Regional Conflict Management of Ethnic Wars: The African Union’s Effectiveness in Cameroon’s Anglophone Crisis

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REGIONAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT OF ETHNIC WARS: THE AFRICAN UNION’S EFFECTIVENESS IN CAMEROON’S ANGLOPHONE CRISIS

A dissertation presented
By
NANGA BICHERINE SALOME

Submitted To the Office of Graduate Studies,
University Of Massachusetts Boston,
In partial fulfillment of the requirement for a degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

May 2022

Conflict Resolution Program
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A dissertation presented

By

NANGA BICHERINE SALOME

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ABSTRACT

REGIONAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT OF ETHNIC WARS: THE AFRICAN UNION’S EFFECTIVENESS IN CAMEROON’S ANGLOPHONE CRISIS

May 2022

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Directed By Professor Kiki Edozie

Intrastate conflicts, many of which are caused by almost similar factors continue to wreak havoc across Africa. These crises demand decisive action by the African Union (AU), the intergovernmental organization that presides over peace and security on the continent. The AU has by its own declaration, adopted the principle of non-indifference, taking upon itself to intervene through various means mostly diplomatic, into the internal affairs of member states who have failed or struggle to ensure domestic stability. The rationale for resorting to the use of diplomacy rather than military intervention is, the security complex and implementation of AU structures differ from one conflict to the other. Thus, reason why it adopts a context-specific approach in conflict prevention, management and resolution in a given situation.
The determination to reduce conflicts that wreck the region have always been judged as being insufficient at times, ignoring the complexity of the situation on the ground. In order therefore to understand this claim, this study assesses the AU’s involvement specifically in the Anglophone Crisis in the Republic of Cameroon. The discourse shall be stimulated by the central question: How effective is the African Union’s towards managing the Anglophone Crisis in the Republic of Cameroon? In order to answer this, an extensive literature survey is employed to present the AU regional security complex in relation to its efforts towards managing the conflict.

Moreover, the study empirically reconstructs the historical development and background of the conflict, explores the conflict management journey, and subsequently assesses the areas, modalities and challenges that still render its resolution far-fetched from a point of view of AU response efforts. Based on the findings, the research presents in a final close on the AU’s strengths and weaknesses, and recommendations for improvement of its institutional ability to attain set goals.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

In the last decade, many African countries have experienced conflicts and other forms of political crisis which have been manifested through civil unrest, protests, disagreements and misunderstandings between state factions, border crisis and cracks of terrorism, just to name a few. Examples are the post-electoral violence in Ivory Coast, the Boko haram insurgency in Northern Nigeria currently overlapping to Chad, the conflict in the Central African Republic, the recent crisis in South Africa with causes linked to xenophobia, degenerating non-international armed struggle and the most recent mass protest in Mali.

Specifically thinking, Solf (2014) recounts that most of the violent conflicts in Africa today can no longer be perceived as traditional wars with the usual aim to overthrow a regime as causal factor but as emerging or new wars characterized by an entanglement of a host of actors, issues and motives like identity and secession threats. Accordingly, a prominent example is the case of the Republic of Cameroon’s ethnic conflict that has its roots in colonialism. The primary motive of its ethnic conflict according to Bapec (2016), being a feeling of marginalization of the two- English-speaking regions in the current unitary State, thus the demand for secession by the latter after the central government failed to initially consider the quest to revisit the terms of a 1961 Foumban Conference which created the federal state until its abolition in 1972. Several attempts to address the issue since 2016 failed and four years later, a grievance which began as a mere protest has now degenerated into what is called “The Cameroon Civil War“ (though not fully a civil war) The Anglophone Crisis” or “The Ambazonian War of Independence”.
According to Williams (2011), the mechanism of conflict management though vibrant, still needs to be revisited as most policies adopted towards resolving an existing grievance are often ambiguous and do not directly target the underlying root cause of the problems. He further notes that, the AU still suffers from major conflict management capability gaps, the sources of which are both technical and political, no doubt, traditional or long-standing conflicts have not yet seen their end as the Continent continues to witness mere protests become civil wars or other forms of violent conflicts with enormous casualties recorded. In this light, if Africa therefore is still struggling to find the best mechanism to manage its old wars which expectedly should be disappearing, how then will other emerging conflicts be prevented? Furthermore, considering that other countries are becoming potent and breeding grounds for future emerging conflicts, it is important to study how such conflicts can be managed. For instance, the case of Cameroon could be referred to as a new war which could have been completely avoided if continental institutions observed a timely intervention in urging the conflicting parties at war to seek lasting ways to resolve the grievance that paved the way for a protest which later degenerated into a war. Hence, a more robust intervention sought.

Faced with the concern of not infringing the sovereignty of nation states, Post World War Two (WWII) saw many changes like the creation of international, continental and regional organizations committed to the maintenance of peace and stability to provide welfare and economic stability which was perceived as an absolute necessity for world leaders and policymakers. Prominent among these changes was the willingness of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in the 1990s to recognize intrastate conflicts and humanitarian crises as threats to international peace and security and the right of the
international community to intervene to prevent and stop such crises. This idea is expressed in the 2001 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) Report on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) especially when humanity is at stake.

In Africa, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was created to address peace and security challenges in the Continent. In 2002, it was replaced by the African Union (AU) baptized with the right to intervene in order to stop war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity as well as the prohibition of unconstitutional change of legitimate order in member states.

Acting therefore under this legitimate responsibility bestowed on it, The African Union has not been absent in the Anglophone Crisis, at least in observation and respect of the right to intervene in order to stop war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity (AU, 2000, Art.4 (h)). This move shall therefore constitute the central argument of this study which is to present, analyze and evaluate the framework of the AU intervention towards managing the Crisis. This evaluation is based on the idea that, although the AU has a legitimate basis for its interventions and entrusted with the confidence and ability to manage continental conflicts, the reality on the ground indicates that implementing AU’s policies is very complex.

Ouma (2016) argues that the AU’s involvement in and dealing with conflicts certainly has had mixed results and presented substantial difficulties and unexpected challenges. The case of Cameroon adds strength to this argument as the continental security actor has been judged rather ineffective in managing intrastate conflicts. This brings to argument scholarly division about whether the AU has been effective or not in its involvement in intra-state conflicts. This will therefore bring to light the central question of the study which consist of analyzing how effective the AU has been managing intrastate conflicts (of course with focus
on the Anglophone Crisis). In order to establish this argument, this study discusses the existing literature on the African Union as a security actor and its conflict management capabilities vis-a-vis the current conflict context of Cameroon. This study particularly raises and discusses the AU’s diplomacy adopted in its response mechanism towards the crisis.

Discussing the complexities involved in its conflict management approach in line with its objectives can sometimes limit intervention schemes. This is mainly because of the separatist character of the Anglophone Crisis which puts into play the territorial integrity of a sovereign member state thereby making intervention more complex. Does the Cameroon conflict showcase therefore a security actor which stands a good chance of being an efficient continental organization in dealing with intrastate conflicts in Africa with the aid of sustainable structures and good decision-making procedures or just an organizations whose shortfalls will slow its momentum and put it to peril in the near future. This consist the final analysis of the study whose aim will be to assess the AU’s approach in managing the conflict through a thorough discussion of its strengths and weaknesses and finally to provide recommendations which would serve as a roadmap for a more robust response in conflict management in Africa.

1.0 Problem Statement

The AU established the Peace and Security Council and has been able to intervene in several conflicts. Some have been successful and others not. However, the Peace and Security complex has not been very successful in dealing with ethnic conflicts in the region. It has especially been inept in dealing with the Cameroon conflict which is one of the most longstanding conflicts in Africa. This study engages this on trying to understand why the AU
Peace and Security Council has been unable to make a systemic intervention in solving this crisis. Understanding this conflict brings to light both primary and secondary questions.

The Primary question is:

- How effective is the African Union’s Peace and Security Council towards managing the Anglophone Crisis in the Republic of Cameroon?

In order to answer this first question, the thesis analyses and evaluates the extent of the AU’s involvement in the Anglophone Crisis and the role this diplomacy will play in managing the conflict.

This central question is further divided into three secondary questions being:

- What measures have been employed by the African Union in managing the Crisis?
- Does the conflict management framework require an upgrade?
- What are the prospects of the AU conflict management response towards addressing future conflicts?

By answering these questions, this thesis provides a better understanding of both the extent to which the AU effectively manages the Cameroon crisis. Establishing this discourse will also show how the AU has been more efficient where its predecessor failed thus enriching existing literature wherein scholars sought to compare the peace and security framework of both institutions, this research also provides a more systematic analysis of the effectiveness of the AU in managing intra-state conflicts.
1.1 Study Objectives

The **underlying objective** of this study is:

To discuss the effectiveness of the AU’s response approach in managing the Anglophone Crisis in the Republic of Cameroon

**Specific objectives are:**

To examine AU’s regional security complex in Africa.

To discuss the Anglophone crisis profile with a focus on its background and present dynamics.

To assess the approach of the AU and to present a roadmap for a robust AU response in the Anglophone Crisis.

1.2 Significance/Justification Of The Study

This study will aid the African Union’s Peace and Security Council (PSC) and African governments (specifically Cameroon) in revisiting and fastening their conflict management mechanisms in order to understand the shortcomings which continue to slow down the attainment of sustainable peace.

Considering that many African countries could rapidly become breeding grounds for future conflicts, this research will assist Africa’s Conflict and Early Warning Systems to re-examine its conflict-predicting mechanisms for a more apt and preventive approach so that conflict is reduced to a minimal and even avoided. As with the case study. It will also highlight on the other hand, African countries’ unwillingness to heed to such Early Warning Systems when they do exist.
The findings of this research will demonstrate that the Cameroonian government could witness a more severe and lasting conflict or even future relapses if the government lags in initiating sustainable peace initiatives which will lead to a final cease-fire thereby compelling conflicting parties to shun violence and return to peace.

This piece will contribute to the already bourgeoning literature on Conflict management in the Continent and add to the few publications on the novel crisis in Cameroon, especially as future research will still be carried out.

1.3 Research And Design Methodology

This study adopts a single case study approach by analyzing and assessing the internal and external factors which support the effectiveness of this framework. This study shall be based on a qualitative research method using primarily secondary sources in which data collection shall mainly be obtained from secondary sources such as information from existing data and reporting. Prior to undertaking this work and to better formulate questions, an extensive literature review will be used to assist in identifying key issues to explore. For instance, the USAID Conflict Assessment Framework which provides a guide to understanding institutional performance as drivers or mitigators of Conflicts or their ability to respond to conflicts in non-violent ways. Extensive reports on the subject matter carried out by the African Union, the United Nations, The International Crisis Group and other Civil Society organizations shall also be useful in fulfilling the objectives of this work this paves the way for a rigorous basis for collecting and analyzing data in an objective manner. Linking back to existing data or literature enables us to develop a suitable theoretical framework to better explain the patterns which would have been noticed for the project. In order to do a
smooth qualitative data analysis, thematic and content analysis will be applied to the case studies.

1.4 Chapter Outline

This thesis consists of five substantive chapters.

CHAPTER 1 introduced the research theme, background, objectives and significance of the study. It also explained the research problem and provided an overview of the research design or methodology used.

CHAPTER 2 focuses on the literature overview which discusses the genesis of the African Union and its mandate as a security actor, theories of conflict of regional security. Following, the chapter shall also present a literature on the Peace and Security architecture of international organizations and their involvement in conflicts.

CHAPTER 3 discusses an in-depth background of Cameroon and provides insights on its peace and security architecture, analyzing the conflict proper. It establishes a pre- and post-colonial dynamics that led to present dynamics.

CHAPTER 4 examines the AU regional security complex in relation to its efforts in managing the Cameroon conflict.

CHAPTER 5 discusses the AU intervention framework in the Anglophone Crisis.

CHAPTER 6 focuses on the general discussion based on research findings.

CHAPTER 7 Conclusions
The AU Constitutive act provides it with a mandate to intervene in intrastate conflicts. This paves the way for easy interference into the state affairs to ensure peace and stability as embodied in the 2001 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) report on Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which focuses on preventing and halting mass atrocities such as genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. The act also provides its founders and supporters with confidence about its ability in managing the variety of conflicts occurring in Africa. However, the terrain appears rather difficult for the AU to carry out its tasks and implementing its policies as a result of the complexity of the situation, since the reality on the ground might render assignments difficult. In order to discuss the AU architecture in managing conflicts, claims are drawn from secondary sources which discuss the African Union as an organization charged with ensuring continental peace and security. These sources take into account the fact that the ability of the AU to achieve its objectives relies on their capability to work collectively in order to do the right things, at the right time, in the right ways and using the right means. Thus, the need for a case study which paints a picture of the AU’s capacity in managing an intrastate conflict amongst others which helps to makes an assessment on its effectiveness.

Following, are some existing empirical studies divided under two sections to support claims or assertions made in this study. The first section discusses the genesis of the African Union and presenting a conflict theory framework which analyzes its mandate as a regional security actor. The second section presents a literature on the AU’s involvement in regional conflicts.
2.1 The Genesis Of The African Union And Its Mandate As A Regional Security Actor

The inception of the AU was backed by interests and incentives especially given the failures of its predecessor. According to Adejo (2001), the birth of the AU “closed the shop” on the OAU, a move which “generated much excitement among African analysts, albeit with some cautious predispositions regarding the future of the new Union”. There have been different explanations in relation to the motivations behind the establishment of this institution. Oji (2004) argues that the ideas or real intentions of some African leaders to reform the OAU (which eventually culminated by replacing it with the AU) were to suit their new foreign policy interests and to adapt to the new geopolitics. This claim can be backed by the fact that, some objectives of the AU paved the way for geopolitical interests. For instance, the need the foster regional integration, ensure easy movements of persons and services discussed in the need to build a free trade area accommodates national geopolitical and geostrategic needs and benefits.

The creation of the AU paved the way for the birth of Regional Economic Communities (RECs) which for Adejo (2001), was created to better coordinate sectorial policies as “African states were structurally disarticulated, each linked to the metropolitan economy but not necessarily to one another”. The RECS for instance, are key actors working in collaboration with the AU, in ensuring peace and stability in their regions. RECs have also seen the emergence of regional hegemons also referred to as pivotal state due to their strategic location and resource endowment which give them a potential status in the regional and international system. After its creation, doubts arose as many could not believe that the OAU could marshal sufficient political will and determination of Africa and its people.
(Adejo, 2001; Franke, 2006) in reaction to this, present in fact another perspective by considering the process of the transformation of the OAU to the AU as the subsequent phase in the evolution of the Pan-Africanism movement.

In other words, the move to create the AU was based on the fact that the OAU was unable to cope with the new social, economic and political challenges after the end of the Cold War particularly the spread of intra-state conflicts in the continent. Accordingly, African states in general and not only the influential ones sought to activate the role of the OAU by updating its institutions. Cilliers and Sturman (2006) argue that the failure of the OAU convinced African leaders to forge closer unity in Africa in order to meet new social, economic and political challenges. In fact, they considered that the normative framework that made the creation of the AU possible can be traced back to the Pan-African ideals. These ideals, which previously motivated the formation of the OAU in 1963, were also behind the creation of the AU.

Following, Badmus, (2015), discusses the reasons for the transformation of the unwieldy OAU into an ambitious security regime, the AU. Furthermore, an understanding of African Union conflict management methods as evaluated by Badmus is important for this study, as it will aid in appreciating AU’s effectiveness in its conflict management framework. The main objective of this literature is the AU’s peacekeeping role in African conflicts. It analyzes its operations thereby providing a platform to better understand how to build on and improve the outcomes of AU peace operations in the future. Understanding the African Union security complex is important for this study because it gives way to establish the nexus between the AU as a security actor and its role in emerging intrastate armed conflicts.
Following, the commissioning of the Africa Union and its mandate of promoting Peace, Security and Stability is influenced by Africa’s need to realize African Solution to African problems. However, some scholars do not align with this, arguing that Africans could be the cause of their problems but they are controlled by non-Africans who might have swayed them into troubled waters. Hence, the mantra of African Solutions to African Problems is not sufficient, especially with recurrent conflicts. They posit it should be African problems to efficient solutions. Other scholars contend this instead noting that, the AU has enormous potential to exercises its mandate and record its successes. Other opinions further hold that the AU’s exercises limited functions because it is an organization controlled through sovereign states with a responsibility of protecting and respecting sovereignty of member-states. Consequently, the AU experiences political, bureaucratic, civilian, military and infrastructural deficits which considerably restrict its efficiency, in turn creating a gap between AU’s security mandate and its achievements in conflict management. This argument adds more flesh to this study which discusses the effectiveness of the African Union of realizing its mandates in an intrastate conflict.

2.2 AU’s Involvement In Regional Conflicts.

Bellamy (2011) notes that the AU Constitutive Act is important and constitutes the source which grants legitimacy for AU intervention in regional conflicts. This basis established “the right of the Union to intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, inscribed in the in the 2001 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) report on Responsibility to Protect (R2P). This also gives the AU a push force to be involved in conflict.
The AU has invested in setting up a security architecture or regional complex to attain its objectives. As a mechanism, the Peace and Security Council (PSC) was created as the central body that coordinates the actions of the APSA’s various components which include a Panel of the Wise (composed of five highly respected African personalities tasked to provide advice and support), a Continental Early Warning System (coordinate information received from Early Warning Systems of the Regional Economic Communities), African Standby Force (consist of five Regional Standby Brigades to rapidly deploy peacekeeping in response to a given region) and African Special Fund (meant to provide the necessary financial resources for related security activities and peace support missions). APSA for instance, is built around structures, objectives, principles and values, as well as decision-making processes relating to the prevention, management and resolution of crises and conflicts, post-conflict reconstruction and development in the continent. In the case of Cameroon, the African Union intervened through two diplomatic missions sent on the ground to discuss the ongoing conflict in order to work towards policies which will restore peace and stability. Thus, the argument that peace missions generally focus on the problem-solving theory. In order to measure effectiveness of its intervention in the Cameroon conflict, it is important to understand the concept of Effectiveness.

Solf (2014) notes that, measuring or evaluating the role of the African Union further brings to light the problem-solving theory which discusses better ways for managing and resolving conflicts thus, the ability to perceive the problem, the perceptibility of the problem, the willingness to solve the problem, the awareness of existence of the problem or strategies of problem solving. It is also important to mention that, the effectiveness of international and
regional organizations can be explained and evaluated depending on their field of competence and tasks.

According to Gutner and Thompson, (2010) focusing on the purpose of the mission and the extent to which this was fulfilled is the most common definition of effectiveness in the peace operations literature. Additionally, they argue that organizational effectiveness is the process which should lead to organizational aims, through examining the organization’s underlying capability.

To begin with, the Anglophone crisis clearly aligns with the New Wars Theory which is a form of warfare characterized by identity conflicts rather than ideological motives with attempts to achieve political, rather than physical, control of the population through fear and terror. Should this study refer only to this theory to explain the Crisis, all facts might not be raised. Hence, the reason for the Structural Conflict theory rather. The structural conflict theory posits that conflict can erupt or be contained by either overthrowing an exploitative system through violence or instituting structural defects with policy reforms.

Originally coined by Johan Galtung (1969), to mean any constraint on human potential caused by economic and political structures. "Structural Violence", embedded in systemic trends of a regime is observed when a group of people feel disadvantaged by political, economic, social and legal schemes enacted by the ruling class. It also provides a plausible explanation for a large agglomeration of social, economic and political vectors that influence groups that eventually collide in conflict. This theoretical framework explains the causes of the Anglophone Crisis wherein the North West and South West Regions of Cameroon complain of being a victim of structural violence because of the violation of their scope of justice. Again, they suffer deep-rooted inequities such as unequal access to
resources, political power, legal standing, health and education which are all forms of structural violence. As the day-to-day life of an individual deteriorates, so does the conflict aggravate as grievances continue to heighten. Hence, sustaining the structural theory argument that the individual identifies so strongly with the group, that his personality is sublimated to fulfill the desires of the collective.

Following, organizational effectiveness and how it is measured consists an important point of this study. The African Union has legitimacy in intervening in the Anglophone Crisis granted by the AU Constitutive Act. It also provides its founders and supporters with confidence about its ability in managing the variety of conflicts occurring in Africa. The AU has made several continental interventions to restore continental peace tagged effective. However, there are several points to consider when discussing the drawbacks of the African Union in conflict management. Pessimists have often described the AU as the OAU without the O and Adejo (2001), would rather an old wine in a new bottle. According to Akonor (2007), “the AU cannot empower and develop Africa, nor guarantee Africa’s collective security or provide a common platform for Africa’s collective diplomacy, if the AU remains the way it is today”.

Moreover, Adejo (2001) argued that although the AU adopted new norms, principles and aims to achieve peace and security in Africa, its role will be very weak due to the lack of political will of its member states. Other scholars have a promising tone when it comes to rating the institution. According to Williams (2011), In order to curb some problems which will reduce this animosity towards the AU, “the AU’s conflict management portfolio requires both political commitment and technical reform across a range of issue areas. Technical reforms are urgently needed to strengthen the AU Commission, especially its
Peace Support Operations Division and the Peace and Security Council’s secretariat; to enhance the AU’s capacity to undertake effective early warning and response, mediation initiatives, as well as targeted sanctions; and to ensure the African Standby Force becomes genuinely operational.” Meanwhile there have been optimist views on the performance of the AU deemed effective thanks to the role of the PSC especially because it brought relative peace in Liberia, Burundi and Sudan.

Four years of into its existence according to Solf (2014), a shift in perspectives occurred within the academic research and literature and the AU’s issues were discussed in terms of its actual roles and capacity to achieve real peace and security in Africa, rather than comparing it to its predecessor. Following this new approach, some scholars considered the AU to be an effective organization in managing intra-state conflict. In fact, they focused basically on whether the AU’s interventions had a positive effect or not, without considering factors that influenced its effectiveness.

2.3 Conflict Management Framework and Case Study

Considering that managing, preventing and reducing violent conflict has become a key priority for African governments and peoples. Grene (2006) examines the sources and dynamics of violent conflict and insecurity in contemporary Sub-Saharan Africa, and critically analyses recent policies and programs to help to prevent, manage and reduce such conflicts. Tiyambe,et.al., (2008) also presents a comprehensive collection of essays which unveils not only the root causes of African conflicts, but also the physical and psychological, socio-political and economic damages that these conflicts have inflicted upon Africa, its people and environment. Furthermore, Chapters 3 and 5 present the issue of identity as potential source of conflict in Africa. It is worth noting that, the Anglophone Crisis presents
characteristics of identity conflicts manifested through a liberation war. The author elaborates on the theory of moral exclusion and its psychological impact on a faction of the state. Opotow (1990) also discusses Moral Exclusion and its psychological dimension which can lead to intergroup attitude change hence, inciting conflicts. Thus, the Self/Other dynamic where the Other is excluded from sharing state power and resources. This is the grievance of the North West and South West Regions of Cameroon who believe they are being sidelined from partaking in the sharing of the national cake. AU intervention has therefore taken into account the problem of identity as it seeks to restore peace in Cameroon.

Grene (2006) argues that even though conflict management and prevention remain a key priority in the Continent, successes of the AU remain limited and sustainable lessons are yet to be learned. Other Scholarly arguments hold that the African Union has recorded more successes than its predecessor especially in the managing conflicts. Some opinions note that, although peace and societal normalcy are not completely restore, at least there is some degree of institutional success in managing conflict.

Knowing fully well that the African Union cannot totally achieve conflict resolution, at least it uses conflict management methods such as; negotiation, bargaining, mediation, problem-solving workshops, economic incentives among many others which have been successful. In Cameroon for instance, the African Union fully endorsed mediation services of the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA), noted for being very active in mediation and peace promotion, and has in recent years accompanied more than 20 countries in over 30 peace processes. Its appeal as a mediator is born from the political culture of consensus-building and a long tradition of neutrality. Swiss facilitation and mediation activities are often subsumed under the term “Good Offices”, which includes providing space
for negotiations (e.g. Syria peace talks), negotiation support (e.g. Myanmar), mediation support (e.g. Colombia) and mediation (e.g. Sudan/Nuba Mountains in 2002 and Armenia-Turkey in 2008–2009). Various Swiss and academic institutions, including the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, Swiss peace and the Center for Security Studies at the ETH Zurich are also involved in process support, training and research related to mediation.

Presenting the case study, According to Anglophone Archbishops (2016), a newsletter published by the Bamenda Provincial Episcopal Conference (BAPEC), several reasons account for the disparity in the country and why most anglophones feel insignificant which will continue to cause more conflicts if not properly addressed. For instance, they note that National Entrance Examinations into Schools that develop the human resources of Cameroon are set by the French Subsystem of Education. This makes it difficult for Anglophones and Francophones to compete on an equal playing field. The Examination Board members are all Francophones, which places some bias against Anglophone candidates. On another perspective, Tembon (2008) discusses the causes of the Anglophone crisis and describes the plight of these two English speaking regions in their struggle for independence from the current government of Cameroon. He presents a detailed history of the Republic of Cameroon and recounts the root causes, various articulations or significant events of the Anglophone Crisis. It also examines the various peace processes so far and attempts a suggestion for a more sustainable peace initiative.

The author also goes further to discuss reasons for the crisis, noting the failure to promote the rule of law and democracy which creates an environment for conflict, often exacerbated by marginalization, discrimination, inequality and inequity. This argument is very applicable and has been a reason for conflict recurrence in Africa. In a situation where
rule of law is in peril, the bitterness of citizens rouses to violence. Grievances are also usually entrenched in lack of basic services and public infrastructure, corruption, lack of personal and economic security and lack of transparency and accountability of government to its citizens. Thus, the greatest problem of African countries is their failure to protect the economic, political, social and cultural concerns of their people.
CHAPTER THREE

THE ANGLOPHONE CRISIS IN THE REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON

3.1 Introduction

According to Francis (2016), The history of British and French colonization in Cameroon created a longstanding problem known as the Anglophone Problem mainly affecting the North West and South West Regions. As a result of this problem, tensions have exploded in the country since 2016, resulting in government crackdowns and threats of secession. Aside the shortcomings of the trends that follow the postcolonial period, Cameroon presents a rather complex security profile which is discussed in subsequent paragraphs.

3.2 Country Profile

The Republic of Cameroon, also known as Africa in miniature, is a low middle income country found in the central part of Sub-Saharan Africa. It is bordered by Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Central African Republic, Chad, the Republic of Congo, Nigeria, and the Atlantic Ocean. Because of its geographical and cultural diversity and is regarded to be of utmost importance to the security of the region.

Figure 1: THE REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON

Source WorldAtlas.com
As discussed by Francis (2016), the territory was discovered around 1472 by Portuguese colonialists who were already settled in Malabo in Equatorial Guinea. However, because of the infestation of mosquitoes at the time, these Portuguese colonialists could not settle in the region, leaving the territory free of any European influence. It was later occupied by the Germans whom after their World War I defeat, were forced out of Cameroon leaving the territory to be later partitioned between Britain and France, victors of the War.

Following a failed attempt by both countries to integrate the territory into their existing colonies, the country was placed under a League of Nations Trusteeship mandate in 1922. This League of Nations mandate gave France control over 80 per cent of Cameroon’s territory and its people, and Britain was mandated to govern the rest. French Cameroon later gained its independence from France on January 1, 1960 and became the republic of Cameroon. However, British Cameroon gained its independence later and united with the former French Cameroon in 1961 to form the Federal Republic of Cameroon. This unified territory was later renamed to the United Republic of Cameroon on May 20, 1972 and finally to the Republic of Cameroon in 1984. Following its independence in January 1960, Cameroon experienced a plebiscite in 1972 during which the French and British Cameroons came together to form a unitary republic, thus replacing the federal republic which was in place at the time.

This new unitary government later became a republic, giving rise to a strong central government. Because of its French and English colonial history, this country is also considered a bilingual country with its population speaking both English and French. However, these two languages only account for 1 per cent of the total population, with the
other 99 per cent speaking over 250 ethnic languages. Cameroon has also witnessed a relatively stable political climate from its independence and through several years, with the exception of the 2008 riots which saw people protesting against the high standards of living.

However, in 2016, the country witnessed a crackdown caused by grievances and later protest from the English-speaking minority from its two Anglophone-inclined regions called the North West and South West. The manifestation of this crackdown led to what is being referred today as the Anglophone war of independence born from the Anglophone problem. In order to better understand this study, it will be of paramount importance to understand the Anglophone problem.

3.3 The Anglophone Problem

Francis (2016) also notes that, ante-colonization Cameroon was a mosaic of people speaking many languages but as a result of colonialism, the country adopted French and English as official languages. As a result of this, the political agenda of the country has become increasingly dominated by what is known as the ‘anglophone problem’, which poses a major challenge to the efforts of the post-colonial state to forge national unity and integration, and has led to the reintroduction of forceful arguments and actions in favour of ‘federalism’ or even ‘secession’. It is believed that colonialism played a crucial role in the birth of the problem.

According to Konings (1997), The root of this problem may be traced back to when the political elites of two territories with different colonial legacies – one French and the other British – agreed on the formation of a federal state.” Contrary to expectations, this did not provide for the equal partnership of both parties, let alone for the preservation of the cultural
heritage and identity of each, but turned out to be merely a transitory phase to the total integration of the anglophone region into a strongly centralized, unitary state. Gradually, this created an anglophone consciousness: the feeling of being ‘marginalized’, ‘exploited’, and ‘assimilated’ by the francophone-dominated state, and even by the francophone population as a whole.

Relations between the two Anglophone regions of Cameroon and the country’s dominant Francophone elite have long been fraught. Many English-speaking Cameroonians complain of structural violence, relative deprivation and moral exclusion from the sharing of the national cake which is mostly benefited by the French regions. The trigger for the current crisis was the appointment of French educated judges to courts in the English-speaking regions. This escalated tensions between armed separatist groups and the security forces, with both sides being accused of committing human rights abuses. Also, the Anglophones of Cameroon, continue to complain about their resources being milked by French Cameroon thereby leading them to exercise civil disobedience through strikes and riots.

Figure 2: THE ANGLOPHONE REGIONS OF CAMEROON
3.4 Present Dynamics

For over 4 years, Cameroon has experienced an emerging armed conflict caused by (a) a shrinking political space, where freedom of expression and political freedom are more of a privilege than a right, (b) the distortion of political inclusion due to a growing distrust of electoral processes and, recently (c) the strife by the minority and marginalized 2 English-speaking regions (otherwise known as English Cameroon) for a change in the form of the state through a referendum which grants them independence from the 8 French-speaking regions (French Cameroon).

Currently caught up in a boycott of voting, a shutdown of schools, and a massive recruitment of minors and youths into rebel groups young English Cameroonians (through rebel and separatist groups) have resorted to violence as the only way to resolve the conflict believing by so doing, the government will give-in to their wish for secession. On the other side, the government has declared war on the rebel groups and secessionist fighters. The rule of law is falling apart, the norms of democracy are drowning, death tolls and the number of Internally Displaced Persons are on the rise. In a hostile and unsafe political environment incited by both government and Anglophone rebel groups, there is an urgent need of an antidote to (1) combat changing mindsets for youths to be patriotic, participatory and responsible citizens, (2) seek possible means to resolve this crisis through a negotiable agreement or an inclusive dialogue and (3) create sustainable peacebuilding mechanisms such as reconciliation to address the root causes of this conflict in a bit to prevent a subsequent re-escalation.

The immediate cause of the conflict according to Bapec (2016), was the October 2016 protest carried out by lawyers of the North West and South West regions to decry injustices
faced by the legal bench. They demanded the translation of the Code of the Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (OHADA) and other legal texts from French to English. They criticized the “francophonization” of Common Law jurisdictions, with the appointment to the Anglophone zone of Francophone magistrates who did not understand English or the Common Law, and the appointment of notaries, to do work done by lawyers under the Common Law system. A lack of trust in the government and the brutality of the security forces aggravated the problem and radicalized the public.

Later in November of the same year, teachers followed suit and also went on strike to decry the appointment of teachers who did not have a good command of English and the failure to respect the “Anglo-Saxon” character of schools and universities in the Anglophone zone. This protest particularly did not go well as the military repressively attacked the peaceful protesters. Several people were severely beaten, dozens of others were arrested and at least two people were shot dead, according to a report by the National Commission on Human Rights and Freedoms the (Commission Nationale des Droits de l’Homme et des Libertés, CNDHL).

Following, the University of Buea protest was another leading manifestation of the Anglophone problem. It is worth noting that, this university was the first purely Anglo-saxon university in Cameroon and had long existed as the only purely English University before the creation of the University of Bamenda. Students of the University of Buea staged a protest against a number of grievances. The government again did what it does best. Security forces were sent to the University for repression. Students’ rooms were vandalized, sprayed with water cannons. There were allegations of looting and rape of students by security forces. Many students were wounded and traumatized as a result of this brutality.
The Anglophone protesters had regrouped themselves into a very influential consortium made up of various trade unions including teachers, lawyers, journalist, drivers, parents teachers association. In December, school boycott proving very effective and the government running out of ideas to get teachers and kids back in school, opened up for dialogue. The government made some few reforms with a department for the common law at the school of administration and magistracy and a bench for common law at the supreme court. But completely avoided touching or discussing the root causes of the crisis. The consortium leadership stood their ground on their demand for federation as the only framework to protect the interest and rights of the Anglophone minority. The president’s end of year speech made matters worse when he declared Cameroon was one and indivisible and that the form of the state will not be discussed and will not change.

As of today, this crisis is ripe. This is because, both the Government forces and rebel groups have registered unmeasurable material and human losses for over 4 years, none of the parties is visibly giving up, instead, confrontations and propaganda persist. There is need for a neutral third-party intervention as openly wished by the conflicting parties. Both groups believe that if an impartial third party intervenes, there will be a call for a ceasefire and the need for a national dialogue to discuss root causes of the problem or even encourage a review of history and constitution of the country to address political grievances. This will also encourage schemes like disarmament, reintegration, reconciliation and pardon which are requisites in conflict resolution and peacebuilding. It is worth mentioning that, a first dialogue process held in September 2019 and has yielded no fruits. The separatists have insisted on dropping their arms only if a neutral third party leads the dialogue, since they believe the government is very partial and will never consider their demands, calling the first
Dialogue inadequate, stating that it sidelined certain actors and did not tolerate the question of secession. So, they vowed to keep fighting. The US on 31st October 2019, scraped preferential trade benefits for Cameroon for alleged gross violations of human rights in breach of s.104 African Growth and Opportunity Act yet, the conflict’s flame continue to heighten.

Bearing in mind the fact that structural violence, marginalization and relative deprivation are the root of grievances raised by English Cameroonians, many nationals have advised the government to be fair and just in managing the crisis. An outcome therefore, should be to see English Cameroonians occupy important positions in the government, be allowed to practice English Common Law in their legal jurisdictions, be taught by native English-speaking teachers and lecturers, be ruled by English-speaking administrative authorities and to have examination papers, public announcements translated to English Language. So, if the government modifies its reforms and successfully implements these policies which favor English Cameroonians, the rate of marginalization will reduce thus, bringing about a favorable environment for the return of peace. But again. This might really be achieved after a candid and impartial intervention.

Today, repressive measures used by the government to address the conflict are not enough to calm grievances which have pushed many to pick up arms and wrestle the army until an independent English Cameroon is restored which will once be called Ambazonia or Southern Cameroons as called in the colonial days. It is worth stating that the Anglophone problem in the Republic of Cameroon dates back to the independence period wherein reunification between both Cameroons was based on centralization and assimilation by French Cameroon which has led the Anglophone minority to feel politically and
economically marginalized, and that their cultural differences are ignored. It is therefore safe to say that the Anglophone problem is the resurgence of an old problem.

According to International Crisis Group (2018), The Anglophone Crisis presents a deteriorating situational report with 3000 casualties, 1.3 million people in need of some humanitarian assistance as of 30 June 2020, about 530,000 people have been internally displaced and tens of thousands have been forced to flee into Nigeria as refugees, an estimated 42,500 children have missed at least a year of school, a substantial increase in Gender Based Violence has been reported in the North-West and South-West Regions since the Crisis started.

Conclusively. Although not yet officially declared as a civil war, the Cameroon crisis depicts forms of a civil war which takes the form of a war of independence wherein a people fight to form an independent country (the case with the Ambazonians). There is much and unending pressure mounted on the central government to grant independence to the North-West and South West Regions of the country. Not applicable to our case study yet worthy of note is the second form of civil wars which is the war of succession wherein a people fight to overthrow a ruling regime generally considered oppressive by protesters.

Countries have various tools for managing intrastate conflicts. Governments can become more inclusive through free and fair elections, institute reforms to address underlying drivers of conflict, and pursue diplomacy hence, the role of the AU and its role of ensuring continental peace and security. Charged with this assignment, the mind is left to ponder on the deteriorating levels of the Cameroon Crisis. Are four years of fighting not enough for Cameroon to have felt a robust intervention? How has the regional security institution responded to the crisis.
CHAPTER FOUR
THE EMERGENCE OF THE AFRICAN UNION AND ITS REGIONAL SECURITY COMPLEX

4.1 Introduction

According to Adejo (2001) the desire to rebrand the OAU led to the launch of the African Union which marked a major event in the history of the continent. In a bid to accelerate socio-economic and political integration and development of Africa, various Heads of states and Governments in 1963, had created the Organization of African Unity (OAU) tasked to eliminate the last traces of colonialism, defend the integrity and territorial sovereignty of African states, foster cooperation which could speed up the development of several states of the continent especially those which were still recovering from the cracks of their wars of independence. In a desire to drift from reinforcing the elimination of colonialism, African minds thought it wise to rather encourage integration thereby leading to the idea of converting the OAU to the African Union. The birth of the AU is therefore a step towards enforcing security, growth and development in the Continent.

4.2 From the OAU to the AU

On May 25 1963, African Heads of states and governments met in Addis Ababa to sign the Charter of the OAU. This marked a milestone in the complete decolonization process and heightened the spirit of pan-Africanism in the Continent. This also accentuated the feeling of belonging to the continent hence erasing all thoughts or memories of colonial oppression and economic subjugation. Hence, the OAU was founded under principles of ensuring African unity and solidarity, protecting their sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence; coordinating and intensifying their cooperation and efforts to improve the
standard of living in Africa; and to promote international cooperation in terms of the principles of the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as stated in Article II of its Charter.

However, these tasks were far from being achieved as the spread of intrastate wars in Africa weakened political, military and security cooperation hence fragilizing the continent which registered a remarkable shift from its goal of preventing, managing and settling conflicts between member states. Far from achieving its set goals, as discussed by Akonor (2007,) the OAU had shortcomings thus, a need for its replacement. Although there

4.3 The Emergence of the African Union.

The idea of creating the AU was conceived in Sirte in 1999 . The shortcomings of the OAU led to the creation of the African Union which was tasked towards bringing a speedy response to matters of African security. Further, the AU was to speed up the project of regional integration which would make them forge towards unity thus, reducing regional conflicts. This eventually led to the drafting of a constitutive act. This Constitutive Act later referred to as the African Union Constitutive Act (AUCA) was signed a year later in Lomé, Togo on 11th July 2000. Principles and objectives of the AU include:

The African Union has seventeen objectives enumerated under Article 30 of its Constitutive Act a few of which are: To achieve greater unity and solidarity between African countries and the peoples of Africa; Defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its member states; Accelerate the political and socio-economic integration of the continent; Promote and defend African common positions on issues of interest to the
continent and its peoples; Focusing on this study, promoting peace, security and continental stability will be an objective which will enable the development of the discussion.

In a bid to better understand the functioning of the AU and to further bring more light to the central question of this research, it is important to understand set principles by which the organization operates. A few of which are:

To maintain Sovereign equality and interdependence among member states of the Union.

To respect of borders on achievement of independence.

To ensure participation of the African peoples in the activities of the Union.

To establish of a common defense policy for the African continent.

And, more specifically most important to this study, To ensure peaceful resolution of conflicts among member states of the Union through such appropriate means as may be decided upon by the Assembly.

Amongst others, these principles were defined in the AUCA. It was stated in its preamble that member states have mandated the AU and its PSC to fulfil a substantially enlarged and much more robust role in the prevention, management and resolution of African conflicts. It is important to mention that, these principles were merged with some which already guided the functioning of the OAU. For instance, the issue of respect of borders and state sovereignty and territoriality which made up principles of both the AU and the OAU. This showed that African leaders were bent on alienating Africa from colonial memories by encouraging every country to reconstruct their identity. Guided by these principles and
objectives, the AU has been involved in ensuring stability in the continent through a regional complex which it adopts according to task and scheme.

4.4 The AU Regional Security Complex

The AU is the leading continental organization, it has a moral and institutional responsibility to contribute prominently towards ensuring peace and security amongst other objectives. Regardless of the motivations behind the establishment of the AU, this new institution has received a considerable attention from academics and researchers worldwide, since its official founding in 2002. Through a robust security complex, the African Union often resorts to measures aimed at enforcing security where peace is threatened. This has been the case with Cameroon wherein the institution uses another form of intervention as response tool to the Crisis.

There exist principles which give the AU the right to intervene in member states in respect of grave circumstances (e.g. war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity) as well as serious threats to the legitimate order, even without the local consent of a member state. AU Member States also have the right to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security. But this right to intervention without state consent changed the fundamental norm of the Westphalian treaties which condemned non-intervention of one state in the internal affairs of another state thus, ensuring the respect for the autonomy and sovereignty of states. Secessionist wars, civil wars, national violence and separatist conflicts are new forms of war which continue to create havoc in the African continent.

In order to respond to peace and security concerns, the AU’s security complex is endowed with of 17 ornate institutions, most of which are devoted towards ensuring peace
and security in Africa for instance, the Peace and Security Council, which is the main AU organ, mandated to manage and resolve conflicts. There also exist as the Panel of the Wise, which promotes high-level mediation efforts; a rapid-reaction African Standby Force (ASF), which is built around five sub-regional brigades; a Continental Early Warning System (CEWS); a Military Staff Committee (MSC); and a Peace Fund.

Considering the robust task of the AU and in a bid to reduce its weaknesses, the AU emplaced quickly the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and equipped it with an instrumental framework in the form of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). the APRM had as objective to encourage member states to practice “good and standard governance values which will ensure the success of mutually agreed objectives in socio-economic development contained in the AU Declaration” (Africa Peer Review, 2014). It also encouraged member states to practice constructive national dialogue. The idea was really to encourage through an inclusive and participatory self-assessment process, and develop policies and practices that would lead to the attainment of peace and security and political stability.

In a bid to ensure integration and mutual growth which in turn promotes peace and stability, the AU coordinate the efforts of Africa’s eight major Regional Economic Communities (RECs). the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); the Southern African Development Community (SADC); the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS); the East African Community (EAC); the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU); and the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD).
The AUPSC is instrumental in strengthening the AU security complex in its efforts to attain peace and security in Africa. As stated in the preamble of the AUCA (AU, 2000) the AU and its PSC are mandated to fulfil a substantially enlarged and much more robust role in the prevention, management and resolution of African conflicts. Accordingly, the AUPSC is considered as “a collective security and early-warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa”. The Peace and Security Council transitioned from OAU’s Central Organ of the Mechanism for Conflict prevention, management and resolution. It was however slightly restructured to aid in better response to crises and conflict situation in Africa. It was also established to be a collective security and early warning arrangement with the ability to facilitate timely and efficient responses to conflict and crisis situations.

Solf (2014) argues that, the AUPSC is responsible for performing a range of duties, starting with prevention and ranging to military intervention. It has responsibility for assessing the eventuality of crisis situations, sending fact-finding missions to conflict zones, authorizing peacekeeping operations, recommending intervention when convinced of the gravity of the situation and endorsing the modalities of intervention once the decision has been taken at the level of the General Assembly. It conducts early warning in order to facilitate timely and efficient responses to conflict and crisis situation and participates in preventive diplomacy, expedite peace-making, and establish peace support operations in which, in unavoidable situations, they recommend interventions in Member States to promote peace, security and stability.
CHAPTER FIVE

THE AU INTERVENTION FRAMEWORK IN THE ANGLOPHONE CRISIS

5.1 Introduction

Conflict recurrence in Africa provides a great test to the efficacy of diplomatic practice on the continent. The use of diplomacy rather than military intervention has been the major tool used by the African Union in addressing the Cameroon crisis. In a bid therefore to respond to the Cameroon call of distress, an AU delegation and its head, Moussa Faki Mahamat, visited Cameroonian President Paul Biya in July 2018 and discussed the need for a national dialogue to resolve the conflict. He visited again in November 2019, this time on a tripartite mission alongside the Secretaries Genera of the Commonwealth and Francophonie to which Cameroon is a member of given its English and French Culture inherited from Britain and France. The rationale for resorting to the use of diplomacy rather than military intervention is that the security complex and implementation of AU structures differ from one conflict to the other. Thus, reason why it adopts a context-specific and flexible approach in conflict prevention, management and resolution in a given situation. Siphamandla (2017) argues that the need for this policy is pursue security, development and peace simultaneously always.

The first visit on July 16, 2018 Visit, the Chairperson of the AU was on a 48-hour visit in Cameroon during which he had a long and extensive one-on-one exchange with the President of the Republic. Popular opinion had it that the exchange was about the deteriorating socio-political context of Cameroon’s Northwest and Southwest regions. According to a July 17 Cameroon press release, of the AU, President Biya spoke about his
Government's efforts to resolve the crisis and reiterated its determination to work towards a speedy return to peace and security, as well as towards the promotion of harmony among all Cameroonians. The Chairperson of the AU Commission welcomed the determination expressed by President Biya and “commended the initiatives taken in this regard, including the launching of a humanitarian emergency plan to respond to humanitarian needs on the ground.

Reaffirming the African Union's unwavering commitment to the unity and territorial integrity of Cameroon and rejection of the recourse to violence, he called for an inclusive dialogue and urged all stakeholders to privilege this path to facilitate a lasting way out of the crisis based on national leadership and ownership and that strengthens Cameroon's unity while respecting its diversity”. They also agreed on the convening of a resource mobilization conference to mobilize greater assistance commensurate with the needs of the affected populations, in support of the humanitarian emergency plan launched by the Government. Following, the mission was also characterized by brief exchanges with students, faculty and accredited members of the diplomatic corps on various aspects of the implementation of the African agenda, with particular emphasis on continental integration.

The outcome of the first visit brought hope towards ensuring national stability. This is because in a bid to implement the demands of the AU Chairperson (to convene an inclusive dialogue), in September 2019, Paul Biya convened a Major National Dialogue which regrouped many national and international stakeholders. Amongst the resolutions of this dialogue was the term of a “special status” granted to the North West and South West regions of Cameroon. Hugely disappointed, the separatist wing rejected this special status stating that it does not concur with their quest for an independent Southern Cameroons.
Also, The Southern Cameroons Liberation Council, an umbrella movement of several Ambazonian separatist groups, including the Interim Government of Ambazonia, immediately dismissed the dialogue as insincere. Consequently, the Crisis heightened after the National Dialogue, thereby proving the need for another intervention.

In November 2019, a tripartite mission comprising of the Chairperson of the AU Commission, the Secretaries General of the International Organization of la Francophonie, Louise Mushikiwabo and Patricia Scotland of the Commonwealth, visited Cameroon to encourage efforts for the implementation of the Grand National Dialogue. Given the geopolitical importance of the republic of Cameroon in Central Africa, the “peace mission” also encouraged pacification, national cohesion and all other activities undertaken by the government to rebuild national unity.

The mission also encouraged the implementation of the resolutions of the Grand National Dialogue which according to the AU declaration of the tripartite mission to Cameroon “ushered in a new dynamic and which recommended, inter alia, the acceleration of decentralization, the special status of the North West and South West regions, and the review of the education and legal systems, including the measures taken by the President Biya to defuse political tensions”.

Again, the mission urged the government to respect the terms of the Grand National Dialogue which could be a way to reach a national political consensus and a country which respects democratic values. The mission also urged for every effort to be made in order to restore security, justice and the conditions for the resumption of normal life in the regions affected by the crisis. The outcome of the second mission has been much similar to the first.
This is because the crisis still persist and has also been tagged in 2019 and 2020 as the world’s most neglected crisis by the Norwegian refugee council.

Both missions justify the AU’s resort to diplomatic missions to resolve the Cameroon crisis. For instance intervention to encourage peace and security as well as encourage developmental schemes. For instance, during the first visit, the AU welcomed Cameroon’s signing of the Agreement on the African Continental Free Trade Area and looked forward to their prompt ratification. The Chairperson also urged Cameroon to sign the Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons, the Right of Establishment and the Right of Residence and to join, the Single African Air Transport Market. Finally, he encouraged the Cameroon government to endorse the negotiation of a new cooperation agreement with the European Union, which will replace the Cotonou Partnership Agreement after its expiry in 2020. It is important to mention that these schemes are looked upon as paramount in enforcing regional integration which will in turn foster peace, stability and development in Africa.

AU intervention in Cameroon is aimed at creating conditions for permanent peace and for development. For this purpose, the AU focus was on continuous confidence-building measures to enable the affected country to sustain on its own the peace. Siphamandla (2017) notes that the AU approach takes peacebuilding as an overarching purpose of intervention and sees continuous political dialogue, confidence building, and institution building as central from beginning to the end of the peace processes. This explains AU’s use of diplomatic missions in resolving the Cameroon Conflict rather than military intervention.

Even though its interventions set a foundation to contain the deteriorating security situation, the conflict still persist as it has become even more difficult to attain a relative stability and the security stalemate between the government and separatist is far from over.
According to Gutner and Thompson, (2010) focusing on the purpose of the mission and the extent to which this was fulfilled is the most common definition of effectiveness in the peace operations literature. Additionally, they argue that organizational effectiveness is the process which should lead to organizational aims, through examining the organization’s underlying capability. This entails analyzing the process of response which theoretically encompasses problem-solving which discusses better ways for managing and resolving conflicts thus, the ability to perceive the problem, the perceptibility of the problem, the willingness to solve the problem, the awareness of existence of the problem or strategies of problem solving will make up an evaluative discussion the African Union through its mission to Cameroon. As discussed in the previous chapter, the AU uses context specific measures to achieve its peace and security agenda.

The approach of the use of diplomatic mission as intervention tool to manage the Cameroon Crisis can therefore be used as a basis of a balanced assessment of institution which is often criticized and seldom praised. The AU speaks a story of an institution of success in managing the Anglophone crisis. However, it is also burdened with a myriad of challenges which reduces the praises it receives especially considering the state of affairs of the Continent. This chapter assesses therefore the strengths of the AU approach with a more centered judgment on the weaknesses of its efforts.

5.2 Strengths and Weaknesses of AU’s approach Towards Resolving the Conflict

Diplomatic peace missions have proven effective in managing the conflict. On the other hand, the approach proves to be inefficient. This subsection discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the AU approach. This discussion focuses more on the weaknesses because in
spite of the mission twice dispatched to Cameroon, the conflict keeps worsening which entails that, the main problem has still not been solved.

5.2.1 Strengths

The AU’s approach to peace missions rather than coercive and military intervention has been applauded in in attempt to resolve the Conflict. It is the laudable initiative for the AU chairperson to be directly involved in the management process. Also, cognizant of the fact that cultural identity plays a vital role in managing the crisis, the AU involved the Commonwealth and Francophonie on its peace team. This shows that the AU understands and acknowledges the root cause of the problem and is willing to tackle it from the roots and not by the branches.

Moreover, the Constitutive Act of the African Union, 2002: 4-h focusses on the respect of national sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states, thereby assuming a responsibility to intervene in the internal affairs of member states especially in instances where humanity is at stake. To this effect, the AU from its inception dismissed the principle of non-interference and embraced the covenant of non-indifference meaning respecting state sovereignty but having the responsibility to intervene where there exist crimes against humanity, genocide and other war crimes. Again, the AU has gives itself the right to intervene when a member state faces a serious threat to peace and stability especially upon recommendation of the PSC.

Again, the ability to disarm combatants could be another indicator of conflict containment. In May 2013, Heads of State and Governments of the AU made a vow to end the reoccurrence of violent conflicts and creating sustainable solutions to conflicts thereby
making the continent a safe habitat for future generations. This initiative was tagged “Silencing the Guns by 2020”. The AU’s engagements therefore in Cameroon have been an attempt to reach this goal. After the July 2018 visit, the Cameroon Government created DDR centers in the North West and South West regions to receive and reintegrate ex-combatants into the society. The AU’s intervention in Cameroon depicts continuous engagement with Member States on conflict prevention, management, resolution and post conflict reconstruction and development as well as peace-building initiatives. Considering that member states have the ability to determine the success of the AU, Adejo (2001), notes that “the success of the AU would require mature African statesmanship that strikes a balance between the desires of member states to pursue their individual interests, and the political will to forgo certain aspects of national sovereignty and independence for the common good of the continent.” This will mean working towards the restoration of peace in conflict-affected areas without focusing on other interest-related policies.

5.2.2 Weaknesses

The mission did not achieve its objective. This is because Conflict is far from ending, and the human security situation is deteriorating. The warring parties continue to record massive casualties both material and human. Thus, making the Cameroonian government not meeting its responsibility to protect, The government has rather sought international attention demanding regional and international attention and action to reduce violence, protect civilians, care for refugees and IDPs, reestablish human rights, and permit a ceasefire and peace negotiations.

The approach used by the AU shows its lack of courage and inability to stand up to errant leaders whose actions threaten good governance and regional security. The visits to
Cameroon sided with the government since the institution has not openly government repression on civilians. Paying fruitless visits to Cameroon show that the AU is as good as its constituent heads of states and representatives especially when it comes to turning a blind eye abuses on the ground. Also, paying visits is not synonymous to fact-finding visits. The AU’s visit did not target other parties of the conflict. Providing a framework to solve the problem and not providing concrete measures to solve the problem does not resolve a problem.
CHAPTER SIX

DISCUSSION

6.1 Introduction

The African Union has Intervened but with no concrete action. Although the AU has shown interest in the Cameroon conflict, it has not taken any concrete action to address the deteriorating context. The AU needs to take up its role of ensuring regional peace and security by going beyond diplomatic missions and opting for better ways for conflict response. For instance, third party mediation can be effective as an instrument in managing the crisis. In February 2012, for example, the AU dispatched former Nigerian president, Olusegun Obasanjo, as an envoy to mediate in the conflict in Senegal. Thabo Mbeki, former South African President served as the AU mediator in various conflicts. With the present case, Negotiation and mediation, which are considered as accommodationist approaches of conflict resolution and management will be of paramount importance since they require the cooperation of the conflict parties in order to reach a settlement of the disputed issues, and enforce any settlement terms.

In Cameroon, both actors have resorted to the need of a neutral third-party mediator to resolve this conflict of identity before it degenerates into a civil war. So, rather than visiting, the AU should be looking at dispatching mediators. Two visits to Cameroon and the conflict persists is enough to conclude that soft diplomacy employed by the AU has failed. Therefore, the AU needs a more concrete and robust intervention. In the case of Cameroon a military intervention should do the trick since it is contemplated or used where pure diplomacy has failed.
Furthermore, Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the AU mandates the Union to intervene in countries in respect of grave circumstances like war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. Cameroon presents a case wherein the government is short of providing maximum protection to nationals of the North West and South West regions (noting the escalating number of refugees in other cities and neighboring Nigeria) thus the need to evoke the R2P (Responsibility to Protect) which provides an impetus for intervention.

Akokpari (2016) argues that R2P obligates member states to defend citizens if their governments appear incapable of protecting them or if the state is the source of the citizens’ insecurity hence this principle of humanitarian intervention which gives further justification for military interference. Generally speaking, if the dominant paradigm of interventions is military force, then conflict recurrence can greatly be minimized. In Africa in particular, military interventions have contributed towards bringing a ceasefire in warzones. For instance, in 2010, the post-electoral conflict in Ivory Coast saw its end thanks to the intervention of the ECOWAS. In 2013, the repulsion of the Tuaregs in Northern Mali was thanks to a military intervention of the AU supported by France. Also, AMISOM and AMIS were deployed to respond to the crisis in Somalia and Sudan respectively. These interventions recorded a remarkable success.

Also, the African Union can use its African Peer Review Mechanism APRM which will encourage the kind of policy initiatives needed to consolidate democratic governance and sustainable peace, both of which are critical for people-centered socio-economic development. Also, since the APRM gives member states a space for national dialogue on governance and socio-economic indicators and an opportunity to build consensus on the way
forward. The AU can use more coercive measure to force the Cameroon Government to release unconditionally Southern Cameroon leaders who are serving jail term.

Williams (2001) notes that, in a case of where the AU is confronted with repeated cases of recalcitrant behavior, the PSC adopted more coercive mechanisms to secure compliance with its stated objectives—namely sanctions regimes. Such sanctions which can be applied to Cameroon are to “suspend the membership of the recalcitrant regime” and further gives the country six months to conform to its own constitution. If no positive change occurs, the AU may apply targeted sanctions, usually travel bans on select individuals and measures designed to freeze regime assets.

According to the author, sanctions are serve the purpose of stigmatizing the target to changing political behavior. Also, the AU can pressure foreign governments to arrest or impose punishments on individuals of the Cameroonian diaspora who continue to fund and incite the Crisis. Also, the AU can pressure the government to revisit the constitution and to conduct another referendum granting at least an option of federation to Southern Cameroons. It is worth noting that a United Nations referendum was held in British Cameroons on 11 February 1961 to determine whether the territory should join neighboring Cameroon or Nigeria but the option of independence was not on the ballot which today, makes many question this UN “error or omission”. The AU can as well impose other sanctions on Cameroon like suspension from the AU until peace is initiated, a ceasefire ensured and a return to sustainable peace.

It is also important to mention that all attempts made by the Anglophones to hold an All Anglophone Conference determine their fate have been frustrated by the government.
The AU can therefore intervene to ease this conference which is seen as a step towards harmonizing the demands of the peoples of Southern Cameroons.

6.2 Recommendations

Despite its weaknesses, the AU can still be up to the task if its conflict management is revisited. Williams (2011) shares the thought of making the agenda of the AU to meet continental realities. In order to enhance its effectiveness in the promotion of continental peace and security and managing the Anglophone crisis is more specific terms. The following points can be recommended:

6.2.1 Initiating Early Warning and Proper Diagnosis of The Conflict

Through its Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), mandated to detect early conflict warning signs and advise the PSC on conflict threats and how to address them, the African Union could avoid relapse into conflict. This is because the Anglophone Problem is not a today’s issue. There had been early warning signs which had just never appears on the AU’s agenda, hence, was never to be addressed. Although the AU had repeatedly been warned by separatists calls, it remained silent.

Atemnkeng (2019) notes that it does not require any rocket science to have seen this war coming as far back as 1961 when the people of the Southern Cameroons were denied the option of sovereign independence and imposed the choice of achieving independence either in confederation with Nigeria or with Cameroon. He further recounts that when this issue was brought to the AU, it pretended that the Anglophone Problem did not exist, therefore not including it on its Peace and Security agenda. Today, the socio-political context of Cameroon is on the verge of collapse as it has become almost impossible to silence the guns of fighting
parties and to find sustainable solutions to the “war”. Such neglect can serve as a lesson to the African Union to address deep-rooted problems so that they don’t de-escalate. Should the AU continue to be less preventive in detecting and managing conflicts, the continent will suffer more conflicts. Also, being more preventive would mean taking charge of situations and addressing them carefully rather than waiting to intervene when war starts which would usually require exorbitant funds and other expensive undertakings which the institutions does not even possess knowing how costly a peace process is. Hence, peace processes encourage dependency on donors and conflict of interest which could compromise a peace process besides, foreign intervention undermines the principle of state sovereignty. The African Union should stand up for its member states and for continent and work towards achieving its set goals.

If the AU ensures a proper diagnosis of the problem this would mean knowing exactly what the reasons for grievances are and, addressing them accordingly. In the case of Cameroon, the African Union has rather been quiet than reactionary. Even its two missions or visits to Cameroon whom many separatists felt would be a step towards addressing their demands, did not address the issues even though one would think that the one-on-one meeting between the Chairperson of the AU Commission and the President of the Republic of Cameroon was set to find ways to better address the Crisis.

The continental body also needs to deploy its “Panel of the Wise” to determine how best to manage the conflict, it must also send a special envoy to the Anglophone region to implement a conflict management strategy that will lead to a sustainable peace agreement.
6.2.2 Effective Follow-up Missions

The AU’s deafening silence concerning the Cameroon Crisis has made many lose hope in the institution. This is because since its last mission in 2019, nothing has been heard. As if that was not enough, the AU had encouraged an inclusive dialogue which was carried out in July 2019. Many separatists wings complained of a rather politicized, oppressive, government-controlled dialogue which was not inclusive and failed to take into consideration separatist demands. For instance, their quest for an independent English Cameroon was responded to by the granting of a “special status” which according to the separatists made no sense. Thus, they vowed to continue fighting. The AU on its part needs to send a follow-up mission to ensure that the demands of their last visit to Cameroon are being observed and respected by both sides of the party.

Also, the AU needs to remain impartial and more inclusive in problem-solving. Most separatists have lost trust in the AU as the need for another inclusive dialogue supervised or mediated by a neutral third party intensifies. Under normal circumstances, envoys should have been sent from the AU but this has not been the case. Separatists believe the USA would be the only impartial mediator. Does this mean the AU which is mandated to address peace and security issues in the continent will have to keep relying on outside intervention? When will it be independent? The AU therefore needs to have a better coordination of the Crisis be visibly involved, not practicing the empty chair diplomacy or visibly siding with one actor of the conflict.
6.2.3 More Robust Humanitarian Coordination

As battles intensify, so do both parties of the conflict suffer human and material casualties. The Crisis has twice been classified by the Norwegian refugee Council as the world’s most neglected conflict under the watchful eyes of the African Union. Humanitarian atrocities are alarming and need to be addressed. As is often the case, civilians are bearing the brunt of this conflict, with over 530,000 Cameroonians being forced to flee their homes. While those who are able to relocate to the relative safety of bigger cities do so, several displaced people are either unable or afraid to, left instead to hide from both the non-state armed groups and the Cameroonian military in the bush or dense thickets that surround both the North-West and South-West regions which is still not safe. Consequently, the African Union needs to coordinate their efforts in addressing the humanitarian needs of the refugees and displaced persons. And the African Union Commission on Human and Peoples Rights must investigate the many complaints of human rights abuses in Cameroon, and to take appropriate action. So far, the Commission has only issued statements condemning the government and separatist groups for the human rights violations without any concrete measures to follow-up.

6.2.4 Develop More Efficient and Effective Forms of Communication

The AU’s communication approach towards managing the Anglophone Crisis has been seriously criticized by many separatists’ factions for whom the AU’s silence has been rather provocative. First, the African Union has never openly addressed the conflict whom many see as taking side with the “evil” government, Secondly, Atemnkeng (2019), notes that the people of Southern Cameroons had communicated their sufferings the African Union on
several occasions, but the institution remained dormant. The author recounts for instance, in 2003, the People of Southern Cameroons through the Southern Cameroon National Council, sought the attention of the African Commission of People’s and Human Rights to report cases of human rights abuses inflicted on them by the Cameroon government but their call fell on deaf ears. According to the author, this was an early warning sign for an imminent conflict.

Moreover, In July 2017, the same people through a Southern Cameroons Consortium sought the attention of the PSC providing images and videos on atrocities committed by the Cameroon Military on Southern Cameroonians and this complaint was ignored. This might have made them lose hope in an institution which they believe is “theirs” and exists to hear them and address their cries. Considering that this act of ignoring calls for action might have angered many. Thus, it can be recommended that, the AU should explore the prospect of using communication more in its approach to conflict management. methods of communication in conflict management should be rejuvenated and integrated. The CEWS which is the organ charged with communication needs to be strengthened to respond more proactively effectively to early warning signs of conflict before war erupts especially because effective communication would save millions of lives in the continent.

6.2.5 Develop More Concrete Measures Towards Addressing the Crisis.

The inability of the Cameroonian government to restore peace could mean that, a more serious intervention is needed. And, the AU is well armed for this kind of intervention which is still very young and can still be contained. This could also be a call for the AU to reaffirm its role as an efficient security actor in Africa thereby, reducing the cost of a more robust peacekeeping which often requires foreign aid and intervention baptized with
irregularities and conditionalities. For instance, rather than encouraging the call for Swiss-led mediated talks, the AU can make use of its mediation unit to mediate talks using the African way which “we” understand and are familiar with to solve “our” problems.

The AU needs to accompany the government in resolving the conflict, getting both parties in reaching peace agreements, urging the government to release the heads of the separatists most of whom are incarcerated in the Yaoundé Central Prison. Most separatists have vowed to keep fighting until their leaders are released. This means that if the government orders some releases, then it might assuage some bleeding and angry hearts who will accept a ceasefire. Such confidence building measures should largely be encouraged by the AU. The AU can as well encourage the government to allow an Anglophone forum which would bring together a wide range of Anglophones and help them forge to a united position.

6.2.6 Support the establishment of an AU mediation unit.

According to Williams (2011) The AU’s current approach to mediation has been ad hoc, ill-prepared, and based on little more than the hope of forging elite, top-down bargains, usually under arbitrary deadlines. To ameliorate this problem, the AU is considering establishing a mediation unit within the commission. Such a unit could coordinate mediation support to AU officials and envoys as well as mediation capacity-building activities.
CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION

The diplomatic efforts of the AU towards resolving the Anglophone crisis have seen limited successes. The efficacy of Africa’s diplomatic practice is generally tested in conflict situations, where there is expectation on states and regional bodies to contain, terminate or manage them. Charged with fostering regional peace and security, the AU has evolved a robust normative framework that has been instrumental in assisting most of its member states struggling with resolving or managing protracted war and violent conflict. This is the case with Cameroon where the use of soft than coercive diplomacy has yielded mixed results upon which a judgment on the AU’s effectiveness in conflict management can be made.

The objective of this study was to answer the question “Has the African Union been effective in managing the Anglophone Crisis?” The discussion raised in this research shows that the AU can be effective in conflict management in Cameroon particularly and in the Continent on a more general note. But the extent of its success is contingent upon several approaches which are content specific. From the findings, the AU has to an extent been effective in managing the Anglophone crisis by achieving some of its objectives through the use of diplomatic missions rather than military intervention thus showing that different approaches might yield results depending on the task and context. However, there are still some drawbacks which have limited the effectiveness of the AU’s approach as discussed in Chapter 5 thus the need for a discussion on a roadmap on how the AU can be more effective
and efficient in ensuring peace in Cameroon. Cameroon continues to deteriorate as its crisis remains unresolved hence socially, politically and economically arresting its development.

In all, it is worth noting that, conflict recurrence in Africa remains obvious and is gradually becoming the norm. From the findings of this study, accusatory fingers can be pointed at the African Union because of its customized modes of addressing conflicts. The AU needs to be more preventive and vigilant to early warning signs of conflicts before they escalate. If the AU takes a rather quiet diplomacy when solicited for intervention, then, it is clear and apparent that it might be hard to attain its peace and security objectives. Given that conflict recurrence remains obvious and persistent, a critical reevaluation of its mode of functioning in security matters is therefore imminent.

Finally, bearing in mind that this is an ongoing conflict, findings reflect dynamics from its inception in 2016 to present day. This study will therefore significantly contribute to the literature that already exist on the Cameroon Conflict and could serve as an addition to national and international research resources. Moreover, it adds to the already-bourgeoning literature on the African Union’s role in resolving, managing and preventing regional intrastate conflict.


Anglophone Archbishops (2016). "Bamenda Provincial Episcopal Conference [BAPEC]". *Newspaper*.


https://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/culture_conflict


Readout of the visit of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission to Cameroon