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Editor's Note

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Editor’s Note

Padraig O’Malley

On January 20, 2017, Donald J. Trump was sworn in as the forty-fifth president of the United States. The country and much of the global community alternates between anxiety and anger over his shoot-from-the-hip decisions, at once confusing and contradictory, sometimes both; his guttural denigration of the judiciary, his off-the-cuff foreign policy remarks, the veer toward incompetency and aggrandizement, melodrama and narcissism. He does not make decisions after a careful weighing of the facts and the quid pro quos involved but is impulsive and unpredictable. Twitter is his modus operandi, ad hocery the flavor of day, his gut instincts his personal think tank to navigate the global arena. The bully pulpit is in the hands of a bully.

Already heretofore unthinkable questions have arisen. Will he abandon the bipartisan framework of US foreign policy in place since World War II? Continue to encourage the breakup of the European Union? Trust his intelligence agencies? Are relations with Russia about to undergo a sea change? Will President Barack Obama’s pivot to East Asia be swept under the waves of the South China Sea? The North America Free Trade Agreement shafted? Are trade wars looming? Will the Iran nuclear deal be abrogated? NATO defunded? . . . and the list goes on. Truth is whatever he says it is. George Orwell’s 1984 is back on the bestseller list.

Peering through the fog clouding our glimpse of the future, we can be certain only that we are entering an era of uncertainty where the United States’ traditional alliances are in doubt. In this environment of uncertainty, state actors will take actions to protect their interests, some of which will result in a more dangerous world where once unthinkable wars will become more thinkable. “America First” does not presage other countries’ falling into line behind its intent but putting their own interests first. A world that has looked outward since the end of World War II is about to look inward. Rather than creating a global village, we are scampering to our own makeshift hamlets on its periphery, furnishing national identities, peering out the closeted window at the “other.”

The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Trump tells us, will be “totally eradicated.” (Although, to be fair, President Obama’s secretary of defense, Ashton Carter, opined, “We are going to destroy the idea that there is an Islamic State.”) This approach to countering ISIS is not a strategy, it is idiocy. Drones do not destroy ideas. To fulfill a campaign promise that was widely condemned at the time, Trump banned—without warning, without consultation with his security agencies, the Pentagon, or the Justice Department regarding the legality of the executive order—the entry of Muslims from seven countries, even those with valid visas, creating a storm of national and international protest. Most counterterrorism experts warned that the order was a propaganda bonanza for ISIS and its likes, more so because there has been no incident of terrorism involving a foreign national in the United States since 9/11 and the judiciary countermanded the order on the grounds that there was no imminent threat to national security. Trump’s agenda for Syria will cement the survival of the regime of Bashar al-Assad, as Trump prioritizes smashing ISIS in concert with Vladimir Putin.

Somehow he imagines a Middle East that can be brought to heel with a thump of his iron fist. His son-in law, Jared Kushner, will bring peace to the Middle East. But an iron fist and feet of clay often go in tandem.

Such is the unpredictability of Trump’s streaming executive orders that much of what I write may be irrelevant by the time this issue of the New England Journal of Public Policy goes to press.
But the articles in this issue will not lose their pertinence, no matter what the administration does. Indeed, given its predilection for “alternative facts,” they assume a greater relevance and consequential significance.

This issue of the journal has three parts. The first part had its origins in a conference on extremism held at the Center for Study of Intractable Conflicts (CRIC), Harris Manchester College Oxford in October 2015; the second comprises four articles on conflicts referred to as “intractable”—Colombia, Syria, and Israel/Palestine—and a reflection on the Holocaust; the third is a stand-alone, one article that addresses the leadership attributes necessary to crack the iron walls of intractability.

Introducing Part 1, Lord John Alderdice, director of the CRIC, outlines the scope of the center’s work and how it distinguishes itself from the plethora of think tanks and research institutes that study issues related to conflict, peace, and postconflict reconciliation and transformation that stride the global landscape.

The five articles in Part 1 interrogate many of the sociopsychological and cognitive underpinnings of extremism, violent extremism, and radicalization, the authors going to lengths to differentiate among them, and measures to blunt their impact.

The authors explore different attributes of extremism: profiles for those most likely to engage in violent extremism, the key elements that are motivators, and a framework for understanding violent extremism in the context of “lone-wolf” attacks in Western societies that draws on terror management theory (TMT) to provide insight into the interaction between religiosity and violence (Wael Haddara); factors that contribute to the appeal of ISIS as a global franchise and the sophistication of the targeting of susceptible recruits and the concept of identity fusion (Lydia Wilson); the virus of extremism in Southeast Asia, ISIS within its wider and older Indonesian-epicentered transnational Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) Al-Qaeda network, and how the emergence of ISIS has affected JI’s evolutionary trajectory (Kumar Ramakrishna); the relationship between the apocalyptic imagination, the cornerstone of the fundamentalist mindset, and the paranoid, a world of “shame and humiliation, of suspiciousness, aggression, and dualisms that separate out all good from pure evil” and the kinetic nature of the interrelationship (Charles Strozier); and whether insights from the attraction of the Golden Gate Bridge for public suicides throw light on “public terrorism”—the restaurant and shopping malls as the preferred sites for terrorist suicides (Gregory Saathoff).

There is nothing unique about violent extremism. It has existed through the ages, and Islamic extremism is just another manifestation of a phenomenon spanning a historical arc of faith-driven violence and violence erupting for ideological, ethnic, racial, and cultural causes. The violence that is the hallmark of ISIS differs from other faith-based ideologies because the violence has the simple motive of killing others (with a proclivity for “nonbelievers,” but for the most it is an equal-opportunity purveyor of death), randomly, through self-immolation, suicide bombings, and shootings in malls, marketplaces—anyplace where crowds gather. Even a truck driven at high speed into an unsuspecting group of people is a weapon of instantaneous death. And there are the public executions in the shrinking caliphate, notably beheadings of individuals who violate the Islamic State’s governance or are condemned for violations of the Islamic State’s interpretations of the Quran and Sharia. Its penchant for the horrific instills fear, conformity, silence, and distrust. Because of the pervasiveness of social media, acts of extreme violence go viral and thus contribute to societal insecurity, uncertainty, and social anxiety and have the potential to upend the social order. They foster xenophobia, racism, hatred, bigotry, and marginalization, which fuels the impetus for further extreme violence. A bombing in a nightclub in Istanbul reverberates in
Annapolis; a mass shooting in Orlando reverberates in Paris. There are no boundaries to its impact. When every human being has the potential to become a time bomb and advances in technology further facilitate terror, we are redefining individual rights versus collective rights. Surveillance is pervasive. Counterterrorism mistakenly concentrates on short-term security measures that erode human rights in the name of protecting them, with insufficient attention given to finding ways to undermine the behaviors that drive it.

Violent extremism is global. Current configurations of Al-Qaeda have their antecedents in pre-9/11 Al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda affiliates include regional networks such as Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Al-Shabaab in Somalia, JI in Southeast Asia, Jabhat Fateh al-Sham in Syria. ISIS, of course, is the current preeminent threat to the West. (In February 2017, a captured ISIS fighter told the police that in villages close to Mosul, ISIS fighters included Saudis, Chechen, Bahraini, American, Chinese, and Kurds.)

ISIS is an off-shoot of Al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda believes in a caliphate in the long run. ISIS believes in it in the here and now. It established the caliphate—the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria—that straddles Iraq and Syria, though its territorial reach is rapidly collapsing. According to Scott Atran, the unrivaled expert on grass-roots radicalization, the idea of the caliphate “represents a very real and powerful attractor for the disaffected across the Muslim world” and is “the only systemic, countercultural global movement” that “represents in the minds of tens of millions a history and destiny denied.” In addition there are what are labeled “lone-wolf” attacks, by home-grown Islamic radicals who have no direct connection to Al-Qaeda or ISIS but are prepared to carry out attacks in solidarity with or support of their jihadist agenda.

Haddara outlines several criteria essential to the actualization of violent extremism. These range from “exposure to violent extremist recruiters” of Westerners drawn to fight with Daesh [ISIS], some 75 percent of whom are recruited by a family member or friend—to access to the resources necessary to travel to Syria, Afghanistan, or Mali or to mount an attack at home. The resources and opportunity necessary for lone-wolf attacks are very different from those necessary for attacks by a violently extremist proto-state such as Daesh, and increasingly, lone wolves are showing that acts of violent extremism can be mounted with minimal resources: a truck can be as deadly as an automatic weapon or a bomb.” Recently, counterterrorism experts have uncovered a new phenomenon, a practice in play for an undetermined period that calls for some attacks that were classified as “lone wolf” to be reclassified as “enabled or remote-controlled attacks.” Here the violence is planned and guided by Islamic handlers whose only connection to the would-be attacker is the Internet. Potential attackers are recruited by external players who often communicate with them online in virtual time, issuing elaborate and detailed instructions about how to plan, coordinate, and carry out attacks. Sometimes the instructions are given up to the moment the attacks are carried out. Many terrorist acts ascribed to lone wolves are not lone wolf at all.

For the most part, the operatives who are conceiving and guiding such attacks are doing so from behind a wall of anonymity. When arrests are made, the attackers are unable even to confirm the nationalities of their interlocutors in the Islamic State, let alone describe what they look like. Because the recruits are instructed to use encrypted messaging applications, the guiding role played by the terrorist group often remains obscure.

Haddara cites the work of Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, who have identified two profiles of individuals most likely to be susceptible to extremism: the “disconnected-disordered profile” (“individuals with a grievance and weapons experience who are socially disconnected and stressed with a psychological disorder”) and the “caring-consistency profile” (“individuals [who]
have . . . felt strongly the suffering of others and a personal responsibility to reduce or revenge this suffering”). Wilson cites the work of William B. Swann and colleagues on fusion theory to delineate the correspondence between concomitant selves. Identity fusion is defined as a “form of alignment with groups that entails a visceral feeling of oneness with the group”; “this feeling is associated with unusually porous, highly permeable borders between the personal and social self.”

“At the point of ‘visceral oneness with the group,’” Wilson writes, “an insult, a compliment, or an injury to the group or to another member of the group is perceived as an insult, a compliment, or an injury to the self, prompting all the same responses up to and including fighting and dying. When one identity clearly dominates another, for example, when someone feels a visceral oneness with the entire Islamic community, over and above his or her own biological family, that person can sacrifice all—including the family—for that one element of identity.” “By using fusion theory in interviews with fighters all over the world,” she points out, “researchers are finding that the fusion to the group motivates extreme action, framed by the ideology that defines the group.” (After the Boston Marathon bombing, Bostonians responded collectively in an extraordinary bonding. “Boston Strong” for a time became a group identity submerging individual identity. A better example is the Irish hunger strikes. In 1981 ten young men, members of the IRA who were prisoners in the Long Kesh/Maze prison in Northern Ireland, starved themselves to death rather than submit to wearing a prison uniform, which would have designated them as criminals. Until a change in policy in the mid 1970s, prisoners had been allowed to wear their own clothes, implying that they were prisoners of war fighting for the freedom of their country.)

ISIS has “outlets” in over a hundred countries. It has three main production companies in the Islamic State (and twenty-six others in regions outside of their current borders in Syria and Iraq) and experienced filmmakers and technicians, some of whom undergo intensive training before they begin producing propaganda for ISIS. Using advanced computer-design techniques, ISIS has produced sophisticated propaganda videos, including brutal videos of executions made to inspire terror in its enemies, and it has also produced rougher products along the lines of home videos to appeal to different audiences. ISIS has platforms in many languages, including Chinese, Indonesian, and Russian. As Wilson points out, “Messaging is tailored to local contexts.”

Conversations are subtle; recruiters respond to “grievances at government, exclusion, longing for a purer form of Islamic governance, private conversations engage the individuals as individuals, their interlocutors listening and responding to their personal concerns and the details of their own lives, making them feel valued and cared for and creating a sense of warmth, inclusion and belonging.” We neglect the power of listening.

A key element that turns an individual to violent extremism is a grievance or a set of grievances—political, economic, social grievances, local or national. Some individual immigrants or the children of immigrants who grow up in the West lack a coherent identity; they are pulled between two competing identities, neither Arab (for example) nor traditionally Muslim, they are not fully integrated and accepted in their societies and countries of birth and rearing. Social and economic disparities can contribute to a sense of being a second-class citizen in one’s own country. It is mistakenly believed that all supporters of ISIS are Muslims.

Grievance, the other to blame, inequity, victimhood, paranoia, hope for better future, the need to cleanse the world of purveyors of false promulgations—there is a historical continuum, played out in different historical circumstances, with different boundaries on knowledge and space, that seek to explain the inexplicable, create religions to give meaning to the nihilism that would prevail in its absence, that would make a world order, societal coherence, concepts of human rights, nonconsequential actions, distinction between good and evil, individual or collective killing
irrelevant. Moreover, stigmatization of Muslims is rife. A Chatham House survey shows that fear of Muslim immigration is the main factor poisoning European politics and driving the rise of nationalisms.\(^7\) Brexit stands as a potent symbol. Across the ten countries surveyed, an average of 55 percent wanted to stop further Muslim immigration into their countries.

Perceptions are driven by fear. Countries with the smallest Muslim populations were the most hostile.\(^8\) (In Brexit, communities with the smallest or no Muslim population recorded the highest proportions voting to exit the European Union.) An Ipos/MORI poll of forty countries in 2016 found public estimates of the percentage of Muslims in their populations to have little bearing on reality. In France, the public estimate was 33 percent; the actual size is 13 percent. The estimate of what the percentage of Muslims would be by 2020 was 40 percent. In Britain, the public estimate of the current percentage of Muslims was 15 percent; the actual size is 5 percent. In the United States, Trump’s warnings of the threat of Muslim migrants find resonance in large segments of the population, again because of perceptions. The 2016 Ipos/MORI poll shows that Americans believe that Muslims make up 1 in 6 of the population, whereas in reality they make up 1 in 100.\(^9\)

In *Age of Anger*, Pankaj Mishra identifies the antecedents of the grass-roots resentments spurring the populism that is sweeping many countries in the West, the broader and deeper grievances in anger-laden groups in countries under the thumb of repressive authoritarian oligarchs or brutal dictatorships, and the loose cannons of paranoid hatreds finding outlets in xenophobic ranting on Facebook and other social media to the writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau.\(^10\) According to the book’s reviewer in the *Economist*, Rousseau “grasped the moral and spiritual implications of a world in which the old gods are gone, society is set in turmoil and people losing ancient fixities are forced to mimic the privileged rich. Rousseau “anticipated the modern underdog with his aggravated sense of victimhood and demand for redemption.”\(^11\)

Many of the “isms” invented to heal these resentments—romanticism, socialism, authoritarianism, nationalism and anarchism—Mishra points out, have their origins in the pages of Rousseau’s books. To Mishra, the reviewer explains, “Ayatollah Khomeini’s Iranian revolution owed much more to Robespierre than to the 12 Shia Imams. The 19th-century resentment so keenly described by Friedrich Nietzsche prefigures the homicidal dandyism of ‘Jihadi John,’ Mohammed Emwazi, who broadcast his victims being executed. The selfie-narcissism of Islamic State, its rape of girls and destruction of Palmyra echo ‘The Futurist Manifesto’ by Filippo Marinetti, a misogynist Italian poet, in 1909: ‘We want to glorify war . . . and contempt for women. We want to destroy museums, libraries and academies of all kinds.’”

The worldview of many young Muslims has ample cause for grievance. Some harbor deep hatred of the United States for “unintended collateral damage” in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan or from drone strikes in, for example, remote mountainous regions of Pakistan where Taliban leaders are targeted but civilians are sometimes the victims. Were such acts carried out by an individual, they argue, they would have been condemned as terrorist acts. The fact that a government carries them out gives it carte blanche. These young Muslims act against perceived injustice and rampant hypocrisy: for every Syrian killed by ISIS eight have been killed by the Assad regime. ISIS is pilloried by the international community as evil and a global coalition is determined to obliterate it; yet there is an absence of serious discussion of the root cause of the massive displacement in Syria (over half the population is internally displaced, perhaps a million refugees): the brutal regime of Assad that has rained death on its own people in order to cling to power. Rather than dealing with the cause, Western governments focus on the extremism of the Syrian rebels or congratulate themselves for forcing Assad to surrender his chemical weapons, as if the
way Syrians are killed matters more than their being killed. Bombing Aleppo into smitherens mattered less than the use of chemical weapons. To the dead it matters little.

These dichotomies, the stuff of Internet chat rooms, where young people dwell, spill into unaddressed grievances, desire for revenge, bringing down the governments. There is a critical divergence between the findings of in-depth research on the motivations of young people who have gone to Syria and joined ISIS or who resort to extreme violence and political populist narratives driven by generalizations, simplifications and labeling, that is, “othering,” a delegitimization of the humanity of perpetrators, that poses, Haddara writes “obstacles to proposing and developing effective policy recommendations.” Quoting Alex P. Schmid, he adds, “Governments need not be perfect before they can effectively engage in successful counter-radicalization efforts.”

Behavior not mindset, he concludes, is the primary motivator of extreme violence. “Daesh [ISIS] and troubled individuals use religion to establish an ‘us versus them’ world. Punitive security measures against all Muslims reinforce this binary vision.” Populists and their political progenitors” (Donald Trump or Nigel Farage, Marine Le Pen, and others on the alt-right) “mirror the very narrative they claim to be fighting . . . [by fostering] an extrinsic identity that helps them assert their place in a hostile world.”

Ramakrishna elaborates further on the insidious reach of ISIS’s tentacles. He examines the radicalization of young Southeast Asians into the violent extremism that characterizes ISIS. The literature on radicalization reveals how complex the concept is, and like Wilson, Ramakrishna emphasizes that there are numerous paths to radicalization and the necessity of steering away from simple politically facile explanations of what it is and how it occurs. He situates ISIS within its wider and older Al-Qaeda Islamist ideological contest and the historical landscape of violent Islamist extremism in Southeast Asia, focusing on the JI network and how the emergence of ISIS has impacted JI’s evolutionary trajectory. Ramakrishna argues that “‘radicals’ and ‘extremists’ should be viewed as analytically distinct,” for the sake of formulating sound policy decisions, and that “extremism itself, not just violent extremism, is a problem that should be addressed in Southeast Asia and beyond.” He asserts that there is no such thing as “‘nonviolent’ extremism and suggests that “not-yet violent” extremism is a more accurate term. His conclusion is that the strategic focus should be countering extremism, which requires “isolating the possible attitudinal and behavioral indicators that are the ‘violent potentials’ within not-yet-violent extremists.”

At the heart of violent extremism is a set of beliefs—nationalistic, religious, ideological, or other. These beliefs are shrouded in the image of a utopian world toward which violent extremists strive. (The Bolsheviks re-engraved the Romanov obelisk in Moscow’s Alexander Garden, erected in 1914 to mark the tercentenary of the dynasty, with the name Thomas More, in recognition of the author of Utopia, published in 1516.) The ideological component is complicated and nuanced; the Islamic component even more so. The appeal of much of ISIS is to this longing for a utopia, freedom, community, equality, connectedness, and the humane. In the late 1960s students from the West flocked to new West Bank settlements, to the kibbutzim, where they worked and lived alongside young Israelis to create a utopia: the simple, frugal, no-frills idealized community of shared living, a shared sense of belonging, shared values, and shared idealism, shared brotherhood and sisterhood. The mystique of the land, undulating hills to the horizon, hard physical labor during the day, communal evenings of song and conversation, shimmering nightscapes when the stars could be plucked from the sky . . . (This, of course, was before the first intifada, before the idea of a Palestinian state. In the years following the Six-Day War “little” Israel could do no wrong.)
Former ISIS members, Wilson found, had for the most part little knowledge of Islamic tenets or of the Quran and revealed that Islam was not a predominating factor leading to their radicalization; the common denominator of attraction was to belong, seeking “brotherhood,” looking for meaning to their lives.

The relationship between Islam and radicalization is paradoxical. On one hand, a religious Islamic upbringing may protect against engagement in violent extremism. On the other hand, terrorists we label “radical Islamists” may not be “practicing” Muslims; in fact, in some terrorists’ acts, the perpetrators led secular lives, with little evidence of observance or of adherence to core Islamic values. The 9/11 attackers and the man in Nice who drove a truck through a crowd during Bastille Day celebrations in 2016, for example, led secular lives. Also, when Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the Nigerian-born Al-Qaeda member who tried to blow up an airliner approaching Detroit on Christmas in 2009 using explosives hidden in his underwear, was told during interrogation by FBI agents that his recruiter and handler, the American-born cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, whom Abdulmutallab revered as a religious authority, patronized prostitutes, he responded, according to documents released to the New York Times following a Freedom of Information lawsuit, that it could be false slander, but if not, Awlaki “could repent for those sins and his commitment to jihad would outweigh such transgressions.”

The dichotomy, which often perplexes in the Judeo-Christian understanding, is that carrying out the will of the Prophet through violent extremism substitutes for adherence to religious practice. This worldview has its roots in a combination of Salafism and Jihadism: certainty of Truth justifies the use of violence to bring about the Truth. Haddara writes: “Personal behavior in keeping with the tenets of Islam is desirable but not necessary. Rather, moral superiority can be achieved, not through personal effort, but by believing in violence as the path to establishing the Truth.”

ISIS shares many of the hallmarks of “isms” —communism, fascism, alt-right nationalism, and ideologies that promise a utopia. Such ideologies, rooted in binary behavior, “othering,” in “us versus them,” are havens for individuals experiencing rejection of their identity as Muslim. “The ISIS way or no way.” Drones do not destroy ideas. The utopian ideal of a coming caliphate is as deeply held in the minds of many Muslims as is the coming of Messiah among the Haredi. ISIS’s variant of deviant Islam defines recapturing the caliphate through violent extremism; the Haredi are content to wait.

Idle talk that with the collapse of the caliphate in Syria ISIS will crumble obscures the breadth of its appeal, the sophistication of its messaging, and its ability to contextualize the local. The West’s condemnation of ISIS as a brutal terrorist movement, engaging in orgies of decapitation and rape of women falls on deaf ears in communities where ISIS enters the inner lives of susceptible youth (and adults). It cannot be defeated without an in-depth understanding of its appeal; and that “defeat” will ultimately depend on how successful it is at tapping into the concerns of so many young people and the pervasive sense of the absence of an anchored identity fused with a sense of not belonging and the human need for meaning.

Ernest Becker in his Pulitzer Prize–winning book The Denial of Death draws on a vast array of anthropological and philosophical sources to make the powerful argument that one consequence of our intelligence is that we came to recognize that we exist. We know we are here, but why? We also know we will die. Knowledge of our mortality is what distinguishes us from other primates, and this knowledge of impending death would paralyze us with terror if it were constantly on our minds. His book begins with the statement: “The idea of death, the fear of it, haunts the human animal like nothing else: it is the mainspring of human activity—activity designed largely to avoid the fatality of death, to overcome it by denying in some way that it is the
final destiny for man.” To mitigate the anxiety such knowledge induces, we construct “beliefs about reality that we share with our fellow humans.” These provide us with “a sense that life has meaning and that we have value.” “All cultures offer an explanation of how the world started” and “tell us what we’re supposed to do while we’re here.” All in one way or another “give us some hope of immortality—either literally, through the afterlife or reincarnations of the world’s religions, or symbolically” through reproduction or historical deed or memory.

“Endism” is a psychological construct Strozier devised in 1994 that he defines as “the location of self in some future narrative.” But the endist narrative is “not one thing but has itself evolved historically from 11,500 years ago.” Our self-esteem is inversely correlated with the degree to which we regard ourselves as valuable persons in a meaningful universe. According to William James, we want to feel heroic. In this way we manage the existential terror that awareness of death would otherwise provoke. The anxiety that surfaces when there is a sudden terror attack that kills people instantaneously in a restaurant, nightclub, or airport exacerbates existential anxiety of death and we are seized with subconscious fear of the concurrent recognition that we could die at any time for reasons that are purely random and that we cannot anticipate or control. In the United States the lingering trauma of 9/11 triggers existential anxiety even when the attack occurs elsewhere, especially in a European city. (More of a sense of connection, even proximity here, rather than, say, in Istanbul. Europeans are “us”; Turks are “them.”) Trump’s continual harping on “bad” people getting into the country with the intention of carrying out terrorist attacks finds a deep resonance in the American psyche even though there is no evidence of such attacks. On occasion, some of us attach ourselves psychologically to dynamic and charismatic leaders (Trump to his supporters) to allay our existential concerns when they begin to cause us more discomfort.

The belief in immortality, symbolic or real, is germane to extremism. Symbolic immortality includes the belief that we will be remembered through the legacy of an act itself (Timothy McVeigh), the belief that the cause of the ism it will advance (Irish nationalist Patrick Pearse, who led the abortive death-wished 1916 uprising in Dublin), or belief in the promise of a paradise (martyrs/suicide bombers). Citing studies by Jeff Greenberg, Sheldon Solomon, and Tom Pyszczynski, Haddara observes: “Real immortality is what faith systems promise: heaven and an afterlife. . . . Immortality, real or symbolic mitigates the terror of mortality only if one has sufficient self-esteem—that is, if one believes that one has lived life in accordance with a values system that promises immortality. Existential terror may ensue when one is confronted with the prospect of dying but has not developed an effective belief in immortality or lacks the level of self-esteem to believe that one is deserving of immortality.” A “corollary” of terror management theory, he adds, “is that when confronted with death, individuals will identify more tightly with their own worldview and denigrate competing worldviews.”

ISIS, therefore, repulsive and evil to many, an apostasy of Islam to most Muslims is a mere blip on a continuum that reaches into time, to our first etchings of human life, an iteration of a need that we have ached to fulfill since we emerged as a species with an awareness of our being. Our self-esteem is embedded in our culturally constructed beliefs because self-esteem is of such importance to us, we go to extraordinary lengths, even if we are unaware of it, to believe in our worldview because it validates the proposition that we are valuable members of that world.

We focus entirely on ISIS’s abominations and brutalities and savage disrespect for human life. Yet, in context it is far less brutal and savage that the violent extremism of the ideologies of mass murders and suffering perpetrated by some of the major historical actors of the twentieth century. Josef Stalin, ruthlessly implementing forced collectivization, consciously contrived famine in the Ukraine in 1932–33, causing the deaths of at least 3.3 million people; another 3 million perished.
in the Gulags; Hitler eradicated 11 million; 30 million died during Mao’s Great Leap Forward; under Pol Pot up to 2 million Cambodians died in the 1970s.

Four differences stand out. Our knowledge of the atrocities of Stalin, Hitler, Mao, and other authoritarian/dictatorial figures (Uganda’s Idi Amin) came after the killings lay fallow, sometimes many years removed from the tilling, and hence have a displaced psychological impact (certainly not true, however, for survivors of the Holocaust and their children). The absence of proximity, the warp of historical memory, and time lapse mean that our knowledge did not result in trauma (again, certainly not true for survivors of the Holocaust and their children where residual trauma is intergenerational: “We are the ‘second hand smoke,’” Rose Zoltek-Jick writes in her powerful essay, “children of an event that we did not live through but that nevertheless unhappily but existentially marks and defines us. We carry our own tattoos but they are numbers on our psyches, the unconscious mirror of the numbers burned into some of our parents’ arms. As individual as we may be, our parents’ experience has seared us a one. We are a group, a numbered, finite generation bound together. We are all children of that calamity that we call the “War,” capital W, and that the world calls the Shoah or the Holocaust.”). The atrocities were committed by state actors within their sovereign borders; these killing fields were hidden—no cameras, no videos, no live streaming, no collapsed geography. Because we had no explicit knowledge of their occurring when they were taking place, their psychological imprints are different than knowledge of atrocity in real time. ISIS is a nonstate actor; its atrocities pale in comparison with those of other “isms,” but ISIS purposely exposes its savage brutalities; lone-wolf or ISIS-cell terror attacks targeting civilians randomly result in societal trauma and existential anxiety of death (there is something extraordinarily visceral about a beheading, though the time that elapses between the execution and death by gunshot is a nanosecond). Through the use of social media to proselytize on the grounds that this is what the Prophet’s caliphate calls for—death to the nonbeliever—ISIS is “purifying” Islam of departures from the Quran that have accrued over time.

Strozier examines the psychological meanings of the apocalyptic imagination, the cornerstone of the fundamentalist mindset, and the paranoid, a world of “shame and humiliation, of suspiciousness, aggression, and dualisms that separate out all good from pure evil.” Regeneration comes out of death, collective regeneration out of mass death.

The fundamentalist mindset is an attribute of the more radical right and extreme nationalism. Within this mindset there is the potential for violence, violence in waiting, dormant violence. Whether one or the other is triggered depends on behaviors, and Ramakrishna argues that our focus should be on behaviors rather than mindsets. (At his sentencing for gunning down nine African Americans during a church service in Charleston, Dylann Roof, the nineteen-year-old white supremacist, told the jury: “I am not going to lie to you. There is nothing wrong with me psychologically. I created the biggest wave I could. I did all I can do, now it is in the hands of my brothers [my italics]. Other than the fact that I trust people that I shouldn’t and the fact that I’m probably better at constantly embarrassing myself than anyone who’s ever existed, there’s nothing wrong with me psychologically. I would like to make it crystal clear I do not regret what I did. I am not sorry. I have not shed a tear for the innocent people I killed. I do feel sorry for the innocent white children forced to live in the country and I do feel sorry for the innocent white people that are killed daily at the hands of lower races. I feel pity that I had to do what I did in the first place. I feel pity that I had to give up my life because of a situation that never should have existed.”)16 In short, his “brothers” will fulfill the apocalyptic vision. He is a martyr. The cause lives on, more, inspired by his example (and heroism), will follow in this footsteps.
If there is a thread that connects the diffuse strands of Trump’s worldview it is an apocalyptic view of Islamic terrorism. In a speech to a Christian conference in the Vatican in 2014, Steve Bannon, Trump’s alt-right chief political strategist and now permanent member of the National Security Council, declared, “We’re at the very beginning stages of a very brutal and bloody conflict, of which, if the people in this room, the people in the church, do not bind together and really form what I feel is an aspect of the church militant, to really be able to not just stand with our beliefs, but to fight for our beliefs against this new barbarity that’s starting [that would completely eradicate] everything that we’ve been bequeathed over the last 2,000, 2,500 years.”

And on Breitbart Radio, he said, “To be brutally frank Christianity is dying in Europe and Islam is on the rise.”

Former general Michael Flynn, forced to resign as head of the National Security Council after disclosure of his illicit contacts with the Russian Embassy before Trump’s inauguration, goes further in his book The Field of Fight. “We’re in a world war,” he writes, “but very few Americans recognize it and fewer still have any idea how to win it.” On February 26, 2016, he tweeted: “Fear of Muslims is RATIONAL.” “Islam,” he says “is not necessarily a religion but a political system that has a religion behind it.” Newly appointed attorney general Jeff Sessions has warned of the “totalitarian threat” posed by radical Islam. Trump, whose saving grace is that he does not believe in much of anything other than his own near infallibility, merely opines that he will lord it over a new global order based on “ancient truths.” In his inaugural address, Trump promised to defend “the civilized world,” not the free world, a departure from the common practice of US presidents.

Some pundits believe that Trump’s apparent openness to resetting relations with Vladimir Putin is prompted in part to his perception of Putin as an ally in the “civilizational” war with Islam. The Russian Orthodox Church, which Putin is close to, his cultural conservatism, his brutal war in Chechnya, and intervention in Syria put him in the Judeo-Christian box, whereas Angela Merkel’s willingness to admit close to a million refugees into Germany marks her, in the eyes of the alt-right, as a traitor to Western civilization and Trump’s characterization of her refugee policy as a “catastrophic” error. Nor are these sentiments only the purview of Trump and his advisers. In France, Marie Pen, the alt-right National Front’s candidate for president, has called on “Washington, Paris and Moscow to form a strategic alliance against Islamic fundamentalism,” because “the scale of the threat forces us to move fast and together.” The center right’s candidate, François Fillon, a former prime minister who was the center right’s frontrunner to become president until he became engulfed in a scandal, writes in his recently published Conquer Islamic Totalitarianism, “We are at war with an adversary that knows neither weakness nor truce.” In his book War Without End, Pierre Lellouche, France’s former European minister, equates Islamism with Nazism.

When his executive order banning Muslims from seven countries from entering the United States was overturned by the courts, Trump immediately “Othered” the judiciary: it is broken; it is political; it is preventing him from securing the safety of the country. He invented terrorist attacks, which, he said, had gone unreported by the media. The media is “the enemy.” To paraphrase V. S. Naipaul, only the other is real, and one of the dangers of Trump is that he has mastered the art of “othering.” In the Internet of everything, facts are matters of opinion, truth is what you say it is, expertise and legal protocol are mere bureaucratic obstacles, the most baseless assertion has no more value than the most sophisticated analysis, and those in positions of power keep their mouths shut, whine spinelessly, or point to polls showing that over 50 percent of Americans agree with Trump’s banning order. Ironically, world leaders who were harshest in their
condemnation of the banning are from the West; Muslim leaders kept silent, better to say nothing than find your country added to the list—one does not want to provoke a capricious bear.

One can wonder whether Trump’s foreign policy advisers (i.e., his White House clique) have read Samuel Huntington’s *Clash of Civilizations*. Highly controversial at the time of its publication in 1996, it is the administration’s ideological playbook. Certainly, when Lord Alderdice convened his center’s conference on extremism in October 2105, none would have thought that within eighteen months much of the West would be in the grip of right-wing extremism and that the United States would play the Pied Piper. Globalization is on a collision course with a variety of competing and hostile “isms” that presage conflict unless the virulent intent of the converging extremes is diluted and the neoliberal global order in place since the end of the Cold War is reexamined and the institutions that underpin it are modified to have governing relevance to the realities of a world where algorisms are the new divinity. In a recent article in the *Guardian Weekly*, David Shariatmadari writes, “So how would Atran . . . explain to a Trump voter that Muslims are not the enemy? Evidence and truth aren’t always very effective tools of argument, he says. Instead, the key is to start appealing to the emotions, perhaps by invoking admired figures such as Mohammad Ali.” He goes on to quote Atran, “If then I can make some inroads, I’d show that leaders of eight Muslim countries have been women, and then go down the line of some of the great achievements of Muslim civilization, and then recognize that, certainly, certainly, in this time and geopolitical space, there is a cruel, revolutionary strand of fundamentalist Islam that is a real danger not only to people in the United States, but much more so to Muslims around the world.”

An answer as hypothetical as the question is real.

The goal of the paranoid extremist violence of the Nazis was racial purity, an Aryan master race—the elimination of Jews, and other “life unworthy of life”; for the Stalinists, “a workers’ paradise”—the elimination of all counterrevolutionaries; for the Maoists, cultural revolution regeneration—the elimination of all reactionaries; for the Khmer Rouge, a classless agrarian society; for the Hutu in Rwanda, “weeding out the cockroaches”—a cleansing of the Tutsi in a frenzied orgy of killing. Even Robespierre fell victim to his own revolution. In each the end of evil through collective death is the precursor of a utopia, however imagined. ISIS is part of a historical continuum.

In the apocalyptic, hope of a better future is deferred and while it is often associated with the violence and the poor and the oppressed, it also incubates itself in less demonic ways. In the 1950s, when I was a child in Ireland—“Holy Catholic Ireland”—an extreme and ultra-conservative version of Catholicism was practiced. A bishop’s authority superseded that of the state. We were taught that bearing the oppressions and misery of daily life was preparation for a future better in the hereafter, and the more we accepted this as God’s will and submitted to it (“Thy Will be done on Earth as it is in Heaven”), the more we were assured of being welcomed at the pearly gates by Saint Peter. “Mortal” sin brought eternal damnation. Purgatory was a pit stop of penance for an indefinite period for “venial” sin. “Bad thoughts,” that is, any thought of a sexual nature, though the word “sex” was never mentioned (perhaps because the mere mention of the word might spur an illicit thought!). Protestants were the other because their beliefs were false and they were not baptized. They would be denied the rewards of the hereafter and forever reside in Limbo, a halfway house between heaven and hell. In modern-day Israel, increasingly a religious state, questions arise about whether national religious members of the Israel Defense Force will follow orders to forcibly evacuate settlers (mostly national religious) from the West Bank should their rabbis tell them not to do so. Haredi do not accept the existence of the state, believing that only when the Messiah descends and declares himself will the Promised Land reveal itself. Christianity has its Last Day
and Islam has its Day of Judgment. “Isms” have their utopian visions; in the extreme versions of each, the beliefs of the other are false; in the extreme versions of some, the other is evil and must be eliminated. (In Escape from Evil, published posthumously, Ernest Becker argues that we repress “residual” anxiety of death and project it onto other groups we designate as the repositories of evil. Then we have to kill them, in order to rid the world of evil.)\(^22\)

We are swamped with “isms.” More so now than in the later decades of the twentieth century in good measure because the rapidity of disruption engineered by advances in technology and the digital revolution, including the robotization of jobs replacing the workforce and self-learning artificial intelligence revolutionizing the socioeconomic framework embedded in our the societal social has outpaced both individual and collective ability to adapt and cope. We seek refuge from the onslaught. “Isms” provide a haven.

Part 2 explores three conflicts from different perspectives.

In Colombia, four years of intense negotiations between the government of Juan Manuel Santos and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) finally ended the longest civil war (fifty years) in the western hemisphere, at least in terms of there being a signed peace agreement (the peace agreement runs to over two hundred pages). At the end of 2014, more than 220,000 people had been killed and thousands injured. Records show 5.7 million registered victims of forced displacement (second only to Syria), murder, torture, disappearances, kidnappings, and sexual violence among the grave violations of human rights—that is, almost 14 percent of the population are direct victims of the war.\(^23\)

The agreement, however, polarized the country. Some FARC commanders have become embroiled in the lucrative drug trade, and the implementation of complex and far-reaching provisions intended to heal divisions and provide reparations for some million documented victims and essential land reform, where most of the land is owned by a small but powerful elite have every reason to thwart the promised land reforms that are the bedrock of the agreement (the assassination of left-wing activists is on the rise), are challenges that are hard to meet and harder still to overcome. Yet, obstacles that lie ahead should not diminish the negotiators’ accomplishments.

Andrés Ucrós Maldonado reviews the lessons the international community can draw from how Colombia used diplomacy, put a premium on patience, and took pains to design an effective negotiation process that placed victims’ rights at its core, and he explains how these lessons can contribute to peace-making at the regional and global levels. Negotiations of this kind call for patience, persistence, and acceptance that there will be many setbacks for which contingency arrangements will have to be made. Expectations should be held in the check to avoid overreaction to setbacks. This caution applies a hundred times over to talks in Geneva and Astana, Kazakhstan, over Syria’s future.

The Syrian civil war grinds on, with at least 470,000 dead, thousands more injured, half the population displaced, refugees creating a migration crisis in Europe, an array of external actors, each with an agenda that is in conflict, and an even greater array of internal actors either for or against Assad’s regime. ISIS intent on establishing a caliphate, militias embroiled in sectarian death squads, Turkey intent on keeping Syrian Kurds from ceasefire talks, Iran’s hegemonic ambitions, the Saudi’s counter ambitions, Hezbollah fighting on behalf of Assad, yet propping up the anti-Assad government in Lebanon. Peace remains the international community’s primary concern, after trying to forestall North Korea’s onward march to full nuclear weaponry in 2017. Russia has emerged as the major power broker. In Kazakhstan, Turkey and Russia (heretofore on opposite sides of the conflict) and Iran, the Assad government, and “moderate” rebel factions
agreed on a ceasefire, though a shaky one. Talks move to Geneva. The West, which has called for Assad’s ouster since the start of the conflict in 2011, has reluctantly accepted that his regime will remain in power for the time being. Russia has expanded its geopolitical ambitions. Rebel forces supported by US airpower close in on Raqqa; Turkish forces have taken Al Bab; Trump’s objective is the “elimination” of ISIS, and an alliance between the United States and Russia to achieve that end will further muddy the terrains of conflict. Rebel groups labeled terrorist will find themselves equally savaged. In a milieu of uncertainties, there are two givens: the Assad regime will be part of any short-term settlement, and Russia holds the keys to whatever arrangements give some permanence to a ceasefire and is in a position to dictate the contours of agreements.

Omar Abdulaziz Hallaj’s framework is how the war in Syria has exposed “the fragility of the territorial order of the nation-state in the Near East.” His aim is not to write another study of the war but to examine the “territoriality” of the nation-state and whether, in the context of the array of extraneous and internal variables and the geography of “territoriality” at play in Syria, it makes sense to seek a “solution” (a word that has little pertinence to Syria) within a nation-state paradigm or whether we should use different paradigms to reconstruct the Humpty Dumpty territorial patchwork. The war, he argues, “has created new geographic realities” that will not be easily surpassed in governance, political economy, and political culture. This fragmented situation will hinder the prospects of a “top-down solution,” because “none of the negotiating parties has full control over its constituency.” He argues that “the emergence of radicalized actors on the scene is not an accidental feature of the conflict dynamics.” Rather, different actors have used territorial patterns of control and exploited the territory to advance their positioning. “These patterns,” he writes, “intended or not, have fostered the radicalization of the armed actors on all sides, imposing in the meantime asymmetrical patterns of territoriality that will seriously undermine the top-down approach of the Geneva process.” Accordingly, sets of sustainable outcomes might be better served by interventions focused on “concrete social and economic foundations rather than on the abstract liberal peace-building model advocated in the Vienna agreement and codified through UN Security Council Resolution 2254.”

In no other conflict in recent memory has there been such a vicious symbiotic relationship—an iterative cycle in which what happens in Syria impacts a range of external players and what happens among the external players and within their respective orbits impacts Syria, creating a self-perpetuating loop of violence. In the maelstrom of these competing complexities, Syrian civil society has emerged as an increasingly significant player. In “Civil Society during the Peace Talks in Geneva,” Zedoun Alzoubi traces the metamorphosis of civil society organizations (CSOs) from humble beginnings to their present involvement in a multitude of diverse activities. Once forbidden nomenclature in Syria, with its undertones of Western values, CSOs have ventured into numerous fields, providing services in areas where the regime, the rebels, and the marauding militias on both sides have failed to do so either because they are unable to or because they have made a strategic decision to withhold services. In Geneva civil society has an official status and a designated place at the negotiation table on the side, a distinction no civil society associated with a civil war has heretofore received. But like everything else in Syria, civil society is riddled with its own contradictions and divisions. Finding ways to close these cleavages becomes the most pressing priority in a minefield of pressing priorities.

The Israeli–Palestinian conflict remains as intractable as ever, perhaps even more so, after fifty years. My article encapsulates many of the arguments I make in The Two-State Delusion, the product of five years of research and interviews with key players on all sides of the conflict, that the envisaged two-state solution along the lines of the 1967 borders is no longer either a viable
or a feasible option and rejects the argument that the only other option is a one-state solution. Trump’s Middle East policies cement the arguments.

Part 3 is a standalone article, but one that allows this issue on extremism and intractability to end on a hopeful note.

Michael Cowan describes a global study for which he is the lead investigator that provides hope that some of the so-called intractable conflicts may be less intractable. The study will identify leaders around the world who work their way through “social traps in divided communities” and those who choose to work within their own groups; understand how they relate to members of their own and other groups; and capture how they think about what works and what doesn’t in the face of such impasses. He examines what kind of thinking allows some people to bridge racial and other divides. A social trap is defined as “a situation where individuals, groups, or organizations are unable to cooperate because of mutual distrust and lack of social capital, even where cooperation would benefit all.” The importance of research of this kind cannot be overestimated. The Israeli–Palestinian conflict is a study in fathomless distrust, so rock solid that even taking a jackhammer to the rock would not make the slightest dent.

In the eighteen months that have elapsed since the Manchester College conference on extremism, extremism in its many varieties and manifestations has skewed the West in particular. In the knowledge that it is not a new phenomenon, however, but a variant of the isms that are the threads that connect different eras of the human saga, speaking in strange and often difficult-to-understand tongues, spawning patterns of paranoid behaviors, false gods, and visions of utopia, it is, perhaps bathos to conclude with remarks that are themselves utopian: the common denominator of all isms is “othering,” the delegitimation of the humanity of others, and the consequences when we fail to speak, not just to condemn but to act. An ism-driven minority will always prevail over a passive majority. If you doubt the truth of that, please reread Rose Zoltek-Jick’s talk and hear her words reverberate with warning. If you are silent, you are complicit.

Notes

1 In a Twitter post on November 17, 2016, Mike Pompeo (@RepMikePompeo), the incoming director of the CIA, wrote, after being confirmed, “I look forward to rolling back this disastrous deal with the world’s largest state sponsor of terrorism” (https://t.co/bfC9jWpY). In 2014, while negotiations were ongoing, Pompeo warned that the agreement was “emerging a regime that is intent on destroying America” (quoted in “Trump’s CIA Nominee Wants Unrestricted Power to Collect Data,” PRI’s The World, November 18, 2016, https://www.pri.org/stories/2016-11-18/trumps-cia-nominee-wants-unrestricted-power-collect-data). This message, of course, was music to Israel’s ears. Trump’s chief strategist, Steve Bannon, was executive chairman of Breitbart News from 2012 to 2016, where he pushed a nationalist agenda and turned the publication into what he called “the platform for the alt-right.”


8 Ibid.


