Bois averred that the knowledge capable of teaching whites

> (concerning black humanity) was seemingly inaccessible. But because there are no choices to be made in this example, one is forced to reject it as "inauthentic" relative to the issue of "warring ideals." (Allen, 2003, p. 33)

Here Allen is talking about "a paradox centering on types of knowledge" (2003, p. 33). What types of knowledge derive from different (social, of course) racial positions of black and white Americans? The question is as broad and as entrenched as black humanity in a white supremacist society and white supremacy can be as subtle as covert racism (Silberman, 1964; Carmichael & Hamilton, 1967; Kovel, 1970; Williams, 1991; Gates, 1992; Morrison, 1992; Carr, 1997; Loury, 2002; Andrews, 2003; Bonilla-Silva, 2003). Especially with such depths and nuances of racism, black people cannot be held responsible for persuading and teaching (sometimes passive or resistant) whites about their own hidden racism and black humanity (personal communications, 1983-present). There should be a difference though, between blacks just teaching whites on one hand and on another hand people cooperatively, equally and dialogically exposing, looking at and diminishing their conditionings together. If people of all sides of the color lines saw and discussed themselves and each other as racial as they and each other see them, then they all might learn more about themselves, each other and how they and others are conditioned to be who they are and to think as they do. That might be an internal, psychological, philosophical and spiritual war of ideals for everyone as we see ourselves in ways that seem quite new and unexpected. Perhaps at this paradox of types of knowledge, multilateral double consciousness could be explored. However, since this inquiry is not literally about specifically defined warring black and American ideals of African Americans, Allen "reject[s] it as 'inauthentic'" (2003, p. 33). There is a lot of

investigation into meanings and practices of white supremacy in the U.S. that is curtailed with such dismissal.

Allen's fourth example of double consciousness is,

> the artist whose agony stemmed from a need to remain aesthetically true to the subject matter which he intimately knew, while surviving in a broad marketplace hostile to the artistic values embodied in his work—not to mention antipathy directed toward the real-life subjects he portrayed. The Negro artist's ideal expressed itself in the form of a commitment to the "soul-beauty" of his people, while his American ideal— the first of Du Bois' examples where such a label explicitly corresponded to its content—had to do with securing the broadest possible audience for his art. (2003, p. 33)

Here, Allen provides an actual conflict between specific black and American ideals. The conflicting ideals are contrary commitments. The black ideal is the artist's commitment to his/her African American community. The American ideal is the artist's commitment to succeed and survive through the mainstream venues of artistic production and consumption.

Allen, says, "But the dilemma of the artist cannot be permitted to stand as representative of the dilemma of all Black Americans" (2003, p. 33). However, this dilemma is more complicated than conflict between an artist's commitment to community and commitment to mainstream success. In that complication, perhaps the dilemma can be generalized. In his endnote to the passage quoted above, Allen says,

> To belabor an important point, this artist's dilemma offers the clearest example why the struggle between two ideals cannot be construed as a struggle between cultures reflected in a single mind. There are two sets of aesthetic values involved, but Du Bois' artist is not torn between them. That is, he was not torn between American and Negro ideals, but between holding onto and expressing African American aesthetic ideals in his work while at the same time gaining recognition for them from whites. By the 1940s, abstract art offered black artists

> such as Hale Woodruff, Rose Piper, Romare Bearden, and Norman Lewis "a means of granting the 'universal' to abstracted ancestral imagery without succumbing to the racialization of recognizably African or African American images." (2003, p. 42)

With black abstract art of the 1940's that was not "recognizably African or African American," whites were not confronted by their identified and unidentified aversions to the self defined African American people who were behind the white ascriptions. The white Americans' conflict between black self definition and white ascription of blacks was avoided in abstract art. What happened, though, outside that venue where whites could not avoid confrontation with their aversion to black self definition in the 1940's?

White aversion to black self definition was privileged by its being situated and enforced solely and entirely and utterly as a black peoples' problem. Then, it is not black and American ideals between which African Americans are torn. Rather, Chester Himes (1986) illuminates in, *If He Hollers Let Him Go*,

> It came along with consciousness. It came into my head first, somewhere back of my closed eyes, moved slowly underneath my skull to the base of my brain, cold and hollow. It seeped down my spine, into my arms, spread through my groin with an almost sexual torture, settled in my stomach like butterfly wings. For a moment I felt torn all loose inside, shriveled, paralyzed, as if after awhile I'd have to get up and die. (1986, p. 3)

Bob Jones is a, "Leaderman," or a foreman, at a shipyard in Los Angeles. He moved there in 1941 to get a better job than he could find in Cleveland. However, although Bob was optimistic and he did eventually get an appropriate job for his qualifications, he says,

> They shook all that [optimism] in Los Angeles. It wasn't being refused employment in the plants so much. When I got here practically the only job a Negro could get was service in the white folks' kitchens. But it wasn't that so much. It was the look on the people's faces when you asked them about a job. Most of 'em didn't say right out they wouldn't hire me. They just looked so goddamned startled that I'd even asked. As if some friendly dog had come in through the door and said, "I can talk." It shook me. (Himes, 1986, p. 3)

Bob continues by explaining that he also had a related unsettled feeling about the Japanese internment camps. He saw Americans of Japanese heritage taken away "without a chance. Without a trial. Without even giving [them] a chance to say one word. It was thinking about if they ever did that to me, Robert Jones, Mrs. Jones's dark son, that started me to getting scared" (Himes, 1986, p. 3).

Bob seems torn not between black and American ideals, but between who he is as a person (a black person and an American person or however he sees himself) on one hand and, on another hand, a stigmatized object negated by America's betrayal of its claimed ideals. If so, that might be Bob's conflict between self definition and white ascription and his double consciousness. A depth, severity and complication of this kind of conflict is shown when Bob's girlfriend, Alice, says,

> Bob, I've been thinking seriously that perhaps I'm not the type of woman for you. I'm ambitious and demanding. I want to be important in the world. I want a husband who is important and respected and wealthy enough so that I can avoid a major part of the discriminatory practices which I am sensible enough to know I cannot change. I don't want to be pulled down by a person who can't adjust himself to the limitations of his race- a person who'd jeopardize his entire future because of some slight or, say, because some ignorant white person should call him a nigger. (Himes, 1986, p. 97)

Living comfortably with a negating ascription is required of Bob in order for him to provide the lifestyle demand by his girlfriend. For her to feel like she is "avoid[ing] a

major part of the discriminatory practices," Alice commands Bob to "adjust himself to the limitations of his race." White ascription may actually divide Bob and Alice.

However, do these terms, conditions, expectations, limitations and choices have to be organized and categorized into precise black and American ideals? Is that as much as DuBois wanted to contribute with his insight and inquiry of double consciousness? Perhaps rather he, Himes and others too hoped to help expose and confront the whole conflict between African American self definition and white ascription. Is it not important to consider how double consciousness makes white ascription a totally and irreconcilable unilateral black problem? There is no white accountability when the surface of platitudes (like "colorblindness" and multiculturalism) is all that is seen and the underlying privileges and burdens of institutional and personal, and overt and covert, ascription are invisible.

Nor did the civil rights movement (as also shown by the Kerner Report, Kovel [1970], and Loury [2002]) expose and address the deeper and hidden issues of ascription. For example, seeming to generalize the struggles within ascription shown by Himes (1986), Beverly Daniel Tatum (1987) asks,

> What does it mean to be a middle-class Black parent living, working, and raising children in the midst of a predominantly White community? An effort to answer this question will help to add an important missing piece to the larger picture of Black families in America. (p. 3)

What is the difference between black and white people asking this question? Also, what does it mean to be a middle-class Black parent living, working, and raising children in the midst of a predominantly White community? And what is the difference between

black and white people's asking this question? There are many questions about perspectives and awareness of other perspectives that could derive from Tatum's original question. One part of an answer is alarmingly like the burden of Bob Jones, but this response is more as Alice expected of Bob. Beginning by quoting an African American man living with his family in a predominantly white community in 1987, Tatum writes,

> "Just being Black makes it hard, because people look at you like you're not as good as they are, like you're a second class citizen, something like that. You got to always look over your shoulder like somebody's always watching you. At my job, I'm the only Black in my department and it seems like they're always watching me, the pressure's always on perform. You feel like if you miss a day, you might not have a job. So there's that constant awareness on my part, they can snatch what little you have, so that's a constant fear, you know, especially when you've got a family to support…So I'm always aware of what can happen."
>
> [And Tatum says,] It seems that "constant fear" would be a major source of stress. But some might argue that being aware of the threat, understanding your own dilemma, is part of "knowing the rules," [see "how the system works," p. 83] and that is supposed to make life easier. Not knowing the rules will definitely make life harder. (1987, pp. 98-99)

Both Bob Jones in the 1940's, and the middle class working family man in 1987, are ascribed as incompetent by the outside white society. They have to deal with that suspicion while not letting it interfere with how they feel and act. No wonder Tatum says this "would be a major source of stress." This stress seems to part of a unilateral black struggle of, or including, double consciousness as self definition and ascription.

However, even if a definite conflict between specific ideals is needed for double consciousness, Cornel West (1993) shows such a conflict in *Race Matters*. Also, by referring to Pecola of Toni Morrison's (1970) *The Bluest Eye*, West situates this conflict across classes where it can burden the general black population as well as the middle class or Talented Tenth. West explains,

> The eclipse of hope and collapse of meaning in much of black America is linked to the structural dynamics of corporate market institutions that affect all Americans. Under these circumstances black existential *angst* derives from the lived experience of ontological wounds and emotional scares inflicted by white supremacist beliefs and images permeating U.S. society and culture. These beliefs and images attack black intelligence, black ability, black beauty, and black character daily in subtle and not-so-subtle ways. Toni Morrison's novel, *The Bluest Eye*, for example, reveals the devastating effect of pervasive European ideals of beauty on the self-image of young black women. Morrison's exposure of the harmful extent to which these white ideals affect the black self-image is a first step toward rejecting these ideals and overcoming the nihilistic self-loathing they engender in blacks. (1993, pp. 17-18)

"White beliefs and images" are the ascriptions that "attack black intelligence, black ability, black beauty, and black character" and self definition. West is showing that there are white ideals, like beauty and language too, that do contradict black ideals, like intelligence, ability, beauty and character. West's explanation helps lead toward an answer to Tatum's question about what it means to be black in white America. Later, West suggests a way to pursue a meaning of blackness in America. He says,

> Instead of cathartic appeals to black authenticity, a prophetic viewpoint bases mature black self-love and self-respect on the moral quality of black responses to undeniable racist degradation in the American past and present. These responses assume neither a black essence that all black people share nor one black perspective to which all black people should adhere. Rather, a prophetic framework encourages *moral* assessment of the variety of perspectives held by black people and selects those views based on black dignity and decency that eschew putting any group of people or culture on a pedestal or in the gutter. Instead, blackness is understood to be either the perennial possibility of white supremacist abuse or the distinct styles and dominant modes of expression found in black cultures and communities. (West, 1993, p. 28)

Here, again, could be conflict between self definition and ascription. West seems to be saying that black self-love and self-respect (perhaps as parts of self definition?) can be based on the "quality of black responses" to American white supremacy (which

includes the ascriptions of black inferiority). Perhaps West is suggesting that the ways Bob Jones, the man in Tatum's study and Pecola respond to their ascriptions are parts of how they define themselves. Maybe this, then, is why "blackness is understood to be either the perennial possibility of white supremacist abuse [ascription?] or the distinct styles and dominant modes of expression [self definition?] found in black cultures and communities" (West, 1993, p. 28).

Allen, in fact, might seem to concur with a possibility of double consciousness as conflict between self definition and ascription. Shifting his focus (from his discussion of the artist in the 1940's) to earlier decades, Allen says,

> If black physicians were beset by existential agony in the late Nineteenth Century, perhaps its source might more readily be found in the respect or esteem denied them by the dominant population as well as by their own people (the latter manifestation constituting a form of internalized white supremacy) rather than a divided consciousness on their own part. (2003, p. 34)

Could that existential agony (of self definition?) resulting from external and internalized (ascriptions from?) white supremacy be part of double consciousness rather than being separate from double consciousness? Could all these examples of conflicts between self definitions and ascriptions be meanings of double consciousness? In the next section of his article, Allen begins by sounding as though he might agree with double consciousness as conflicts between self definitions and ascriptions.

A Tactical Choice in the Battle for Respect

In this section, Allen writes,

> In the face of a violent suppression of Afro-American civil and political rights and the imposition of segregation in all avenues of Southern life during the last

> quarter of the Nineteenth Century, black folk were in the process of being stripped of fundamental vestiges of respect as human beings. Confronted with a sinister engineering of signs and mores designed to fix the social and political inferiority of Afro-Americans in perpetuity, black self-respect was severely put to the test, with seeds of despair and self-doubt finding extremely fertile ground. (2003, p. 34)

The signs and mores might be seen as ascriptions while the assault on black self respect might be seen as involving assault on self definition. It was because of these obstacles that DuBois asserted that the Talented Tenth was needed to lead the general African American population. To so lead, the middle class would need college education and power through recognition and respect from whites (Allen, 2002, p. 34). "However," Allen continues, "The Talented Tenth itself was in danger of succumbing to a self-fulfilling prophecy [of feeling inferior because it was designated to be inferior]" (Allen, 2002, p. 34). Is not this succumbing a form of a self definition succumbing to a projected identity? Was the Talented Tenth hindered by the negating ascriptions that challenged its people's self definitions? If so, could this be related to double consciousness?

After helping to raise these questions, Allen explains that DuBois endeavored to gain increasing recognition and respect for the black middle class from "educated and influential whites." This would "empower [the Talented Tenth] to carry out the task of uplifting the masses with a greater determination and efficiency" and improve the "social policies affecting them in general" (Allen, 2003, pp. 34-35).

Allen continues,

> [B]ecause double consciousness was already widely acknowledged as a psychological malady among the learned, the tactical embrace of the concept by Du Bois also seems calculated to elicit *sympathy* from educated whites, in lieu of an appeal to their sense of justice. Moreover, the tactic held out an additional

> enticement in that such whites could be called upon to support the Talented Tenth without having to admit their own culpability in perpetuating or tolerating a harsh racial climate: who could be blamed for black folks' having come down with a case of the double consciousness? (2003, p. 35)

The enticement for whites to eschew their own racism may be a treatment of a symptom, rather than a cause, that is more accommodative and Washingtonian than DuBoisian. Washington wanted to use black economic advancement as a route toward better racial relations. He was working around, not through, race and racism. Washington might have wanted to work around white supremacy by not directly confronting how "the case of double consciousness" was caused by overt and covert white supremacy. Conversely, if DuBois was seeking exposure and ceasing of white ascription as a cause of black double consciousness, then he may not have wanted to make superficial progress in a round about way. He would not have wanted to further obfuscate deeper levels of white inquiry into "their own culpability in perpetuating or tolerating a harsh racial climate" (Allen, 2003, p. 35).

Treating the symptom by "elicit[ing] *sympathy* from educated whites, in lieu of an appeal to their sense of justice" by addressing the underlying delusion, institution and ascription of black inferiority would only add to what Gaertner and Dovidio (see p. 53) would later find in 1986. Their research illuminates that "whites are consciously concerned with maintaining an egalitarian and non-prejudiced self-concept even if they hold negative sentiments toward African Americans" (Andrews, 2003, p. 66). The history of this cultural trait, if studied, might be shown to lead back to, and before, the early Twentieth Century. Also, Andrews states above (see p. 53),

> Gaertner and Dovidio note that discrimination is most likely to occur when nonracial justifications for discriminatory behavior are available. It would appear that, for better or for worse, other whites also look to find nonracial justifications for the actions of other whites so as to diffuse racial angst of blacks and possibly to further cement their own status as egalitarian and non-prejudicial. (2003. pp. 66-67)

Sympathy for the black middle class from the educated whites may only have made a façade of justice seem surely like the real thing. Then what would appear as the solution would actually be the cause of the problem. In other words, the façade of justice would appear to be the solution, but it would really be just a symptom of covert white supremacy. The risk of such corruption may have made DuBois hesitant to develop the concept of double consciousness. However, that does not necessarily mean DuBois rejected and abandoned the concerns he might have had about double consciousness as, perhaps, conflict between self definition and ascription. In the next section, Allen asks, "[W]hy did DuBois effectively jettison the concept after 1903?" (2003, p. 35)

Why Was the Concept Dropped?

Three main reasons are offered for DuBois' "dropping" of double consciousness. Andrews explains that the idea itself could not be sustained and developed conceptually. Second, Allen discusses that whites who did not recognize poor blacks could not be expected to recognize middle class blacks (2003, p. 35). "Thirdly," Allen says,

> [T]here came to Du Bois the eventual discovery that, rather than continue expending energies to compel the recognition of white Americans—at least for the purpose of healing the psychological scars incurred by racism—their disrespect might be partially circumvented in other ways. (2003, p. 35)

Allen presents two ways this circumvention might have been approached. First, he says,

> One revelation gained was that *protest* against unjust conditions itself, whatever the actual political outcome, tended to promote a healthy sense of self-respect among its practitioners. (2003, p. 35)

And second, Allen says,

> Another revelation for Du Bois and other middle-class Black Americans in general, was that in after being forced into segregated communities during the last quarter of the Nineteenth Century, they discovered recognition in and of themselves: a renewed sense of mutual self-respect, collective self-esteem, and black-on-black solidarity cutting across class lines. (2003, p. 35)

Both of these strategies against white supremacy do, as Allen explains, reject dependence on white recognition of black humanity and equality. However, they do not necessarily argue against black struggles with ascriptions as a part of double consciousness. Whether or not, or however, blacks are "compel[ling] the recognition of white Americans," they may still be burdened by negative projections that challenge their identities and self definitions.

This possibility may be similar to what Allen explains as he continues,

> Although neither outward protest nor the rise of inner group-based mutual esteem were able to change the dominant character of Nineteenth Century social relations or material conditions, they contributed nonetheless in many ways to the overall mental health of the race. Most importantly, in the process of mutual recognition so necessary to identity formation, African Americans were not unilaterally dependent on whites for their individual as well as collective sense of self. (2003, p. 35)

Perhaps Allen is showing that self definition through collective rejection of external negating ascriptions may have been a way African Americans contended with double consciousness when white Americans were maintaining a façade of justice or out rightly degrading African American people and culture. This would not argue against double consciousness as a conflict between self definition and ascription.

Then, however, Allen says,

> And finally, at no time was the Afro-American struggle for social justice in need of double consciousness arguments to make its case. Direct appeals for justice worked just as effectively—or ineffectively— as calls for ameliorating the claims of double consciousness. (2003, pp. 35-6)

Here, Allen is stating that the arguments of double consciousness have never been necessary because, "Direct appeals for justice worked just as effectively—or ineffectively — as calls for ameliorating the claims of double consciousness." Why, though, does there have to be a distinction and choice of either "direct appeals for justice" or "ameliorating the claims of double consciousness" as conflict between self definition and ascription? Could the two, the direct appeals and the ameliorating, be more alike than different? Could exposing and confronting the ascriptions (especially those of aversion and coversion) be a direct appeal for justice?

Double Consciousness: Mini-History of a Misconception

Beginning this section, Allen discusses how DuBois' conception of double consciousness was considered and addressed by his contemporaries. First, Allen explains,

> What was possibly the earliest reference to Du Boisian double consciousness in the social sciences arrived in 1914 in the context of a discussion concerning the purportedly divided mind of the mulatto. "The unique position and hence the peculiar influence of the mulatto on all racial questions," wrote sociologist John Moffatt Mecklin, "...is due to the fact that the blood of both races courses in his veins. Biologically he belongs to both and yet to neither, and corresponding to the anomaly of his physical traits is his social status. He is a Zwischending (in-between thing) ethnologically and socially." (Allen, 2003, p. 36)

Allen indicates, "Mecklin attributed double consciousness to biological causes" (2003, p. 36). This cause is obviously impossible because race is an entirely social construct with neither biological essence nor significance. However, there is a connection between biracial people (in this case people who are both African American and European American), double consciousness and white supremacy.

White does mean human in the U.S. In and since the earliest decades of "The New World," the biological fallacy of white supremacy did not stop it from being cultivated and believed (Jordan, 1962; Morgan, 1975)[lvii] until it became an actual and acquired designator of who could be whom, and who could be human, in U.S. society and

[lvii] The, "Jordan/Morgan debate," is an ongoing study of whether American slavery or American racism developed first and led to the other. Edmund Morgan argues that slavery preceded and led to racism while Winthrop Jordan argues that racism was already developed when African and African American indentured servitude was changed to slavery. Lerone Bennett, Jr. (1975, p. 69) and Eric Williams (1994 p. 7, 29) support well Morgan's thesis that slavery was first. John Boles (1984, pp. 10-11) suggests sensibly that the two processes were more symbiotic. However, in support of Jordan, an overriding issue might be that the Africans were taken without choice while Europeans chose to be indentured servants. That was already a worse treatment of Africans than that of the Europeans (Jessica Leroy, Leonardo Toppin, 2010, personal communications). On the other hand, though, since many European indentured servants were criminals, how much choice did they have when often their other option was imprisonment or death? Whether slavery or racism came first, Africans were situated and naturalized as lowly and as inhumanly as could be done.

mainstream culture (Morrison, 1992; Ellison, 1994). Biracial people have been situated not only as black and white, but also as human and non-human. Racial inferiority, whether ascribed to a whole person or any part is still a negation that can be part of double consciousness as conflict between ascription and self definition. White supremacy does not need race to be natural; white supremacy only needs race to be naturalized. How could it be naturalized? Although there is no biological essence of black double consciousness, if it became normal enough so that it was not really noticed by the people involved and not involved, perhaps a black burden of unilateral racial double consciousness and a white privilege of no racial double consciousness could be part of a social essence, or an overarching invisible framework, of race.

Allen, however, argues against such a long history of black double consciousness. He says as criticism,

> [U]nder the indomitable pressure of Afro-American cultural nationalism of the 1960s, the levee gave way. Now almost everyone, it seems, was convinced that the Negro had been afflicted with cultural double consciousness since the landing of unfree Africans on Virginia soil in 1619! (Allen, 2003, p. 37)

It might not have been as far back as 1619 (when the first Africans arrived in Virginia), but certainly by 1670, Africans and African Americans in Virginia and other colonies were increasingly dehumanized through being forced from indentured servitude (which led to freedom and did not exclude one from humanity) into slavery for life and one's children's lives. They were increasingly denied recognition as human through baptism (Morgan, 1975, p. 331). From then on at least, as Europeans defined themselves and each other as white, their self esteem and social position rose collectively and

individually at the expense of the self definitions of Africans and African Americans. Ascription of black inferiority was and also is an ascription of white superiority (Bennett, 1975, p.78; Morrison, 1992, pp. 37-39). With unequal distribution of (and power over) positive and negative racial ascriptions, black double consciousness could be linked to white supremacy since very early in U.S. history. In fact, even in and before 1619, Africans' being forced without recourse from their homes into Western slavery was a direct and crushing assault on one's self definition. Nathan Irvin Huggins explains,

> Two edges of the slave trade- the rupture of the African from the social tissue that held all meaning for him and his conversion to a marketable object- cut the deepest and cut each to the quick. (1990, pp. 26-27)

Also in this section, Allen discusses meanings of double consciousness explained by five other scholars. Allen shows that in two of these considerations,

> Although far more sophisticated than the biological determinism of Mecklin, [1920's sociologist Robert E.] Park's [and 1920's sociologist Edward Byron Reuter'] formulation basically substituted the role of a determinant culture for that of Mecklin's biological forces in the life of the mulatto. (2003, p. 36)

In both cases, as Allen quotes Park, "The cultural life and traditions of two distinct people" (2003, p. 36), are so incompatible and so averse that the mind of, "The Marginal Man" (2003, p. 36), suffers. Although this does not raise any clear distinction between being black and being American, when, "Whiteness," means, "Human," and, "American," as perhaps DuBois critically perceived, his warring ideals can be seen as involving peoples' self definitions as humans and African Americans against their being ascribed as less.

Allen then shows examples of Sociologists Everett. V. Stonequist and E. Franklin Frazer that seem to agree with Allen's argument of there being no evidence of clear warring ideals between black and American ideals. Both Frazer and Stonequist inquire into the conflicts of being part of two conflicting cultures (2003, p. 37). Although these examples of double consciousness might not show conflicts between black and American ideals, they could be examples of double consciousness as conflict between human self definition within one (African American) culture and inferior ascription within another (mainstream white American) culture.

If a whole system of white privilege, with its government and economy in support, can work only with the inferior status of blacks and other people of color then the pressure from white supremacist society to maintain that position of black inferiority would be as strong and crucial to its survival as a natural law. It would be a naturalized, but social, law of the social system just like a natural law is of a natural system. Naturalization and tradition (and so hiding from real questioning) of black invisibility and exploitation can seem as intractable as nature itself, especially in the U.S. where profit and so much profit is to be made. Perhaps this is how race, especially double consciousness, and class are so entwined. Perhaps the ascriptions and the ensuing conflicts with self definitions are necessary and must stay unexposed in order for white Americans to function and interact in ways that they find comfortable, convenient and manageable.

Was an Afro-American Double Consciousness Possible?

This concluding section begins with Allen's reviewing that double consciousness can not be found as a conflict between black and American ideals. He says, though, that there is one more issue that needs to be considered before we "advance the claim that any discussion of Afro-American double consciousness, whether in the context of Nineteenth Century life or today, is of dubious value" (2003, p. 37). Allen goes on to explain the duality between white Americans' claims to justice and practices of covert forms of white supremacy (such as aversive racism or discrimination in contact). Then Allen says,

> The consequence was a situation in which many, if not the majority of Afro-Americans, simultaneously felt themselves to be a part, yet not a part of American society, virtual exiles in the land of their birth. Here was an institutionalized encounter which might lend itself readily to a Du Boisian characterization. (2003, p. 38)

This exile within one's home might be a way, Allen seems to suggest, DuBoisian double consciousness can involve conflicts between one's self definition and ascribed identity. Returning, though, to strict adherence to double consciousness as conflict between ideals (or in this case, identities), Allen says,

> On the other hand, there was no guarantee that alienation from or ambivalence towards American society would lead to a conflict between one's American and Afro-American identities. All depended on conditions. (2003, p. 38)

What were the conditions and how did all depend on them? Also, as Allen likely ironically means, there should *not* be a need for a guarantee of anything in order to look into whether DuBoisian double consciousness is more tenable as a conflict between self definition and ascription rather than as a conflict between black and American identities.

Instead of looking into double consciousness as that kind of conflict, though, Allen considers different conflicts and different conditions of late Nineteenth Century U.S. society.

The conditions to which Allen refers were the increasing violence and segregation forcing African Americans to develop and maintain their own community resources self sufficiently. Simultaneously, white nativists were calling for all Europeans to forsake their home-identities and assimilate a new American identity. Success in the U.S. required assimilation into mainstream whiteness, but African Americans could only succeed with the help and support of their own communities (Allen, 2003, pp. 38-39).

Also, African Americans were necessarily kept out of the white mainstream so it and its members could be white, mainstream and assimilated at all and all together. Allen explains how this black segregation and white assimilation happened together. He explains that,

> Separate developments created *by* European immigrants on U.S. soil were viewed as a menace by the larger society; but since the very presence of African Americans was considered menacing to whites, similar developments mandated by law and otherwise *for* them were viewed as a necessity. Nonetheless, queried Du Bois, if Afro- Americans opted for self-help and solidarity, were they not perpetuating the same type of cleft of which immigrants were being accused? On the other hand, had Afro-Americans any more obligation than the more recently arrived Germans, Irish, or Italians to downplay their sense of group identity and corresponding group aims? (Allen, 2003, p. 39)

First, Allen seems to be saying, segregated European ghettos were criticized by the mainstream, but segregated African American ghettos were preferred by the mainstream. This immediately raises questions about what such demography would do to one's self definition.

Then, Allen continues, DuBois wondered whether accepting that segregation would not worsen divisions between blacks and whites. Here, the question arises whether there can be such strong exposure and rejection of ascription that it cannot be accepted among people.

Last, Allen reminds that African Americans are not immigrants. Their being seen as foreign to U.S. society and culture is, itself, a form of covert white supremacy that defines, "White," as, "American," and, "Black," as, "One of us in a way, but not really."

All three of these points can include issues of self definition contradicted by ascription. Allen asserts, "If ever there were an institutional basis for the existence of 'two souls dwelling in one,' this was it" (2003, p. 39). Does this mean inquiring about double consciousness might help lead to exposure of covert white supremacy and equality of privilege? Perhaps it might, but Allen cautions,

> However, acknowledging the existence of objective grounds for the formation of a specific form of Afro-American double consciousness at a particular moment in history does not imply that every Afro- American individual felt the pulls of divided loyalties in the same way, or even that he or she experienced *any* such tension at all. Much depended on one's class position, socialization, and perhaps even individual temperament. Ultimately there arose a general consensus among Afro-Americans that, come what may, progress would only arrive from a consolidating of resources internal to black communities. But whether that advancement might arrive by the grace of manual training and success in commercial enterprise as advocated by Booker T. Washington, or following Du Bois' counsels, by cultivating a Talented Tenth to lead the race as well as oversee the dispensing of "cultural gifts" to the dominant society, it would assuredly have to materialize someday, they believed—and with it an end to the separation of Afro-Americans from vital centers of American life. (2003, p. 39)

Allen cautions against generalizing too much. Is it too much to question whether DuBoisian double consciousness might be part of something, a whole invisible system of

white supremacy and white privilege, larger than double consciousness itself? Allen earlier suggests,

> Given such inadequate examples [of double consciousness as conflict between black and American ideals], not to mention the altogether slippery quality of critical definitions, one is led to conclude that Du Boisian double consciousness was not so much a usable concept as an exquisitely crafted metaphor. (2003, p. 33)

Perhaps double consciousness was an observation that could not, and still cannot, be explained within the reasoning available within current language, discourse and ideology. If so, double consciousness could be an observation that reveals the limitations and therefore the existence of our all being within the parameters, contexts and values of our languages, discourses and ideologies. Identifying our being so situated would be a way of our being aware of our, and each others', subjectivities.

CHAPTER 14

LITERATURE REVIEW CONCLUSION

Allen effectively shows how double consciousness is not a conflict between black and American ideals. His evidence, however, does not resolve that double consciousness is untenable as a concept and irrelevant to racial struggles of African Americans. In fact, Allen's evidence seems to concur with the operational definition of double consciousness in this thesis (double consciousness is conflict between self definition and ascription). The issue of difficulty with the meaning of double consciousness is not with the viability of the concept, but with the language of the concept. The same limitations of critical thought about race faced DuBois and face us today. We still do not know what he was trying to talk about. For example, we still do not know how to explore and address the overlaps of self definition and ascription as they both derive from the social environment. Toward what questions (for everyone) about choice over identity does that lead? Is our sense of choice over self definition just a conditioning? Is having and/or choosing an identity a conditioning?

While discussing meanings and roles of race in recognition and invisibility between people, MIT political science professor, Melissa Nobles (2000, personal communication) said, “We don’t have a language for that.” We do not have a language for how some of the most sensitive and personal issues of race are also the most nourishing dynamics of racial inequality. Perhaps one way to approach such difficulties without too much aversion would be to start by looking at how we all may be caught within a system or web of thought, positions and dynamics that limit our perspectives and perceptions. Perhaps all of us multilaterally looking at ourselves as racial and as racial others from across color lines could help reveal how ascriptions of black inferiority are projected and how they unequally affect black and white self definition as aspects of covert white supremacy.

To help with the development of this language, the research of this thesis seeks specific interactions in African American literature and non-fiction where (1) a black perspective can be identified; (2) a white perspective can be identified; (3) and a black response to the white perspective can be identified. It is in (3) the black response to the white perspective that evidence of black double consciousness (as conflict between self definition and ascription) is sought. This inquiry will endeavor to help answer the research question of this thesis: Does African American writing illustrate DuBois’ concept of double consciousness? Pursuing this question involves situating Richard Wright (through his novels, *Native Son* and *Black Boy*) as an ideal example of implicit discussions of double consciousness in African American writing. Then, other writings can be considered to explore whether or not they provide further examples of double

consciousness. If instances of double consciousness are in the literature, then to see them would be seeing covert white supremacy actually happening to and between people at the moment of the negation and ascription. Exposing that would make DuBoisian double consciousness more accessible and more traceable than when it is hidden and invisible as though, like covert white supremacy, it is not there at all.

PART II

METHODOLOGY

CHAPTER 15

METHODOLOGY

Bounding and Sampling

The methodology of this thesis involves and asserts the presence of an African American literary canon. Henry Louis Gates Jr., in, *Loose Canons* (2002), defines a canon by saying,

> I suppose the literary canon is, in no very grand sense, the commonplace book of our shared culture, in which we have written down the texts and titles that we want to remember, that had some special meaning for us. (2002, p. 21)

Gates then reviews historical debates and the formation of an African American canon by American scholars. He addresses whether there is a distinct African American canon, or whether a single American canon includes the diversity of this country. Gates maintains that since the mid-eighteenth century, a unique African American canon has been developed in the many anthologies of African American literature (2002, pp. 22–31). Gates himself (1997) is one of the general editors of *The Norton Anthology of African American Literature*. These anthologies are a physical part of the canon,

comprised of shared stories that have special meanings for African Americans. They help serve as the commonplace book of African American shared culture.

Another way to identify a canon is to include books that are not necessarily compiled into anthologies, but that are the foundational texts for literary studies in secondary and higher education. Books are considered classics and canonical when they speak to human conditions and situations that relate to people beyond their own unique lives. Such books are considered to expose and explore human conditions and qualities that can be found across communities and cultures, giving them both particular reference to their own unique contexts and broad reference to shared human conditions and struggles. (1982, high school teacher, Benjamin Finke, personal communication).

Many of the books used for this thesis can be considered canonical because they fit either or both meanings of a canon. Some books are parts of anthologies that show shared culture, as Gates discusses. Other books are considered canonical because they are considered fundamental texts of African American experiences. As a Black Studies major in college, I was assigned many books that were considered to show relationships, dynamics, politics, and struggles faced by a broad range of African Americans.

By beginning with these books that fit the meaning of *canonical*, I sought parts of the books that might elaborate—implicitly, at least—on DuBois' concept of double consciousness. I then searched for other books that, although not considered canonical, might also show examples of double consciousness.

The concept of double consciousness sets the boundary[lviii] of this study. The boundary—the theme and issue of double consciousness—is a focus on a single aspect of writings within and between a wide range of cases in African American literature. Within each of these writings, *single-case data* provides depth and specificity, while the *cross-case data* shows themes and patterns that link texts. This bounding with single- and cross-case data produces the frame.[lix] With the research defined and organized around double consciousness, the detailed single-case data and the linking cross-case data reveals how double consciousness is indicated by the data as an undergirding construct.

Two sampling strategies are used with these bounding and framing methods. First, *theory-based sampling*[lx] reveals passages of texts that fit within the boundary and frame of double-consciousness data. These samples are then analyzed as data that details the occurrences of individual double-consciousness issues. Second, *critical-case sampling*[lxi] links common features of the double-consciousness issues between texts within writings. Coding systems are used to identify instances of double consciousness in the texts and to collect and organize data within the frame.

[lviii] Boundaries "define aspects of your case(s) that you can study within the limits of your time and means" (Miles and Huberman, 1994, p. 27).

[lix] "You need to create a frame to help you uncover, confirm, or qualify the basic processes or constructs that undergird your study" (Miles and Huberman, 1994, p. 27).

[lx] "Finding examples of a theoretical construct and thereby elaborate and examine it" (Miles and Huberman, 1994, p. 28).

[lxi] "Permits logical generalization and maximum application of information to other cases" (Miles and Huberman, 1994, p. 28).

Data Coding and Display

Each book is coded within a single case matrix. Coding details represent the nuance and specificity of each source. Simplicity of coding is necessary, since the literature has a wide variety of formats, including novels, poetry, nonfiction analysis, personal narratives, and history texts. A *role-ordered matrix* leads toward such detail and simplicity. In a role-ordered matrix, a role is a set of actions that people do and are expected to do that correspond to their positions and functions within groups. A role-ordered matrix organizes information about role performance in columns and rows (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 122). This kind of matrix is useful for textual double-consciousness exploration because it can organize for comparison many instances of actions and expectations that demonstrate how people are forced to contend with imposed identities and social positions while maintaining their self-definitions.

The roles sought in the texts include double consciousness. It is in the relationships between the black and white characters that evidence of black double consciousness develops. Three roles—or, more precisely, three perspectives—can be illuminated and related to show how double consciousness is present and functioning in the interactions. These roles or perspectives are coded as:

1. **Black Perspective (BP).** BP refers to parts of texts that show the authors' portrayals of views, feelings, attitudes, and positions of blacks in society. This is the first of the two consciousnesses. Sometimes, though, it is more of an awareness that the author or character might not identify consciously. Whether conscious or not, this first perspective is the initial context and outlook of the black person from which the interaction with the white character develops.

2. **White Perspective (WP).** WP refers to parts of texts that show the authors' portrayals of views, feelings, attitudes, and positions of whites toward African Americans. This perspective conflicts with the black perspective, but the conflict can be completely invisible to the white character because that person is in a dominant position of imposing his or her perspective without equal negotiation or dialogue about the terms of the interaction.

3. **Black Response (BR).** BR refers to parts of texts that show the authors' portrayals of how blacks are responsive to whites' imposed perspectives. This meta-awareness, whether identified by the black person or not, is what defines double consciousness. The black person begins with his or her own context, feelings, attitudes, views and ideas as the 'black perspective.' Then the 'white perspective' is imposed without equal negotiation or dialogue. The result is a black response that must unilaterally try to contend with the conflict between how a person defines him/herself and how the outside society, through its white members, imposes negating and conflicting identities, positions and interactions. . BR shows double consciousness because it is how black Americans respond to whites according to how blacks perceive themselves and are treated by whites. There is not equal negotiation or dialogue. Instead, blacks just have to follow others' lead under others' control of the interaction. Such interactions do not allow whatever kinds of relationships the black people might want. They can only respond within the limits of what the white people want.

One important distinction between code 1 and code 3 is that code 1, Black Perspective, serves as the overall context of each situation in the texts. It is a black perspective with which the white participant interacts in code 2, White Perspective. With both codes 1 and 2, there is a relationship, interaction, and power dynamic between black and white people. Then, within this context, double consciousness as the black response to this power dynamic is revealed in code 3, Black Response. The third coding shows how the African American person responds to the white American's projected identity.

When that response involves a negotiation between projected and self-defined identities, then that response is double consciousness.

For detail, the codes of BP, WP, and BR refer to specific passages that, in the matrices, are indicated by page numbers and short quotes or paraphrases. Those page numbers, quotes, and paraphrases are the data within the matrices. The rows of the matrices are the books and other sources. The columns are the codes themselves.

In most cases, only one example is sought from each text. The purpose and goal of this choice is to gain a broad view of how many African Americans show implicit or explicit examples of double consciousness. An alternative would be to demonstrate how fewer authors show more examples within their writings, but that would not help reveal whether double consciousness is a ubiquitous condition revealed by a wide range of writers.

Each matrix begins as single-case studies for each source and is then stacked together as a cross-case matrix. By stacking the single-case role-ordered matrices, cross-case construct cables develop (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 184) (see Appendix). This display format helps shows how a single concept, double consciousness, is portrayed in a multitude of texts (see Table 1).

Table 1

Black Double Consciousness Matrix

	Black Perspective	White Perspective	Black Response
Text 1	Pg, quote, paraphrase	Pg, quote, paraphrase	Pg, quote, paraphrase
Text 2	Pg, quote, paraphrase	Pg, quote, paraphrase	Pg, quote, paraphrase
Text 3	Pg, quote, paraphrase	Pg, quote, paraphrase	Pg, quote, paraphrase
Text 4	Pg, quote, paraphrase	Pg, quote, paraphrase	Pg, quote, paraphrase

As with the single-case data, the Construct Tables have page numbers, quotes, and paraphrases as the data within the matrices. There are texts in rows and codes in columns. Although the data, and the writings about the data, refer to complicated and nuanced uniqueness within each case, the simplicity of the coding allows the general meanings and themes of double consciousness to emerge and recur through the wide range of formats, and through the broad scope of the double-consciousness literature. Also, these relationships between double consciousnesses allow for analysis of different types of double consciousness in the data analysis section.

Typologies of Double Consciousness

By grouping the data from the matrices according to shared or related messages, seven categories or models of double consciousness emerge. Each model groups examples of double consciousness in a way that illuminates an aspect of double consciousness. At first, some texts seemed linked by common dynamics, which then led to the broader categories. Other typologies emerged as I considered forms of racism and

looked for forms of double consciousness that might correspond to those kinds of racism. Seven double-consciousness typology categories emerged from my analysis. The typologies are:

Conventional or Overarching Definition of Double Consciousness

This model begins with DuBois' original explanation of double consciousness. It expands this concept with examples from Richard Wright and Gayle Pemberton that reinforce and clarify the general meaning of double consciousness as the power dynamics and personal struggles of African Americans being forced to view themselves through the perspectives of others while maintaining their own self-definitions.

Blatant and Violent Double Consciousness

This typology refers to how black double consciousness in African American literature can be evoked by an African American person when exposed to blatant psychological and physical violence from white people. For example, in *The Fire Next Time*, Baldwin (1963) urges his nephew to try to feel love toward the whites who impose negative identities. White psychological violence against blacks is shown to require an understanding and acceptance of whites as trapped in their violence. Seeing that through double consciousness can help African Americans free both the whites and themselves from that violence.

Accommodated-Tension Double Consciousness

This typology shows how black double consciousness is demonstrated by African American characters in African American literature during social dynamics where blacks consciously work to prevent whites from becoming aware of how whites can be seen as

offensive from black perspectives. For example, Mabry (1995) feels awkward and uncomfortable with his white friends at a predominantly white preparatory high school. When he finds that there is not the overt hostility he expects, as Baldwin discusses, Mabry is forced to negate his own uneasiness and the more-subtle tension he feels. By accommodating instead of negotiating the more-nebulous tension, Mabry is forced into double consciousness because he has to help whites prevent themselves from facing the discomfort of noticing how they can be seen as offensive from black perspectives.

Cultural and Institutional Double Consciousness

So far, double-consciousness typologies have been situated within personal dynamics. Another typology goes beyond individuals and extends into the broader realm of culture and institutions. Ellison, first published in 1953, and later, Morrison (1992), help show how racial positions and dynamics can be part of the broader culture that reproduces itself when individuals are socialized to internalize and fit their positions. In the United States, contradictions between democratic ideals and racial inequalities can lead to double consciousness when cultural and institutional factors, like a "Master narrative" (Morrison, 1992) or a "Master plan" (Ellison 1994) create, reproduce, and situate African Americans in inferior social positions that are beyond the scope of individual interactions. This typology involves African Americans being forced to view themselves as a negated group and a self-defined group within the broader context of American democracy and racism.

Personal and Invisible (to Whites) Struggles with Double Consciousness

This type of double consciousness occurs in texts that highlight whites who have no awareness of the struggles African Americans face in negotiating and dealing with their double consciousness as oppressed people. This typology exists between the two categories of "Accommodated-Tension Double Consciousness" and "Cultural and Institutional Double Consciousness." The texts that illustrate this double consciousness suggest a relationship between how African Americans are forced to accommodate white people who have no double consciousness, and the broader political and social systems that impose black double consciousness. For example, with whiteness as the norm, many African Americans are forced to embrace a foreign identity in school (Fordham, 1991). When whites are not aware of their involvement with maintaining white normalcy, then they cannot appreciate the struggles and objections to these conditions that African Americans may wish and need to express (Cose, 1993). Double consciousness can be a form of silencing. These texts illustrate that African Americans have to struggle with double consciousness and with reconciling two vastly differently representations of themselves as black Americans, while, and because, the problem itself is off the table, and whites remain conveniently unaware of the phenomenon.

Black Resistance to Double Consciousness

This typology of double consciousness shows some of the ways that African Americans conceptualize and confront their position of double consciousness. This category emerges in texts that reveal how double consciousness is used as a response by African Americans to whites' negative views of blackness. These texts show that it is not

double consciousness itself that is the problem; the real problem is whites' failure to appreciate—even as they contribute to—the struggles of African Americans with double consciousness. For example, Gates (1992) explains how whites can oppose efforts to define blackness positively because the whites oppose the concept of race. This white "colorblindness," however, reproduces and exacerbates double consciousness when attention that could expose double consciousness is seen as racist. Instead, white race consciousness can illuminate and oppose the trap of double consciousness.

Irony, Broadening, and Sharing of Double Consciousness

This typology shows how double consciousness can refer to a cognitive ability of irony that is shared by a wide range of African Americans, as well as other people of color. It also shows how whites who lack double consciousness can grow intellectually and socially by learning from those who have developed sophisticated and sharp skills of double consciousness. For example, Hughes (1969) explains that it is in the liminal spaces of categories, identities, interactions, and negotiations that people can explore how they see and are seen by and as others. Building a new space or entering a borderland can open perspectives and identities to new understandings of old outlooks. In that way, sharing of double consciousness, or *multilateral double consciousness*, is a step beyond resistance to double consciousness because it can involve blacks and whites together in consideration of how identities can or cannot be negotiated. In these ways, Hughes and other writers show double consciousness as part of one's cognitive skills, including the ability to shift mental mind-sets and the ability to entertain irony.

Pattern Coding

Pattern coding (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 69) illuminates and organizes the themes and meanings of double consciousness in the bodies of literature. After the tables are completed with black perspectives, white perspectives, and black responses, and after the data is organized into the seven typologies of double consciousness, pattern coding shows three common themes across the seven typologies and the three perspectives. These seven typologies and the three perspectives within them are composed of data that show the common and recurring themes and patterns across the data. Three general themes that emerge across these groups are:

1. Subjugated people are often aware and critical of their disadvantaged social position.
2. Subjugated people are dehumanized, and they struggle with their position and with the perspectives of the domineering population.
3. The struggle with domineering perspectives, the struggle with double consciousness, is a survival tactic and form of resistance against dehumanization.

The data from the tables is pattern-coded into these three categories and serves as evidence and examples of the three pattern-coded categories. Pattern coding, then, is part of both data collection and data analysis. The data is analyzed through coding as it is collected and synthesized into the categories that are being revealed.

PART III

FINDINGS: THREE RECURRING PERSPECTIVES WITHIN SEVEN TYPOLOGIES OF DOUBLE CONSCIOUSNESS

The Findings section organizes and discusses the selected texts according to typologies of double consciousness. These typologies are:

1. Conventional or Overarching Definition of Double Consciousness;
2. Blatant and Violent Double Consciousness;
3. Accommodated-Tension Double Consciousness;
4. Cultural and Institutional Double Consciousness;
5. Personal and Invisible (to Whites) Struggles with Double Consciousness;
6. Black Resistance to Double Consciousness;
7. Irony, Broadening, and Sharing of Double Consciousness.

The texts are grouped and discussed according to how they comprise and reflect these seven types of double consciousness. The texts are shown to provide evidence and explanation of the seven different types of double consciousness.

Within the seven typologies, the texts are shown to provide evidence of a black perspective, white perspective, and black response. A discussion of the texts is focused on the three perspectives in order to show how they demonstrate double consciousness within the texts.

Before exploring the texts in detail, a brief synopsis of the books is provided to contextualize each text and the data within each text. This Findings section begins with the first double-consciousness typology, conventional double consciousness.

CHAPTER 16

FINDINGS SECTION ONE:

CONVENTIONAL OR OVERARCHING DEFINITION OF DOUBLE CONSCIOUSNESS: GENERAL MEANINGS PROVIDED BY DUBOIS AND OTHER WRITERS

This typology reflects DuBois' original concept of double consciousness. The conventional meaning of double consciousness is presented as the subjugated positions and perspectives of African Americans who are forced to view themselves through the oppressive perspectives of the outside white community, while maintaining their own self-definitions. This overarching meaning is elaborated with examples from Gayle Pemberton (1992), Richard Wright (1940, 1944), and Chester Himes (1945), which reinforce and clarify how the imposed and self-defined perspectives are projected and experienced by the characters in the writings. Each writer reveals:

1. a black perspective;
2. a white perspective; and
3. a black response to the white perspective.

Also like all seven typologies, each of the three perspectives combine to form a general exploration of double consciousness and the dynamics between black and white Americans. This combined exploration leads to the pattern codings that reveal the common issues within and between all seven models. The three pattern codings are:

1. Subjugated people are often aware and critical of their disadvantaged social position.
2. Subjugated people are dehumanized, and they struggle with their position and with the perspectives of the domineering population.
3. The struggle with domineering perspectives, the struggle with double consciousness, is a survival tactic and form of resistance against dehumanization.

These three common themes suggest that, in addition to double consciousness being a burden of oppression, it can also enable subordinated people, such as African Americans, to define, participate in, and respond to the broader social context with dialogue and agency. In this first section, the general overview of Dubois's conventional definition of double consciousness, African Americans' possession of double consciousness can enable them to better understand the social context within which African Americans exist in subordinated status. Although they may not call it double consciousness, the literature shows that when African Americans see themselves through the perspective of white others, and through their own perspectives, they employ a meta-awareness and agency that can enable them to respond to, resist, and negotiate who they are, as well as how and by whom they and their social situations are defined.

W. E. B. DuBois, *The Souls of Black Folk*

First published in 1903, DuBois' *The Souls of Black Folk* explores a wide range of positions and psychological, spiritual, and emotional struggles that African Americans face within themselves and within American society. In addition to introducing the concept of double consciousness, DuBois writes of the historical background of emancipation; his ongoing debate with Booker T. Washington; relationships between class and racial subjugation; and religion and other ways African Americans contend with oppression in America.

Black Perspective

First, in a conventional definition of double consciousness, the black perspective is shown in *The Souls of Black Folk* (1965) when DuBois discusses, "The unasked question," and when he explains the meanings of *twoness* and *double consciousness*. The following quote reflects DuBois' introductory comments in *Souls of Black Folk* (1965, p. 209). He comments that the book is an effort to show the "spiritual" struggles of African Americans that arose after emancipation. Although DuBois does not explain exactly what he means by "spiritual," he calls on the reader to engage with his writing in order to develop a shared or negotiated dialogue between blacks and whites in America. DuBois is opening a dialogue here, not presenting a manifesto. He is trying to talk about dynamics and positions that are not clear or even recognized.

He says,

> Between me and the other world *there is ever an unasked question: unasked by some through feelings of delicacy*; by others through *the difficulty of rightly framing it*. All, nevertheless, flutter around it. They approach me in a half hesitant

> way . . . To the real question, *How does it feel to be a problem?* I answer seldom a word. (1965, p. 213) (Emphasis added)

How can the problems of race be discussed when, since at least1903, a tension and aversion to the discussion itself has existed? DuBois is asking whites to recognize that it is their very aversion to the issue that exacerbates the problem, which is then projected onto blacks. White aversion becomes part of the dynamic that makes *blacks* seem like the problem, when the problem is actually the aversion itself. DuBois is asking for dialogue about this conundrum. Issues of delicacy, framing, fluttering around, and hesitation are parts of the evasion DuBois is putting on the table.

Double consciousness is revealed by DuBois in his understanding of the way questions are asked, not asked, and not answered. He observes how he is seen as black by whites. Dialogue about the problem of projected identity cannot develop when there is no interracial discussion of how blacks feel about being seen as the problem. Such absence of dialogue is a part of white supremacy, because it maintains a superior position for whites that includes their not having to talk about their superior position. However, DuBois is aware of this element of white supremacy, and he is trying to raise it as a topic of discussion. It is his own double consciousness that enables him to see his own perspective and the position that is imposed upon him by whites.

Another example of a black perspective presented by DuBois in *Souls of Black Folk* involves his earliest experience with the "veil of twoness." He writes,

> Then it dawned upon me with a certain suddenness *that I was different from the others*; or like, mayhap, in heart and life and longing, *but shut out from their world* by a vast veil. (1965, 214) (Emphasis added)

DuBois became aware of his perceived inferiority. He also became aware that he was not different from the white others in his heart, life, and longing. This awareness of sameness and difference is not only part of being shut out of the broader world in political and economic ways, but it is also part of being shut out in terms of the very dialogue about *being* shut out. Perhaps in response to his being asked by whites, "How does it feel to be a problem?", DuBois is asking, "How does it feel to *call* me a problem?" This may be the dialogue DuBois is trying to initiate.

DuBois is painfully aware of the contempt and pity that is part of his projected identity, and he is quite articulate at explaining his position. However, it is the projected identity itself that prevents the interracial dialogue about these conditions from taking place. DuBois is making a very powerful point: He is aware that he is invisible to the outside white population. He seems to be showing a part of himself—the fact that he's aware of his invisibility (not his inferiority, but his *perspective* on his inferior position)—to those who project and/or do not discuss that inferior position, thereby making him invisible.

White Perspective

"White perspective" refers to African American writers' explanations of how whites see them as inferior—as problems. DuBois shows how white perspectives of blacks, and of themselves, can be very different from blacks' perspectives of blacks and whites. DuBois writes,

> [Whites] say, I know an excellent colored man in my town; or, I fought at Mechanicsville; or, Do not these Southern outrages make your blood boil? (1965, p. 213)

Statements like these do not address the imposed identities and invisibility that DuBois is sharing as his concerns and as topics of dialogue. Rather, they are white claims to recognition of blacks that actually reinforce black invisibility. In a way, then, DuBois is suggesting that these evasions could be topics of dialogue that can help expose how whites can project positive, but self indulging, identities (of being antiracist and interested in dialogue) onto themselves without any critical feedback from blacks.

DuBois is aware that he is expected to accept and accommodate these projections even if they are obviously absurd to him. He does so superficially only. DuBois writes,

> At these [comments or projections or positionings] I smile, or am interested or reduce the boiling to a simmer, as the occasion may require. (1965, p. 213)

DuBois writes about how he has to keep his own perspective to himself in different ways, as required by each individual situation. By writing about that superficially accepted but truthfully denied accommodation, DuBois is rejecting the accommodation and putting the dynamics on the table for negotiation. The fact that he is doing this may not be noticed by whites, however, who are too busy making sure they feel accommodated by DuBois and other blacks. If so, then the accommodation itself is a projected identity onto both blacks and whites.

This ability of DuBois to write about white perspectives of blacks is itself an indication of double consciousness that many whites do not share. (After all, how many white people are familiar with how they are seen as whites, and how their whiteness is seen, by people of color? And how many feel that this is an important concern? Although there are many books about White Studies, how many of them are about whiteness from

white perspectives? How many are dialogues with African Americans about how whiteness is constructed and defined through various forms of black invisibility?)

DuBois and the following black writers go beyond merely writing about white perspectives of blacks and whites. They also write the responses of blacks to these often negative and racist and evasive white perspectives. The third category discussed in this thesis is that of black responses to whites.

Black Response to White Negation and Projected Identities

This third coding is what reveals double consciousness by showing not just black perspectives, as in the first coding, but by showing black responses to specific white perspectives that the authors reveal in their writings. DuBois explains that African Americans are forced to view themselves from the negative perspectives of the outside society. According to DuBois, having two antagonistic identities means that a lot of time and energy has to be spent negotiating and enduring the conflicts experienced within twoness—the sense of irreconcilability between who DuBois is as a person and how he struggles to live in the outside world that normalizes its misrepresentation of DuBois. Even worse, the internal conflict is exacerbated because the external misrepresentation is projected inside DuBois, behind the veil, as who he is. Having one's own sense of self juxtaposed against the imposed contempt and pity for an ascribed self—having twoness—is what DuBois calls double consciousness. The true self-consciousness prevented by this condition may be a merging of two positive identities (black and American) without the harmful ascription, contempt, and pity from the outside world. DuBois says,

> The history of the American Negro is the history of this strife,- this longing to attain self-conscious manhood, to merge his double self into a better and truer self. In this merging he wishes neither of the older selves to be lost. He would not Africanize America . . . He would not bleach his Negro soul . . . He simply wishes to make it possible for a man to be both a Negro and an American, without being cursed and spit upon by his fellow, without having the doors of Opportunity closed roughly in his face.
>
> This, then, is the end of his striving; to be a co-worker in the kingdom of culture . . . (1965, p. 215)

Instead of antagonism between one's own sense of self and imposed contempt, DuBois is suggesting a merging of positive meanings of blackness and one's individual identity. He wrote extensively and in detail about the positive meanings of blackness in terms of Africa's early civilizations and their contributions as leaders to world history (see *The World and Africa*). It is these contributions, and these meanings of African heritage, that have been supplanted by the negative contempt with which blackness has become associated. Instead of a merging of being both black and American, each in a positive way, twoness and double consciousness remain.

DuBois' main response involves his "contradictions of double aims" and his efforts "to merge his double self" (DuBois, 1965, p. 215). The contradiction is that DuBois has to confront the obstacles imposed by his inferior position in relation to whites while also struggling to improve and advance his own situation and live as he wishes to live, regardless of the hassles, harassment, and dangers from outside. Merging his double self, however, is challenged by his contradiction of double aims. The outside world keeps DuBois divided, making him struggle to deliberately "reduce the boiling to a simmer" (DuBois, 1965, p. 213).

This is the harm of unilateral double consciousness: African Americans are forced to face and manage a division of self that is imposed by white society. DuBois has no recourse. As superordinates, whites do not need the meta-awareness to understand how blacks and other subordinates see their own invisibility to whites. Without their own double consciousness, whites cannot consider and discuss how they are seen as whites, and what that means to subordinated people, from their perspective. DuBois is not heard when he objects to being seen as a problem by people who will treat him that way, but then neither acknowledge nor discuss their treatment. And his having to try to live with and sort all this out takes a lot of time and energy he might prefer to spend otherwise.

The three codings of black perspective, white perspective, and black response to white perspectives recur through numerous black writings across a wide historical range. For example, Gayle Pemberton's essay, "The Zen of Bigger Thomas," from her book, *The Hottest Water in Chicago* (1992), faces the same struggle as DuBois when confronted by a white American who forces her to contend with an imposed identity that is not negotiable. However, Pemberton is writing ninety years after DuBois wrote *Souls of Black Folk*. Pemberton by no means remains silent as DuBois had done, when he could only smile and stay silent as he listened to white pronouncements of their having black friends as a claim to recognition of blacks—a claim that actually reinforces black invisibility. Instead of only smiling and trying to reduce her anger, Pemberton puts the problem back onto the shoulders of the white person, only to find that the white person is not prepared, not able, to talk this way.

Gayle Pemberton, *The Hottest Water in Chicago*

Gayle Pemberton's (1992) *The Hottest Water in Chicago* is a collection of essays, autobiographical narratives, and social criticisms that give readers a sense of Pemberton's own experiences and perspectives as an African American intellectual of the later twentieth century. In "The Zen of Bigger Thomas," Pemberton explains and connects (1) her own experiences with violence within the black community; (2) black invisibility to whites, as shown in Richard Wright's (1987) *Native Son* (originally published in 1940) and Ralph Ellison's (1989) *Invisible Man* (originally published in 1947); and (3) her own experiences with being invisible to well-meaning whites who reinforce her invisibility even as they try to understand Pemberton.

Pemberton's connections are about the images projected onto and held by African Americans and how they can or cannot oppose those images. The questions she raises are about how imposed identities can seem to be self-definitions, and how they can be difficult to cast off. For example, Pemberton explains that just before Bigger is executed for accidentally suffocating Mary, he realizes that his identity and role had been defined without his own negotiation and conscious choice. In contrast, Pemberton shows that Invisible Man is aware of and critical of the kind of trap that has caught Bigger, but Invisible Man still has to struggle, even though he has a better sense of who he is and who he is not.

At the end of this essay, Pemberton shows her own relationship with the imposed identities and positions that make African Americans invisible to whites. She writes of an exchange she had with a white woman at a conference about racism. She shows her own

perspective, the first coding, by saying, “A woman was coming toward me, a clipper ship in full sail with me as port . . .” (1992, p. 174). This metaphor suggests a haste and determination on the part of the white woman and a predetermined role and service from Pemberton that is happening quickly and without recourse for Pemberton. She has been targeted as the clipper ship’s immobile destination and the ship is approaching in full sail.

The second coding, the white perspective, is shown when Pemberton says, “She held out her hand to shake mine . . . and demanded, ‘Tell me about your pain’ ” (1992, p. 174). On the surface, and to the white woman, this demand could be seen as her opening, demonstrating her caring and willingness to share and perhaps empathize with Pemberton. Perhaps the white woman thinks that there has been too much silence and too much fear of really sharing experiences and feelings, so she has just decided to break the ice, even if it is in an abrupt way. However, the white woman is asking a very personal question of Pemberton. So, for all of her good intentions, the white woman is arrogant and condescending toward Pemberton, whose pain is not, without Pemberton’s consent, available for public display and discussion, even if the white woman’s intentions seem worthy to her.

In response, Pemberton writes,

> Then I told her, “Since the surgery, thank you, my left knee is working much better . . .” She backed off, wearing a most peculiar expression on her face. (1992, p. 174)

This response is a clear, utter, and absolute rejection of the positions and dynamics that attempt to put Pemberton in a position to accommodate the “good” intentions of the white woman, which actually reinforce Pemberton’s utility to the white

woman. The issue becomes the fact that Pemberton's pain is none of the white woman's business, and how dare she disrespect such limitations? By commenting on her knee, Pemberton changes the meaning of pain, and, specifically, *her* pain and who she is. Pemberton defines herself (or at least who she is not) and her interaction by exposing, not accommodating, the "good" intentions and disrespectful impositions of the white woman.

Pemberton's clipper-ship woman may be similar to the white people who ask DuBois how it feels to be a problem. In both cases, the white people in the books maintain a distance from the black people they are questioning, even as they ask intimate questions about the ways black people are mistreated and disrespected by whites. The whites assume a familiarity with the blacks that is projected as a generous reaching out, even though it is actually demanding and disrespectful. The questions themselves are about how the black people are disrespected by whites, but the questions themselves are examples of the disrespect, the forced intimacy and patronizingly superodinate and distant position they ask about.

When DuBois is put in this position, as he explains in *Souls of Black Folk*, he says nothing. About ninety years later, Pemberton shows that the positions of white supremacy and white expectations of black accommodation have not changed, but that black responses can be different. She too says nothing to answer the white person's impertinent question about Pemberton's pain as a subjugated black woman, but Pemberton challenges the white woman's perception of her as someone who is just waiting to serve the privileges of the white woman by answering her questions and by revealing whatever the white woman wants to know. And by presenting the white woman as a clipper ship in full

sail, Pemberton indicates that the white woman is demonstrating not a confidence, but an arrogance of good intentions. The white woman feels that she is exonerated from any critical reflection because she has the power of good intentions, as understood from her own perspective, which she imposes on Pemberton without being open for negotiation.

Pemberton's double consciousness is not just an awareness of her subjugation to projected identity, but also an exposure of and resistance to projected identity. Pemberton recognizes her subjection to the white woman's projected misrepresentations, and she plays with that projection by intentionally misinterpreting the question as a more-respectful question about physical pain, rather than the pain caused by suffering within the bounds of white supremacy. Pemberton is redirecting the white woman to more-appropriate behavior as she pretends to misunderstand the question.

The message is that Pemberton recognizes the white woman's voyeurism; even though both women might already understand that the white woman's question is attempted voyeurism, the surprise—the rejection of the role—is that Pemberton is calling attention to the white supremacist roles and interactions that the white woman expects Pemberton to accommodate. Like DuBois, Pemberton surely has better things to do rather than deal with people like the Clipper Ship woman.

Richard Wright, *Native Son*

In *Native Son*, Bigger Thomas lives with his mother and his younger brother and sister in Chicago, around 1940. They are struggling economically, so Bigger agrees to

take a job as a chauffeur for a wealthy white family as a way to receive government aid. Bigger is uneasy with white people, so his anxiety about the job is high.

On his first day of work, he meets Mr. and Mrs. Dalton, and has a chance to talk with Peggy, the African American woman who cooks for the Daltons, when she brings Bigger to his room. At first, Bigger feels like the people and the job might not be too bad; then he meets Mary, the teenage daughter, who makes him extremely uncomfortable. Bigger feels like she is teasing and playing with him in friendly but mocking ways that he does not understand, and to which he cannot respond. Bigger feels that this girl could, and very well might, get him fired, which would mean his family would lose their aid.

Bigger is told to drive Mary to the library. In the car, however, Mary tells Bigger to take her to see her boyfriend, Jan. When they arrive, Jan is coming out of a meeting of his Socialist group. Jan treats Bigger with the same kind of playful mocking, which, like Mary's behavior, seems simultaneously friendly and ridiculing. Jan holds out his hand to shake hands with Bigger (Wright, 1987), saying, "First of all . . . Don't say sir to me. I'll call you Bigger and you'll call me Jan. That's the way it'll be between us. How's that?" (Wright, 1987, p. 67).

Bigger's own perspective, the first coding, is revealed when "Bigger's right hand gripped the steering wheel and he wondered if he ought to shake hands with this white man" (Wright, 1987, p. 66). Bigger eventually lets Jan shake his hand, reluctantly, but there is complete misunderstanding of each other's feelings and intentions. Bigger just wants to be left alone to do his job.

The second coding, the white perspective, is shown when Jan and Mary impose their own dynamics on Bigger without any negotiation of equal dialogue. Jan and Mary's forced and excessive friendliness is an assumption of familiarity that makes Jan and Mary feel closer to Bigger, while Bigger feels that they are not noticing or respecting any of his signs of his feelings (or even acknowledging that he might have any feelings of his own). It is as if Jan and Mary are excited for Bigger because now he has some white people who want to be his friends—not because they know and like him as a person, but because he is black.

Perhaps that is why Bigger wonders,

> Did not white people despise a black skin? Then why was Jan doing this? Why was Mary standing there so eagerly, with shining eyes? What could they get out of this? Maybe they did not despise him? But they made him feel his black skin by just standing there looking at him, one holding his hand and the other smiling. He felt he had no physical existence at all right then; he was something he hated, the badge of shame which he knew was attached to a black skin. It was a shadowy region, a No Man's Land, the ground that separated the white world from the black that he stood upon. (1987, pp. 67–68)

This powerful but unresolved consternation is Bigger's double consciousness, the third coding of black response. He is forced to see himself not only through the perspectives of others, but also through perspectives that he does not even understand. Having familiarity assumed and forced upon him, without any recourse, denies Bigger's choice over how he participates in the interaction and in the social setting. And why does this happen? It happens because Bigger is black, so that is all Bigger can feel, because that is all he is to the others.

Richard Wright, *Black Boy*

Wright's *Black Boy* was originally published in 1944. It is a novel based largely on Wright's own experiences as a poor and hungry African American young man from a religious family in the American Jim Crow South. Wright does not feel drawn to religion, but he loves to write. He gets published in a local black newspaper when he is a young man. He also works many jobs during his teenage years, trying to cope with the demands and abuses of his white employers so he can help support his family. Wright eventually moves to Chicago with his aunt and takes a job in a restaurant, where he becomes acquainted with some of the white waitresses. His mother and the rest of the family plan to join them soon.

The first coding, the black perspective, is shown when, one day at the restaurant, one of the waitresses arrives late and rushes to start working. She asks Wright to tie her apron. He hesitates briefly, but then pulls back the apron ties, and fastens the apron around her waist. The waitress takes Wright's hand and thanks him, and they both get to work. It feels personal and comfortable, but Wright reflects on the complications and implications that such contact would have had in the South (Wright, 1993, p. 319), where black men were lynched just for looking at or speaking to a white woman.

Wright does not develop strong or deep relationships with the waitresses. He says, showing the first coding of the black perspective,

> I did not feel any admiration for the girls, nor any hate. My attitude was one of abiding and friendly wonder. For the most part I was silent with them, though I knew I had a firmer grasp on life than most of them. (Wright, 1993, p. 319)

Wright does not take them too seriously, and he is not threatened by the girls. They seem to leave each other alone for the most part, even though they can be close in superficial ways. Wright does have a general sense of the waitresses, however. His explanation of their outlook is the second coding, the white perspective:

> During my lunch hour, which I spent on a bench in the near-by park, the waitresses would come and sit beside me, talking at random, laughing, joking, smoking cigarettes. I learned about their tawdry dreams, their simple hopes, their home lives, their fear of feeling anything deeply, their sex problems, their husbands. They were an eager, restless, talkative, ignorant bunch. They knew nothing of hate and fear, and strove instinctively to avoid all passion. (Wright, 1993, p. 319)

The girls expose themselves to Wright in more depth and detail than mere acquaintances ordinarily do. Their perspective seems to be that they can sit with Wright and talk openly with each other in front of him, even though Wright is not really part of their group, or their conversation. The waitresses feel a comfort and familiarity that allows them to be open in front of him because there is a distance, an abyss, between them that prevents any meaningful closeness.

In response to this dynamic, Wright's double consciousness, the third coding of black response, is revealed when he says,

> For these poor, ignorant white girls to have understood my life would have meant nothing short of a vast revolution in their lives. (1993, p. 320)

To see themselves as Wright sees them would have brought radical changes to the lives and perspectives of the girls. Wright is aware of how he is seen by the waitresses, to the point of being able to show his position from their perspective, but apparently, they have no interest at all in how they are seen from *his* perspective. Wright also has a sense

of what seeing themselves from his perspective would do to the girls' senses of themselves, and to their sense of Wright. Wright does not explain what this vast revolution would be like, but his point is that it would change the girls profoundly, and introduce them to the dynamics between them. They would understand that they are privileged to be able to ignore what Wright has to cope with on his own, as if the problems are his alone. That may be why Wright writes,

> And I was convinced that what they needed to make them complete and grown-up in their living was the inclusion in their personalities of a knowledge of lives such as I lived and suffered containedly. (1993, p. 320)

Chester Himes, *If He Hollers Let Him Go*

In Chester Himes's (1986) *If He Hollers Let Him Go*, first published in 1945, Bob Jones is a crew foreman at a shipbuilding facility in Southern California during World War II. Racial tensions are high as Bob's family pressures him to assimilate while his coworkers resist and harass Bob as he tries to do his job and work as an equal.

For example, Marge, a white woman who works at the shipyard, uses the mutual attraction between her and Bob to flirt with him. However, Marge soon puts Bob in extreme danger by accusing him of attempting to rape her. She almost gets Bob killed by the white men at the shipyard. Bob attempts to confront this problem head-on. During a lunch break, Bob sees Marge sitting alone, eating her lunch. Himes writes (first coding, black perspective),

> [I] started toward her, my heart pumping like a rivet gun and my legs wobbly weak . . . 'Just who do you think you are?' My voice came out of the top of my mouth, light and weightless and stilted. (Himes, 1986, p. 129)

Bob is both assertive and anxious about confronting Marge as he demands an explanation, while his heart races and his legs wobble. His own perspective includes outrage at being put in profound danger, and his understanding that the danger, regardless of his outrage, is very real and humiliating.

Marge is not bothered by so many dangerous conflicts and feelings. Bob's anger and anxiety is fun for Marge. She is sadistically playing with him. The second coding, white perspective, is shown when Himes writes of Marge,

> After all the crazy, wild-eyed, frightened acts she had put on, the white armour plate she'd wrapped herself up in, the insurmountable barriers she'd raised between us, here she was breaking it down, wiping it out with a smile; treating me as casually as an old acquaintance. (1986, p. 130)

Marge mocks Bob. She mocks his being in the position that she has put him in. She mocks him by reducing a very serious danger to friendly banter that she can control and manipulate at her whim. Marge's perspective is that at any time, she can become Bob's helpless victim; or his friendly, bantering partner; or the death of him, depending on her mood and on how she can most effectively harass him. And she knows exactly what she is doing. She knows that Bob has no agency, because the outside community—the white men of the shipyard and the white society beyond the shipyard—will support her position and perspective and act accordingly toward Bob.

Although Bob tries to confront the games and power of his white female antagonist, he ends up receiving more of the same abuse that he is trying to oppose. Marge won't (because she doesn't have to) accept the terms of confrontation asserted by Bob. Instead, she makes light of Bob's assertions; ultimately, he knows that he cannot

negotiate these terms of interaction. He is trapped in her terms, in her role for him. This is Bob's double consciousness (the third coding, black response), because he sees himself and his position from Marge's perspective. That may be why Himes writes,

> It was too much, just simply too much, for one person to be able to do. I must have looked very funny at the moment, for she burst out laughing. (1986, p.131)

Himes, if not Bob, is showing how Marge uses her position as a white woman to link her personal relationship with Bob to her access to white power outside their relationship. She can treat Bob as a person, a sexual interest, or a racially subjugated object, however and whenever each choice suits her. Seeing how Bob is trapped in Marge's game is double consciousness. Bob is aware of his plight within the novel, but Himes uses his own double consciousness to expose the whole dynamic within which Bob and Marge interact.

Pattern Codings

The pattern codings are:

1) Subjugated people are often aware and critical of their disadvantaged social position.
2) Subjugated people are dehumanized, and they struggle with their position and with the perspectives of the domineering population.
3) The struggle with domineering perspectives, the struggle with double consciousness, is a survival tactic and form of resistance against dehumanization.

First, DuBois, Pemberton, Bigger, Wright, and Bob know they are in disadvantaged positions. They have to contend with white perspectives, even as whites are quite free to dismiss, ignore, and play with black perspectives. Pemberton is clever enough to deflect the white person, but she has to contend with the imposition anyway.

Second, this subjugation is dehumanizing. It almost gets Bob killed. It torments Bigger. It casts DuBois into silence. Even Pemberton, who knows how to protect herself, is forced to remain on guard and vigilant in order to defend herself.

Third, this double consciousness is a survival tactic that helps black people, to varying degrees, to live with white people in domineering positions. Bigger has very little ability to use his double consciousness as protection, but Pemberton has the benefit of being older than Bigger, of having read Wright's books, and of living later than Wright's characters. She has developed double consciousness into an effective tool of retaliation. Bob, however, is trapped between Bigger and Pemberton. He has Pemberton's awareness, but he is like Bigger in that he does not know how to respond effectively.

There is also a spectrum for the behavior of white people. At one extreme, Mary and Jan are simple youths who, like the waitresses Wright discusses, know nothing but the conveniences of racial privilege. At the other extreme, Marge plays with her privilege deliberately, combining her domineering status with her sadistic cruelty. These parameters raise the question of where other whites appear on the spectrum. How many whites try to prevent themselves, deliberately or thoughtlessly, from developing double consciousness? Do they want to stay domineering through naiveté or sadism, or are they simply the victims of privilege because they lack the ability or willingness to apprehend

their own double-consciousness deficit? An even more disturbing question is whether Madge does have her own double consciousness as a weapon to contradict Bob's human equality and social inferiority. If so, that bilk really has to be exposed.

This general overview of double consciousness has shown that DuBois introduces the problems of black racial subjugation, and shows how blacks are forced to see themselves through the perspectives of others while maintaining their own self-definitions. Pemberton (1992), Wright (1987, 1993), and Himes (1986) show implicit examples that substantiate the overall problems DuBois introduces.

In the next section, Blatant and Violent Double Consciousness, other African American writers show specifically how implicit examples of psychological and physical violence against African Americans can evoke, reveal, and involve black double consciousness.

CHAPTER 17

FINDINGS SECTION TWO:

BLATANT AND VIOLENT DOUBLE CONSCIOUSNESS

This model shows how black double consciousness can involve exposure to blatant psychological and physical violence from white people. The violence here is both physical and psychological because in either case, the violence directly harms African Americans. These sources combine when violence, whether or not it is considered violent by the perpetrator, is committed against African Americans. What may appear to be nonviolent to those without double consciousness may be seen as blatantly violent to those with double consciousness. This section includes Michele Wallace (1990), Gwendolyn Brooks (1960), Amiri Baraka (1964), and James Baldwin (1964). After the three codings (black perspective, white perspective, and black response) are shown, the data is pattern-coded to show the common themes and issues.

Michelle Wallace, *Invisibility Blues*

Invisibility Blues by Michelle Wallace (1990) is a collection of essays that explores Wallace's perspective as an African American woman who is insightfully critical of American racial dynamics and positions. Wallace combines her own insights with cultural theory to show how African American perspectives can be missed or negated by whites. For example, Wallace describes how white people volunteer at prisons to try to help the inmates by teaching them arts and crafts. Wallace says (first coding, black perspective), "A woman inmate would start to tell a story that was truly horrible. The do-gooder would stop to listen: she would be paralyzed by guilt" (1990, p. 48).

This situation involves a black woman explaining a story that upsets and overwhelms a white woman who has taken a position as a helper or listener. The term *do-gooder* suggests a condescending attitude that African Americans see as more self-serving to the white people than helpful to African Americans. This black perspective suggests that blacks can see whites as imposing themselves into the struggles of blacks as a way of using, or exploiting, the blacks to make the whites feel better about themselves.

For the second coding, the white perspective, Wallace says,

> The do-gooder goes home feeling empty, disgusted with herself, realizing that she has done nothing to improve the lives of women in prison . . . She decides that what she has to bring is revolution, not art, to the prisons . . . (Wallace 1990, p. 48)

Wallace is showing a turning point at which whites could begin to think about how they appear as do-gooders—as well-intentioned but patronizing people—to the prisoners. However, rather than learning double consciousness, Wallace is saying that

whites prefer to maintain their domineering position instead of seeing themselves as others see them. Instead of dialogue, which could make them allies, they seek some different, unspecified, form of revolution that they could impose in order to assuage their guilt, while also maintaining their superior position as helpers.

Wallace's perspective shows that she not only has black double consciousness, but she also has the white's double consciousness, the double consciousness of the other, that the others cannot develop for themselves. In other words, Wallace has the ability to see how whites would see themselves both from their own perspective and from Wallace's perspective. Wallace also has her own double consciousness of how she, herself, is seen by others. Wallace has two double consciousnesses. The do-gooders have none. This is why Wallace can say (third coding, black response),

> Another Sunday had passed, the women inmates had not learned anything about art, anything about staying out of prison, had only learned that people are as full of shit as ever. (1990, p.48)

These whites are not laughing at the prisoners as Marge, as discussed in Section 1.E, laughs at Bob. They are not trying to be sadistic for the sake of sadism. Rather, their frustration may come from their efforts to be helpful and yet patronizing at the same time. They may want to maintain their superior position so they can help subjugated people learn to deal with their subjugation. This is the violence of their good intentions—the fact that they are do-gooders. Whites can be violent by being patronizing, even if it's through their good intentions. Wallace's ability to reveal whites in ways that whites do not understand or wish to notice comes from her own double consciousness.

If so, this helps explain DuBois' point about the contradiction of double aims. Blacks are forced to try to merge their struggles against racial oppression with their aspirations as Americans, endeavoring to succeed in American society. Are the do-gooders helping to resolve this contradiction, or are they merely reinforcing the contradiction so they can feel like they are helping, even though they're really only helping themselves to stay on top of those they claim to want to free? Don't the whites also have their own contradiction of double aims? With their own double consciousness to see themselves as whites from perspectives of people of color, whites might find that they could be more equal by trying to help by listening/learning more.

Gwendolyn Brooks, *The Lovers of the Poor*

In 1930, when she was thirteen, Gwendolyn Brooks published her first poem. Brooks continued to publish poetry and at least one novel through the 1990s. Her friends and influences included James Weldon Johnson, Langston Hughes, and Amiri Baraka. Brooks describes her writing as focusing on life around her in her African American community of Chicago.[lxii]

Like Wallace, but writing thirty years earlier in 1960, Brooks shows the transparency of the white double-consciousness deficit. Also like Wallace, Brooks shows that the white deficit is transparent to African Americans. In this way, white Americans are shown to be visible to black Americans. Concurrently, white Americans do not

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[lxii] Gates, McKay (eds.), (1997). *The Norton Anthology of African American Literature*, pp. 1577–1578.

realize that they are recognized by black people, who are invisible to them. This message is provided by Brooks (1997) in her poem, "The Lovers of the Poor," first published in 1960 in her collection, *The Bean Eaters*. She says (first coding, black perspective),

> The Ladies from the Ladies Betterment League
> Arrive . . .
> Of proud, seamed faces with mercy and murder hinting
> Here, there, interrupting, all deep and debonair,
> The pink paint on the innocence of fear;
> Walk in a gingerly manner up the hall. (Brooks, 1997, p. 1589)

These white people are visiting housing projects to give charity to the poor. Brooks' reference to mercy and murder suggests that these are do-gooders who are struggling, perhaps unknowingly, with the same double aims of help and domination, or condescension and psychological violence, that Wallace describes. Brooks shows the whites treating African Americans with murder and mercy covertly, and with a violent innocence. Brooks elaborates on this duality when she shows the white perspective (the second coding):

> Their guild is giving money to the poor.
> The worthy poor. The very very worthy
> And beautiful poor. Perhaps just not too swarthy?
> Perhaps just not too dirty nor too dim
> Nor—passionate.
> In Truth, what they could wish
> Is—something less than derelict or dull. (Brooks, 1997, p. 1589)

The ladies of the guild give charity in the form of money, but they are also sharing their feelings of disgust for and with those they want to help. This white perspective of "charity with disgust" is the psychological violence of murder and mercy

that the ladies commit. They might not even notice their white perspective, or how clearly they are expressing their contempt, but the feelings are very clear to Brooks.

Although there is no part of "The Lovers of the Poor" in which Brooks responds explicitly to the white perspective with her own perspective (her own double consciousness), the way she writes about the white perspective is signifyin(g). (See discussion of David Krasner's (1995) "Parody and Double Consciousness in the Language of Early Black Musical Theatre," in the Literature Review section of this thesis.) By drawing attention to the charity and contempt, the murder and mercy of the ladies, Brooks parodies the ways African Americans are seen by whites in relation to how African Americans see themselves. That parodying is, in and of itself, double consciousness, because it includes both imposed and self-defined identities.

Amiri Baraka, *Dutchman*

Amiri Baraka's (1964) *Dutchman* is a play about Clay, a black man, and Lula, a white woman, who meet on the subway in the mid-1960s. In this play, Baraka shows the deadly physical violence that can result when African Americans confront contradictions of whites as shown, for example, by Wallace (1990) and Brooks (1997). In *Dutchman*, however, instead of the white duality involving charity and aversion, Baraka explores a contradiction of white duality involving sexual attraction and aversion.

Clay, a twenty-year-old black man, is reading a magazine on the subway. Lula, a thirty-year-old white woman, is waiting on the platform for the train. The first coding, the

black perspective, is shown when Baraka introduces the setting of the play. Baraka writes,

> The train slows after a time, pulling to a brief stop at one of the stations. The man looks idly up, until he sees a woman's face staring at him through the window; when it realizes that the man has noticed the face, it begins very premeditatedly to smile. The man smiles too, for a moment, without a trace of self-consciousness. (1997, pp. 1885–1886)

Baraka shows that Clay is not looking for anyone through the window, or trying to look at anyone, but Lula is staring at him; then, she smiles at Clay. In these two ways, Lula initiates interaction with Clay. Lula enters the train, stands next to Clay's seat, says hi, and then asks if she can sit down next to Clay. He agrees, and they start talking (Baraka, 1997, p. 1886).

The conversation is highly flirtatious and includes bantering about who was staring at whom through the window of the train at the station. Lula quickly turns the conversation toward herself, telling Clay what she believes she knows about him simply by looking at him. This is part of the second coding, the white perspective. Clay is very curious about how Lula can seem to know so much about him—where he is from, his friends, and even a party that Clay is going to attend. He thinks they must have met before.

Then, also as if it had all been done before, Lula leads the conversation to imagining how they would go to the party together, hang out with the people there, and then go back to Lula's apartment together. From this white perspective, Lula seems to know Clay, as if the two strangers are reminiscing about each other and their experiences together.

Then the white perspective, Lula's direction of the conversation, changes from the tension of flirtation to the hostility of racial animosity. The hostility is anonymous, as it focuses on Lula's abstract sense of Clay, while also seeming familiar, since Lula seems to know Clay; after all, they just shared the putative reminiscing about each other and their imagined intimacy. Lula's white perspective indicates that she knows everything about Clay even though she has never met him before.

The change from flirtation to animosity includes Lula's overtly sexual singing and dancing in the aisle, especially when she tries (unsuccessfully) to get Clay to join her. Lula insults Clay, condemning his assimilation as "crossing a line"—entering into mainstream society—something he is neither entitled to nor welcome to do, from Lula's white perspective. She says,

> Be cool. Be cool. That's all you know . . . jackets buttoning up to your chin, so full of white man's words . . . Clay. Clay, you got to break out. Don't sit there dying the way they want you to die. (Baraka, 1997, p. 1586)

Finally, when a drunken man starts dancing with Lula, Clay shoves the man away and pushes Lula into her seat as she screams in resistance. Lula again calls Clay an Uncle Tom, and Clay slaps her twice across her mouth. Within this violence, Baraka shifts the focus of the play from Lula's white perspective to Clay's response, the third coding. Clay says what he really thinks of the way Lula has treated him, and how he feels about his own position in relation to that treatment. He says,

> You don't know anything except what's there for you to see. An act. Lies. Device. Not the pure heart, the pumping black heart. You don't ever know that. And I sit here, in this buttoned-up suit, to keep myself from cutting all your throats. (Baraka, 1997, p. 1887)

The assimilation for which Lula condemns Clay is not a trap, or not only a trap, from which he wants to break out. Clay uses his assimilation as an act and device through which to fit into a hostile white world, and with which he can keep his heart pure, in whatever way that might be to Clay. That buttoning-up of his suit while keeping his heart pure is the double consciousness of seeing oneself from the perspective of others while maintaining one's own identity.

That outside white world, however, includes Lula's hostility toward Clay's finding a way to deal with, and protect himself from, the hostility that he can encounter at any subway stop. Lula seems unconcerned with whether or not Clay assimilates; rather, she seems concerned only with helping to ensure that black people never find or keep any peace. It is the purity of black people's hearts, or their human struggles to maintain some purity, that Lula wants to corrupt. Perhaps that is why, when she learns of Clay's ability to live with his accommodation and purity of heart in some manageable way, she stabs him in the chest and kills him.

James Baldwin, *The Fire Next Time*

Baldwin's (1962) *The Fire Next Time* is composed of two letters, the first of which is discussed in this thesis. These letters are personal narratives about Baldwin's experiences and assessments of racial dynamics in the United States in the early 1960s. In the first letter, "My Dungeon Shook," Baldwin writes to his nephew, James. In contrast to the deliberate sadism shown in Baraka's (1997) *Dutchman*, Baldwin explores a more-subtle, but no less deadly, kind of violence.

In this letter, Baldwin begins by explaining how his father, the grandfather of his nephew,

> [w]as defeated before he died because, at the bottom of his heart, he really believed what white people said about him . . . You can only be destroyed by believing that you really are what the white world calls a *nigger*. [italics in original text] (1962, p. 18)

Although Baldwin is already implicitly talking about double consciousness (the struggles between imposed and self-defined identities), he adds a new aspect of white innocence to the problem of black double consciousness. Baldwin says (first and second codings: black and white perspectives),

> I know what the world has done to my brother and how narrowly he survived it. And I know . . . that they have destroyed and are destroying hundreds of thousands of lives and do not want to know it . . . It is the innocence that constitutes the crime. (1962, pp.19–20)

Baldwin brings both black and white perspectives together by indicating that there is a relationship between black survival (through positive self-definition) and white violence (through the projection of negative identities). To this combination, Baldwin adds his observation of a putative innocence with which white Americans can maintain the destruction of African Americans—what was experienced by Baldwin's father and narrowly escaped by his brother.

It is the innocence of whites that makes them dangerous. Whites may be innocent because, except for the overt sadists, they mean (or intend to mean) to do good, but they are unaware of how much harm they can do from their domineering position. Violence is not always deliberate, and it's not always seen as deliberate by the perpetrator. In Baldwin's letter to his nephew, this form of violence is not specific, but it is the violence

of imposed perspectives that, as with Baldwin's father, can undermine one's sense of self and lead one to possess an identity of inferiority.

This "innocent violence" is the issue Baldwin asks whites to notice, but he is more focused on helping his nephew deal with the unlikelihood that whites will be willing to notice this innocent violence. Baldwin implicitly uses his double consciousness to try to accept the limitations of these whites. Baldwin says (third coding: black response),

> There is no reason for you to try to become like white people and there is no basis whatever for their impertinent assumption that they must accept you. The really terrible thing, old buddy, is that you must accept them. And I mean that very seriously. You must accept them and accept them with love. For these innocent people have no other hope. (1963, p. 22)

Within his view of himself from the perspectives of whites, Baldwin realizes that he is kept invisible to whites by their sense of their own innocence. When invisibility is invisible, the innocence that keeps it that way is a weapon in and of itself. And Baldwin knows of this innocence even if whites prevent themselves from becoming aware of it. In this way, Baldwin is seeing himself as whites see him. Also, Baldwin has a view of himself as being invisible to whites and this is a view of Baldwin that the whites do not even realize they have. Baldwin's own perspective of himself and of whites would undermine the whites' sense of innocence. His message to his nephew is that he has to accept, in order to survive—that he cannot expect to free whites, and himself, from their sense of their innocence.

Pattern Codings

For the pattern codings, Wallace, Brooks, Baraka, and Baldwin show a combination and overlap of psychological and physical violence involving double consciousness. In pattern coding one,

1. Subjugated people are often aware and critical of their disadvantaged social position.

Wallace and Brooks show that this awareness can encompass the knowledge that do-gooders want to help in patronizing ways even as they maintain their distance. This contradiction is not physically violent, but it is psychologically violent. Patronizing help without equal dialogue and negotiation forces African Americans to accept the whites' terms and perspectives.. This dynamic is revealed by African American writers, indicating their awareness of the violence of the social position that leads to unilateral black double consciousness.

However, Baraka shows what can happen if black people confront their oppressors too vehemently. Neither Wallace nor Brooks show what can happen when blacks directly confront their imposed position. Baraka shows how easily and instantly white psychological violence can turn to deadly physical violence when the psychological violence is confronted. Perhaps this is why Baldwin suggests that loving the oppressors is the only way to survive the self-claimed innocence of the oppressors' psychological violence. All these responses demonstrate the second and third pattern codings:

2. Subjugated people are dehumanized, and they struggle with their position and with the perspectives of the domineering population.
3. The struggle with domineering perspectives, the struggle with double consciousness, is a survival tactic and form of resistance against dehumanization.

The psychological violence, the physical violence, and the thin line between the two dehumanizes African Americans who are prevented from directly confronting their oppressors. They can struggle within their position, but not confront it. This is a subversion of agency that is dehumanizing. Awareness of this position, however, as shown especially by Baldwin, can be a way for African Americans to maintain a critical view of their situation. Double consciousness in this context means maintaining a critical sense of self in opposition to imposed psychological and physical violence. In this way, double consciousness can be a form of resistance against dehumanization.

CHAPTER 18

FINDINGS SECTION THREE:

ACCOMMODATED-TENSION DOUBLE CONSCIOUSNESS

This typology shows how black double consciousness is part of a dynamic whereby blacks are forced to compensate for whites' double-consciousness deficit by helping whites prevent themselves from facing the discomfort of noticing how they can be seen as offensive or psychologically violent from black perspectives. This model includes Marcus Mabry (1995), Patricia Williams (1991), and August Meier and Elliot Rudwick (1975). These texts are shown to reveal the three codings of black perspective, white perspective, and black response. They are then pattern-coded to illustrate their common themes and messages.

Marcus Mabry, *White Bucks and Black-Eyed Peas*

Marcus Mabry is an African American man who grew up in a poor neighborhood in New Jersey. He later went to Stanford University and then worked as a reporter for *Newsweek*. In his autobiography, *White Bucks and Black-Eyed Peas*, Mabry writes of his

high school experience as one of the few students of color at a school he calls, "Lawrenceville," a traditional preparatory high school during the late 1980s.

Mabry's experience at Lawrenceville is positive in general. He enjoys his teachers, classmates, friends, and activities. When Mabry decides to run for Student Council, he feels that he's respected enough by his peers to have a good chance of winning the election. However, the winner is Nick Roegner, one of Mabry's good friends, who was a white student. The two had remained friendly during the campaign, but became less and less close. Each of them had different groups of friends and social scenes (Mabry, 1995, p. 125).

After the election, Roegner visits Mabry in his dorm room. There is mutual tension as they begin to talk, but their earlier familiarity and closeness soon returns. They decide to order a pizza for dinner. After they eat, Mabry tells Roegner that he has been keeping a journal of all his personal thoughts and feelings about the campaign that he would not share in public. Mabry shares that he has felt hostility toward and from Roegner. Roegner reveals that he has also been keeping a journal. Mabry suggests they read what each other has written, and both friends agree to share their journals (Mabry, 1995, p. 126). Mabry writes,

> I read each sentence, then read it again. I couldn't find the seething hatred I had expected. I had written whole passages about how my friend [Roegner] had betrayed me, how it was racially motivated. If I had been a white boy, naturally, I would have been elected. How hypocritical, I had written, that they call *me* arrogant. No one would have called me arrogant if I too had come from Greenwich and my father was a CEO. Then I'd be "confident." (1995, p. 127)

Mabry reveals two important views in this passage: First, he expects his hostility toward Roegner to be reciprocated in Roegner's journal. Second, he feels that his race and class background make him appear arrogant to others, whereas higher racial and class status would have made him appear merely confident. In other words, personal traits of wealthy whites can be considered positive characteristics, but when poor blacks exhibit these same traits, they are seen as arrogant. Perhaps Mabry expects to find this double standard in Roegner's writing. This is the first coding, the black perspective.

Mabry, however, does not find the hostility and hypocrisy he expects from Roegner. Roegner's response to Mabry is that he didn't know Mabry felt this way about him. This is the white perspective, the second coding. Mabry writes,

> [Roegner] said he had no idea I had felt that way. He never suspected that I had seen everything in racial terms, when, in fact, the house's rejection of me [for president] reflected how moody I had become, how deliberately I had cut myself off from people, nothing racial, he said. (1995, p. 127)

It seems that Mabry withdrew and became moody because he suspected his friends and classmates of racial discrimination. And that suspicion is confirmed by Mabry's expectation that Roegner would have referred to him as a "n——" in his journal. Mabry reveals Roegner's response:

> Staring at me, his mouth dropped open. Then, with disdain, he asked, "You thought *I* would write that. Fuck, Marc, you *don't* know me. (1995, p. 128)

This part of the white perspective is very revealing, because it dismisses one kind of hypocrisy and double standard while, or in order to, reinforce another perhaps more-subtle hypocrisy and double standard. The hypocrisy that can be dismissed is that Roegner has overt discrimination, as in considering Mabry arrogant, or a "n——."

However, such absence of overt discrimination is used to dismiss the possibility that there might be other more-subtle and unexplored kinds of discrimination. If these more-evasive forms of discrimination are dismissed because only overt forms of discrimination are recognized, then the absence of overt discrimination can itself be a mechanism by which covert discrimination is allowed, because the covert discrimination is invisible when discrimination is defined only as the overt variety. And that is what happens, so Mabry apologizes to Roegner for suspecting him of overt discrimination (1995, p. 128).

When Mabry apologizes for his suspicions, he is accepting fault for his feelings, which are, in fact, quite valid. First, Mabry becomes moody during the campaign because he suspects racial discrimination, which contributes to his losing the election; then, he later apologizes for suspecting discrimination. For what, though, is Mabry really apologizing? It is not only for suspecting overt racism. The apology is also for suspecting the kinds of discrimination that are considered impolite and too personal for whites to address. Mabry apologizes for breaking the unspoken rule: "If it is not deliberate, it is not discrimination." This coattail apology develops because Mabry feels angry, but his anger is superseded by Roegner's anger, because there is a discourse for rejecting overt discrimination, so Roegner can dissociate himself from that. However, there is no discourse for the subtle and covert forms of racism, so Mabry cannot engage Roegner in that way. Mabry can only apologize for his suspicion of the overt discrimination, to which apologizing for covert discrimination is coattailed.

His valid feelings about covert discrimination, even if not consciously identified, do come out when Mabry is asked to give a speech to the whole school as part of Martin

Luther King Jr. Day. In this speech, Mabry's double consciousness, the third coding, can be found. To the school community, Mabry says,

> [P]eople have a way of saying . . . I can hardly end racism in America, or even in my own dorm, so why even talk about it? [. . .] The first reason is the simplest. Listen. I stood erect and looked silently into the crowd. I made eye contact with as many people as I could. I let the minutes drift on. The silence became oppressive.
>
> "Silence," I finally said, letting the word hang in the still air.
>
> "Silence. What happens in silence? . . . Nothing."
>
> Later, Mabry says,
>
> Well, to put it simply you can help end racism by trying to guard against it in your own thoughts, and your own perceptions of others . . . I am Black, a fact of which I am very proud. Yet it is only one facet of my personality. And when you approach me, I expect you to realize my color, of course. Yet, when you try to place me into certain categories as a result of that Blackness, we have problems. . . . So deal with me as an individual, a Black individual, but nonetheless an individual. (1995, pp. 131–134)

What are the treatments Mabry is arguing against? In what ways does he feel that others do not treat him as a black person and as an individual? Is he only talking about overt racists, or is he also talking about more-subtle treatments that whites might not even notice are negating, oppressive, offensive, or disrespectful? And what measures, like apologizing, does Mabry have to take to accommodate white unawareness, white silence, and white "not listening," so he can hold their perspective of him (so he can have double consciousness) in order to enable them to get along with him even though they cannot, or will not, entertain his perspective of them? These are some of the questions that Mabry helps open up for interracial discussion, especially with people who are opposed to racism.

However, Mabry writes, "My classmate said it was all fire and fury to him" (1995, p. 135). He did not get the kind of engagement that might have opened up new

avenues of discussion through which black and white students could learn more about how they think about and see each other. Mabry is forced to accommodate this silence through double consciousness, because at least one white student finds breaking the silence, even as a way to fight racism, too fiery and furious.

What the white student says, ultimately, is that white people determine what forms of racism they will oppose and what forms they will permit through a combination of silent practice and dismissal of that practice. This arrangement—of white people determining the terms of debate and black accommodation through double consciousness—is itself a form of covert racism that would be exposed if Mabry was heard and engaged as openly and as personally by whites as he is presenting himself to them.

Patricia Williams, *The Alchemy of Race and Rights*

The Alchemy of Race and Rights is an autobiographical narrative in which Patricia Williams (1991), a law professor, shows many examples of white discrimination and legal-system discrimination against African Americans that might not seem discriminatory to many readers. The "alchemy" of the book is Williams's ability to reveal the examples of discrimination by leading the reader to a shift between perspectives, and to see what can go unnoticed without such shifting. This shift not only helps reveal the unseen discrimination, but it also helps illuminate the very perspectives that had previously kept the discrimination hidden.

One way Williams accomplishes the shifting of perspectives is by first reviewing legal cases and decisions, and then, by explaining her own views of the assumptions and

biases presented in the cases and decisions. This comparison encourages readers to discuss Williams's views of the assumptions and biases, and the assumptions and biases themselves.

In her essay, "The Obliging Shell (an informal essay on formal equal opportunity)," Williams helps readers shift between perspectives by writing,

> If racism is artificially relegated to a time when it was written into code, the continuing black experience of prejudice becomes a temporal shell game manipulated by whites. Such a refusal to talk about the past disguises a refusal to talk about the present. If prejudice is what's going on in the present, then aren't we, the makers and interpreters of laws, engaged in the purest form of denial? Or, if prejudice is a word that signified only what existed "back" in the past, don't we need a new word to signify what is going on in the present? Amnesia, perhaps? (1991, p.103)

Williams is talking about the legally institutionalized and overt racism that was outlawed in the 1960s. She is also saying that such civil rights legislation did not end all forms of discrimination. Prejudice can still exist, regardless of what laws are passed. The "shell game" refers to the fact that legislation can be used to dismiss discrimination, even as it has continued to survive and thrive. One way this has happened is because of a kind of denial and amnesia that seeks to attribute to the past what is still occurring in the present. For example, Williams explains a situation in which,

> Not long ago, a white acquaintance of mine described her boyfriend as "having a bit of the Jewish in him." She meant that he was stingy with money. I said, "Don't talk like that! I know you didn't mean it, but there are harmful implications in thinking like that. She responded with profuse apologies, phone calls, tears, then anger . . . As we argued, words like "overly sensitive," "academic privilege," and "touchy" began to creep into her description of me. She accused me of building walls, of being unrealistic, of not being able to loosen up and just be with people. She didn't use the word "righteous," but I know that's what she meant. I tried to reassure her that I didn't mean to put her on the defensive, that I had not meant to attack or upset her, and that I deeply valued our friendship . . . She didn't want me

> to understand merely that she meant no harm, but wanted me to confess that there was no harm. Around this time, my sister sent me an article about the difficulties of blacks and whites in discussing racial issues in social settings. (1991, pp. 125–126)

This situation of prejudice remaining even after civil rights legislation and the conflict between Williams and her white acquaintance shows all three codings of black perspective, white perspective, and black response. The black perspective, the first coding, is Williams's awareness of how prejudice continues while, or because, it is attributed to an earlier time. She writes of the manipulative shell game, which suggests that whites make an effort, whether conscious or less conscious, to not face and address racism, but instead, to dismiss and evade the problem so that discrimination can be considered a thing of the past, even though it still exists.

The white perspective, the second coding, is the denial, amnesia, and defensiveness of whites when the shell game, as shown by Williams's acquaintance, is put on the table to be addressed. Exposing and addressing the shell game is breaking a taboo. Whites can be highly offended, as Williams shows, by such opposition to their manipulation.

Williams's black response to this situation, her double consciousness, is revealed in both her personal and political insights into the problems. She writes,

> We [African Americans] resent those [African Americans] who are not well-groomed and well-masked and have not reined in the grubbiness of their anger, who have not sought the shelter of the most decorous assimilation possible. So confusing are the "colored" labels, so easily do they masquerade as real people, that we frequently mistake the words for ourselves. (1991, p.120)

Williams reveals a condition of assimilation and masquerade by African Americans that is necessary, but not always possible or preferable, in order for blacks to be accepted by whites in American society. The double consciousness is apparent in Williams's awareness of the necessity and burden of this navigation of assimilation and masquerade. Part of this double consciousness is Williams's having to explain how her white acquaintance is offensive while also accommodating her acquaintance's expectation to have her tears and her claims to non-racism accommodated by Williams. There is a double standard of white discrimination being part of the burden that blacks must endure and accept in order for whites to not have to feel that they have the double standard. White denial and amnesia become the duty of blacks to maintain so whites can feel that racism ended with civil rights legislation. Williams requires double consciousness both for her own sense of self, and also to navigate the accommodation of whites that is imposed on her without any negotiation. This position is a form of covert racism that is actually hidden by a singular focus on civil rights legislation that addresses overt racism. Williams writes,

> The rules may be colorblind, but people are not. The question remains, therefore, whether the law can truly exist apart from the color-conscious society in which it exists. (1991, p.120)

Even if whites do not have hidden biases and prejudices, there are still unequal positions that can leave blacks in inferior positions. Whites do not have to try deliberately to stay dominant. However, not being open to recognizing how such positions function, and getting upset when the positions are exposed, is a way white people can dominate

while claiming to be equal. Then, blacks are blamed for objecting to their own subordination.

August Meier and Elliot Rudwick, *CORE: A Study in the Civil Rights Movement*

One question arising from Williams's insight that rules can be color-blind, even though people are not, is about how this problem has developed. Evidence of this problem can be found in the civil rights movement itself. Meier and Rudwick (1975) explore the origins and history of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE). They explain in detail the struggles, negotiations, successes, and failures of CORE as a civil rights organization, from its beginnings in the 1940s to its transition to Black Power in the 1960s.

One strength of this book is how it shows CORE as it functions within the civil rights movement, as well as how it functions with its own internal relations between more conservative and radical members and between blacks and whites. Some of the dynamics explained in the transition to Black Power, in chapter 12, "A House Divided," help reveal how the covert and subtle forms of discrimination experienced by Mabry and Williams were there, but also unaddressed, during the civil rights movement itself.

In the mid-1960s, there were conflicts and divisions within CORE regarding whether the organization should officially oppose the Vietnam War or remain focused on helping to organize African American people living in slums. There were also conflicts about maintaining nonviolent tactics, the appropriate roles for whites, and whether the

group should have an integrationist strategy or whether it should become more separatist (Meier and Rudwick, 1975, pp. 375–376).

Although CORE had national leadership, its local chapters, all over the country, had the autonomy to choose their own leaders and issues. Often, such choices in the mid-1960s involved how much local black community organizing would be pursued and how whites could or could not contribute in leadership or fieldwork toward that community organizing (Meier and Rudwick, 1975, ch. 12).

One aspect of the conflict over the role of whites is illustrated by a situation that existed in the San Fernando chapter of CORE in 1964. White members used group meetings to vent their guilt, which drew attention away from the issues of direct action and community organization, focusing instead on the whites, who were already seen by many people as impeding progress. Meier and Rudwick write,

> [W]hites in many chapters sensed aloofness or brusqueness from some of their black colleagues. It became less frequent for black and white members to act as a cohesive in-group which socialized together . . . [White] withdrawal [from the organization] usually occurred without an open struggle against what seemed like an irresistible tide of growing [black] nationalism. (Meier and Rudwick, 1975, p. 383)

CORE was facing severe challenges in its struggles for racial equality in the broader American society, and it was also facing serious struggles within itself. Some of these internal struggles can be seen as problems of double consciousness. The black perspective, the first coding, is revealed in this passage:

> Underneath there was a basic distrust of educated white people who tried to participate in the black community. (Meier and Rudwick, 1975, p. 386)

This black perspective suggests that the racial equality and harmony CORE was seeking in the broader U.S. was very difficult for the group to achieve within itself. The black distrust of whites was an inherent part of the issues faced by individual chapters, including how chapter leadership was determined, and how decisions were made about community organization, direct action, opposition to the Vietnam War, and other issues.

The white perspective included whites using CORE meetings as a venue to vent white guilt. Other parts of the white perspective involved the kinds of work whites did within the chapters. Meier and Rudwick say (second coding, white perspective),

> Whites shouldered a great deal of the work, from performing clerical chores through participating in negotiations with city officials to organizing tenants . . . (1975, p. 386)

Whites were involved in the practical workings and relations between CORE and the broader community. Concurrently, whites became increasingly isolated socially from their black peers with whom they were working. Therefore, from the black perspective, there was distrust of whites, while from the white perspective, there was formal participation combined with social division. This dynamic of black distrust, white guilt, white clerical involvement, and interracial social distance is not shown by Meier and Rudwick as a dynamic that was discussed by and between the black and white members. The tension increased, leading toward black rejection of whites instead of subsiding through effective dialogue and negotiation. This black rejection of whites in CORE may have resulted from the absence of the dialogue and negotiation that occurs when social bonds between two parties deteriorate, or never even develop.

Meier and Rudwick write (third coding, black response), “Several blacks began to ask openly, ‘Who are the whites to define the issues for us?’ ” (1975, p. 386). This question might be part of a transition, from accommodating tension with double consciousness to critiquing what happens with that accommodation. By questioning the position of whites as *those who define*, the blacks are actually exposing and challenging whether they should be recipients of white definitions, or equal participants in negotiating definitions of issues and identities.

This is a good question that could alert whites to the problem that blacks face—of having to see themselves through white perspectives even though whites do not have to reciprocate. A part of black double consciousness is when blacks ask why whites should be able to define issues for blacks. Black people are forced to accept the fact that their issues are defined, explained, and addressed through white perspectives, when there is very little negotiation of these issues in relation to how whites can work with black issues, as defined by blacks. Whites also pay little attention to their own use of meetings to vent their white guilt, or to the fact that they perform clerical work without social closeness to their black peers.

The tension that leads to blacks openly asking who whites are to define black issues was brought into the open during the civil rights movement. However, such a question does not arise years later when Mabry and Williams have to use their double consciousness to accommodate whites. The accommodation that was challenged by CORE is tolerated once again, as it was before CORE and Black Power. Perhaps CORE, although it was fighting for racial equality, was not itself racially equal. Perhaps the

invisibility of double consciousness during the civil rights movement prevented the movement from addressing double consciousness as an ongoing issue of black accommodation of racial tension.

Pattern Codings

Double consciousness is recognized by Mabry, Williams, and Meier and Rudwick for its accommodation of tension with whites. The first pattern coding focuses on the fact that subjugated people are often aware and critical of their disadvantaged social position. Mabry, Williams, and Meier and Rudwick raise the question of black awareness versus articulation of their inferior position of accommodating white double-consciousness deficit. Mabry apologizes for his suspicions at first, but then reveals and challenges the deeper issues of silence that strengthen and validate his suspicions. Williams shows how whites can be dominant by requiring blacks to accept good intentions as *good enough*. She shows that when this standard is questioned, whites can reinforce their demands for accommodation simply by getting upset and reasserting their claims to the sufficiency of their good intentions. Meier and Rudwick provide a historical background of CORE to show how these problems were not addressed in that organization. Perhaps the civil rights movement itself was not integrated properly enough, and didn't have enough mutual negotiation of positions and identities to succeed at addressing more-subtle levels of racial inequality.

In the second pattern coding, the silence such accommodation requires is how subjugated people are dehumanized, leading to their struggle with their position and with

the perspectives of the domineering population. They have to stay silent and voiceless in order to not upset the whites. This accommodated-tension double consciousness can be a survival tactic, the third pattern coding, which becomes a form of resistance as well as a form of accommodation.

CHAPTER 19

FINDINGS SECTION FOUR:

CULTURAL AND INSTITUTIONAL DOUBLE CONSCIOUSNESS

The problems of double consciousness within CORE, in the civil rights movement and since, indicate that double consciousness can be generalized to an institutional and cultural level in the U.S. Problems of double consciousness were hidden within the civil rights movement itself, which fought overt racism while perpetuating, through ignorance, inattention, and accommodation, the covert racism of double consciousness. And this is not a problem only at the individual level. This typology, Cultural and Institutional Double Consciousness, shows how the double-consciousness problems that were perpetuated by and after the civil rights movement have become, or were already, institutionalized within American society and culture.

The writers in this section are June Jordan (1994), Toni Morrison (1992), and Ralph Ellison (1953). After a discussion of how these writers reveal the three codings of black perspective, white perspective, and black response, they are pattern-coded to indicate the common themes and issues of the texts. These writers offer related messages

that expand the context of double consciousness to show some of its broader sociopolitical dimensions.

June Jordan, *Technical Difficulties*

June Jordan's (1994) *Technical Difficulties* is a collection of essays and personal narratives that present Jordan's perspectives on American culture and society. She illuminates many contradictions between ideals or claims to justice and equality and conditions or practices that betray the ideals or claims.

In chapter 7, "Don't You Talk About My Mother," Jordan discusses how African Americans help each other survive and succeed through their families. She contrasts this strength and resilience with the ways the broader white community views black poverty as a result of black inferiority and a failure of black families.

Jordan begins chapter 7 with a main theme that recurs throughout the whole chapter. She talks about the roles of black women in maintaining black families and the struggles and obstacles they have to, and do, overcome. This is the black perspective, the first coding. Jordan says,

> From the time you learned how to talk, everybody's momma remained the holiest of holies. Yes, we were young. And a lot of people probably thought we were hoodlums, or something like that. But we knew we were smart; we made and kept ourselves ready to deal on those dangerous streets. Many of us, there, in Bedford-Stuyvesant [Brooklyn], were poor. But very few of us were stupid. You couldn't be. In those days, as now, Black kids enjoyed damned little margin for error.
>
> So we never lost track. We could feel it. We could see it. We could hear it. We could not deny it. And we did not ever forget it, this fact, that the first the last and the most, that the number on persevering, resourceful, resilient, and devoted person our lives was, and would always be, your mother and my mother. (1994, pp. 65–66)

Jordan is explaining that black mothers were, and are, the foundation of their children's lives. This is probably universal, but for black children living within a uniquely racist broader society, Jordan explains that the roles and challenges of their mothers are unique. It is the mothers who are targeted by the broader society as the causes of black poverty, struggle, and exclusion from mainstream society. Linking this blaming-the-heroin treatment to the civil rights movement, and therefore to the work of groups like CORE, Jordan reveals,

> [W]e, the people of this allegedly 'pathological ghetto culture,' were waging the most principled, unassailably moral revolution of the twentieth century: we, the pathological community of black folks were forcing these United States to finally honor the democratic promises responsible for the First American Revolution. (1994, p. 69)

Jordan shows that the black struggle to bring democracy to America is resisted by people who treat the fight for democracy as a pathology, while presenting the results of oppression as the inferiority of blacks and their mothers. This problem helps explain the criticisms of CORE members. For blacks to define their own issues, as CORE members demanded, they would have to be heard on their own terms. This might include changing the view of black mothers, to see them as persevering, resourceful, resilient, and devoted, rather than as inferior and incompetent.

However, the subtlety and dimensions of these problems escaped the awareness of mainstream Americans. They just blamed blacks for not fitting into a democracy that they would only be able to fit into after helping to create that democracy through their self-representation, which has not been allowed by the white majority. Jordan shows that

blacks were criticized for not fitting into a democracy that did not exist, and were blamed for being excluded from a system that did not exist. She says (second coding, white perspective),

> Back in 1965, Daniel P. Moynihan issued a broadside insult to the National Black Community. With full support of the Democratic administration that was tired of Negroes carrying on about citizenship rights, and integration, and white racist violence, Moynihan came through with the theory that we, Blackfolks, and that we, Black women, in particular, constituted the problem . . . it was the failure of Black families to resemble the patriarchal setup of white America that explained our unequal, segregated, discriminated-against, and violently hated Black experience of nondemocracy, here. (1994, p. 67)

Moynihan, who went on to become a New York senator (1977–2001), decided to define a pillar of the black community as a malady. He gave black mothers blame for the position of African Americans instead of credit for their endurance. This perspective, and the assaults on welfare it included, shifted attention away from how African American perspectives are required for democracy, and helped reinforce a sense of democracy that excluded difference and difference in outlook. Black CORE members asked who whites were to define their issues. Jordan is asking who whites *are*, and who Daniel P. Moynihan is, in particular, to define people's mothers.

Questions and definitions should also be asked and considered about black fathers, but these equally important concerns are neither addressed nor even mentioned in Jordan's book.

Despite the exclusion and negation of black perspectives, Jordan shows that these perspectives are strong and clear to African Americans. In response to Moynihan and

others, Jordan shows double consciousness, the third coding of black response, by writing,

> [F]rom under the whip through underpaid employment, and worse, Black folks have formulated our own family, our own home base for nurture and pride. We have done this from extended kinship methods of taking care to teenagers thrilled, not appalled, by the prospect of a child: a Black child. We have loved our own inside a greater environment of systematized contempt. (1994, p. 71)

This "loving their own inside an environment of systematic contempt" is an example of double consciousness. Jordan has shown that the larger environment, led by Moynihan and others, has endeavored to instill self-hatred and, perhaps worse, hatred of black mothers, within the minds and hearts of black people. Jordan, however, can see herself through this hostile and imposed perspective while also maintaining her own view of herself on her own terms. She elaborates on her double consciousness when she writes,

> [O]ur Black lives have never been standard or predictable or stabilized inside a benign, nationwide environment. We have been flexible, ingenious, and innovative or we have perished. And we have not perished. We remain and we remain different, and we have become necessarily deft at distinguishing between the negative differences—those imposed upon us—and the positive differences—those that joyously attest to our distinctive, survivalist attributes as a people. (1994, p. 73–4)

Toni Morrison, *Playing in the Dark*

In, *Playing in the Dark*, Toni Morrison (1993) shows literary origins and examples of the institutional negation Jordan reveals. Morrison explores the roles and positions of African Americans in mainstream American literature. She reviews and explains how blackness and race is created, reproduced, and reflected through the writings of many white American authors. Morrison shows that the presence of blackness

(or blackness as a concept and a position that defines whiteness) is produced and reproduced in ways that can make the concept both familiar and invisible when the creation of that black presence is not exposed and explored.

In chapter 2, "Romancing the Shadow," Morrison (1993) shows the literary role of race in forming and reproducing racial positions and identities of white Americans. She explains racially defined meanings and parameters of freedom and civilization. Morrison discusses what Herman Melville (1819–1891) calls, "The power of blackness" (1993, p. 37). Morrison explains,

> [T]here was a resident population, already black, upon which the imagination could play; through which historical, moral, metaphysical, and social fears, problems, and dichotomies could be articulated. The slave population, it could and was assumed, offered itself up as surrogate selves for meditation on problems of human freedom, its lure and its elusiveness. (1993, p. 37)

Blackness is defined and used to provide an opposite against which whiteness, and freedom, morality, savagery, wilderness, and civilization, can be defined. Morrison continues,

> Black slavery enriched the country's creative possibilities [. . . through . . .] the projection of the not-me. What rose up out of collective needs to allay internal fears and to rationalize external exploitation was an American Africanism—a fabricated brew of darkness, otherness, alarm, and desire that is uniquely American. (There also exists, of course, a European Africanism with a counterpart in colonial literature.) (1993, p. 38)

Morrison is revealing a fabricated brewing of the *not-me*. Blackness is constructed as a negative against which whiteness, civilization, savagery, and America could be constructed. Morrison writes,

> [C]ultural identities are formed and informed by a nation's literature, and what seemed to be on the "mind" of literature of the United States was the self-

> conscious but highly problematic construction of the American as a new white man. (1993, p. 39)

Morrison goes on to explore some ways this construction of whiteness in relation to the construction of blackness is shown in writings of early American writers. In addition to Morrison's framework leading toward a more detailed inquiry of the development of whiteness and blackness within American writings, her framework can also lead toward a broader exploration of the construction of blackness as the not-me that supports the white identity and claim to civilization. This broader exploration includes the projection of the not-me as a projected identity that negates one's own self-definition. As the construction of the white identity requires the projection and negation of the black identity, the white identity also depends on black double consciousness.

Based on this defining background of cultural formation early in American literature and history, Morrison can be shown to offer a black perspective, white perspective, and black response that fit with the double-consciousness model pursued in this thesis. The black perspective, the first coding, is that,

> [T]he imaginative and historical terrain upon which early American writers journeyed is in large measure shaped by the presence of the racial other. Statements to the contrary, insisting on the meaninglessness of race to the American identity, are themselves full of meaning. The world does not become raceless or will not become unracialized by assertion. The act of enforcing racelessness in literary discourse is itself a racial act. Pouring rhetorical acid on the fingers of a black hand may indeed destroy the prints, but not the hand. Besides, what happens in that violent, self-serving act of erasure to the hands, the fingers, the fingerprints of the one who does the pouring? Do they remain acid-free? The literature suggests otherwise. (1993, p. 46)

Morrison earlier explained how blackness was deliberately constructed so savagery, civilization, and whiteness could be developed in relation to blackness. Now,

however, she is saying that the literature that was written for such racializing purposes is read as if it is color-blind. The racializing of America is now seen as being nonracial through assertion and enforcement of racelessness in the literature that did the racializing in the first place. It seems, from Morrison's black perspective, that first, people want to become white by making others black. Later, others want to read such cultural productions and positions as if they are not racial. Why, one might wonder, would people do that? Morrison answers and explains the white perspective, the second coding, by writing,

> Africanism is the vehicle by which the American self knows itself as not enslaved, but free; not repulsive, but desirable; not helpless, but licensed and powerful; not history-less, but historical; not damned, but innocent; not a blind accident of evolution, but a progressive fulfillment of destiny. (1993, p. 52)

African Americans are still the measure by which white Americans define themselves. Now, though, they accomplish this by dismissing race, not blacks. The racialization remains, but the racialization is dismissed. Blacks are not overtly dismissed, but their being black, and whites being white, is dismissed. And this happens through assertion and enforced racelessness. Can people do that? Perhaps Americans have to, need to, see themselves as being able to do that in order to maintain the old sense of freedom, individuality, civilization, innocence, license, and destiny that they derived from cultural formation.

If so, the black perspective and white perspective are at odds with each other. The black perspective sees blackness negated, and then sees that negation being negated later on through color blindness. The white perspective sees the later, or color-blind, negation

of earlier black negation (because race has no biological essence) as progress toward a time when race will not matter. Whiteness remains pure, civilized, and individual, even though—or, actually, because of the fact that—it has completely shifted from basing itself on race consciousness to color blindness. That whiteness can shift its being from race consciousness to color blindness is how it can sustain itself—not the way it deteriorates. Morrison's double consciousness about these perspectives is shown in her writing:

> How could one speak of profit, economy, labor, progress, suffragism, Christianity, the frontier, the formation of new states, the acquisition of new lands, education, transportation (freight and passengers), neighborhoods, the military—of almost anything a country concerns itself with—without having as a referent, at the heart of the discourse, at the heart of definition, the presence of Africans and their descendants?
>
> It was not possible. And it did not happen. What did happen frequently was an effort to talk about these matters with a vocabulary designed to disguise the subject. It did not always succeed, and in the work of many writers disguise was never intended. But the consequence was a master narrative that spoke for Africans and their descendants, or of them. The legislator's narrative could not coexist with a response from the Africanist persona. Whatever popularity the slave narratives had—and they influenced abolitionists and converted abolitionists—the slave's own narrative, while freeing the narrator in many ways, did not destroy the master narrative. The master narrative could make any number of adjustments to keep itself intact. (1992, p. 50)

Morrison knows how African Americans have been and are spoken of and for. The acid-pouring as a metaphor for color blindness discussed earlier may be her explanation of how the master narrative is making adjustments now to keep itself intact.

In Morrison's writing, the double consciousness is evident in her exploration of how the master narrative can shift and adjust so that no matter what it or others say about it, whites will remain innocent, civilized, and individual; and just because blacks have to

see themselves from the perspective of the master narrative, whatever it is at whatever time, whites do not—and will not ever have to—see themselves from black perspectives. And that is a burden the master narrative perpetually imposes on others for them to deal with on their own.

Ralph Ellison, *Shadow and Act*

Ralph Ellison's (1994) *Shadow and Act* is a collection of essays through which Ellison explores and explains his own development as a writer and as an American who grew up in Oklahoma during the 1920s. Ellison broadens the personal by discussing meanings of being American and black in relation to writings of other authors, including Richard Wright, Mark Twain, Ernest Hemingway, William Faulkner, and others.

Ellison wrote *Shadow and Act* about forty years before Morrison wrote *Playing in the Dark*. Both books explore similar themes of how literature can reveal cultural positions and relationships between black and white Americans. For example, in the second section of chapter 1, "Twentieth-Century Fiction and the Black Mask of Humanity," Ellison discusses Mark Twain, Ernest Hemingway, and William Faulkner. He shows how Twain's Huckleberry Finn chooses to free his friend, Jim, a slave, when Jim is caught as a runaway as they float down the Mississippi River. Huck's decision, Ellison explains, is difficult because he has to decide between his own sense of friendship, humanity, and justice on the one hand, and broader society's slavery laws and their meanings of justice. Ellison explores how and why Huck chooses to free Jim, even though Huck knows this is wrong according to society's laws (Ellison, 1994, pp. 32–33).

Ellison then draws contrasts between Twain and Hemingway, the latter being, according to Ellison, "the prime example of the artist who ignored the dramatic and symbolic possibilities presented by this theme [of personal choice as intervention into the broader social and political morality of race]" (1994, p. 29). Ellison also discusses Faulkner as a writer who both views black Americans as racial stereotypes while also "explor[ing] perhaps more successfully than anyone else, white or black, certain forms of black humanity" (1994, pp. 29–30). By investigating these contrasts, Ellison emphasizes how "the stereotype is no less personal than political. Color prejudice springs not from the stereotype alone, but from an inner need to believe" (1994, p. 28).

Ellison's sense of the personal being political is illuminated by his discussion of how black and white Americans do or do not identify with American literature, or how they do or do not identify certain literature as being American. It is through these issues that black and white perspectives, as well as black responses as double consciousness, can be found in Ellison's writing. Explaining both black and white perspectives, Ellison writes,

> Obviously the experiences of Negroes . . . have not been that of white Americans. And though as passionate believers in democracy Negroes identify themselves with the broader American ideals, their sense of reality springs, in part, from an American experience which most white men have not had, but one with which they are reluctant to identify themselves even when presented in forms of the imagination. Thus when the white American, holding up most twentieth-century fiction says, "This is American reality," the Negro tends to answer (not at all concerned that Americans tend generally to fight against any but the most flattering imaginative depictions of their lives), "Perhaps, but you've left out this, and this, and this. And most of all, what you'd have the world accept as *me* isn't even human." (1994, p. 25)

Ellison is explaining that black and white Americans often have the same identification with abstract American ideals. However, the ways blacks experience the practices and violations of these ideals are not embraced by whites. In this way, black and white perspectives are connected together. The black perspective is one of a unique American experience that is not accepted, even by the imaginations, of whites. The white rejection of black perspectives is what allows whites to consider most American fiction as reflecting reality. The double consciousness of African Americans comes from their having to maintain their own sense of reality while also accepting white claims to the American reality presented in their fiction that negate and dismiss African American humanity. Perhaps this is why Ellison refers to "Richard Wright's remark that there is in progress between black and white Americans a struggle over the nature of reality" (1994, p. 26). In his own words, Ellison writes,

> [T]he American himself has not been finally defined . . . this struggle between Americans as to what the American is to be is part of that democratic process . . . the ideal American character . . . is slowly being born. (1994, p.26)

However, part of this struggle involves conflicts between broader democratic ideals that Americans value and the violation of these ideals, which can undermine the sense of American justice. Ellison explains how these conflicts—and, therefore, the critical perspectives of African Americans—are excluded from rather than brought into the debate. The result is that,

> [The] Negro . . . is also a key figure in a magic rite by which the white American seeks to resolve the dilemma arising between his democratic beliefs and certain antidemocratic practices . . . The Negro was placed outside the democratic master plan, a human "natural" resource . . . so that white men could become more human. (Ellison, 1994, pp. 28–29)

Being placed outside the master plan so whites can become more human puts blacks in a position of having to maintain a sense of white humanity and American democracy, where neither are accurate because they exclude blacks. So blacks are both subordinated by the system and forced to support it through their dehumanization. However, white dehumanization of whites through the dehumanization of blacks is turned around into white humanization of themselves when blacks are forced to help support or accommodate their own dehumanization. Ellison's double consciousness is his ability to explain these dynamics while also maintaining his own sense of himself, and his sense of what it means for America to actually and honestly become equal—at least in the form of imagination. Ellison's awareness of how he views himself, and how others see him as a function of the larger American society, is double consciousness not only on an individual level, but also as a broad literary, historical, and political position.

Pattern Codings

Ellison, Jordan, and Morrison reveal not only double consciousness of themselves, but they also show that double consciousness can be a form of political analysis and social criticism. With this broader use of double consciousness, these writers expand the scope of the pattern codings.

The first pattern coding is that subjugated people are often aware and critical of their disadvantaged social position. These authors reveal that they are aware of their position as being larger in scope, beyond themselves. Jordan shares her own awareness of

the contradictions between the aims and limitations of the civil rights movement as they pertain, and perhaps led, to the later assault of blaming black mothers and families. She is aware that the blame is used to shift attention away from the political deficiencies of the nation and American society as a whole. Morrison and Ellison show how the politics behind the image of American freedom can be exposed and explored through a critical reading of American literature. In these ways, the writers reveal how they, as subjugated people, are aware and critical of their disadvantaged social position

The second pattern coding is that subjugated people are dehumanized and struggle with their position and with the perspectives of the domineering population. Making sense of this position brings the subjugated people beyond the mere personal problems they have with others, and toward a deeper assessment of the structural of American culture and society. Jordan shows how she, and other African Americans, are dehumanized in this passage:

> [W]e, the people of this allegedly 'pathological ghetto culture,' were waging the most principled, unassailably moral revolution of the twentieth century: we, the pathological community of black folks, were forcing these United States to finally honor the democratic promises responsible for the First American Revolution. (1994, p. 69)

Jordan shows how dehumanization has remained even after African Americans waged a revolution to lead America closer to its own ideals. Morrison and Ellison show how this ideal of "democracy for everyone" is in direct conflict with the role of blackness in creating a sense of whiteness, civilization, and freedom. For blacks to help develop American democracy in a more equal way, whites would have to accept that their own

sense of civilization and freedom is grounded in their whiteness as a position that is dependent on black exclusion.

The third pattern coding is that the struggle with domineering perspectives, with double consciousness, is a survival tactic and form of resistance against dehumanization. By locating the problem outside themselves, the focus of the solution shifts from concern with what seems wrong with blacks to concern with how this blame is in and of itself part of a problem that blacks can confront, rather than a problem with blacks themselves. Jordan shows that her view of black mothers (which comes from others' perspectives) can enable her to view the imposed *perspective*, rather than the blacks themselves, as the problem. Her double consciousness is a form of resistance because it exposes and critically rejects the broader institutional, or commonly accepted, views of blacks. Morrison and Ellison provide a literary framework that reveals a whole systematic literary tradition through which black and white identities and positions have been created. All three authors use their double consciousness as a survival tactic, of awareness of, instead of submersion in, the negating perspectives that are imposed on blacks.

CHAPTER 20

FINDINGS SECTION FIVE:

PERSONAL AND INVISIBLE (TO WHITES) STRUGGLES WITH DOUBLE CONSCIOUSNESS

This model shows more-subtle personal and political ways black Americans struggle to function with double consciousness while, and because, whites have no awareness of these struggles. Black double consciousness is both a problem that black people confront and one that is often invisible to whites. This invisibility can lead whites to blame blacks for the problems they encounter, although part of the problem is white unawareness of black double consciousness. This kind of double consciousness is shown by Signithia Fordham (1991), Henry Louis Gates Jr. and Cornel West (1996), and Ellis Cose (1993). After showing how these writers are coded by black perspective, white perspective, and black response, they are pattern-coded to reveal their common themes.

Signithia Fordham, "Racelessness in Private Schools: Should We Deconstruct the Racial and Cultural Identity of African-American Adolescents?"

Signithia Fordham's article, "Racelessness in Private Schools: Should We Deconstruct the Racial and Cultural Identity of African-American Adolescents?," was published in *Teachers College Record* (1991). In this article, Fordham explains how black students in six New Jersey private preparatory high schools faced conflicts between their own identities and the "racelessness" imposed on them by their schools. Although Fordham does not give an explicit operational definition of racelessness for this article, she discusses how black students have senses of themselves as individuals and as black people that are invisible and dismissed by the schools in order for the schools to claim equality and inclusion. Fordham says,

> In this article, I argue that racelessness is a concept that symbolizes the effort to deconstruct the historically constituted relationship between black and white Americans, including its intrusion into the notion of academic adequacy and African-American students' enrollment in private schools. (1991, p. 472)

So it is by ignoring, dismissing, and negating race that the schools claim to equalize students of color and white students. This color blindness seems to be what Fordham implies, but does not denote, as her meaning of racelessness.

This racelessness or color blindness is shown to have severe impacts on the black students. However, these negative impacts are not noticed by the school administrators or

the parents. They see the racelessness as healthy rather than as harmful to the black students. Fordham explains,

> Achieving academic success in a context where a Eurocentric ethos dominates necessitates divorcing one's commitment to a changing yet familiar African-American identity and embracing instead an unpredictable, unfolding meaning of both Self and Other. For African-American adolescents, learning to cope with the "burden of 'acting white' " is (or becomes) an academic imperative, an undeniable breach of the Self. (1991, p. 471)

The black perspective, the first coding, is the sense of self, other, and coping that black students bring to school. This sense of self, other, and coping is quite different from, and incompatible with, the sense of self, other, and coping that is expected by the schools or by the white perspective, the second coding. For example, Fordham shows the black perspective by discussing Edmund, his sense of self, how he interacts with others, and how he understands himself within his broader environment of American racism. Explaining Edmund's perspective, Fordham says,

> Personal racism you can deal with. Someone calls you a nigger and you can smack him in the mouth, and if you are bigger than him, he's gonna know not to call you a nigger again. Edmund had dealt with that kind of racism all his life—we all do—but before he went to Exeter, he had never, ever in his life dealt with institutional racism. That was something he couldn't fight against. How do you fight an assumption? How do you tackle history? How do you get your hands on an environment? You can't—you can't even begin to come to grips with it. That's what makes it so insidious and hard to deal with. And the thing is, it's never personal. It's just there. (1991, p. 479)

Both Edmund and Fordham share this perspective on visible forms of personal racism and obscure forms of institutional racism that is just there—impersonal, but very harmful in personal ways. This black perspective seems to be an orientation, an understanding of both identifiable and hidden dangers, that can give black people a sense

of themselves and of others, and a way to cope with a personally and institutionally racist society. And black teenagers have to know how to deal with all of this.

However, the white perspective is shown by Fordham to be incompatible with the black perspective. This white perspective is just too simple, and simple-minded. Sylvester Monroe, a *Newsweek* journalist, is quoted by Fordham as saying,

> What bothered me [at St. George's Academy] was that some people found it easier to pretend I was something else (other than African American). "We're colour-blind here," a well-meaning faculty member once told me. "We don't see black students or white students, we just see students." But black was what I was; I wasn't sure he saw me at all. (1991, p. 479)

How does this well-meaning color blindness treat the sense of self, other, and coping with personal and institutional racism that Fordham attributes to African American teenage students? The treatment is negation, but it is called recognition. This sublimation is insidious, according to Edmund. However, it does not have to be; if it is exposed as simple-minded sublimation, it can be deconstructed as a form of institutional racism that black youth face in personal ways.

The question, and the third coding of black response, then arises from Fordham's writing about the insidious sublimation of negation to recognition. Are there two forms (known and unknown) of double consciousness? Does Edmund have double consciousness that is unknown to him, while Monroe is aware of his double consciousness? Edmund asks many questions about how he can fight an assumption, tackle history, and get his hands on an environment. To him, the struggle to maintain his own sense of self while living with his imposed negation is amorphous. Perhaps he is caught with double consciousness of which he is unaware, leaving him trapped between

awareness and unawareness of that trap. Conversely, perhaps Monroe knows more cognizantly that he is balancing, negotiating, and confronting the simple-minded color blindness that is presented as inclusion and recognition, even as it dismisses his sense of the self and the other in the name of equality. Fordham says (third coding, black response),

> Achieving academic success in a context where a Eurocentric ethos dominates necessitates divorcing one's commitment to a changing yet familiar African American identity, and embracing instead an unpredictable, unfolding meaning of the Self and the Other. Consequently, learning to cope with the burden of acting white becomes an academic imperative for African American adolescents, a quintessential violation of the Self. (1991, p. 481)

"Acting white" can be seen as the outcome of black double consciousness. It then gives whites the false impression that they and blacks are the same. However, this unilateral double consciousness cannot make people the same. Rather, they could be more similar, more the same, if both parties had their own double consciousnesses. Then, with that in common, they could talk about their differences with a common grounding in each other's perspectives, and with a shared understanding of the complexities and intimacies of double consciousness. That would be the sameness that whites would have to work and struggle for, on equal terms with people of color. Instead, they try for an easy feeling of sameness that only exacerbates, by hiding more deeply, the differences that make whites uncomfortable. Color-blind whites claim to be fighting racism by pretending that black invisibility is, itself, invisible. Then it is only those who see the differences, who expose the delusion of sameness, who are seen as the racists. The messengers are blamed for the message.

Henry Louis Gates Jr. and Cornel West, *The Future of the Race*

Gates's and West's (1996) *The Future of the Race* includes one essay by each author, both of which address DuBois' concept of the "Talented Tenth" (1996, p. 139). According to DuBois, the Talented Tenth is the educated leadership elite of the African American community. This group is comprised of teachers, businesspeople, professionals, religious leaders, and others who can help the African American masses acquire the hope, education, and opportunities needed for successful participation in mainstream society. DuBois explains,

> But I have already explained that human education is not simply a matter of schools; it is much more a matter of family and group life—the training of one's home, of one's daily companions, of one's social class. Now the black boy of the South moves in a black world—a world with its own leaders, its own thoughts, its own ideals. In this world he gets by far the larger part of his life training, and through the eyes of this dark world he peers into the veiled world beyond. Who guides and determines the education which he receives in this world? His teachers here are the group leaders of the Negro people—the physicians and clergymen, the trained fathers and mothers, the influential and forceful men about him of all kinds; here it is, if at all, that the culture of the surrounding world trickles through and is handed on by the graduates of the higher schools. (1996, pp. 149–150)

The Talented Tenth consists of those members of the black community who can lead the other members through self-help toward successful training to participate in the "veiled world beyond." DuBois is talking about a leadership group that has transitioned into the white, veiled world and can help others learn how to make this transition.

In their essays, however, Gates and West each show how the Talented Tenth model is much more difficult to put into practice than it is to theorize about; for example, Gates shares, through personal narrative, his own experiences and challenges as a first-

generation college student at Yale in the 1960s. He also contextualizes this narrative within a broader consideration of the complicated and controversial dynamics between African Americans. He says,

> Even today [as in the 1960s], however, the enormous class disparities within the "black community" are discussed only gingerly and awkwardly, and that's because they undermine the very concept of such a "community" in the first place. (1996, p. 37)

So the notion of a Talented Tenth may be too idealistic to pertain to the complexities of African American communities of the civil rights and post–civil rights eras. In his essay, Cornel West helps elaborate on Gates' critique. West says,

> [T]he Enlightenment worldview held by DuBois is ultimately inadequate, and in many ways, antiquated, for our time. The tragic plight and absurd predicament of Africans here and abroad requires a more profound interpretation of the human condition—one that goes far beyond the false dichotomies of expert knowledge vs. mass ignorance, individual autonomy vs. dogmatic authority, and self-mastery vs. intolerant tradition. Our tragicomic times require more democratic concepts of knowledge and leadership which highlight human fallibility and mutual accountability, notions of individuality and contested authority which stress dynamic traditions; and ideals of self-realization within participatory communities. (1996, p.64)

By suggesting more-democratic concepts of knowledge and leadership, West implies a need for negotiation rather than authoritarianism. Toward this goal, West suggests a focus on self-realization within participatory communities. This reorientation does not dismiss the Talented Tenth, but it might help reposition the elite in a more-cooperative, and less authoritarian, role within black communities and within broader American communities.

West suggests a different role for the Talented Tenth and the masses. He maintains the crucial contributions of the educated and professional class, but he

recommends more cooperative and equal relationships between all African Americans. West explains,

> The fundamental role of the public intellectual—distinct from, yet building on, the indispensable work of academics, experts, analysts, and pundits—is to create and sustain high-quality public discourse addressing urgent public problems which enlightens and energizes fellow citizens, prompting them to take public action . . . Intellectual and political leadership is neither elitist nor populist; rather it is democratic, in that each of us stands in public space, without humiliation, to put forward our best visions and views for the sake of the public interest. And these arguments are presented in an atmosphere of mutual respect and civic trust. (1996, p. 71)

In West's view, there should not be an elite guiding the masses, but there should be a cooperative and mutually negotiated dialogue between all participants. One of the issues that need such dialogical attention, West writes, is Black Nationalism and white supremacy. He explains Black Nationalism and white supremacy by writing,

> Black nationalists usually call upon black people to close ranks, to distrust most whites (since the reliable whites are few and relatively powerless in the face of white supremacy), and to promote forms of black self-love, self-defense, and self determination. It views white supremacy as the definitive systemic constraint on black cultural, political, and economic development. More pointedly, black nationalists claim that American democracy is a modern form of tyranny on the part of the white majority over the black minority. For them, black sanity and freedom requires that America not serve as the major framework in which to understand the future of black people. Instead, American civilization—like all civilizations—rises and falls, ebbs and flows. And owing to its deep-seated racism, this society does not warrant black allegiance or loyalty. White supremacy dictates the limits of the operation of American democracy—with black folk the indispensable sacrificial lamb vital to its sustenance. (1996, p. 73)

This is a reorientation from the Talented Tenth helping the masses to assimilate into mainstream American society. Instead, West argues that public intellectuals need to maintain a dialogue with fellow citizens in order to help illuminate the functions of white supremacy as tyranny against the assimilation DuBois was suggesting. These are the

issues that need to be debated dialogically. To do that, the Talented Tenth needs to assume a role not so much as guides toward assimilation into the mainstream of white supremacist society, but rather as equal partners with the masses in defining and opposing white supremacy.

This reorientation leads to West's discussion of DuBois' concept of double consciousness. West discusses all three codings—black perspective, white perspective, and black response—in this passage:

> To be a black human being under circumstances in which one's humanity is questioned is not only to face a difficult challenge, but also to exercise a demanding discipline.
>
> The sheer absurdity of being a black human being whose black body is viewed as an abomination, whose black thoughts are perceived as debased, and whose black pain and grief are rendered invisible on the human and moral scale is the New World context in which black culture emerged. (1996, p. 80)

This challenge, and the discipline of living with one's humanity made invisible, is double consciousness. A critical and dialogical focus on this issue, instead of a focus on assimilation, could be part of West's reorientation of the Talented Tenth from elitist directors to equal negotiators with all African Americans, and, perhaps, with other people of color, and hopefully with some white people.

In this writing, West illuminates the elitist pitfalls of DuBois' model of the Talented Tenth, but he repositions that class in a more-democratic and more-dialogical relationship with the less-assimilated African Americans. The result is a return to DuBois that links his concepts of the Talented Tenth and double consciousness in a more dialogical and empowering way. West writes,

> Black people will not succeed in American society if they are fully and freely themselves. Instead, they must "endure petty insults with a smile, shut [their] eyes to wrong." They must not be too frank and outspoken and must never fail to flatter and be pleasant in order to lessen white unease and discomfort. Needless to say, this is not the raw stuff for healthy relations between black and white people.
>
> Yet this suppression of black rage—the reducing "the boiling to a simmer"—backfires in the end . . . After playing the role and wearing the mask in the white world, one may accept the white world's view of oneself. (1996, p. 87)

Exposing, explaining, and debating this danger of double consciousness (instead of promoting assimilation through wearing a mask, which can backfire) seems to be West's view of how the Talented Tenth can help the black and broader American communities clarify and overcome white supremacy.

Ellis Cose, *Rage of a Privileged Class*

In *Rage of a Privileged Class*, Ellis Cose (1993) organizes interviews and testimonies into shared narratives of middle-class African Americans. Cose reveals widespread experiences of success in school and earning desirable and respected employment positions. These successes, however, are often followed by limited opportunities for further advancement and episodes of "subtle discrimination" (Cose, 1993, p. 17).

For example, Cose shares the story of Joseph Boyce, who served as bureau chief of *Time* magazine in Atlanta. Boyce was transferred to New York to become the assistant bureau chief there, and according to their policy, Time Inc. offered to pay Boyce 105 percent of the appraised value of his house. Boyce, however, got an appraisal from a realtor that he knew was too low. He asked his white secretary to pretend the house was

hers when the next appraisers came. They appraised the house at a 15 percent higher value (Cose, 1993, p. 43). Although it may be argued that the second realtor may have offered the higher appraisal to Boyce, as well, Cose shares many examples of whites offering better deals and more trust to whites than to blacks. The examples add up to a pattern of discrimination. Cose generalizes the responses to this kind of racism by writing,

> Few human beings of any race could survive the psychic toll of uninterrupted anger. Those who did would be in such a miserable state that they could scarcely cope with life, much less succeed at it. In successful individuals, especially those who are members of racial minority groups, even righteous rage tends to be leavened with humor and grace. What is constant is not anger but awareness, awareness that even the most pleasant interracial encounter can suddenly become awkward, ugly or worse. (1993, p. 44)

Cose reveals a relationship between awareness, anger, and humor that many African Americans are burdened to navigate. And since this condition can result from the subtle racism that white Americans deny and dismiss, the whole problem is attributed to African Americans, while white participation and accountability is denied. This situating of subtle racism as a black problem of awareness, anger, and humor is part of the problem of double consciousness. Blacks are forced to deal not only with white perspectives and white unawareness of how they have to deal with white perspectives, but blacks also have to keep their responses to subtle racism suppressed with awareness and humor, so they do not upset the whites by illuminating their racist behavior. Showing the black and white perspectives, the first and second codings, Cose writes,

> Among successful blacks—and among many who belong to other ethnic minority groups as well—the number who spend much of their energy fighting desperation is alarmingly high, notwithstanding that we live in an age where legions of white

> men [sic: and white women] have concluded that they are the group most discriminated against. That the pain of those blacks is generally invisible to whites in part reflects that voicing of it can carry consequences. (1993, p. 35)

So there are levels of subtle racism. There is a surface level of promotion discrimination, real estate discrimination, shopping discrimination, and other forms of subtle inequity. There is also a psychological level involved, whereby black people have to keep their feelings about the surface discrimination inside themselves so they do not upset the whites, who are practicing or ignoring the surface discrimination. Black awareness, grace, and humor become survival tools not just for blacks, but for whites too. Blacks carry the double burden of being oppressed and of keeping their oppression from upsetting the whites. That may be why, Cose says (third coding, black response),

> Alan Poussaint, associate professor of psychiatry at Harvard Medical School and a close advisor to Bill Cosby, sees black self-censorship as a simple tool of survival. "It's always a risk for a black person in a predominantly white corporation to express individual anger," he says, "because whites do not understand what the anger is about."

Pattern Codings

In this section, Personal and Invisible (to Whites) Struggles with Double Consciousness, Fordham begins by showing the struggles black students face between their own identities and the identities imposed by their schools. Cose shows that the imposed identities are continued after high school and in the professional world. These conflicts are the first pattern coding, as facing the conflicts indicates that the subjugated people are often aware and critical of their disadvantaged social position. The confusion experienced by the high school students and the anger of the adults is their awareness of

the dehumanization they face because of the perspectives of the domineering white population. Cose reveals that blacks have to be cautious about maintaining a sense of humor and grace because they know how quickly whites can become upset and dangerous when their sense of color blindness is questioned. This humor and grace is one way black double consciousness is a survival tactic and a way to fight dehumanization, but it is a heavy burden, nonetheless, necessitating complicated navigation between who one is and how one responds to the expectations of white others.

West extends the role of double consciousness as a survival tactic and form of resistance to dehumanization. He does this by first suggesting a new relationship between the educated and professional African American class and the masses. Instead of an elitist Talented Tenth leading from an authoritarian and distant position, West is calling for dialogical participation and equality between *all* groups of African Americans. If this dialogue and equality leads toward new exposures and negotiations of double consciousness—instead of maintaining the accommodationalism of racelessness and the silencing of anger—then the personal and hidden aspects of double consciousness might become clearer and more open for discussion. In that way, double consciousness might become a more-empowering survival tactic.

CHAPTER 21

FINDINGS SECTION SIX:

BLACK RESISTANCE TO DOUBLE CONSCIOUSNESS

This model reveals some of the ways African Americans conceptualize and confront their position of unilateral double consciousness. Double consciousness can be a sophisticated and insightful response to those who lack double consciousness. Double consciousness of some can challenge the double-consciousness deficits of others. To show these dynamics, Henry Louis Gates (1992) in *Loose Canons*, Donaldo Macedo (1994) in *Literacies of Power*, and Ralph Ellison (1989) in *Invisible Man* (first published in 1947), are first coded to show black perspective, white perspective, and black response. They are then pattern-coded to illuminate their common messages.

Henry Louis Gates Jr., *Loose Canons: Notes on the Culture Wars*, and Donaldo Macedo, *Literacies of Power*

Gates's essays in *Loose Canons* (1992) were originally written as oral presentations to be delivered by Gates. He collected them into this published volume to help contribute

to the development of shared understandings and respect between the divided racial, cultural, and ethnic groups in American and international societies. Through Gates's discussions of American literature and American culture, the book calls for and helps shed light on how academia in the U.S. is already multicultural, and how it can continue to grow intellectually through multiculturalism. Gates writes with the optimism, hope, and openness, that,

> [a]ny human being sufficiently curious and motivated can fully possess another culture, no matter how "alien" it may appear to be. (1992, p. xv)

This view—that people can truly share each other's cultures—supports the idea that double consciousness can be a positive ability. If double consciousness can help people interact with another culture by helping people see how they appear to people of that culture, then double consciousness could become a form of cultural mobility or border crossing. Although Gates does not discuss it explicitly, some of his writing does implicitly address double consciousness.

In chapter 2 of *Loose Canons*, "The Master's Pieces: On Canon Formation and the African-American Tradition," Gates implicitly appropriates double consciousness. He turns the concept from a negative and harmful condition to a healthy and empowering sense of agency. Gates begins the chapter by reviewing the history of African Americans' efforts to define and compile an African American literary canon. He offers a meaning of *canon* by explaining,

> I suppose the literary canon is, in no very grand sense, the commonplace book of our shared culture, in which we have written down the texts and titles that we want to remember, that had some special meaning for us. (1992, p. 21)

A commonplace book of shared culture would likely show common histories, experiences, positions, tastes, perspectives, values, and ideals that help form a record of the shared ways of life that lead to a sense of belonging. Perhaps that is part of the special meaning of the texts to which Gates refers.

Gates continues by briefly exploring the long African American history of compiling texts into anthologies to bring together some of the African American writings that reveal the shared experiences of black Americans. These include anthologies by Armand Lanusse (as far back as the antebellum period, in 1845), William G. Allen in 1849, James Weldon Johnson in 1922, Alain Locke in 1925, V. F. Calverton in 1929, and the anthology Gates himself edited with Kwame Anthony Appiah (Gates, 1992, pp. 24–31).

Gates then discusses some views that are opposed to black canon formation. Here, in response to these oppositions, is where Gates appropriates double consciousness, turning it from an oppressive condition to an empowering form of agency.

Gates explains that William Bennett "claims that black people can have no canon, no masterpieces . . ." (Gates, 1992, p. 33). This position maintains that introducing a black canon would politicize the established and mainstream literary canon. The question is raised about whether a black canon would politicize academics, or whether it would illuminate the fact that literary canons, like all of academics, are already political, but just not seen as political. Donaldo Macedo shows how this is true of the mainstream canon, and how a black canon reveals, but does not create, the politics of canons. Macedo writes,

> [T]here was never a "common culture" in which people of all races and cultures equally participated. The United States was founded on a cultural hegemony that privileged and assigned control to the White patriarchy and relegated other racial, cultural, and gender groups to a culture of silence. (1994, p. 44)

The development, or recognition, of a black canon would expose the fact that the common culture assumed by the mainstream canon is not a common culture at all. It only seems common to some because those excluded are not recognized as such. Their invisibility is invisible to those who think the mainstream canon is universal. That is how the mainstream canon can seem universal, and also, how the mainstream canon is political, even as it claims and appears to be apolitical. Gates writes,

> That people can maintain a straight face while they protest the eruption of politics into something that has always been political from the beginning—well, it says something about how remarkably successful official literary histories have been in presenting themselves as natural and neutral objects, untainted by worldly interests. (1992, p. 33)

What people may be objecting to is not the politicization of literature, but the exposure of the politics of literature. Macedo writes,

> What [Allan] Bloom and other conservative educators have failed to acknowledge is how the traditional approach to education has primarily served the interests of the elite classes, mostly White males. If they were to acknowledge the elitist, antidemocratic, and discriminatory nature of traditional approaches to learning, they would understand the perceived anger and demands from the members of those groups who have been denied access to the bastions of knowledge and power. In Bloom's view, education is the acquisition of predefined forms of knowledge that are organized around the study of Latin and Greek and the mastery of the great classical works. This traditional approach to education is inherently alienating in nature. On the one hand, it ignores the life experience, history, culture, and language practices of students. On the other, it overemphasizes the mastery and understanding of classical literature and the use of great books as the only venue that enables on the search for the "Good and True." (1994, p. 63)

This position presents politics as an exposure of inequalities. In other words, it rejects the view that if inequalities are not exposed, then those inequalities are not political, nor do they exist. If the inequalities are exposed in areas that have been seen by the mainstream as apolitical, then this exposure is seen as politicizing something that was not previously political. Like Macedo, Gates is revealing, not creating, the politics of canon formation. Therefore, he is seen as politicizing when he is actually revealing what is already political.

The perspectives of Gates and Macedo are the first coding, the black perspective (and in this case, Macedo contributes the broader perspective of people of color). The perspectives of Bloom and Bennett are the second coding, the white perspective. In response to Bloom and Bennett's putatively depoliticizing perspectives, Gates offers powerful examples of how double consciousness can be transformed from a harmful assault on one's sense of self to a form of critical thinking and agency. Gates writes,

> [T]o deny us the process of exploring and reclaiming our subjectivity before we critique it is the critical version of the grandfather clause, the double privilege of categories that happen to be preconstituted. Such a position leaves us nowhere, invisible and voiceless in the republic of Western letters. Consider the irony: precisely when we (and other Third World peoples) obtain the complex wherewithal to define our black subjectivity in the republic of Western letters, our theoretical colleagues declare that there ain't no subject, so why should we be bothered with that? (1992, p. 35-36)

This concept of a "double privilege of preconstituted position" means that both objectivity and the subject can be rejected after the positions, privileges, exclusions, and invisibilities created by those senses of objectivity and the subject have already been established and naturalized. The "double privilege" refers to mainstream society's

position of dominance and exclusion, which is then dismissed after it has become the standard, so ensconced that it is no longer noticed as the norm. Exposing this view is a kind of double consciousness that breaks down and examines the broader social dynamics and rationalizations that perpetuate invisibility and exclusion by denial and evasion. Gates explores the illuminating debate between a kind of double consciousness that speaks, through and of its own duality, to its counterpart of double privilege

Ralph Ellison, *Invisible Man*

Ralph Ellison's *Invisible Man*, originally published in 1947, is a novel about a young African American man whose sense of himself develops as an internal identity that is not recognized or accepted by other people. This young man can only be referred to as "Invisible Man" because his real name is never revealed. It is as though he has no name.

Invisible Man is a student at an elite southern college who is expelled for driving off campus with one of the founders, Mr. Norton (at Mr. Norton's request), and for the fact that Mr. Norton is made to listen to an upsetting and shocking story of incest. Curious to meet a member of the local community, Mr. Norton spontaneously asks Invisible Man to stop so they can meet and talk with Jim Trueblood, a local black farmer the see along the way. Mr. Norton is shocked when Trueblood reveals how he committed incest with his own daughter. After his expulsion, Invisible Man travels north to find work, and he is continually betrayed along the way. Everyone he meets has a prescribed role for Invisible Man, but no one can recognize or accept Invisible Man for who he is, or on his own terms.

The three codings of black perspective, white perspective, and black response can be found after Invisible Man and Mr. Norton meet Jim Trueblood. Mr. Norton is quite upset by Jim's story of incest, and as they are driving away, Invisible Man says,

> Suddenly Mr. Norton touched me on the shoulder. "I must have a little stimulant, young man. A little whiskey."
> "Yes, sir. Are you all right, sir?"
> "A little faint, but a stimulant . . ." (Ellison, 1989, p. 69)

Invisible Man takes Mr. Norton to the nearby Golden Day, a bar and brothel, so Mr. Norton can have a drink and collect himself. However, instead of having a comfortable and relaxing respite, Mr. Norton and Invisible Man meet up with a veteran who is also visiting the Golden Day. "The Vet" reveals all three codings at the same time:

> "You see," he said turning to Mr. Norton, "he has eyes and ears and a good distended African nose, but he fails to understand the simple facts of life. *Understand.* Understand? It's worse than that. He registers with his sense but short-circuits his brain. Nothing has meaning. He takes it in but he doesn't digest it. Already he is—well, bless my soul! Behold! A walking zombie! Already he's learned to repress not only his emotions but his humanity. He's invisible, a waking personification of the Negative, the most perfect achievement of your dreams, sir! The mechanical man! . . . Poor stumblers, neither of you can see the other. To you he is a mark on the scorecard of your achievement, a thing and not a man; a child or even less—a black amorphous thing. And you, for all your power, are not even a man to him, but a God, a force." (1989, pp. 94–95)

The Vet shows that Invisible Man has a black perspective of which he is not aware. The Vet also shows that Mr. Norton has a white perspective of which he is not aware. The Vet's own perspective—his critique of the first two perspectives—is double consciousness.

The black perspective, that of Invisible Man as explained by the Vet, is one of self-negation. Invisible Man is trying so hard to assimilate that he loses the distinction

between his own identity and the role he is trying to fill for his school, and for Mr. Norton. Who he is has become dependent on, and determined by, how well Invisible Man can abnegate his own sense of self so that he can be shaped by the images others project onto him.

The white perspective of Mr. Norton, also explained by the Vet, is the sense of philanthropy Mr. Norton gets from seeing Invisible Man fit the image of assimilation that is ascribed to him. Mr. Norton does not realize that the more he putatively helps Invisible Man assimilate, the more he is actually alienating Invisible Man from himself. This means that the relationship between Mr. Norton and Invisible Man becomes more mutually estranged even as they think it becomes closer.

This is why the Vet says, "Poor stumblers, neither of you can see the other." It is the Vet's double consciousness that enables him to see Invisible Man and Mr. Norton from their shared perspective while also seeing their perspectives from his own. Mr. Norton and Invisible Man are invisible to themselves and to each other. Only the Vet has the double consciousness necessary to see their assumed familiarity, which is actually alienation.

It takes a long time and a lot of anguish, but Invisible Man eventually develops his own critical double consciousness. Near the end of the book, Invisible Man says,

> It was a joke, an absurd joke. And now I looked around a corner of my mind and saw Jack and Norton and Emerson merge into one single white figure. They were very much the same, each attempting to force his picture of reality upon me and neither giving a hoot in hell for how things looked to me. I was simply a material, a natural resource to be used. I had switched from the arrogant absurdity of Norton and Emerson to that of Jack and the Brotherhood, and it all came out the same—except that now I recognized my invisibility. (1989, p. 508)

Pattern Codings

Ellison and Gates show how critical awareness of one's own invisibility can be empowering when it's used to counteract the psychological assault of that invisibility. The first pattern coding is that subjugated people are often aware and critical of their disadvantaged social position. By showing Invisible Man's futile and naive intention to assimilate, Ellison, through the Vet, challenges and rejects Mr. Norton's patronizing treatment. Gates and Macedo place the Vet's insights into a broader perspective. They show that when the dominating and patronizing positions are seen as apolitical—as they are in *Invisible Man*, for example—the awareness the Vet provides is inaccessible to Invisible Man and Mr. Norton. In this way, the contrast between awareness and unawareness of one's disadvantaged social position is captured by Ellison in a specific way, while the contrast is captured by Gates and Macedo in a broader way.

In the second pattern coding, subjugated people are dehumanized, and they struggle with their position and with the perspectives of the domineering population. Gates, Macedo, and the Vet realize their dehumanization and try to help others understand how they are in the same position. In so doing, they reveal that it is not only African Americans or people of color in general who are subjugated and dehumanized. Whites, including Mr. Norton, Allen Bloom, and William Bennett, are also shown to be dehumanized by their inability to engage people of color outside their dominating and supposedly depoliticized relations. This struggle with the domineering population, then, is not just internal and defensive, but it is also the assertion of a perspective that can help

transform mainstream society, enabling people to recognize how white privilege is maintained at the cost of dehumanizing both the privileged and the subjugated.

The third pattern coding is that the struggle with domineering perspectives, the struggle with double consciousness, is a survival tactic and form of resistance against dehumanization. Gates, Macedo, and the Vet use their double consciousness as much more than a survival tactic. In their cases, it can be seen as a powerful intervention and form of resistance. They reveal that, for double consciousness to be oppressive, the political has to be seen as apolitical, and the patronizing, dehumanizing relations between the races have to be seen as fair and assimilative. A deeper look, though, as provided by the Vet, reveals that there can be an epiphany or a gradual realization of double consciousness itself. When that happens, double consciousness can be brought into deliberate consciousness and watched and critiqued as it is functioning. In other words, the clash of perspectives can be examined and explored instead of just being endured without reflection. The Vet demonstrates such examination and exploration on a personal level, while Gates and Macedo demonstrate how double consciousness can edify a societal level of critical inquiry.

CHAPTER 22

FINDINGS SECTION SEVEN:

IRONY, BROADENING AND SHARING OF DOUBLE CONSCIOUSNESS

This final section of data analysis focuses on writers who help show how and why double consciousness can be positive and constructive when it is shared across color, language, ethnic, and cultural lines. When only one group has double consciousness—when double consciousness is *unilateral*—then the entire burden of adaptation with negation is ascribed to that group.

However, when double consciousness is shared—when it is *multilateral*—then all groups can negotiate how they are seen by each other. This multilateral double consciousness can eliminate the negation of double consciousness and replace it with dialogue that equalizes the participants by sharing the development of identities and positions through negotiation rather than through imposition. Several writers explicitly suggest what this thesis calls multilateral double consciousness: David Mura (1998), Carlos Fuentes (1992), Vernon Andrews (2003), and Langston Hughes (1967, 1969).

Vernon Andrews, "Self-Reflection and the Reflected Self: African American Double Consciousness and the Social (Psychological) Mirror"

In the personal narrative, "Self-Reflection and the Reflected Self: African American Double Consciousness and the Social (Psychological) Mirror," Vernon Andrews (2003, pp. 59–79) explores how, in current times, his own identity is negotiated, recognized, or dismissed. To provide a framework, Andrews discusses a broad range of social settings and locations, including professional athletics and popular music; academic forums; and interracial interactions in the U.S., England, and New Zealand. A theme within the situations is how blacks are forced to negotiate, interpret, and respond to how they are viewed with suspicion by white people. Andrews also discusses how he has expected suspicion from white people in certain situations, only to realize later that he had been treated with respect and fairness.

Andrews (2003) says (first coding, black perspective),

> In a mixed setting how do we continually shift and decide which group is the true social mirror? The choice of audiences to reflect is a daily situational contestation with professional African Americans who are always and constantly in cross-cultural settings and interactions. Whose norms do you choose? Who is watching? Whose imagination do you reflect? (2003, p. 73)

This question of choice between conflicting representations of oneself is unilateral because the question is situated as pertaining to people of color within mainstream American society, instead of pertaining to everyone within society in relation to each other. It is a conflict and problem that involves the whole American community, but that community views the conflict as one for people of color only. This unilateral double

consciousness is one way whiteness is the self-denying norm. Andrews (2003) explains (second coding, white perspective),

> By the hyper-critique of past actions and white behaviors in interracial environments, it might be easy for white students, professors and others to adapt a "say nothing, do nothing" approach in ambivalent interaction scenarios. (2003, p. 77)

Whites might not want to face the discomfort of speaking or acting when their own discomfort and uncertainty with white normalcy might be exposed and disrupted. After all, if they do not know how to deal with themselves as others see them, then they can do nothing but stay silent. This raises the question: What are whites uncomfortable with? Is it a discomfort because they do not have the language and perspective to consider whose norms to choose and whose imagination to engage? Or is it a discomfort because, on the one hand, they are dependent on *not* having such language and perspective, while also, on the other hand, needing to feel that they do *not* support the system of white supremacy—a system that allows this very dependency, which directs their consideration of whose norms to choose and whose imagination to engage?

Unilateral double consciousness for people of color may be the price they have to pay for white dependence on a white supremacist system that allows whites to claim to believe in equality only because they do not, or will not, see how that sense of equality is enabled by redoubling the oppression of people of color. In other words, the more whites pursue a false sense of equality through their denied dependence on white supremacy, and through the absence of their own double consciousness, the more oppressive they

become. Adaptation becomes more and more the burden of those oppressed by unequal adaptation. Andrews (2003) suggests (third coding, black response),

> [S]ay what you think in social settings with African Americans. But also think about what you say, and if called upon to self-reflect, be willing to step outside the norm of whiteness, white rules, white manners and white hegemony to be able to take the imagined position of the social/racial/cultural/gendered other. Part and parcel of the ability of African Americans to redefine interracial social spaces as appropriate venues for the enactment of blackness might be the dual ability for whites to exhibit double consciousness about multiple meanings of the social acts of non-whites. (2003, p. 77)

Andrews is suggesting that whites learn how to see themselves as others. He is suggesting that they develop their own double consciousness. He is suggesting that this white (or multilateral) double consciousness could help whites learn more about people of color. Also, by developing the ability to see oneself as the other, whites can learn more about their own social positions and personal identities by helping to open up the topic of double consciousness to interracial discussion. Then, instead of the invisibility of unilateral double consciousness being a pillar of white supremacy, the sharing and discussion of multilateral double consciousness could become a way to expose and dismantle white supremacy as a structure of thought and as a structure of society.

Carlos Fuentes, "The Mirror of the Other"

In "The Mirror of the Other," Carlos Fuentes (1992) discusses how the long history of Hispanic people throughout North America is remembered through art, even though this history and art is not appreciated as indigenous by the mainstream. This perspective raises the question of what it means for everyone, people of color and whites,

to be Americans. Is the mainstream really a melting pot or some kind of salad, where everyone can live together on their own terms? Or are these metaphors merely a form of forced assimilation that erroneously, and deceptively, claims to be equalizing? Fuentes asks (first coding, black perspective),

> So the cultural dilemma of the American of Mexican, Cuban or Puerto Rican descent is suddenly universalized: to integrate or not? To maintain a personality and add to the diversity of North American society, or to fade away into anonymity in the name of the after-all nonexistent "melting pot?" (1992, p. 3)

The choice to Fuentes is between maintaining cultural and personal integrity by contributing to diversifying the U.S., or becoming anonymous through the illusion of surrendering to the melting-pot metaphor. Fuentes is posing the problem as more than just opposing the oppression of anonymous integration. He is situating people of color as having contributing roles in helping the U.S. become more democratic through diversity. Diversifying the U.S., then, is a gift to the country as well as a demand that the country must answer. This perspective, however, contradicts the way *freedom* is defined by and for the mainstream. Fuentes explains (second coding, white perspective),

> When it achieved independence, the Mexican republic inherited these best, underpopulated territories, but lost them in 1848 to the expanding North American republic and its ideology of Manifest Destiny: the U.S.A., from sea to shining sea. (1992, p. 1)

There is no place in the mainstream for the gift and demand that people of color maintain their cultural and personal integrity by helping to diversify the U.S. on their own terms. This type of freedom prevents equality, and must hide that prevention of equality from itself so the freedom can seem legitimate to the mainstream. However, there is a

way out of this conflict between freedom and equality. Fuentes explains (third coding, response from people of color),

> [W]hen we embrace the Other, we not only meet ourselves, we embrace the marginal images that the modern world, optimistic and progressive as it has been, has shunned and has then paid a price for forgetting. (1992, p. 3)

It is through seeing other people on their own terms that we can learn about who we are. Fuentes illuminates that people are not only how they see themselves. They are also how they are seen by others. However, Fuentes reveals that the modern world, mainstream white society, has overemphasized its own view of itself and others to the point of forgetting how to see itself from the perspectives of others. Switching from such forgetting to remembering can involve white, or multilateral, double consciousness as a route toward whites learning how they may have roles and identities in the broad multicultural communities of which they are members, but of which they are not aware. In this sense, the mainstream society's principal freedom is freedom from awareness, or the freedom to be ignorant of itself and other people. This is freedom from learning how to be part of the human community. Multilateral double consciousness would help illuminate this problem so that it could be identified and discussed within and across all multicultural communities. This would make it a freedom from ignorance rather than a freedom from awareness.

David Mura, "Strangers in the Village"

David Mura's "Strangers in the Village," published in *The Graywolf Annual Five: Multicultural Literacy* (1988**)** is an essay that covers a wide range of topics to show how white Americans can, but usually don't, learn to see themselves as they are seen by people of color. Mura discusses how white parents hire black nannies, which leaves the black women's children to fend for themselves while their mothers are taking care of other people's children. He writes about how homes of Japanese Americans were sold to white Americans for very low prices when Japanese Americans were interned or imprisoned during World War II. Mura also discusses racial stereotypes in films and debates that occur between actors of color over whether or not they should play such roles. Mura discusses how Frantz Fanon helped him understand the psychological costs of oppression, and how Stanley Crouch helped him critique some writings by James Baldwin as binary and lacking the subtlety and nuance of Baldwin's other writings.

Within this wide range of topics, Mura implicitly shows that double consciousness can and should be shared by people of all cultures as a route toward self-understanding, integration, and equality. Mura writes (first coding, black perspective),

> Blacks, and other colored minorities, must generally know two cultures to survive—the culture of middle-class whites and their own minority culture. (1988, p. 137)

This insight shows that this first coding is not only a black perspective. It is shared by other people of color who are also burdened with adjusting to two cultures, even though this adjustment is not shared by whites, into whose communities the people of color must adjust. This, in other words, is unilateral integration, and a form of

inequality within the putatively equalizing strategy of integration. The goal of integration is subverted by the method of unilateral integration.

This self-subversion of unilateral integration is clarified by Mura's writing (second coding, white perspective), "Middle-class whites need only to know one culture" (1988, p. 137). He elaborates on the kinds of confusion and alienation that can result from such monoculturalism by writing,

> As I talk [with white friends about images of Asians in American society] I often sense their confusion, the limits of their understanding of the world. They become angry, defensive. "We all have experiences others can't relate to," they reply and equate issues of race with prejudice against women or Italians or rich people. Such generalizations can sometimes be used to express sympathy with victims of prejudice, but as used by many whites, it generally attempts to shut down racial anger by denying the distinct causes of that anger, thereby rendering it meaningless. Another form of this tactic is the reply, "I think of you just as a white person," or, a bit less chauvinistically, "I think of you as an individual." While, at one time in my life, I would have taken this for a compliment, my reply now is, "I don't want to be a white person. Why can't I be who I am? Why can't you think of me as a Japanese-American *and* as an individual?"

Mura raises the vital question of whether whites, who only have to know their own culture, are sympathetic or evasive when they assert, or impose, their own views of the challenges people of color face. Mura also shows how whites may be sympathetic to or evasive of his own identity as a Japanese American and an individual. Mura views the predominant white discourse as one that attempts to shut down racial anger in people of color. This white perspective reinforces unilateral integration by foisting the whole problem onto people of color and exonerating whites through the self-serving and negating language of "colorblindness." The message from whites is for people of color to

accept white perspectives and the accompanying negation so they can assimilate, presenting this as the only option.

As an alternative, Mura not only reveals his own double consciousness, but he also implies that whites can integrate equally by learning how to see themselves as whites from the perspectives of people of color. Mura writes (third coding, people of color response),

> [A] balance can only be achieved if the speaker who has dominated speaks less and listens more . . . [O]nly when whites in America begin to listen to the voices of the colored minorities and the Third World will they come to understand not just those voices but also themselves and their world. Reality is not simply knowing who we think we are, but also what others think of us. (1988, p. 152)

Part of this self-understanding and world-understanding involves white awareness of how what might seem fair to them, and fair to assert to people of color, is really a form of domination. Whites not seeing color and only seeing individuals, and whites missing the unique causes of oppression of people of color, may not seem oppressive from perspectives of good-intentioned but evasive whites. These issues of what is and what is not an oppressive perspective (for example, a perspective lacking double consciousness) can be illuminated and explored across racial lines. Such exploration can help make those racial lines less impenetrable by helping people engage with each other as equals, as individuals, and as racialized subjects in the exploration.

Langston Hughes shows his understandings of racial lines in two of his poems.

First, showing the negation he experiences from whites in “Impasse,” he writes,

> I could tell you,
> If I wanted to,
> What makes me
> What I am.
>
> But I don’t
> Really want to—
> And you don’t
> Give a damn. (1989, p. 85)

However, Hughes has a more positive message that can help whites engage him as an equal and on his own terms. In, “Down Where I Am,” Hughes writes,

> Too many years
> Beatin’ at the door—
> I done beat my
> Both fists sore.
>
> Too many years
> Tryin’ to get up there—
> Done broke my ankles down,
> Got nowhere.
>
> Too many years
> Climbin’ that hill,
> ’Bout out of breath.
> I got my fill.
>
> I’m gonna plant my feet
> On solid ground.
> If you want to see me,
> Come down. 1989, p. 50)

In response to a paper written about Langston Hughes, Calvin Hernton, a college professor (personal communication, 1990) wrote on the paper, “Why don’t whites come down? What stops them? Perhaps to come down is to get down, to be truly human, which is the greatest risk anyone can take.”

Pattern Codings

The first pattern coding is that subjugated people are often aware and critical of their disadvantaged social position. However, in these writings, the focus is on how people in the dominating and imposing positions can benefit themselves and others by developing their own double consciousness. Only then can they begin a dialogue about themselves, others, and double consciousness itself.

In the second pattern coding, subjugated people are dehumanized, and they struggle with their position and with the perspectives of the domineering population. However, in this section, the focus is redirected from the dehumanization of people with double consciousness; in fact, it becomes the people *without* double consciousness who are seen as culturally deprived—as victims of their own privileges. They cannot function outside their dominant and accommodated positions, so they are trapped in a sheltered outlook that depends on the accommodation and tolerance of those whom the sheltered oppress. With critical double consciousness, or to those with such awareness, it is the oppressors who are also oppressed by their own oppression.

The third pattern coding is that the struggle with domineering perspectives, the struggle with double consciousness, is a survival tactic and form of resistance against dehumanization. In this section, however, critical double consciousness becomes a form of liberation. When subjugated people are aware of their own double consciousness, and when they can view their oppression through the critique of their double consciousness,

then their position and perspective can expose and penetrate their own invisibility and the invisibility of others. Perhaps it is this combination of illuminating the invisibility of oneself and others that is the true liberation of double consciousness.

CHAPTER 23

CONCLUSION OF FINDINGS: UNILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL DOUBLE CONSCIOUSNESS

The seven typologies of double consciousness show that double consciousness can be harmful, but it can also be empowering when it helps people become more critical of their subjugated positions. For example, Bigger, in Wright's *Native Son,* and Bob Jones, in Himes's *If He Hollers Let Him Go,* see themselves from the perspectives of white others to the point of losing their own senses of themselves from their own perspectives. Conversely, Pemberton, in *The Hottest Water in Chicago,* and Ralph Ellison, in *Invisible Man* and *Shadow and Act*, show how they can use their combination of self-defined and imposed identities to critique and understand their inferior position. This insight turns their double consciousness from dehumanizing negation to empowering insight. In these ways, double consciousness can be either submersion in white supremacy or opposition to white supremacy.

The issue of double consciousness as submersion in white supremacy or opposition to white supremacy, so far, pertains to double consciousness as it relates only to African Americans and people of color within their own selves and within their own relationships with other people of color and with whites. In this way, double consciousness is considered in its unilateral dimension. Double consciousness is unilateral in that it is considered and experienced only as it relates to subjugated people.

However, there is a broader context for double consciousness, and that is multilateral double consciousness. In this framework, the focus changes from how subjugated people deal with self-defined and imposed positions as submersion or opposition in relation to a distant and unaccountable broader structure of white supremacy. Instead, with multilateral double consciousness, whites see themselves from their own perspectives, while also viewing themselves as whites from the perspectives of people of color. In this way, all parties have an equality of perspectives, identities, and positions. That equality can be part of equalizing and revealing negotiations between the dominating and subjugated communities, or whites and people of color.

This negotiation involves whites learning how they too are seen by and as others. It is not only people of color who are seen as others. Whites are others too, but their dominant position allows them to disregard, or be completely unaware of and unconcerned with, how they are seen by and as others. That position of dominance can be illuminated and brought under investigation with equal input by all parties when everyone involved explores their positions together, through relationships that include mutual double consciousness.

When whites learn to develop their own double consciousness, then double consciousness can be an ability and a burden that is equally shared across color (and other) lines. No longer is imposed identity a hidden struggle against, or a one-sided analysis of, dehumanization, as it is with unilateral double consciousness. Instead, multilateral double consciousness brings all participants into equal debate, because all participants have their own senses of themselves, the senses others have of them, and the senses they have of other people. It is this new relationship of equality within inequality that, for example, Gates and Macedo suggest by exposing the politics of positions and relationships that may not seem political. This new relationship is also suggested by Andrews, Mura, and Hughes as they call on whites to learn to see themselves as they are seen by and as others.

The shift from unilateral to multilateral double consciousness could have a significant effect on how equality is pursued in American classrooms and within debates about education. The negotiations between teachers and between teachers and students would become more equal. The preexisting negotiations would be revealed as less equal and less equalizing than previously realized. To help conceptualize these changes, two related areas of scholarship will be related to, and combined with, multilateral double consciousness in the concluding section of this thesis: 1) Paulo Freire's concepts of dialogue, unfinishedness and critical consciousness; and 2) Lilia Bartolomé's and Donaldo Macedo's insights into teacher education.

PART IV

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

CHAPTER 24

DISCUSSION: FROM CRITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS TO MULTILATERAL DOUBLE CONSCIOUSNESS IN TEACHER PREPARATION

A transition from unilateral double consciousness (UDC) to multilateral double consciousness (MDC) means white people, or those in dominant positions, learn to see themselves as white or dominant from the perspectives of people of color, or subjugated people. This shift would share the problems revealed in the seven typologies of double consciousness that are shown in the Findings section of this thesis. Instead of black double consciousness being unilateral, it would be part of an equal negotiation where all parties share, explore, critique, and develop their views of themselves and others. This would mean that the imposition of identities would be replaced by the awareness and practice of mutual construction of identities. Double consciousness would change from a form of oppression of some to a form of dialogue and negotiation for all. Absence of double consciousness would change from a privilege for the dominant to a form of insight and shared inquiry into social formation of identities, on equal terms and with mutual dependency between all parties.

This empowerment of MDC can occur first through dialogue. Paulo Freire (1992, 2001, 2005) and Donaldo Macedo and Lilia Bartolomé (1999) present the kind, or meaning, of dialogue to which MDC can contribute. Although not writing explicitly of double consciousness, Freire captures the meaning of the concept and condition by writing about dialogue:

> [T]he task of the humanists is to see that the oppressed become aware of the fact that as dual beings, "housing" the oppressors within themselves, they cannot be truly human.
>
> This task implies that revolutionary leaders do not go to the people in order to bring them a message of "salvation," but in order to come to know through dialogue with them both their objective situation and their awareness of that situation—the various levels of perception of themselves and of the world in which and with which they exist. One cannot expect positive results from an educational or political action program which fails to respect the particular view of the world held by the people. Such a program constitutes cultural invasion, good intentions notwithstanding. (1992, p. 84)

Dialogue can be more than equality between positions and perspectives. It can also help create that equality. Toward creating equality, dialogue includes the development of equal valuing and respecting between people of different worldviews. When these forms of equality between worldviews are shared between people of unequal racial positions, then the dialogue can transform cultural invasion of the dominant to mutual sharing and negotiation between the subjugated and the dominant.

Then, the equal dialogue can lead to equal discussion of unequal conditions, including how the oppressed are dehumanized by "housing" the oppressors within themselves. And this "housing" can include the UDC of African Americans and other minorities being forced to see themselves through the perspectives of white others, while maintaining their own self-definitions. Dialogue can lead to interracial discussion of

perspectives that develop from racial positions without those discussions becoming repetitions and reinforcements of the inequalities (e.g. the silencing of the oppressed for the impositions of the dominant). When all groups share awareness of how their own dialogue with each other can be corrupted, then the corruption can be the focus of the dialogue instead of the corruption being the framework and rule of the interaction. In these ways, dialogue and MDC can be intimately connected. This connection can become clearer when another Freirean concept is introduced and included.

Freire's concept of *critical consciousness* can help link dialogue with MDC. Freire explains critical consciousness development in three stages. First, in the state of "semi-intransitive consciousness" (Freire, 2005, p. 13), people are aware of their biological needs and issues of survival. They are not aware of the political dynamics that affect them. In this condition, people attend to effects they face without being aware of the causes. UDC on the part of people of color, and absence of dialogue about that UDC, can help limit both the oppressed and the oppressors to semi-intransitive consciousness. When double consciousness is not discussed in dialogue, and when that dialogue does not lead toward MDC, then how people see themselves and how they are seen by others—as well as all of the political relationships and dynamics of imposition and accommodation—remain out of reach and outside the realm of awareness. The dominant population can also become mired in semi-intransitive consciousness, although they may not notice its limitations. This is because the ignorance inherent in this type of consciousness can seem like equality when all of the accommodation and adaptation is relegated to people of color.

As people emerge from this first stage of consciousness, they can enter the second stage, but still not apprehend the whole complexity of their condition. In this second stage, *naive transitivity*, as people become more aware of their position as political subjects and agents, they realize that they can apprehend and act on the causes of their conditions and positions. However, Freire writes that this stage of naive transitivity is

> characterized by an over-simplification of problems; by a nostalgia for the past; by underestimation of the common man; by a strong tendency to gregariousness; by a lack of interest in investigation, accompanied by an accentuated taste for fanciful explanations; by fragility of argument; by a strongly emotional style; by the practice of polemics rather than dialogue; by magical explanations. (Freire, 2005, p. 14)

At this stage, problems are oversimplified, people are underestimated, and arguments are frail and highly emotional. The problems are not completely invisible, but they are not critically evaluated. Perhaps this is the stage at which color blindness develops and discussion of race is considered racist. Then, there is no dialogue about perspectives, or about how both oppressors and oppressed people have identities and views of each other that can be explored as routes to mutual understanding, dependency, and shared empowerment and cooperation. This level of critical consciousness does not apprehend MDC.

Finally, *critical transitivity* (Freire, 2005, p. 15), or *critical awareness* (Freire, 2005, p. 15), or *critical consciousness*, is

> [c]haracterized by depth in the interpretation of problems by the substitution of causal principles for magical explanations; by the testing of one's "findings" and by openness to revision; by the attempt to avoid distortion when perceiving problems and to avoid preconceived notions when analyzing them; by refusing to transfer responsibility; by rejecting passive positions; by soundness of argument;

> by the practice of dialogue rather than polemics; by receptivity to the new . . . (Freire, 2005, p. 14)

This process of critical consciousness includes powerful transitions. In earlier stages, people simply respond to whatever conditions are imposed on them. Then they develop simple-minded awareness of their being within political positions that they cannot identify. With such awareness, people learn that they can act on those conditions and positions, but their views and actions can be uncritical. Freire explains:

> However, the further, crucial step from naive transitivity to critical transitivity would *not* occur automatically. Achieving this step would thus require an active, dialogical education program concerned with social and political responsibility . . . (2005, p. 15)

Dialogue and critical consciousness develop together. It is through dialogue that people can pursue a deeper interpretation of problems. This relationship between dialogue and critical consciousness does not suggest what the interpretations of problems will reveal. Rather, Freire shows that a sharing of perspectives on equal terms can lead all parties toward insight into the dynamics and conditions of which they can have only partial awareness if they view the dynamics and conditions in isolation and without dialogue.

MDC can require and contribute to this process of dialogue and critical consciousness. MDC opens views of oneself and others to negotiation. No longer, as with UDC, are views imposed by whites onto people of color, who then have to try to reconcile the contradictions even as the whites can ignore or dismiss such struggles of reconciliation. Rather, with MDC, *all* parties develop their senses of themselves and others through equal negotiation of multiple perspectives. No longer is identity a private

matter. MDC situates an individual identity as a product of a political position that can be exposed, explored, and developed through dialogue and critical consciousness.

There is an interdependency, then, between identities that critically conscious people can recognize. And this interdependency can be part of the liberation and humanization of both whites and people of color. Freire explains an "unfinishedness" that helps clarify the interdependency that can be found when MDC is pursued through dialogue and critical consciousness. Freire explains,

> I like to be human because in my unfinishedness I know that I am conditioned. Yet conscious of such conditioning, I know that I can go beyond it, which is the essential difference between conditioned and determined existence . . . Far from being alien to our human condition, conscientization [critical consciousness] is natural to "unfinishedness" humanity that is aware of its unfinishedness. (2001, pp. 54–55)

Critical consciousness can help reveal how people are unknowingly conditioned. With such understanding, conditionings can be identified and surmounted. Being "unfinished" means being aware that there is always more to learn about how people are conditioned, and there is always more to do to understand how these conditionings affect the ways people think and believe. Unfinishedness can be recognized and achieved with MDC because, Freire writes,

> Ideally, educators, students, and prospective teachers should together be conversant with other forms of knowledge that are seldom part of the curriculum . . . [S]ubjects in dialogue learn and grow by confronting their differences. (2001, p. 58)

Other forms of knowledge, including equal and mutual knowledge of how people see each other can enable awareness of unfinishedness. This awareness can help open a dialogue between whites and people of color, to explore how their identities, positions,

and perspectives are dependent on each other, even if they do not seem related outside of an understanding of unfinishedness. This new understanding of unfinishedness includes perspectives of oneself and others that are mutually constitutive (as in the ways blackness and whiteness construct each other), and that are not ordinarily part of mainstream academic curriculums.

Exploring this kind of mutual construction involves appreciating how understanding and acting on people's own unfinishedness depends on their abilities to dialogue with each other to expose and explore their views together. This process can involve MDC, because confronting differences can include explorations of how whites and *all* people—not just blacks, people of color, or subjugated people—can see themselves from their own perspectives while also seeing themselves from other people's perspectives. This universal unfinishedness, apprehended through critical consciousness and dialogue, can open up these perspectives to shared inquiry. In this way, no single group is burdened with another group's impositions of identities. Rather, the imposition itself can become a topic of exploration through shared and mutually developed critical consciousness and dialogue.

This relationship of shared inquiry through MDC can contribute to the kinds of changes in education that are presented by Lilia Bartolomé in "Beyond the Methods Fetish" (Macedo and Bartolomé, 1999). This writing was originally published as a journal article in *The Harvard Educational Review* (Bartolomé, 1994). It was later expanded to become a chapter of the book *Dancing with Bigotry* (Macedo and

Bartolomé, 1999). This expanded and elaborated chapter version of "Beyond the Methods Fetish" is discussed in this thesis.

In this chapter, Bartolomé discusses how many white teachers mistakenly attribute academic difficulties of linguistic, racial, and cultural minority students to the teacher's senses of the students' learning and cultural deficits. The teachers often believe that the way to help minority students to overcome their supposed deficits is through new techniques and methods of teaching. This kind of thinking attributes the problems of minority education to the minority students themselves, and prevents attention to ways the teachers' views of the students (and the broader political relations between dominant and subjugated groups) affect teaching and learning (Macedo and Bartolomé, 1999, pp. 120–121). Instead of this deficit model of minority students and this fetish over methods, Bartolomé reveals how teachers can improve their own performance, and be better teachers for their students, by developing their awareness and their students' awareness of how they and their students are situated within an under-addressed political dynamic of assimilation that undermines the good intentions of the teachers. Bartolomé writes,

> We believe that by taking a sociohistorical view of present-day conditions and concerns that inform the lived experiences of socially perceived minority students, prospective teachers are better able to comprehend the quasi-colonial nature of minority children . . . By conducting a critical analysis of the sociocultural realities in which subordinated students find themselves at school, the implicit and explicit antagonistic relations between students and teachers (and other school representatives) take on focal importance. (Macedo and Bartolome, 1999, pp. 122–123)

How are teachers, however well meaning they might be, complicit with forms of domination, silencing, and assimilation that impede the academic performance of

minority students? This question is quite hard to answer when teachers are not aware of their complicity with these forms of domination, or when they are resistant to being exposed to them. Teachers, especially white ones, need their own multilateral double consciousness in order to help expose, explore and discuss how their own good intentions may seem helpful to the teachers, but not to their students and colleagues of color.

Bartolomé's concept of political clarity helps expose and surmount some of the ways teachers can unknowingly reproduce positions and relationships of dominance and subjugation with their students of color and linguistic minority students. Such exposure can empower teachers to overcome the limitations and oppression of their own perspectives and practices. Bartolomé explains,

> Political clarity refers to the process by which individuals achieve a deepening awareness of the sociopolitical and economic realities that shape their lives and their capacity to recreate them. In addition, it refers to the process by which individuals come to better understand possible linkages between macro-level political, economic, and social variables and subordinated groups' academic performance at the micro-level classroom. Thus, it invariably requires linkages between sociocultural structures and schooling. (Bartolomé, 1994, p. 178)

Political clarity can expand with MDC as a form of dialogue that can lead to mutual development of critical consciousness between students of color and white teachers. When white teachers learn how they are seen from the perspectives of students of color, then both students and teachers can explore how their interactions, views, and relationships may reflect broader sociocultural inequalities. This shared inquiry can reveal how schooling can be political in ways that had not previously been identified.

Linking education to the development of political clarity for both students and teachers, Bartolomé writes,

> A teacher's political clarity will not necessarily compensate for structural inequalities that students face outside the classroom; however, teachers can, to the best of their ability, help their students deal with injustices encountered inside and outside the classroom. A number of possibilities exist for preparing students to deal with the greater society's unfairness and inequality that range from engaging in explicit discussions with students about their experiences to more indirect ways (that nevertheless require a teacher who is politically clear), such as creating democratic learning environments where students become accustomed to being treated as competent and able individuals. (Macedo and Bartolomé, 1999, p. 126)

One of these possibilities can be coursework from the perspectives of MDC. Such perspectives can enable dialogue that will lead students of color and teachers toward new ways of interacting that will treat the students as competent and able to share their own views, so that the whole class can explore how the students' views of whiteness are important parts of dialogue. Also, such dialogue can expose how the exclusion of students' views of whiteness reproduces forms of inequality within classrooms that teachers and students may think are politically neutral. These are democratic learning environments that can contribute to critical consciousness that develops through new and negotiated appreciations of students' and teachers' unfinishedness.

Bartolomé helps lead teachers toward this new combination of political clarity, dialogue, critical consciousness, unfinishedness, and MDC. She writes,

> [T]eachers must confront and challenge their own social biases so as to honestly begin to perceive their students as capable learners. Furthermore, they must remain open to the fact that they will also learn from their students . . . Acknowledging and using existing student language and knowledge makes good pedagogical sense, and it also constitutes a humanizing experience for students traditionally *de*humanized and disempowered in the schools. (Macedo and Bartolomé, 1999, p. 131)

Learning together about their social biases through their shared MDC development with the students is a way white teachers can learn with their students and

create a humanizing and democratic educational experience for everyone. Teachers could learn more about how they are seen as white, and how the exclusion of this perspective had previously influenced class dynamics that may have appeared apolitical, since the perspective on their whiteness was excluded. It is through exploring perspectives on whiteness held by students of color that existing student knowledge can be used to create dialogue, reveal unfinishedness, and lead toward critical consciousness for teachers and students.

Schools of education, and all departments that produce teachers and professors, can help prepare prospective teachers by helping them to develop MDC as a form of political clarity *before* they begin teaching. For example, students could begin by reading DuBois' discussion of double consciousness in *Souls of Black Folk* for an overview of the concept. Then they could explore how Wright, through Bigger Thomas in *Native Son* and Richard in *Black Boy*, enables white readers to first identify with the black protagonists and then begin to share their outlooks.

Then, white prospective teachers could engage in a shift. Perhaps this could be part of the vast revolution in their lives suggested by Wright in *Black Boy*. The shift or revolution could occur when white readers, already identifying with the black characters in the books, encounter the white characters, including Jan and Mary in *Native Son* and the white waitresses in *Black Boy*. These encounters with whites can become encounters with "whites as others" from the black perspective, which the white reader has internalized already from reading the books. Whiteness in the books can be *otherness* to white readers. With the texts as a foundation, prospective teachers can explore how they

may be able to identify with some of the whites in the texts who do not notice how they are seen as whites by people of color.

This position can enable white readers to switch between seeing whiteness as otherness and seeing themselves as the whites who are the others. This is the beginning of white double consciousness. It is an abstract double consciousness because it is located within literary texts. However, with this conceptual appreciation for seeing self from outside self, white readers and white prospective teachers can use their abstract model of double consciousness to develop multiple perspectives of self in real life, with real people, instead of only having these new perspectives in the readings. This is when dialogue, unfinishedness, political clarity, and critical consciousness can truly join with the precepts of MDC.

This type of preparation reveals to white prospective teachers how whites are seen as whites by people of color. With such understanding, white teachers can learn to become more comfortable with being seen as white, so that they can engage their students without defensive or evasive postures. Also, the preparation can lead white prospective teachers to notice some ways their own MDC deficits can force students of color to unilaterally accommodate racial tensions with whites. With that awareness, prospective teachers can better prepare themselves to create safe and democratic venues for discussing (instead of unknowingly reproducing) these tensions. What will the teachers do after providing a safe place for their students to discuss the tensions? Is there a next step between teachers and students? These are questions, or kinds of questions, that can be developed between teacher education professors and the prospective teachers

in their university classes. Also, these types of questions can be explored by teachers, school administrators and parents in primary and secondary schools. The goal of this thesis is not to answer these questions, but to help illuminate and open the questions to shared and equal dialogue and debate.

The facets of dialogue, unfinishedness, political clarity, critical consciousness, and MDC, then, can begin to develop between professors and the prospective teachers they teach. In fact, there can be a reciprocal relationship between the teaching of MDC and dialogue, unfinishedness, political clarity, and critical consciousness. Not only do the later skills, or states of awareness, help develop MDC, but MDC can also help prospective teachers acquire the states of awareness comprised of dialogue, unfinishedness, and critical consciousness.

MDC, dialogue, unfinishedness, political clarity, and critical consciousness are internal (or psychological) states of awareness, as well as social practices. More precisely, they are all concurrent psychological states of awareness and social practices. They can only occur simultaneously. This means that the psychological realm is inseparable from the social realm. There is no distinction between personal development of MDC and dialogue with others about MDC development. The sense of self that sees itself as separate from the outside world and other people is seen, with MDC, as an illusion. Ultimately, with MDC, there is no sense of separate self, because the sense of self is comprised not of its own ideas of itself, but of the broader social environment of which it is a product. In this way, people can transition through MDC from a sense of isolated individuality to a sense of interconnectedness, where not only the racial, cultural,

and linguistic barriers, but also the individual separateness, of people is recognized as unreal. This state of awareness can lead toward compassion that develops from a sense of interdependence. The illusion is that we are merely our senses of ourselves. The actuality is that we are much more each other.

CHAPTER 25

THESIS CONCLUSION: RACE AND "COLORBLINDNESS" AS HIDDEN IDEOLOGY

Toward the actuality that we are more each other than our senses of individuality, a more concrete "big picture" can be seen and explored. This picture is of race as a hidden ideology. Exposing race as hidden ideology through multilateral double consciousness development and dialogue can help all Americans notice and critically evaluate how our identities, senses of justice, strategies, methodologies, ideals, perspectives and narratives are informed, or even determined, by the social environment.

Exposing race as hidden ideology can begin with a return to Loury's definition of race. The social categories of race, Loury explains, "are among the structures in our social environment to which meanings about the identity, capability, and worthiness of their bearers have been imputed" (2002, p. 58). Also, social categories of race are structures by which positions of inferiority or superiority are ascribed. The negation and ascription of black inferiority, this thesis has argued, can conflict with self defined identities of African American people and lead to what DuBois calls, "Double

consciousness." If this black burden is happening while whites are privileged to be free from double consciousness at the expense of unilateral black double consciousness, then that is a form of inequality and white supremacy. If that oppression is not noticed, then the lives lived within and through that oppression can be limited to the systems of thought (the hidden social structure of black burden and white privilege) that are accessible with the system of thought. That system, the hidden privileges and burdens of race, and the hidden social structure of black burden and white privilege, is a hidden ideology. It is a way we think from, but not about. It is what we use to think and study, but it is not the target of thought and study. Claude Levi-Strauss says,

> From birth and…probably even before, the things and beings in our environment establish in each one of us an array of complex references forming a system-conduct, motivations, implicit judgments, which education then confirms by means of its reflexive view of the historical development of our civilization. We literally move along with this reference system, and the cultural systems established outside it are perceptible to us only through the distortions imprinted upon them by our system. Indeed, it may even make us incapable of seeing those other systems. (1992, p. 11)

People live in social environments that impart references that form systems of conduct, motivations and implicit judgments. Other systems of thought are unclear or inaccessible because people can only see them through the distortions of their own reference systems. Race is one such reference through which we are shaped by history. Loury explains,

> "Race" is all about embodied social significance… [Bodily markings are] signs from which cues of identities are drawn, and upon which indices of belongingness are inscribed. As we encounter one another in social space, we perceive the physical markings on one another's bodies and go on to play our respective parts, enacting scripts written long before we were born… Here we enter the territory of

> *racial stigma*, of dishonorable meanings socially inscribed on arbitrary bodily markings, of "spoiled collective identities." (2002, pp. 58-9)

These scripts are often more subtle than overt or deliberate racism. They can be as aversive as superseding class over race when class and race are actually symbiotic. That position of class salience over race evades the whole problem of racial stigma while claiming to be anti-racist. The covert white supremacy of dismissing racial stigma is hidden, and made inaccessible, by the ideology itself. Donaldo Macedo et.al. say,

> [I]f the results that are presented as facts were originally determined by a particular ideology, these facts cannot themselves illuminate issues that lie outside the ideological construction of these facts to begin with. (2003, p. 72).

It is hard to look at an orientation or a reference system because it is the reference system that does the looking. Ideology is hidden because it cannot see itself, but it is the only perspective from which its host can see. When there is a population, a nation, within an ideology of unilateral black double consciousness, then all members are living in a system of deception. There is an intrinsic inequality within unilateral double consciousness that persists as who we are regardless of our positions, identities, beliefs, work or deeds. Vaclav Havel explains,

> Ideology is a specious way of relating to the world. It offers human beings the illusion of an identity, of dignity, and of morality while making it easier for them to part with them. As the repository of something suprapersonal and objective, it enables people to deceive their conscience and conceal their true position and their inglorious *modus vivendi*, both from the world and from themselves. It is very pragmatic but, at the same time, an apparently dignified way of legitimizing what is above, below, and on either side. (1991, p. 133)

The invisibility of ideology in unilateral double consciousness enables illusions of fair and equal identity, dignity and morality to develop. When unilateral black double

consciousness is not identified as a form of covert white supremacy, then people can have a shared insidious sense of their own identities, dignity and morality that remains collectively validated because no one sees or admits the deception or delusion. Then, without knowing of their positions, the inequality they do not see can seem just. It seems just because it just is. This is how covert white supremacy, as revealed by DuBoisian double consciousness, is a hidden ideology.

A question then arises of how to surmount hidden ideology. Ideology has to be exposed and explored dialogically. Karl Mannheim says,

> Once we recognize that all historical knowledge is relational knowledge, and can only be formulated with reference to the position of the observer, we are faced, once more, with the task of discriminating between what is true and what is false in such knowledge. The question then arises: which social standpoint vis-à-vis of history offers the best chance for reaching an optimum of truth? In any case, at this stage the vain hope of discovering truth in a form which is independent of an historically and socially determined set of meanings will have to be given up…Thus the ideological element in human thought, viewed at this level, is always bound up with the existing life-situation of the thinker. (1936 pp. 79-80)

This is a difficult, but not complicated, problem. It is very difficult to persuade a person to minimize a whole sense of reality when that reality is confirmed by tremendous emotional and identity investment and when that reality is confirmed by a whole historical standpoint that gives the person a secure and recognized position among other people. It is a simple, problem, though, because the solution is nothing more than a new, alternative, orientation from which the ideology can be considered and regulated from outside. The way out of a hidden ideology is through a different ideology.

There may be no need to bother wondering if people can be free from ideology. It does not matter. What matters is that people do not have to be trapped within a single

ideology. When a person can move between ideologies, no one ideology can control a person's thinking. As soon as one system becomes too domineering, another system can assert itself and demand restraint of the other system. Such mobility can reveal that any ideology is limited and limiting, thereby discouraging too much investment in any one system of thought. Mannheim says,

> It seems inherent in the historical process itself that the narrowness and the limitations which restrict one point of view tend to be corrected by clashing with the opposite points of view. The task of a study of ideology, which tries to be free from value-judgments, is to understand the narrowness of each individual point of view and the interplay between these distinctive attitudes in the total social process (1936, p.81).

When opposing views clash between different people, they can lead to each party hunkering-down within conflicting positions. If, however, opposing views can clash within the same person, the person can emerge from both views with a sense of the limitations of each view. More important, the person can notice that all positions are limited and limiting. This insight does not mean a person cannot invest and believe in anything. Rather, it just means that beliefs, or believing, should not be allowed too define us. Identity may be necessary to function with other people in life, but we do not have to be trapped by or as our identities. Instead of having only one pattern of thought to adhere to, live within and believe in with increasingly limited flexibility and increasingly limiting certainty, the interplay between the views, and between all views, can be appreciated and negotiated within oneself and with other people. Lilia Bartolome says,

> The juxtaposing of ideologies should help teachers to better understand if, when, and how their belief systems uncritically reflect those of the dominant society and thus maintain unequal and what should be unacceptable conditions that so many students experience on a daily basis. (2004 p. 98)

Multilateral double consciousness can help people identify and then juxtapose ideologies and become familiar with mobility between ideologies. Juxtaposition and mobility between ideologies is both a personal process and a social interaction. It happens within one's own thinking, but it comes from talking with people from other communities and especially across color lines.

Such exposure of race as hidden ideology through multilateral double consciousness development involves openly facing and addressing views and experiences that are extremely sensitive for most people in the US. Race became too touchy to mention because of the rise of "colorblindness" as the dominant ideology since the 1990's. "Colorblindness," along with unilateral double consciousness, became part of both a known and hidden ideology of race. Its sensitivity to race, in and of itself, is an ideological justification for "colorblindness" to avoid addressing the continuing social significance of race and ongoing racism.

As "colorblindness" was developing, since the 1980's, black incarceration has increased (Tonry, 1995); segregation and mutual suspicion continues (Kotlowitz, 1998); institutionalized racism is perpetuated (Brown, 2003); and racism is denied through "colorblindness" as it mutates internationally in the globalizing economy (Macedo & Gounari, 2006). Meanwhile, also since the 1980's, and with accusations of racism from the colorblind, African American scholars have been writing, for example, about the deepest roots of white supremacy as shown through American Literature (Morrison, 1993); the double standards of "colorblindness" (Gates, 1992); and the privileging of

white people's sensitivity to race over that of blacks (Williams, 1991). Despite the reproductions of racism and the research into exposing the hidden realms of that racism, "colorblindness" became the dominant strategy "against" racism. In fact, "colorblindness" became so politically correct that any mention of race could be considered racist just because it drew attention to the censored subject. Questioning that censorship, and identifying it as hidden ideology, was not made part of critical thinking.

One of the strongest arguments of "colorblindness" is called, "Anti-essentialism." Anti-essentialism means that each individual is so unique that he/she, or who he/she is, cannot be reduced to any common racial trait, especially since there is no biological significance or essence of race anyway. That sounds reasonable at first. However, anti-essentialism seems reasonable at first because white supremacy, as hidden ideology in the forms of hierarchical ascriptions and "colorblindness," runs through and shapes meanings and understandings of race, individuality, choice and agency. The vaunted individual uniqueness of anti-essentialism is not so pristine as one might like to insist. Americans are unique individuals within a social system of white supremacy. Blacks and whites are differently and unequally situated as unique individuals within white supremacy as an overarching structure and a hidden ideology.

When anti-essentialism goes so far from the biological into the social as to claim that there is no role of white supremacy in the unique individualities of racially differentiated people, then "colorblindness" prevents awareness of ways common racial burdens and privileges malleate the unique individualities of black and white Americans as well as all people in the U.S. and perhaps in other countries as well. This is a way

“colorblindness” is a known ideology against racism, but as a hidden ideology it maintains the unilateral burden of black double consciousness.

In other words, there is no biological essence of race and no unanimous meaning of what race means to individually defined identities. However, evaluation of race as part of U.S. white supremacy is exploration of how white supremacy essentializes race as a social hierarchy even if it the essentializing is not noticed. This thesis endeavors to evaluate and explore how unique individuality within white supremacy might be allocated or rationed according to racial designations. If this is socially essentializing race, then that is asserted to be anti-racist rather than racist.

To explain another way, it is easy to say race has no meaning because it has been a lie all along, so why keep lying? In a way, yes, it is true and right to see race as a lie, as not existing, as a known ideology contrived to create unnatural differences in meanings of humanity, social position and interpersonal dynamics. That is nothing new, though. It has always been right and true to see race as such a known ideology and as a fallacy. However, although race has always been false, it has always been, or had, an actual existence too since it was first developed during the Seventeenth Century colonization of the New World. The falsity of race never prevented it from becoming socially and psychologically real; part of the nation; and part of who Americans are. Although it is not biological, we do not have to believe in race for it to be real. We, from before birth, are already ideologically shaped by the black stigma and white pedestal of race regardless of what we decide to think and believe and regardless of how we feel deep inside.

Colorblind people, of all sorts of social groups, have insisted that it is racist to discuss race because that maintains, instead of forsaking, the existence of race, which only exists because we maintain it in our thinking, interactions and choices (personal communications, 1989- present). Consider, though, what this meaning of anti-racism does. It leads us to dismiss and censor race as a known ideology instead of looking exquisitely into how all Americans are shaped and influenced by race as a hidden ideology, no matter how false and contrived a lie it is. Then, we ignore the most visible and concrete meanings of race (as a known ideology) in order to ignore the deeper and more obscured meanings of race (as a hidden ideology), all in the name of anti-racism.[lxiii] In this way, anti-essentialism actually maintains the racism it claims to oppose.[lxiv]

Instead of seeking the depths of race as hidden ideology, the biological fallacy of race is sublimated by "colorblindness" into rejection of race as socially significant. This subterfuge is accomplished by conflating racial stereotypes with racial essences, as if believing in stereotypes is social essentializing. (For example, many African Americans may be conservative and even racist. Not all tall African Americans play basketball. Not all black youth like hip-hop.) Anti-essentialism and "colorblindness" might say that, since none of the racial stereotypes can be generalized and since there is no biological significance, there is no evidence of race as a natural or nurtured reality. Then, perseverating on all those social and biological fictions can seem to do nothing

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[lxiii] This limiting of range of inquiry may be similar to Herbert Marcuse's meaning of, "Closure of meaning," in, *One Dimensional Man*.

[lxiv] This conflation of maintenance with opposition may be similar to Marcuse's meaning of, "Unification of opposites," in, *One Dimensional Man*.

productive, but only keep them active and functioning in thought and society. This might be why “colorblindness” argues that it is racist to talk about race.

It is not the stereotypes, however, that are the possible social essences of race. Focusing only on stereotypes directs attention away from the ascriptions of white superiority and black inferiority. Those positive and negative ascriptions could be the essences of race that do exist socially and that are missed when looking at race closely is considered racist. Seeing, really seeing, racism would no longer be turned around and considered to be racism itself.

The social significance of race is dismissed on the grounds of stereotypes, but those are not sufficient grounds. There is more to the social significance of race than stereotypes. Generalizing the dismissal of stereotypes to mean that all social significance of race can be dismissed is a way the remaining social significances (including ascriptions, positions and dynamics racial superiority and inferiority) can remain a hidden ideology, hidden behind a façade of anti-racism. These remaining social significances (the hidden ascriptions, positions of racial superiority and inferiority) are very covert, subtle, nuanced, emotionally sensitive and psychologically guarded. These could be the social essences of race that derive from U.S. white supremacy and maintain an unexposed black burden of unilateral double consciousness. If so, illuminating the essences, or at least the significances, of race could help expose the broader system of white supremacy.

When social ascription of white supremacy is seen as a social essence of race, then anti-essentialism can be caught out as evading, denying and reproducing the unilateral black double consciousness that multilateral double consciousness can expose.

Then, we can see and address the contradictions of our carrying the ascriptions we also reject. Multilateral double consciousness could help introduce people to each other, to themselves and to their hidden ideologies and unexposed conditionings across color lines. Meeting the other, meeting one's self and exposing hidden ideology and conditionings can happen together when people share the burdens and gifts of seeing themselves as racial from views across the color lines. That would be a practice of critical thinking.

APPENDIX A

BLACK DOUBLE-CONSCIOUSNESS DATA

	Black Perspective	White Perspective	Black Response
9. *Shadow and Act* (Ellison, 1994)	26: "[T]he American himself has not been finally defined . . . this struggle between Americans as to what American is to be is part of that democratic process . . . the ideal American character . . . is slowly being born."	28–9: "[The] Negro . . . is also a key figure in a magic rite by which the white American seeks to resolve the dilemma arising between his democratic beliefs and certain antidemocratic practices . . . The Negro was placed outside the democratic master plan, a human 'natural' resource . . . so that white men could become more human."	28: "I propose we view the whole of American life as a drama acted out upon the body of a Negro giant."
10. *Playing in the Dark* (Morrison, 1992)	47: "American means white, and Africanist people struggle to make the term applicable to themselves with ethnicity and hyphen after hyphen after hyphen."	47: "For the settlers and for American writers generally, this Africanist other became the means of thinking about body, mind, chaos, kindness and love; provided the occasion for the exercises in the absence of restraint, the presence of restraint, the contemplation of freedom and aggression . . ."	50: "[T]he consequence was a master narrative that spoke for Africans and their descendants, or of them. The legislator's narrative could not coexist with a response from the Africanist persona."

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