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Editor's Note

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Editor's Note

Padraig O'Malley

We adapt.

Adaption is a survival mechanism, germane to the species. The longer the Covid-19 pandemic wreaks its lethal havoc across the world, decimating some societies, leaving trails of death and inconsolable loss, economic wreckage and social polarization, the more we are inclined to climb out of the silos of fear that characterized our initial responses to the devastations of the disease. We weigh the risks; as time passes, the calculus we use to weight the probability of different consequences changes. We slice and dice rates of infection and death rates for different subgroups of the population, perceived susceptibility against perceived severity, and if we appear to be in a lower-risk category, we are less prone to believe we should have to adhere to levels of lockdown and behavior restrictions that appear designed to protect more vulnerable groups. In the United States, if you are Hispanic or Black, you are at least three times more likely to become infected.¹ The differences are reflected in a Pew poll on issues of most concern to voters in the November election, with 82 percent of Blacks saying the virus was “a very important issue” compared with 63 percent of Hispanics and 49 percent of whites.²

The next ten thousand deaths do not have the same impact on us as the first, the impact at the margin continues to decrease, a variation of the law of diminishing returns, a little less careful to social distance and less likely to wash hands, a little more inclined to gather in greater numbers. In the United States in May, 6 percent of diagnosed cases were fatal, less than 3 percent are today. The deaths themselves are an abstraction, a place on a curve that needs flattening, that take place in isolation unaccompanied with the rituals we usually associate with dying, the growing enormity too overwhelming without a context for an overarching understanding; the absence of a unifying social theme; none or very limited imagery of the suffering that accompanies death, of the funerals that take place in silence, most often with restricted numbers, the absence of collective grieving.

Rather than a great equalizer, Covid-19 has reinforced and entrenched further inequalities. According to the World Bank, because of national lockdowns, up to 100 million people will fall back into extreme poverty this year (\$1.90 or less per day), half the newly destitute will be in South Asia. The economy of Sub-Saharan Africa, which has grown every year for the past twenty-five, will shrink in 2020, and the number of people facing hunger will double to 265 million.³ In the United States, a further 6 million to 8 million have fallen into poverty.⁴ “The post-pandemic world will be less globalized as supply chains are shortened or brought home, more digitized, more automated, and less equal.”⁵ Democracy itself is bending under the weight, already under assault in the growing number of countries where “illiberal” democracy has taken hold. A report from Freedom House, based on a survey of 192 countries, concludes: “The COVID-19 pandemic has fueled a crisis for democracy. . . . Since the coronavirus outbreak began, the condition of democracy and human rights has grown worse in 80 countries. Governments have responded by engaging in abuses of power, silencing their critics, and weakening or shuttering important institutions, often undermining the very systems of accountability needed to protect public health. . . . The problem is particularly acute in struggling democracies and highly repressive states—in other words, settings that already had weak safeguards against abuse of power are suffering the most.”⁶

The deaths from the coronavirus pandemic have accumulated; flattening the curve has become more arduous, especially in the democracies; worldwide deaths surpassed one million on October 1, a milestone that was reached forty weeks after the first recorded deaths; some estimates project the second million to occur by late December and a third million by late January.⁷

Six countries—the United States (21 percent), Brazil (14 percent), India (10 percent), Mexico (8 percent), Italy (4 percent), and the United Kingdom (4 percent) account for 60 percent of the deaths. With just 4 percent of the world’s population and more than 225,000 deaths, on course to reach more than 410,000 by February 2021, the United States commands an unenviable position—21 percent of all deaths—heart breaking and beyond comprehension that the world’s largest economy with such an abundance of resources, world-class medical personnel, and health facilities should fall so short. Editorializing on the situation in the United States, the prestigious *New England Journal of Medicine* writes:

With no good options to combat a novel pathogen, countries were forced to make hard choices about how to respond. Here in the United States, our leaders have failed that test. They have taken a crisis and turned it into a tragedy.

The magnitude of this failure is astonishing. According to the Johns Hopkins Center for Systems Science and Engineering, the United States leads the world in Covid-19 cases and in deaths due to the disease, far exceeding the numbers in much larger countries, such as China. The death rate in this country is more than double that of Canada, exceeds that of Japan, a country with a vulnerable and elderly population, by a factor of almost 50, and even dwarfs the rates in lower-middle-income countries, such as Vietnam, by a factor of almost 2000. Covid-19 is an overwhelming challenge, and many factors contribute to its severity. But the one we can control is how we behave. And in the United States we have consistently behaved poorly.⁸

In China, a total lockdown in Wuhan, where the virus emanated from, was enforced and testing and contact tracing were made mandatory, effectively curtailing the spread of the virus. In other cities where small spikes occur, the region is quarantined, all citizens tested. After a dozen cases were detected in Qingdao in early October, authorities moved to test all 9.5 million residents. Only in an authoritarian society—in China made easier by the pervasive state surveillance technology—is such a gargantuan approach feasible. Life there is for all intents and purposes back to normal. and while many pundits in the West talk about “new” normals in a post-pandemic world affecting every way we live and work, in China and much of Southeast Asia, the “new” normal is much like the old one. China just recorded a 4.9 percent economic growth rate for the third quarter of 2020, while OECD countries, still mostly in the throes of a Covid-19-induced recession, experienced negative growth.

In hindsight it is easy to conclude that western countries reopened much too quickly and by too much, but in democracies there are sociopolitical constraints, embedded notions of individual freedom, and limits on the role of government in society that can be stretched but not stretched to breaking points, especially where populism and polarization are already rife. South Korea, where an aggressive “trace, test, and treat” program was put immediately put in place, Japan and Taiwan, with a culture of mask wearing, and New Zealand and Australia have largely contained the virus. In the United States and parts of Europe, in contrast, mask wearing is a divisive issue.

For the most part, in the early spring when Covid-19 broke out of China and embarked on its lethal journey across the globe, leaving no country unvisited, the public across the globe were

prepared to hunker down and accept imposition of wholesale restrictions on movement and travel and the closing down of nonessential parts of the economy as the price to halt the spread of the virus. The prevailing belief was that this action would suffice to reduce the spread of the virus to manageable proportions until vaccines became available. Most lockdowns ended in early summer and in many places “normal” life was resumed. But by early fall the numbers had begun to rise again, creating a second wave more virulent in some countries than the first; rising cases of hospitalization stretched hospital facilities. The reimposition by governments of many lockdown restrictions, however, is being met with pushback from their publics, less compliant, less willing to accept them, more inclined to publicly protest new restrictions. The high social cohesion that was a hallmark of the first lockdown is becoming undone, most undone in countries where it was fragile to begin with. Mask wearing, though still widely prevalent, has become a political statement, opposed by right-wing and populist parties or groups supporting wild conspiracy theories that emerge in times of great uncertainty, on the grounds that it is an infringing of individual liberty, a hoax on the part of elites, or a government-driven plot. Even debate on the extent of the necessity of further economic lockdowns is politicized: too often the proponents of “follow the scientists” are professional-class people, the decision-maker public servants who work from home, have assured incomes, and have endured the least economic disruption, while those most eager to return to work and most affected by lockdown decisions are blue-collar workers, small business, and the self-employed who live in very different socioeconomic circumstances and bear the brunt of decisions closing sectors of the economy.

In the early fall, the Czech Republic, highly praised for the effectiveness of its initial lockdown, found itself with the highest rates of infection in Europe. Similar huge spikes in infections and hospitalizations occurred to varying degrees, frequently exceeding spring rates. Spain (a state of emergency and curfew in Madrid), France (curfews in Paris and other major metropolitan areas), Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom reimposed restrictions, many targeted to specific infection nodes and economic activities. In Ireland the government announced a second total lockdown when infections spiked to their highest ever. In October in the United States, infections surged catastrophically, beginning to average to more than 80,000 a day and adding 500,000 the last week of the month, bringing the totals to 9 million infections and 230,000 deaths. In half of the country’s counties, infection loads were increasing and hospitalizations, up 46 percent over the preceding month, were soaring in forty-one state, and hospitalizations increasing in twenty-six. The situation was out of control.

But government actions to suppress the current wave of infections and the efficacy of lockdowns that close large swaths of the economy are increasingly questioned; consensus, a characteristic of the early response, is absent now, opponents demanding evidence that the proposed measures will in fact substantially end transmission.

The World Health Organization estimates that half Europe suffers from Covid-19 “fatigue,” a collective exhaustion making it increasingly less likely that the public will follow behavioral recommendations to protect themselves and others from the virus.⁹

The “We’re all in this together” spirit has largely evaporated; so, too, the rituals of hope that bound people together during the pandemic’s early stages. Cheering for caretakers and first responders, hospital workers on the front line, has largely subsided, replaced by a sullen resignation and stoic unconcern. Maybe “this too shall pass,” but not now. For governments trying desperately to get a handle on the virus’s second wave, increasingly the task is to find levels of restrictions that the public will adhere to but not sufficiently onerous to unleash a negative backlash and noncompliance. They also have to find the balance between targeted

economic lockdowns that will curb transmission and lockdowns that might undermine the slow and fragile recovery made after the first wave, to ensure social stability in the face of the tsunami of challenges they face, offset the negative opinion of expertise with political acumen, and resort to coercive powers in the name of the common good, yet balance with civil liberties. Most have yet to fulfill promises made during the first phase of the virus to put comprehensive testing and sophisticated tracing and contact protocols in place, and few are using the time between lockdowns to address the systemic failures in their health infrastructures; too often responses are reactionary, with getting the numbers down yet not laying the groundwork for ensuring no recombinant surge when restrictions are relaxed.

In countries that scored high marks on the World Values Survey metric of interpersonal trust—including China, Australia, and most of the Nordic states—governments were able to act quickly and their citizens willingly complied with the new restrictions. “In low-trust nations,” David Brooks writes in the *Atlantic*, “like Mexico, Spain, and Brazil—there was less planning, less compliance, less collective action, and more death.” He continues: “Countries that fell somewhere in the middle—including the U.S., Germany, and Japan—had a mixed record depending on the quality of their leadership. South Korea, where more than 65 percent of people say they trust government when it comes to health care, was able to build a successful test-and-trace regime.” In the United States, however, “where only 31 percent of Republicans and 44 percent of Democrats say the government should be able to use cellphone data to track compliance with experts’ coronavirus social-contact guidelines, such a system was never really implemented.”¹⁰

US president Donald J. Trump was among the most prominent persons to test positive for Covid-19, raising the question whether he might become incapacitated and his condition warrant the invocation of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment of the Constitution, the Presidential Succession and Disability Amendment, which would allow Vice President Mike Pence to assume the duties of the presidency until such time as the president became fit again.¹¹

In their article, “The Troubled Backstory of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment,” Garrison Nelson and Brenna Rosen explore the background, at once parochial, pragmatic, and visionary, to the amendment, passed by Congress and ratified by the states after the assassination of John F. Kennedy in November 1963. The amendment provides for the presidency to be temporarily filled by the vice president should the president announce his own temporary incapacity or lose the powers of the office if the Cabinet and Congress were to determine that he is incapable of carrying out the duties of the office. The president retains the office but the powers of the office shift to the vice president as “Acting President.” The president may petition Congress to regain the powers and if Congress agrees that “no inability exists,” the powers are restored to the office of the president. Section 2 of the amendment enables the president, with congressional approval, to fill the office of vice president, should it become vacant, voiding the Presidential Succession Act of 1947, which had placed the Speaker of the House directly behind the president in the line of succession if the vice president became president as a result of the death of the sitting president. In 1963 this meant this when Lyndon B. Johnson, Kennedy’s vice president, assumed the office of president when Kennedy was murdered, John W. McCormack, the seventy-two-year-old Speaker of the House, became next in the line of succession, followed by the eighty-six-year-old Carl Hayden, president pro tempore of the Senate. The fifty-five-year-old Johnson’s would-be successors—he had a history of heart disease and would die nine years later—were two aging members of Congress. The Twenty-Fifth Amendment was initiated to rectify this situation and provide a more stable succession process. It was approved in July 1965, sent to the

states, and finally ratified by the necessary three-quarters of the states in February 1967. As a result, House minority leader Gerald R. Ford became vice president after Spiro Agnew was forced to resign in August 1973, and after Ford became president in August 1974 when Richard M. Nixon was also forced to resign, Nelson A. Rockefeller became Ford's vice president.

Other articles in this issue of the journal have their origins in presentations at the Centre for the Resolution of Intractable Conflicts conference at Oxford University, September 2019, which addressed themes arising from dual anniversaries—the 150th birthday anniversary of Mahatma Gandhi and the 140th birthday anniversary of Albert Einstein. The presentations covered a wide and disparate geographical spread—with authors from Singapore, Australia, Turkey, the United States, Syria, the United Kingdom, and Belgium, and articles covering Myanmar, Japan, Australia, and Syria,

In “Understanding Myanmar's Buddhist Extremists,” Kumar Ramakrishna examines Buddhist extremism in Myanmar through the prism of several characteristics he identifies as being closely aligned with religious extremism and explains how this extremism has fueled violence against the ethnic minority Rohingya Muslim community.

These characteristics: identity supremacism, an intense emotional and fanatical attachment to a religious belief system, relegating everything else to a secondary status and taking their wider group identity to an extreme by “intensifying its self-understanding and self-proclamation as representing or being the center”; dogmatic commitment to the notion that their religious ingroup is inherently morally superior to all out groups, including mainstream adherents of the their own religion; dogmatic commitment to believing that the outgroup as a whole is evil and poses an urgent, existential threat to the ingroup—hence the willingness to engage in structural violence, which at its extreme can lead to genocide; a strong obsession with purity and fear of contamination of “the good essence” of the ingroup through commingling with the outgroup, which includes strict adherence to core beliefs, behaviors, and badges (clothing or other markings and the banning of smoking and alcohol) and efforts to impose such commitments on the wider community of less extreme coreligionists; pronounced categorical thinking, where the genetically encoded propensity to cognitively simplify and organize the social environment into binary oppositions is dominant, and a correlative factor—low integrative capacity that disallows other perspectives; dehumanization of the Other through speech that amplifies the proclivity for violence by labeling the outgroup as “vermin, pests, insects, animals”; and a concerted drive to seek political clout and influence to reorient society to impose the preferred vision, sanctioning the use of violence as being divinely mandated on outgroups perceived as threats.

In “The Long-Term Effects of Japan's Traumatic Experience of the Second World War and Its Implications for Peace in Northeast Asia,” Eugen Koh and Tadashi Takeshima introduce us to the work of a Japanese study group they convened to examine whether Japan's inability to take unfettered responsibility for its role in the Second World War has its origins in its own traumatization, and whether the healing of its own collective traumatic wounds is a prerequisite for taking responsibility for its role in the war. Over the next five years the interdisciplinary group, using a psychological lens, will study how the impact of the collective and cultural trauma from the war has affected the Japanese psyche, especially the devastating experience of defeat.

Often overlooked in accounts of the war in the West is the devastation it wrought in the Pacific and in Northeast and Southeast Asia. Koh and Takeshima recount the grim figures: Of the approximately 75 million people who died during the Second World War, more than 20 million were civilians, a figure that gives some sense of the impact of the war. “China suffered the highest casualties with the loss of over 20 million, of whom approximately 3 million were

military personnel and 7 million civilians who died as a result warfare and another 10 million died from famine and disease during the war. Hundreds of thousands of Koreans were conscripted into the Japanese army and their loss has not been accurately accounted for, while approximately half a million Korean civilians were killed. Japan itself, had more than 2 million of its military killed (25 percent of its 8 million military personnel), and an estimate of almost a million of its civilians perished, including more than 200,000 from the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Approximately 120,000 Okinawans, a quarter of the population of the prefecture at the time, died as a result of the Battle of Okinawa, and most of the casualties were civilians.” The authors point out that saturated carpet bombing of sixty-six of Japan’s major cities by the United States, according to John Dower, destroyed “40 percent of these urban areas overall, rendering 30 percent of their population homeless.” Furthermore, Dower points out, “in Tokyo, 65 percent of all residencies were destroyed [and] in Osaka and Nagoya, the country’s second and third largest cities, the figures were 57 and 89 percent.”

Despite Japan’s having apologized for its role in instigating war in the region with all the horrific consequences that followed, there has been an aura of insufficiency about their apologies; they have always been ambiguously qualified and often come with caveats suggesting mitigating circumstances.

One focus of the study group is on whether Japanese shame at losing the war is too severe to overcome, making an unabridged apology “a cultural political and sociocultural bridge too far to cross.” They conclude that “the Japanese people, as individuals and as a collective whole, are unable to be responsible for what happened because they have not been able to face their own massive and overwhelming trauma from the war and thus have to hide the total episode from their collective memory (with varying success).” One line of analysis suggests that “the Japanese people have not been able to face their own pain of loss and grief from the war; if one is unable to experience the pain of loss, one will not be able to bear the pain of shame and humiliation, and guilt. Exposure to the painful emotions associated with loss and grief arouses deep feelings of shame and guilt; such feelings would be utterly overwhelming and traumatic and must therefore be avoided.” The proceedings of a conference on the subject with presentations from members of the group will be published in a forthcoming issue of this journal in English and Japanese.

In “Belief Rigidity as a Viable Target in the Peaceful Resolution of Enduring Conflict,” Bianca Slocombe and Colin Wastell address the phenomenon of intractable conflict, that actors in conflict situations do not always act in their rational self-interest, that contrary to an assumption often held, they are not rational actors motivated by instrumental concerns. Their article discusses ongoing research that aims “to inform potential interventions in costly sacrifice at the level of belief adherence—the capacity to decrease an actor’s perceived understanding of a rigid belief system may prevent or reduce his or her willingness to act violently in its name.” They use a theoretical framework, drawing on concepts of “intractable beliefs” (not open to moderation or change even with evidence challenging them); the “devoted actor” (identity fusion where members of a group “experience an innate sense of cohesion; a union between the person self and the social self”); sacredness/sacred values/“aura of sacredness” (“an intrinsic value that is inappropriate for the assignment of economic or material value and considered taboo to evaluate on such a scale”; “opposition to trading a value for material gain”); and the mechanistic task (being asked to give a step-by-step causal explanation of the knowledge underpinning one’s belief or adherence to a value can make one aware of the gaps in one’s knowledge; this method can moderate the rigidity with which one adheres to beliefs that underpin a willingness to make costly sacrifices).

The results from the series of studies Slocombe and Wastell carried out, using different combinations of these core variable in association with different threat levels, provide “preliminary evidence that belief rigidity might mediate action—moderation of the strength with which an individual holds a value or belief may moderate willingness to fight and die in its name.” And, perhaps counterintuitively, that “successful moderation by means of mechanistic engagement may be most likely for those who are most highly fused and most threatened.” In short, “in the peaceful resolution of conflict, ideas may be a viable target.”

“Seventeen Pieces: Displacement, Misplacement, and Conservation” is a collaborative article presenting the work of Kevork Mourad, an artist who left Syria before the Syrian civil war, with commentary by Manas Ghanem, also an artist from Syria, and Yasmin Merali, a systems thinker born in Africa who shares the experience of displacement. Ghanem’s artwork appeared in a recent issue of the journal.¹²

For the first generation of a displaced people there is a transition process—they carry recollections of the land they left or were forced to flee that are rooted in the communities from which they came. “Art, music, literature, and food allow the requisite latitude for the conservation of the things that matter, to make the transition from one *place* to a new, evolving *space*, as individuals grow into the new life they have embarked on.” This transition is reflected in Kevork Mourad’s artistic process and in the work that emerges from that process. The images and sketches, the authors write, reflect Mourad’s “imagined constructions.” While none are replicas of actual objects, “all are representations of the collective senses and experiences that for him conserve the essence of his cultural heritage and the histories of Armenia and Syria. The place of his ancestors and the place of his birth are woven into his identity, but he is not defined wholly by these.” The article conveys a sense of an internationally acclaimed artist who “makes works with his bare hands, . . . who co-creates things of beauty and power with musicians and poets, . . . who will always know the smell of the bread from his grandmother’s kitchen in Aleppo, the parent . . . the immigrant who walks the streets of Manhattan with pride.” His focus is on “the conservation of images, historical reference and cultural meaning” for displaced and stateless people who make the often-hazardous journey, sometimes through refugee camps, to a new country to begin one more arduous journey to assimilation, often, too, in the face of discrimination, prejudice, and other formidable obstacles.

In “*Damnatio memoriae: On Deleting the East from Western History*,” Koert Debeuf takes us on an intellectual journey across eight hundred years, outlining with broad strokes the history of the philosophy of ideas. He stresses the pivotal importance of Arab philosophers, especially Averroes (1126–1198), whose translations of Aristotle and commentaries upended the underpinnings of philosophy in the West. The breadth of his influence and his followers extended across centuries through the high Middle Ages. But Aristotle was not the only Greek philosopher that Arab translations introduced to European scientific thought. “With the translation into Latin of Euclid’s *Elements*, Ptolemy’s *Almagest*, and Galen’s works on medicine,” Debeuf tells us, “Europe rediscovered the sciences of mathematics, astronomy, and medicine.” Thomas Aquinas was tasked with refuting what the Catholic Church regarded as Averroes’s heretical thinking—a theory of eternity at odds with the teachings that the world was created and that the soul is immortal. During the Renaissance in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Europe experienced an Arab revival with new translations and editions of Averroes that allowed him to be seen “less as a commentator on Aristotle and more as a philosopher in his own right.” In Schedel’s *Weltchronik* (1493), one of the first printed history books, with seventy biographies of “the most famous and renowned,” thirteen are of Arab scientists, “a recognition of

their contribution in mathematics and astronomy.” A similar recognition is given to Arab philosophers in Georg Horn’s *Historiae philophicae libri septem* (1655), the first history of philosophy. But Hegel downplays the significance of Arab philosophers. In *Lectures*, he writes that “Philosophy, along with all the other arts and sciences, flourished to an extraordinary degree, in spite of its here not displaying any special characteristic features.” Nevertheless, they “developed the metaphysics of understanding and a formal logic.” Hegel adds: “Some of the famous Arabians lived as early as the eighth and ninth centuries; their progress was therefore very rapid, for the West had as yet made very little advance in culture.” Bertrand Russell’s *History of Western Philosophy* (1945), one of the most widely sold books on philosophy of the twentieth century, further minimizes the role of Arab philosophers and thinkers in the evolution of the West’s civilization. “Mohammedan civilization,” he writes, “in its great days was admirable in arts and in many technical ways, but it showed no capacity for independent speculation in theoretical matters. Its importance, which must not be under-rated, is as a transmitter.” Russell’s view has become the prevailing view—“Arab civilization is no longer described as having been centuries ahead of European civilization in philosophy and sciences”; Arabs were not independent thinkers. Philosophy is a western European accomplishment. Debeuf compares this “process of deleting non-Europeans from the history of philosophy” with what the Romans called *damnatio memoriae*—removing all references to a person or event in the empire, as if they had never existed. One has only to read Akbar Ahmed’s sweeping exploration of Islam in Europe, *Journey into Europe*, to understand how unbalanced the scale has become when we measure Islam’s contribution to Europe, an antidote to Islamophobia, widespread in parts of Europe, and the belief in some countries that Islam has no place in Europe:

Islam first came to Europe when General Tariq ibn Ziyad, representing the Arab Umayyad dynasty in Damascus, landed in Spain in 711 and defeated the Visigoths. His victory would eventually result in one of Europe’s most celebrated civilizations—al-Andulus. There were moments in the turbulent sweep of Iberian history when different societies lived, worked, and prospered together. Muslims were then associated with art, architecture, literature, and philosophy. Their culture promoted libraries, colleges, and baths. They were also known for their acceptance of other cultures and religions. Their learning, confidence, prosperity, and power stand in stark contrast to the Muslims of Europe today.¹³

The final article in this issue explores the role of emotions in political behavior, a relatively new field of psychopolitical inquiry. Of more urgency now in an era of rampant societal polarization is the need to understand the motivating emotional factors that underpin the rise of populism. For their study of Turkish voting behavior, “Turkey’s Map of Emotions and Its Political Reflections,” Gokben Hizli Sayar and her colleagues, Huseyin Unubol, Deniz Ulke Aribogan, and Nevzat Tarhan, applied a series of psychological tools to analyze differences in several psychometric characteristics among the study’s participants who live in the regions of three voting pools, identified after election results in Turkey’s local elections held on March 31, 2019.

For the first time in nearly two decades, there was a significant break with long-entrenched voting patterns. While the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP), led by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP)—“the People’s Alliance”—(Zone 1) achieved a 51.7 percent vote overall, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the IYI Party—“the National Alliance”—(Zone 2) won 38 percent of the vote but won some of the major

cities, most importantly, both Istanbul and Ankara; the pro-Kurdish People's Democratic Party (HDP) (Zone 3) voted strategically, not aligning itself with either alliance but supporting candidates of either where it would maximize the chances of its preferred candidate's being elected. Nevertheless, the People's Alliance did surprisingly well in some strong Kurdish strongholds, notably in South East Anatolia where AKP secured 43.8 percent of the vote compared to the HDP's 31.6 percent.

The study assigned participants to one of these voting regions (zones) to ascertain how differences in the psychometrics—levels of positive and negative emotions, alexithymia (not recognizing one's own emotions and excitement), psychiatric symptoms, and affective styles (notions of personal wellbeing) —were reflected in voting behavior. Among the findings, what stands out is the extent to which zones have distinct and statistically different scores on the psychometric scales, especially between Zone 3, the pro-Kurdish voting region, and Zones 1 and 2. Among the authors' findings: significant differences in mean scores of personal wellbeing were higher in Zone 1 than in Zones 2 and 3, and higher in Zone 2 than in Zone 3; mean scores of anxiety were higher in Zone 3 than in Zones 1 and 2; mean scores of depression were higher in Zone 3 than in Zone 2 but were not statistically significantly different between Zones 1 and 2 or between Zones 1 and 3. Surprisingly, the authors report, mean scores of hostility were not found to be statistically different among the three zones, but mean scores of negative self-evaluation were statistically significantly higher in Zone 3 than in Zones 1 and 2, though they were not statistically significantly different between Zones 1 and 2. Also, with regard to difficulty in identifying feelings, mean scores were higher in Zone 3 than in Zones 1 and 2, and with regard to positive affect, mean scores were lower in Zone 3 than in Zones 1 and 2.

Notes

¹ Stephanie Soucheray, "US Blacks 3 Times More Likely Than Whites to Get COVID-19," CIDRAP News, August 14, 2020, <https://www.cidrap.umn.edu/news-perspective/2020/08/us-blacks-3-times-more-likely-whites-get-covid-19>.

² Amina Dunn, "Only 24% of Trump Supporters View the Coronavirus Outbreak as a 'Very Important' Voting Issue," Pew Research Center, Fact Tank, October 21, 2020, <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/10/21/only-24-of-trump-supporters-view-the-coronavirus-outbreak-as-a-very-important-voting-issue/>.

³ "The Pandemic Is Plunging Millions Back into Extreme Poverty," *Economist*, September 20, 2020, <https://www.economist.com/international/2020/09/26/the-pandemic-is-plunging-millions-back-into-extreme-poverty>.

⁴ "Monthly Poverty Rates in the United States during COVID-19" (working paper, Center on Poverty and Social Policy, Columbia University, October 15, 2020), available at <https://www.povertycenter.columbia.edu/news-internal/2020/covid-projecting-monthly-poverty>; "Near Real Time COVID-19 Real Income and Poverty Dashboard," Harris Public Policy, the University of Chicago, and the University of Notre Dame," accessed October 26, 2020, <http://povertymeasurement.org/covid-19-poverty-dashboard/>.

⁵ "The Peril and the Promise," *Economist*, October 8, 2020, <https://www.economist.com/special-report/2020/10/08/the-peril-and-the-promise>.

⁶ Sarah Repucci and Amy Slipowitz, "Democracy under Lockdown," Freedom House, October 2020, <https://freedomhouse.org/report/special-report/2020/democracy-under-lockdown>.

⁷ Joseph Chamie, "Covid-19 Deaths: 1 Million and Surging," *Inter Press Agency*, October 1, 2020, <http://www.ipsnews.net/2020/10/covid-19-deaths-1-million-surging/>.

⁸ "Dying in a Leadership Vacuum," *New England Journal of Medicine*, October 8, 2020, <https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMe2029812acu,mhttps://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMe2029812>.

⁹ “Pandemic Fatigue May Be Setting in Across Much of the World,” *Economist*, October 6, 2020, <https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2020/10/06/pandemic-fatigue-may-be-setting-in-across-much-of-the-world>.

¹⁰ David Brooks, “America Is Having a Moral Convulsion,” *Atlantic*, October 5, 2020, <https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/10/collapsing-levels-trust-are-devastating-america/616581/>.

¹¹ Jay Maddock, “Sick of COVID-19? Here’s Why You Might Have Pandemic Fatigue,” *The Conversation*, October 2020, <https://theconversation.com/sick-of-covid-19-heres-why-you-might-have-pandemic-fatigue-148294>.

¹² Manas Ghanem, “Stories Untold: Art from Syria,” *New England Journal of Public Policy* 31, issue 1 (2019), art. 6, <https://scholarworks.umb.edu/nejpp/vol31/iss1/6>.

¹³ Akbar Ahmed, *Journey into Europe: Islam, Immigration and Identity* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2018), 8–9.