Potty Politics: Investigating the Policymaking Processes of Sanitation Service to the Urban Poor in Delhi

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POTTY POLITICS: INVESTIGATING THE POLICYMAKING PROCESSES OF
SANITATION SERVICE TO THE URBAN POOR IN DELHI

A Dissertation Presented

by

TANUSHREE BHAN

Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies,
University of Massachusetts Boston,
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

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POTTY POLITICS: INVESTIGATING THE POLICYMAKING PROCESSES OF SANITATION SERVICE TO THE URBAN POOR IN DELHI

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by
TANUSHREE BHAN

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This study investigates why sanitation outcomes vary across urban poor communities in Delhi, India. Unequal access to quality sanitation has serious implications for the health, dignity, and economic well-being of the poor and public health in general due to risks of environmental contamination. For this multiple-case study, a sample of 15 communities is drawn from slums, public housing, homeless shelters, and the streets. The database comprises of direct observations of sanitation outcomes in these communities, interviews with 95 key policy informants, official documents of relevant government agencies, newspaper articles, and a perception-of-the-poor survey of 30 sanitation bureaucrats. Thematic analysis of government documents and interviews with officials reveals a
laissez faire framework for governing sanitation where the state plays a limited role of building infrastructures. Broadly speaking, the poor are blamed for unsanitary conditions that arise due to limited government intervention, and are handed the responsibility of service management for sanitation improvement. To then understand why outcomes vary within this broader framework, the qualitative dataset is analyzed using process-tracing to uncover policy decisions across communities. Variations in social constructions of the poor by policymakers have a dominant influence in shaping policy decisions. Perceptions of unsanitary habits and incorrigible, irresponsible behaviors result in lack of government support and worse sanitation outcomes in “deviant” communities. Government support for better sanitation is justified as civic education of the communities perceived as needy “dependents”, and a reward for politically organized “contender” communities. A quantitative cultural consensus analysis of the survey shows that a majority of the bureaucrats share a strongly-held view of the poor on the dependent-deviant spectrum. This largely corroborates the qualitative findings. Clientelist politics is the other influential factor that shapes policy decisions. Poor communities access service improvements by exchanging votes with politicians and solidarity with service providers. The strength and longevity of these clientelistic exchanges influences the timing and provision of entitled sanitation services in client-communities. Findings show that inequitable sanitation outcomes are manufactured by biases that blame the poor for service deficits and make the provision of entitled benefits contingent on political mobilization of exhibiting “good citizenship.” This has serious implications for democratic accountability between the government and the very citizens that are most in need of public services to meet their sanitation needs.
DEDICATION

To my grandfathers
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

There are few moments in my life that have had such a profound effect on the way I make sense of the world than the education, experiences, and learning on this research journey that has culminated in this dissertation study. I owe an immense debt of gratitude to all the community members who, without expectation of return, opened up their homes and trusted me with their stories of struggle and success to have access to better public sanitation, and the serious violations to personal dignity and community health that ensued in its absence. Though a stranger in their midst, in more ways than obvious, I was extremely fortunate to have met these people who were generous with their time and respect toward me and this study. This dissertation would not have been possible without their engaged participation. I would also like to convey special thanks to Sunil Aledia, without whom I would not have been able to hear the voices of the homeless in Delhi.

My community of accomplished scholars, educators, and mentors in the Department of Public Policy and Public Affairs – my academic home – at UMass Boston imparted quality research training and sharpened my analytical skills through patient engagement and critical assessment of research ideas and plans that developed my ability and confidence to conduct this research project. To all the faculty members who shared their knowledge and valuable time with me, both inside and outside the classroom, my heartfelt thank you. A special thank you is owed to Melissa Quashie, our graduate program administrator, and Debby Kermer, research consultant in the Fenwick library at George Mason University. Ms. Quashie has been a tremendous and invaluable source of support for an international student like me, and more so over this past year. I cannot
thank Ms. Kermer enough for being so unbelievably supportive in helping a non-GMU student work through the NVivo data analysis software. I am also thankful to the Office of the Vice Provost for Global Programs and Office of Graduate Studies for the research grants that supported nine months of fieldwork for this study.

I could not have asked for a better and more inter-disciplinary dissertation committee than the one guiding this study. Dr Erin O’Brien, the committee chair, was a tough advisor but an even stronger supporter of this project and my ability to conduct high-quality research. Ever since Spring 2015, when I first took her class, her keen interest and close engagement guided the development of this project from a one-page concept note. I am immensely thankful for her commitment to this research, and her questions and insights have challenged me to think harder and work towards becoming a better researcher. Dr Amit Patel’s expertise on issues of slum poverty in India provided critical insights that improved the design of this dissertation study. His valuable inputs helped me present topical issues in the narrative with much greater clarity for a foreign audience. I owe him immense gratitude for connecting me with Ms. Kermer at his alma mater. Dr Patel has also been very generous with his time in mentoring me pursue a career in research. I was extremely fortunate to have found Dr Rosalyn Negrón in the Department of Anthropology, who not only agreed to be part of this policy research project but has tremendously advanced the novelty of this study by introducing me to a methodological framework whose application remains largely untested in policy studies. I am grateful for the time and support she provided, both while I was in the field and subsequently, in helping me operationalize a novel research method, and her thoughtful feedback on other parts of the dissertation that vastly improved the quality of writing and analysis.
And finally, though by no means least, my hopes and decisions that have led to this moment were made resolute by the unwavering support and abundant love of my parents – Maa and Papuli, we did it! They have always put my needs and my dreams ahead of their own, gone above and beyond to remove hurdles in my path, and comforted me from thousands of miles away when I was here, advancing my career, and barely there for them. I have missed their warm embrace, in good times and in bad, over these five years or so. I owe everything to them. I have missed a hand over my head, a gesture of benediction upon young ones, of my grandfathers whom I lost early on in this journey. As they look down upon me today, smiling from the heavens, I know their blessings never left me and have carried me to this day. This moment is as much mine as it is theirs. My family here in the US, Rakesh M. Bhatt, Ashi Bhatt, and Priya Bhatt and their friends, and our relatives provided comfort and joy. To my friends in Delhi and Boston, I am truly thankful for your academic and emotional support, and for being so understanding of my constraints when work took precedence over phone calls and hangouts. Stephen Colbert and his team of writers deserve a special mention for providing humor in challenging times and brightening up my mornings.
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<td>BSUP</td>
<td>Basic Services for the Urban Poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCA</td>
<td>Cultural Consensus Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>Cultural Consensus Model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCT</td>
<td>Cultural Consensus Theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CM</td>
<td>Chief Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSE</td>
<td>Centre for Science and Environment</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTC</td>
<td>Community Toilet Complex</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCW</td>
<td>Delhi Commission for Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DJB</td>
<td>Delhi Jal Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMC</td>
<td>Delhi Municipal Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DUSIB</td>
<td>Delhi Urban Shelter Improvement Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIUS</td>
<td>Environmental Improvement of Urban Slums</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EWS</td>
<td>Economically-Weaker Sections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOIA</td>
<td>Freedom of Information Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INR</td>
<td>Indian National Rupee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JJC</td>
<td>Jhuggi Jhonpri Cluster</td>
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<tr>
<td>JJR</td>
<td>Jhuggi Jhonpri Resettlement</td>
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<tr>
<td>JMP</td>
<td>Joint Monitoring Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCD</td>
<td>Municipal Corporation of Delhi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLA</td>
<td>Member of the Legislative Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organizations</td>
</tr>
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<td>NSDP</td>
<td>National Slum Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O&amp;M</td>
<td>Operation and Maintenance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OD</td>
<td>Open Defecation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODF</td>
<td>Open Defecation-free</td>
</tr>
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<td>RTI</td>
<td>Right to Information</td>
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<tr>
<td>RWA</td>
<td>Residents’ Welfare Associations</td>
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<tr>
<td>SBM</td>
<td>Swachh Bharat Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UBSP</td>
<td>Urban Basic Services Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>WSP</td>
<td>Water and Sanitation Program</td>
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background: What’s the Problem?

The year 2017 marked a critical moment as 55 percent of the world’s population came to live in cities and towns, with a majority of these people living in developing countries of Asia. Yet, this critical moment was also a somber reminder to policymakers of the staggering sanitation challenge: 700 million urban residents lived without improved sanitation, compared to 156 million without safe drinking water in 2017.¹ These global trends mirror the disparities between progress on sanitation versus water for developing countries as well: about 30 percent of the urban population in developing countries lived without safe sanitation compared to 15 percent without drinking water supply (UN, 2017). The problem of inadequate provision of hygienic, convenient, and affordable sanitation (i.e., toilets and waste removal/treatment system) is rapidly urbanizing,

¹ Improved sanitation is defined as access to toilets connected to a piped sewer system, septic tanks, improved pit latrines that hygienically separates human excreta from human contact (UN, 2014). Although international and local development organizations recognize community toilets as improved sanitation, growing evidence on access and quality of these public facilities in urban slums in India questions such a classification. Therefore, the present study considers only sewered/septic/improved pit toilets as improved sanitation, recognizing full well that absent access to 24x7 water supply and technical/financial support for scientific designs and waste removal in poor areas, household-level solutions may be better than the prevalent public option, but not always be able to prevent human contact with feces or environmental pollution. Since homeless shelters are a place of shared living, and pavement dwellers only have access to public toilets, improved sanitation for these two categories of urban poor is a well-maintained (i.e., accessible, usable, sanitary) public toilet facilities.
especially in the developing world (WHO, 2015) and disproportionately bears on the poor who are largely dependent on public services to meet their basic human needs. Absence of proper sanitation that eliminates contact with feces and wastewater, at home and in the neighborhood, will reverse gains to personal health from improved water supplies and economic wellbeing from better job opportunities due to higher incidence of morbidity when poor sanitation threatens to contaminate food and water sources. As such, inadequate provision of sanitation is among a host of serious deprivations facing the poor such as access to drinking water, food, durable shelter, and livelihood opportunities.

Against the backdrop of a rapidly urbanizing problem of inadequate sanitation, I argue that it is a matter of serious policy concern for India where its urban population and slum population are increasing at similar rates at 31 percent and 25 percent respectively (Census of India, 2011:12). In 2011, 19 percent of urban households in India did not have access to private/at-home sanitation systems (toilets connected to sewer/septic system) compared to 8 percent households that were not being served by piped water supply. In the same year, 19 percent of slum households in India did not have access to any sanitation (private or public), compared to 3 percent without drinking water supply (Census of India, 2011).

As the poor bear a disproportionate burden of unequal access to improved/quality sanitation (UN-HABITAT, 2012), there is general consensus in the global policy community on who the urban poor are in developing countries: slum dwellers (e.g., Fay and Laderchi, 2005; McFarlane, 2019; World Bank, 1999; United Nations, 2016). Though slums are the most visible manifestation of poverty, they are by no means a
homogenized group of urban poor in terms of socio-economic-political resources. This study follows the lead of emerging research that adopts a broader conceptualization of shelter-defined urban poverty beyond slums to also include other vulnerable housing as well as shelter-less residence of the poor on the streets (e.g., Banda et al., 2014; Begum, 1999; Joshi et al., 2011). As an indicator of the scope of the sanitation problem facing the urban poor, evidence shows that slums are urbanizing faster than the cities more generally, particularly for the regions of Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, including India (e.g., Black and Fawcett, 2004; Samanta, 2015). For example, according to the Global Monitoring Report of the World Bank (2013), South Asia witnessed a net increase of 25.9 million poor living in urban slums between 1990 and 2008, while in India, the slum population increased from 52.4 million in 2001 to 65.5 million in 2011, at a decadal growth rate of 25.1 percent per annum between the two census periods (Census of India, 2011).

Though slums are, by definition, characterized as underserviced low-income settlements, there still exist variations in the level of service deprivation among them. For example, in India, 65 percent of slum households had access to potable drinking water supplies compared to 56 percent who had access to private toilets that were connected to underground sewers or septic systems (Census of India, 2011). The trends in urbanization of the poor and laggard progress on safe and hygienic sanitation have led scholars like Bakker et al. (2008), Murthy (2012), and Nolan et al. (2017) to argue that policymaking for sanitation must be de-linked from urban water supply. Planning for sustainable quality of sanitation would require innovative technologies and service delivery mechanisms in low-income and densely-populated slum settlements such that all urban residents have
quick, easy, and round-the-clock access to clean, secure, and functional facilities without having to plan ahead to use (i.e., public/community toilets - fixed hours of operation, distance, waiting-time) and that do not contaminate the environment (McFarlane et al., 2014; Satterthwaite et al., 2015). A concerted policy effort is needed to address this vexing basic needs and public health issue because those suffering the brunt of service deficits are a rapidly growing number of urban poor with limited capacities to afford non-public and quality sanitation options.

1.2 Research Purpose

Even as the poor disproportionately bear the burden of weak public services (e.g., Keefer and Khemani, 2004; McGranahan and Satterthwaite, 2006), there is emerging empirical evidence to suggest further differential in service provision among the poor based on where they live (e.g., Heller et al., 2015, Vithayathil and Singh, 2012). In fact, some scholars like Sidhwani (2015) have argued that there is much more segregation among residential settlements of the poor by basic services like water and sanitation in Indian cities than by otherwise salient social demographics like caste. The question anchoring this research inquiry seeks to investigate why sanitation outcomes vary across communities of the poor in Delhi, India. The overall objective of this study is to examine how policymakers design the content of sanitation policy – framing the problem, policy recipients, and implementation rules and procedures – in the process of service delivery to the urban poor.
This study of urban sanitation for the poor in Delhi is a case of politics of poverty in the process of public policymaking. I engage Harold Lasswell’s (1936) formulation of politics as a pragmatic and yet, philosophical question of ‘who gets what, when, and how’ for the present study because it helps us understand politics as a process of distribution and re-distribution of public resources, while, at the same time, allowing an investigation of the characteristics of individuals or groups (i.e., the who) that receive these public benefits (or why not) via public policies. The study of politics in social policy research matters because formal institutions can, at best, act as loose constraints on how bureaucracies shape policy outcomes on the ground, especially for services where implementation procedures still involve face-to-face encounters with client populations (e.g., Lipsky, 1984; Brodkin, 1997; Keiser, 2010). And while ample research on American welfare state politics shows how social policies and programs are designed to support/benefit some populations more than others (e.g., Soss, 1999; Soss et al., 2001; Fording, 2001), there is much less evidence of such investigations into the ‘making’ of policies for the poor, especially on urban sanitation, in India.

The purpose of this case study research is as follows: it is an investigation of how politics in the content and design of sanitation policymaking can lead to unequal distribution of service outcomes for the poor in Delhi. This investigation tests the aforementioned scholarly claim that some poor may be more “privileged” or “deserving” than others in terms of access to better sanitation outcomes. For example, the study is well-positioned to show how and why policymakers may deliberately re-design provision of sewerage as a redistributive (need-based) service even when some poor become eligible to receiving it as a distributive (entitlement-based) sanitation service. This multiple-case study adopts a
mixed-method research design that, on the one hand, entails a qualitative investigation of the policymaking processes underlying varied sanitation outcomes across 15 poor communities sampled for this study, and on the other engages a quantitative inquiry to test the validity, via triangulation, of qualitative findings. Qualitative data, in the form of 95 key-informant interviews, policy documents from the three sanitation bureaucracies, newspaper articles, and field observations are analyzed by tracing the sequence of decision-making steps in the policy process and pattern-matching between a theoretically-predicted process and an empirically-observed process of unfolding of decision-making events resulting in observed outcomes. Quantitative data, in the form of a perception-of-the-poor survey administered to 30 sanitation bureaucrats, was analyzed using factor analysis in the cultural consensus model to test whether these public officials shared a view of deservingness of the poor for policy support that could in turn be used to triangulate social construction theory-led explanations for variations in sanitation outcomes.

1.3 Research Significance

Scholarly and policy attention on improving coverage and access to safe sanitation has often lagged behind drinking water supply largely because the former is directly connected with some of our most private behaviors. This lends a measure of social awkwardness to research and policymaking that understands and governs public consequences of everyday bodily processes (McGranahan, 2014). Research on urban sanitation in developing countries has predominantly, though by no means exclusively, focused on struggles and politics of the poor in access to sanitation infrastructures (e.g.,
Burra et al., 2003; McFarlane et al., 2014), slums as ideologically-framed sites of dirt, disease, and exclusion (e.g., Kaviraj, 1997; McFarlane, 2008). And when research on governance is undertaken, it tends to be largely based on explorations of technological innovations for providing low-cost sanitation infrastructures (e.g., Satterthwaite et al., 2015), evaluations of hygiene/behavior change interventions for improving sanitation-related health outcomes (e.g., Das, 2015; Kar and Chambers, 2008), and resource constraints (fiscal and technical knowledge deficits) to achieve the universal provision of quality sanitation (e.g., Boex and Edwards, 2014; Mara, 2012). There has been little concern among scholars to investigate how policies are being made to address sanitation deficits among the poor, and whether it is the case that these policies are deepening the sanitation crisis and vulnerabilities among a section of the society that is most dependent on publicly-provided services like sanitation.

Since the investigation of the policymaking process began with a broad research question on why sanitation outcomes varied across poor communities, this open-endedness allowed the opportunity to capture and study multiple possible explanations. Four theoretical perspectives emerged as relevant explanations for varied outcomes – theory of social construction of target populations in the design of public policies (Schneider and Ingram, 1993; Schram, 2009), clientelist politics in policy implementation (e.g., Chandra, 2004; Ferraz, 2007), neighborhood effects of spatial inequities in the provision of public goods and services (e.g., Montgomery and Hewett, 2005; Feler and Henderson, 2011), and organizational constraints in service delivery to low-income communities (e.g., Mara, 2012; Mohanty, 2014).
This study makes an important contribution to the literature on urban sanitation by using a normative theory of deservingness of the poor as one of the explanatory factors underlying disparate provision of sanitation to the poor. By unpacking the content and design of policymaking that relate to the process of sanitation problem-framing, formal and informal rules and implementation procedures, and rationale for these design decisions, I am able to determine whether unequal provision of sanitation are influenced by policymakers’ normative-evaluative judgements of the poor (policy recipients) as “deserving” or “undeserving” of policy support. This normative theoretical framework, developed by Anne Schneider and Helen Ingram (1993, 2005), postulates that policymakers’ calculus of who gets what, when, and how is shaped by the dominant social stereotypes or cultural characterizations of target populations that become embedded in the decision-making processes vis-à-vis the content and design of a policy. To the best of my knowledge, Schneider and Ingram’s (ibid.) theory of social construction of target populations has not been tested in the study of a public policy issue in India. Therefore, this research also makes an important contribution to this scholarly literature by joining a handful of studies that expand the scope of its empirical application outside the global North, and likely being among the first to test the core tenets of the theory, and thereby developing nuanced insights into its application for a critical urban policy issue in South Asia (see Pierce et al., 2014 for a review of empirical applications of the framework).

The application of social construction theory for this study is significant because policy-created and policy-perpetuated characterizations of “deserving” or “undeserving” signals to policy targets, and the public at large, the actions or behaviors that are deemed
necessary by the government for people to qualify for benefits and opportunities in society. In other words, how people are treated by policies – whether their problems are heeded or ignored – has implications for the construction of citizenship itself. Though investigating the implications of unequal sanitation provision on the nature and extent of citizenship practices of the poor was beyond the scope of this study, there was emerging evidence of policymakers’ view of a “deserving citizen”. During interviews with bureaucrats in sanitation agencies in Delhi, some officials articulated a “threshold condition” for the agencies to observe their constitutionally-mandated duties: the poor had to exhibit responsible civic behaviors by adhering to their normatively-dictated ‘duties and obligations’ – e.g., self-managing service upkeep in their communities – as “proper” members of society before expecting or demanding better provisioning from the government as a morally-claimed right.

There is substantial body of research on clientelistic politics in developing countries, including India, where quid pro quo agreements between poor-residents and state agents are established on the basis of exchange of “valuable goods” (e.g., votes, bribes in the form of cash, liquor etc.) by the former for provision/improvements in public services by the latter. However, these politics, especially in the urban policy domain, have largely focused on poor people’s access to water (e.g., Herrera, 2014; Laurie and Crespo, 2006) or de facto security from slum demolitions (e.g., Doshi, 2012; Edelman and Mitra, 2006). This study will, therefore, widen the application of clientelistic politics of sanitation service to the urban poor.
Moving beyond the perspectives from public policy and political science in the study of the policymaking process, there is growing scholarly interest in the sociological and epidemiological domains of research on neighborhood effects to situate intra-urban disparities in access to public services in the context of the location of poor settlements within cities of developing countries. Since sanitation is a natural candidate to study the effects of negative externalities from the presence of slums (e.g., increased exposure to health risks; diminished prestige and real-estate value) to the larger neighborhood, research on neighborhood effects has taken off in countries like Brazil (e.g., Nadalin and Igliori, 2015), China (e.g., Zhang et al., 2016), and South Africa (Steinbrink et al., 2011) over the last two decades. While research on neighborhood effects in India, and especially in Delhi, has largely explored removal and peripheralization of slums due to negative externalities to middle and higher-income neighborhoods (e.g., Dupont, 2011; Ghertner, 2011), this study is also well-positioned to investigate if poor communities benefit from positive externalities (i.e., better sanitation service) from being located in a well-served or higher-income neighborhood compared to those embedded in a similarly impoverished neighborhood.

Engaging an organizational resource perspective from public administration/public management tradition further advances an inter-disciplinary and a deeper understanding of the policy decisionmaking processes. Researchers in this scholarly tradition have conducted numerous studies on municipal financing and service management procedures to argue that urban local governments in many developing countries like India, Indonesia, and Brazil suffer from weak revenue-raising capacities and techno-managerial skills to meet growing demands for services, especially by the rapidly urbanizing poor populations
(e.g., Bakalin and Jaganath, 1991; Rondinelli, 1990). With water supply being the predominant subject of investigation (e.g., Bayliss, 2011; Herrera, 2014), this study expands the empirical application of this public administration/public management literature to test whether local governments may be perversely incentivized to “cream clients” by filtering out those poor communities that are either too big (in terms of number of households) or too difficult (in terms of topography) to provide sanitation service.

1.4 Policy Significance

The issue of unequal and unsafe sanitation should be of concern to policymakers and policy practitioners for three reasons. First, poor sanitation has serious consequences for personal health and dignity of already vulnerable populations and public health in general, due to spillover effects via environmental contamination. Second, greater risk to personal and public health due to bad sanitation attenuates productivity of the workforce, and curtails prospects for upward economic and social mobility of the urban poor as well as overall economic growth. And third, growing service deficits should cause a re-think about how the problem is understood and solutions are delivered to the un-served and under-served populations to ensure, at a minimum, that public funds are effectively utilized for lasting service outcomes. The first two reasons relate to the overarching policy significance of sanitation research, like the present study, while the third reason deals specifically with the policy design-oriented nature of this study. I discuss each of these aspects in detail below.
The first major significance of this study relates to the health hazards associated with deficient sanitation that are particularly acute in zones of urban poverty like slums that are characterized by congested living spaces. Poor sanitation is responsible for growing burden of diarrheal diseases, especially among children – of the 1.7 million fatalities caused by such diseases, 90 percent are children under the age of 5 living mostly in developing countries (Minh and Hung, 2011: 64). This means that even if most slum households ‘could’ build their own safe and hygienic household toilets and hire private waste removal services, health risks associated with even a few households in the community improperly disposing sewage or defecating in the open would still be high enough to mitigate gains from personal sanitation improvements. Poorly constructed toilets and absence of proper waste disposal facilities can also contaminate groundwater resources, thereby resulting in negative spillovers for community health. Yet another source of risk exposure to personal health and dignity is having to use dirty shared/community toilets that are provided in slums and informal settlements by government agencies. Besides threats to personal safety from using these public facilities late in the evenings, persons with disability, women (including pregnant mothers), and young girls are particularly vulnerable to infections and diseases. The gross indignity of forced open defecation when waiting in line at community toilets is not an option, or reducing food/water intake at night to synchronize one’s bodily functions with fixed hours of operation of these facilities also has serious adverse health consequences like urinary and intestinal infections and diseases (see also Satterthwaite et al., 2015).

The implication of poor slum sanitation for city-wide public health is established by the close proximity of slums to other non-slum residential areas that provide (informal)
employment opportunities to residents of the former. For example, in Delhi, 75 percent slums are surrounded by residential areas which means that, regardless of higher-income households’ ability to afford preventative medical treatment, health risks for the city’s population are not completely eliminated (DUSIB, 2014). Therefore, negative spillover effects of poor sanitation within communities seriously jeopardizes health of the vulnerable poor who are directly prone to infections and diseases and, though to a lesser extent, of residents of adjoining areas in the same neighborhood. As this study will show, the negative health effects of poor sanitation described above are by no means limited to slums but are shared more broadly by some public housing sites, homeless shelters, and pavement dwellers.

The second major policy significance of this study relates to the loss of human capital attributable to poor sanitation that has adverse consequences for economic growth. Poor sanitation causes economic losses associated with direct costs of treating sanitation-related illnesses, lost income through reduced or lost productivity, and lost productive time due to distant sanitation facilities and/or searching for clean facilities. For example, a World Bank study (2011: 53) estimated that urban households in the poorest wealth quintile in India suffered the highest per capita economic losses, and the total economic loss due to improper sanitation was equal to 6.4 percent of India’s gross domestic product in 2006. In general, studies have also shown that fiscal gains from improved sanitation in developing countries via social and economic development are significant. For example, Hutton and Bartram (2007) estimated that for every US$ 1 invested in providing universal coverage of safe and quality sanitation in developing countries would result in return of US$ 11.2 to world output. While the costs of achieving improved sanitation provisions in
the developing world may seem insurmountable at US$ 142 billion per year (at 2005 prices), the cost per capita is in fact only US$ 28. And when we account for often unmeasured benefits like cost-savings on healthcare and caregiving, and productivity gains due to fewer lost work-days, school-days, better environment quality that altogether operate with a multiplier effect, the potential economic gains from improved sanitation far exceed the costs of service provision and maintenance (Minh and Hung, 2011: 68). Therefore, quality sanitation for all citizens is fundamental to public health and dignity and makes good economic sense for policymakers to invest in universal service improvements because it improves everyone’s wellbeing.

The third major policy significance is that the study allows policymakers to evaluate the ostensible advantages in framing sanitation as a structural problem and, instead, consider the sociological aspects of sanitation as a multi-dimensional problem that requires more than just expertise in engineering/physical sciences. As scholars like Mara (2012) and Satterthwaite et al. (2015) observe, improving access and quality of provision will require local governments to work with inadequate/un-served communities recognizing that one-size-fits-all sanitation may not be amenable across a heterogenous group of urban poor and nature of their residential environment. Against the backdrop of growing deficits in sanitation to the poor that were highlighted in the opening section of this introductory chapter, the study is also significant in that it allows an examination of other elements of policy design such as policy goals, rules, tools, and procedures to achieve said goals. This is important because it not only allows an evaluation of whether and how sanitation provisions are alleviating the challenges faced by the poor in meeting their basic sanitation need, but also whether public monies are being wasted in ad-hoc provisions
that are divorced from ground realities of the problem of sanitation. Engaging diverse perspectives of local communities and experts with relevant domain knowledge in the process of making sanitation policy may be necessary to bring about significant (sustained) improvements in the health and wellbeing of the poor.

1.5 Structure of the Dissertation

This dissertation is organized into seven chapters. After this introductory discussion, chapter 2 lays out the four theoretical frameworks – neighborhood effects, social construction of target populations, organizational constraints, and clientelistic politics – that provide the conceptual basis for understanding differential provision of a public service like sanitation to the poor. By comparing and contrasting thematic findings of these theoretical models, I am able to engage in a critical assessment of the literatures by identifying gaps as well as exploring areas for cross-theoretic learning to bridge knowledge deficits in extant theories. Chapter 3 presents the methodological framework to operationalize this study that begins with introducing the broad research question, rationale for a mixed-method design for this multiple-case study, and Delhi as the chosen research site. Thereafter, I proceed to present a detailed description of the unit of analysis, study variables, study sample, and the sources and methods of qualitative and quantitative data collection and analyses. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the steps taken to ensure validity of empirical findings, and limitations in research design that can curtail the analytical power of conclusions drawn from this study.
The next three chapters present analytical discussions that help us understand the overarching research question anchoring this dissertation research: why do sanitation outcomes vary across urban poor communities in Delhi. Chapter 4 establishes the context of ideas and institutions that have governed sanitation policymaking for the poor in Delhi. Using themes from new institutionalism literature, this qualitative analysis of government documents and interviews with public officials shows how federal government-led urban sanitation programs over four decades (1972 - 2014) put in place path-dependent policy processes that have defined the problem and design of implementation rules for local bureaucracies delivering sanitation to the poor. The bureaucracies in Delhi, on their part, have not unthinkingly adopted broad policymaking guidance from the top, but instead used normative ideas of personal/community (and by extension, limited government) responsibility in sanitation delivery to justify and perpetuate a laissez faire framework of federally-prescribed institutional designs over time, that has been replicated across a broader categorization of low-income communities. These institutional analyses are important for contextualizing the discussion on the politics of policymaking and sanitation outcomes observed in the poor communities sampled from these residential categories in the next chapter.

Chapter 5 seeks evidence for process-based causal explanations of variations in sanitation outcomes across 15 urban poor communities in Delhi. Starting with field observations of outcome(s) in each sampled community, I used the method of process-tracing to work backwards to investigate the sequence of policy decisions that resulted in these observed outcomes. These policy decision processes were uncovered via in-depth interviews with 95 key policy stakeholders like bureaucrats, politicians, residents, and NGOs that were
triangulated with newspaper reports, government documents, court filings, and field observations. Since process-tracing is concerned with whether a theoretically-hypothesized causal process is observed in the chain or process of empirical decisionmaking resulting in the outcome, I used a pattern-matching technique to establish the prevalence of these theory-driven causal relationships. Findings from this pattern-matching analytic method revealed multiple conjunctural causality in the sequence of policymaking decisions resulting in observed variations in sanitation service. Using a coding reference rate to establish dominant causal explanations as well as parsing the evidence grounded in competing theories generated strong support for social construction theory in shaping policymaking process(es) that resulted in varied sanitation outcomes in 9 communities, and clientelistic politics that weighed in on policy decisions connected with service provision in the remaining 6 cases.

Chapter 6 undertakes a quantitative assessment of 30 sanitation policymaking bureaucrats’ shared views about the poor and the poor’s deservingness for sanitation upkeep by the government in Delhi. Specifically, bureaucrats’ social constructions of the poor will be analyzed using cultural consensus analysis (CCA), a methodological framework for measuring the presence of a culturally-coherent knowledge domain. CCA will further enable empirical testing of theoretically-proposed causal linkages between categories of social constructions and commensurate policy design choices in Schneider and Ingram’s (1993) typological model. Results of the CCA will be triangulated with the preceding chapter’s qualitative findings about social constructions of the poor, to make more robust causal inferences. In so doing, this mixed-method design, wherein a
quantitative inquiry is embedded within a larger qualitative case study, strengthens this study’s theoretical generalizability and validity.

Finally, chapter 7 summarizes and reconciles findings from the three empirical chapters that shine light on the politics of urban poverty in public policymaking vis-à-vis disparate provision of sanitation service to the poor in Delhi. Based on these findings, this chapter also leads a discussion on some policy recommendations toward alleviating these disparities that have serious implications for physical, social, and economic health of the vulnerable poor and the health of our democratic institutions when they fail to deliver these citizenship benefits to all.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

This chapter presents a detailed discussion of four inter-disciplinary theories that predominate scholarly work on unequal distribution of public services in society. These theoretical models provide the conceptual framework for understanding the overarching research question for this study: why sanitation outcomes vary among the cohort of urban poor in Delhi. Although these theories developed independently in their respective scientific communities, there may be some complementarity between the operationalization of these perspectives. For example, social construction theorists argue that policy deservingness of target populations is a function of their prevailing public image – positive or negative – and political power – e.g., propensity to organize and mobilize. The latter component of social construction theory is the central concern of clientelism that makes some groups more politically attractive to extend benefits (e.g., sanitation) over others. Moreover, the conditions underlying rising and falling political fortunes of client groups can explain changes in social construction of target populations over time. And it may be possible that bureaucracies face fiscal and/or personnel constraints when resources are disproportionately allocated to constituencies of powerful
political patrons that, in turn, lowers availability of resources for service provision and improvements in other areas or neighborhoods of the city.

Sections 2.2 – 2.5 discuss these theoretical perspectives in detail. The discussion is organized around a “funnel” approach whereby general scholarly work is summarized to reveal broad theoretical applications, followed by a synthesis of literature most closely related to the politics of sanitation poverty in urban India (Roberts, 2010). The objective is to draw out similarities and contradictions across arguments within each tradition, and to explore key issues and knowledge gaps via cross-theoretic learning. Section VI concludes with a summary of the main theoretical ideas of these four independent variables of this study.

2.2 Social Constructions of the Deserving Poor

The theory of social construction of target populations in the study of policy design was developed by Anne Schneider and Helen Ingram (1993, 2007) to understand how power operates in the policymaking process that can explain why public policies sometimes fail to achieve public goals. In other words, by focusing attention on the design and content of public policy in the policymaking process, the authors investigate how policy treats some people better (or worse) than others in terms of distribution of policy benefits (or punishment). By adopting a clear normative-evaluative stance in the study of policy design, the theory breaks from other policy process theories like Lowi’s (1979) ‘iron triangles’ and Sabatier’s (1988) ‘advocacy coalition frameworks’ of interest group politics and policy coalitions associated with formulation of distributive policies and policy change (Schneider and Ingram, 2013: 190).
Social construction in political science and policy studies, which developed independently of similar tradition in other disciplines like sociology, is not concerned with the source of these cultural characterizations or whether they resonate with how groups identify themselves; what matters for policy scholars is that these popular images exist and that they are manipulated by policymakers to craft policies that have “real” consequences for the well-being of recipient persons or groups. Because public officials care about political consequences of policy decisions, social construction of target populations is itself a cognitive process in the minds of politicians based on both the stereotypes that they themselves hold and those they believe are held by the public at large – the latter being important for policies to be perceived legitimate (actively or tacitly) in democratic societies. Because elections matter in democracies, policymakers also pay heed to the perceived political power (e.g., ability to organize and mobilize, make campaign contributions) of the target group on whom they wish to confer burdens or benefits. This convergence of perceived public images and political power of target populations led Schneider and Ingram (1994: 334) to develop a 2x2 typology of four broad categories of social construction of target populations and commensurate policy designs. This typology has constructions of deservingness on the x-axis and perceived political power on the y-axis.

The advantaged group, like the elderly and working professionals carry positive public images like “hardworking”, “honest taxpayers”, and are perceived to a politically formidable group (e.g., vote en bloc). These groups will be beneficiaries even when the causal linkages to justify their inclusion and connection to some larger public goal is
tenuous or absent, mainly because they possess political resources to largely fend off negative portrayals. Therefore, policymakers will oversubscribe policy benefits and undersubscribe burdens to this group – ‘deserving and entitled’. The *contenders*, such as business lobby groups, cultural elites, are powerful but negatively constructed in the eyes of the public who sees them as ‘largely undeserving’ of their wealth and status – “cheating” businesses, “condescending” elites. Though policymakers prefer extending large benefits to this powerful group (e.g., tax cuts), fears of public outcry result in such benefits being accorded to them *sub rosa*, whereas the few burdens they receive are made highly visible to the public (e.g., industry regulations). But the impact of these undersubscribed burdens will be minimal because contenders have sufficient resources to keep punitive issues off the policy agenda – ‘undeserving but entitled’. The *dependents*, such as homeless women and children wield little political power but generally carry positive public image – “needy poor”. While policymakers want to be perceived as sympathetic towards this group, the inability of the latter to mount any political challenge will lead the former to confer only symbolic (on-paper, few tangible) benefits and very few burdens – ‘deserving but unentitled’. Finally, *deviants* are the most punished group because they lack political power and are negatively constructed in society through such labels as “criminals” and “freeloaders”. Policies directed toward this group will oversubscribe burdens aimed at correcting delinquent behaviors or cultural practices. The extent of policy burdens or punishment policies will be greater than is required to achieve results (e.g., longer sentencing terms), and any semblance of support provided to this undeserving group is nevertheless couched in exclusionary mechanisms that curtail access to even limited benefits – ‘undeserving and unentitled’ (ibid. p.337-338).
Though this framework may appear rigid, these social constructions are not hegemonic, rather subject to continuous contestations for dominant position. As Schneider and Ingram (2013) argue, the framework exposes the tension that characterizes politics in public policy: motivations (of public officials), public image (of target populations), and design (of policies) are interconnected considerations that push and pull against each other in the decisionmaking process. In a review of 111 empirical applications of the Schneider-Ingram framework between 1993 and 2013, Pierce et al. (2014: 13) found that 15 percent of the studies were international applications – mostly European – of which only 18 percent focused on sub-national policy issues. In this sense, the exploration of politics in the content and design of sanitation policymaking for the urban poor in Delhi in a developing country like India will add to the breadth and depth of the framework’s application.

The following discussion is organized around three elements of the design framework that reveal the substance and mechanisms by which public policies differentiate between who deserves what, when, and how.

2.2.1 Framing the Targets and Problem

Social constructions are centrally implicated in the selection of target populations among several possible candidates for receiving beneficial or burdensome policies. The choice of target populations is seldom a linear technocratic exercise: policymakers may choose inappropriate targets (from a technical perspective) in the sense that the latter’s actions are inconsistent with the production of a policy problem or purpose of policy intervention. At any given point in time, there may be many different ‘conditions’ or
‘issues’ that are damaging to those who suffer direct consequences but do not make it on to the policy agenda. As Stone (1989: 282) points out, defining a problem is an exercise in image-making: issues are “named as a problem only after political leaders deliberately portray them as conditions caused by human actions and needing reform through government action. Since individuals are “cognitive misers” both out of choice and bounded rationality to parse multiple and complex problems, social constructions of target populations are drawn from the dominant ideological lexicon that allow policymakers to package problems and policy prescription efficiently and effectively. Therefore, “image-making” of the problem is inextricably related to ‘frames’ of target populations, especially when the public feels ambivalent about issues (and assignment of blame and benefit) which are perceived as intractable or boring (e.g., poverty), that do not impact them directly, and therefore are hard to understand (Guber and Bosso, 2012).

Public policy toward the poor has been shown to closely follow the dominant frames in public discourse – whether shaped by the larger political environment, the media, or both. In a critical analysis of the McKinney Homeless Assistance Act of 1987 in the US, Ken Kyle (2006) presents a historiography of the “regimes of truth” predating the English vagrancy laws up to the welfare reforms during the Clinton administration. These regimented frames of the problem of homelessness included reformer, liberal, and conservative views that were differentiated by ‘images’ of deservedness of the homeless: personal responsibility for problem affliction and the extent to which the state could be responsible for their welfare. One of the most comprehensive analysis of media framing of the poor and fluctuations in federal spending on welfare programs in the US between 1960 and 2008 is conducted by Rose and Baumgartner (2013). Through a content
analysis of articles in the New York Times index that depicted constructions along the
dependent-deviant dimension, the authors found a statistical relationship between media
frames and government spending, controlling for the severity of the problem. Beginning
mid-1960s, the authors’ results find support in the work of Gilens (1999) who argued that
the media’s disproportionate framing of welfare recipients as blacks – “welfare queens”
who were “lazy” and “promiscuous” - resulted in fall in public support for welfare and
subsequent fall in benefits.

The dominant framing of sanitation problem by policymakers in the global South, that
engenders a “demand-side” thinking on the issue, tend to further stigmatize and
marginalize the disproportionately-impacted poor populations. Scholars like Comaroff
and Comaroff (1997), Engel and Susilo (2014), Barrington et al. (2017) argue that
sanitation was a key policy area of colonial public health administration in many cities in
countries of the global South like Bangladesh, South Africa, and the Philippines. The
central preoccupation of colonial administrators was to “sanitize and de-congest” the
cities, and control “inappropriate behaviors” via imposition of fines and penalties to
manage “noxious smells” in native quarters that posed nuisance to the living standards in
European neighborhoods. These scholars argue that the colonial narratives of sanitation
and public health continue to predominate urban planning and policy discourses in post-
colonial countries where “natives” have been replaced by tropes of “rural migrants”.

Agreeing with these scholarly accounts, McFarlane (2008, 2012) argues that the
construction of sanitation problem in urban India has remained embroiled in a general
discourse on dirt, disease, and disorder - the only difference being that the key agents in
this discourse are domestic middle-class elites rather than foreigners. The problem of sanitation inequality is produced by a ‘malevolent urbanism’ where the poor are increasingly seen “out of place” within elite visions of urban development. And the moral operations of urban policy proceed with an unwillingness to recognize service deficits and engage poor communities to provide sanitation they actually want to use, only to be made cumulatively worse by governments’ abdication of responsibility to oversee upkeep of its own, albeit inadequate, infrastructure. That is, by locating the cause of the problem to the nuisance and impropriety of the “polluted poor” engaging in open defecation and unsafe practices of waste disposal, sanitation has become a metaphor for cultural delinquencies of impoverished families to sanitize themselves that, in turn, leads to degeneration of environment and space (Ghertner, 2011a, 2011b).

2.2.2 Selecting Policy Rules and Tools

Policy rules ‘specify’ what needs to be done, when, and by whom (i.e., describing implementation procedures, timing/sequence of implementation, authorizing agents or agencies). Policy tools, on the other hand, articulate motivating devices (i.e., incentives or sanctions) intended to ensure that target groups and agency officials comply or behave in accordance with the guidelines delineated in policy rules. The Schneider-Ingram framework (1993) sheds light on why some policy rules and tools are chosen over others, and how the intersectionality of social construction and political resources of target populations impinge upon their selection to produce differential policy impact. Within the context of the deserving-undeserving typology, the authors (ibid. p. 337) argue that beneficial policies received by the ‘advantaged’ group will have simple and clearly defined procedures (i.e., positive rules) with greater government outreach (i.e., supportive
tools) that offers positive inducements and assistance. For contender groups, rules and tools according beneficial policies will be less visible though “real” (e.g., legal sewer connections to illegal slums) compared to those imposing burdens (e.g., fines) that will be ambiguous though their existence will be known to the public. The design of rules extending benefits to ‘dependent’ targets will be clear “on paper” (e.g., public housing projects eligible for sewerage infrastructure), but the tools compatible with receipt of benefits will be symbolic (e.g., underinvestment in infrastructure at public housing sites) and largely exclusionary (e.g., lack of disabled-friendly toilets at homeless shelters). On the other hand, burdens directed at ‘deviant’ groups will be executed through strict “zero tolerance” procedures that offer no leniency, and policy tools employed to correct “dangerous” and “immoral” behaviors will be more punitive, wherein the use of force rather than rehabilitation is the preferred mode of reformation.

It is surprising that the normative slant of the Schneider-Ingram (ibid.) framework does not distinguish between formal written rules and informal norm-based rules whilst analyzing political contestations in the design content of public policy. New institutionalists like March and Olsen (1984), Lowndes (2002, 2018) and others argue that rules are central to understanding how interests in the policy process are defined and defended, and how they shape actors’ behavior and policy outcomes. That is, rules are centrally implicated in explaining politics. More than just formal statements of dos and don’ts, rules are also interpreted by actors on the ground through shared belief systems, norms or informal or ‘unwritten’ rules that govern what March and Olsen (1989) call the “logic of appropriate behaviors”. Therefore, it is the dialectical relationship between these conventions and formal rules that shape outcomes of public policy on the ground.
Juxtaposing this with the Schneider-Ingram typology, one can argue that a match between formal and informal rules likely corresponds to policies designed for advantaged and deviant groups. On the other hand, rules can also be consciously ambiguous and/or poorly specified in a way that makes them enforceable in “old ways” that leave entrenched behavioral patterns/power relationships intact. This strategic silence in formal implementation procedures allows policymakers to offer symbolic support (real benefits largely elusive) to dependent targets and penalty (punishment ‘on paper’) to contenders. The salience of street-level bureaucracy or frontline government officials as vital cogs in the policymaking machinery was introduced by Michael Lipsky (1980) who argued that discretion – informal rule-making – is inherent and inevitable in the delivery of social services. Since then, numerous studies on the US welfare state have shown that street-level bureaucrats not only exercise significant discretion in (re)interpreting legislative mandates and organizational missions based on ‘who deserves’ sanction or support (see for example, Keiser and Soss, 1998; Ricucci, 2005; Weissert, 1994), their own value-based priorities in the design of policy implementation may actually subvert democratically-determined goals (Lipsky, 1984). Faced with competing political pressures and high demand for services, the bureaucracy can undertake a ‘rationing’ of public spending that transforms entitlement programs into conditional programs. This can happen when street bureaucrats engage in “shirking” – ignoring or slowing down rule-based response to problems – during periods of relative insulation from everyday monitoring by the legislative and judicial branches of government. Over time, bottom-up aggregation of discretion routinizes these ‘moral frames’ of ‘whom to serve, when, and how much to invest’ that become part of the organization’s standard operating procedures.
– and impinge upon formation of new rules in the future – and diminishes punishment for shirking by lower-level officials (Keiser and Soss, 1998).

Anti-poverty policies in the global South, as Berner and Phillips (2005), Engel and Susilo (2014), and Jewitt (2011) argue, are not designed to establish direct engagement with the poor to assess their deprivations and demands. Left to their own devices, the rules of poverty alleviation focus on “empowering” the dependent poor to help themselves to overcome service deficits by constituting community organizations to co-produce or manage basic public amenities like housing, sanitation etc. Based on the view of a homogenous community of the poor, self-help is central to the neoliberal doctrine that attempts transformation of poor recipients of public services from “passive beneficiaries” to “active stakeholders” responsible for their own development. Reviewing sanitation marketing programs in countries like Bangladesh, Indonesia and Nepal, Barrington et al. (2017) and Engel and Susilo (2014) show that policy tools for hygiene improvement and toilet construction that rely on mocking and taunting – facilitated by NGO “experts” - in poor communities can adversely impact communal harmony and psycho-social wellbeing of those who cannot afford private investments in household toilets and are forced to defecate in the open.

Scholars like Banerjee and Duflo (2008) and Chaudhury et al. (2005) also find support for anti-poverty policies in India that make the poor responsible to uplift themselves out of poverty. Based on the misconception that the poor are “natural entrepreneurs”, scholars argue that while the poor may own small-time businesses, mainly in the informal economy as street vendors or daily-wage laborers, this survival strategy is (mis)used by
policymakers to propagate *laissez faire* mechanisms for poverty reduction. From building their own housing on land plots provided by the government to managing /monitoring public sanitation (toilet) facilities in low-income communities, bureaucracies presume that the poor are both able and willing to assume these responsibilities, and the policy tools to incentivize acceptance of policy rules of self-service perversely entail long periods of government apathy in improving access and quality of basic services for the poor. Evaluating the impact of a large-scale slum sanitation program in the city of Mumbai in India, Sharma and Bhide (2005) found that deep ethnic, political, and economic divide within poor communities made “community participation” difficult and skewed in favor of politically resourceful and organized ‘elite poor’. With participation rules limiting participation of only those community groups who accept the municipality’s sanitation agenda of community sanitation, absent institutional reform in service upkeep rules further meant that neither collective action (wherever it existed) nor community toilet facilities could be sustained over time. More recently, the *Swachh Bharat Mission* program of eliminating sanitation poverty in India has also leaned on punitive policy devices to shame the poor into changing “filthy cultural practices” of open defecation and threatening to terminate other public benefits (e.g., subsidized food) for households that refuse to build toilets (Aiyar, 2017; present study).

The urban poor in India, however, are not locked into a pre-ordained low political power spectrum of dependent-deviant construction. As Chaplin (1999: 62) argues, the poor in India have generally taken democracy more seriously than middle or upper-income class, whether in the form of voting during elections or creating demand for new regional or local ethno-political parties to represent their interests. And it is for this reason that
policymakers (elected representatives) cannot ignore the urban poor even as their very existence (as illegal slum residents) represents violation of the law that the former are duty-bound to uphold. Pointing to the politicization of Indian bureaucracies, scholars like Benjamin (2008), van Dijk et al. (2016) among others argue that the divergence between formal and informal “rules” should not be seen as the incapacity of policy-implementing agencies. The law-making political class deliberately creates spaces to insert itself in the process of policy implementation, and these open windows of negotiations facilitate transactions of economic (petty bribes to street-level officers) and political (votes for politicians) “goods” between the state and “elite poor”. Therefore, organized groups of poor can, at times, break the status quo of state apathy by mobilizing (i.e., moving toward contender status) to pressure the political leadership to bend exclusionary implementation rules that allows them access to services.

2.2.3 *Rationalizing Policy Design Decisions*

Rationales, more than the other policy design elements discussed so far are the most direct and clear expression of legitimacy/public support with respect to the policy problem/goals and choice of target populations, and as such are more important to partisan stakeholders than the elimination of a troubling social condition. Whilst the overarching explanation for government intervention tends to be to serve “public interest”, the rationale for who the public is (i.e., targets), what is of interest (i.e., problem/goal definition), and how it will be achieved (i.e., policy mechanisms) varies on the basis of social construction (and political power) of target populations. Schneider and Ingram (1993: 340) contend that rationales for public policies that confer benefits on powerless but largely positively viewed dependent groups tend to emphasize
humanitarian considerations rather than economic efficiency ones. And so far as deviant
groups are concerned, punishment rather than benefits are justified on the grounds of
public safety and social order. Even when benefits to deviants are fiscally efficient (e.g.,
if rehabilitation is cheaper than incarceration), their negative public image will drive
public opinion towards punishment policies and their weak political power make
humanitarian appeals for reform less attractive to policymakers (ibid).

Schram (2005) shows how ‘deceptive rationales’ have been used to justify cutbacks in
welfare spending since the publication of the Moynihan report in 1965. The report’s
erroneous claim was based on statistical misestimations that growth in welfare rolls was
disconnected with the state of the economy where Black male unemployment rates were
declining. Rather, the decades of seventies and eighties were witnessing a shift in the
racial composition of welfare recipients, with more black women becoming majority
recipients of public assistance. The “real” justification for cutbacks, which remains firmly
embedded in the cultural reservoir of American public, was not that welfare spending was
unnecessary in a buoyant economy but that it was creating a “pathology of dependency”
and “culture of poverty” among Black populations (ibid. p.263, 267). As welfare policies
for the poor in the US took a decidedly punitive turn since the mid-1990s, sanctions or
threat of penalties by terminating benefits and surveillance mechanisms for correcting
“delinquent behaviors” became the rationale for paternalistic welfare-to-work programs
for undeserving racial minorities, especially African American (see for example, Pavetti
et al., 2003 for a review of sanction policies; Soss et al., 2008; Schram et al., 2009).
Stephens (1996) argues that with rapid urbanization of poverty in the global South, the ideological stance of governments supporting neoliberal principles such as “polluter-pays” has justified limited policy support to bridge health inequities in urban areas (ibid. p.17). The principle of polluter pays, that situates the cause of the problem on those disproportionately impacted by inadequate service provision (i.e., poor) is used to push for rationales of cost-efficiency in poverty alleviation programs. For example, the policy of privatizing water supply and sanitation services in Latin America, beginning 1990s, also applicable in poor communities, was shaped by rationales of polluter pays and cost-recovery in public investments that entailed contributions by the poor namely, their labor and payments toward construction/upkeep of sanitation (Hardoy and Schusterman, 2000).

The emphasis on cost-recovery, propagated by international development and donor agencies and adopted by developing-country policymakers, reflects a shift away from universalism toward payments-based access to public services. For example, the World Bank (1994: 44) encourages cost-recovery tariffs to change the ‘entitlement mentality’ that has resulted from decades of subsidized access to, often poor quality, water services in Asia, Latin America, and sub-Saharan Africa. Rusca and Schwartz (2017) argue that this line of thinking emanates from the view that “cultures” of non-payment for public services among the poor should be overturned. Paying for services not only incentivizes them to be “responsible” consumers of scarce (water) resources, but also teaches them that they cannot be a perpetual burden on the state exchequer or “tax-paying citizens” (Bhan, 2009: 138; Ong, 2006). Although financial sustainability is important for progressive improvements in service coverage and quality, Castro (2007) and McDonald (2002) argue that there is little empirical evidence to support the link between cost-
recovery and equitable service delivery. Without augmenting economic capacities of the poor to be able to pay for services, and forgoing subsidy-based approaches that distort economic signals for consumers, cost-efficiency in poverty governance has been largely justified to reform cultures and behavioral delinquencies of the poor (Winpenny, 1994; Berner and Phillips, 2004).

2.3 Clientelism and Unequal Distribution of Public Services

“Perversion of political virtue and mockery of representative democracy” (Piliavsky, 2014), “corruption and graft” (Stokes, 2005); “feudal systems of social oppression and economic backwardness” (Hopkin, 2006) are some of the conceptual frames and epithets associated with clientelism in electoral politics. But clientelism and “vote-buying” through inducements of cash or other favors are not limited to low-income countries of the developing world. Banfield’s (1954) study of a southern Italian village where the Christian Democratic party distributed small packages of pasta, sugar, and clothing to voters before elections, Scott’s (1969) study of machine politics of votes for government jobs and welfare services like legal aid for racial/ethnic minorities in American cities like New York and Chicago in the early 20th century, and Hopkin’s (2001) study of discretionary distribution of employment subsidies by the Socialist party to its core constituents in southern regions of Spain are some examples of patronage politics in advanced western democracies.

Some political scientists like Wilkinson (2006), Stokes (2005), and Taylor (1996) use the term clientelism synonymously with patronage, machine politics, and pork-barrel politics.
Scholars like Chandra (2003; 2007), however, express concern over the lost analytical purchase in such concept-mixing. Patronage politics describes a relationship that is less bureaucratized or business-like than a political machine: in the former, politicians/political operators often do not distribute benefits that the voters say they need, and upon victory may less likely be able to deliver on the demands that core constituents voice during the campaign. Machines are more efficient in supplying goods, and derive their power and legitimacy on their ability to secure concrete benefits for the supporters. And finally, pork-barrel politics refers to gaining electoral support through appeals of favorable legislation (mainly through the exchequer). Chandra (ibid. p 8) argues that patronage politics entails currying only votes not through promises of favorable legislation but favorable policy implementation. According to her, clientelism is a dyadic relationship bound by ties of social or economic dependence.

I endorse Chandra’s (2003; 2007) distinctions and use clientelism as an umbrella term for transactional relationship between citizen-clients and state/non-state entities for exchange of public goods and services for private gain. Patronage politics is a specific form of this quid pro quo agreement forged between citizens-as-voters/principals and politicians-as-agents where rewards to the former (access to sanitation service) are exchanged for their votes to the latter. Clientelistic politics, on the other hand, is defined as a dyadic relationship whereby citizen-clients obtain service access/improvement by exchanging material (e.g., petty bribes to bureaucrats) or psychic benefits (e.g., legitimacy experienced by NGOs serving vulnerable populations) with the patrons. The discussion of literature in the remainder of this section is organized around these two themes.
2.3.1 Patronage Politics

Chandra (2003) introduces the concept of “patronage democracies” to refer to election-based political systems in which the state is the largest provider of jobs and services, and as a consequence, elected officials wield substantial discretion in the distribution of public resources to the voters on a personalized basis. Citing extant literature, she argues that patronage democracies are a vestige of colonial rule in Asia and Africa and communist regimes of the Soviet era that left behind a legacy of state-dominated economies (ibid. p.9). The electoral process in such democracies is thus a “hand-to-mouth barter” system where cheap votes of poor are bought by politicians to secure their positions from where they can deliver less to earn support (over promises of delivery) in future elections (Piliavsky, 2014: 15).

The scholarly discourses on patronage-based targeting of benefits to electoral constituencies give simultaneous recognition to the salience of ethnicity of target populations as a marker of identifying supporter (and challenger) groups. The ‘conventional wisdom’ emerging from much scholarly work on African politics is that politicians consistently engage in vote buying through promises of targeted distribution of public resources, and voters assess the credibility of these patronage appeals on the basis of ethnic solidarities (Bates, 1982; Bratton and van de Walle, 1994). Among the few studies to closely investigate ethnicity-based patronage politics in Africa, Wantchekon (2003) conducted a field experiment in the first round of presidential elections in Benin in 2001 to test the impact of patronage versus programmatic appeals on voter behavior. The author argued that given voters have ethnic affinities, the results of the experiment revealed that appeals for targeted distribution of government jobs or local public goods
like opening up of a new university in a constituency reinforced voting for co-ethnic candidates (ibid. p.403). Scholars like Fearon (1999) and Gallego (2015) argue that patronage ties tend to be ethnic coalitions, mainly because ethnicity acts as a natural barrier to efficiently limit the group size in a way that higher amounts of benefits are enjoyed by each member.

Chandra (2003: 13) offers an alternative explanation for the simultaneous presence of patronage and ethnicity discourses in electoral decisionmaking in countries like India. She argues that patronage-democracies are characterized by severe information constraints for voters to choose quality candidates who can deliver benefits as well as for the latter to target constituents who will act as loyal supporters at the polls. But, benefit-seeking voters are strategic. Heath et al. (2015) present evidence of strategic voting by Muslim constituents for co-ethnics in a north Indian state with a higher than national average percentage of voters belonging to this religious minority group. Supporting Chandra’s (2003) thesis, Heath and his colleagues (2015: 16) agree that Muslims will not vote for their candidate if she/he does not have a realistic chance of winning, even in constituencies where they are in majority. These results stand in sharp contrast to ‘ethnic threat/backlash hypothesis’ observed in studies on European and American politics (e.g., Fisher et al., 2014; Glaser, 1994; Teney et al., 2010).

More recent work on patronage relations has begun to focus on why and how these informal “agreements” of exchange become self-reinforcing. In poor societies with limited state capacity to, at times, deliver even targeted benefits, making selective provisions is an effective and cost-efficient strategy to ensure dependency of poor citizens
on the benevolence of political patrons (e.g., de Wit and Berner, 2009). A key mechanism through which patronage relations, and lack of public trust in state institutions to deliver entitlements, become self-sustaining is the role of political operatives in subverting secrecy of the ballot. These ‘booth representatives’ surveil polling stations to keep track of who “from their area” shows up to vote and convey turnout figures to party officials. So even though the ballot is officially confidential, agents outside the polling station will take into account the time spent by each voter to evaluate the individual’s commitment to the patron-client contract. And since voters can observe these subversive tactics in a patronage-democracy, they are unlikely to believe that their ballot is completely secret (Berenschot, 2014). Stokes (2005) and Weitz-Shapiro (2009) find evidence of these ‘perverse accountability’ tactics of “monitoring” individual votes in Argentina by grassroots workers of political parties who are embedded deep in the friendship and familial networks of voters in electoral constituencies.

Research on slums in urban India shows that community leaders can assume the role of “fixers” who facilitate residents’ access to various welfare programs by leveraging ties with political parties, and the latter depend on these individuals to get out the community vote (Appadurai, 2001; Berenschot, 2015; Keefer and Khemani, 2004). However, as Jha et al. (2007) observe, these community leaders need not be party-affiliates, but may act as “social workers” who engage the bureaucracy to access services like electricity during times of diminishing political clout. In sum, voters’ awareness or even perceptions of the possibilities of such surveillance taking place are often strengthened by their experiences of corruption in other forms of engagement with the state, especially service-delivering bureaucracies.
A prominent feature of patronage democracies is the politicized nature of bureaucratic institutions through which politicians exercise significant influence over rule-making and un-making to affect ‘calculated’ implementation of policies. Politicians extend ‘carrots’ to pliant bureaucrats (e.g., promotions) if they bend implementation procedures to benefit voter-clients, and wield the stick of job transfers or delayed promotion if officers resist or delay implementing their particularistic demands. In this context, Abdulai and Hickey’s (2016) study of regional disparities in access to a federal education program in Ghana, the authors found that ethno-regional disparities in the distribution of influential ministerial positions at the federal level was a stronger causal factor in observed variations in access outcomes than the alternative explanation of voting pattern differentials (ibid. p.48). Similar findings for bureaucrats expediting approvals for environmental projects in constituencies of influential politicians, to further career prospects, were obtained in Ferraz’s (2007) study on urban politics in Brazilian municipalities.

Using national level data on 392 parliamentary constituencies of India between 1999-2009, Nath (2011:30) shows that top bureaucrats approve public projects within stipulated time of 45 days (i.e., perform better) in the year they are up for promotion and the approval time is higher by 11 percent in constituencies where the probability of a politician’s victory is higher. She notes that all projects first require lower-level officials to conduct feasibility studies and prepare budget estimates, which means that inordinate delays lower down the hierarchy can jeopardize top executive’s career prospects (see also, Bussell, 2010; Wade, 1985). As regards bureaucracy’s role in checking rule-violations by citizens, Davis (2004: 40) finds a “common” form of quid pro quo between politicians and bureaucrats across 8 urban water agencies in different states of India.
where officers break/bend official rules to authorize legal water connections in illegal slums “approved” by elected officials to secure promotions. This ‘culture of patronage’ imbues the public psyche as a “political truth” that bureaucracies are loath to serve unless they get a call from “big-men” (Piliavsky, 2014).

2.3.2 Clientelistic Politics of the Bureaucracy

To a large extent, the shadowy nature of corrupt rent-seeking routines and relations has hampered scientific investigations into the conditions supporting or curtailing clientelism in developing countries. As Gupta (1995: 376) observes, empirical studies on the “state” have focused scant attention on the quotidian practices of the bureaucrats – what they actually do in the name of the state – that have direct impact on how individuals experience ‘the state’ in their everyday lives. Conventional wisdom may lead one to argue that corruption mainly affects the elites who can afford to pay bribes. However, a salient feature of bureaucratic corruption in developing countries with less than universal coverage of public services is that poor face growing pressures to pay petty bribes to gain and maintain access to services (McGranahan and Saitterthwaite, 2006: 107).

With state monopoly over public services and limited resources of poor households to afford private options, which is the case in many developing countries (e.g., Asian Development Bank, 2013), inability of poor clients to exit the public option of service provision make street-level bureaucrats more likely to extract rents (bribes) from this user group compared to relatively richer households (who may have the capacity to pay more) that can turn down such requests in favor of private service options. Hunt and Laszlo (2012) examine this clientelistic relationship between street-officers and poor service
users in Peru and Uganda to argue that bribes paid by the poor constitute a larger share of their income, and are often locked into this vicious clientelistic relationship such that poverty increases the frequency with which individuals face demands for bribes. This is supported by other studies such as Olken’s (2006) research on welfare programs in Indonesia where corruption reduces the overall amount of benefits (subsidized food supplies) reaching the targeted populations. In a survey study of 18 African countries to capture people’s experiences with paying bribes in exchange for public services like household amenities (water and electricity connections), Justesen and Bjørnskov (2014: 113) find that poor households, particularly in urban areas with more ‘exit options’, are more likely to experience demands for bribes in exchange for services from government officials. And that poor people are, on average, almost three times more likely to pay bribes to government bureaucrats compared to wealthier people, though the study is unable to quantify the amount of relative distribution of these payments.

Shining light on the link between bureaucratic corruption and patronage politics between politicians and citizens in India, Bussell (2010: 1237-1238) observes that part of the bribes extracted by bureaucrats is transferred to politicians as inducements for “expediting” career advancement requests. Because they play an important role in recommending and overseeing appointments, in addition to needing resources to finance their own election campaigns, politicians can demand rents from bureaucrats that, in turn, leads the latter to make similar demands from citizens who are most dependent on public services (i.e., the poor). Therefore, neither the bureaucrats nor politicians are incentivized to introduce anti-corruption rules for transparency in bureaucratic administration (Davis, 2004: 61). As a result, bureaucratic discretion in service provision continues to be shaped
by pecuniary motivations that disproportionately discriminates against those with most limited financial resources. Similar research studies have led scholars like Batabyal and Yoo (2007), de Zwart (1994), and Wade (1985) among others to argue that corruption in public institutions is an endemic and major challenge to equitable and sustainable delivery of services in developing countries like India.

Juxtaposing this evidence of clientelism between the poor and agency officials with Schneider-Ingram’s (1993) 2x2 typology of deservingness of target populations, one could argue that the shadowy nature of this transactional relationship is characteristic of one forged with contender groups that have some access to income resources. Arguably, most functioning democracies have some version of anti-corruption laws that are meant to be checks on illicit public activities and signal adherence to principles of equality before law. Therefore, payment of bribes in exchange for public services symbolizes hidden benefits that some citizens can avail when enforcers of anti-graft rules temporarily condone the law.

2.3.3 Clientelistic Politics of the NGOs

In the face of “government failure”, Salamon (1987), Valentino (2008) among others have argued that NGOs, operating on a non-distribution of profit motive, hire skilled personnel and organize funds from donors aligned with their humanitarian missions to provide essential services, customized to local needs, to excluded communities. A well-developed and large network of these human service organizations in advanced countries like the US has also been a leading force in advocating for policy benefits for their clients through legislative changes. (Donovan, 1993; Warner, 1995). This entails curating a
positive image (i.e., changing social constructions) of deservingness of their clients in policy discourse which, in turn, serves to legitimize their own existence and organizational mission (i.e., psychic benefits of organizational legitimacy exchanged for welfare benefits to needy targets). Numerous studies on the activism of nonprofits, especially in the domain of immigration policy, have shown that clientelistic relations between service providers and clients can be grounded by emotional ties of respect and solidarity (Coutin, 1998; Rubin, 1991).

Arguing that the (size of) nonprofit/NGO sector is still at a nascent stage in lower-income countries like Mexico, Themudo (2013) explains that high levels of economic uncertainty and lower-levels of economic development dampen private contributions to such entities. Therefore, voluntary organizations in low-income countries are more like “community governments” that overwhelmingly depend on government funds to deliver services to geographically-confined clients (Ilcan and Basok, 2004). As a service delivery arm of the government, Pugh’s (2014) study on immigration policy in South Africa shows that concerns of organizational survival among NGOs resulted in selective exclusion of undocumented immigrants and non-native migrant populations from rehabilitation services (ibid. p.234, 236). As NGO activities remained confined to the realm of delivering state-funded services, clientelistic relationships with native poor groups established by these non-state entities were driven by narrow personal benefit (i.e., organizational survival – personal benefits – by towing state principles of serving the ‘natives’) rather than social benefits of improving the well-being of all vulnerable poor, including the “other” non-native residents by challenging state orthodoxy.
Surely non-governmental organizations must survive to deliver essential services and succor to excluded populations. But as Mosley (2012: 21) observes, advocacy for organizational viability versus campaign for social rights and benefits for the entire vulnerable population are distinct agendas because of different desired outcomes. By focusing on maintaining funding streams and minimizing conflict, NGO partner of the state have minimal interest in policy change. Therefore, if the purpose of their existence is to overcome governments’ failure-to-provide, then serving a select group of poor ‘deemed deserving’ by the state begs the question of legitimacy of NGOs as the ‘third sector’ (Devarajan et al. 2013). And as Garrow and Hasenfeld (2014) have shown, reliance on government funding does not predict advocacy for social benefits – rather it is the ‘moral vision’ of the cause of their clients’ problems that determines whether nonprofit organizations advocate for organizational versus social benefits.

Evaluating a World-Bank funded, NGO-facilitated, slum sanitation program in Mumbai, India, Sharma and Bhide (2005) observe that NGOs seldom challenge bureaucratic norms or disturb their relations with politicos to recommend alternative sanitation solutions that may be preferred by and/or feasible in some slum communities. Instead, the authors argue that some large NGOs in urban India have become “super contractors” for the state such that these non-state entities select only those communities for infrastructure improvement programs where they are able to ‘manufacture consent’ among residents to accept state-approved agendas – i.e., “creaming clients” (see also, McFarlane, 2008). As NGOs compete for survival in the service delivery domain, those that have long-standing reputation of partnering on government programs are also more likely to receive financial support from international agencies and corporate elites (Appadurai, 2001). The
ambivalence of large factions of the NGO sector to challenge institutionalized exclusion or partaking in selective implementation of social policies is levelled as a criticism against the ‘self-serving’ clientelistic politics of the NGOs - a claim based on the very few recorded instances of litigations against state authorities filed in the judiciaries in India (Harriss, 2007: 2721). By participating in service-delivery work ‘defined and designed’ by the state, NGOs ‘bail-out’ the authorities by legitimizing latter’s non-performance and institutional orthodoxy against the poor. Unless they support the urban poor in setting ‘their agenda’ and improving their negotiating strength vis-à-vis the state for broader policy reform, clientelistic politics of self-preservation of NGOs will inadvertently push marginal voices within communities toward rent-seeking politicians (Chandhoke, 2003: 76).

In countries like India where state monopoly in provision of public services has produced painfully slow improvements, Joshi and Moore (2004: 40) argue that NGO-led co-production of public services may be the ‘price to pay’ for services that “actually work” (see also, Burra et al., 2003; Hobson, 2000). These scholars argue that NGOs cannot be frequently confrontational simply because the “stakes are too high” to preserve the progress of service delivery in poor communities. And yet, as Jenkins (2010) observes, there is scant scientific knowledge on the accountability of the NGOs vis-à-vis the poor, sustainability of ‘improved’ service outcomes, and biases in “consensus-building” and implementation of welfare programs that favor demands of elite poor (e.g., dominant ethnic or politically well-connected group) within communities in urban India.
2.4 Organizational Constraints

Rapid urbanization in developing countries, in conjunction with a growing population of urban poor slums and informal settlements in countries especially in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, has not only placed increasing pressure on governments to provide basic infrastructure and services but has revealed constrained capacities to achieve universal coverage of essential amenities like safe and affordable sanitation (Boex et al., 2019; Samanta, 2015). To highlight the growing incidence of service deficit in urban areas, and by extension lagging governing capacities, official statistics of the United Nations (2014) estimated that urban (poor) residents without access to hygienic sanitation actually increased from 547 million in 1990 to 748 million by 2012 (McGranahan, 2015). Public administration and public management literature on governance challenges in developing countries to meet rising demands and maintain quality and coverage of essential services to rapidly urbanizing and increasingly poor urban residents can be categorized under two heads: (i) resource constraints (i.e., financial and technical); and (ii) institutional constraints (i.e., restrictive policy rules). The remainder of this section summarizes and critiques the key findings of these two thematic debates.

2.4.1 Resource Constraints

There are two major, albeit inter-related, strands of literature on resource constraints that overwhelm urban local governments to undertake equitable distribution of public services: (a) fiscal challenges associated with a weak tax revenue base that also contribute to, (b) technical constraints in finding innovative solutions to deliver cost-effective and quality services to under-served or un-served populations. A detailed discussion follows.
(a) Fiscal Constraints

The pattern of urbanization in developing countries that includes a growing concentration of slum poor engaged in low-wage informal employment means that local governments often are unable to generate revenues from property taxes and fees to finance urban services. Since only some residents constitute a viable tax base to fund large infrastructures like water and sanitation that are highly monopolistic in nature (due to high sunk costs), provision and quality of urban services can vary within an urban jurisdiction (Boex et al., 2019). And so, large and densely-populated settlements of the poor within cities limit efficient provision of services by government agencies because they are costlier to serve (due to congested and irregular spatial pattern of settlement), and where residents have limited ability to pay for services (Resnick, 2014). As a further disincentive to efforts toward improving own-source of revenue, federal governments in many developing countries play a leading role in financing most public services in urban areas that cultivates dependency of municipalities on loans and grants that carry conditions on how and for what projects these monies may be used (Mahal et al., 2000).

Scholars like Rondinelli (1990) and Olanrewaju (2011) among others have argued that limited revenue-raising capacities of municipalities in many developing countries also curtail their ability to ensure proper maintenance of infrastructures that may have been built with the support of donor agencies and/or federal governments. For example, Dagdeviren and Robertson (2009) summarize the evaluations of World Bank-funded slum renewal projects in Latin American and South Asian countries in the 1970s and 1980s. They argue that in the absence of a long-term plan by local governments to mobilize resources for long-term upkeep of slum amenities like communal water supply and toilet...
facilities, donor investments were ‘largely wasted’ as most infrastructure fell into
disrepair by the end of the funding period (ibid.p.6). However, scholars like Olowu
(2003) and Smoke (2003) argue that it may not be the administrative lethargy of local
governments in terms of seeking alternative sources of revenue; rather, it is often the
unwillingness of higher levels of government to fully undertake decentralization reforms
that entail devolution of revenue sources and tax-raising authority to urban local bodies.
In this sense, state power and resources can be a zero-sum game: incomplete
decentralization of municipal resources is a way for developing-country governments to
retain control over local revenue sources and policymaking processes. As such, policy-
implementing bureaucracies are made largely dependent on conditional inter-
governmental transfer of funds.

India is an example of developing countries that embarked upon decentralization of urban
governance to elected municipal bodies but typically decentralized along a single
dimension – i.e., devolved responsibility to administer/deliver local services without
concomitant devolution of full set of fiscal/revenue sources. This partial fulfilment of
constitutional mandate has led scholars like Rao and Bird (2014) to argue that lack of
adequate resources is one of the leading reasons for generally poor standards of public
services in cities and towns of India. The weak condition of municipal finance in India
can be seen in the share of aggregate revenues of urban local governments that amounted
to only 0.76 percent of the country’s GDP in 2007-08, of which one-third was contributed
by transfers (grants and loans) from the federal government (ibid p.233). Mohanty (2014)
goes so far as to argue that Indian municipalities are among the weakest in the world,
with the share of revenue from property taxes (predominant source of municipal income)
in total GDP at 0.25 percent being much below developing-countries’ average of 2.12 percent in 2007-08. With municipal governments in India largely dependent on a single tax viz., property tax, the limited nature of fiscal federalism is such that state governments continue to exercise control over the method/rate of tax assessment and categories of properties that may be exempted from tax liability (Seddon, 2014: 173).

In the case of sanitation, fee for servicing drainage infrastructure is a component of the total property tax liability of an urban household except illegal slums that are an exempt category due to their unauthorized occupation of vacant lands. Juxtaposing this with the foregoing discussion on the state of municipal finance in India, one could argue that varied sanitary conditions across slums may be attributable to municipal agencies willing to expend some at least resources on smaller-sized settlements (fewer households) compared to bigger settlements that demand, for example, greater deployment of municipal sanitary workers that may not be economically justifiable for tax-exempt properties.

But it would be naïve to argue that the relationship between financial health of public utilities and access to quality services is straightforwardly intuitive. Mehta (2014), among others, has argued that although financial viability may be promoted as necessary to delivering equitable services, in reality the policy may be rhetorical with little change in access for marginalized populations. Public utilities driven by cost-recovery agendas are conspicuous by their silence over reconciling tensions between universal service delivery and cost recovery. In the absence of policy deliberations over cross-subsidizing infrastructure investment in low-income communities by increasing taxes on high-
consumption and high-income users, a market-oriented approach to cost-recovery will prevent upkeep of services in existing poor communities as well as extension of infrastructure to newer settlements (Bayliss, 2011; Herrera, 2014).

Though there is little disagreement in the scholarly community over ad hoc nature of political decentralization – that has not gone hand-in-hand with fiscal decentralization – in many developing countries, scholars like Klitgaard (1997) and Polidano (1999) contend that service bureaucracies have largely been unmotivated to improve their financial health by strengthening administrative efficiency – mainly, weeding out corruption – in functions that they control. Pope (1999) finds evidence that some countries in Africa that have undertaken managerial reforms, anti-corruption bodies lack investigative powers and/or prosecutorial authority and as such serve merely as a smokescreen to give the impression of action being taken against malpractices or even to cover-up ongoing activities. Payment of bribes – whether to frontline workers to obtain service access or to higher-level officials to win service delivery contracts – reflects a weakness in bureaucratic capacities to process the quantum of demand for public services in a timely fashion that, in turn, disproportionately impacts outcomes in communities that are unable or unwilling to indulge in corrupt practices. Unfortunately, as Davis (2004) shows for sanitation bureaucracies in some major cities in India, urban poor may be doubly-disadvantaged when they feel compelled to offer petty bribes to street-level bureaucrats to achieve respite from rapidly deteriorating service conditions.
(b) Technical Constraints

A further challenge in service provision to the urban poor pertains to technical difficulties in extending city infrastructures to communities located on difficult terrains like flood plains, landfill sites, near railway tracks and so on. Because of high costs of construction in urban areas, many settlements of the poor such as slums tend to be located in hazardous or ecologically unsafe sites that are often the only affordable vacant areas in many densely-populated cities of the global South (Murthy, 2012). As these informal settlements develop organically and haphazardly, without allowing required space (i.e., right-of-way) for installation of water and sewer pipes, conventional infrastructures may also turn out to be inappropriate for the given topography of such residential localities. Even if possible, difficult topographical layout of these poor settlements may also make laying of conventional systems increasingly expensive that, as the foregoing discussion describes, may generate little interest among cash-strapped bureaucracies to deliver services to these tax-exempt sites.

Based on an evaluation of USAID-funded water and sanitation projects for slum communities in developing countries in Latin America and Asia, Solo et al. (1993) contend that engineers at public works departments tend to be trained in conventional service delivery technologies of the global North that are at odds with the realities of largely unplanned and densely-settled urbanization patterns in their cities. Unaware of alternative, and possibly low-cost, technologies of servicing poor settlements located on difficult terrains, low-income families are largely left to their own devices to improve sanitation conditions. Further, and as a result of their weak financial position, municipalities may have limited ability to hire appropriately-trained personnel or provide
capacity-building training to existing employees for tackling technical challenges presented by the complex urban environments (Robinson, 2007).

It is often assumed that sanitation improvements for the poor in low and middle-income countries require costly interventions in terms of technological and human capital investments. Rather, as Miller (1998) and Satterthwaite et al. (2015) argue, it is the resistance of public agencies to break away from business-as-usual practices of service delivery. The presence of international development agencies like the United Nations Development Program, World Bank, and Asian Development Bank in nearly all major developing countries means that knowledge-sharing on innovative service technologies across countries, and dissemination of information within countries can hardly be considered a challenge in the 21st century. Mara (2012) and Satterthwaite et al. (2015) take stock of low-cost, non-conventional sanitation technologies – e.g., condominial (low-density and shallow) sewerage and on-site faecal sludge management systems (cluster septic tank system) – adopted by municipalities in countries such as Brazil, Pakistan, Haiti, and Nairobi to argue that high-density low-income areas, including those located in topographically-difficult zones can be given quality services (often at the household-level) at a lower cost. And, knowledge dissemination and training workshops for government officials organized by foreign donor/development agencies through their headquarters in major cities of developing countries mean that municipalities do not have to incur expenses to train their staff in new service technologies.

In Delhi, collaboration between foreign and domestic NGOs has provided a few examples of low-cost and household-level slum sanitation solutions for local bureaucracies to
emulate. Around 100 households in an illegal slum in east Delhi were connected to a simplified/condominial system when a city-based NGO, CURE, designed and co-financed this infrastructure project with WaterAid, a UK-based NGO, in 2015. Voluntary labor contribution by some slum residents was instrumental in further reductions in the overall cost of infrastructure development. The same local NGO mobilized financial support from other local and foreign NGOs for constructing a community septic tank and waste treatment system in a public housing project in west Delhi. By 2017, private toilets of over 300 households were connected with small shallow sewers that, in turn, carried the waste to the community septic system (CURE, 2018). Both the aforementioned projects were implemented after obtaining approvals from relevant government authorities that also were also provided with detailed technical reports by the NGO. Arguably, service delivery technologies and personnel training support are often available to organizations irrespective of their public or private status; rather it may be the tolerance of public agencies for sub-optimal outcomes in low-income communities that acts as an impediment to equitable distribution of quality public services (Manning, 2001; Miller, 1998).

2.4.2 Institutional Constraints
Access to utility-provided piped water and sanitation services to the poor can be restricted due to tenure problems (i.e., illegality) of urban slums (see for example Gimelli, 2018; Subbaraman et al., 2012). As Murthy (2012:66) argues, formal (rule) barriers to municipal services in slums are instituted in an effort to prevent “opportunistic influx” or, migration of often rural and low-income populations into cities and unauthorized housing construction on vacant land in order to take advantage of service benefits. There are
further institutional barriers to planning infrastructure development in slum areas: when slums come up on vacant lands belonging to private entities or federal government over which local governments have no jurisdiction, these land-owning agencies may refuse to allow the occupants/inhabitants to receive basic services (Juneja, 2001). These tenure insecurities mean that slums are subject to imminent demolition, that in turn, dis-incentivizes urban governments to provide formal and quality basic services like piped sewerage and underground drainage systems.

Perhaps a peculiarity of slum governance in India, service differential across slums within cities may be attributed to a legal divide between government-recognized ‘legal’ or notified slums and non-notified illegal slum settlements. In India, only 37 percent of slum settlements are notified by the government which means that households are largely secure from random evictions, have the right to rehabilitation in the event of displacement to make way for public infrastructure projects, and also entitled to household-level services like water, sanitation, and solid waste management by urban local governments (NSSO, 2013). Despite an overwhelming majority of slums without legal residential status, state governments appear to be reluctant to undertake notifications, in keeping with growth of larger-size illegal slums, as formal recognition triggers eligibility of these impoverished areas for the full set of rehabilitation works enshrined under various slum improvement laws (Bansal, 2015; Bhan, 2011; Murthy, 2012).

Among the few comparative studies on variability in service deprivations between notified (legal) and non-notified (illegal) slums in India, Nolan et al. (2017) find a steady improvement in service outcomes, controlling for other variables, the longer a slum has
been notified, with these legal slum settlements also more likely to receive financial aid for infrastructure development under various slum improvement programs. Using cross-sectional data on 2390 slums for 10 states (including Delhi) in India from 1993-2012, the authors constructed a 12-item deprivation index that comprised of services like water, sanitation, electricity, schools, and health center to arrive at a basic services deprivation score for legal and illegal slums in the sample. For services that were most vital for health—water, sewer, and toilet access—the percent of slums without access fell among notified slums, while the percent of non-notified slums without access grew worse (in the case of water) or essentially remained stable (for sewers and toilets). The distribution of deprivation scores was right-skewed for notified slums and left-skewed for non-notified slums, suggesting that, on average, the former faced less deprivation in access to basic services than non-notified slums. In fact, every additional year of notification was associated with about 0.8-point decline in the average score, with the largest decline occurring after the first decade of being conferred legal status (ibid p.16, 19). Controlling for other variables like settlement size (number of households), ownership of slum lands, and slum location, legal status explained the largest percent variation in the average services deprivation score.

Despite greater deprivation in non-notified illegal slums, the second multi-level logistic regression model found that these settlements had significantly lower odds of receiving financial support from government programs like JNNURM compared to notified slums. And, in support of prior claims by Bansal (2015), Bhan (2011), and Murthy (2012), Nolan et al (2017: 27) also found that progress on slum notifications by the 10 sampled states had stalled after 2008. That is, governments were not only diverting more public
resources to less-deprived (legal) slums, they were progressively restricting the size of the “eligible poor” populations. While there is little support for theories of opportunistic migration of rural poor into cities adding to urban deprivation that appear to be a justification for many government policies, there is growing empirical evidence to suggest that discriminatory policies that restrict service provision to illegal slums perpetuate urban inequality in quality of life outcomes (e.g., Nakamura, 2016; Subbaraman, 2012). As Wankhade (2015) observes, public benefits from sanitation will improve quality of life in cities only if everyone has access to equitable and quality services: policies that restrict sanitary toilets, sewerage, and underground drainage for only 37 percent of slum populations with even a minority of the remaining 63 percent defecating in the open or disposing raw sewage in open surface drains can threaten to reverse health improvements witnessed in legal slums and other surrounding areas within cities.

2.5 Neighborhood Effects

Although empirical research on the impact of neighborhood conditions on individual wellbeing took off in social science journals only by the mid-1990s, federal policies aimed at deconcentrating urban poverty through housing mobility programs especially in the US began as early as 1960s and 1970s (Hogan, 1996; Santiago, 2001). Scholarly interest in neighborhoods (popularly defined in terms of census tracts) was driven by research which suggested that individual-level socio-economic factors may be inadequate towards explaining personal social and economic outcomes. The theoretical concept underlying neighborhoods research is that of spatial externalities or ‘spillover effects’
such that the larger socio-economic environment in which individuals reside can influence conditions prevailing in one's immediate locality (Morenoff, 2003; Sampson, 2002). Spillover effects can be positive – e.g., presence of welfare-service providers in a neighborhood can provide access-related benefits to communities embedded in that area – or, negative – e.g., prevalence of crime or environmental pollution in one location can diffuse to nearby areas.

A major experimental housing mobility program called Moving to Opportunity (MTO) launched by the federal government for 5 metropolitan cities in the US in 1994 was designed to move families residing in public housing projects in census tracts with poverty rate of 40 percent or more to less-segregated and wealthier locations. It was expected that such a transition would facilitate access of low-income families to better institutional resources like schools, health centers, and labor markets that could improve individual outcomes like education, morbidity, and unemployment. Numerous evaluation studies have been conducted on the MTO program to measure the causal impacts of neighborhood attributes on family and youth outcomes for low-income families in treatment and control groups. For example, a study by Katz et al. (2001) on the impact of MTO on family and child well-being at the Boston site found that children in the treatment group experienced significantly improved test scores and behavioral outcomes, compared to those in the control group. On the other hand, there were string treatment effects on the mental health of adult family members (household heads) due to declines in exposure to violence and reduced rates of criminal victimization (comparable results in Leventhal et al., 2000 and Ludwig et al., 2001 for MTO evaluations in New York and Baltimore sites, respectively).
To some extent, research on institutional mechanisms (i.e., presence of nonprofit welfare organizations, businesses, public amenities like schools and healthcare clinics) of differential neighborhoods effects intersects with research by public administration scholars on resource constraints producing varied service outcomes, discussed in the preceding section. Research on availability of funding (public or privately-raised) and location of nonprofit service organization shows that there is a strong and positive relationship between presence of anti-poverty organizations more affluent localities, which means that neighborhoods with a lower concentration of poor families can receive a disproportionately larger share of social benefits (e.g., Corbin, 1999; Gronjberg and Paarlberg, 2001; Small et al., 2008). On the other hand, neighborhoods research by Conley and Dix (2004) shows that municipalities distribute public services (e.g., timely garbage pick-up, snow-shoveling) as an instrument of retaining wealthy households in their tax base. Cognizant of these income effects, poor households prefer to live in mixed-income localities to capture the spillover benefits of well-funded public goods and services. Ostensibly, the rich also benefit from living in larger localities (that have some presence of poor households) since such high-population areas likely receive a higher proportion of municipal funding for public goods that can be produced at a lower per capita cost.

However, as Ellen and Turner (1997) and Quercia and Galster (1997) among others contend, there may be a critical threshold for some neighborhood characteristics – e.g., proportion of poor households in total population – beyond which positive spillovers – due to availability of institutional resources – may be reversed – e.g., due to out-migration of rich neighbors and consequent depletion of resource base. For example, in a mixed-
Method study of location of subsidized housing in Denver, Santiago et al. (2001) find that proximity to public housing sites in neighborhoods with more than 20 percent of black residential population triggered negative spatial externalities of slower growth in housing sales prices in an otherwise booming real estate market during the 1990s. Focus group discussions with homeowners residing within 2000 ft of each public site revealed growing concerns over physical degradation of neighborhood due to poor upkeep not only of public housing units (i.e., trash pile up, unmowed front yards), but also of common green spaces and other infrastructures in the neighborhoods. Consensus among participants was that poor upkeep contributed to decline in property values, corroborating quantitative findings of the authors’ regression analyses (ibid. p.81).

In contrast to scholarly interest in the United States and other high-income countries of the global North, research on neighborhood effects in developing-country cities began to gain prominence only by the first decade of the 21st century. Debates on urban poverty in the developing world, Herr and Karl (2002) argue, have largely focused on the living conditions such as access to water, sanitation, electricity, tenure security in urban slums. Slums are increasingly the most visible manifestation and spatially-concentrated form of deprivations associated with urban poverty in developing countries (Davis, 2006). Montgomery and Hewett (2005) rationalize this apparent neglect of larger neighborhood influences that surround these urban slums by claiming that absence of data on living standards (income or consumption expenditures) or service indicators for municipal wards or census tracts present methodological difficulties in studying the relationship between neighborhood factor and individual-level outcomes (ibid p.398). Even the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) of the US Agency for International Aid that
collect citywide data in different countries sample “housing clusters” as neighborhoods which tends to lump sum and non-slum households under a single cluster.

Unlike developed countries where building restrictions such as minimum plot-size and frontage requirements discourage the growth of irregular housing construction alongside formal housing, poor enforcement of such zoning regulations in the cities of developing countries creates islands of informality within formally planned residential neighborhoods. Some cities, like Surabaya in Indonesia, realized that quality and maintenance of built infrastructure, including informal housing, is key to a neighborhood’s status and well-being. Instead of knocking down slums, that often leads to new slums in other parts of the city, a slum revitalization program – known as Kampung Improvement Programme – was launched to improve basic amenities by the municipality in 1969. Triggered by a combination of concerns for positive externalities – status or prestige – and negative externalities – spread of diseases from kampungs (dense and overcrowded settlements of primarily low-income households) to better-off residential districts – infrastructural improvements by municipal authorities included laying of water pipelines, drainage system, community toilets, provision of evacuation services for household septic toilets and trash pickup etc (World Habitat, 1993). An evaluation conducted by the World Bank, which provided financial support for the program, revealed that slum revitalization in Surabaya increased land values in the neighborhoods that led to an economic rate of return of 28 percent on project investments (World Bank, 1995: 47).
A study on progressive service improvements in slums located in thriving city center of Nairobi is another example of positive neighborhood effects in a rapidly urbanizing African city. Using repeated cross-sectional data on households based on the 1999 and 2009 population census, Bird et al. (2017) conducted an OLS regression (and later a probit regression as a robustness check) on neighborhoods within 2-15 km from the city center to find that access to piped water and sewers decreased with distance. And that this trend occurred nearly uniformly over the decade. Although the authors were unable to disentangle the reasons behind these neighborhood effects – government support, political stronghold, or wealthier central slums – they showed that neither population density (i.e., size of slum) nor age of slum had a significant effect on improved service access (ibid. p 516).

Foregoing examples of positive neighborhood effects of slum location seem to be a narrower body of research. Much of the empirical work on neighborhood effects in developing countries shows that governments see slums as a disamenity that should either be sequestered or provided with bare minimum services so as to prevent spread of diseases to surrounding areas. To study the impact of locality effects on infrastructure servicing to housing settlements of the poor, Feler and Henderson (2011) use multi-year census data on 327 urban localities in 54 metro areas in Brazil to show that there is a significant negative relationship between share of small houses (defined in terms of number of rooms and street patterns, and disproportionately occupied by low-income migrant poor) and access to municipal water supplies even after introducing controls for political preferences, housing density, and service coverage (to non-poor residential areas) within a given jurisdiction from the previous census period. To determine whether
there are spillover effects from neighboring localities on a particular locality’s under-provisioning calculus, the authors use weighted average of other localities servicing small houses in a metro area as a key independent variable in a maximum likelihood estimation model to show that an increase in servicing in one locality leads other municipalities in other localities in a metro area to withhold their servicing so as to deflect low-income (low-taxable) migrants from their own neighborhoods, controlling for metro area characteristics (ibid. p. 269).

The reason for discriminatory housing practices against low-income residents (assuming them to be predominant occupants of informal housing, with exception) can be attributed to negative externalities (perceived or otherwise) due to co-existence of formal and informal housing. Paradoxically, exclusion from essential services is precisely why informal housing, and slums in particular are a disamenity for proximal formal housing markets. Exploring the economic attributes of negative externalities, Nadalin and Igliori (2015) measure the relationship between proximity to slums on the price of residential units released for sale on the formal housing market in São Paulo, Brazil. Because the valuation of a house takes into account the quality of its location in the neighborhood, proximity to slums that have barely any access to civic amenities within its boundaries which likely increases “theft” of services available at the larger neighborhood level – electricity, water supply – can worsen quality of life of higher-income neighbors and depress real estate prices. Georeferencing slum locations from the municipality database and locations of residential releases from a private company database for the period 1989 to 2008, the authors calculate the Euclidean distance of the nearest slum from each property. The findings of the hedonic pricing model (at 2000 prices) reveal that for every
100m increase in the distance, the median housing price goes up by 1.53 percent; similarly, proximity to large slum settlements has a strong negative effect on housing prices, controlling for neighborhood fixed effects.

Other examples of state-led policy action to minimize the effect of negative externalities from informal housing on government revenue sources include eminent domain and residential permits for urban areas (hukou) popular in China. In China, urban citizenship restrictions on rural migrant workers to access public housing markets has given rise to slum-like housing on rural lands within city limits (Tang and Chung, 2002). Because these lands are owned by a rural collective who do not pay any rent or fee to city governments, the latter in turn do not provide any urban municipal services like water, sewers to them. These “urban villages” also do not fall under the ambit of urban building regulations, and as such are characterized by irregular-shaped buildings that are overcrowded with very high floating population density and unsanitary living conditions that impose a bundle of negative externalities on nearby communities.

Zhang et al (2016: 12) have shown that these urban villages are scattered across the Beijing including commercialized areas in and around the city center, and from time to time, the local government has undertaken their removal to unlock real estate value of evacuated lands. Akin to the study of Nadalin and Igliori (2015) for São Paulo slums in Brazil, Zhang and colleagues (ibid.) measured the economic benefit (i.e., appreciation in proximate housing value) from the removal of urban village housing over two waves in 2008 and 2010 in Beijing. Using formal housing and urban village data from 2006 as their baseline, the authors run a hedonic price regression models to show that removal of
urban villages in the first and second waves triggered a 3.9 and 4.0 percent appreciation in property values for housing located within 1 km radius from the baseline, after controlling for urban village and location features, distance to city center, and housing price difference before and after removal. Interestingly, the authors find no evidence of the urban village’s characteristics (size, perceived crime, amenities) and location variables (proximity to parks, subway, hospital etc.) having statistically significant effects on removal probability. And so, unlike the São Paulo study, one could argue that the decision to remove villages perhaps had less to do with higher-income neighbors’ influence on the bureaucracy. Rather, as Zhang et al. (2016) claimed, removal of these poor settlements may have been motivated by the government’s own intent to clean up the city (in the run up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics) and unlock land value in “depressed” areas to make them investor-friendly. In India, too, ethnographic studies by Bhan (2009), Dupont (2011), and Ramanathan (2008) among others have shown that displacement of slum dwellers occupying public lands and pavement dwellers became the *modus operandi* of government authorities in Delhi to “beautify”, “clean up” in the mid-2000s as the city prepared to host an international sporting event in October 2010.

In contrast to explicit justifications to unlock values of encroached-upon lands, there is growing evidence to suggest that removal of slums as a source of negative externalities is increasingly framed as a ‘necessary’ step to curtail degradation of the neighborhood environment. Examining the physiological attributes of negative externalities, Heller (1999) argues that proximity to poor settlements with only partial coverage of services, especially water and sanitation can pose health risks even to those residential areas that have access to formal infrastructure because of contaminants in the environment. Using a
combination of three government and non-government nationally representative surveys that capture municipal-level water, sanitation, and demographic variables, the author examines the impact of environmental sanitation services on morbidity due to diarrhea among 1000 cases of children under the age of 5 in the urban locality of Betim in the city of Belo Horizonte in Brazil (ibid. p.135). Results of multivariate analyses show that although 98.4 percent of the population was connected to piped water supply network, the relative risk of morbidity (ratio between the incidence rate of the disease among an exposed group and the incidence rate among an unexposed group) was 2.38 times higher, compared to the other 1.6 percent of the population, because of the polluted wastewater flowing downstream. In fact, the author showed that absence of drainage - pools of wastewater flowing on to the streets - is a more important determinant of diarrhea risk than being unconnected to the sewer system.

Another study of a slum area located along the main river basin in center of the Bandung city of Indonesia revealed that absence of sanitary toilets (disposing waste directly in the river) and piped drinking water not only caused serious fecal contamination of common wells and springs within the community, random sampling of sources of groundwater and river basin found microbiological contamination (Sari et al., 2018). Although the authors did not estimate risk of infection for households surrounding the slum area, they noted that low coverage of municipal water networks throughout the city and few hours of supply a day meant that even non-poor households were dependent on groundwater for their unmet needs (ibid. p.4).
In Indian cities, especially in Delhi, middle-income residents of gated communities have engaged in judicial activism through their welfare associations to seek removal of neighboring illegal slums on the grounds of nuisance of unsanitary and unsightly settlements of the poor. Ghertner (2011) argues that since the early 2000s, especially after India won the bid in 2003 to host the Commonwealth Games in Delhi in 2010, welfare associations have calculatedly deployed a “nuisance” frame of environmental degradation due to unsanitary conditions in slums to couch their visual annoyance with impropriety of slums in their enjoyment and vision for an aesthetic and modern city. Up until the 1990s, before India opened up its economy to global markets, unsanitary conditions in slums or slum-related public nuisance such as open defecation were articulated in judicial pronouncements as deficiencies of municipal governments that did not provide essential services to slum-dwellers. But in a landmark judgement of the federal Supreme Court in 2000, that was cited as precedent in the cases filed by welfare associations as well as government authorities to seek removal, slum residents were singularly identified as the cause of “domestic waste being strewn in the open” and the “best way” for municipal authorities to control this public nuisance was to prevent the growth of slums. The decade following the Supreme Court decision entailed judicial orders by the Delhi High Court (counterpart of state supreme court in the US) that re-affirmed nuisance narratives of slums as embodiments of Malthusian fears of diseases and infections that vitiated the quality of life in surrounding localities (Ghertner, 2008: 60, 65).

In further support of foregoing examples that slum demolition processes may be triggered by “nuisance to public health” rather than reclamation of land values by the government, Dupont (2008) conducted a survey of evacuated sites in Delhi where slums had been
demolished between 1990-2007 to appraise the change in land use for “redevelopment” purposes in the “larger public interest”. Out of the 67 sampled sites (from a total of 217), the author found 56 vacant land plots where no development had taken place; even after excluding sites that were evacuated after 2004, the author still found 26 vacant sites that were not being used for “public purposes” (ibid. p 85). This is juxtaposed with the policy procedure since the 1960s of relocating slums from inner cities to distant and undeveloped rural-urban fringes of the agglomeration of Delhi that continues to this day (see also Baviskar, 2006; Khosla and Jha, 2005; Bhan, 2009). Peripheralization of the poor, in the name of ecological revitalization, also appears to be a leitmotiv for urban governance in other developing-country cities (see Caldiera, 2000 for São Paulo; Bénit-Gbaffou, 2011 for Johannesburg; Steinbrink et al., 2011 for a comprehensive review of cities in global South) and that widens intra-urban disparities in access to essential services as well as deepens impoverishment of the poor.

2.6 Conclusion

For social construction theorists, motivation to win (re)elections to preserve and perpetuate power is the causal logic that enables selection and framing of policy problems, goals, implementation mechanisms, and rationales among possible alternatives, and manipulation of social constructions vis-à-vis target populations is how public officials play this political game. In this sense, social constructions of target populations are neither pre-ordained nor, in fact, stable or well-developed. This claim bears out in the review of topical literature on urban poverty in India where the poor, depending upon their organizational skills and capacity to negotiate, can elevate their deservingness status
to contend construction. The typology, therefore, is supposed to act as a guidepost for scholars to study variations in social constructions and their impact on policy designs.

A point of critique levelled against social constructivists may be that do not distinguish between the motivations elected and non-elected policymakers vis-à-vis the formulation of the policy design process. As the discussion on bureaucratic clientelistic politics shows, discretion-to-serve (or not) exercised by policy-implementing bureaucrats can be independently shaped by their own evaluations of the deservedness of policy recipients, or driven by pecuniary considerations (i.e., bribes) that results in unequal distribution of public resources. In fact, some scholars argue that discretion is activated when there is a divergence between preferences of non-elected and elected officials vis-à-vis the goals and outcomes of the policymaking process. Therefore, bureaucratic discretionary politics of targeted (re-) distribution of public goods and services can operate alongside the electoral calculus of the political machine, and represents the dual nature of citizens’ relationship with, and role in, the political system.

As the research on neighborhood effects demonstrates, bureaucratic intervention to alleviate service deprivations in poor communities may be undertaken to curb negative spillover of diseases and infections to surrounding wealthier localities. Or, as social construction theorists would argue, anti-poverty policy actions may be justified to the public through appeals of “noble self-interest”. That is, poor communities may receive positive spillovers (in the form of service improvement) by virtue of their location in high tax-paying districts to preserve the aesthetic image of the city and quality-of-life of higher-income residents. In other instances, research has shown that economic
considerations of augmenting tax revenue base and monetizing land values can result in government-led removal of slums from thriving centers to peripheral areas of the cities where a growing number of these low-income settlements are left without adequate provision of essential services like sanitation.

The discussion on patronage politics in democracies like India shows how the motivations of elected and non-elected public officials to engage in discriminatory provision of public resources may be aligned. Because politicians need a docile bureaucracy to deliver on their electoral promises to the poor, that often involve digressions from standard operating procedures, elected officials wield the power of the purse and bureaucratic appointments or transfers to ensure compliance among public officials down the bureaucratic hierarchy. The bureaucrats, on their part, are not passive agents in servitude of the wishes of the political higher-ups. Rather, they use their proximity with politicians to advance their career prospects. Therefore, bureaucracies are not neutral vehicles of policy implementation but deeply partisan institutions who do governing parties’ bidding through calculative allocation of over-subscribed benefits to politically-salient constituencies, and costs to marginal voters.

Politicized nature of the Indian bureaucratic state has led some scholars to argue that “cunning” bureaucracies feign their inability to undertake universal provisioning of basic services in order to selectively serve privileged interests. While it is indeed the case that municipalities are faced with growing pressure for public services by rapidly urbanizing poor populations, some scholars question claims of resource constraints faced by major developing-country cities like Delhi. The argument goes that these cities not only have
thriving local economies (ranking high on per-capita GDP) but also have strong institutional presence of international development and donor organizations like the World Bank and various agencies of the United Nations that provide monetary and technical support for alternative, quality, and cost-effective solutions for servicing low-income and hard-to-reach settlements. As such, administrative claims of cost and technological constraints in equitable distribution of public services to urban poor populations merit a closer investigation.
CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

This chapter describes the methodological framework to operationalize the research question that asks why sanitation outcomes vary across urban poor communities in Delhi, India. A case study design is used to conduct this research because the nature of the research question entails an in-depth investigation of the policymaking processes for the urban poor in Delhi. In this study, sanitation is selected as representative of a suite of public services provided by urban local governments in India. This multiple-case study observes sanitation service outcomes across 15 urban poor communities in Delhi and provides an in-depth understanding of why these outcomes vary between these communities.

Section 3.2 of this chapter begins with a description and rationale for a mixed-method design, followed by the definition and measurement of sanitation (i.e., dependent variable). Next, I discuss the rationale for choosing Delhi as the site for this multiple-case study. The section concludes with a discussion on the identification/selection of the sample frame for urban poor communities. Section 3.3 describes the types and sources of data, and section 3.4 discusses methodologies estratégicas for mixed-method data collection.
and analyses, including the rationale and suitability of using a quantitative method for triangulating results from qualitative analyses. Section 3.5 undertakes a broader discussion of internal and external validity of the study’s research design, and section 3.6 discusses my positionality as an upper caste and class woman undertaking research on sanitation in poor communities. Finally, section 3.7 concludes this chapter with a discussion on the limitations stemming from the research design employed for this dissertation study.

3.2 Case Study: Rationale and Design

Since the overarching research question focuses on investigating why sanitation outcomes vary across urban poor communities in Delhi, a case study design was adopted for this research inquiry that is considered appropriate for two main reasons. First, the ‘why’ and ‘how’ nature of the research questions focus on developing an in-depth investigation of the (policymaking) processes to understand a contemporary issue – e.g., varied provision of sanitation service – that is bounded by a socio-spatial context – e.g., urban poor communities in Delhi. The four theoretical frameworks presented in chapter 2 undergird this investigation that seeks theory-led explanations for a phenomenon – variations in sanitation outcomes. Since the methodological approach entails tracing causal linkages between sequential steps in a decision-making process that lead up to the observed outcome(s), this study belongs in the genre of explanatory case studies (Yin, 2009).

Second, a multiple-case study design advances another purpose of this study: development and advancement of theory. There exists scant empirical application of
neighborhood effects, organizational constraints, and clientelism theories in the study of
differential access to sanitation service by the poor in India, and as such this study moves
toward bridging that knowledge deficit. Further, and to the best of my knowledge, this
study is likely the first application of social construction theory to study a public policy
issue in India. Therefore, one of the important scholarly contributions of this dissertation
is to develop an incisive understanding of the three theories described in Chapter 2 and
lead the application of the fourth theory to a city in South Asia.

Within this case study design, the study of Delhi presented in this dissertation adopts a
mixed methods approach to strengthen the validity of qualitative findings. Specifically,
results from a perception-of-the-poor survey administered to sanitation bureaucrats in
Delhi will be analyzed using a cultural consensus analysis (CCA) to triangulate the
qualitative findings about social constructions of the poor. CCA will further enable
empirical testing of theoretically-proposed causal linkages between categories of social
constructions and commensurate policy design choices for analytical/theoretical
generalizability of Schneider and Ingram’s (1993) typological model. A detailed
discussion on mixed-methods approach is presented in sections 3.3 and 3.4.

The remainder of this section discusses the three key components of case study design: (i)
what sanitation means and how it is operationalized in the present study; (ii) why Delhi is
chosen as a site for this study; and (iii) the rationale for using communities as the unit of
analysis, and the procedure for sampling them.
3.2.1 Sanitation: Concept and Measurement

In this study, I use the Census of India (2011) formulation of sanitation outcomes which defines it on the basis of two infrastructural aspects: (i) availability and type of latrine (i.e., receptacle of waste) and type of sewerage system (for removal/ conveyance of waste); and (ii) drainage (i.e., stormwater drains). There are two reasons why I started with Census of India’s definition for sanitation. First, infrastructure-based indicators of sanitation allow for concrete/fixed observation and comparison of outcomes across poor communities. Second, a close study of official documents of sanitation bureaucracies show that public officials continually reference census estimates on coverage of this public amenity whilst accounting for and/or proposing sanitation programs for the poor in Delhi. Table 3.1 presents the Census of India (2011) indicators of sanitation infrastructure outcomes.

Table 1: Types of Sanitation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Latrines and Sewerage</th>
<th>Drainage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Latrine facility within premises</td>
<td>(i) Closed drain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i) Flush/Pour-flush latrine connected to:</td>
<td>(ii) Open drain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) piped sewer system</td>
<td>(iii) No Drainage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) septic tank</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) other</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) Pit latrine:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) with slab/ventilated improved pit</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) without slab/open pit</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) night soil disposed into open drain</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iii) Service Latrine:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Night soil removed by humans</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Night soil removed by animals</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. No latrine within premises:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i) Public latrine</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) Open defecation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Census of India (2011) definition of sanitation infrastructures was used as a starting point of my field observations of sanitation outcomes that also included noting whether or not these public assets were serviced/maintained across communities. I found this extension of sanitation definition that goes beyond structural aspects important for two reasons. First, absence of or inadequate maintenance of available infrastructure can result in its eventual unusability by community members. Such malfunctioning of existing infrastructure was indeed found to be the case during field visits and interviews with residents in some communities. Second, upkeep of different types of sanitation infrastructure (listed in Table 3.1) is not only shared between different sanitation agencies – e.g., one state-level sanitation agency builds drainage, but municipality is in charge of cleaning it – but can either be formally outsourced to non-state entities – e.g., NGOs managing amenities at homeless shelters – or, informally handed over to the communities themselves. And coordination failures between agencies or improper/inadequate management can affect the functionality/usability of a sanitation system, therefore contributing to differential conditions of sanitation outcomes across communities.

Therefore, sanitation outcome is conceptualized as having two components – a structure that is operationalized using Census of India (2011) indicators; and (ii) a service that is operationalized using my own observations in the field (e.g., availability of water, electricity) and interviewees’ assessments of functionality or usability of infrastructure. In general, in this dissertation, I present sanitation as a service outcome because the term is all-encompassing: service subsumes the presence of infrastructure, whereas the latter can exist in some form without being serviced. I use the term sanitation infrastructure
specifically when discussing only the structural aspects of observed variations in service outcomes.

3.2.2  Why Delhi?

Delhi is chosen as the site of this study for two separate but related reasons. First, institutional fragmentation of sanitation service delivery between state and city agencies in Delhi is representative of metropolitan cities in India such as Mumbai, Bangalore, Hyderabad, and Chennai, that in turn has implications for patronage-based distribution of targeted policy benefits to deserving poor-clients. Second, Delhi is a revelatory case to study the politics emanating from this fragmented institutional structure because, as a city-state, the political boundaries of state and city legislatures are identical. The selection of a city-state is important because it brings out the power struggle between city and state governments over influencing policymaking for public services like sanitation. I chose Delhi on the basis that the effects of one of the independent variables of this study – clientelistic politics in sanitation service delivery – will be clearly revealed in this city-state, a unique characteristic of Delhi. The following discussion presents a detailed explication of the two aforementioned rationales by showing how a fragmented sanitation service delivery system creates institutional spaces for clientelistic politics, and then locating the case of sanitation in Delhi within this institutional environment as a unique example to study these politics.

The split institutional arrangements of sanitation governance in major cities reflect a case of unfulfilled constitutional commitments to decentralization of political power to municipal governments. Despite stipulations under the 74th amendment to the constitution
of India for devolution of local functions (e.g., water supply, sanitation) to municipalities, state governments have been reluctant to give up their decision-making power over urban policy issues as doing so would also entail giving up control over their ability to levy and collect revenue from taxes on these services (Sivaramakrishnan, 2013). In the case of sanitation, state governments have retained control over provision of sewer services in cities via creation of technical agencies or parastatals but devolved the responsibility of drainage services to municipalities. The emergence of parastatals for sanitation in cities has not only had the perverse effect of centralization of political power at the state-level, but the administrative structure of these bureaucracies is such that they are headed by a political appointee who is not answerable to urban residents. So, by virtue of their control over sewerage policy, state elected representatives have the power to stymie construction works in urban centers that are strongholds of rival political parties and, instead, invest heavily in their preferred constituencies. On the other hand, city legislators belonging to political parties different from those at the state may be similarly incentivized to re-direct bureaucratic resources of the municipality for upkeep of drainage services in their wards. Therefore, a fragmented institutional structure opens up space for cultivating patronage relations with voters/clients where appeals for political support (and punishment for non-support) come out of targeted distribution of sanitation benefits.

Even though a fragmented sanitation policy institution has service delivery implications for the entire city, the urban poor communities are the ones disproportionately vulnerable to poor outcomes via political rent-seeking activities. This is because the poor are heavily dependent on public provision of essential services like sanitation, and thus have fewer options other than to mortgage their vote with political patrons to receive incremental
access to sanitation benefits. While such politics is prevalent in other cities as well, Delhi provides a unique opportunity to study the effect of these politics in the process of sanitation policymaking because perfectly overlapping jurisdiction of city and state legislatures means that political competition to win over the same voting population with promises of targeted exchange of service-for-votes is likely to be more intense and clear-cut.

In particular, the institutional arrangement for sanitation service is split between three agencies in Delhi: two parastatals viz., Delhi Urban Shelter Improvement Board (hereafter, DUSIB) and Delhi Jal Board (hereafter, DJB), and one municipality viz., Municipal Corporation of Delhi (hereafter, MCD). While the municipality is responsible for providing drainage services to the entire population of Delhi, DUSIB has the mandate to build community toilets and drains in illegal slum areas. DUSIB has also assumed de facto responsibility of providing shelter facilities (including sanitation) to the homeless (DUSIB, 2010; 2014). Finally, DJB provides sewerage in legal residential areas of the city that include legal slums and public housing projects (DJB, 1998). Despite distinct sanitation mandates of these two parastatal agencies, the institutional space is open for state-level politicians to curry votes in exchange for bending DJB rules, for example, to deliver sewerage in slums. And yet, since these parastatals are governed by only a small subset of state-level politicians on their governing boards, opportunities for bureaucratic clientelism may still exist such that non-elected public officials can seek bribes, for example, for upkeep of community toilets in slums from those poor whose elected officials wield less/no power over agency functions.
3.2.3 Unit of Analysis

The unit of analysis in this study is housing settlements of the poor in Delhi. I follow the lead of researchers like Mitlin (2004), Satterthwaite (2004), and Banerjee et al. (2012) who use shelter poverty indicators like housing quality and legality of tenure to identify the poor. Since this study focuses on sanitation to the poor – a service delivered by the government to settlements – using shelter-related indicators to sample the poor is methodologically appropriate. Although shelter poverty has been argued by scholars to be a more robust measure of capturing poverty compared to conventional measures like income or consumption, especially in developing countries like India, it is unable to account for socio-economic diversity among the poor within a poor settlement or community. This is a valid concern, especially since some poor households within a community may be able to afford private sanitation solutions like at-home toilets or hire a private company to evacuate septic systems. Still, living in close proximity of less fortunate neighbors who either dispose raw sewage in open stormwater drains running through the community, or defecate in the open would continue to expose the “better off” poor to health risks and keep them vulnerable to losses in social and economic wellbeing. That is, negative spillovers from a few poor households who lack access to safe sanitation can cancel out wellbeing gains enjoyed by community members who may have a marginally higher socio-economic status.

2 I use the term settlement interchangeably with community, fully aware that the latter term has a distinct sociological significance in terms of bonds of solidarity, kinship etc. And although government documents like the census or annual reports of sanitation bureaucracies in Delhi use settlements to identify residential place, I tend to use the term community to emphasize that public policies like sanitation have direct impact on the lived experience of the people.
To operationalize shelter poverty for identifying urban poor populations in this study, I consider three types of housing categories: privately-built housing (i.e., slums), government-provided housing (i.e., public housing projects and homeless shelters), and no housing (i.e., pavement-dwelling homeless with no roof over their head). This categorization frame is more comprehensive because it goes beyond most studies that equate shelter poverty with the presence of urban slums (e.g., Baud et al., 2009; Parikh et al., 2015). While it is uncontroversial to claim that slums are sites of multiple deprivations such as poor construction quality, overcrowded living area, insecure tenure, and lack of basic amenities, I would argue that this a limited operationalization of urban poverty because it excludes large sections of the poorest of the poor. These vulnerable populations include the homeless living on the streets and in shelters who face many of the aforementioned deprivations and other environmental threats to their physical safety and dignity. Further, there is emerging evidence to show that even after slum poor are relocated to public housing projects, they continue to face vulnerabilities related to tenure insecurity, poor housing quality, and near-absence of entitled household-level services (e.g., Feyter, 2017). I used a combination of government of Delhi’s housing categories database, DUSIB’s database of homeless shelters, and the support of a local NGO (Centre for Holistic Development) for identifying locations of pavement dwellers to construct a comprehensive sampling frame according to types of housing settlements of the poor for this study in Table 3.2 below.
Table 2: Sampling Frame

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Settlement</th>
<th>Housing Characteristics/Tenure Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Jhuggi Jhonpri (JJ) Clusters</td>
<td>Illegal slums on vacant land; insecure tenure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Slum Designated Areas (i.e., legal slums)</td>
<td>Slums notified by government; secure tenure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. JJ Resettlement Colonies</td>
<td>Public housing (undeveloped land plots) for shanty-dwellers; lease-term of 99 and 15 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Economically-Weaker Section Housing</td>
<td>Public housing (apartments) for shanty-dwellers; lease-term of 10 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Homeless Shelters</td>
<td>Temporary public (institutional) housing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. Pavement Dwellers</td>
<td>Homeless populations living on the streets</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The government’s housing database contains information on name, location, and size (i.e., number of households) of poor communities within each of the five of six settlement categories listed above. Information on location and number of pavement dwellers was absent in government’s database. Since the size of pavement settlements was neither known ex ante nor is meaningful because of their spatial unboundedness, I selected only one such community. I used settlement size to stratify the first-five housing categories – small, medium, and large – because some research studies have shown that size can be a predictor of sanitation outcomes as agencies may face resource constraints in building/ extending infrastructure to a large settlement (see for example Heller et al., 2015). The rationale for stratifying settlement-types was to allow for maximum cross-case variation for analytic generalizability (Yin, 2009) of empirical findings. Following King et al. (1994: 134, 137), sampling cases according to an independent variable (i.e., size) does not create problems of biased inferences because the selection procedure doesn’t predetermine the study outcome, as would be the case if selecting on the
dependent variable (i.e., sanitation outcome). Furthermore, even if the independent variable were correlated with the dependent variable, bias would not be introduced because I controlled for this variable.

The stratification categories (i.e., size range of number of households within each small, medium, large classes) were iteratively determined because no uniform size-classification for such a diverse set of settlements is available, or perhaps even possible. For example, the largest size of homeless shelter (i.e., capacity for maximum number of occupants) is 600 that equals the average (medium) size of a JJ cluster/illegal slum settlement in Delhi (DUSIB, 2014). In the case of EWS public housing category DUSIB (2014) records showed, and subsequent interviews with officials confirmed, that the agency had relocated slum families to only two sites at the time of study (beginning August 2017). As a result, this housing category has only those two sampled cases.

I used the method of stratified purposeful sampling to select poor communities under each size category for each settlement-type. This purposive sampling followed a step-wise method of elimination to arrive at a final sample of communities or cases (Creswell, 2013: 158). Step 1 of elimination was when a community chosen from the database could not be located in the field, which occurred when the location description in the database was partial or incorrect. Step 2 of elimination was when I could not establish contact with or recruit resident(s) of a sampled community for reasons other than incomplete location information. This was either due to: (i) absence of formal or informal residents’ associations/groups, or (ii) when community members did not consent to participate in
the study. Table 3.3 presents the final sample of communities/cases that participated in this study.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community Name</th>
<th>Settlement Type</th>
<th>Size (# households)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D-Block, Mangolpuri</td>
<td>JJC</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhaiya Ram Camp</td>
<td>JJC</td>
<td>466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Block B, Kusumpur Pahadi</td>
<td>JJC</td>
<td>4999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gurhai Mohalla</td>
<td>Legal Slum</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basai Darapur</td>
<td>Legal Slum</td>
<td>4700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ballimaran</td>
<td>Legal Slum</td>
<td>10000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satya Niketan</td>
<td>JJR</td>
<td>299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blocks 16, 22, 31 Trilokpuri</td>
<td>JJR</td>
<td>1500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Block-E, Bawana</td>
<td>JJR</td>
<td>4000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sector 16B, Dwarka</td>
<td>EWS</td>
<td>980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rajiv Rattan Awas, Baprola</td>
<td>EWS</td>
<td>1168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lodi Road Women's shelter</td>
<td>Homeless Shelter</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkman Gate Men's shelter</td>
<td>Homeless Shelter</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yamuna Pushta Men's shelter</td>
<td>Homeless Shelter</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nizamuddin Homeless</td>
<td>Pavement-dwellers</td>
<td>approx. 50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: JJC = JJ Cluster or 'Jhuggi-Jhonpri' Cluster; JJR = JJ Resettlement Colonies; EWS = Economically-Weaker Section Housing


3.3 Data Collection

This section describes the sources and methods of qualitative and quantitative data collected for this multiple-case study, and also explains how qualitative data informed quantitative data collection in the design of this mixed-method research inquiry. Three types of qualitative data were gathered: (i) field observations of sanitation outcomes in the 15 sampled communities; (ii) documentary and archival data on sanitation policy for the poor obtained from the three sanitation bureaucracies; legislative record of elected officials of obtained from the websites of relevant legislatures; newspaper articles on sanitation programs/policies; and reports by NGOs and court records pertaining to sanitation in sampled communities; and (iii) in-depth interviews with 95 key informants representing sanitation bureaucrats, state and city-level elected officials, community members, and NGO personnel. These qualitative data informed the development of a perception-of-the-poor survey which was administered to a sample of 30 bureaucrats to conduct a quantitative analysis of whether or not these public officials share a coherent view of deservingness of the poor vis-à-vis sanitation service.

The purpose of this embedded mixed-method investigation was two-fold. First, a quantitative consensus analysis allowed testing for the validity (via triangulation) of a dominant independent variable - social construction of the poor - for differential provision of sanitation. Cultural consensus model from cognitive anthropology not only

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3 I was unable to find studies that could be drawn upon for quantitative investigations of clientelistic politics in public service provision – the other dominant explanation for outcome variations – to triangulate these
complements Schneider and Ingram’s (1993) construction theory by arguing that cultural knowledge of shared norms and beliefs (e.g., deservingness of poor) shapes organizational or group behaviors (e.g., policy choices of sanitation agencies), but also offers a methodological tool to measure the presence and strength of shared beliefs.

Second, I will be able to engage in a critical development of theoretical knowledge by using consensus analysis to test whether theoretically-hypothesized causal linkages between social constructions of target populations and policy design choices find evidence in my data on implementation choices of sanitation policy for urban poor communities in Delhi. Existing survey research on perceptions of the poor provided a rough template to develop survey vignettes. My inability to find a pre-tested survey instrument that operationalized elements of social construction theory led me to develop my own survey instrument using insights from qualitative data (i.e., observations and interviews) and social construction literature. I finalized the instrument after two rounds of cognitive interviews with policy experts in Delhi.

3.3.1 Phase 1: Investigating Policymaking Processes for Varied Sanitation Outcomes

The overarching research question anchoring this investigation can be stated as the following:

*RQ 1: Why does the provision of sanitation service vary across urban poor communities in Delhi?*

qualitative findings. This may be because of the shadowy and case-by-case nature of these quid pro quo agreements between citizens and state actors.
(a) Study Variables

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable in this study is the type of sanitation outcome across the 15 sampled communities of the poor in Delhi, which was operationalized using census of India definition (see Table 3.1) for structural indicators and interviews and field observations for service upkeep. I used the census-defined checklist of sanitation infrastructure-types to manually record data on outcomes from direct observations of ‘visible or public’ infrastructure during community visits (e.g., community toilets, drains). Information on service upkeep was recorded through interviews with key community-informants for information on service upkeep and presence of alternative/private sanitation solutions like households with personal toilets and waste conveyance systems (i.e., sewer, septic tanks). Although the focus of this investigation is not to uncover reasons for disparate sanitation outcomes within each community, I collected information on all types of outcomes to provide a full picture of the sanitation situation in each community, including privately-built solutions that often exist in the absence of public provision of sanitation services. It is important to account for the share of people who depend on publicly provided sanitation services versus those who depend on self-built sanitation systems. This is because it could influence whether, and if so how, residents may mobilize to negotiate improved service access from agencies or other service providers. Thus, intra-community variations in sanitation outcomes could explain inter-community variations in outcomes via varying levels of political engagement. Appendix A lists the types of sanitation outcomes observed in the 15 sampled communities.
Independent Variables

As discussed in the review of literature in chapter 2, four independent variables were expected to be relevant causal explanations for variations in the dependent variable: (i) neighborhood effects; (ii) organizational constraints; (iii) social construction of target populations; and (iv) clientelistic/patronage politics. Since I asked broad and process-oriented questions like why outcomes varied across communities, and why/how a particular outcome was delivered or achieved, I was also open to capturing and probing other factors that the interviewees could raise in their narration of the sequence of policy decisions that shaped sanitation provision in each community. Even with this open-ended inquiry, it became clear during data collection that these four factors identified from the literature also emerged organically as relevant themes from the interviewees’ narratives. Therefore, they represent the full set of independent variables for this study.

Data on neighborhood effects emerged during in-depth interviews with community informants and public officials. This qualitative data relates to themes of positive locational spillovers – poor communities located in a higher-income or well-served neighborhood can receive improved sanitation outcomes (e.g., sewerage or drain cleaning) so as not to bring down real-estate value or quality of life standards of the neighborhood. On the other hand, negative locational spillovers can occur when sanitation outcome in a poor community results from inadequate or absent infrastructure or service maintenance in the larger, perhaps low-income, neighborhood. In this case, government agencies may be dis-incentivized to provide service support to a neighborhood in a low tax-zone because of the limited potential to raise revenue from
service users. Wherever possible, interview data were corroborated with government documents on served and un-served neighborhoods, high and low property tax revenue districts, news reports etc.

Data on organizational constraints in service provision was obtained during interviews with sanitation bureaucrats and elected officials, and when available, from government documents such as technical reports, annual reports, budget statements, or other feasibility studies conducted or commissioned by the agencies. These constraints relate to *technological difficulties* when the government lacks skilled personnel or technical know-how to serve some communities that may have challenging topographical features – rocky terrain of a community located atop a hill, or a community located in a low-lying marshy area. A second type of administrative constraint could be that the agencies are *fiscally challenged* (i.e., insufficient funds) to undertake service provision to a community that is too big (in terms of number of households). A third type of constraint could be *institutional barriers* that prevent service provision to certain categories of communities that agencies are not mandated (per their organizational constitution) to serve.

Data on social constructions of the poor residing in sampled communities was obtained via *(i)* in-depth semi-structured interviews with city and state-level elected officials, bureaucrats in the three public agencies, sanitation service-providing NGOs, and in some cases from the community informants who spoke of how they were viewed by policymakers; *(ii)* careful review of policy documents of the three agencies such as annual reports, minutes of the board meetings, internal memos/circulars, and court filings;
and (iii) direct observations of conversations/discussions of the respondents at interview locations. Qualitative data collection focused on the themes of how policymakers framed the problem, policy recipients, implementation rules and tools, and rationale for procedural mechanisms whilst designing the process of delivering sanitation to the poor.

Data on clientelistic/patronage politics was gleaned from in-depth interviews with community informants, politicians, bureaucrats, and NGO personnel in the process of uncovering reasons for how policy decisions were made, and why those policy choices prevailed over status quo options. So, data collection for clientelistic and patronage politics focused on the nature of quid pro quo “agreements” between community residents and state/non-state service providers, and how these transactional exchanges influenced the policy formulation and implementation procedures that led to the observed sanitation outcomes. Wherever possible, legislative records of politicians on sanitation issues obtained from the online databases of the state and federal legislatures to triangulate interviews with current and recently-former politicians as well as to corroborate claims by community residents about achievements of their elected representatives in previous decades; and news reports and government databases like election victory margins to triangulate claims of political salience of communities.

At this stage, it is important to point out that the distinction between thematic coding for politically-resourceful ‘contender’ target populations and citizen-clients of political patrons relates to the sub rosa nature of benefits received by citizen-targets in the former case and the visibility of targeted rewards in the latter. The politics of patronage rests on the ability of the patron-politician to establish credibility by showing that he/she can
deliver the goods and fulfill campaign promises. The display of political formidability is also important for it indexes the power of the patron to credibly punish opponents, by denying them access, and defectors by rescinding access if they don’t sustain their support upon receipt of services.

Whilst there may be overlap between ‘hidden’ nature of clientelistic transactions (e.g., bribes) and benefits to contender targets through policy, there are nevertheless some conceptual nuances that distinguish coding for these themes. Allocation of favorable policy benefits to contenders is based on policymakers’ perceptions of the power resources of the former – e.g., propensity to mobilize – that, in turn, creates an expectation of political gain (or loss, in case of unfavorable policies) from this group. Whether contenders are able to activate their power (e.g., coordination failure to mobilize may occur), or expectations actually materialize in gains for policymakers cannot be taken for granted. This is the point of difference. Quid pro quo exchanges in clientelistic politics produce direct and tangible material gains. For example, poor may offer petty bribes or non-monetary inducements like small gifts during holiday season “to buy” an official’s time/agency resources to fix a water pump in a public toilet that improves sanitation outcome in their community.

(b) Data Sources

The database for this multiple-case study comprises of three types of data: (i) direct observations in the field; (ii) documentation and archival records; and (iii) key informant interviews, that were used to triangulate findings across sources and to develop more
informed and nuanced lines of inquiry. The sources and collection procedures of these data are discussed next.

**Observations**

Since this multiple-case study investigates why provision of sanitation service varies across communities of the poor in Delhi, direct observations of such disparities were an inherent part of data collection activities. While data on sanitation outcomes was gleaned from formal observations in the community using the census of India instrument (see Table 3.1) as a standardized checklist, I also observed other aspects of community life and events in the field to develop thick descriptions for each community and to contextualize and corroborate interviewee narratives. These observations included: (i) spatial characteristics of communities (e.g., type of housing, type of commercial establishments in the community, socio-spatial characteristics of adjoining areas), and physical condition of public infrastructure (sanitation, water, garbage dumpster) in the communities; (ii) interactions between key informants and their colleagues about sanitation-related issues in the field (e.g., among residents; among bureaucrats in their offices etc). I recorded these data on paper by taking notes in the field.

**Documentation and Archival Data**

To contextualize the analysis of policymaking processes and variations in sanitation outcomes across poor communities in Delhi, I gathered official documents on five federal government-designed urban sanitation programs in India that provide the overarching institutional framework for governing sanitation for the urban poor since the 1970s. The five programs viz., Environmental Improvement of Urban Slums (1972), Urban Basic
Services (1985-1990), National Slum Development Programme (1996-2004), Basic Services for the Urban Poor (2007-14), and Swachh Bharat Mission (2014-ongoing) represent the universe of federally-funded sanitation programs for slum poor in India, with Delhi being a steady recipient of federal monies for undertaking slum improvement activities per program guidelines. The ten documents pertaining to the five programs were obtained from the offices of two relevant federal agencies (viz., ministry of housing and urban affairs and planning commission of India), and carry information on program objectives or statement of the problem, projects eligible for funding, guidelines to be pursued by cities/states during implementation, statistical and technical appendices on slum populations, financial statements, operational details on preparing project proposals for funding, budgeting and invoicing, case studies on best practices for project design and service improvements etc.

Three types of documentary data were collected on sanitation policymaking for the poor communities in Delhi: (i) administrative documents of the three relevant agencies viz., DJB, DUSIB, and MCD; (ii) other documents such as court filings and legislative record of elected officials in state and federal legislatures; and (iii) news articles from two national dailies in English and Hindi. Some documents, like news articles and annual reports and budgets were gathered prior to field visits to understand the policy context and develop field protocols, whereas others like court filings and legislative records of elected officials were collected during field visits as new information/sources became known during interviews.
Administrative evidence from three comprised of their respective governing acts that define the scope of activity and conditions and zones (settlements) of exclusion; annual reports (2011-17) and board meetings (2014-17) that document progress on existing programs and/or new policy proposals; internal memos on new sanitation programs and/or policies (2016 and 2017); and shelter-management manual documenting roles and responsibilities of the state (DUSIB) and NGOs vis-à-vis service provision (2017). These documents were downloaded from government websites. Court records, which included filings by DUSIB, were the only source of documentation available on community history/characteristics and the state of service provision to pavement dwellers sampled for this study. These court documents were downloaded from the website of the Delhi High Court, and were used to triangulate interviews with the homeless and officials at DUSIB. And finally, I searched the online archives of state and federal legislatures to corroborate claims by current politicians of their legislative record and by community residents about their former elected officials’ legislative achievements vis-à-vis sanitation when interviewing these politicians was not possible (due to unavailability of new/accurate contact information or death).

A careful review of news articles published in two national dailies – *Hindustan Times* (English) and *Navbharat Times* (Hindi) – on sanitation issues specific to the six types of settlements of the poor in Delhi was conducted from January 1, 2017 to April 30, 2018. These two newspapers were chosen for their highest circulation rates in their respective languages in the city (LiveMint, 2018). Though the period of data collection in the field was August 2017 – April 2018, there were two reasons why the starting point of news-gathering was January 2017. First, I wanted to capture information on any sanitation
policy or program that the government may have introduced or discontinued, in the
months leading up to the start of the data collection in the field, that could have had an
impact on observed sanitation outcomes in communities. Second, I was limited in my
pursuit of tracing policy/program precedence beyond January 2017 because access to
digital copies for earlier months/years was not free for either newspaper. A total of 29
newspaper articles were used to glean information on sanitation policies/programs of the
government and profile of service situation in sampled communities (wherever available)
for developing broad lines of inquiry in the interview protocol, and corroborating
sanitation-related claims made by interviewees.

Archival records used in this study include statistical data of the Census of India (2011)
on the total slum population and homeless population in Delhi; budget reports of the
government of Delhi for 2015-16, 2016-17, and 2017-18 that provide data on financial
support through grants and loans made to DUSIB and DJB for their annual operations;
budget statements of DUSIB and DJB for 2016-17 and 2017-18 that provide data on
expenditures on sanitation amenities across different settlement categories; and DUSIB’s
(2017) database on the number of households in each of the 722 JJCs (illegal slums), and
size and location of homeless shelters. All these data were downloaded from the websites
of respective government agencies.

**Key Informant Interviews**

This qualitative inquiry draws primarily on in-depth interviews with key informants, as
the targeted nature of questioning about sanitation situation for each community/case
provided insights into the reasoning processes underlying the provision of service
outcomes. I conducted over a 9-month period from August 2017 to April 2018, and the format of interviewing was semi-structured meaning that open-ended questions included topics/themes derived from the literature, documentary, and observational data as well as those emerging from interviewee narratives. Since the interviewees assisted in uncovering new lines of inquiry through their insights into the topic, I identify them as ‘informants’ rather than ‘respondents’ (Yin, 2009). Information on these knowledgeable persons was obtained through careful study of documentary evidence and field visits/interviews. A discussion of the process of recruiting the sample of key informants and designing the interview protocol follows next.

(c) Sample and Recruitment of Key Informants
A total of 95 key informants were recruited and interviewed to investigate why sanitation outcomes vary across urban poor communities in the city of Delhi, and how the underlying policymaking processes explain differentiated delivery of such a basic public service. The sample of informants comprised of 40 residents drawn from the 15 sampled sites, 14 elected officials representing these communities at the state and city legislatures, 25 bureaucrats holding senior and mid-level positions at state (DJB and DUSIB), and city (MCD) government agencies, and 16 NGO officials engaged in the provision/evaluation of sanitation service in these communities. Except for interviews with politicians, all others were conducted over multiple sittings. Interviews with community informants were conducted in Hindi, while others were in Hindi and English, based on the respondent’s preference. Interviews took place in the offices, homes, or public places within communities per the convenience and consent (written or verbal) of informants to participate and be audiotaped.
Recruitment of community informants proceeded via perusal of a government of Delhi (2010) database that contained the names and contact information of members of residents’ welfare associations in different localities in the city. This database was open-access, and was downloaded from the government’s website. Residents were contacted by phone to introduce the study and seek their consent for participation that subsequently led to in-person interviews. Four sampled communities were not represented in this online public database – two EWS housing projects and two illegal slums – that led me to seek this information via field visits. In all four cases, residents’ associations existed but were either not registered with the government (slums) or came up after the database was published (EWS). Resident-members in these four locations were recruited during field visits. Given their extremely vulnerable status, I took a cue from existing research on homeless populations (e.g., Padgett and Priyam, 2017) to seek support of a local NGO to access and establish trust (to keep their identity and responses confidential to protect them from government reproach) with homeless populations in government-run shelters and on the streets. This NGO featured in news articles reviewed for the study, and the name and contact details of the organization’s head were obtained through its website.

The names and contact details of elected officials were obtained from the database of the state government as well as community informants in instances where phone numbers were not updated. The politicians were contacted by phone to set up an appointment, followed by cold-visits to the office where I waited until the official to show up. In the absence of public record of names and/or contact details of officials, the first informant at MCD was recruited through personal contacts from my previous job. Snowball sampling
from this informant led to 7 other officers in the MCD. State-level bureaucrats at DUSIB and DJB were recruited by the researcher after systematically going down the list of names of officials published on their respective websites. Telephonic follow-ups to introductory emails to DUSIB officials materialized in 9 key-informant interviewees. Follow-ups over email, phone, and cold-visits to the offices ultimately resulted in 8 key-informant interviews with DJB officials. And finally, names of relevant NGO were identified whilst gathering documentary evidence; and their contact information was obtained from DUSIB (for shelter-managing NGOs) and through Google search. The sample of NGO officials represented senior, middle-level, and street-level positions.

(d) Protocol Design

The interview protocol comprised of two categories of inquiry. First, introductory questions on the policy design background, particularly from public officials, vis-à-vis sanitation delivery to different categories of poor settlements (viz., slums, public housing, shelters and pavements) were relevant for gathering data to carry out institutional analyses of policymaking for the poor in Delhi (see chapter 4). Second, focused questions on specific communities were also contextualized by identifiers such as name, location, and size to obtain appropriate (not guessed) responses from informants on variations in sanitation outcomes across sites. This contextual information acted as personal reminders/cues from the literatures to frame the investigation and probe interviewees’ responses. In some cases, questions on specific cases and/or variations among them were customized for interviewees according to their domain of knowledge (e.g., residents having more insights into how sanitation outcomes in their own communities materialized; or a shelter-managing NGO being informed about sanitation in homeless
shelters). Policymaking bureaucrats and politicians were more adept at answering questions on varied sanitation outcomes across all cases because of their jurisdiction over the entire city. Overall, open-ended line of inquiry, grounded in the research question, allowed me to capture and probe ‘emic’ responses.

The interview protocol in Appendix B presents the broad lines of inquiry and some sample questions. The protocol, however, is only to guide and familiarize the readers with the overall context of the investigation. The line of questioning was unique to each informant/informant group because questions were also informed by non-verbal cues of the respondents and the dynamic nature of the interviewing environment (e.g., unexpected telephone call or visitor that added new insights into and/or allowed for further probing of interviewees’ responses).

3.3.2 Phase 2: Cultural Consensus Analysis of Social Constructions of the Poor

At the end of the first stage of qualitative data collection in April 2018, I conducted a preliminary review of my data by perusing my field notes and listening to interview recordings and found social construction to be an emerging theme underlying variations in sanitation outcomes across communities. This finding (later confirmed by formal analyses) led to the decision to conduct a cultural consensus analysis via a survey. The survey was designed to measure the presence of a shared social construction of deservedness of the poor vis-à-vis sanitation service among policy-implementing bureaucrats in Delhi. Qualitative data gathered in the preceding stage - field observations and archival (statistical) records - were used to develop vignettes for each of the 15
communities on the survey, and key-informant interviews were used to frame a standardized set of questions and response-categories on the questionnaire. The format of the questions was also shaped by the stipulations of the cultural consensus model – the analytic framework for this quantitative inquiry. The questionnaire design is discussed in sub-section (b) below. Data was analyzed using a statistical methodology known as consensus analysis, that is discussed in detail in section 3.4.

The following research questions anchor the consensus analyses of social construction of the poor and sanitation policy design by bureaucrats in Delhi:

**RQ 2 (a):** Do government bureaucrats in sanitation departments/agencies share a common perception of the urban poor vis-à-vis deservingness of sanitation service in Delhi? If so, what are the shared cultural attributes associated with each poor community, and how strongly is this cultural view shared within the group?

*(b):* Do government bureaucrats share a cultural view of implementation design choices for maintenance of sanitation service for each poor community? If so, what are these policy choices, and how strongly is this view shared within the group?

**RQ 3:** Do consensus analysis findings in (a) and (b) above support the propositions of Schneider and Ingram’s social construction framework? What are the implications of the analytical results for generalizability of theory-driven causal explanations for variations in sanitation service across urban poor communities in Delhi?
(a) Study Variables

Social Construction

Based on Schneider and Ingram’s (1993) 2x2 typological framework of social constructions of target populations and themes emerging from qualitative data gleaned in phase 1, I developed four categories of characterizations of the poor residing in the sampled communities. In the study, advantaged target populations were identified as “dutiful” and deemed to carry a positive image of being resourceful and responsible citizens who took responsibility for keeping their communities sanitary. At the other extreme, deviant targets were identified as “uncultured for city life” and deemed to carry a negative image as being personally responsible for unsanitary outcomes in their communities. Contender targets were recognized as “politically well-connected” who although viewed negatively were perceived as politically resourceful to be able to obtain unconventional sanitation outcomes in their communities. And finally, dependent targets were those perceived positively as “needy” but deemed lacking resources such that their sanitation situation was their own concern.

Policy Implementation Design

Commensurate with the above social construction categorizations, “dutiful” poor would be deemed deserving and entitled for direct support from sanitation bureaucracies – operationalized as “government should undertake maintenance of sanitation service”. The “uncultured” poor are deemed undeserving of policy support and instead receive punishment from the government. This was operationalized as “government should penalize residents for their unsanitary practices”. The “politically well-connected” poor, because of their resourcefulness but negative public image, would receive only
clandestine or indirect benefits from the government. This was operationalized as “government should monitor NGOs for maintenance of sanitation service.” And finally, the deserving but weak “needy” poor would be largely unentitled to receive policy support. This was operationalized as “government should encourage residents to form self-help groups for maintenance of sanitation service.”

(b) Questionnaire Design

The survey instrument comprised of vignettes for each of the 15 communities, followed by a two-part question in a multiple-choice format for social constructions and policy design, respectively. In all, there were 30 questions for 15 communities. Community vignettes were drafted using key spatio-locational characteristics and sanitation outcomes gleaned in the qualitative phase of the study. Per the stipulations of the formal consensus model, ‘guessing’ should not be a response option (e.g., “don’t know”) because the model already has a built-in correction for guessing (Weller, 2007: 350). Since respondents must be encouraged to answer every question, a response option of “none of the above” only works if they are asked a follow-up question to report their preferred single-word or short-phrase answer (ibid). Cognitive interviewees expressed concern over the survey length and the cognitive burden that would be imposed on the respondents to come up with pithy responses, both of which could lead to low response rates. Heeding their cautionary advice, I decided to drop this response category from the final survey.

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4 Weller (2007) suggests that missing responses to skipped questions can be imputed randomly values of 0 or 1 when raw data is converted into numeric data.
5 Concerns over length of final survey came up again during post-test discussions with some respondents.
The second-part of the question pertaining to policy design was framed with respect to maintenance of sanitation service, rather than provision (of infrastructure) for two reasons. First, the issue of maintenance presumes that the infrastructure has been provided – in all the sampled communities, some form of sanitation infrastructure existed, albeit, of varying quality/adequacy. Cognitive interviews with government officials, to pre-test the instrument, also revealed that while agencies were generally willing to build infrastructure, issues of ‘who maintains and how’ were contested. Second, maintenance was chosen because wide variation in the types of sanitation infrastructure (e.g., community toilets of varying size/user-seat ratio, sewers, septic tanks, closed/open/underground drains) would have made provision questions more tedious and the questionnaire lengthier. This would have, in turn, increased chances of non-completion of questionnaires by time-constrained public officials.

In June 2018, I conducted two rounds of cognitive interviews with 4 experts to pre-test the language of vignettes and answer options, and overall comprehension and length of the survey instrument. The group comprised of two retired and one current federal government official, and a senior faculty at an urban planning school in Delhi with over 20 years of research experience that included surveying bureaucrats. The questionnaire was administered to a total of 30 bureaucrats in DUSIB, and the municipality beginning the first week of July 2018. There were no missing responses, and all surveys were completed by the last week of August 2018. The survey was offered in Hindi and English, but most respondents chose the English version in paper format. The order of the questions on the survey was randomized to minimize response bias by using a combination of RANDBETWEEN, RankEQ, and COUNTIF functions in MS Excel™
version 16.3 (MS Office, 2018). I also asked demographic questions from the respondents such as age, sex, and organizational tenure based on existing research by scholars such as Weissert (1994) and Reingold and Liu (2009) who have argued that these factors can shape discretionary attitudes toward clients among public officials. Appendix G presents the full survey.

c) Sample and Recruitment of Bureaucrats

A total of 30 bureaucrats representing senior, mid, and street-level positions in the state and city departments consented to participate in this study. I arrived at this sample size using a rule of thumb regarding sample size for consensus analysis proposed by Weller (2007: 355). She argues that to determine the sample size before beginning the study, it is best to assume a low level of agreement among respondents. Given this criterion, the minimum sample size required to obtain a high accuracy of answers (at 95% confidence level) is 30. The state-level bureaucrats belonged to the Delhi Urban Shelter Improvement Board (DUSIB) that provides basic amenities like sanitation (community toilets and drains) in slums, some public housing projects, and homeless shelters. City-level bureaucrats were officers in the municipality that is responsible for maintaining community-level stormwater drains in Delhi. I assigned rank-categories to designations of officials using the organization chart on agency websites in the following way: officers in the top-three rungs of the organizational hierarchy (CEO or Commissioner, Director/Member, Chief Engineer/Superintendent Engineer) were grouped as senior bureaucrats; moving down to the next three rungs (Executive, Assistant, and Junior bureaucrats did not respond to emails or phone messages. Those who had earlier participated in the interview study did not give consent for the survey.
Engineers) were grouped as mid-ranking bureaucrats; and the bottom-three rungs of field officers/supervisors (Chief Sanitary Inspector, Sanitary Inspector, and Assistant Sanitary Inspector) were grouped as street-level bureaucrats. An initial email introducing me and study was sent to 20 senior and mid-ranking DUSIB officials whose email addresses were available on the agency’s website. Subsequent follow-up emails resulted in 6 senior and 2 mid-ranking officials consenting to take the survey. Each officer filled out a paper-version of the questionnaire that carried a serial number on the top-right corner of the front page for me to identify the respondent in case of follow-ups for missed questions or erroneous markings.

Selection of municipality officials for the survey was based largely on snowball sampling as the complete database of contact details of the officials (except the municipal commissioner, or the CEO of the municipality) was not published on its website. I contacted the municipal commissioner to introduce my study, and obtained the contact information of five superintendent engineers in the sanitation department. All 5 officials filled out a paper-version of the survey in my presence in their offices. I was able to obtain a printed roster containing the names and mobile numbers of mid-level officials and field-level sanitary inspectors from the office of a senior official. A series of telephonic and in-person follow-ups resulted in 11 mid-ranking officers and 8 field inspectors to complete the questionnaire in my presence, though I was seated at some distance so as to mitigate the social desirability effect, at least to some extent, by being unable to directly observe the response patterns in real time.

The municipality officials who participated in the interviews did not consent to participate in the survey.  

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7 The municipality officials who participated in the interviews did not consent to participate in the survey.
3.4 Data Analysis Strategies

3.4.1 Thematic Analysis of Sanitation Policy Institutions

Data from federal and state government documents on sanitation programs and policies, and interviews with bureaucrats in Delhi were analyzed using themes from path dependence theory and ideas in new institutionalism to reveal the nature of the broad framework designed by the federal government for sanitation for the urban poor in India. And how this macro-institutional framework, embedded in more than four decades of federally-led urban sanitation programs (1972 - 2014), has shaped the content and design of sanitation policies by local bureaucracies that serve urban poor communities in Delhi. The data were manually coded under three broad thematic categories: (i) framing of the sanitation problem; (ii) framing of formal and informal rules and procedures; and (iii) rationale for these policy design decisions. The focus on policy ideas reveals why federally-designed institutions persist and are replicated by sanitation bureaucracies in Delhi. These institutional analyses are presented in chapter 4, and are important for contextualizing the discussion on the politics of policymaking processes and sanitation outcomes observed in the sampled communities.

3.4.2 Pattern-matching by Process-tracing

The analytic results of interview data that will shine light on the policymaking processes underlying observed variations in sanitation outcomes across the 15 poor communities in Delhi are presented in chapter 5. Translated transcripts of raw interview data and relevant documentary evidence (e.g., court records) were sorted for each community or “case” or
unit of analysis in NVivo™ version 12.1. Other documents and archival data like agencies’ annual reports, records of board meetings, and budgets, and field notes on observations were used to contextualize and corroborate thematic findings from interview data for each case. Coding data into conceptual categories was an iterative process whereby themes from literature were compared with those emerging from empirical data to develop “nodes” and “child nodes”. In addition to key thematic terms/phrases, coded passages also included respondents’ explanations for how a theme (or themes) was (were) operationalized in the design of sanitation policymaking process leading to disparate outcomes.

Process-tracing entails working backwards from observed outcomes to potential causes by studying the sequence of decisionmaking events – or a chain of causal mechanisms – that led to the said outcome(s) (Bennett, 2010). Since process-tracing is concerned with whether the causal process a theory hypothesizes is observed in the chain of evidence in empirical data, pattern-matching is an appropriate companion methodology to rule out alternative, theory-driven, causal explanations (Tansey, 2007). Synchronous use of these two qualitative data analytic methods also allowed me to address a common critique of process-tracing: infinite regress problem in process-based causality of a large number of independent variables in small-n studies (King et al., 1994:86). In situations where pattern-matching revealed the presence of two or more causal factors shaping the policymaking process that led to the observed sanitation outcome I used an analytical tool in NVivo known as coding reference rate to determine the dominant theme for the total material coded for each case/community (QSR NVivo, 2018). Table 3.4 gives an example
of a simple pattern-matching technique for a theoretically-predicted pattern found in empirical data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme: Deviant social construction</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deviant targets are perceived to be politically weak and have a negative public image of <em>criminality and delinquency</em> which policymakers use to justify policy burdens to these recipients via punitive rules and implementation procedures. (Schneider and Ingram, 1993)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“DUSIB has done an exemplary job of providing all amenities inside shelters.. these people [pavement dwellers] are sleeping in the open because of their own vested interests. Passers-by give them money, blankets..they sell these to buy drugs.. if someone is just coming in to use the toilets, we don’t know who they are..should have ID.. we can’t allow unknown criminal elements.” (DUSIB official)</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Theme: Clientelistic Politics (citizen-bureaucracy)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public bureaucracies are middle-class entities that prioritize and ‘norm’alize the needs and demands of service users in the policymaking process with whom they feel solidarity or share common mores and values. (Matthews and Hastings, 2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Satya Niketan’s profile is different..many people living there have been public employees..in good positions. matter[s] from where complaints are received. So you will find services better there..” (MCD official)</td>
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</table>

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Theme: Neighborhood Effects</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local governments care about unsanitary conditions in informal settlements because of their spillover effect on the economy (real estate prices), health (communicable diseases/infections), and prestige (past glory/modern vision) of the cities. (Nadalin and Iglioni, 2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Ballimaran is located in the historical zone of Delhi..so we started providing sewer services in the area early on so that people could convert their unsanitary dry latrines to a modern flush-toilet connected to the sewers.” (MCD official)</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Theme: Organizational Constraints</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Governments of lower-income developing countries face logistical challenges in the form of technical knowledge to invest in cost-efficient infrastructure development in low-income communities. (Marson and Savin, 2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Bawana is a low-lying area..laying conventional sewerage is difficult..you need to make sure that underground sewer pipes can be laid at an angle for sewage to flow..marshy areas make that difficult.” (DJB official)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Key informant interviews conducted by the author*
3.4.3 Cultural Consensus Analysis

The results of a consensus model to analyze survey data to test whether policymaking bureaucrats share a cultural view of deservingness of the poor residents of the sampled settlements are presented in chapter 6. Unlike conventional factor analyses that are done on a set of variables, factor analysis in the consensus model is done on the respondents to measure how well the responses of each individual correspond with those of others in the group using the minimum residual method without rotation. There were two consensus models – social construction and sanitation policy design. Consensus analysis was conducted using a software called UCINET™ version 6.3 which gives the following 5 outputs.

First, an agreement matrix is obtained that comprises of Pearson correlation coefficients between each pair of respondents which gives the pattern of responses. This agreement matrix is factored with minimum residual factoring method that produces the second output, i.e., competence score for each respondent which appear as factor loadings on the first factor. Competence scores indicate the domain knowledge of each individual, and high positive loading of 0.5 and above indicates high cultural competency. The third output is the number of negative competencies for the full sample of respondents which represents the number of individuals whose answers were different from the pattern of responses of the overall group. The fourth output is the eigenvalues of the first factor and second factor that are used to compute model fit. Cultural consensus exists only if the ratio of eigenvalue of the first factor to the second factor is at least 3. The fifth output is a “culturally-correct” answer key which is obtained by weighting responses of each
respondent by their competence score and aggregating responses across people to generate a unique answer for each community.

Therefore, if cultural agreement among bureaucrats exists (i.e., eigen ratio is above 3), then the consensus ‘answer key’ can be used to interpret where the different poor communities fall on the deserving-undeserving spectrum of social construction theory as well as test the theoretically proposed linkages between constructions of target populations and the commensurate policy design choices adopted by policymaking bureaucrats. Absent consensus among public officials in either or both models, would mean that that the bureaucracy is likely more flexible to receiving outside perspectives (e.g., NGOs, news media) on deservingness of the poor and/or implementation of customized sanitation solutions across different communities of the poor.

3.5 Validity

I used the following four tests proposed by Yin (2009: 40) to establish the quality of qualitative research design: construct validity, internal/content validity, external validity/generalizability, and reliability. Construct validity entails a clear definition of theoretical concepts and development of operational measures for those concepts in the context of the study. Section 3.2 discusses the concept of sanitation, and the Census of India (2011) indicators operationalize this theoretical construct (see Table 3.1) which, in turn, are used to investigate sanitation policymaking processes producing varied outcomes across housing sites of the poor in Delhi. Section 3.3 discusses the theoretical frameworks
and how these constructs are transformed into independent variables as proposed explanations for variations in the dependent variable (sanitation outcomes).

A strategy to strengthen construct validity is through triangulation across multiple data sources with the aim of achieving corroboration for robust empirical conclusions (Yin, 2009:42). This multiple-case study uses three methods of qualitative data collection, including in-depth interviews with multiple stakeholders in the policy process to capture and analyze different perspectives on the problem. Internal or content validity seeks to establish a causal relationship between predictor and outcome variables through a matching of ‘patterns’ between theoretically-proposed and empirically-observed chain of events/decision-making reasoning process resulting in observed outcomes. Since the study design accommodates multiple causal explanations for outcome variations to emerge from data, pattern-matching via process-tracing can test the presence of multiple conjunctural causality which when used with the analytical tool of coding reference rate in NVivo is used to zero in on the dominant causal pattern.

Generalizability in qualitative research can be understood as being two-pronged: internal and external (Maxwell, 2005). Internal generalizability of conclusions for the case of Delhi is ensured by maximizing the range of cases (case heterogeneity) and data sources (data heterogeneity). For case heterogeneity, I followed King et al. (1994: 94) to not choose communities/cases on the basis of the dependent variable that would have led to biased causal inferences. For data heterogeneity, I followed Yin (2009) to investigate the processes of variation in sanitation outcomes from multiple standpoints of different key players making and influencing policy decisions. As regards external generalizability via
“transferability” of the study context (Lincoln and Guba 1985 cited in Eisenhardt 2009: 9), the representativeness of the case of Delhi in the sense of parastatalization of sanitation delivery institutions can make some of the thematic findings generalizable to other major cities of India (see for example McFarlane et al., 2014 for patronage politics in slum sanitation in Mumbai). With respect to analytical generalizability by refining idiographic knowledge, some qualitative findings of the present study are corroborated by other research in the global South.

The final test of validity is to establish reliability of the study’s findings. By introducing myself as a student (that cleared up possible suspicions/apprehensions about ulterior motives) and listening and probing patiently in a non-confrontational manner, I was able to establish rapport with informants. Since I cited direct observations and documentary evidence in support of a targeted line of inquiry during interviews, the informants had little incentive to provide false information or rehearsed “public transcripts” about provision or upkeep of sanitation service in the communities (Fu, 2017). As regards homeless-informants, though access was facilitated by the NGO, the interviewees were not affiliated with the organization. In fact, while some had seen/talked to the NGO head in the past, none of the interviewees were aware of his organization’s mission or activities. The NGO head was not present on-site at the time of the interviews, that could have otherwise influenced interviewees’ narratives.

As regards quantitative phase of this mixed-method research, construct validity of survey findings was assured while designing the instrument in which characteristics of community vignettes were standardized (e.g., settlement type/size, location, sanitation
outcomes), and the response categories were developed using themes from extant social construction literature, data from field observations and interviews with bureaucrats in the qualitative (i.e., first) phase of the study. Content validity of consensus analysis findings is given by the cultural threshold criterion, eigenratio of 3 or above in the model that prevented me from making spurious inferences.

3.6 Researcher Positionality

The readers and reviewers of this research study should bear in mind that the interpretations and conclusions drawn from the analyses of qualitative data are subject to my own positionality as a highly educated woman who belongs to the middle class and upper caste of the dominant religious group (Hindu) in India. I chose to study sanitation policy for the poor in Delhi (my home city) because I developed interest in urban poverty issues during my three-year stint (2011-2014) as a researcher at a public policy think-tank in Delhi. This interest in urban poverty was nurtured through scholarly engagement in an interdisciplinary and center-left doctoral program in the public policy department at UMass Boston. My work experience and doctoral education have played a big role in shaping my worldview and political ideology.

I had not visited the communities in my study sample prior to my doctoral fieldwork in 2017, but been in similar communities as a summer intern at a local NGO in 2016 to test the feasibility of my dissertation research plan. In the sampled communities, I faced less than anticipated challenges in seeking interviews with resident-informants/leaders or getting their support early on to familiarize me with the site for field observations. While
I have no empirical bases to say with any degree of confidence or reliability how I was perceived by the residents or what informed their decision to participate in my study, I can talk about how I presented and conducted myself in their community. I followed the IRB-approved protocol script for this study to introduce myself as a student who was conducting this research to complete her education. At no point did I suggest the outcome of these interviews to be anything other than a written document for my department/university. The resident-informants in each community were informed that the study was investigating sanitation outcomes in different poor communities of Delhi.

Sanitation in India has a history in caste relations, and known intersectionalities with class may have signaled my higher caste status to the community informants. At no point prior, during, or after the interviews was I asked about my caste or religion, though my name is a marker of my ethno-religious identity. Similarly, I did not seek information on the caste or religion of my interviewees but their names signaled this information about them. Information on the caste and/or religious composition of the communities was revealed by the resident-informants and it came up organically during discussions on settlement histories. It may be reasonable to expect that a person of my caste/class would likely not face hostility in poor communities because people of my status occupy influential positions in society that have a direct impact on the lives of the poor - such as doctors and teachers, policymakers, court judges, journalists, or as employers. But I was none of the above. It is hard for me to know what they could gain from participating in my study, other than to educate me about their everyday struggles in meeting their sanitation needs which I would then use to complete my education. On the contrary, I do not to know why my higher status was not a reason for them to disapprove of me. People
like me, of high social status, benefit from cheap labor of the poor as informal-sector service workers (e.g., domestic help, cleaners) and at the same time bear no consequence for the decisions we make that impinge so directly, and negatively when services are disproportionately bad, on their lives. These unresolved conflicts in my mind about how my caste position influenced my acceptance in the communities led me to reflect on other likely factors.

It is possible that community members responded positively to my mannerisms i.e., verbal and non-verbal gestures of respect. Some diacritics of respect that draw from the Indian culture/sub-cultures include folding of hands as a greeting, use of honorific terms and suffixes for persons older than oneself or not known from before, and accepting a glass of water from the host when invited in their homes. I adhered to these cultural norms in the communities, and most interviews were conducted either inside or on the landing area outside people’s homes. I cannot say how many people of my generation and in my social position would adhere to these norms. But I can say that the vileness of the caste system is that social traditions prohibit upper castes from drinking/eating or sharing kitchen utensils with persons of lower castes because the latter’s engagement in low-level or “unclean jobs” ostensibly “pollutes” their bodies and belongings. It is possible that my mannerisms and patience in prioritizing their time over mine, or because I listened like their voice/problems mattered could have led them to open up to me.

Just as sanitation has a basis in caste, it is also a gendered issue. My positionality as a woman perhaps allowed women informants in the communities to talk openly and in detail about their experiences with sexual harassment and fears of sexual assault as
challenges associated with access to public toilets or forced defecation when services were inadequate. The women informants were also candid about the challenges they or their daughters and/or granddaughters faced with unsanitary facilities during pregnancy and menstruation. Given the private and taboo nature of some of these issues and behaviors, it is possible that these discussion topics may not have come up if the interviewer were male. Even though I never faced these threats to safety and health vis-à-vis sanitation, but as a woman in a city that has a poor global track record on women’s safety in public places in general, I was in a position to understand these experiences and share their need for safe and hygienic spaces for sanitation.

My positionality as a woman of higher social standing, studying in the US, and whose parents were federal government employees (not related to the agencies sampled for this study) could have been salient for sanitation bureaucrats and elected officials to talk candidly about the rationales and motivations shaping policy decisions vis-à-vis service provision (or lack thereof). Again, as a disclaimer, I have no empirical bases to know what aspect of my perceived or known positionality informed the decisions of these government elites to participate in my study, or how it shaped the content and extent of their responses to my questions. As in the communities, I followed the IRB-approved protocol to introduce myself, the purpose, and the outcome of this study, and conducted myself in the same manner with this group of interviewees. The only difference was that prior or during the interviews, the bureaucrats sometimes asked about my work/educational background and my parents’ work background. On the other hand, the politicians often asked where I lived in the city likely to determine if I were a voter. I answered these questions fully and honestly whenever they came up.
3.7 Research Limitations

A known and clear limitation of cross-sectional research design is that I was unable to study the dynamic nature of sanitation policy outcomes in the communities. Since my engagement in each of the 15 communities was limited to no more than 2 weeks, I was unable to capture whether/how sanitation outcomes changed over a longer term, what changed in the community’s or government’ response and why, or if new variables became relevant for explaining change. Due to my limited engagement at each case site, I was unable to fully explore the impact of intra-community identity politics of caste, religion, gender on communities’ propensity and ability for political mobilization especially since each sampled community was a mixed ethnic (caste) or religious group. Limited engagement, coupled with my own perceived (and actual) social status as an upper class and caste elite, may have created some hesitation among resident-informants to talk readily and openly about ethno-religious barriers to community mobilization and sanitation access. Even for this study which comprises of a diverse sample of communities, these patterns could have been salient given the country’s long and painful history of caste and religion-based violence and discrimination that continues to poison social and political life to this day.

As regards limited follow-ups with government elites because of time constraints, I was unable to explore how politicians actually “discipline” sanitation bureaucrats if and when the latter do not prioritize or get delayed in implementing sanitation works in client-constituencies. That is, while bureaucrats talked about heeding political demands for job preservation or career advancement reasons, time constraints prevented me from seeking
out and interviewing those public officials who had benefitted (e.g., promotions) or suffered (e.g., job transfer or job loss) from the politicization of the policymaking process. Owing to time constraints, I was also unable to capture whether, and if so, how NGOs, as a service delivery arm of the state, maintain or push for changing institutional status quo in sanitation policy outcomes in their service communities.

Because of significant time invested in the process of interviewing elected officials and senior and mid-ranking bureaucrats, I was unable to recruit more street-level agency officials to participate in the study. Since these officers are often the first point of contact for the citizens with the state, nuanced insights into day-to-day policy implementation decisions on the ground across case sites was somewhat limited. Because of the high average age of the communities (about 31 years), not all bureaucratic elites were equally informed about micro-level policy decision processes. This meant that triangulation among bureaucratic respondents was limited, though threats to the validity of responses and overall findings were minimized through triangulation with other interviewee groups (community informants, politicians, NGOs) as well as data sources (e.g., archival records like news reports, legislative documents).

A significant vulnerability in quantitative research design relates to the untested nature of the survey instrument. At the time of this study, a pre-tested survey instrument from other research studies using social construction theory was not available. Although the survey instrument was developed with inputs from retired bureaucrats, this pre-testing group of cognitive interviewees was very small (n=4) to ensure robust construct validity of the instrument. This could have had an impact on the reliability of survey responses. The
subject matter of the survey could have also made it vulnerable to biased responses due to political correctness or socially desirability concerns. In addition, since the surveyed bureaucrats were not the same as those interviewed – though they were affiliated with the same organizations sampled for this study – interview findings cannot directly establish the validity of, or offer explanations for, the survey responses of the bureaucrats.
CHAPTER 4
A FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING SANITATION POLICYMAKING FOR
THE URBAN POOR

4.1 Introduction

This chapter lays the context of the ideas and institutions that have dominated sanitation policymaking for the urban poor in Delhi. The framework governing policymaking in Delhi cannot be fully understood without a careful investigation of federal sanitation programs that have shaped the urban sanitation agenda and institutional procedures for policy-implementing bureaucracies. That is, despite India’s federal structure that makes sanitation a state/city government function, scholars have argued that federal governments, through various programs, have used the power of the purse to cultivate and sustain a top-down tradition of sanitation policymaking for urban areas (e.g., Wankhede, 2015). And yet, there is little systematic analysis of how the broad institutional ideas and mechanisms get internalized and operationalized by local bureaucracies in delivering sanitation service to the poor in Indian cities. So, the purpose of this chapter is two-fold. First, I introduce and discuss the federal programs for the purpose of defining the institutional context of sanitation policy for the urban poor in India. Second, I locate local policies/programs within this larger framework for the purpose of showing how and in what ways (i.e., the process and the content) institutional learning by sanitation agencies
has occurred vis-à-vis policymaking for different residential categories of urban poor (e.g., slums, public housing, shelters) in Delhi. This institutional analysis is important for contextualizing the discussion on the politics of policymaking processes and sanitation outcomes observed in the poor communities sampled from these residential categories in the next chapter.

The analytic discussion in this chapter is anchored in the following two research questions: (i) What are the formal institutional structures embedded in federal programs that have defined the scope of sanitation agenda for the urban poor; and (ii) How have these macro political institutions shaped sanitation policymaking by local bureaucracies for the urban poor in Delhi. New institutionalism provides the theoretical framework within which these questions explore the design and content of sanitation programs and policies for the urban poor. Two kinds of data are considered: (i) documentary evidence such as federal program documents; and policy memos, budgets, annual reports of three sanitation bureaucracies in Delhi; and (ii) key-informant interviews with 25 public officials at municipal and two state-level sanitation policymaking agencies in Delhi. These data are analyzed using themes from the literature for (i) the manifest purpose of showing official/formal framing of the sanitation problem and rules of service provision, and how these programmatic design elements interact with each other to produce path-dependent sanitation policy institutions over time, and (ii) the latent purpose of drawing out reasoning processes underlying institutional lessons/choices in the content and design of sanitation policies for the poor in Delhi.
The remainder of the chapter is organized in the following way: section II presents a brief overview of the theoretical approaches; section III lays out the data and methods used for answering the research questions; section IV presents the evidence pertaining to the research questions; section V interprets the evidence using the conceptual frameworks of historical institutionalism/path-dependency and normative institutionalism; and section V concludes with a summary discussion of the key findings of the framework governing urban sanitation for the poor.

4.2 Theory

New institutionalism is the overarching theoretical framework for the upcoming analytic discussion because it allows an investigation of not only formal/written articulation of the policy problem and rules, but also informal values and beliefs justifying the formal designs in the production of stable and recurring patterns of policy responses to a particular problem. Another advantage of new institutionalism is its capacity to engage multiple institutional approaches such as historical institutionalism/path-dependency, on the one hand, and discursive institutionalism (Schmidt, 2010) or the role of ideas in the creation and maintenance of (or change in) institutions on the other (Lowndes, 2002; Béland, 2016). I engage path-dependency approach to show that federally-funded urban sanitation programs for the poor since the 1970s exhibit self-reinforcing patterns of institutional designs viz., formulation of the problem, and rules and procedures of sanitation policy. This discussion is the subject matter of the first research question. To answer the second question, I draw on the ideational scholarship in new institutionalism to show how bureaucrats in sanitation agencies are engaged in the process of discursively
and deliberately (re-) legitimizing ideas of personal responsibility of the poor (or limited responsibility of the state) in sanitation service delivery to justify and replicate federally-prescribed stable institutional patterns in sanitation policy designs for the poor in Delhi. Historical institutionalists, such as Hall and Taylor (1996), argue that the form and character of institutions are grounded in historical decisions such that once formal and informal rules and procedures are put in place, they assume a certain degree of rigidity and provide an explanatory framework for future decisionmaking choices and subsequent policy outcomes. Within this tradition, path dependency theorists reason that status quo occurs is because self-reinforcing institutions create and deepen organizational investments – e.g., framing rules and learning standard operating procedures, hiring and training personnel – that make cost of exit from established arrangements costlier over time (Pierson, 2000). But critics like Schmidt (2010: 77, 78) observe that historical institutionalists/path-dependence scholars exaggerate the importance of institutional structures and routines and under-emphasize the role of individual actors whose “background ideational abilities” explain how they create and maintain institutions, and at the same time their “foreground discursive abilities” allow them to communicate why these institutions are maintained (or changed).

Ideas in institutional analysis – what Schmidt (2010) calls discursive institutionalism as a ‘newer’ new institutionalism – are an umbrella concept that not only include strategic interests and perceptions of actors but also historically-constructed causal beliefs, norms, and values that reflect the broader cultural environment (Béland 2016). Scholars in this tradition make the case for the causal influence of ideas in institutional development where structures of constraints and opportunities are not external to policy actors, as an
outcome of historical paths for path-dependence institutionalists, but are internal as ideational constructions of intentional and thinking actors. By elevating human capacities and agency to a more prominent position in institutional analyses, ideational scholars in the institutionalist tradition argue that institutions are a framework of ideas that are constructed, deliberated, and communicated by actors in the process of public persuasion to build support for (or, take action against) maintenance of these institutions (Campbell, 1996; Béland and Powell, 2016). Juxtaposing with path-dependence/historical institutionalism that emphasizes stability over change, discursive institutionalists would focus attention on how policymakers deliberately use taken-for-granted ideas or strategically manipulate them to frame problems and problem-solving rules in a way that is deemed appropriate or acceptable or legitimate in the collective or cultural understanding of the public at large.

4.3 Data and Method

The analytic discussion is anchored in the following two research questions:

RQ #1: What is the nature of formal institutional structures embedded in federal programs that have defined the scope of sanitation agenda for the urban poor?

RQ #2: How have these macro political institutions shaped sanitation policymaking by local bureaucracies for the urban poor in Delhi?
4.3.1 Data for RQ #1

To investigate the first research question, I investigate the elements of institutional design (viz., problem-definition, implementation rules/tools, and rationale) of five federal programs that comprise the universe of federally-funded urban sanitation programs for the poor in India. Information on the five programs namely, Environmental Improvement of Urban Slums, EIUS (1972), Urban Basic Services Programme, UBSP (1985-1990), National Slum Development Programme, NSDP (1996-2004), Basic Services to Urban Poor, BSUP (2007-14), and Swachh Bharat Mission, SBM (2014-ongoing), was discovered while I was collecting official documents of sanitation bureaucracies in Delhi that carried references to these federal interventions in the context of funding sanitationinfrastructures for the poor (DJB, 2009; DUSIB, 2015, 2017; MCD, 2017). In its own official documents, the federal government has recognized these five programs to represent the full set of policy interventions targeted at improving access of the urban poor to basic services in Indian cities (Government of India, 1992; 2008; 2011; 2017).

These five sanitation programs are not legislations or acts passed by the Indian parliament. They are policy decisions by the federal executive in recognition of service deficits faced by rising urban poor populations, often taken by different configurations of political parties upon victory in parliamentary elections that are held every five years (Batra, 2009).

The manifest purpose of this documentary data-gathering and subsequent analysis is to show official/formal formulation of the sanitation problem, and service provisioning rules and policy design rationale, and how these programmatic design elements interact with each other to exhibit path-dependent sanitation policy institutions over time. The latent
purpose of these self-reinforcing institutions are discussed to reveal the gaps/missing elements in these institutional design(s) – e.g., what sanitation options are off the policymakers’ agenda; components excluded from the design of rules and procedures; and the idea behind these policy decisions. These latent designs have implications for the design of the policymaking process in Delhi that answers the second research question.

Data on these five sanitation programs comes from 10 official documents published by two federal agencies viz., Ministry of Urban Development and the Planning Commission of India. One document for EIUS, and two each for UBS and NSDP were available and obtained (in paper-format) from the offices of the two federal agencies. Three documents for BSUP and two for SBM were available and downloaded from the websites of the federal agencies, and I verified these documents with federal officials who confirmed the completeness of my textual materials obtained online. These documents contain background information on economic potential of cities, growing urban and slum populations, rising infrastructure deficits; program purpose/goals, projects eligible for funding, specifications/guidelines for project implementation; and appendices on federal funds released to states, status of projects completed/slums covered, technical assistance on financing/monitoring infrastructure construction, budgeting/invoicing, guidelines on preparing proposals to apply for funding etc.

4.3.2 Analytic Procedure for RQ #1

An in-depth review of documentary evidence revealed that the following three themes were already operating across all five federal programs: (i) problem-definition (i.e., specification of a problem that merits policy intervention), (ii) rules and tools (i.e.,
procedures and mechanisms to address the stated problem), and (iii) rationale (i.e., assumption/justification for the stated implementation procedure). These three themes not only helped to organize textual data into largest possible categories to reveal maximum information pertinent to answering the research question, but allowed me to capture and isolate policy design-specific information from techno-managerial information (e.g., operational details on preparation of project proposals, budgeting, technical assistance on infrastructure financing, construction technologies etc) in the dataset. In the documents, the three analytical themes were identified under various section-heads as: (i) “statement of the problem” or “objective” or “purpose” that was defined in terms of (meeting) infrastructure deficits in urban slums; (ii) “guidelines” or “mechanisms” that described federal specifications for fund utilization in the implementation of projects; and (iii) “principles” or “reforms” to be undertaken by cities or states in pursuance of the guidelines and abatement of the problem.

I began with open-coding of data to aggregate the text under each theme into smaller categories of information. This allowed me to capture similarities and differences between codes in order to start grouping them hierarchically (child codes) under a conceptual category (parent code) or creating new categories with distinct meanings/information. This iterative process of manually coding data finally led to a total of seven themes: (i) problem-definition themes on infrastructures, and individual practices; (ii) implementation themes on provision rules, maintenance rules, community mobilization tools, information awareness tools; and (iii) policy rationale theme of cost-efficiency.
To determine the predominance of frames within each thematic category, I counted the number of times a specific code appeared in the dataset (Miles and Huberman, 1994). These dominant frames were analyzed using thematic analysis that can be described as the method of identifying and organizing patterns or themes emerging from data, and interpreting them using constructs and themes from the path-dependence/historical institutionalism literature, reviewed in section II, to answer the research question (Creswell, 2013; Maguire and Delahunt, 2017). For the first research question, thematic analysis was conducted at the semantic level where explicit or manifest meanings of the data as presented in written documents were synthesized with theoretical constructs and patterns to understand the nature of federal institutional designs (Braun and Clark, 2006: 84).

4.3.3 Data for RQ #2

The data for the second research question draws primarily from in-depth and semi-structured key-informant interviews with 25 senior and mid/lower-middle ranking officials at three sanitation bureaucracies in Delhi: 9 officials from the state-level agency of DUSIB, 8 officials from the state-level agency of DJB, and 8 officers from the city-level municipality (MCD). Whilst DUSIB is responsible for providing community toilets and drainage system in illegal slums, some public housing, and shelters, DJB delivers sewer services in legal slums and public housing, and MCD has the mandate of upkeep of drainage system in slums, public housing, and shelters. Reliance on interviews became important because information in official documents was not adequate to extract details on specific policy designs for different residential categories of the poor. Other than DUSIB for which documents provided some precise policy-relevant details, the official
documents of the DJB and MCD often did not have disaggregated information on sanitation policies or expenditures in poor residential areas. This may likely be because DJB’s and MCD’s service mandates cover non-poor residential neighborhoods of the city as well, and include a larger suite of local functions. Still, I gathered 22 official documents (i.e., 12 for DUSIB, 7 for DJB, and 3 for MCD) such as founding legislations (MCD: 1957, DJB: 1998, DUSIB: 2010), policy memos (2016-2017), annual reports/board meeting reports (2012-2018), budget statements (2014-17) primarily to triangulate interviewee narratives. To the best of my knowledge, these materials present the full record of publicly-available documents on sanitation policymaking for the poor by these agencies in Delhi that existed at the time of study (August 2017 – August 2018). To the extent possible, data from documents was used for the manifest purpose of showing where or in what form the three bureaucracies in Delhi incorporated federal-defined sanitation institutional designs in local policymaking.

Since the second research question is an exploration of how federal government-led urban sanitation programs have shaped policymaking for different categories of urban poor in Delhi, I used the broad themes from the first research question – problem-definition, formulation of governing rules and tools, and rationale for these policy choices – to ask ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions from bureaucrats to draw out details on policy designs (esp. where documentary information was inadequate or missing) as well as the latent reasoning for these designs. Since Delhi has been a steady recipient of project funds under all five federal sanitation programs for urban slums, it is a representative case to test whether the empirical patterns of institutional designs prescribed by the federal
government match with those implemented by local bureaucracies. A combination of ‘how’ interview questions and supporting documentary evidence determined whether there is a match between empirical patterns of federal and local institutional designs. And ‘why’ interview questions revealed the reasons for this empirical match (i.e., why institutions persist over time). Further, these broad themes also served as introductory questions to a more focused investigation of variations in sanitation outcomes across a sample of poor communities discussed in chapter 5.

4.3.4 Analytic Procedure for RQ# 2

I proceeded with using a combination of pre-existing codes from the analysis of federal documents and emergent codes reflecting the views of bureaucrats (interviewees) to organize and analyze interview data. I also coded official documents of the bureaucracies wherever specific information on policy design outcomes was available – for example, formal rules of sanitation provision in public housing, rules of sanitation upkeep in shelters, or tools to ensure compliance with service maintenance rules in slums. Manual coding of data through an iterative process of winnowing of the text into smaller conceptual categories generated a total of nine themes: (i) problem-definition themes of infrastructures, and individual habits; (ii) policy implementation themes on provision rules, maintenance/oversight rules, and education tools; and (iii) policy rationale themes of lack of service demand by the poor, lack of service mandate of the agency, technical constraints faced by agency, and norm/belief of agency officials.

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9 Allocation of federal funds to Delhi for implementing projects as per program guidelines is as follows: EIUS (1973-): Rs 0.2 million; UBSP (1985-): Rs 3 million; NSDP (1996-2004): Rs 741 million; BSUP (2008-2014): Rs 1.5 billion; SBM (2014-2019): Rs 3.4 billion. These figures are not inflation-adjusted.

Source: compilation of various Government of India statistics, available at: [https://www.indiastat.com](https://www.indiastat.com)
I was able to establish dominant thematic frames by counting the number of times a specific code under each theme appeared in the dataset. Thematic analysis was used to examine these dominant frames of sanitation policy design outcomes for Delhi using themes from discursive institutionalism that emphasize bureaucratic agency and role of ideas in maintenance and replication of a particular institutional arrangement over time. Thematic analysis was determined to be the appropriate methodological tool because it allows examination of not only ‘semantic’ themes that are explicit or manifest meanings of the data as written in documents or spoken by informants, but also allows ‘moving beyond’ manifest meanings to examine the ‘latent’ themes – i.e., ideas, assumptions, rationales – that inform the semantic content of the data (Braun and Clarke, 2006:84).

4.4 Evidence

This section presents the data on formal institutional arrangements documented in the federal government-led urban sanitation programs for the slum poor, and formal and informal designs of sanitation policymaking by local bureaucracies for a larger cohort of urban poor in Delhi that includes slum dwellers, residents of public housing, and homeless populations. In response to the first research question, the data will show that the federal institutional designs of sanitation for urban slums have largely proceeded in a path-dependent way such that decisions in the past have shaped the domain of policy choices and action strategies in the subsequent programs over a forty-year period. In response to the second research question, the data will show how policy designs by sanitation bureaucracies in Delhi replicate/match federal institutional designs, and the
decisionmaking rationales that local policymakers use to perpetuate these structures over time.

The data is organized around two themes viz., framing of the sanitation problem and problem-solving rules/procedures, with the rationale for these design decisions woven into the presentation of evidence under each thematic category.

4.4.1 Problem-definition: Infrastructures and Individuals
(a) Federal designs

In all 10 documents of the federal programs since the launch of EIUS in 1972, sanitation has been defined as a set of infrastructures – community toilets and drains – such that the problem of sanitation in urban slums pertained to deficiencies in these infrastructures. Over the years, federal policymakers, through financial assistance, have incentivized state and local governments to undertake infrastructure development as a “basic minimum” provision to improve quality of life in slums. The following quote from the NSDP describes the program purpose and formulation of sanitation problem, and is representative of the objectives and problem statement in the 8 of 10 documents:

“[To meet] the increasing demand for basic services in the wake of urbanization of poverty.. to improve productivity and quality of life of the poor who live in illegal structures put up on vacant lands..known as slums..[provision of] basic services like community latrines, open drains.. are considered a minimum prerequisite. The standards for improvement have been laid down by the central [federal] government through its Environmental Improvement of Urban Slums (EIUS) scheme.. as follows: community latrines [with] one seat for 20 to 50 persons, open drains for avoiding accumulation of stagnant wastewater.. Projects on meeting these basic minimum standards will be eligible for financial assistance” (Government of India, 2001: 85; emphasis added)
The frame of “basic minimum” community-level sanitation has persisted in federally-led urban sanitation programs for the slum poor since the EIUS program launched in 1972. It was only in 2014, with the launch of SBM, that federal policymakers somewhat broke from the entrenched institutional design to also include the provision of individual household toilets and alternative solutions within the structural framing of sanitation problem in slums regardless of their residential status (i.e., illegal slums also eligible). The following quote is representative of the expanded structural framing of slum sanitation found in 2 official documents of SBM out of a total of 10 documents:

“..to ensure that no household engages in the practice of open defecation..any household, whether they live in notified/non-notified slums… that does not have access to an individual toilet..can apply for central government incentive [federal subsidy] for construction of household toilets.. wherever individual household latrines cannot be constructed due to lack of land or space, ULBs can provide community toilet blocks..can consider support for innovative solutions when an underground sewerage system may not be feasible, for example in hilly areas, dense settlements..provided by Technology Evaluation Committee set up by the ministry..” (Government of India, 2018: 16; emphasis added)

It was only by the beginning of the 21st century, and with the launch of BSUP (2007-14), that federal policymakers widened the scope of problem-definition beyond the structural frame of “basic minimum” infrastructures to also include an individualistic frame of “behavior change” among slum dwellers as integral to sanitation improvements in slums. While the theme of behavior change appeared as many times as the structural theme of sanitation problem in the two documents of BSUP, it appeared an average 10 times more frequently than the structural theme in the two documents of SBM (2014-ongoing). Further, financial assistance to state/local governments for hygiene-related information and education campaigns in urban slums increased from 5 percent of the total federal grants under BSUP to 15 percent under SBM (Government of India, 2010: 8; 2017:22).
As the costliest urban sanitation program to date at INR 1.5 trillion, “changing behaviors for eliminating the practice of open defecation” has received major policy attention for improving the quality of life in slums under SBM (Government of India, 2017:10; 2018). The following quote from the BSUP program represents the rationale for the inclusion of behavior change within the definitional scope of sanitation problem found in 5 of 10 documents:

“physical infrastructure assets created in the past have been languishing…The approach is to bring about behavioural change and safe sanitation practices to ensure proper and sustained use of toilet facilities.[and] to create ownership and demand generation for sanitary facilities among the beneficiaries [slum dwellers]” (Government of India, 2009: 91; emphasis added)

(b) Designs by sanitation bureaucracies

“For the betterment of the lives of jhuggi [illegal slum] dwellers, under the Environment Improvement of Urban Slums [EIUS], DUSIB is providing pay-and-use jan suvidha complexes [community toilets]..1 toilet seat for 25-35 persons, open drains..to curb the habit of mass defecation in open” is a representative quote that frames the problem of slum sanitation which appears in 6 of 12 documents of the state-level agency, Delhi Urban Shelter Improvement Board (DUSIB) (emphasis added). When I asked how these slum sanitation parameters were improving living conditions in illegal slums, the following quote by a senior bureaucrat represented the view of 6 of 9 DUSIB officials:

“don’t go into the literal meaning of EIUS, we are doing the bare minimum..not building [facilities] based on population.. we have provided sufficient facilities as per the norms [user-toilet ratio]...they are open 6AM-9PM.. we have done our part now people have to

10 The remaining 6 documents in the dataset are 4 budget documents, 1 shelter policy document, and 1 founding constitution document of the DUSIB.
do their duty... change their habits of going in the open, and be willing to pay for [using] facilities” (emphasis added).

“To stop people from defecating in the open and promote toilet-use, the MCD [municipality] has launched Roko-toko [stop-and-nag] and seeti bajao [blow whistle] campaigns...we will be deploying 300 sanitary workers for this cleanliness drive...to fulfill the Swachh Bharat Mission [SBM] and make Delhi open defecation-free” is a quote from a policy memo published by the municipality in October 2017 that also appeared in another memo in December 2017 in which it decided to continue with this behavior change campaign in 109 illegal slums located on vacant lands owned by the agency (MCD, 2017a; 2017b; emphasis added). A mid-ranking municipal official, representing the view of 6 of 8 officials argued that sanitation in slums is “ultimately it’s a mindset problem... people have been habituated to going in the open...we are working towards changing these hardened practices and get them to use community toilets through these campaigns”. However, there were 2 of 8 municipal officials and 2 of 9 DUSIB officials who cited public expenditures on building community toilets in reference to the need for behavior change campaigns. “The government has spent a lot of money from SBM funds to build these toilets...campaigns will encourage people to use these facilities...otherwise they will fall into disrepair” stated a senior bureaucrat at DUSIB who represented the view of this minority cohort of sanitation officials.

When I asked how the agencies were implementing SBM’s agenda of household toilets in illegal slums, “illegal slums cannot be given subsidies to build individual toilets...they have illegally encroached on government lands...they can’t be rewarded for it...” said a
senior MCD official representing the view of all 8 officials and 5 of 9 DUSIB officials. The remaining 4 of 9 DUSIB officials argued that the agency is authorized to build only community toilets and open drains for improving sanitation in illegal slums. However, there is no clause or provision in DUSIB’s constitution that either states community toilets as the only possible solution for slums (in fact, community toilets is never mentioned), or prohibits provision of individual-level toilets in slums (DUSIB Act, 2010).

The frame of “basic minimum” sanitation has also been replicated for public housing projects (resettlement colonies) in Delhi, as evidenced in 4 of 12 documents of DUSIB in which the agency consistently spent an average of 1 percent of its budget on community toilets and drainage over a four-year period (DUSIB, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016). Despite the legal residential status of these housing projects that entitles residents for sewer connections, the DJB has de-prioritized sewerage in the localities that came up in the early 2000s. “Our agenda right now is to provide sewerage in urban villages and [non-poor] unauthorized colonies...we will get to these [resettlement] colonies after we have provided in other areas...DUSIB has provided community toilets there but have you seen their condition? they are in a bad shape because people are not ready to pay for public services...over time they will learn [to pay]...and will be ready for water and sewerage...” stated a senior DJB official, representing the view of 4 of 8 officials when asked why unsewered resettlement colonies were not included in its sewerage master plan document for 2031 (DJB, 2014; emphasis added). Three of 8 DJB officials claimed lack of demand

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11 Prior to 2015, slum dwellers were relocated to resettlement colonies where they were allotted undeveloped land plots. In 2015, DUSIB introduced a new slum rehabilitation policy for relocation of eligible (illegal) slum dweller to apartment complexes. These apartment units have private toilets with water supply and sewer connections (DUSIB, 2015).
for sewerage among residents of resettlement colonies captured by this representative quote by a mid-rank official: “people have been living there for a long time..they have constructed their own septic toilets..” When I asked these officials if there was data on coverage rates of household toilets in these resettlement colonies, they said their “guess” was that “most households” would have made “some provision” by now. Five annual budget documents out of a total of 7 documents reviewed for the DJB corroborate the de-prioritization of sewerage in resettlement colonies as the budget head titled “capital works” (i.e., new construction) has only 3 line items: “sewerage in urban villages”, “sewerage in unauthorized colonies”, and “sewage treatment plants” (DJB 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017).

The frame of “basic minimum” has also been adopted by bureaucracies for homeless shelters and, to some extent, in legal slums. When I asked how sanitation provision was defined for shelters, the following representative quote by a mid-rank DUSIB official captured the view of all 9 officials: “for a shelter of size 50 [number of occupants] we provide 2 porta toilets.. you can say that these norms are same as community toilets in slums..1 seat for about 25-30 people..there is no special need there..we are building everywhere according to these fixed norms. These facilities are free, and shelters are open 24x7.” A comparison between the budget documents of the DUSIB and DJB revealed that legal slum areas were being provided community toilets as well as sewerage (DJB, 2017; DUSIB, 2015). When I asked DJB officials about this observed disparity, all 8 attributed lack of sufficient space to lay sewerage in these dense settlements for continuation of community-level sanitation. Over the course of the interviews when I asked broad questions on the how SBM had shaped policymaking by the DJB, the
following quote on exploring alternative sewer technologies of sanitation provision by a senior official represented the view of 5 of 8 officials: “what is not sewerage is not our mandate..we have not applied for any assistance under SBM..we don’t need it..we get a lot of money from the state government to build sewers, treatment plants..DUSIB can provide jan suvidha complexes [community toilets] in those dense areas [legal slum].our job is sewerage” (emphasis added).

4.4.2 Implementation Rules and Procedures

(a) Federal designs

The implementation guidelines or strategies for 4 of 5 federal programs, except (EIUS in 1972), articulated the need for private-sector participation, NGOs, and slum communities in operation and maintenance of sanitation infrastructure in urban slums. This formulation of program implementation rule has been justified by federal policymakers on the grounds of achieving cost-efficiency in delivery of sanitation service in slums. The following quote from the UBSP is representative of the content of implementation rule and rationale for private participation that appears in 9 of 10 programmatic documents:

“Looking at the magnitude of the renewal and upgradation programmes, the public sector alone cannot take up this mammoth responsibility..For the development of sustainable and congenial human settlements, engagement of the private sector, NGOs, and community participation has become an important component in the implementation and management of slum improvement programmes. This is especially significant when public agencies are faced with the almost perennial problem of resource constraint and high cost of delivery of urban services” (Government of India, 1996: 56)

In 3 of these 9 documents, community participation in implementation and maintenance of services was also rationalized as a means for building “self-confidence”, “ownership”,

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and “entrepreneurship” among slum dwellers (Government of India, 1992; 2001; 2010). Even though federal policymakers imagined the role of private-sector in maintenance of sanitation infrastructures, only 2 of 9 program documents provided procedural details on how local governments could engage businesses—e.g., financial and technological support for construction, cost-sharing between state and private companies— for delivering sanitation in slums. In 7 of 9 documents, policymakers envisaged a much clearer vision of community participation facilitated by NGOs for cost-efficiency in infrastructure maintenance or management. The following quote from the NSDP represents the service management procedures articulated in 7 of 9 documents:

“NGOs, who are an important interface between the people and the government, have been a major player in social programmes [in slums] like non-formal education, child and maternal healthcare... [they] should also be involved in community infrastructure to facilitate formation of community based organizations such as women’s self-help groups.. slum sanitation committees.. for converging people’s efforts towards asset management.. necessary for sustainable development of slums and cost-effective utilisation of funds” (Government of India, 2001:85; emphasis added)

With the launch of BSUP in 2005, and subsequently for SBM in 2014, the role of NGOs as facilitators of community self-management of sanitation was broadened to include hygiene awareness and contributions/payments toward use of community sanitation facilities. That is, hygiene awareness to encourage use of public facilities among, and mobilizing them to pay at these facilities were program implementation strategies designed to achieve cost-efficiency or cost-recovery in infrastructure development. The following representative quote from BSUP captures this view documented in 3 of 4 documents pertaining to BSUP and SBM programs:
“For uninterrupted urban service delivery, linkages between asset creation and asset maintenance are necessary. Asset maintenance or Operation and Maintenance (O&M) in turn relies on levying user charges for the services provided to graduate to full O&M cost recovery…ULBs [urban local bodies] should elicit active participation of civil society, self-help groups, NGOs to mobilize raise contributions from beneficiary households..NGOs can be involved by ULBs for awareness building among beneficiaries [slum dwellers] regarding healthy community life, hygiene, and cleanliness that are the direct and indirect benefits of these projects..” (Government of India, 2015: 15; emphasis added).

(b) Designs by sanitation bureaucracies

Community participation for self-management (via regular use and paying for use) of community toilets was the dominant theme among the group of 8 municipal interviewees. “Ending open defecation and promoting toilet-use in slums through these campaigns [Roko-Toko] is only the first step..once people start using these facilities, they will begin to see it [community toilet] as a community asset..and will take responsibility to pay for its upkeep ..ownership [by community] is very important..our campaign volunteers are trying to create this awareness.. otherwise MCD has no presence in slums..it’s not our responsibility ..slums is DUSIB’s mandate” is how a mid-rank MCD official, representing the sentiment of all 8 MCD officers articulated the role of the municipality in maintenance of sanitation service in slums (emphasis added). But according to the municipality’s governing act, there is an official rule of servicing drains that is also applicable to slum areas of Delhi: “it shall be incumbent on the Corporation [municipality] to make adequate provision for.. maintenance and cleansing of drains and drainage works.. in the entire area of Delhi” (DMC Act, 1957:40; emphasis added).

While it is indeed the case that there is overlap with DUSIB’s mandate of “improvement of drainage services” in slums (DUSIB, 2010:10), overlapping constitutional mandates, however, mean that drainage services in slums is a ‘shared’ responsibility.
DUSIB envisages community participation in oversight of the private firms and NGOs that it has contracted for the maintenance of community toilet complexes in slums, with formal contract rules stating that the agency “can conduct inspections at any point of time, and if cleaning of the complex is not found satisfactory, a fine of Rs 500/- per occasion will be imposed” on the contractor (DUSIB, 2018:3). When I asked about the service oversight (inspection) procedure followed by the agency for its 641 community toilets in slums in Delhi, a senior DUSIB official stated that “we have a centralized tracking system here that receives complaints via a mobile app..given all the information on how users can download the app at our facilities..slum dwellers have smartphone these days..when they fill out the complaint form on the app, an engineer visits the location to check the problem..we have a team of 4 engineers”, representing the responses of 8 of 9 colleagues. When I presented findings from a recent annual report which documented “poor day-to-day upkeep and maintenance of community toilet complexed. Due to malfunctioning of water pumps”, a representative view by a mid-rank officer of 3 of 9 DUSIB officials was that “if people don’t want to complain, how will we know something is wrong from here”, while another mid-rank officer representing the view of 4 of 9 officials also added that “if people paid for using the toilets, the contractors would be able to keep the complexes in good condition” (DUSIB, 2018:2). Five of 8 DUSIB officials said that a monitoring team of 4 engineers was “sufficient” because monitoring was online whereas other 3 felt that more would be “good”, “needed”. The de-prioritization of government-led oversight of slum sanitation is supported by its budgetary decision rules wherein DUSIB allocated an average of less than 1 percent of its annual budget on asset maintenance between 2014 and 2017 (DUSIB, 2017).
The municipality also envisages a greater role of community organizations in oversight and maintenance of drainage systems in resettlement colonies (public housing projects), even as the formal rule in its governing act defines drain cleaning as an “obligatory function” of the agency (DMC Act, 1957:40). “We cannot monitor sitting here.. unless people feel personally responsible for their surroundings, no progress can be achieved.. must learn to first perform your duty before expecting the government to deliver.. RWAs [residents’ welfare associations] should oversee service issues..can tell us if sanitary workers are not doing their job.” is how a senior officer in the municipality, representing the view of 4 of 8 colleagues framed the rationale of community responsibility in service management (emphasis added). The representative view of another senior official for the remaining 4 of 8 officials rationalized community responsibility by stating that “our services will not always be enough..with rising demands, we cannot be present everywhere..associations [RWAs] should collect monthly contributions from members to pay for proper upkeep of services..” (emphasis added).

The frame of community responsibility via public education is stated as the official justification for DUSIB’s role in upkeep of common services like sewers and drains in EWS public housing projects. The following representative quote captures the rationale for government-led service upkeep in EWS localities featured in 2 of 12 documents: “It has been observed that after allotment of dwelling units..the maintenance of the common services in these colonies is not done properly by the occupants due to ignorance, lack of knowledge to form [residents’ welfare] associations. Therefore, DUSIB will maintain the common services..for a period of 5 years..” (DUSIB, 2016:10; emphasis added). When I asked a senior DUSIB officer about how the term-limit on government engagement in
service upkeep was decided, his view represented the statements of 6 of 9 officers: “these people have lived in slums for a long time...the government is trying to teach them to live responsibly..like residents of formal housing in better localities ..where we live.. to keep their localities clean. This cultural change may take about 5-10 years..so we decided to try for 5 years”

Although management of services at 198 homeless shelters has been contracted out to local NGOs, the latter has also been entrusted with the responsibility of educating the (homeless) community to partake in upkeep. “NGOs are doing a good job..they have expertise in this area..we support them financially to manage services in shelters.. they should work with the homeless ..educate them..to keep shelters clean. DUSIB is only providing space and structural support [porta toilets, water storage system etc.] for shelters” said a senior DUSIB official representing the view of 6 of 9 colleagues. A mid-ranking official, representing the view of 4 of 9 officials, added that “shelters are actually not our mandate ..we are just following court orders..we have significantly increased the number of shelters in Delhi..we have done our part..” This claim of shelters being DUSIB’s de facto responsibility by the orders of the Delhi High Court and Supreme Court of India in 2010-11 is also documented in two annual reports, as the provision and servicing of shelters is not mentioned as a mandated function in the governing act of the agency (DUSIB, 2010; 2013; 2014).

The frame of social (NGO) responsibility in service management is also documented in one shelter policy document, out of the 12 pertaining to the agency, that describes contractual obligations between DUSIB and NGOs: “traditionally, society used to take
care of the neediest.. shelters offered by dharamshalas, mosques and churches. Unfortunately, these philanthropic cultures are dying…homeless have very little option but to sleep on the streets.” (DUSIB, 2014:3). However, diminishing priority to fund shelter services is revealed in DUSIB’s budget decisions where gross spending declined from Rs 0.3 million in 2014-15 to 0.14 million in 2016-17 as the number of homeless shelters grew from 150 to 183 over the same period (DUSIB, 2015; 2017).

4.5 Interpretation

This section presents a discussion on the role of ideas – i.e., how ideas matter – in producing largely self-reinforcing and replicable patterns of institutional designs vis-à-vis sanitation policymaking for the poor. Based on the evidence on federal and local institutional designs presented in the preceding section, I would argue that the idea of personal responsibility of the poor to meet their own sanitation needs – and by extension, limited government responsibility – sustains the overarching governance framework of laissez faire institutional designs that are, in turn, replicated by sanitation bureaucracies in Delhi as ‘appropriate’ for delivering sanitation to the poor. While this idea/normative belief that the poor assume greater responsibility (and, consequently, bear the blame) for their own sanitation is latent in federal sanitation designs, it is manifest in the reasoning articulated by sanitation bureaucrats in Delhi as shaping their decision-making processes. These discussions on latent (in the case of federal institutions) and manifest (in the case of local institutions) designs in the framing of sanitation issue, sanitation problem, and

\[\text{12} \text{ Dharamshalas are inns run by charity-based Hindu organizations.}\]
sanitation delivery rules follow next. In the following discussion, I use the term ‘framing’ to emphasize the deliberate and strategic nature in which policymakers operationalize latent ideas in the construction of policy designs.

4.5.1 Framing the Sanitation Issue

In all 10 documents that comprise the dataset of the scope and guidelines of the federal government-led urban sanitation programs over four decades, there is no evidence of how/from where policymakers developed the parameters of community sanitation (i.e., community toilets in fixed user: toilet provision and open drains), or how this “basic minimum” infrastructure development by local governments could/would improve quality of life in slums. Except for SBM, none of the other four program guidelines specified the need for state/local agencies to undertake scientific assessments (e.g., surveys) of service deficits and the size/composition of the user population that would arguably be necessary to build facilities that adequately met the needs and demands (e.g., number of senior/disabled users, men, women, and children) of all slum residents. These latent designs underlying the thematic frame of “basic minimum” sanitation signaled to program-implementing bureaucracies, and the public at large, that government’s responsibility in sanitation poverty alleviation was limited to that of a construction company which felt no need to engage the communities to determine the adequacy of structural provisions.

13 I discuss issue-framing and problem-framing separately to show the distinct ways in which the normative view/ideational construct of personal responsibility is operationalized in institutional design.
Over four decades of recurrent framing of the issue as fixed infrastructures, the
definitional parameters of “basic minimum” sanitation have become fairly well-
established in the institutional memory of policymaking bureaucracies in Delhi. The
decision by DUSIB bureaucrats to replicate basic minimum sanitation (i.e., community
toilets in fixed proportion and open drains) as the appropriate provision in illegal slums
was supported by the idea that those building illegal housing structures on public lands
had to “live with the consequences” (i.e., be personally responsible for the outcome) of
their decisions of encroachment. As these poor did not exhibit responsible behavior, the
dominant view among DUSIB and municipality bureaucrats that preserved status quo of
basic minimum frame was that residents of illegal slums could not be “rewarded” with
household-level sanitation that is incentivized by the federal government under its
ongoing SBM program.

Path-dependent appropriate design of basic minimum slum sanitation was also applied to
public housing projects and homeless shelters. In the case of the former, community-level
provision was sustained by the dominant perception among DJB and DUSIB bureaucrats
that these residents (whom the government had relocated from illegal slums to public
housing) were unprepared to pay for sewerage services because old habits of ostensible
unwillingness to pay for community toilets in slums (in their previous residence) take
time to change. That is, replication of basic minimum sanitation design was a deliberate
attempt by agencies to inculcate learnings of personal responsibility among residents of
public housing as a precondition for provision of entitled sewer services to them. In the
case of homeless shelters, despite an exogenous shock of judicial intervention that pushed
construction and provision of services at shelters on to DUSIB’s policy agenda,
policymakers continued to draw from their cultural/ideational repertoire of appropriate responses to provide basic minimum sanitation that was perceived to be “sufficient” as “no special need” was felt to reform routine processes of building structures without assessing the demands of the poor.

These patterns of status quo framing of the issue of sanitation provision, consistently applied across different categories of the poor in Delhi supports the claims of institutionalist scholars that the longer a frame persists through policy designs, the more firmly it gets locked into the cultural or ideological repertoires of policymakers (e.g., Campbell, 2004; Somers and Block, 2005). The frame of basic minimum sanitation inculcated a policy learning among sanitation bureaucrats of limited government responsibility via pre-determined and fixed sanitation provisions that were deemed sufficient and appropriate for the poor in Delhi. The case of sanitation in legal slums, however, exposes the tension between formal rules of service provision and path-dependent ideational construct of limited government responsibility within a fairly stable normative framework of issue definition.

While sewers were installed in some legal slums, in others, lack of space was articulated by DJB bureaucrats for provision of community-level sanitation. Dismissing the need for seeking federal funds and technical assistance for alternative household-level sanitation in dense settlements available under SBM, the bureaucrats rationalized this decision on the basis of lack of organizational mandate to deliver alternative solutions. However, there is no clause or provision in the governing act of the DJB which prohibits provision of innovative or unconventional sewerage like septic tanks and condominial sewers to any
residential settlement (DJB, 1998). On the one hand, routine tensions between rule-based provisions and normative beliefs of (limited) government responsibility in the definition of sanitation suggest that incremental change (to sewerage) even in a well-established institutional environment is possible (March and Olsen, 2009). On the other, administrative practices of community-level sanitation incentivized over decades of federal programs have created deep-seated learnings of largely status quo policy responses that make learning new procedures to deliver household-level sanitation to all the entitled poor in legal slums outside the domain of government responsibility (Pierson, 2000; Tillin and Duckett, 2017).

4.5.2 Framing the Sanitation Problem

Although the federal programs over four decades institutionalized the framing of sanitation as a structural issue to alleviate the problem of poor quality of life in urban slums, with the launch of BSUP in the early 2000s these federal policymakers expanded the problem-frame to include the need for changing sanitation behaviors of the poor. The problem-frame of behavior change was an all-encompassing concept that captured changing behaviors of open defecation as well as getting the poor to use (and subsequently pay to maintain) “basic minimum” sanitation (i.e., community toilets) in slums. With the launch of SBM in 2014, the theme of “ending open defecation” as a deft metaphor (Guber and Bosso, 2012) was deployed to evoke mental images of cause/blame as well as to assign responsibility for improving the problem of unsanitary living conditions in slums. Designed to generate acceptance or “ownership” of “basic minimum” sanitation infrastructures in slums, the concept of behavior change was, therefore, anchored by the idea of inculcating ‘behaviors’ of personal or community
responsibility to promote use and sustainability of public facilities. This re-orientation of the problem-frame served only to further institutionalize the normative appropriateness of “basic minimum” sanitation by problematizing practices and attitudes of poor individuals for languishing public infrastructures in slums. In other words, this process of “layering” allowed policymakers to add new elements to, without actually displacing, existing policy legacies of institutional design (Béland, 2016: 736).

To reconcile the policy paradox wherein sanitation continued to be defined as a structural issue but the problem was framed as a behavioral one, I would argue that image-making of the poor perhaps became essential for federal policymakers to justify/legitimize the need for continued allocation of government resources for slum sanitation programs to the public at large (Jacoby, 2000; Stone, 2004). In so doing, policymakers attempted to de-mystify a complex problem (unsanitary slums) that persisted despite decades-long federally-funded and locally-implemented projects and policies for improving sanitation for the poor. The image-making of the poor as habituated in old ways of state dependency (unwillingness to pay for public amenities) and unsanitary practices (open defecation) drew from, and added to, federal policymakers’ established value/belief of limited role of the government and poor being largely responsible for sanitation in their communities. This latent policy idea of personal responsibility has been imbibed by local policymakers in Delhi for designing new policy elements of shaming and educating the poor to use and manage community sanitation in slums and shelters. This case of institutional layering again shows how bureaucrats exercise agency by deliberately manipulating taken-for-granted ideas to design new policy tools that maintain/regenerate established routines of
sanitation provision (Campbell, 1998; see Bateman and Engel, 2018 for an overview of shaming as an instrument of laissez faire sanitation policy in other developing countries).

Now, some may argue that shaming or educating the poor to use public infrastructures would have been appealing to policymakers because it could be a cost-effective way to improve sanitation in low-income communities (e.g., Black and Fawcett, 2008). But against the backdrop of lack of demand assessment to build suitable infrastructures and declining public investments in maintenance or service oversight in slums and shelters in Delhi (supported by some official evidence of improper functioning of infrastructures), these behavior change interventions may not improve sanitation in communities where people end up being forced to use unsanitary public toilets. That is, open defecation may not necessarily be happening out of habit, but that public facilities may be inadequate, closed, or unclean that forces people to go in the open (e.g., Feyter et al., 2017; Sheikh, 2008). But since this possible explanation does not fit the institutionalized learning of the appropriateness or adequacy of structural provision, normative or value-laden problem frame of sanitation-as-personal-responsibility persist in policymaking for the poor (Chong and Druckman, 2007).

4.5.3 Framing Sanitation Rules

Scholars of urban politics in India have argued that the dominant model of governing the poor characterized by privatization (cost-efficiency and individual responsibility) and deregulation (limited role of state in public services), especially since the 1990s, was shaped by the larger institutional environment of macroeconomic and political reforms that set the country on the trajectory of market principles (private enterprise and
competition) and decentralization (self-governance) in public policymaking (e.g., Bhan, 2009; Dupont, 2011). For all five federal programs, cost-efficiency was the dominant rationale among policymakers to engage communities in the program implementation process related to managing upkeep and sustainability of sanitation infrastructures. However, policymakers’ concern with cost-efficiency appears to be limited to management rather than building cost-effective infrastructures. This is because, other than SBM, I found no documented evidence of federal policymakers articulating the need to explore alternative low-cost sanitation options in urban slums as provisioning rules largely proceeded on a self-reinforcing path of pre-determined fixed infrastructures (i.e., thumb-rule for community toilets; open drains).\footnote{Since the early 2000s, knowledge on alternative cost-effective sanitation has existed in Indian cities like Ahmedabad, Pune, Bhopal where local governments have experimented with providing low-cost household-level sanitation systems in slums/informal settlements (World Bank, 2016).} It appears, therefore, that “cost-efficiency” was a metaphor for cost-reduction in sanitation provision.

I also found no evidence that implementation procedures designed to elicit participation among slum dwellers in operation and maintenance of sanitation infrastructures were based on assessment by local bureaucracies of the ability or willingness of community residents to assume such responsibility. This latent finding of outsourcing service management to communities is consistent with the design of “basic minimum” sanitation where the government’s role/responsibility is limited to building structures without assessment of needs/demands. The federal documents also did not define any guideline or specification related to utilization of funds that required local bureaucracies to undertake oversight of sanitation infrastructure assets. By perversely rewarding local bureaucracies for irrelevance of oversight by funding infrastructures without requiring a service
management plan, in conjunction with a latent emphasis on cost-reduction in provision, I would argue that federal policymakers signaled and reinforced the belief/normative view that poor bore a disproportionate responsibility for managing their own sanitation.

In the case of Delhi, the weak salience of cost-related concerns in service administration by local bureaucracies may be attributed to the respondents’ claim, and extant evidence, that the city-state has access to a strong resource base of federal and numerous foreign donor agencies that are located in the nation’s capital (e.g., Chaplin, 2011; Karpouzoglou and Zimmer, 2012). Instead, the normative view of personal responsibility came to be fully and clearly articulated as the dominant rationale for community participation (and by extension, limited state presence) in the implementation/management of sanitation service across different residential categories of urban poor settlements in Delhi. And through the community participation design of policy implementation, the normative frame of personal responsibility of the poor emerged a dominant rationale for agencies’ virtual non-compliance with formal rules of maintenance or oversight of sanitation service in Delhi.

Despite formal contract rule of oversight of service operators of community toilet facilities in slums, in conjunction with diminishing allocation of financial and human resources for asset maintenance, DUSIB has handed over responsibility of monitoring to slum dwellers who are perceived to have smartphones and be proficient in operating the complaint app on their phones. It may be the case that some slum dwellers own/can use smartphones, but it less clear whether these so-called resourceful slum dwellers are also users of community toilets (may have constructed septic toilets at home). Generalized
perceptions among bureaucrats of smartphone-owning slum dwellers reinforces the view that all poor have resources to pay for upkeep of sanitation infrastructure and must therefore assume responsibility for its management.

Because policy actors interpret formal rules through the filter of their own normative beliefs (of sanitation as personal/community responsibility), value-laden informal rules (of community participation) pave the way for opportunistic strategies – under-investing resources for infrastructure maintenance – which, in turn, increases the incongruity with written rules of oversight (Alexander and Sherwin, 1994; Cole, 2014). And inconvenient facts (Lakoff, 2004) of oversight failure – documented evidence of malfunctioning facilities in slums – are blamed on lackadaisical attitudes and reluctance of the poor to assume responsibility that allows DUSIB officials to expunge considerations of course-correction and, instead, legitimate institutionalized designs of limited government engagement via online oversight. Disregarding compliance with its own formal rule of maintenance of drainage networks in slums, the municipality also adhered to the dominant normative view of sanitation-as-community responsibility to design a new implementation tool of shaming and education campaigns to promote “ownership” of public sanitation facilities. As a legacy of federal institutional designs, these behavior change campaigns were seen as a necessary first step to develop community/collective willingness to participate in service management. That is, within an established normative environment the selection of these new design elements such as online/off-site monitoring of service contractors by DUSIB, or nagging/whistling campaigns by the municipality represented an ‘incremental institutional adaption’ and shows how ‘intentional agents’
work within, internalize, and regenerate the ‘animating idea’ of community responsibility in institutions governing the poor (Goodin, 1996:27; March, 2009).

The intentionality in the design of informal rule by municipal officials that prescribes residents of public housing to form community-based welfare organizations is also embedded in the belief that “progress can be achieved” when poor execute their “duty” of monitoring sanitary officials and/or show willingness to seek private solutions for municipal services that will be available in limited supply. The official claim of deemed inevitability of service deficits is used by the agency to justify non-compliance with formal rules of drain-cleaning activities to itself, and perpetuate path-dependent and hands-off implementation designs sustained by the normative view of personal/community responsibility in sanitation “progress”. Extant research on self-help designs of poverty alleviation programs in other developing countries suggest that normative beliefs of personal responsibility may be attributable to elite perceptions that those who are poor in income are rich in spare time to engineer consensus within their own communities vis-à-vis monitoring and organizing resources for co-production of essential public services (e.g., Berner and Philips, 2004; Jakimov, 2007; Vandergeest, 1991). In India, scholars like Banerjee and Duflo (2008) and Mahmud (2010) also show that the design of anti-poverty policies in the fields of public education and housing have emphasized a ‘mandated empowerment’ whereby the poor are handed the responsibility of improving public services without being asked what services they want, or if they are able (time- or resource-wise) or willing to manage these services.
To bring about this mandated empowerment among the poor, DUSIB has assumed the role of an educator that justified the formulation of a new formal rule for the agency’s direct involvement in service upkeep in public housing projects for a five-year period. As regards shelters, DUSIB has adopted an indirect role of educating the homeless in self-management via service-providing NGOs, that the agency, in turn, uses to disregard the need for compliance with formal oversight rules (complemented with a steady decline in financial support to NGOs). As institutions carry the legacy of path dependencies (Pierson and Skocpol, 2002; Thelen, 1999) where education was institutionalized in federal sanitation designs, DUSIB has also – like the municipality for slums – incorporated this policy tool in its institutional repertoire of standard operating procedures of delivering sanitation to the poor in public housing and homeless shelters. In fact, the case of homeless shelters is testament to the fairly well-established administrative routines and learnings - the exogenous shock of judicial oversight of the bureaucracy largely left the entrenched behavioral patterns of a limited state (diminishing public investments and engagement in poor communities) in service delivery, and the poor being made responsible for sanitation management intact.

4.6 Conclusion

The foregoing discussion presented an institutional analysis of the federally-designed framework governing sanitation for the slum poor in India, and its impact on shaping policymaking processes designed by local bureaucracies for a broader cohort of urban poor in slums, public housing, and homeless shelters in Delhi. The investigation of five federal programs (1972-present) that have defined the broad governing architecture of
urban sanitation for the poor revealed largely path-dependent patterns in the manifest/official formulation of the sanitation problem and rules/implementation procedures to improve quality of life in urban slums. While structural provision of community toilets, in a fixed ratio of number of users per toilet seat, and open drains emerged as the well-established definitional standard of basic minimum sanitation in slums, the widening of the problem-frame beyond infrastructure deficits to include behavior change of slum poor, since the early 2000s, further institutionalized the adequacy of fixed provisions and community management. The theme of community participation (facilitated via NGOs) emerged as the dominant implementation procedure to promote use and sustainability/management of these public infrastructures. As federal funds were tied to urban local governments building sanitation infrastructures, there was no formal guideline on (or, fiscal incentives for) the need to conduct assessments of the size or needs of the user population in slums. Similarly, the federal programs articulated no official rule or implementation guideline for local governments to assess the ability or willingness of slum communities to manage their own sanitation before handing over the responsibility of service upkeep to them.

Though the manifest rationale for these laissez faire or hands-off institutional designs formulated by federal policymakers was to achieve “cost-efficiency” in utilization of funds by urban local governments, policy concern with costs was only imagined vis-à-vis infrastructure management (that involved slum communities), not infrastructure provision/ construction that would have involved an exploration of alternative low-cost or cost-efficient sanitation technologies. Rather, the latent rationale or policy idea that has lent stability to this laissez faire framework of sanitation governance is the causal belief
that sanitation is largely a personal/community responsibility and the government has only a limited role (of building infrastructures) in alleviating sanitation poverty via service delivery. This policy (ideational) learning has been imbibed by sanitation bureaucracies in the design of sanitation policy across jurisdictions of the poor (slums, public housing, and shelters) in Delhi.

The interaction between idea and institutions not only manifests in formal policy designs such as replication of basic minimum provision and behavior change interventions to promote toilet-use, but also via latent designs (informal rules) of non-compliance with formal service oversight rules, diminishing allocation of agency resources in infrastructure maintenance, and emphasis on community organizing and education in self-management of sanitation services. The policy idea of personal responsibility and limited state responsibility that imbued these policy design decisions shows how bureaucrats in Delhi have strategically and purposefully framed policymaking processes to sustain and replicate laissez faire institutional framework of delivering sanitation service across jurisdictions of the poor.

However, path-dependency in normatively-designed political institutions does not axiomatically imply pre-determined or predictable sanitation policy outcomes. Chapter 5 presents a qualitative analysis of 95 key informant interviews with policy actors/groups in Delhi to show how, within the overarching laissez faire institutional framework, policymakers are evaluating/determining the deservingness of the poor that can explain disparate provision of sanitation service across 15 communities sampled from the residential categories presented in this chapter. Chapter 6 presents a consensus analysis of
a survey of 30 bureaucrats in Delhi to test whether or not a shared perception of deservingness of the poor exists, and its relationship with implementation design for sanitation upkeep support in each sampled community. These analytic discussions are central concerns in the stability and potential change in the institutional framework governing sanitation for the poor in Delhi.
CHAPTER 5
TRACING PROCESSES OF SANITATION POLICYMAKING FOR THE URBAN POOR IN DELHI: WHO GETS WHAT, WHEN, HOW AND WHY

5.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the findings of a qualitative inquiry into the content and design of sanitation policymaking process(es) that result in unequal distribution of service outcomes across 15 communities of the urban poor in Delhi. The purpose of this inquiry is to investigate why, and show how, the provision of an essential public service like sanitation varies across an often-singularly constructed ‘urban poor’ cohort. I used semi-structured key informant interviews with officials in three sanitation bureaucracies, city and state-level elected representatives, communities, and NGO representatives, and triangulated them with documentary evidence (e.g., government reports and policy memos, news articles) and field observations, to construct a policymaking ‘chain’ for each community. Using process-tracing as an analytic framework of causal inference I uncovered the temporal sequence of events, starting with the observed outcomes and working backwards in the policymaking chain to reveal what decisions were taken when, by whom, why, and how that culminated in the given sanitation outcome(s) for each community. This mapping of decisionmaking steps was complemented by an analytic technique of matching empirically-observed processes with theoretically-predicted
patterns to arrive at theory-driven, process-based causal explanations for outcome variations across communities sampled for this study.

Section 5.2 lays out the research question, describes the method for organizing and coding qualitative data gleaned from multiple sources, the analytic techniques for establishing dominant causal process explanation for sanitation outcomes, and states the theoretical propositions that offer the conceptual frameworks to understand the patterns and processes observed in the data. Section 5.3 lays out the evidence obtained from tracing the decision-making processes related to the research question, and engages an analytic discussion that compares theoretically-predicted patterns of policy decisions with the observed design of policymaking processes. Through an unraveling of the policymaking processes – agenda-setting, planning a course of action and formulating implementation rules and procedures, and the rationale for these policy design decisions – the discussion shows how two theoretical propositions emerged as major/dominant explanations articulated by key policy actors in the design and content of policymaking that culminated in varied sanitation outcomes across cases. Section 5.4 concludes the chapter with a summary of key findings.

5.2 Data and Method

The research question anchoring this qualitative inquiry can be stated as follows:

*Why do sanitation outcomes vary across urban poor communities in Delhi?*
To study this question, I used the methodological tool of process-tracing. Through this approach, I first began with the observable (sanitation) outcome for each case, and then worked backwards to investigate the sequence of decisions, and the underlying reasoning for these decision choices, in the process of sanitation policymaking that led to the present outcome. To uncover these decision processes, the inquiry draws primarily on 95 key-informant interviews conducted with 25 senior and mid-ranking bureaucrats at two state-level agencies – Delhi Jal Board, DJB (n=8) and Delhi Urban Shelter Improvement Board, DUSIB (n=9) – and the municipality, MCD (n=8), 14 current and former politicians at the state and city legislatures, 40 resident-leaders representing 15 sampled cases (i.e., 2 to 3 residents from each), and 16 NGO personnel engaged in delivering and appraising sanitation service in poor communities in Delhi. Archival and documentary records (e.g., budgets, annual reports, records of board meetings, policy memos, newspaper articles) and field notes on observations were generally used to contextualize and triangulate interviewee narratives. Some textual materials like news articles, sanitation audit reports by NGOs, court filings relating directly to the sampled communities were added to their respective dossiers, that also included interview transcripts, for coding and analysis in the qualitative data software NVivo™ v.12.1.

For key informant/elite interviewees, especially public officials, I also utilized published research materials that served as counterfactual evidence (e.g., technical reports on sanitation technologies by reputed policy research organizations, sanitation outcomes in comparable communities not in the sample but in a politician’s constituency or wards studied by other researchers) to probe to get as complete and nuanced an explanation as
possible.\textsuperscript{15} This, as Hochschild (2009:125) argues, gives the interviewer credibility as a knowledgeable person, and also helps to keep the respondent from giving partial or “imaginative” narratives. The latter can often be the case when interviewing government elites who may be particularly skillful in evading questions or giving vague responses (Harvey, 2011: 438). To ensure that presentation of such counterfactual evidence did not lead the interviewees to respond in a particular way or cause them to drop out of the study, I was guided by Beamer (2002) who emphasizes the salience of sequencing questions in elite interviews. I presented this evidence once I got the sense that the interviewees were comfortable and began to speak freely.

To capture \textit{emic} responses of the respondents, I began the interviews by first asking open-ended questions like “\textit{how did this sanitation outcome(s) come about in your community?}” and “\textit{why do we see variations in outcomes across these communities?}” I also asked broad and open-ended questions based on themes from the literatures. A line-by-line review of the interview transcripts revealed that organically-emerging \textit{emic} responses coincided with the four \textit{etic} variables – neighborhood effects, organizational constraints, social construction of target populations, and clientelism – to represent the full set of theory-driven and process-based explanations articulated by interviewees regarding variations in sanitation outcomes across the communities sampled for this study. Using a set of initial codes from the literatures, the iterative process of sorting and organizing the text into smaller conceptual categories ultimately led to a total of 15 themes: (i) neighborhood/location themes of political zone, economic zone, and cultural

\textsuperscript{15} Documents used as counterfactual evidence were obtained prior to interviews while collecting case materials.
zone; (ii) organizational themes of technical, cost, and institutional constraints; (iii) positive patronage (benefits to voters); negative patronage (punishment to non-voters); clientelistic solidarity between bureaucracy and community; clientelistic solidarity between NGO and community; clientelistic corruption-based ties between bureaucracy and NGO; clientelistic corruption-based ties between bureaucracy and community; (iv) ‘contender’ community/hidden benefits; ‘dependent’ community/sporadic benefits; ‘deviant’ community/largely no benefits. Coded passages under these themes comprised of key terms or phrases (e.g., “posh neighborhood”, “slum mentality”) and explanations by interviewees about how a theme(s) was operationalized in the design elements of policymaking process – agenda-setting, planning, formulation of rules and implementation procedures, and rationale – leading to disparate sanitation outcomes. This exploration of the policymaking process also included an uncovering of who participated in designing these policy elements/analytic themes, how they did so, and the rationale for their inclusion (and exclusion of others) in decision-making.

To determine the dominant thematic explanation for the observed sanitation outcome for each community, I used the Crosstab Query function in NVivo that computes a coding reference rate for each theme out of the total coded material under each case/community (QSR NVivo, 2018). That is, estimation of dominant explanatory theme in NVivo is based on the quantum of text coded under each thematic category. Since the present study is an investigation of the decision-making processes underlying observed variations in the outcomes of sanitation policy, the passages that I coded under each theme had more data on the explanation of how a thematic process unraveled in policymaking. Multiple citations of the same theme (e.g., “technical constraints”) by an interviewee in reference
to a particular sanitation outcome in a community was coded only once to prevent biased
inferences.\textsuperscript{16} Arguably, multiple citations of a theme by an interviewee for a community
may reveal a high degree of interest. But the process-oriented nature of the research
question required giving weightage, via the coding reference rate, to how a theme(s)
shaped policy decision-making.

To strengthen the validity of dominant thematic explanations for varied sanitation
outcomes of the policy process, I provide a count of the number of interviewees who
referenced a given thematic frame in the dataset (Miles and Huberman, 1994). However,
two caveats must be noted. \textit{First}, even though key informants, especially government elites were chosen based on their current position in the decisionmaking process, the average age of a community in my study sample being 30.53 years meant that not all were equally informed about how the decisionmaking process unfolded in the past which led to communities’ access to sanitation. Therefore, responses such as “don’t know...happened before my term in office”, “don’t have details...not involved in deliberations” were also heard. The last quote was mostly heard from some bureaucrats when clientelistic relations between patron-politicians and client-residents resulted in access to/improvement of sanitation outcomes in communities. Other reasons for non- or partial responses were “it’s not in my ward/department”, “I wasn’t in the sanitation department at the time”, or “it’s not my constituency”. Non-responses or partial responses were also heard from resident-leaders and NGO officials who had in-depth information about their own communities but had little/no information about other communities.

\textsuperscript{16}Citations of different themes (e.g., technical constraints, cost constraints) under the same thematic category (organizational constraints) by an interviewee for a community were included in the coded passage, whenever they emerged
Second, the three sanitation bureaucracies are not only responsible for different aspects of sanitation service outcomes (i.e., community toilets, sewerage, drainage), but also that their service mandates are split across different community-types. Therefore, while DJB officials cannot respond to questions about sanitation outcomes (community toilets, drainage) in illegal slums or shelters, DUSIB officials cannot respond to inquiries about sewerage in legal slums and public housing projects. Municipality officials can only respond to questions about drainage services, though for some communities also about sewerage that was part of the municipality’s mandate before DJB was established in 1998.

The dominant thematic frames identified using the foregoing combination of coding reference rate and counting codes were analyzed by pattern-matching as a form of hypothesis-testing where patterns of decisionmaking, underlying a sanitation outcome, observed in the data are compared with patterns proposed by theories to determine whether the empirically-revealed policy actions match with those that would be predicted by hypothesized theoretical explanations in relevant theories. The choice of pattern-matching technique as an inferential tool was guided by its complementarity with the process-tracing method that seeks to establish theory-driven and process-based explanation of observed outcomes via an investigation of causally-linked decision-making steps in a sequential process (Bennett, 2010; Collier, 2011). The four theoretical propositions obtained from the relevant literatures, and used for pattern-matching are presented below:
H1: Neighborhood Effects

Communities located in high-value neighborhoods are expected to receive better sanitation outcomes (adequate, well-maintained facilities) because of their spillover effects on the prestige/quality of life/real-estate value of the larger neighborhood.

H2: Organizational Constraints

Communities that are large in size (number of households), located far from existing infrastructure, or have a difficult topography are expected to receive poor sanitation outcomes (inadequate, improperly maintained) because they will be prohibitively costlier to serve in terms of high investments of financial and human capital, and technology.

H3: Clientelistic Politics

Communities that have strong ties with public officials/service providers are expected to receive better sanitation outcomes because they will be able to exchange something of value (votes, money, shared identity) for service access/improvements.

H4: Social Construction of Target Populations

(a) Contenders:

Communities perceived to have a largely negative public image but high political power are expected to receive better sanitation outcomes hidden from public view because rewarding negatively-viewed groups may invite backlash, making them surreptitiously deserving of policy support for problem-solving.

(b) Dependents:

Communities perceived to have a largely positive public image but low political power are expected to receive sporadically better sanitation outcomes because their political weakness will allow policymakers to ignore them as much as possible, making them symbolically deserving of policy support for problem-solving.

(c) Deviants:

Communities perceived to have a negative public image and low political power are expected to receive poor sanitation outcomes because their personal failures will be seen causing the problem, making them undeserving of policy support for problem-solving.
5.3 Analysis

For 9 communities, thematic patterns from social construction theory were referenced 80 percent of the time, organizational constraints were referenced 10 percent of the time, and neighborhood effects and clientelistic targeted provisions were referenced 5 percent of the time respectively as explanations for varied outcomes. In each of these 9 cases, social construction was a dominant theme, and, thus, the basis for this grouping. For 6 communities, thematic explanations for variations grounded in clientelistic theory were referenced 74 percent of the time, neighborhood effects referenced 14 percent of the time, social construction theory referenced 10 percent of the time, and organizational constraints were referenced 2 percent of the time. In each of these 9 cases, clientelism was a dominant theme, and, thus, the basis for this grouping. The analytic discussion begins with the two less-dominant global themes, and shows how narratives explaining the decisionmaking processes emerge to largely coalesce around the two dominant global themes of social construction and clientelism. However, this is not to say that the minor themes should be ignored as untrue or unimportant. Even if these thematic reasons were offered as lies to stop my further probing into possible institutional weaknesses or biases, they would still provide insights into the policy design calculus. It may be also be the case that the use of contrasting cases and multiple types of data forced interviewees to think deeply about the complexities of decision-making that reveal how the two minor themes can get operationalized in the policy process.
5.3.1 Neighborhood Effects

BR Camp (illegal slum), Ballimaran (legal slum), Gurhai Mohalla (legal slum), Satya Niketan (public housing), Dwarka (public housing), and Baprola (public housing) were the 6 communities for which location-based themes emerged as an alternative explanation for varied sanitation service outcomes. As the following evidence will show, the first 4 communities, their location in a particular economic, political, or cultural neighborhood of Delhi did not have an independent (process-based) thematic effect on shaping sanitation policy outcomes. Rather, these 4 communities were recipients, as ‘contenders’ and (non-) clients, of targeted distribution (or withholding) of benefits by public officials within the larger politico-administrative neighborhood. However, for the remaining 2 communities (Dwarka and Baprola), data shows that policymakers’ decision for service support was shaped by the economic potential, and as such, preserving a particular (service-related) standard of living, of the larger neighborhood.

When I asked how was it that BR Camp slum had sewerage but not another slum in my study sample (Kusumpur Pahadi) located in a high-income neighborhood of south Delhi, a senior municipal officer said, “you see where BR Camp is located…it is right next to the prime minister’s house.. also where parliamentarians, senior bureaucrats.. live...so you will find these exceptions here” representing the view of 3 of 8 officials, Two informants from Kusumpur Pahadi slum also attributed distinct sanitation outcome in BR Camp to its location, but could not explain how it would be operationalized in policy. The exception that municipal officers were referring to was that of a deviation from the agency’s standard operating procedure that limits sewerage provision to legal residential areas.

During the interview, when I presented findings of a research study (Banda and Sheikh,
2014) that documented absent sewerage and malfunctioning community toilets in two slums near BR Camp, the senior official echoing other 3 of 8 colleagues said: “..how we can we make these exceptions everywhere? our norms only allow for community toilets..yes, we have a few slums, but BR Camp is different.. it has kept ties with political leadership …that’s why these are exceptions”

Corroborating the documentary record of the planning agency of Delhi (DDA, 2007) that identifies Ballimaran’s location in the heritage district of Delhi, a mid-rank DJB official representing the view of other 3 of 8 officials said that “it benefitted because of its location.. it’s a hub for tourists because of the area’s historical significance .. to preserve its cultural value, restoring infrastructure is important.” when I asked how the agency decided to upgrade sewers in this community, compared to another legal slum community of Basai Darapur with an equally old sewer system. When I probed about the origins of the planning process to uncover how locational considerations manifested in policy design, two mid-rank officials claimed that they were “not involved in the planning stage” while the third mid-rank official representing the view of other 4 of 8 officials said that “the current MLA [state representative] took the initiative to replace old water and sewer networks in his entire constituency..had been working on it since his last term..this time, he was more active.. held a series of meetings with agency officials.. mobilized funding from the Chief Minister’s [head of state government] office.. once the CM got behind it, we started working on it expeditiously.”

The response by a mid-rank municipal official representing the view of 4 of 8 colleagues about open drains in Gurhai Mohalla legal slum was that it “is in a low-income
neighborhood...so some difference is to be expected...you will find open drains in other areas [of the neighborhood] too.” But when I presented evidence of closed drainage system which is connected to underground sewers in the sampled legal slum of Basai Darapur that is also located in another low-income neighborhood of Delhi (MCD, 2015), “sometimes these things are beyond our control...a large part of our operating budget comes as grants/loans from the state...this work [closed underground drains in Gurhai] was stalled as their leader had other plans...when there is pressure, we have to heed the demands of those who control our budget...” said a senior officer among 2 of 4 officials, whilst the other 2 of 4 guessed some kind of “agreement” may have transpired between the residents of Basai Darapur and their elected representative.

To my question comparing absence of sewerage in Bawana but not in Satya Niketan public housing, a senior DJB official remarked, “how can you compare the two? Satya Niketan is in a posh...thriving neighborhood of south Delhi...that’s why they got sewerage sooner...and works well...you will find that most of south Delhi is high-tax neighborhoods...services have to be of that standard...Bawana is basically the rural fringe of Delhi...that entire area is still undeveloped.” echoing the view of other 3 of 8 officials and 2 of 3 community informants from Bawana public housing project. Over the course of the interviews when I presented findings from a research study (Sheikh and Banda, 2014) about absent sewerage in a public housing project in a high-income neighborhood of south Delhi, “the gentry is not the same...Satya Niketan residents are well-educated...entrepreneurs...in government jobs...they are like us...we set our own priorities when we are not weighed down by political exigencies” said a senior DJB official. This view was shared by another 3 of 8 DJB and 6 of 8 municipal officers, though 2 DJB
officials dismissed the findings of the counterfactual evidence as being inaccurate.\textsuperscript{17} Two of 3 community informants of Trilokpuri public housing claimed that higher-income residents of Satya Niketan were “capable of paying more in bribes” to sanitation workers for faster problem-resolution compared to their community. I could not find any corroboration for this claim from other informants, documents, or observations in the field.

When I asked about presence of officers overseeing drain-cleaning in Dwarka but not in Baprola, despite oversight rules being applicable to both (DUSIB, 2016), a senior DUSIB official said, “Dwarka EWS housing is located in a new neighborhood that is being planned as an upper-middle income area..now if services are poor in Dwarka, it will bring down the value ..prestige of the entire neighborhood..who would want to live there..so we monitoring service upkeep there..Baprola EWS is in a low-income neighborhood..we can only invest up to a point..and people also expect that service standard..better than where they earlier lived” echoing the view of his other 3 of 9 colleagues and the state legislator of Dwarka

The evidence presented so far suggests that while economics - in terms of the value/revenue-potential of a community in a given neighborhood - can indeed play a role in shaping policy decisions about whom and how much to provide, there can be an underlying geographical/location basis for targeted provision or withholding of public services to communities in some neighborhoods versus other communities in the same or

\textsuperscript{17}A news article published one week before these interviews supported the veracity of the counterfactual evidence (source: https://www.indiatoday.in/mail-today/story/swachh-bharat-sdmc-toilets-close-after-9pm-open-defecation-1079758-2017-10-30).
comparable (in terms of economic value) neighborhoods. That is, poor communities located in high-value neighborhoods cannot be assumed to automatically benefit from positive spillovers of services in the larger area because these communities existed in high-value locations for decades without service improvements. Political engagement between communities and state was necessary to achieve sanitation improvements from years-long status quo. For politicized bureaucracies like in India (e.g., Davies, 2004; Randheria, 2004), mediation by elected representatives is not limited to setting policy priorities by controlling agency budgets, but also manifests in exercising influence over bureaucrats and field engineers to stall or divert resources for service implementation in (un)preferred districts/neighborhoods. As other research shows for water supply in urban slums in India, infrastructure may exist in the larger neighborhood, but access (approval for group connections; duration of supply) can be contingent upon endorsements and regulations by powerful ward councilors (e.g., Anand 2011; Björkman, 2015). In a similar vein, the politics of spatial inequities in service provision can also be driven by bureaucrats who may privilege certain communities or wards based on ties of shared class or ethno-religious affiliations (e.g., Gandy, 2008). In such cases, the guiding logic of policy implementation need not be techno-managerial rationality of maximizing revenues, rather bureaucratic efficacy in “managing well” (Björkman, 2018) the competing demands from politicians, communities with shared affinities, and other residents.

The process of how public officials (elected and non-elected) design policies that unravel the distributive politics of these spatial inequities in sanitation outcomes in the communities introduced above will be presented in detail in the upcoming analytic
discussion on social construction of contender communities, and clientelistic/patronage politics.

5.3.2 Organizational Constraints

Bawana (public housing), Kusumpur Pahadi (illegal slum), Mangolpuri (illegal slum), Pushta (homeless men’s shelter), Lodi Road (homeless women’s shelter), Basai Darapur (legal slum) were the 6 communities for which themes of technological constraints, fiscal limitations, and organizational mandate-based institutional constraints were cited by key informants as an alternative explanation for varied sanitation outcomes.

Responding to absence of sewerage in Bawana public housing but not in the other two public housing projects, “topography is an issue..Bawana is in a low-lying wetland with thick vegetation..laying sewer pipelines is technically challenging..” said a mid-rank DJB official, echoing the view of other 2 of 8 colleagues, and 3 of 8 officials at DUSIB that operates community toilets (in the absence of sewerage) in Bawana. Similarly, when I asked why it was the case that two illegal slums in the constituencies of his party colleagues had sewerage, the state representative of Kusumpur Pahadi stated that “it is located on a hill.. the terrain is very rocky..laying sewers there would need special technology..DJB doesn’t have that yet..” Over the course of these interviews when I presented evidence from an environment policy think-tank (CSE, 2017) that submitted its report on alternative sewer technologies to the DJB, the mid-rank official said “Bawana’s MLA [state representative] has to show interest in such cases..then we can think of a plan..prepare a budget for it..we have much to do right now..if this were his priority, we would have heard from him..” representing the view of his other 4 of 8 officials.
This was also the representative view among these officials for absent sewerage in Kusumpur Pahadi. Upon hearing the evidence of DJB’s technical know-how, the state representative of Kusumpur Pahadi remarked, “we can’t repeat past mistakes [sewers in 2 illegal slums]. what happened there was wrong...these are illegal slums...” (emphasis added). The politician claimed no prior knowledge about the report.

Responding to disparate outcomes vis-à-vis Kusumpur Pahadi slum, “Mangolpuri slum lies close to the trunk sewer network..it was very cheap to have them get connected to the system..in other places it may be costlier.” said a senior DJB officer, echoing the view another mid-rank officer among 8 colleagues. When I presented them with the findings of a research study (Chaplin and Kalita, 2017) of another slum in the vicinity that did not have access to sewerage services by the DJB, “we were told to extend the network there..maybe the other community did not have good relations with the MLA as the Mangolpuri slum” said the senior DJB official, representing the view of 4 of 8 officers and both the community informants from Mangolpuri slum. With respect to disparities in implementing sewer upgrade in Ballimaran legal slum but not in Basai Darapur legal slum, “sewer replacement requires a lot of money..we can’t undertake these projects all at once..it’s too costly” said a senior DJB official, echoing the view of other 3 of 8 officers. Over the course of the interviews when I asked about funding sources for the agency, in particular its cache of discretionary (non-earmarked) funds, the senior official said “I can tell you that we have..get enough money.. discretionary funds are available per constituency ..Basai’s MLA will be given money to spend in his constituency..but if they cannot lobby their leader..[to] extract these funds..they will lose out..we prioritize
[work] requests from the MLAs.” representing the view of other 4 of 8 officials at the DJB (emphasis added).

Responding to questions about varied outcomes and service upkeep rules vis-à-vis malfunctioning toilets at Pushta compared to the other two homeless shelters, a senior official said that “DUSIB has gone beyond its mandate..it’s not our mandate..the responsibility was thrust upon us [by the courts].to provide shelter facilities for the homeless..right now we are focusing on fixing community toilets in slums..that's our mandate..there's also pressure from our board members [comprising of a small group of state legislators].shelters can wait..” representing the view of other 3 of 9 colleagues (emphasis added). This claim of institutional barrier (i.e., lack of mandate) manifesting in policy indifference vis-à-vis proper functioning and/or upkeep of sanitation facilities in shelters was also made by 4 of 16 NGO officials.

The foregoing evidence supports theoretical claims that bureaucratic discretion may be inevitable in the policymaking process as a way of managing workload or minimizing time/effort to deliver public services by under-investing resources (homeless shelters) or maintaining policy status quo by ignoring or suppressing new informational resources (alternative sewer technologies) (e.g., Brodkin, 2011; Ellis, 2011). However, the evidence presented above also suggests that these “coping strategies” (Lipsky, 1980) underlying discretionary decisionmaking may not be a pragmatic exercise in balancing demands and available resources by providing services to ‘easy’ clients. As the evidence shows, bureaucrats use some mental heuristics to gauge which clients or communities lack political power, and respond and adapt to pressures emanating from their political
environment by diverting resources toward powerful constituents or “creaming clients” (Brodkin, 1997; Hupe and Buffat, 2013). In such cases, bureaucrats exercise discretion by ignoring rules (e.g., structural repairs at shelters) or giving primacy to organizationally-sanctioned practices (prioritizing works of politicians) to justify their (in)actions (Hasenfeld, 2000).

But doing less with more – services provided to a few, who enjoy more resources than if there were equitable distribution – has to be concealed in rationales so that the authenticity of policy designs can be accepted by the public at large, or defended in the face of public scrutiny or backlash. Based on the evidence presented above, I would argue that to justify oversubscribing benefits or diverting resources to powerful groups, bureaucrats constructed “deceptive rationales” (Ingram et al., 2007; Schneider and Sidney, 2009) of cost-efficiency or fiscal constraints and technological challenges that served to conceal these politically-cued discretionary decisions under the guise of rational-choice policymaking. These contrived rationales, and the other justification of mandate-based institutional constraint, not only support the thematic findings of neighborhood effects that show how bureaucrats respond to political influence in policy formulation and implementation processes, but also demonstrate that perceived political power of policy recipients can have an independent effect on bureaucratic decisionmaking in terms of who gets what, when, and how. This salience of political power that guides policymakers’ decisions to construct deceptive policy designs in the distribution of policy benefits (and burdens) is the second pillar of the framework of social construction of target populations (Schneider and Ingram, 1997).
The foregoing discussion on the role of two less-dominant themes in shaping the policy design processes underlying disparate provision of sanitation outcomes lends further support to the two, more salient, thematic explanations that now allows me to investigate the broad research question with a much narrower focus presented below:

RQ #1 (a): How do policymakers construct deservingness of target populations whilst framing the content and design of sanitation policy across poor communities in Delhi? How do these social constructions influence sanitation outcomes across these communities?

RQ #1 (b): How do clientelistic relations between communities and state/service providers influence policymaking processes in shaping the provision of sanitation service outcomes?

The remainder of this section is divided into two sub-sections to address each of these two research questions, respectively.

5.3.3 Constructing deservingness of the poor for sanitation service

(a) Sanitation for Contender Target Populations

The similarity between the two groups of ‘contender’ target populations is limited to them being residents of illegal slums - BR Camp in central Delhi and Mangolpuri D-Block in northwest Delhi – as both communities were motivated by distinct reasons and adopted radically different strategies to leverage electoral power and push sanitation (sewerage) on to the policy agenda via their respective state representatives. Table 5.1 lists the sanitation outcomes for these two communities.
Table 5: Sanitation Outcomes in Contender Communities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community Name</th>
<th>Community Type</th>
<th>Outcome Type(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bhaiya Ram Camp</td>
<td>JJC</td>
<td>Sewered toilets; two community toilet facilities; trash, stagnant water in open surface drains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D-Block, Mangolpuri</td>
<td>JJC</td>
<td>Complete coverage of sewered household toilets; covered and clean surface drains</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: JJC = Jhuggi-Jhonpri Cluster (i.e., illegal slam)*

Describing how BR Camp achieved sewerage, Ramesh, echoing the other two community informants stated

“the two community toilet complexes in our community had come under tremendous stress over the years..our community was growing.. there would be long lines..and women faced problems. Before the first state assembly elections were held in 1993, Azad [former state representative] visited our community for election campaigning, we asked him why the government was making us live without the dignity of having household toilets..” (emphasis added).

Ramesh, the community leader, also added that he told the then candidate (Azad) that the community would vote for him *en masse* if he promised to deliver sewerage. “*These poor had been living in gross conditions..they have large families.. packed into small shacks. Where is the dignity in that?*” said the politician, to rationalize sewerage to BR Camp.

When I presented him with findings of a research study (Sheikh and Bandana, 2014) that showed unsanitary conditions in a slum adjacent BR Camp also in his constituency, he smiled and said, “*BR Camp is the biggest slum of central Delhi.. they were united and willing to vote for me.. which politician will say no to such a large voter base?*”
Aware of their ‘contender’ status, community informants agreed with a senior municipal officer who said that “the municipality doesn’t service the slums [because].. they are occupying this government land illegally. We can’t be seen as legitimizing illegal slums by providing them formal services..but the community has been politically active..want to do our jobs in peace without any conflict with the leadership..so we made this exception” echoing other 3 of 8 officials about bending agency “norms” to install sewers in BR Camp. So then when I asked how then the drains in BR Camp lay open with stagnant water and some trash, unlike the slum in Mangolpuri, the senior official echoing the other 3 of 8 officers stated that “cleaning of drains can’t be done routinely in an illegal slum..sanitary workers visit once a week to clean..sometimes Ramesh calls when drains start overflowing..at that time, I send someone to do a quick cleanup...but that can’t happen every day...”

The women informants of Mangolpuri slum reported receiving sewerage in their community few months prior to the 2013 state assembly elections in Delhi. “Fights would break out at the nearby public toilet facility with residents of the adjacent public housing project.. they would claim first-use and push us out of the waiting line.” Frustrated with futile visits and patient sit-ins at the office to meet with their elected official, “I convinced other women that we had to take a radical step.. we made our young children defecate outside the politician’s office every morning.. it’s across the street..we did this for a few weeks. When he finally visited our community, we told him that if we got sewerage we would vote for him in the upcoming elections” explained Veena, echoing the view of the other 2 community women. The state representative of Mangolpuri reiterated the “disgusting imagery” of feces outside his office.
“My staff was sick of the filth outside. I was busy with elections but everyday I would hear of children ‘going’ on the pavement outside. Frustrated with these complaints, when I finally heard their demands of at-home toilets, I knew sewerage could be extended ‘without any problem’. I told a couple of engineers to look into it; looked like a minor everyday road-side construction issue.”

Like BR Camp, women of Mangolpuri slum were aware of their privileged ‘contender’ status: “we know that this an exception...the government only extended sewerage because our MLA [state representative] put pressure... all these years we struggled, but they [bureaucracy] did not care.” (emphasis added).

The two politicians’ claims that the sewer jobs were ‘off-the-book’ plans for which no budget or construction contract was prepared by the bureaucracy was supported by 8 of 16 officials at DJB and municipality. As a representative view of a senior DJB official among this group emphasized the politicized nature of administrative functioning by saying that “we are heavily dependent on loans and grants from the state government...there is no formal rule against sewers in slums...so we install sewers wherever and whenever political leadership wants. Nobody likes to get pulled up...” When probed about covered drains only in Mangolpuri slum, a mid-rank municipal officer echoing the view of all 8 officers said, “we have a policy to keep drains open, but some communities clandestinely cover them with the support of politicians...we do not come in the way of these politics.” Supporting Schneider and Ingram’s (1993) thesis of policy benefits to ‘contender’ groups, the bureaucracies implemented the campaign promise of politicians to provide sewerage in the two slums, through surreptitiously-looking “minor works”, to avoid public backlash against “exceptions” to illegal occupiers of public lands.
It was the illegal (residential) status of these communities that shaped their image as furtively deserving ‘contenders’ to whom benefits had to be shrouded in deceptive rationales of “casual repair works” or “dignified living” for fears of public outrage. When formal decision rules are absent – as is the case for sewers in slums (DJB Act, 1998) or closing stormwater drains (MCD, 1957) – bureaucratic discretion can reflect electoral promises of politicians that affect distribution of urban public services (e.g., Meier and Soss, 1991). That is, to the extent that service bureaucracies are embedded in the larger political system, moral frames of ‘whom to serve and when’ can be shaped by ‘informal interactions’ between the political class and citizens. And partisan capture of institutional resources (e.g., agency budgets) provides the boundary conditions for policy implementation within which bureaucrats’ construction of deservingness of target populations materializes in unequal provision of sanitation outcomes

(b) Sanitation for Deviant Target Populations

The “mentality”, “cultures”, and “life choices” of residents of 4 communities – B-block Kusumpur Pahadi (illegal slum), E-block Bawana resettlement colony (public housing), Yamuna Pushta (homeless men’s shelter), and Nizamuddin pavement dwellers – were markers of their ‘deviant’ behaviors that most policymakers in Delhi attributed as the cause of unsanitary conditions in these localities. The distinct residential categories of these communities makes for an interesting evaluation of how and why different configurations of the theme of ‘deviancy’ are constructed by policymakers and embedded in the content of sanitation policy design(s) to justify variations in service provision. The discussion will also show how social constructions can perpetuate through policy to produce path-dependent policy designs that continue to deprive poor in the latter
community of their entitled access to improved sanitation (i.e., sewerage). Table 5.2 lists sanitation outcomes in these four cases.

Table 6: Sanitation Outcomes in Deviant Communities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community Name</th>
<th>Community Type</th>
<th>Outcome Type(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Block-E, Bawana</td>
<td>JJR</td>
<td>No sewerage; near complete coverage of septic toilets; broken community toilet facility; trash and stagnant water in open surface drains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Block B, Kusumpur Pahadi</td>
<td>JJC</td>
<td>No sewerage; partial coverage of self-built septic toilets/pit latrines; erratically-functional community toilet; open defecation; sewage and stagnant water in open surface drains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yamuna Pushta (Men)</td>
<td>Homeless Shelter</td>
<td>On-site free toilet facility connected to a septic system; open defecation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nizamuddin Homeless</td>
<td>Pavement-dwellers</td>
<td>Pay-to-use public toilet located 50m away; shelter with toilet facility located 100m away; open defecation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: JJR = Jhuggi-Jhonpri Resettlement colony (i.e., public housing)

Echoing the view of 2 of 3 women informants about the apathy of their politician towards the sanitation problem facing their nearly 5000-household community of Kusumpur Pahadi illegal slum, Sonia said that

“There are just 15 stalls each for men and women in the community toilet, and it is agonizing to wait in line in the mornings. When our turn finally comes, all we get is a dirty toilet. The water system installed by the government breaks down often. When some of us went to complain about this to our MLA [state representative], he spoke rudely to us saying that we were not his only constituents...we were shown the door” (emphasis added).

While two of three women have, over time, built rudimentary septic toilets at home, the third informant was among those families who could not afford to build a private toilet,
and had “no option” but to defecate in the open as the public facility was inadequate and often dirty. When I asked the state representative as to why it was that the slum had no sewerage, unlike other two sampled slums of his party’s colleagues, he characterized the undeservingness of Kusumpur’s residents by explaining that “after I won the election, I got rid of water truck mafia [unlicensed operators] ..now there is no water problem. But you see these people will never be happy..their entire life in the city is a web of illegality ..they want all legal services..the more you give them, the bigger their bellies become..” (emphasis added). Field observations and interviews with DJB officials revealed that the community toilet is served by groundwater (not water trucks) whose levels have been rapidly depleting.

Responding to questions on provisioning rules of community sanitation, “Kusumpur Pahadi was one of the 259 OD [open defecation] spots we identified..so we provided a community toilet there, but still people are going in the open.. Our facilities are sufficient ..[number of toilet seats] not based on slum population..ultimately these jhuggies [illegal slums] will be demolished so we’re doing the bare minimum.. it’s a culture of convenience actually...why pay when you can go in the open as many times for free?” said a senior DUSIB official, representing the view of his other 4 of 9 officers. When I asked about varied upkeep of open drains in Kusumpur slum compared to other two slums, a senior officer representing the view of 5 of 8 municipal officers said “we have no role in slums... DUSIB is responsible for slums..people have connected their toilets to open drains..raw sewage is flowing in the open..their culture must change first..we cannot be involved in this.” Responding to better sanitation in the other two illegal slums, “when our MLA has shunned us, why would the government [bureaucracy] care? If we had
political backing, they [bureaucracy] would have treated us with respect if we went with our problems” said Sonia, representing the view of the other 2 of 3 women (emphasis added).

When asked about disparate sanitation outcome compared to other public housing, “we moved here in 2005 to nothing more than two community toilet complexes and a few water hydrants..12 years later, we are receiving the same services we had when we lived in slums..” lamented Rukhsana, echoing the other 2 of 3 informants of Bawana public housing. Over time, most households have self-built septic toilets but “when we can’t afford to pay the contractors to evacuate the septics, we are forced to use the broken community toilet..the government still sees as illegal slum dwellers..when we go to the DJB office to ask about sewerage, they say talk to your MLA..ignore us because they know the MLA’s voters are elsewhere..in [adjoining] Bawana village” said Kailash, echoing views of the other two residents (emphasis added). Withholding of entitled sewer service (DJB Act, 1998) was justified by 5 of 8 DJB officials among whom a senior officer stated that “there are close to 2000 other residential areas where we are installing sewers first..that’s our plan until 2031.” Corroborating this view, Bawana’s state representative said, “my government’s priority is to provide piped water and sewers in urban villages and unauthorized colonies first..”

Responding to questions on broken public facility in Bawana and role of government in oversight, “they don’t want to pay a single rupee [to use toilets]...they break and steal the hardware so what can the contractor do? He will just recover his costs and leave.. it is not an easy job to deal with these people..” said a mid-ranking DUSIB official, echoing
the view of 4 of 9 colleagues. When asked about service oversight and varied sanitary conditions of open drains in Bawana compared to the public housing locality in Trilokpuri, a senior municipal officer endorsed the view of personal failings of the poor that was also shared by other 4 of 8 officers:

“the problem is that these people are still used to ‘old ways’...they sweep their homes and throw trash in open drains. They have to change their mindsets first, and changing this slum mentality takes time…do their civic duty of keeping their surroundings clean instead of expecting the government to do everything… people will learn over time.” (emphasis added)

The foregoing discussion shows the near-parallel lives of the residents of an illegal slum and a public housing of state apathy in provision of functional and entitled sanitation services. For both communities, deviancy of improper cultures and habits of residents is salient to the framing of sanitation problem by policymakers – open defecation in Kusumpur slum, and defunct community toilet in Bawana public housing. On the one hand, “bare minimum” policy support to Kusumpur slum was couched in exclusionary policy designs of DUSIB wherein lack of need for engagement in a 40-year old community kept the existing problem of inadequate and improperly functioning toilets intact (Schneider and Ingram, 1993; see also Engel and Susilo, 2014). On the other hand, these hands-off policy designs were replicated in Bawana on the grounds of path-dependent slum habits of unsanitary practices that justified non-compliance with oversight rules of DUSIB and the municipality. Further, continuing non-compliance with the formal rule of sewerage provision by the DJB strongly supports an overriding acceptance of informal “rule” of exclusion such that non-provision of entitled benefits,
that are being made available to the wider neighborhood, is normatively constructed as appropriate or deserved by the residents of Bawana (Cole, 2014).

That political power plays an important role in shaping deservedness for policy benefits was also articulated by resident-informants of both communities. Political patronage was recognized by communities as a necessary condition for re-making their image as deserving recipients of bureaucratic support. Communities attributed “lack of unity” and “lack of interest” to their inability to politically organize/mobilize for forging patronage ties that, in turn, kept their sanitation problems off the policymakers’ agenda. Although social construction theorists talk broadly of political power, emergent evidence of an interaction between patronage/clientelist politics and social construction theory suggests that patronage-as-political power may be more salient in influencing the design of policymaking vis-à-vis agenda-setting and implementation of formal rules for the poor in politicized bureaucracies.

The remaining two communities deemed as ‘deviant’ targets were the homeless populations living in a government-owned, NGO-run men’s shelter at Yamuna Pushta and shelter-less homeless community living on the pavements at Nizamuddin. Though policymakers attached distinct rationales for deviancy to these two target groups, the state of sanitation outcomes remained virtually the same. “The NGO told us to use porta toilets only for urination..we go down there [by the riverbed] to relieve ourselves... it has been over a month now..” said Javed, echoing another older resident of the homeless men’s shelter at Pushta, when I asked why 6 of 9 porta toilets on the premises were locked.
Responding to the problem of open defecation and perceived timeline for problem-resolution, Shailendra echoed the view of the other 6 of 16 said:

“All 12 septic tanks are overflowing, but we have kept 3 toilets open.. only for urination.. otherwise it will become a big problem for us. We have complained and DUSIB engineers come for inspections..but so far nothing has been done. Problems of the homeless are not urgent for the government. Maybe by December [of 2017, two months after this interview] something happens..that’s when the media is active.” (emphasis added).

A review of news reports published in two national language dailies between January 2017 and August 2018 lent support to the claims by NGO staff. Out of a total of 16 stories on homelessness over the period, 9 were published in December-January alone and all were field pieces. As the problem of leaking septic tanks continued into the winter months of 2018, 6 of 9 DUSIB bureaucrats responded to unsanitary conditions at Pushta, unlike in the other two shelters: “Delhi is facing a problem of excessive migration from rural areas..and Pushta is a big hub of these new arrivals..facilities are overused..have a bad habit of throwing cigarette stubs, tobacco packets inside the toilets..this is causing malfunctions” was a representative quote by a senior official. Paradoxical as to why then DUSIB engineers were inspecting the malfunction if it could be fixed by merely informing residents not to throw trash in toilets.

Responding to questions on sanitation provision for the homeless pavement-dwellers, a mid-rank DUSIB official echoing the view of 7 of his 9 colleagues said

“they are sleeping in the open because that’s their ‘business model’. Passers-by give them money, blankets...they sell these to buy drugs ..they have money but don’t want to pay for [public] toilets (emphasis added). Asked about a nearby shelter with free toilet facility, “[shelter] caretakers have records on all the
homeless inside.. if someone is coming in only to use the toilets, we don’t know who they are. Their [shelter occupants] safety is also important..we can’t allow unknown criminal elements to enter” (emphasis added).

Responding to their access to sanitation, “we beg on the streets...some men sell rags, bottles.. [referencing a paid public toilet nearby] so men sometimes pay, but how we can pay to use toilets every time? On good days when we make some money, we buy food. Caretakers misbehave with us.. search our belongings.. harass us to show ID.. we don’t go to there anymore..we avoid eating and drinking during the day and go at night.. down by the side of the road..behind those bushes” said Mumtaz, echoing the views of the other two pavement-dwellers at Nizamuddin.

Despite documented contract rules of shelter management which state that “DUSIB reserves the right to upgrade the project facilities [physical assets].. [and] shelters shall be open 24x7 for any individual...and treat all users with respect and dignity”, these formal rules act as loose constraints over normative bureaucratic discretion vis-à-vis when to provide (or, fix leaking septics) and whom not to provide (“criminal” pavement dwellers) (DUSIB, 2017; emphasis added). This bureaucratic discretion operates within the context of image-making of target populations as “uncivilized” and “dangerous” deviants through causal, and not necessarily factual, story-telling – Pushta’s men clogging toilets and Nizamuddin’s unknown homeless deemed criminals – that serves to legitimize policy non-decisions of compliance with formal rules of service upkeep and service access (Maynard-Moody and Musheno, 2000; Stone, 2004).

The target frame of ‘deviancy’ varies across these 4 communities, ranging from slum culture to rural culture to outright criminal enterprise. Even between the two types of
homeless communities, policymakers distinguish between the “unruly” pavement dwellers who refuse relocation to shelter facilities as criminal drug dealers, and rural migrants of Pushta who are un-acculturated in proper use of a toilet. Policymakers’ lack of urgency, at best, and unconcern, at worst, to address the deteriorating sanitation conditions is justified by externalizing the cause of the problem. The nuisance and impropriety of the “polluted poor” (Ghertner, 2011) engaging in open defecation and unsafe practices of waste disposal then becomes a metaphor for cultural deficiencies, not policy failure of piecemeal sanitation provision and largely hands-off governance (e.g., Baviskar, 2003; Schram, 2005).

(c) Sanitation for Dependent Target Populations

The dependent status of Lodi Road women’s shelter and the two EWS public housing sites at Dwarka and Baprola respectively vis-à-vis largely symbolic policy support for sanitation service manifests in distinct ways primarily due to distinct initial conditions of engagement with the state. The discussion explores these initial conditions and the related policy processes culminating in distinct outcomes that are, to a large extent, anchored in the same policy rationale of self-help. Table 5.3 lists sanitation outcomes in these three communities.
Table 7: Sanitation Outcomes in Dependent Communities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community Name</th>
<th>Community Type</th>
<th>Outcome Type(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sector 16B, Dwarka</td>
<td>EWS</td>
<td>Complete coverage of sewered household toilets; open and clean surface drains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rajiv Rattan Awas, Baprola</td>
<td>EWS</td>
<td>Complete coverage of sewered household toilets; trash in open surface drains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lodi Road (Women)</td>
<td>Homeless Shelter</td>
<td>Off-site paid public toilet facility connected to a sewer system; located approx. 10m away; night-time open urination</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: EWS = Economically-Weaker Section (public housing)*

When asked how the nearby toilet facility was provided for their Lodi shelter, “this public toilet was in a bad shape..back in September 2015. The two porta toilets provided by DUSIB as replacement also did not last long..I complained to Sunil beta [son] that no action was being taken to fix the toilets. He was the only one who could help us. A small group of us went to meet a senior woman officer in December [2015].. she told us that DUSIB will take care of our problem..” said Amma, echoing the other woman informant from the shelter. Sunil heads a local advocacy NGO and is Amma’s former employer. Showing me the complaint papers Sunil said, echoing 3 of 16 NGO officers who knew about this event:

“After DUSIB responded to my RTI query [Indian counterpart of FOIA] that the public toilet was MCD’s property and they had no role in its upkeep.. I took them [women] to Maliwal [Chairperson of Delhi Commission for Women, DCW] to report their grievances. She was appointed to the Commission by the Chief Minister [also chair of DUSIB]..and was the only one who could put pressure [on DUSIB].. soon after, DUSIB sent an updated response to my RTI in December [2015].. they had taken ownership from MCD and were undertaking repairs” (emphasis added)
Corroborating these informants, DCW’s annual report (2016: 49) states “a group of homeless women complained about a non-functional public toilet...Chairperson issued notices to DUSIB CEO for immediate action ..public toilet was repaired and opened in August 2016.”

Though the toilet facility was functional when I visited in September 2017, two porta toilets provided later by DUSIB outside the main facility, when it closes at 10PM, are without water or electricity connection forcing women to urinate in the open at night.

“We have built shelter for these destitute women..and hired a private contractor to manage operations at the toilet facility.. so now it’s not in our hands..[shelter] women should organize to hold the contractor responsible..for keeping it clean..porta toilets in running condition” said a senior officer echoing the view of 6 of 9 DUSIB officials when I asked about service problems at the women’s shelter that were not found at Turkman Gate men’s shelter. A senior official of the NGO managing the women’s shelter said that “DUSIB doesn’t care for the plight of these women..we complained to the toilet contractor ..but why will he bother if DUSIB is unwilling to exercise any oversight? They want NGOs to do everything...have washed their hands off” representing the view of other 8 of 16 officials and the two homeless women informants.

Aside from formal obligations of service oversight, rules of shelter management drafted by the agency require the agency to provide functional infrastructures (including sanitation) before contracting out management services (DUSIB, 2018). A short-lived activation of homeless women’s political power, engineered by a policy entrepreneur at the advocacy NGO, was temporarily able to break the status quo of bureaucratic
unconcern vis-à-vis sanitation needs of these symbolically-deserving homeless women. However, once the main facility became operational and political pressure from the Delhi Women’s Commission office eased, sanitation needs of these women again dropped from DUSIB’s policy agenda. I would argue that this re-set in “deservingness” of homeless women – from ‘dependents’ to ‘contenders’ to ‘dependents’ – by policymakers at DUSIB attests to the path-dependent ‘core belief’ of symbolic policy deservingness of this target population (active ‘dependent’ status) that rationalize and legitimize policy inaction. And the ‘punctuation’ in policy (non-) implementation engineered through collective action by homeless women led to the activation of a countervailing ‘strategic belief’ of their deservingness for service improvement during a (brief) period of political oversight by the head of executive. Distinct influence of core v. strategic constructions of the poor not only draws attention to the role of bureaucratic discretions in policy “making” but also questions Schneider and Ingram’s (1993) assumption of a unitary ‘public official’ whose motivation to win elections becomes the causal logic that shapes policy design commensurate with perceived deservedness.

For constructivists like Ingram and Schneider (2005:7), core beliefs are widely held and path-dependent social constructions of target populations such that the longer they embed the repertoire of policy implementing agency’s (non) performance of rules (and the rationale underlying these rules), the harder it becomes to strategically manipulate these constructions of deservedness to produce policy change. Following political scientists like Béland (2016), Goldstein and Keohane (1993), and Schmidt (2010) who define beliefs as mental roadmaps broadly constitutive of perceptions, values, interests, and judgements held by individual and collective policy actors, I argue that strategic beliefs of
constructions of the poor can be seen as more malleable mental constructs held by bureaucrats that are deliberately activated to maximize/safeguard their personal interests (e.g., job security) in response to pressures emanating from the wider political environment within which policymaking takes place (see also Keiser and Soss, 1998; Nath, 2018). The framing of the rationale for policy support to the largely deemed ‘dependent’ residents of Dwarka and Baprola EWS housing projects further illustrates this.

When I asked why open drains were well-kept in Dwarka but not in Baprola, “Dwarka showcases the tireless commitment of my government to improving the welfare of rehabilitated slum dwellers” said the state representative of Dwarka EWS housing. The two community informants at Dwarka said that DUSIB was overseeing sanitation upkeep (drains and sewers) because families had paid the agency for these services at the time of moving-in.

The political visibility accorded to this site by policymakers was reiterated by a mid-rank officer who echoed the other 4 of 9 DUSIB officials:

“we have chosen this community because it was the first EWS project we built ..that’s why there is active political interest..our field staff is working hard to

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18 The concept of beliefs – their nature and composition – and how they shape behaviors, is intensely debated and tested by cognitive theorists and empiricists in psychology and anthropology among other disciplines. Engaging these debates are beyond the scope of my study and training. I make a narrow, theoretical argument for strategic beliefs that borrows from the International Relations literature and is limited to what was articulated as the dominant calculative judgement by the bureaucrats. However, this is not to say that these cognitions/social constructions, and their impact on behaviors, can be simply understood only by what is/can be articulated. In the present context, the purpose of strategic beliefs is to show how and when bureaucrats exercise agency and draw on their own values and judgements (including fidelity to constitutional duty, democratic ideals of social welfare, fairness etc) to strategically (re-) frame the deservingness of the poor that may be distinct from widely-held (organizationally or in society) beliefs.
oversee upkeep of common services for 5 years. This is sufficient time for residents to learn and replicate good community-living practices later on. Purpose is to educate these people by setting a service standard...they have never lived like this before. Have you seen a slum look like this? Representing the views of other 4 of 9 DUSIB officials (emphasis added).

Absent invocations of political interest/pressure by policymakers to showcase Baprola EWS akin to Dwarka reveals the core beliefs of symbolic deservingness. "DUSIB cannot provide these services everywhere...residents will have to assume personal responsibility" is how the state representative (MLA) of Baprola responded to the question of absent on-site DUSIB officials to comply with formal rules of oversight for drain-cleaning as in Dwarka. Three resident-informants of Baprola agreed that the on-site office was merely symbolic: "we paid for upkeep, but we have no power over them...they will only listen to the MLA..open the office for him..he has come only once.." said Ali, echoing the other two residents. An on-site DUSIB officer, whom I met after much delay, said "there are many problems here...nobody wants to be here and listen to these people complain...they play cards the whole day but won’t clean the drains outside their homes. These people have to learn to live like residents of formal housing localities...set up an RWA and collect money from households to pay for service shortfalls...they must discard old habits...otherwise it will begin to look like a slum after 5 years" echoing 5 of 9 DUSIB officers.

Sporadic sanitation support to Baprola by DUSIB’s policymakers, while stigmatizing the poor for their erstwhile slum status as in the case of Dwarka, is also justified as a teaching moment to educate them in standards of responsible living like residents of formal housing who do not depend on the government for sanitary support. The policy rationale underlying DUSIB’s 5-year rule of service upkeep rules in EWS public housing projects was not based on the fact that it is an entitled service for which each poor household at
both sites had paid a lump-sum amount (DUSIB, 2016:10). As the case of Dwarka shows, rule-enforcement had more to do with the DUSIB’s strategic interest in curating its own positive image in public. For both EWS sites, the design rationale for policy (non-)implementation conveys and perpetuates entrenched stereotypes of the poor that unsanitary conditions result from their own unwillingness to take personal responsibility and imbibe lessons in proper living. This, in turn, defines the limit of their policy deservingness from the government (Hasenfeld, 2000; Schneider and Ingram, 2005; Stone, 2004). These findings also exposed the tension between bureaucrats’ path-dependent core beliefs that frame the problem of sanitation as either a function of lack of personal responsibility or past unsanitary habits, and strategically-constructed deservedness of the residents for sanitation upkeep during time-bound periods of active political interest/oversight.

5.3.4 Clientelistic politics of selective sanitation provision

The strength of patronage ties between citizens and politicians/service provider was a dominant factor in the provision of sanitation service in the remaining 6 cases. In fact, presence of a patron in the same/adjacent community was the key and common initial condition in forging *quid pro quo* relations that improved sanitation service – installation of sewerage and upkeep of community toilet facility – in all but one case. The following discussion explores how these clientelistic relations come about, why they last (or don’t), and how they impinge upon the design of sanitation policy process to produce varied outcomes. Table 5.4 lists the sanitation outcomes in these 6 communities.
Table 8: Sanitation Outcomes in Clientelistic Communities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community Name</th>
<th>Community Type</th>
<th>Outcome Type(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gurhai Mohalla</td>
<td>Notified Slum</td>
<td>Complete coverage of sewered household toilets; animal feces/stagnant water in open drains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basai Darapur</td>
<td>Notified Slum</td>
<td>Complete coverage of sewered household toilets; resident complaints about pending sewer upgrade; underground drainage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ballimaran</td>
<td>Notified Slum</td>
<td>Complete coverage of sewered household toilets; underground drainage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satya Niketan</td>
<td>JJR</td>
<td>Complete coverage of sewered household toilets; underground drainage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blocks 16, 22, 31 Trilokpuri</td>
<td>JJR</td>
<td>Complete coverage of sewered household toilets; underground drainage (16, 22); trash/stagnant water in open surface drains (31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkman Gate (Men’s shelter, including disabled men)</td>
<td>Homeless Shelter</td>
<td>On-site free toilet facility connected to a sewer system</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Notified Slum is a legal slum

(a) Patronage ties and patron strength in service provision and exclusion

Echoing the view of the other community informant about universal coverage of sewer system in Ballimaran since the late 1960s, “our community has a rich political history.. home to freedom fighters of India’s independence to prominent politicians in the parliament..and since the constitution of Delhi’s state legislature in 1993, all MLAs [state representatives] of Ballimaran have been residents.. there has been a tradition of political engagement..and that’s why we have benefitted from sanitation advancements..” said Mishra, on comparisons with the other two legal slums. Archival parliamentary records from the 1980s corroborate informants’ claim that resident-politicians routinely raised the issue of civic amenities in densely-settled old Delhi neighborhoods like Ballimaran (source: www.rsdebate.nic.in). “I have lived here my entire life..know my voters and local
problems well.. our chief minister has special concern for the minorities [Ballimaran is majority Muslim].. you must have seen old sewers being replaced .. I have got many projects approved by him.. worth a billion rupees..since 2015” is how the current state representative of Ballimaran, who lives in the community and is also a cabinet official, set the context of his service-related patronage ties with the residents (emphasis added). A press byte (Bhatnagar, 2019) by the chief minister saying that the Muslim vote in Ballimaran and two other constituencies holds the key to electoral success in Delhi lends support to the state representative’s patronage claim.

Public record of DJB’s activities also partially corroborate the politician’s claim as the agency budgeted Rs 0.45 billion for sewer works in all old Delhi neighborhoods, including Ballimaran, in 2017-18 alone (Government of Delhi, 2018:113). “DJB policy is nothing more than what the political executive wants to get done.. when we prepare the budget we ask our chairperson [chief minister] for his priority.. then whoever is close to him gets their work prioritized..Ballimaran is an important constituency..so we were under a lot of pressure to undertake this sewer upgrade project.. it is our most ambitious one to date.. Reinstalling conventional sewers in such a dense settlement has been tough..we are using a new technology..it had to be done..can’t ignore this and jeopardize our jobs..” said a senior official echoing 5 of 8 DJB officials about varied implementation of agency rules for sewerage in Ballimaran compared to Bawana (no sewers) and Trilokpuri (no upgrade).

The weakening relationship between citizens and their resident-state representative vis-à-vis service improvement in Trilokpuri resettlement colony (public housing), over time,
stands in sharp contrast to the legal slum of Ballimaran. The following quote by Vaid echoes the views of other two informants of Trilokpuri resettlement colony and describes how this public housing project achieved improved sanitation (i.e., sewerage):

“When we moved to the neighborhood, there were few community toilets.. in each block.. that fell into disrepair as population pressure increased.. over two decades later.. with no provision of piped water or sewerage until the 1990s, some of us met with Massey [former resident-councilor] who was an active leader in the congress party.. we told her how the toilets had turned into cesspools.. the stench wafted out on the streets.. we went few more times before the election [for state legislature in 1998] to show our support ..after her party won, sewers were finally installed in the neighborhood..” (emphasis added)

Sitting in her home-office amidst a gallery wall of her pictures with the former three-term chief minister (CM) of Delhi, Massey said “Trilokpuri resettlement colony is the largest precinct in my electoral ward.. it was a long and tough campaign.. residents had been complaining.. regularly visiting my office.. so when we won majority [in the legislature in 1998] I told Sheilaji [former CM and DJB chair] that Trilokpuri couldn’t be ignored.. we owed them .. as women politicians, we had a very good rapport” (emphasis added). State election commission records corroborate Massey’s claim that Trilokpuri was a congress party bastion from 1993 to 2008 (Government of Delhi, 2018).

Vijay, community leader of block 30, points to the dirty stagnant water in open drains that is starting to contaminate supplementary water pipes piercing out of surface drains and going into people’s homes. “We filed a complaint at our [current] MLA’s [resident of nearby block 23 in the same neighborhood] office a few months ago but to no avail. We voted for him .. hoping he’ll come through for us when we need him.” The other two informants also agreed with Vijay that the current resident-politician was a weak leader.
“These problems will always be there...wear-and-tear issues in normal course of operation...I have informed the DJB...but you see, I’m not a miracle-worker...my constituents are happy... [turns to three men seated next to him]...why, isn’t that true? [men nod, smilingly]” said the current state representative about varied sanitation outcomes within his constituency, and versus Ballimaran. As I stood up to leave, an older resident seated behind me yelled why nothing had been done about murky water supplies, after which the politician shot back, “I told you it’s out of my hands...DJB will get to it...what more can I do? I don’t control the DJB.” The following quote by a senior officer, echoing 5 of 8 DJB bureaucrats revealed bureaucratic decisionmaking in the context of patronage politics: “all MLAs give us their demands...but we cannot provide for all...which area gets water or sewer pipes and when, is the prerogative of our political executive...they decide the budget...priority works cannot be delayed [as] we don’t want to invite any [job-related] trouble for ourselves...so Trilokpuri will have to wait.”

The diminished patronage ties between residents of Gurhai Mohalla and Basai Darapur (legal slums) and their respective (current) politicians represent a case of expired policy benefits that were delivered via former politicians residing in the neighborhood. Echoing the view of the other community informant, the president of Gurhai Mohalla’s residents’ association said the following about the delayed timeline of their access to sewerage:

“It was in the mid 1990s, close to two decades after our community got legal status, that some residents raised alarm over water contamination...there were no sewers...most households had the old system [septics] that started leaking...we made several visits to our then MLA [Ram]...we did not vote for him but we were desperate...his staff only gave us platitudes...and nothing happened. Things changed when our candidate, Dr Nath, of the congress party won the state election in 1998...as a doctor he understood the health impact of sewerage...he lived in the adjacent locality...was influential in the party” (emphasis added)
A government document corroborates Dr Nath’s credentials as a two-term cabinet official; and a news report published on his death characterizes him as the (former) chief minister’s “confidant” (Government of Delhi, 2018; Times of India, 2013). Four of 8 DBJ officials also corroborated these findings. When I asked why their community had open surface drains unlike other localities like Ballimaran and Basai Darapur, the two resident-informants blamed Ram’s political party that had majority in the municipal government for rejecting their request to close the drains after sewers were installed. Five of 8 municipal officials agreed that this request was not approved by the executive committee of which Ram was a member. Two decades later, Ram returned to power in the state government in 2015. Responding to disparities in sanitation outcomes between Gurhai Mohalla and his party colleagues’ constituencies i.e., Ballimaran and Basai Darapur, Ram, the current state representative said:

“When I won the election for the first time [1993] my priority was to deliver water and sewerage to my constituents...Gurhai residents did not vote for me ..not then, not now... and now you are asking me why drains are open and polluted.. with animal feces. You see, this is politics.. they are out to malign me and the good work I have done here ..they can’t stand it..I have opened two major technical education institutes..public schools in this area are better than before..but they will deliberately create problems [dispose feces in drains] and complain to tarnish my record.. because their party lost” (emphasis added).

The experience of the legal slum community of Basai Darapur after the loss of their political patron-resident has had a less hostile policy impact on sanitation service compared to Gurhai Mohalla. represented the basis of privileged patronage ties as recounted by Pati Ram, representing the view of the other community informant of Basai Darapur
“This community was culled out of the larger [urban] village commune.. and [government] conferred legal status in 1963..we were fortunate that our village-elder [Mangat] who won the election.. [and] led the development of the entire village. He was sympathetic to the needs of the working poor families of the slum...saw it [slum] as a part of his ancestral village.. he had near-complete support in this neighborhood.. was a popular leader who remained committed...even after he lost the next election [in 1969]. [Although] water pipes were installed during his term in office, continuous engagement with Mangat’s associates in the municipality ensured that sewers were installed and open drains covered by paved roads by the late 1970s” (emphasis added).

Though municipal officials could not corroborate the timeline of service provision, 3 long-serving municipal officials out of 8 officials remembered Mangat being a popular and resourceful elected representative of Basai. When asked how was it that his colleague in the party representing Ballimaran was undertaking sewer upgrade in a legal slum, the current state representative of Basai said “...because his constituency is notified [legal] slum areas.. what else will he show for himself?...we have to see where our votes are.”

When I asked how sewer upgrade in Basai’s village neighborhood made it on to DJB’s agenda that excluded the contiguous namesake legal slum area “at this point, my priority is to provide..and upgrade..water and sewerage only in urban villages and [non-poor] unauthorized colonies..it [Basai slum] is separate from Basai Darapur village..in my constituency, there are mostly unauthorized colonies and urban villages...” said the representative. Five of 8 DJB officials attested to the politician’s claim of the agency prioritizing sewerage provision in urban village and informal/unauthorized localities. The following quote by Pati Ram represents the view of the other community informant about losing political patronage, and reiterates how their state representative identified his constituency: “no leader from the neighborhood since Mangat has risen to prominence in Delhi’s politics.. we have lost visibility...you will have seen water and sewer upgrades in the adjoining urban village..but no sign of work on this side..our systems are also old.
The current MLA has not visited us even once...we are no longer seen as part of the village community.” State election commission record corroborates residents’ claim of Basai’s lack of representation in the legislature since 1993 (Government of Delhi, 2018).

The foregoing discussion shows how spatially-grounded patronage ties between citizens and their elected representatives impinge on bureaucratic decisionmaking processes to produce targeted, though by no means stable/predictable, distribution of sanitation service. Faced with competing political pressures to serve a select group of constituents (clients) with high demand for services, the bureaucracy rations public provisioning that transforms entitlement programs (e.g., rule-bound sewer construction) into conditional-access programs. And this happens because politicians extract compliance from the bureaucracy by controlling the purse strings of the agencies. For example, in 2015-16 and 2016-17, the DJB received Rs 17.3 billion and 19.7 billion as loans/aid from the state government for infrastructure works, respectively, compared to Rs 2.3 billion and Rs 3.2 billion raised from its own tax revenues (DJB, 2016: 21-22). Further, since the state legislature rarely makes policies for parastatals like the DJB and DUSIB, that are, instead, made by a small group of elected representatives on the governing board and/or cabinet officials, bureaucrats “privilege” requests of political patrons like Ballimaran’s state representative who can deliver credible threat of job loss or inducements of job advancements to the former (e.g., Davis, 2004; Ferraz, 2007; Nath, 2016).

I would argue that in such political systems – that have been called patronage democracies (Chandra, 2004; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2014) – where discretionary provision of public services is the ‘default’, patronage relations can be efficaciously
sustained when politicians have *credible power* – holding an influential position in the government (e.g., cabinet member, close personal ties with top leadership) or represents a politically-salient constituency (e.g., swing district; minority-majority district). These characteristics of a political patron allow him/her to make credible promises to the constituent-clients that are delivered via credible inducements of carrots and sticks to the bureaucracy. Therefore, poor enforcement of formal rules can be seen as *deliberate* attempts by bureaucracies to redistribute resources to constituencies of ‘credibly-powerful’ politicians such that this bureaucratic shirking is not only expected but also tolerated by less credibly-powerful politicians like Trilokpuri’s current state representative (see also, Khan, 2010). Bureaucracies are neither neutral nor passive agencies of policy implementation but are deeply partisan. As politicians exercise varying degrees of credible power, bureaucrats construct *deservingness of politicians* that shapes decisionmaking vis-à-vis agenda-setting and implementation designs of sanitation policy: whose constituency to provide what, when, and how.

The case of patronage politicking in the legal slum communities of Gurhai and Basai also signifies two key elements that sustain and perpetuate a low-level equilibrium of selective distribution of public resources: subverting ballot secrecy and information asymmetries among voters (Keefer and Khemani, 2009; Stokes, 2005). When I asked the current state representative how he knew Gurhai’s residents were not his supporters, he said that his party workers on the ground knew which community harbored misgivings about the leadership and who responded positively to political advertising. The two community informants of Gurhai also noted that grassroots workers of political parties lived in adjoining localities, and often mingled with local residents. With politicians operating
under a budget constraint, they tend to rely on information on voters obtained from their network of grassroots political operatives to achieve efficient targeting of rewards to supporter groups, and punishing opponents like Gurhai’s residents with a long history of voting for rival political party by stalling infrastructure works (e.g., Berenschot, 2014; Weitz-Shapiro, 2009).

Neither residents of Basai had knowledge of sewer upgrade work in Ballimaran, or Gurhai had any information on closed drainage systems in these two communities, nor had they ever visited their counterpart communities. Further, the state representatives of both communities belonged to the same political party as Ballimaran’s state representative. There exists scholarly evidence to suggest that such informational deficiencies in patronage polities work to the advantage of incumbent candidates as poor face high barriers to information access such as lower levels of literacy and limited mobility across jurisdictions (e.g., Fujiwara and Wantchekon, 2013; Keefer and Khemani, 2009). With my access to information on varied outcomes and discretionary compliance with agency rules based on intensive field visits and interviews, the foregoing evidence also supports extant literature that unequal access to public services may not be due to inadequate demand among the poor, but because lack of public disclosure of information by politicians/agencies perpetuates patronage-based private transfers of public services (e.g., Banerjee et al., 2011; Keefer and Khemani, 2004).
Clientelistic politics of solidarity in service improvements

Representing the narratives of the other two residents of Satya Niketan about how the community transitioned to improved sanitation outcomes (from community toilets to sewerage) and why upkeep standards varied from Trilokpuri and Bawana, Gupta said:

“Most of the original slum families who were relocated here in 1962 began selling their land plots to higher-income families by the mid-sixties… the new occupants decided to set up a welfare association to lobby the government to provide household-level services...some of us were in government jobs...so we knew how to navigate the bureaucracy. We put pressure through our MLA [state representative; non-resident] by organizing a signature campaign to show him that the community would vote en masse if he recommended the bureaucracy to expedite our service projects. Before the elections... in the late 70s, government began demolishing community toilets and laying sewers... surface drains were covered when roads were re-paved after sewer installation. Since then, we have engaged independently with the bureaucracy for service issues...more often than not, our work gets done... they listen to us.. know us.. unlike our MLA who only wants to patronize slum voters.” (emphasis added)

Responding to questions about well-functioning sewer system and closed drainage, unlike the two counterpart communities of Bawana and Trilokpuri, “on paper Satya Niketan may be a resettlement colony, but [its] residents are not like other colonies.. many people living there have been public employees... they are well-educated. They are like us... These things matter.. from where complaints are received. So you will find services to be better there” said a senior municipal official, representing the views of other 10 of 16 officials at the municipality and DJB. The current state representative agreed with the dominant view of these officials and community members that “the gentry is self-sufficient... they don’t need me to take care of these issues.”

Since Satya Niketan’s residents have a high ‘choice elasticity’ – private sanitation option affordable due to higher income status – for service improvement, the elected official
cannot ‘keep the client dependent on her benevolence’ and does not waste political capital on forging patronage ties with “the gentry” (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007:14). On the other hand, residents’ awareness of their own public image – “not slum dwellers” – has served as the foundation upon which new clientelistic ties of solidarity were forged by the bureaucracy. This was also how they managed to circumvent the possibility of diminishing service benefits from political patronage which, as residents claimed, would be directed towards slum dwellers. “Being heard” by the bureaucracy that, in turn, considers Satya Niketan’s residents as “people like us” illustrates the intersectionality between social construction theory and clientelistic politics of solidarity with a representative bureaucracy. As policymaking bureaucracies are largely middle-class entities, comprising of salaried professionals with a higher socio-economic status, decisions pertaining to who gets what, when and how as well as the rationales underlying these designs can reflect shared expectations and understandings of problem-solving procedures that are shaped by direct engagement in a community of class-comrades like Satya Niketan (e.g., Chaplin, 2011; Gal, 1998; Matthew and Hastings, 2014).

Clientelistic benefits of sanitation to the residents of the homeless shelter for men at Turkman Gate in central Delhi are “exchanged” for a combination of psychic benefits (i.e., solidarity with its clients) and self-preservation benefits by the NGO (i.e., preserving public image to survive as a service partner of DUSIB). “We have been at this shelter for a few years.. water and sanitation amenities are well-maintained thanks to Vicky [caretaker].. until a few years ago, he was also homeless like us.. that’s why he’s so involved.. we have not seen such good upkeep anywhere else” said Kaka, representing claims of the other shelter-informant. “I moved to Delhi in August 2014.. I know the abuse
and vulnerabilities of being homeless in the city. when I found this job, I wanted to make this shelter a safe and livable space for my homeless brethren. This shelter has received some interest from the courts over the years. I use that to put pressure on the NGO to fix service issues” said Vicky when asked why the facility was so sanitary compared to the men’s shelter at Pushta, and how he went about addressing service-related complaints.

The following quote by head of the NGO managing shelter services in Turkman Gate represents the claims made by other 2 officials of this NGO about the implementation of informal rules of problem-solving:

“What is our [NGO] source of income? we are heavily dependent on government contracts..we run 55 shelters in Delhi.. recently, the pumping system supplying water to the bathrooms at Turkman Gate broke down.. Vicky would call the office every other day..he was worried about surprise visits..so we decided to move money out of other projects ..we don’t wish to antagonize them [DUSIB] by complaining too much about these issues..we fixed the problem because if I look bad, DUSIB looks bad.. [and that] can jeopardize contract renewal.” (emphasis added).

Five of 9 DUSIB officials attributed disparate sanitary conditions between Turkman Gate and Pushta men’s shelters to “good working relationship between the homeless and NGO officials” in the former shelter, that in turn, corroborates the aforementioned claims of informal problem-solving procedures employed by the NGO managing Turkman Gate shelter. Claims that complaining “too much” could possibly jeopardize contract renewals were also stated by 8 of 16 NGO officials.

Responding to disparities in sanitation outcomes between Turkman Gate and Pushta shelters, “PRAYAS [NGO that manages Pushta shelter] has a lot of money..if they wanted, they could have fixed the problem by now.. they don’t need DUSIB’s help.” said a senior
official of an advocacy NGO echoing the sentiment of 10 of 16 NGO officials. “See, this is DUSIB’s job...as per the contract, we have fixed set of responsibilities...we have to be patient. DUSIB will do it...they also have to follow procedure...” said the head of PRAYAS, representing the view of 2 of his 5 colleagues about the continuing problem of leaking septics at Pushta. A comparison of financial status of the two men’s shelters – Turkman Gate and Pushta – reveals that the NGO managing the Pushta shelter is in a much stronger fiscal health (with steady contributions from non-state domestic and foreign donors) compared to the NGO managing Turkman Gate that is largely dependent on government funding. With both these shelters located in the “court-monitored” central district of Delhi as per official record (DUSIB, 2014: 3), I would argue that disparate sanitary conditions may be attributable to the efficacious entrepreneurial skills of the caretaker-patron to improve sanitation service for his ‘comrades’ in the shelter by strategically leverage “fear” of surprise third-party audits that results in NGO-service provider bending fund-allocation rules and procedures. This finding resonates with research that finds that reliance on government funding may not predict social advocacy (e.g., Garrow and Hasenfeld, 2014), and that clientelism may not be exploitative or antithetical to collective claims-making (e.g., Gay, 1990; Lazar, 2008).

The case of clientelistic politics of Turkman Gate challenges extant research that posits mutual exclusivity between NGO politics of advocacy for social benefits and politics of organizational survival (e.g., e.g., Hula et al., 1997; Mosley, 2012). The NGO politics of Turkman Gate shelter shows that solidarity-driven advocacy for social benefits and

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survival tactics to maintain funding streams can co-exist and temper each other. While on the one hand, the caretaker-advocate was able to skillfully wrest resources for service upkeep in his shelter, evidence also shows how politics of survival can supersede need- fulfillment of vulnerable populations when donor monies re-routed by the NGO to “visible” facilities can reduce service standards at other shelters. However, as NGOs compete to outperform each other in the service delivery domain, it also creates a moral hazard problem whereby the state (DUSIB, in this case) can get away with non-compliance of formal rules of repairing or upgrading malfunctioning infrastructures (see also Chandhoke, 2009; Jewitt, 2011).

5.4 Conclusion

This chapter investigated the policymaking processes that can explain why sanitation outcomes vary across the sample of 15 poor communities in Delhi. The analyses of qualitative data obtained from elite interviews with key policy informants, field observations, relevant government documents, and news reports revealed that four theoretical frameworks were salient in explaining varied sanitation outcomes. Themes from the theory of neighborhood effects were articulated by government elites and some community informants when presented with disparate sanitation outcomes for communities that were located in high-value neighborhoods like Satya Niketan public housing and low-value neighborhoods like Bawana public housing. But in-depth probing using counterfactual evidence of disparate outcomes across communities located in two high-value neighborhoods – e.g., BR Camp illegal slum v. Kusumpur Pahadi illegal slum – or, two low-value neighborhoods – e.g., Bawana public housing and Trilokpuri public
housing – revealed that communities did not receive spillover service benefits due to their location in elite neighborhoods or vice-versa. In fact in the cases where this theme emerged, better-served communities had existed in their respective neighborhoods for decades without improved sanitation. A critical and necessary condition for service improvements was political mobilization by these communities.

This apolitical theoretical framework from sociology and public economics was unable to explain why an unsanitary poor community in a posh neighborhood did not receive positive externalities, or how a poor community could receive better services to offset the effect of negative externalities in a low-income neighborhood. Findings from this study offer a bridge between distinct scholarly traditions where neighborhood effects can be studied by policy scholars as deceptive rationales to conceal political influences on setting the policy agenda and implementation timeline and procedures of policymaking agencies. Findings also advance the clientelistic politics literature as they reveal a spatial context to micro-targeting of sanitation service by patron-politicians within a neighborhood. Sanitation is an example of public infrastructure/services which have a locational context (such as water supply, roads) that have been leveraged in electoral politics in India to mobilize, reward, and punish voter constituencies.

Themes from organizational constraints theory were also articulated by policymakers to justify poor sanitation outcomes for communities that were too big or had difficult topographies like Kusumpur Pahadi and Bawana, or because the agency lacked mandate as in the case of Pushta men’s shelter that restricted financial investments for sanitation improvement, compared to cheaper-to-serve communities like Mangolpuri illegal slum,
Basai Darapur legal slum, and Lodi women’s shelter. However, comparison with quality sanitation in the largest/densely-populated community of Ballimaran legal slum and triangulation with government documents like budgets, annual reports, and technical reports on alternative sanitation revealed the deceptiveness of these organizational constraint rationales in decisionmaking. Bureaucracies not only prioritized resources in response to community’s pressure via their elected officials, they also exercised discretion in whom to serve based on their perceptions of the communities’ political clout or role in causing the problem of poor sanitation. Even “fiscal constraints” that were ostensibly imposed by a lack of agency mandate could be ignored to deliver benefits if suitable political pressure was applied (e.g., Lodi women’s shelter).

This theoretical framework from public administration literature is silent on the role of politics and bureaucratic culture (normative biases) that can also act as constraints on policy decisionmaking. The theory of organizational constraints could not explain the process of disparate provision of sanitation across communities in this study as the decisionmaking calculus of whom (not) to serve was not driven by rational choice or cost-benefit considerations. This is not to say that organizations do not face resource constraints – it is probably a given that demand/need for (better) services will outweigh available resources. But that the theory under-emphasizes how these scarce resources are allocated or distributed to meet competing and conflicting demands by different citizen groups. In other words, the positivist slant of organizational constraints literature is unable to capture the politicized and discretionary processes of setting the policy agenda, framing the problem, and formulating a plan of action that prioritize sanitation needs of
some poor communities over others. Findings from this study draw out these gaps in the organizational constraints theory.

Clientelistic politics of residents’ votes exchanged for sanitation improvements delivered by resident-politicians and/or neighborhood politicians emerged as the dominant explanation for communities such as Ballimaran, Basai Darapur, Gurhai Mohalla, and Trilokpuri. Though improved outcomes such as provision of sewerage and underground drainage by the bureaucracy were mediated by political patrons, electoral mobilization of these communities around sanitation was necessary to push this issue on to the policy agenda. The themes of punishment and failed promises in clientelistic politics literature resonate with the study’s findings that having political representation does not guarantee sanitation improvements in the communities. A new neighborhood politician could punish a community of non-supporters by withholding entitled services (Gurhai Mohalla), or a new resident-politician could be ineffective in fulfilling his campaign promise of service improvements upon re-election (Trilokpuri). This latter finding when contrasted with the case of Ballimaran whose resident-politician was able to deliver steady sanitation improvements allowed me to question the assumption of clientelistic politics theory that treats all politicians as equally powerful. By investigating the position and characteristics of political patrons in the policymaking process, this study shows that when politicians wield ‘credible patronage power’ (e.g., hold cabinet positions, have close ties with politicians on the governing board of bureaucracies), they are able to disburse sustainable policy benefits (or punishment) to constituents via agenda-setting and disciplinary oversight of policy-implementing bureaucrats. This study also challenges the conventional wisdom in clientelistic politics literature of ethnic favoritism in targeted
provision of public resources by political patrons. This is not to argue that ethnicity does not matter in politics, but that ethno-religious heterogeneity in urban poor settlements (as in this study) suggests that political parties may be incentivized to build broader coalitions to win (re-)elections (see Auerbach et al., 2019 for a review of new approaches to the study of electoral politics in India).

Clientelistic politics theory is largely silent on the role that bureaucrats play not only as key actors in securing patronage ties between voters and politicians, but also as patrons of the communities independent of political influence. Data shows that sanitation bureaucrats are largely aware of the communities’ lack of political clout (e.g., Basai Darapur, Gurhai Mohalla) and also act strategically in setting the policy agenda and prioritizing agency resources to serve those communities where the fear of political retribution or incentives of reward are higher (e.g., Ballimaran) compared to others (e.g., Trilokpuri). Moreover, as the case of solidarity-based clientelistic politics of service improvements in Satya Niketan public housing show, bureaucrats can also deliver rule-compliant service benefits to those whom they see as “people like us”. This study’s finding on how solidarity ties between the residents and caretaker of Pushta men’s shelter can become the basis for skillful negotiations by the caretaker for timely compliance with upkeep rules reveals yet another gap in clientelistic politics literature. The theory under-emphasizes the role of non-state patrons of client-communities especially for public services like sanitation (also water, trash pickup) where service management is contracted out to the private/non-state sector.
Supporting extant empirical applications of Schneider and Ingram’s social construction framework, this study finds that stereotypes about poor communities played a dominant role in shaping policy decisions that impacted sanitation outcomes. A common pattern for policy design across the deemed “dependent” communities (Lodi women’s shelter, Dwarka and Baprola public housing sites) was that agencies’ compliance with service upkeep rules was largely to teach lessons in community self-help and sanitary living. On the other hand, worst sanitation outcomes for “deviants” (Pushta men’s shelter, Kusumpur Pahadi illegal slum, Bawana Nizamuddin pavement community) were blamed on incorrigible unsanitary practices and “slum mentality” of state dependency which in turn justified non-compliance with formal provision and upkeep rules until communities exhibited reformed personal and civic behaviors. The framework also fits the study’s findings for “contender” communities like the illegal slums of BR Camp and Mangolpuri that achieved improved sanitation (sewerage) as a hidden reward for political mobilization which helped their respective state representative win the election.

Findings from this study highlight a limitation of this theory which is the assumption that public officials are a monolithic entity whose constructions of target populations and distribution of rewards/punishments are driven by a common motivation to win elections. While politicians no doubt care about winning/maintaining elected office, bureaucrats are more strategic in constructing deservingness of target populations. Under political pressure, bureaucrats can be strategic in their beliefs or perceptions of deservingness of communities as they seek to maximize their personal interest of job security by trying to avoid political rebuke or win political favors (e.g. promotion). But as these pressures subside in their day-to-day functioning, bureaucrats can fall back on standard operating
procedures that are sustained by path-dependent core beliefs or perceptions of the poor. A revelatory example of these observed shifts in social constructions and policy design outcomes over time is the largely “dependent” and briefly “contender” community of Lodi women’s shelter.

The theory is also limited in its ability to explain ambivalent social constructions articulated by interviewees in the same interview and about the same community. For example, while the elected representative of BR Camp spoke of the community as a formidable political “contender” group that was critical for his re-election, he also used “deviant” tropes for the residents as having “large families despite living in small spaces” and “high tolerance” for unsanitary conditions. Similarly, for the deemed “dependent” communities of Baprola and Dwarka public housing, bureaucrats also ascribed “deviant” labels of residents being “used to slum lifestyles” that would make these housing projects “look like a slum in a few years”. Despite its focus on cognitive biases in policymaking, social construction theory does not provide the analytical tools to help us understand how these ambivalent constructions influence policy designs, what source of cultural/subcultural knowledge policymakers are drawing from, and the conditions under which some constructions will prevail over others to shape policy decisions. Shifting and ambivalent social constructions of poor communities and discretionary nature of policy implementation by sanitation bureaucracies that (re-)shape outcomes question the stability of theoretically-proposed causal relationship between social constructions and policy design which assumes a static policymaking environment and a linear decisionmaking process.
6.1 Introduction

This chapter presents a new epistemological approach to test the presence of shared bureaucratic beliefs vis-à-vis social construction of target populations that is central to understanding who gets what in the process of public policymaking. Social constructivists in the political science tradition like Schneider and Ingram (1993), Yanow (1996), and Stone (2004) argue that policymakers make moral/normative evaluations in selecting the problem worthy of government intervention, framing its definitional boundaries and target audience, and defining policy goals and means (rules and procedures) to achieving them. These cognitive-evaluative judgements are based on the ‘shared perceptions’ of deservingness of the identified policy targets since policymakers often have to justify the design and content of policies to the public at large. On the other hand, cultural anthropologists like Geertz (1973) and D’Andrade (1995) have understood culture as a knowledge system of learned and shared norms and beliefs that determines the standards of “appropriate” behaviors among individuals and societies. Based on this cognitive view of culture, A. Kimball Romney, William H. Batchelder, and Susan C. Weller (1986) developed a statistical methodology – cultural consensus analysis – to determine if a
group of individuals share understandings about an issue topic, and estimate the
distribution of that shared knowledge within the group. In this chapter, I undertake a
cross-fertilization of a methodological approach from cognitive anthropology to test the
theoretical propositions of Schneider and Ingram’s (1993) social construction of target
populations in public policy. To the best of my knowledge, the use of consensus analysis
as an epistemological tool for knowledge-sharing between cognitive anthropology and
political science has been largely unexplored. This chapter is a step in that direction.

The purpose of these analyses is to test the validity of theoretically-proposed causal
linkages between social constructions and policy designs, triangulate the social
construction-related qualitative findings from Chapter 5, and assess the generalizability of
this theory-based causal explanations for variations in sanitation outcomes across
communities of the urban poor. The concept of generalizability in cultural anthropology is
distinct from how it is understood in classic statistical theory. Since data in cultural
anthropology is inherently relational i.e., reflects the knowledge acquired through social
processes, the violation of the assumption of independent data observations makes
classical statistical tests inappropriate for cultural analyses. Therefore, statistical tests in
anthropology (e.g., cultural consensus analysis) analyze socially constructed cultural data.
According to cultural theory, these statistical results (e.g., presence of bureaucratic culture
of social constructions and sanitation support to the poor) can be generalized to groups of
persons with similar life experiences (e.g., poverty, discrimination, social advantage) that
influence how people make sense of their own conduct and the world around them
(Handwerker and Wozniak, 1997: 870).
The significance of this empirical investigation is grounded in Schneider and Ingram’s (1993: 335) contention that social constructions of target populations and how widely they are shared are important matters for empirical analysis because of the real consequences of policies for individual wellbeing and substantive meaning of the concept of “public”. The inquiry is anchored by two separate, but related, research questions: (i) what are the cultural beliefs that are held among sanitation policymaking bureaucrats vis-à-vis poor communities in Delhi, and (ii) what are the consequent policy decisions for maintenance of sanitation service in these communities. Surveys were administered to 30 officials at the state agency of Delhi Urban Shelter Improvement Board (DUSIB) and the city-level municipal corporation of Delhi (MCD). Factor analyses of survey respondents were conducted to test for the presence of consensus or shared view, and how strongly they are held with respect to the aforementioned research questions. In situations when large N databases like General Social Survey or other publicly available surveys are unavailable, as is the case in the present study, consensus analysis can be a useful tool to administer to a small sample of key informants or policy stakeholders to determine the presence and strength of a shared cultural belief system.

The next section sets the theoretical foundations for a ‘cultural exchange’ between anthropology and public policy. Data and Results are presented in sections 6.3 and 6.4, respectively. Section 6.5 presents a discussion on the analytic results, and section 6.6 concludes with the implications of consensus analysis for social construction theory and applied policy research.
6.2 Theory

Cognitive anthropologists argue that culture is a system of knowledge (norms, beliefs, perceptions) that is ‘learned’ and ‘shared’ through socialization processes which govern individual behaviors in a social setting (Allaire and Firsirotu, 1984: 197-98). This conceptual framework of culture as a ‘shared system of cognitions’ shaping behavioral patterns through mechanisms of “acceptable codes of conduct” is closely associated with Schneider and Ingram’s (1993) social construction framework. Social constructivists in the political science tradition argue that public officials use cognitive maps to frame the deservingness of target populations which influences their decisionmaking behaviors, such as formulation of implementation rules and procedures, for allocating public service benefits or imposing penalties through public policy (ibid.). And since a critical ingredient of this construction recipe is a ‘shared belief’ of normative/moral evaluations (positive or negative or somewhere in between) of policy targets among officials, policymaking processes are enactments of a ‘collective mind’ that is related to individual cognitions in an indirect way (ibid. p. 204). The remainder of this section explores the suitability of consensus model in measuring the role of beliefs or attitudes in political decisionmaking, and engages the intersectionality between theoretical frameworks of cultural consensus and social construction in public policy with respect to perceptions of deservingness of the poor that shape policy implementation choices among government bureaucrats vis-à-vis sanitation service across poor communities.
6.2.1 Cultural Consensus Theory and Public Policy

Cultural Consensus Analysis (hereafter, CCA) is a theory and a statistical methodology that allows researchers to determine if a group of individuals – for example, bureaucrats in a government agency – share understandings on an issue topic, and estimate the distribution of that shared knowledge within the group. CCA derives its theoretical legitimacy from a cognitive view of culture as a set of ‘learned’ and shared beliefs and behaviors, and is a measurement tool used by cognitive anthropologists to estimate the extent to which group beliefs are shared, or consensus, and each individual’s knowledge levels, or competencies. These competencies are tested for a series of questions, and then used to arrive at a single set of “culturally correct answers” based on the respondents’ shared cognitions (Borgatti and Halgin, 2011). Scholars engaged in studying public attitudes toward the poor and causes of poverty understand that these perceptions have crucial implications for the design of welfare policies (e.g., financial allocation for welfare programs, means-tested assistance etc.). Tagler and Cozzarelli (2013) argue that behavioral consequences of attitudes toward the poor have not been sufficiently tested in the literature to advance scientific knowledge about features and strength of attitudes that can predict real-world behaviors and policy decisions.

To the best of my knowledge, the potential of consensus analysis as an epistemological tool for knowledge-sharing between cognitive anthropology and political science remains largely unexplored. Therefore, the current study presents a unique opportunity to advance scientific knowledge by widening the domain of empirical applications of consensus models and subjecting the Schneider-Ingram (1993) social construction framework to rigorous quantitative testing. In the present study, CCA offers a robust measurement tool
to test the presence of shared social constructions among policymakers as well as shared behavioral (i.e., policy implementation) choices vis-à-vis maintenance of public sanitation services in the sampled urban poor communities in Delhi. Before delving into a discussion of consensus analysis for estimating latent traits like beliefs and knowledge among policy-implementing agents, I present an overview of cultural consensus theory which is the conceptual framework for this analytic approach.

Cultural Consensus Theory (CCT), introduced in 1986 by A. Kimball Romney, William H. Batchelder, and Susan C. Weller, postulates that individuals often rely on agreement or consensus to determine “the truth” about issues or topics when they do not know the correct answer. That is, consensus theory allows “correct” answers to be ‘inferred’ from the responses of informants. However, the pre-requisite to estimating knowledge through patterns of agreement among persons in a group is that the following three conditions be met. First, there is a single set of answers (“answer key”) to the questions in the sense that respondents must belong to the same culture.\(^2\) Since CCT is founded in a cognitive view of culture, reliability of responses cannot be ensured unless there is some degree of consistency (i.e., learned and shared beliefs and behaviors among individuals) in the underlying data. Second, each respondent answers a question independently of his/her answers to other questions and other respondents in the group. And third, the questions are drawn from the same knowledge domain (e.g., questions about attitudes toward the poor should not be mixed with those toward science-fiction movies) and at the same level

\(^2\) Borgatti (2007: 22) argues that to identify if a sample of respondents belong to the same culture, one only needs to ensure that they be affiliated to social systems which are established enough to have had a chance to develop their own body of wisdom or knowledge. Organizations, as Allaire and Firsirotu (1984) contend, are a microcosm of the larger social system in which they are embedded.
of difficulty so that competency of respondents is consistently measured across items (Weller, 2007: 340).

The power of CCT is not only that it provides tools to measure agreement between different informants, but that it allows for consideration of variability in their cultural knowledge. Borgatti and Halgin (2011:7) argue that there are two sources of variability in informants’ responses: culture and competence. Cultural variability in responses refers to systematic differences in patterns of answers that are indicative of informants belonging to different cultures or having disparate views of the world (e.g., individualistic versus structural view of causes of poverty). Competence variability refers to differences in responses for people drawn from the same culture (e.g., government bureaucracies) but having differential access to elements of that culture. In the presence of a shared view of (cause of) poverty, for example, informants can vary in their agreement with each other regarding different aspects of that culture - laziness as a determinant of poverty among able-bodied versus disabled persons. Scholars of public policy and public management argue that the discretionary power of bureaucrats in interpreting politically-determined policy mandates and implementing rules and procedures represents organizational culture of “deservingness” of the citizens of public services (e.g., Lipsky, 1980; Keiser and Soss, 1998; Riccucci, 2007). But although bureaucrats ostensibly belong to the same culture, sharing ideas and experiences within the same social setting, they comprise a diverse group with different personal traits and socialization patterns outside the workplace which may produce variations in their cultural competencies – what cultural anthropologists recognize as the presence of ‘sub-cultures’ (e.g., Meier, 1975; Matthews and Hastings, 2012).
6.2.2 Social Construction and Consensus Model of the ‘Deserving Poor’

No empirical investigation into the policymaking processes can respond to Lasswell’s (1936) question of ‘who gets what, when, and how’ without unraveling how public bureaucracies apply broad legislative mandates – that often predominate public attention – in specific situations that impact the outcome of policies experienced by citizens on the ground. Being the first point of contact for the citizens with the state, bureaucracies occupy a decisive place in policy politics because, as Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2000: 333) argue, their activities are guided more by normative judgements about ‘who deserves what’ that can refashion federal mandates and undermine accountability of elected officials to their electorate. Anne Schneider and Helen Ingram’s (1993) theory of social construction of target populations offers insights into the cognitive calculus underlying bureaucratic discretion in implementing policies that orchestrates differential outcomes based on moral/normative judgements of deservingness of individuals or groups.

Social constructions are cultural characterizations of persons or groups who may be perceived positively or negatively by the society at large, through dominant portrayals in the media, literature etc. When designing policies, policymakers consider not just the public image of target populations so as to avoid backlash against their policies from mass publics, but also the perceived political power of these recipient groups to mobilize against discriminatory practices or lobby in support of favorable policies. The convergence of social constructions and perceived political power of target populations creates four categories of deservingness: advantaged policy targets are deemed deserving because they have a positive public image (depicted by labels such as “dutiful”, “tax-
paying citizens”) and high propensity for political mobilization; contender targets are largely deemed undeserving because they have a negative public image (“politically well-connected”, “greedy lobbyists”) but have high political power; dependent policy targets are deemed rhetorically deserving because even though they have a positive public image (“needy”, “helpless”) they lack political power; and deviant policy targets are deemed undeserving because they have a negative public image (“criminals”, “uncultured”) and low propensity for political mobilization (ibid. p.337). This image-making by policymakers shapes commensurate policy designs for discretionary distribution of policy rewards and penalties to these target groups. These theoretical propositions are presented below, and will be tested for the data collected from bureaucrats in the state and city governments on variations in sanitation policy outcomes across 15 communities of the urban poor in Delhi using consensus analysis:

**H1: Target populations of public policy constructed as Advantaged receive a disproportionate share of policy benefits with negligible policy burdens - Deserving and entitled**

**H2: Target populations of public policy constructed as Contenders receive hidden, but real, policy benefits with few, but visible, policy burdens - Undeserving but entitled**

**H3: Target populations of public policy constructed as Dependents receive symbolic policy benefits with few burdens - Deserving but unentitled**

**H4: Target populations of public policy constructed as Deviants receive a disproportionate share of burdens with negligible policy benefits - Undeserving and unentitled**

The status quo nature of public policymaking merits scientific inquiry into how strongly (i.e., whether and to what extent) these beliefs and stereotypes are held in the minds of bureaucrats, especially, and paradoxically, when there is evidence that what is on paper
doesn’t exist on the ground, and what is on the ground doesn’t exist on paper (Bhan, 2013: 59; Cole, 2014; Pierson, 2000).

Weller (2007: 339) argues that cultural consensus theory – which comprises of models and analytical procedures – can be used to estimate whether cultural beliefs exist among a group, how strongly they are shared by members within that group (i.e., cultural competencies of individuals), and what the “culturally correct” answers are. The purpose of consensus analysis is not to test informants’ knowledge about an objective truth. The goal, according to Batchelder et al. (2018: 2) is to determine if the informants share a tacit consensus regardless of whether that consensus corresponds to some exogenously defined objective truth. Pearson correlation coefficient is used to estimate agreement between each pair of members, and a factor analysis of the estimated agreement matrix is used to obtain competence scores for each informant, which is given by the factor loading on the first factor. Responses are then weighted by the competence scores to arrive at the “culturally correct” answers. Unlike conventional factor analyses that are done on a set of variables, factor analysis in the consensus model is done on the respondents to measure how well the responses of each individual correspond with those of others in the group. To satisfy the assumption of a single set of “correct answers” under cultural consensus theory, consensus analysis determines the presence of shared cultural knowledge if the ratio of the first to the second eigenvalue (produced as an output of factor analysis) is at least equal to three. So, if the ratio is below three, it means that the respondents are drawing their knowledge from more than one subculture. If cultural agreement among bureaucrats exists, then the consensus ‘answer key’ can be used to interpret where the
different poor communities fall on the deserving-undeserving spectrum of sanitation policy benefits and burdens received from public bureaucracies in Delhi.

6.3 Data and Method

The survey questionnaire titled, *Swachh Delhi: A Survey of Sanitation Problem and Policy Solution* was developed and administered over a three-month period from June to August 2018 to 30 government bureaucrats in sanitation departments/agencies in Delhi.\(^{21}\) The main purpose of this empirical inquiry is two-fold. First, I am interested in testing whether there exists a shared view among government bureaucrats of the cultural attributes of populations residing in 15 urban poor settlements in Delhi. Second, consensus analysis also tests for whether there is bureaucratic agreement with respect to implementation designs to allocate sanitation policy rewards or penalties across the poor communities, and whether this consensus comports with the hypothesized causal linkages postulated in the Schneider-Ingram (1993) framework.

6.3.1 Research Questions

Consensus analyses and subsequent discussion of the results of this study are anchored in the following research questions:

\*RQ 1 (a): Do government bureaucrats in sanitation departments/agencies share a common perception of the urban poor vis-à-vis deservingness of sanitation service*
in Delhi? If so, what are the shared cultural attributes associated with each poor community, and how strongly is this cultural view shared within the group?

RQ 1 (b): Do government bureaucrats share a cultural view with respect to implementation design choices for sanitation service delivered to the urban poor communities? If so, what are the unique policy options associated with each poor community and how strongly is this policy view shared within the group?

RQ 2: Do consensus analysis findings in (a) and (b) above support the theoretical propositions of the Schneider-Ingram social construction framework? What are the implications of the analytical results for the generalizability of theory-driven causal explanations for variations in sanitation service across urban poor communities in Delhi?

6.3.2 Sample and Recruitment

A total of 30 bureaucrats from state and city departments consented to participate in this study. I arrived at this sample size using a rule of thumb regarding sample size for consensus analysis. Weller (2007: 355) argues that to determine the sample size before beginning the study, it is best to assume a low level of agreement among respondents. Given this criterion, the minimum sample size required to obtain a high accuracy of answers (at 95% confidence level) is 30. The state-level bureaucrats belong to the Delhi Urban Shelter Improvement Board (DUSIB) that provides basic amenities like sanitation (community toilets and drains) in slums, some public housing projects, and homeless shelters. City-level bureaucrats are officers in the municipality that is responsible for

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22 DJB officials did not respond to emails or phone messages. Those who had earlier participated in the interview study did not give consent for the survey.
maintaining community-level stormwater drains in Delhi. An initial email introducing myself and the study was sent to 20 senior and mid-ranking DUSIB officials whose email addresses were available on the agency’s website. Subsequent follow-up emails resulted in 6 senior and 2 mid-ranking officials consenting to take the survey. Selection of municipality officials for the survey was based largely on snowball sampling as the complete database of contact details of the officials was not published on its website. I contacted the municipal commissioner (i.e., CEO of municipality) to introduce my study, and obtained the contact information of five superintendent engineers (senior officials) in the sanitation department. 23 I was able to obtain a list of mid-level officials and field-level sanitary inspectors from the office of one of the senior officials. A series of telephonic and in-person follow-ups resulted in 11 mid-ranking officers and 8 field inspectors to participate in the survey. Appendix E presents the demographic data of the respondents.

6.3.3 Questionnaire Design

The survey comprised of short community vignettes followed by a set of two-part questions on social construction and policy design for each vignette. Since no prior research has used social construction theory to develop a perception survey to measure the deservingness of the poor, I used themes from qualitative findings (see chapter 5 for details) as well as social construction literature (see chapter 2 for details) to develop multiple-choice response categories. For example, Schneider and Ingram (1993) argue that target populations constructed as advantaged – “dutiful” – will receive direct and visible policy benefits from the government. Therefore, on the survey, the theoretically-predicted design choice is one in which the government provides direct support towards

23 The municipality officials who participated in the interviews did not consent to participate in the survey.
maintenance of sanitation service. Similarly, policy design option for dependent target populations – “needy” – receiving symbolic or on-paper government support is given by communities helping themselves (“self-help”) in service upkeep that entails limited/symbolic state intervention (Berner and Phillips, 2005). For each community vignette, respondents had to select from four descriptors as follows:

Part 1: Social construction
- Dutiful
- Politically well-connected
- Needy
- Uncultured for city life

Then, respondents had to indicate which of the following four policy design options were appropriate for the given community, as follows:

Part 2: Policy design choices vis-à-vis maintenance of sanitation infrastructure
- Direct government support
- Indirect government support via NGOs
- Symbolic support via community self-help
- Punishment by the government via imposition of penalty

A draft set of community vignettes and multiple-choice responses about each community was pre-tested and finalized during two rounds of cognitive interviews with 4 policy experts in Delhi in June 2018. Appendix G presents the final version of the survey that
comprised of a total of 30 questions for 15 communities. It was administered beginning the first week of July 2018, and completed surveys were collected by the last week of August 2018.

6.3.4 Analytic Method

The first step before conducting consensus analysis using factor method is to convert categorical data into numerical data. For that, I assigned values between 1 and 4 to each answer option on the survey questionnaire. Raw data was tabulated in the form of a matrix with respondents as rows and responses as columns in MS Excel. This resulted in a 30 x 15 data matrix file for the 30 bureaucrats. The MS Excel spreadsheet was imported into a social network analysis software called UCINET that has a consensus analysis tool (Borgatti et al., 2002). Factor analysis in consensus models is done on respondents using the minimum residual method without rotation. Details of this method are discussed in Chapter 3.

6.4 Results and Analysis

The mean age of bureaucrats is 51 years (with sd= 9.36). The youngest respondent is a 28-year old female engineer (lower-middle officer) in the sanitation department of the municipality; the oldest is a 65-year old male senior official at the DUSIB who was rehired to a senior position after retiring from the same agency at age 60. There are only two women bureaucrats in the sample, both junior engineers in the municipality with less than 5 years of experience. Another officer with the same length of tenure is a 29-year old male junior engineer in the municipality. Eighty-seven percent of the total respondents
have served more than 11 years in their respective organizations, and only one respondent – a mid-ranking male municipality official - has been in service between 6 and 10 years. Consensus models of social construction and implementation policy design for bureaucrats are discussed next.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 9: Descriptive Statistics (n=30)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age (in years)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum Age (in years)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum Age (in years)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Male Respondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Respondents with tenure over 11 years</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.4.1 Model 1: Consensus Model of Social Construction of Target Populations

The factor analysis of social construction dataset for 30 bureaucrats generated no negative competencies and a ratio of first-to-second eigenvalues equal to 2.823. The ratio just falls short of the consensus threshold of 3 and does not meet the first pre-condition of consensus theory which requires unidimensionality of data. The average competence score for the group is estimated at 0.545 which suggests that although the respondents are generally knowledgeable about the domain, this knowledge (culture) is weakly shared among bureaucrats in sanitation agencies in Delhi (Weller and Mann, 1997: 78). The bureaucrat with the highest competence score (R22) of 0.83 is a 55 year-old mid-level municipal officer with over 10 years of experience, and the least competent officer (R13) with a score of 0.037 is his 53 year-old colleague with the same amount of municipal
work experience. The test item that elicited most divergent views is Bawana public housing project in north-west Delhi. In other words, 16 out of the 30 respondents have item-specific negative competence score for social construction of Bawana residents. The community that elicited the least divergent views with only 4 item-specific negative competence score is the illegal slum settlement of BR Camp located in central Delhi.

(a) Answer Key, Sub-cultures, and Reconciling results with qualitative findings
Since the eigenratio of less than 3 for the full model indicates presence of sub-cultures of social constructions, the dataset is partitioned into three sub-groups based on respondents’ occupational ranks to test for consensus within each cohort (Caulkins, 2004:321). While the factor analyses of the responses of 8 street-level officers and 11 mid-level officers did not confirm cultural consensus (eigenratio of 2.1 and 2.4 respectively), the model for 11 senior (6 DUSIB and 5 municipality) bureaucrats shows the presence of shared knowledge (eigenratio of 3.34) vis-à-vis social constructions of sampled urban poor communities in Delhi. With a computed average competence score of 0.62 for sample size of 11, Weller (2007: 354) estimates that 85 to 90 percent of the answers are correctly classified at 99 percent confidence level. Consensus analysis of senior bureaucrats in state and municipal sanitation agencies produced no negative competencies. Further, the answer

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24 Per Weller’s (2007: 361) suggestion of running another iteration of consensus analysis when there is only one individual with an unusually low competence score, dropping R13 still shows lack-of-model-fit as the eigenratio marginally improves from 2.823 to 2.887 (UCINET software does not round-off eigenratios to the next integer value).
25 The presence of sub-cultures can be seen in the context of the discussion on strategic beliefs of deservingness of the poor presented in Chapter 5. The tension between core beliefs (culture) and strategic beliefs (sub-culture) in discursively shaping the deservingness of the poor may be a reason for the lack of consensus among bureaucrats.
26 In the cultural consensus model, confidence levels are computed for different levels of agreement (estimated as the average Pearson correlation coefficient between all pairs of respondents, or cultural competency) and for different levels of validity (estimated as the correlation between aggregated responses and “true” answers).
The group of 11 senior officials constructed most of the sampled poor communities on the opposite ends of the deservingness spectrum of the Schneider-Ingram framework: the deserving group of “dutiful” residents and the undeserving “uncultured” residents. As Table 2 shows, only Trilokpuri public housing and Lodi Road women’s shelter residents were constructed by policymakers along the middle of the deservingness spectrum as symbolically deserving “needy” residents. No community, either in the full or senior officials-only model, is constructed as a contender or politically well-connected group.

The answer key for senior bureaucrats in Table 2 characterizes urban poor residing in both legal and illegal housing settlements as deserving dutiful or advantaged groups and undeserving uncultured or deviant populations. For urban poor constructed as advantaged targets, survey vignettes present a snapshot of the sanitation situation in these six communities characterized by well-functioning/maintained service with no sign of trash in open drains or open defecation. This may be a reason for residents of an illegal slum (Mangolpuri) and homeless shelter (Turkman Gate) to be viewed as “dutiful” by bureaucrats – a divergent finding from extant empirical research that characterizes them as “nuisance” and “law-breaking” deviants (e.g., Newton, 2008; McFarlane, 2008,
Ghertner, 2011) and homeless as somewhere between “needy” dependents and “drug-addict” deviants (e.g., Harriss, 2005; Dupont, 2011).

Table 10: Social Construction Answer Key

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Community</th>
<th>Full Model</th>
<th>Senior Officials</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>X1</td>
<td>Baprola Public Housing</td>
<td>Uncultured</td>
<td>Uncultured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X2</td>
<td>Satya Niketan Public Housing</td>
<td>Dutiful</td>
<td>Dutiful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X3</td>
<td>BR Camp Illegal Slum</td>
<td>Needy</td>
<td>Uncultured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X4</td>
<td>Nizamuddin Pavement Dwellers</td>
<td>Uncultured</td>
<td>Uncultured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X5</td>
<td>Pushta Homeless Shelter (men)</td>
<td>Uncultured</td>
<td>Uncultured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X6</td>
<td>Turkman Gate Homeless Shelter (men, including the disabled)</td>
<td>Dutiful</td>
<td>Dutiful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X7</td>
<td>Bawana Public Housing</td>
<td>Uncultured</td>
<td>Uncultured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X8</td>
<td>Ballimaran Legal Slum</td>
<td>Needy</td>
<td>Dutiful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X9</td>
<td>Kusumpur Pahadi Illegal Slum</td>
<td>Uncultured</td>
<td>Uncultured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X10</td>
<td>Trilokpuri Public Housing</td>
<td>Needy</td>
<td>Needy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X11</td>
<td>Dwarka Public Housing</td>
<td>Dutiful</td>
<td>Dutiful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X12</td>
<td>Basai Darapur Legal Slum</td>
<td>Dutiful</td>
<td>Dutiful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X13</td>
<td>Lodi Road Homeless Shelter (women)</td>
<td>Needy</td>
<td>Needy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X14</td>
<td>Mangolpuri Illegal Slum</td>
<td>Dutiful</td>
<td>Dutiful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X15</td>
<td>Gurhai Mohalla Legal Slum</td>
<td>Uncultured</td>
<td>Uncultured</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The other four advantaged communities comprise of two legal slums – Ballimaran and Basai Darapur – and two public housing projects – Satya Niketan resettlement colony and Dwarka EWS – of varying sizes (number of households) and located in different parts of Delhi. On the other hand, the sanitation situation in seven communities falling in the deviant group is characterized by the presence of trash (Baprola, BR Camp, and Bawana) and animal faeces (Gurhai Mohalla) in open drains, and prevalence of open defecation/urination (Nizamuddin pavement, Pushta shelter, and Kusumpur illegal slum)
and attributed to “uncultured lifestyles” of the residents. However, sanitation in Trilokpuri public housing is also characterized by trash in open drains, like Baprola, but its residents are constructed by senior bureaucrats as “needy” dependents. Similarly, sanitation situation at Lodi Road shelter, like for Nizamuddin’s pavement community, is also described by women urinating in the open (though only at night), but unlike the street-dwellers, these shelter-homeless women are constructed as “needy” targets.

Comparing the answer key with qualitative analyses of interviews with bureaucrats conducted in the preceding phase of this study (see chapter 5) can guide substantive interpretation of social constructions obtained from the consensus model. It is worth pointing out that the sample of interviewees is not the same as the respondents who participated in the survey. Further, survey respondents represent two of the three sanitation bureaucracies (DUSIB and municipality), unlike the interviewees who were also recruited from a third agency namely, DJB. Therefore, thematic findings of in-depth interviews with bureaucrats cannot test the validity of or offer explanations for social construction responses of senior bureaucrats.

Reconciling consensus model results with qualitative findings

Seven out of the 15 communities were constructed similarly by all bureaucrats in the interviews and senior bureaucrats in the consensus model: four “uncultured” communities, one “dutiful” community, and two “needy” communities.
“Uncultured” communities

The four “uncultured” deviant communities for whom the social construction answer key matches the dominant view articulated by bureaucratic interviewees are: Nizamuddin Pavement-dwellers, Pushta men’s shelter, Bawana public housing, Kusumpur Pahadi illegal slum. Residents of these five communities in the consensus model were also characterized as deviants in the interviews, and were responsible for poor sanitation outcomes in their respective communities. Key-informant interviews revealed that the pavement-dwelling community of Nizamuddin was prevented from using the toilet facility in a DUSIB-owned shelter nearby because of concerns articulated by officials that allowing “criminal elements” living on the streets to use the facilities would jeopardize safety of shelter occupants. The dominant view among DUSIB bureaucrats blamed the malfunctioning of toilets (causing open defecation) at the homeless shelter at Pushta on the perceived “bad habits” of “rural migrants” of throwing tobacco packets and cigarette stubs inside toilets. The dominant view among bureaucratic interviewees vis-à-vis poor upkeep of community toilet and drainage system in Kusumpur Pahadi was that “slum mentality” of state dependence and consequent unwillingness to pay for public amenities resulted in unsanitary conditions.

“Dutiful” and “Needy” communities

The remaining three communities for whom social construction answer key matches the dominant view articulated by bureaucrats during interviews are the “dutiful” advantaged residents of Satya Niketan public housing, and the “needy” dependent communities of Trilokpuri public housing and Lodi Road women’s shelter. One of the first public housing developed for slum families in Delhi in the early 1960s, the demographic composition of
Satya Niketan changed soon after slum families sold their government-allotted land parcels to non-slum households. The bureaucrats attributed well-functioning sanitation systems in the locality to “well-educated” families whose concerns are treated on par with other high-income residential localities of “people like us”. The consensus among bureaucrats that Trilokpuri’s residents were “needy” comports with the dominant view among interviewees that was more sympathetic towards low-income families who had, over time, learnt to help themselves by forming residents’ associations for their civic concerns. And finally, even though officials viewed homeless women of Lodi Road shelter as “needy” and “destitute” dependents, the homeless were expected to “empower themselves” to hold the government-contracted private operator of the toilet facility accountable by demanding better upkeep of toilets, especially for night-time use to prevent open urination in the dark.

6.4.2 Model 2: Consensus Model of Policy Implementation Design for Target Populations

The consensus model for policy implementation design choices articulated by 30 bureaucrats vis-à-vis maintenance of sanitation service in the 15 urban poor communities in Delhi shows a lack of fit. Consensus analysis output in UCINET generated an eigenratio of 1.185 and negative competencies among 2 mid-ranking officers and a senior official at the municipality and a mid-ranking officer at DUSIB. Negative competence score means that the understandings of the cultural domain (policy design) of these 4 respondents are inconsistent with, and potentially contrary to, the rest of the group. An eigenratio of less than 2 suggests that there may be competing sub-cultures (Caulkins, 2004: 320). The presence of a sub-culture was confirmed when running factor analysis on
the responses of these 4 officials, which produced an eigenratio of 14.53 and a high average competence score of 0.63. These results suggest that the respondents strongly share sub-cultural views and knowledge about sanitation policy designs. In sum, cultural knowledge or policy design views are strongly shared within this sub-group of four policymakers. Time and financial constraints prevented me from re-entering the field to conduct post-survey interviews with these officials to uncover commonalities among them – latent factors – that could help explain the observed cultural agreement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community</th>
<th>Social Construction</th>
<th>Policy Design</th>
<th>Match?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baprola Public Housing</td>
<td>Uncultured</td>
<td>Self-help</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satya Niketan Public Housing</td>
<td>Dutiful</td>
<td>Self-help</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BR Camp Illegal Slum</td>
<td>Needy</td>
<td>Self-help</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nizamuddin Pavement Dwellers</td>
<td>Uncultured</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pushta Homeless Shelter (men)</td>
<td>Uncultured</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkman Gate Homeless Shelter (men, including the disabled)</td>
<td>Dutiful</td>
<td>Self-help</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bawana Public Housing</td>
<td>Uncultured</td>
<td>Self-help</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ballimaran Legal Slum</td>
<td>Needy</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kusumpur Pahadi Illegal Slum</td>
<td>Uncultured</td>
<td>Self-help</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trilokpuri Public Housing</td>
<td>Needy</td>
<td>Self-help</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dwarka Public Housing</td>
<td>Dutiful</td>
<td>Self-help</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basai Darapur Legal Slum</td>
<td>Dutiful</td>
<td>Self-help</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lodi Road Homeless Shelter (women)</td>
<td>Needy</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mangolpuri Illegal Slum</td>
<td>Dutiful</td>
<td>Self-help</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gurhail Mohalla Legal Slum</td>
<td>Uncultured</td>
<td>Self-help</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After omitting “culturally-different” officials on the overall model, factor analysis of the responses of 26 officers still does not confirm the presence of a shared bureaucratic understanding with respect to policy implementation as the eigenratio improves
marginally to 1.427. However, dropping these 4 officers from the full model still produces the same answer key of design choices. Table 3 presents the answer key of the two consensus models for all bureaucrats, and the results of pattern-matching between social construction theoretical propositions and observed data. There are only two communities – BR Camp illegal slum and Trilokpuri public housing locality – where the theoretically-predicted patterns between social construction and commensurate policy designs are a match, though these results are not “culturally significant” i.e., do not show shared knowledge, since eigenratios for both the models – social construction and policy design – are below the cultural threshold of 3.

(a) Reconciling qualitative findings with consensus model results

For seven communities – Baprola public housing, Turkman Gate homeless shelter, Ballimaran legal slum, Trilokpuri public housing, Dwarka public housing, BR Camp illegal slum, and Mangolpuri illegal slum – the answer key for policy design choices by bureaucrats resonates with dominant themes in interviews with a larger group of bureaucrats to understand why sanitation service outcomes vary across urban poor settlements. To reiterate, these comparisons are only meant to guide interpretations of consensus analysis results and do not attest the validity of or offer explanations for actual responses of surveyed bureaucrats.

When asked why sanitation conditions varied between Baprola and Dwarka public housing sites, the dominant view among DUSIB officials was that the residents of

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27 Partitioning the dataset into sub-groups of senior, mid-level, and street-level bureaucrats does not confirm cultural consensus in any of the three models.
Baprola had to learn to help themselves by setting up, and making monthly monetary contributions to a welfare association to bridge the gap in publicly-provided services like cleaning of community drains. On the other hand, DUSIB’s oversight of sanitation (drain-cleaning) and other communal services in Dwarka was justified by bureaucrats as an education in high standards of living and self-management of public services which the residents were expected to undertake after 5 years, thereby signifying symbolic deservingness. In the case of Trilokpuri, the dominant view among municipal officials was that because of the low tax-revenue potential of the low-income public housing locality, residents bore the responsibility of making monetary contributions to their welfare associations for regular cleaning of community drains.

With respect to upkeep of sanitation services in the shelter at Turkman Gate, the theme of self-help evoked by DUSIB officials manifested as an ‘informal rule’ of handing down responsibility to the shelter-managing NGO to not only undertake structural repairs and comply with service standards, but also educating the homeless in good sanitary behaviors to obviate the need for government oversight. Though the survey questionnaire does not provide any cue that signals political power, interviews with bureaucrats recognized that direct government support to Ballimaran for a well-functioning sewer and drainage system was attributable to the community’s strong patronage ties with current state representative who not only lives in the same community but is also a resourceful cabinet official with close ties to the top politician - the head of the state government - of Delhi. And finally, though both the illegal slums of BR Camp and Mangolpuri emerged as contender communities during key informant interviews, municipality officials recognized that sub rosa allocation of sanitation benefits meant that upkeep of drains...
could not be done routinely by the agency (i.e., occasional self-service by community) to avoid public backlash, especially from communities with a legal residential status that have entitled access to service support.

6.5 Discussion

The results of consensus analyses reveal that while overall the 30 bureaucrats did not share a cultural model of deservingness of the poor, 11 senior bureaucrats in the sanitation agencies in Delhi did share a cultural construction of the poor residing in the sampled communities. However, they do not agree with each other with respect to commensurate designs of sanitation policy for these target groups as hypothesized by Schneider and Ingram’s (1993) social construction theory. Factor analysis of these senior bureaucrats’ responses generated an answer key that sorted the 15 poor communities largely on the opposite ends of the deservingness spectrum – advantaged and deviant target populations. Only Trilokpuri public housing project in east Delhi and Lodi Road women’s shelter in south Delhi were characterized as needy target communities. Cultural understandings of social construction of communities as either wholly deserving (“dutiful”) or categorically undeserving (“uncultured”) allows one to speculate about the latent factor driving this cultural response pattern among senior bureaucrats. A critical assessment of two possible ‘unobserved variables’ or latent factors impacting the consensus score among senior bureaucrats is discussed below.

In the first instance, one could argue that the latent factor represents the political ideology of senior respondents that provide explanations for a given social reality and offer
meaningful ways for collective action Allaire and Firsorotu (1984: 21). Liberal ideology identifies unjust social practices and social structures as causal factors. Attributing a positive image (advantaged) to communities that have ‘achieved’ well-maintained sanitation solutions and negative image (deviants) to those where either the infrastructure does not exist, or is not well-maintained ‘individualizes’ systemic failures as personal failings of individuals with “bad morals”. I would argue that this conservative ideology of blaming the poor for their own situation may stem from bureaucrats’ desire to maintain status quo by virtue of their positionality (see also, Zucker and Weiner, 1993).

In-depth interviews with public officials conducted in the preceding phase of this dissertation research reveal that status quo in sanitation policy is maintained, in large part, by the bureaucrats’ unwillingness to engage poor communities to assess their needs and demands for sanitation service. Scholars of urban politics in India such as Chatterjee (2001), Bhan (2009) among others have argued that the shift in urban governance from state paternalism to market welfarism has coincided with the new era of economic reforms in 1991 when the federal government sought to inject private-sector competition to energize national economic growth. For the poor, this governing ideology – or what Schneider and Ingram (2013: 205) define as the underlying policy logic – means that the responsibility of poverty alleviation gets handed back to the poor without giving them either the tools (e.g., material resources) to utilize private (sanitation) options or authority to penalize rent-seeking activities by private contractors managing public toilets. Therefore, the problem of inequality under neoliberal governmentality is constructed not in terms of what the poor lack (because the government has not provided) but what they are unwilling to do (i.e., conservative beliefs of individualistic causes of poverty).
A second possible characterization of the latent factor underlying extreme cultural views among the senior bureaucracy may be that it represents their lack of direct experience with the recipients of sanitation policies. That is, the greater the distance between policy-makers and policy-receivers, the fewer the opportunities to develop a nuanced understanding of personal circumstances of those whose (sanitation) behaviors the policies seek to regulate (Frymier and Nadler, 2017). However, if greater exposure with target populations were sufficient to shape a more liberal or even nuanced cultural view of the poor (e.g., an answer key with higher prevalence of needy poor construction), then one would find consensus among street-level bureaucrats overseeing day-to-day implementation (or lack thereof) of sanitation policy on the ground. This, however, is not the case in the present study as the factor analysis of the responses of street-level bureaucrats generated an eigenratio of 2.1 for social construction and 1.9 for policy design models. Akram (2017: 2) argues that representation of class interests is a less conscious cognitive process that is fostered through socialization. This means that even if lower-level bureaucrats are deemed to be somewhat socially representative of their clients, socialization processes within the bureaucracy may weaken the retention of values stemming from their social backgrounds. That is, workplace culture – present among senior officials in the present study – can percolate to lower levels in the bureaucracy such that those officials may hold values which are internally (subconscious or unconscious) inconsistent and manifest in externally unpredictable behaviors.

Related to direct field experience, scholars also point to the educational training of bureaucrats that shapes attitudes towards their clients such as values of humanitarianism and social justice propagated in academic programs in public health and social work (see
for example, Marrow, 2012). Although the present study did not collect information on the respondents’ educational background, informal conversations with respondents before or after the survey revealed that they had an engineering background which they said was not uncommon for agencies mandated to “build infrastructure”. And even as one of agencies – DUSIB – has a sociology department whose officials directly engage in the field to conduct socio-economic surveys in slum settlements, this office finds no representation on the governing board of the agency that is over-represented by officials from the engineering and finance departments (sources: [http://delhishelterboard.in/main/?page_id=238#](http://delhishelterboard.in/main/?page_id=238#); [https://www.business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/dusib-to-conduct-survey-in-ji-clusters-for-issuing-provisional-certificates-to-occupants-118071301224_1.html](https://www.business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/dusib-to-conduct-survey-in-ji-clusters-for-issuing-provisional-certificates-to-occupants-118071301224_1.html). Therefore, I would argue that an organizational culture that prioritizes and understands sanitation as a ‘hardware’ issue results in de-emphasizing the sociological aspects of usability of built infrastructure (e.g., concerns of accessibility for people with different physical, social, and economic vulnerabilities) and de-humanizing the concerns and needs of the ‘public’ in policy.

A third possible characterization of the latent factor could be that a ‘class effect’ among senior bureaucrats explains their cultural characterizations of the sampled communities as deserving (advantaged) or undeserving (deviant) poor.

Based on consensus analysis findings, I would argue that senior officials share a cultural view of poor communities as deserving when sanitation outcomes in these communities “fit the image” of an aesthetic/clean Delhi, and undeserving when unsanitary conditions in these communities – e.g., open defecation, trash pile-up in open drains that may be coping strategies for the poor to deal with inadequate/missing state support - do not
resonate with bureaucrats’ own experiences of sanitation service. Extant research on public bureaucracies in Delhi shows that outcomes of policymaking are not arbitrary but rather perpetuate social privileges, especially since the visions of a modern city are based on a shared cultural positionality among policy planners and middle-and upper-class elites (e.g., Dupont, 2011; Ghertner, 2011; Harriss and Jeffrey, 2013). And I would argue that there is greater homogeneity in social and economic characteristics among senior officials than at lower levels of the bureaucracy. This claim finds support in other research by scholars like Gal (1998) who emphasizes that public bureaucracies, which influence how ‘who gets what and when’, are distinctly middle-class entities comprising of salaried professionals with a higher level of education and standard of living. He contends that middle-class bureaucrats occupy crucial positions in the policy formulation process, and so one can ostensibly attribute his middle-class label to include senior officials in the present study. Policymakers’ views on definitional boundaries of a problem, moral opinions on the beneficiaries of public programs, and preferences for implementation procedures to deliver services may be influenced by the class affiliation of high-level civil servants and represent perceptions of those in their social circle vis-à-vis appropriateness of a social policy and deservingness of policy recipients (Mathews and Hastings, 2012; Meier, 2018).

The finding of a latent class bias shaping senior bureaucrats’ constructions of the poor also lends support to the durability of a laissez faire framework governing sanitation for the poor in Delhi presented in Chapter 4. This latent finding may be generalizable to the federal policymakers (most likely senior officials) who developed and sustained this “hands off” governing framework through federally-funded urban sanitation programs
over four decades. In fact, consensus analysis findings that senior bureaucrats in Delhi construct the poor largely on the dependent-deviant spectrum supports the dominant frames of personal responsibility (i.e., rhetorical government support for “dependents”) and behavior change (i.e., no government support unless “deviants” change unsanitary habits and irresponsible practices) embedded in the broad governing framework. This suggests that the cultural knowledge vis-à-vis constructions of the poor shared among senior bureaucrats in Delhi can generalize to federal policy elites.

6.6 Implications for social construction theory and policy analysis

Overall, the group of 30 bureaucrats drawn from different ranks of the city and state sanitation departments did not share a culturally-coherent characterization of the urban poor residing in different low-income housing settlements in Delhi. Nor did these public officials share common knowledge or vision of policy design choices to distribute burdens and benefits across these communities. Therefore, bureaucratic agreement over proposed causal relationships between social constructions and policy design proposed by the Schneider-Ingram framework (presented in section II) using consensus analysis did not materialize. Yet, for some subsets of bureaucrats representing higher echelons of the bureaucracy as well as a mix of senior, mid-, and street-level ranks in sanitation agencies, it is a coherent cultural domain. In the case of the latter, a group of 18 officials – 6 senior DUSIB officials, 1 mid-level DUSIB official, 3 senior municipality officials, 5 mid-level municipality officials, and 3 street-level municipality officials that have an individual competence score of at least 0.5 – has an average competence score is 0.70. It is possible that a unique pattern of socialization (frequent interactions and/or collaboration) among
these bureaucrats results in high domain knowledge. Interestingly, the only two women (municipal) officials in the sample who are the youngest and have spent the least amount of time in their organization belong to this group of highly knowledgeable and long-serving respondents. Despite their newness in organizational culture, I would argue that their access to domain knowledge is structured by theoretical rather than real-world knowledge. Post-survey discussions with these young women officers revealed that they both were fresh graduates from an elite engineering university in Delhi. Perhaps knowledge acquired through socialization processes prior to joining the municipality may be a leading cause for high domain knowledge.

Though these two consensus models exhibited an overall lack of fit, theoretically-hypothesized causal linkages between social construction and policy design were found only for two communities – BR Camp illegal slum and Trilokpuri public housing (see Table 3). Consensus analysis as a test for the validity of the propositions of social construction theory is limited in two ways. First, this cross-sectional study cannot attest the durability of social constructions among bureaucrats over time, meaning that lack of consensus and empirical matching of theoretical propositions may not be time-invariant. Second, the survey was administered in a specific urban context which means that the results may be influenced by idiosyncratic factors such as the peculiar nature of decentralized urban governance wherein delivery of sanitation service in Delhi is fragmented between city and state governments with coterminous political jurisdictions, and socio-economic diversity among urban poor ranging from public housing residents to pavement dwellers. Nevertheless, lack of consensus among bureaucrats with respect to social constructions and commensurate policy designs is still meaningful for a deeper
understanding of the application of this theoretical model in the study of distributive politics of sanitation policymaking in a metropolitan city of a developing country like India.

Since political power of target populations is a crucial element in perceptions of deservingness for policy benevolence in the Schneider-Ingram (1993) framework, shifting political preferences of elected officials imply that favoritism in the distribution of resources cannot be consistently claimed by a particular target group. Chandra (2004: 115) argues that in postcolonial patronage-democracies like India with decentralization of political power through federalism, intense electoral competition can result in politicians cultivating different constituencies of voters by offering a variety targeted development benefits to extract votes. Therefore, construction of deservingness based on political clout of citizen groups may be less stable in highly politicized societies making it more difficult to establish coherent causal connections with value-laden choice-decisions in the design of sanitation policies. Qualitative investigation into ‘who gets what, when, and how’ among the sampled communities via elite interviews in communities, bureaucracies, and city and state legislatures presents more evidence of fluctuating political fortunes of the urban poor constituents that effectively carry an expiration date on the flow of sanitation rewards delivered by a malleable bureaucratic response to policy implementation norms and procedures.

Since the analysis in this chapter focuses on constructions of deservingness of the poor as determined by government bureaucrats, the politicized nature of public bureaucracies in India is central to understanding the relationship between the politician, client, and
bureaucrat that shapes the negotiated system of distribution of public resources among target populations. The nature of bureaucratic state in India has been metaphorized by scholars through various pseudonyms such as ‘cunning state’ (Randeria, 2003), ‘weak-strong state’ (Rudolph and Rudolph, 1987), ‘porous state’ (Benjamin, 2008), ‘mediated state’ (Berenschot, 2014), all of which are emblematic of a ‘shared understanding’ of informal policy processes where the interplay of political power in citizen-politician and politician-bureaucrat relations influence which rules are bent, ignored or broken with impunity, and for how long.

The lack of consensus among 30 bureaucrats vis-à-vis deservingness of the poor and theoretically-predicted policy implementation choices in this study resonates with existing research on bureaucratic discretion that constructs deservingness and allocates rewards on a case-by-case basis. As the preceding discussion shows, the politics of implementation of sanitation policy in terms of what rules are to be complied with or ignored, for which community and when are strategic and dynamic calculations made by bureaucrats because of the potential for political backlash. Anonymizing communities on the survey – that was necessary to protect the identity of residents and minimize response bias – divorces them from their political context. Therefore, bureaucratic discretion in determining ‘who get what, when, and how’ does not happen in the abstract (or for an abstract group of people), but occurs in the dark corners of the policymaking process where the opaque transactions between politicians and bureaucrats shapes the ‘rules of the game’ in the distribution of rewards and penalties to the public through policy (see for example, Wade 1989; Chatterjee, 2008; Piliavsky, 2013).
It is precisely in this context, to identify the presence of these bureaucratic sub-cultures and measure the strength of shared knowledge, that consensus analysis as a theory and methodological tool can make a significant contribution to advance scientific understanding of ‘how’ policies are made. While new institutionalist theorists and social constructivists recognize the salience of norms and beliefs of “appropriateness” vis-à-vis what to provide, to whom, and how in the policymaking process (see chapters 4 and 5 for a detailed discussion), these shared understandings are not operationalized in a robust way – i.e., how strongly they are shared among policymakers so as to define the standard of appropriateness. Consensus analysis and the concept of sub-cultures from cultural anthropology juxtaposes with institutionalist approach to policy analysis in political science, wherein formal or consciously-designed rules can either be reinforced (cultural competence) or overridden (sub-cultures) by informal or unwritten conventions by local bureaucrats responsible for implementing policies ‘on the ground’ (Lowndes, 2017: 61). Social construction theorists go a step further by arguing that bureaucrats do not respond to laws, rules, and regulations in unthinking or passive ways but undertake moral assessments of ‘deservingness’ of policy recipients that are embedded in formal rules and informal conventions (Hasenfeld, 2000; Schneider and Ingram, 1993). Given the salience of these discretionary normative-cognitive elements in shaping policy designs and outcomes, policy scholars like Peters (1999) contend that researchers need a more robust measurement tool for rigorous policy analysis. This chapter was a step in that direction.
CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION

This chapter presents a brief summary of the study, and discusses the key findings of this dissertation research. It also presents a discussion of the recommendations for policy action, and prospects for future research.

7.1 Summary and Major Findings of the Study
The problem of inadequate provision and poor quality urban public sanitation is a serious policy concern for India, especially since a growing number of its urban population is increasingly poor and without the means to afford alternative private solutions for their basic needs that are unmet by publicly-provided sanitation services. And yet, even as the burden of inadequate provision bears disproportionately on the poor, extant empirical studies have found variations in service outcomes among communities of the poor in major urban areas of India (e.g., Heller et al., 2015; McFarlane et al., 2014; Vithayathil and Singh, 2012). The present study tested this empirical finding for a metropolitan city that is also the nation’s capital, by investigating why sanitation outcomes vary across poor communities in Delhi. The purpose of this research inquiry was to examine the policymaking processes – i.e., investigating the content and design of problem-formulation, implementation rules and procedures, and the rationales for these decisions – to show how sanitation policy for the poor is ‘made’ which can then help us understand
why outcomes of this policy vary. The investigation adopted a mixed-method case study research design wherein qualitative data in the form of documentary evidence, key-informant interviews, and field observations were analyzed to reveal the overarching institutional framework of governing sanitation for the urban poor. Against the backdrop of this governing framework, I then traced the processes of sanitation policymaking underlying varied sanitation outcomes across 15 poor communities sampled for this study. A quantitative analysis of a survey administered to policymaking bureaucrats in Delhi was carried out to test for the presence of a bureaucratic culture of deservingness of the poor to triangulate social construction theory-based qualitative findings and test theoretical hypotheses.

The following discussion lays out the key takeaways from this dissertation research, the relationship of these findings to the literature and extant studies, and how these results contribute to the advancement of current knowledge.

7.1.1 *Laissez Faire Institutions of Sanitation for the Urban Poor*

The framework governing sanitation policymaking for the poor in Delhi has its antecedents in the institutional designs embedded in five federally-led and funded sanitation programs for the slum poor in Indian cities between 1972 and 2014. The evidence presented in Chapter 4 shows that the design of policymaking processes by local bureaucracies in Delhi replicate path-dependent patterns in federal programs vis-a-vis framing the problem and implementation rules and procedures not just in slums but also shelters and some public housing projects. The replication of manifest programmatic designs for a limited state via fixed provision of “basic minimum” community-level
sanitation and emphasis on behavior change and community participation for sustained use and management of sanitation infrastructures in Delhi has also shaped the standard operating procedures or informal rules of service delivery by sanitation bureaucracies. The limited role of the state embedded in latent policy designs (i.e., informal rules) include diminishing public investments in maintenance of sanitation infrastructures, greater emphasis on government-led shaming/whistling and education campaigns for behavior change to improve community sanitation, limited rule-based oversight of sanitation infrastructures, and inadequate or delayed provision of entitled sanitation. These laissez faire institutional designs in sanitation policymaking for the poor are not unique to Delhi or India. Especially since the 1990s, with the advent of a neoliberal revolution in public services sector in much of the developing world, laissez faire governance has also been a dominant model of urban sanitation in other developing countries like Indonesia, South Africa, and Cambodia (Engel and Susilo, 2014; Bateman and Engel, 2017).

It may be the case that some poor communities are willing to participate in service management. But unless the government directly engages in/with communities to ensure adequate provision and timely repairs of infrastructures, service management by the poor would not improve sanitation conditions in their communities. Similarly, and in the absence of direct oversight by the government, if policy rules do not empower poor communities to hold service contractors accountable, the latter may be incentivized to charge indiscriminate amounts from the poor for using the facilities and get away with improper upkeep. In other instances, such as illegal slums where the poor lack residential security and live under the fear of imminent evictions, community residents may be
unwilling to assume responsibility of service management or oversight. Similarly, homeless populations who have extremely attenuated means of sustenance may be unable to pay to use public sanitation facilities. Residents of public housing projects who continue to receive community-level sanitation, rather than entitled sewerage for household toilets, may also be unwilling to participate in managing government-provided community toilets.

A laissez faire governing framework with a limited role of the state, and one in which the poor are made responsible for improving their quality of life, is centrally implicated in exacerbating inequities in the provision of a basic needs service like sanitation. On the one hand, provisioning rules of pre-determined and fixed community sanitation that do not require building infrastructures according to the size or demands of the communities are less likely to meet the sanitation-related needs of the poor populations. The implementation rules, on the other hand, require these poor to assume responsibility for paid use and upkeep of facilities without determining whether/how much the poor are able to pay or willing/able to manage sanitation maintenance. That is, policy rules of sanitation upkeep are not designed to make community participation voluntary – communities must mobilize to either run the facilities themselves or oversee private contractors hired by the government for service management.

(a) Policy Implications of Laissez Faire Framework of Governing the Poor

As the design of sanitation provision and implementation rule shift the burden of service management and improvement on to the poor, a gradual withdrawal of the state through declining allocation financial and human resources for functional infrastructures means
that the poor have, at best, limited access to safe and hygienic sanitation facilities. This has serious negative implications for the dignity, health, and well-being of those who are most dependent on public services to meet their basic needs.

First, the indignity of waiting in line at an under-provided community toilet or paying to use what may ultimately turn out to be a dirty toilet or having no access to toilets at night due to fixed hours of operation can force people toward equally unsafe sanitation options of open defecation or make-shift toilets at home that pollute open community drains. Living in close proximity to open drains flowing outside poor homes can contaminate their food and water supplies through disease-carrying vectors. These experiences of indignity lead to further ostracization at the hands of the government when it undertakes public shaming and hygiene awareness campaigns to change unsanitary habits and inculcate good civic behaviors that problematize the symptoms rather than address the systemic causes of poor sanitation.

Second, limited access to adequate and safe sanitation, and being shamed for what is government failure to provide universal access to quality sanitation directly and negatively impacts the physical and economic well-being of the poor and deepens the crisis of poverty. Women, children, and the elderly/disabled are particularly vulnerable to harassment or injuries and infections associated with forced open defecation and improper public sanitation. Self-help policy designs that “mandate” performance of civic duty for service upkeep assume that those who are poor in income are rich in free time to organize for community-based monitoring/management of public utilities. Aside from the fact that service management is the government’s formal responsibility, the poor are
largely dependent on informal, daily-wage jobs. This means that the time spent on monitoring/managing community sanitation is the productive-time lost for earning a living. Without an overall improvement in their material wellbeing, forcing community participation in service management can impose a serious economic burden on the poor.

7.1.2 **Policymakers design policies to treat some poor better than others**

To argue that policymakers treat some poor better than others may seem contradictory to the foregoing discussion on the overarching laissez faire framework of governing the urban poor in Delhi. However, as the case of 15 urban poor communities in Delhi shows, a largely stable institutional framework does not mean that policy outcomes are predictable or fixed or the same. The investigation of the decisionmaking processes, presented in Chapter 5, revealed the distinct rationales and deliberative strategies of elected public officials and non-elected bureaucrats when confronted with the socio-political realities of policy (re-)making on the ground. However, the policy decisions associated with who gets what, when, why, and how were not always linear nor immediately obvious, even for the same category of urban poor communities.

Cross-case analyses of the policymaking processes resulting in distinct sanitation outcomes in illegal slums of BR Camp (sewered household toilets) and Kusumpur Pahadi (inadequate community toilet) located in two high-value neighborhoods, or legal slums of Basai Darapur (underground drainage) and Gurhai Mohalla (open, polluted drains) located in two lower-income neighborhoods revealed that positive or negative service outcomes do not automatically “spillover” from the larger neighborhood. These communities existed in their respective neighborhoods for several decades without proper
sanitation, and received improved outcomes only when some among them (BR Camp and Basai Darapur) were able to politically mobilize to influence bending bureaucratic procedures or forcing compliance with rules to access benefits as hidden ‘contenders’ or visible clients of political patrons. On the other hand, while dominant ‘deviant’ view among public officials of Kusumpur’s residents as having unsanitary habits and expecting freebies from the state shaped strict compliance with informal rule of lack of government responsibility for service upkeep, a hostile elected official of Gurhai Mohalla forced bureaucratic non-compliance with agency procedures to deny underground drainage to the community. Patterns of political engagement were also observed in client-communities of Satya Niketan public housing and Ballimaran legal slum such that service improvements (sewered toilets; underground drainage) were delivered by influencing rule-compliance and policy agenda of sanitation agencies, and not as outcomes of an apolitical process of spillovers of quality services to these communities in order to secure the property values or cultural prestige of their respective neighborhoods.

Cross-case analyses of the process of allocation of agency resources can result in distinct sanitation outcomes in comparable communities in terms of tough topographies or spatial density of population, settlement size, or settlement type. Institutional constraints (lack of agency mandate/formal rule; limited manpower) and technical constraints (lack of technical knowledge) were used to justify non-compliance with formal rules of oversight (leaking septic toilets at Pushta men’s shelter; unkept community drainage in Baprola EWS public housing) and service provision (no sewerage in low-lying Bawana public housing). However, when compared with peer communities with better sanitation outcomes it was revealed that policy designs vis-à-vis (re-) allocation of technical/human
resources and fidelity to agency mandate were deliberately created and re-created by bureaucrats’ responsiveness to interventions by political leadership (Lodi homeless women, Dwarka EWS public housing, and high-density Ballimaran legal slum). Or, bureaucrats’ perceptions of “old habits” of state dependency that rationalized symbolic personnel support to reform ‘dependent’ communities (Baprola EWS; and stigma-laden support to Dwarka EWS) or persistent malpractices and bad behaviors that justified non-enforcement of formal rules to ‘deviant’ communities (Bawana public housing, Pushta homeless men, Nizamuddin pavement-dwellers).

Though the themes of neighborhood effects and organizational constraints emerged as apolitical or socially-acceptable deceptive rationales for policy designs underlying varied sanitation outcomes, at times I wondered if they were articulated by bureaucrats and politicians to purposefully deceive (lying or suppressing information) to stop further probing. Or, if the design of the present study was fertile to uncover the reasoning processes that reveal the deceptive ways in which themes can shape policy decisions. The way (process) in which these themes were unraveled in the politics and design of sanitation policymaking for the poor finds support in the literature on political geography of clientelistic politics (e.g., Björkman, 2014; Clemens et al., 2015) and bureaucratic discretion in resource allocation (e.g., Keiser and Soss, 1998; Nath, 2018).

Overall, social constructions of the poor as ‘contenders’, ‘dependents’, and ‘deviants’ emerged as the dominant explanation for varied outcomes in 9 communities, and the strength and longevity of quid pro quo ties of electoral support between citizen-as-clients and patron-politicians and solidarity between citizens and non-elected public officials.
emerged as the dominant explanation for varied outcomes in 6 of 15 communities. These thematic explanations shaped the bureaucratic decisionmaking processes by influencing the timing and (non-) compliance with agency rules and procedures to provide/withhold access to improved sanitation outcomes in target communities. Politicians evaluated the deservingness of communities for sanitation benefits based on voter loyalty and political mobilization for electoral support. In addition to heeding to political pressures, agency bureaucrats also rationalized their actions or inactions vis-à-vis provision and upkeep of sanitation based on their evaluations of who exhibits or can be trained in “good citizenship” behaviors – fulfills civic duty of keeping one’s own community clean with limited state dependency. In fact, among the group of 9 communities, an interesting finding relates to the shifting social construction of the homeless women of Lodi shelter from ‘dependents’ to ‘contenders’ to ‘dependents’. The varied and shifting perceptions of the poor begs the question – where do social constructions come from, and how can we understand or reconcile the varied and unstable constructions of the poor? The following discussion on strategic beliefs of client-deservingness held by bureaucrats-as-policymakers and class-driven constructions of the poor by senior bureaucrats in sanitation bureaucracies offers some insights into answering this question.

(a) Core v. Strategic Beliefs: Bureaucrats and Politicians as distinct public officials

Social constructions of target populations are strategic, meaning that image-making of the poor as deserving or undeserving of policy support is not only a function of how they are perceived in the society at large (i.e., dominant positive or negative group stereotypes) but also their political power. In the case of ‘contender’ communities, political mobilization of the largely negatively-viewed or uncared for poor manifested in
compliance with (previously ignored) formal rules of provision and bending of implementation procedures for improved service provision by sanitation bureaucracies. For the homeless women of Lodi shelter, as the effect of their political mobilization that resulted in a brief period of political oversight ended, bureaucratic compliance with formal rules of service oversight went back to being ignored as before. Findings from this study also reveal that bureaucrats – as neither neutral nor passive policy actors – are cognizant of the hierarchy of political power of the politicians (e.g., in Trilokpuri public housing v Ballimaran legal slum). Where and when sanitation services are to be provided, where and how budgetary and human resources are to be prioritized, and where policy implementation rules are to be enforced or ignored is the outcome of deliberate and strategic decisionmaking by bureaucrats to redistribute resources to those constituencies where they are likely to face political repercussions for shirking, and away from those constituencies where such shirking would be “tolerated” by a less powerful politicians.

Social constructions can also be taken-for-granted and entrenched perceptions of the poor that draw on cultural stereotypes dominant in society (e.g., in the media), or policy legacies (e.g., norms and ideas embedded in the federal sanitation programs that created the governing framework), or policy discourse that characterizes groups based on place of origin (e.g., “rural habits” of urban poor migrants), previous residential status (e.g., being seen as having a “slum mentality”) etc. These taken-for-granted constructions perpetuate via path-dependent policy designs unless changes in the normative environment of policymaking and/or collective political activism by target populations re-calibrates the design of policy rewards through shifts in the public image and/or political attractiveness of these populations. These taken-for-granted constructions, or what Schneider and
Ingram (2005) call core beliefs, can be juxtaposed with the laissez faire framework of sanitation governance in Delhi where emphasis on personal responsibility and behavior change are commensurate with policy designs for ‘dependent’ and ‘deviant’ constructions of the poor.

In light of the above, Schneider and Ingram’s (ibid.) formulation of path-dependent social constructions as core beliefs can be supplemented with what I would argue are strategic beliefs of deservingness of target populations. These strategic beliefs are more malleable mental constructs held by policymaking bureaucrats that are deliberately and strategically framed to maximize their subjective/personal interests (e.g., Goldstein and Keohane, 1993; Schmidt, 2010). Data on policy decisionmaking shows that bureaucrats deliberately engage strategic beliefs of deservingness of ‘contender’ communities in response to pressures emanating from the wider political environment within which policymaking takes place. Administrative functioning of policy-implementing bureaucracies is largely insulated from day-to-day oversight by politicians and election-cycle pressures. As a result, bureaucrats can exercise agency and discretion in implementing policies based on their core normative constructions of deservingness of the poor that shapes distinct outcomes compared to periods of intense political pressure when strategic beliefs are consciously activated to improve services to avoid political rebuke.

The differential influence of core v. strategic constructions of the poor questions Schneider and Ingram’s (1993, 2005) formulation of ‘public officials’ as a unitary or homogenous entity where motivations to win elections act as the causal logic in shaping policy designs. Co-existence of somewhat loosely held strategic beliefs with culturally-
dominant core beliefs of client-deservingness held by non-elected public officials recognizes the agency and role of bureaucrats as ‘makers’ of public policies, and offers a nuanced understanding of how and why policy outcomes can vary within a relatively stable institutional framework. This insight makes an important contribution to strengthen the analytical power of social construction theory by suggesting that public officials are not monolithic with identical motivations, and as such future studies should differentiate between elected and non-elected public officials to better understand how social constructions are manipulated/negotiated in shaping the content and design of policies.

The addition of strategic beliefs of client-deservingness and bureaucrats as non-elected policymakers offers a more nuanced understanding of the application of the theoretical framework by accommodating a more discretionary/less stable approach to policymaking. This insight advances the original formulation of theory by strengthening scholarly responses (e.g., Schneider and Ingram, 1995, 2005; Ingram et al., 2007) to earlier criticisms by scholars like Lieberman (1995) of the rigidity of Schneider and Ingram’s (1993) typological framework of social constructions and allocation of policy burdens and benefits. Further, it facilitates cross-theoretic learning by acting as a bridge between the literature on bureaucratic discretions in policymaking (e.g., Lipsky, 1980; Brodkin, 1997) and social construction theory. The tension between core and strategic beliefs of the bureaucrats vis-à-vis social constructions of the poor shows how policy decisions can produce varied service outcomes within a largely stable laissez faire framework of governing sanitation for the poor.
(b) Class Bias in policymaking for the poor

A quantitative cultural consensus analysis of 30 sanitation policymaking bureaucrats’ social constructions of the poor, presented in Chapter 6, revealed that while overall the bureaucrats did not hold a culturally-coherent view of the poor, a subset of 11 senior bureaucrats shared a common view (with an average competence score of 0.6) vis-à-vis the 15 poor communities sampled for this study. The answer key of “culturally-correct” constructions of the poor for these 11 bureaucrats classified a majority of the sampled communities (i.e., 9 of 15) on the dependent-deviant spectrum of Schneider and Ingram’s (1993) typological framework.\(^28\) Since there is likely greater homogeneity in the socio-economic characteristics among senior bureaucrats, especially their higher levels of education and standard of living, I would argue that these upper-class policy elites draw from the values and judgements dominant in their social circle to construct the deservingness of the poor. This claim finds support in extant research on public bureaucracies in Delhi which shows that outcomes of policymaking are not arbitrary but rather perpetuate social privileges, especially since the visions of a modern city are based on a shared cultural positionality among policy planners and middle-and upper-class residents (e.g., Dupont, 2011; Ghertner, 2011; Harriss and Jeffrey, 2013).

The dominant social constructions of the poor on the dependent-deviant spectrum by senior sanitation bureaucrats also resonate with the overarching laissez faire framework (i.e., self-governance and behavior change) developed by the federal policymakers to govern sanitation for the urban poor. Cultural consensus vis-à-vis constructions of the poor held by senior bureaucrats in Delhi can be generalized to senior officials in the

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\(^{28}\) The remaining 5 of 15 communities were constructed as ‘advantaged’ target populations.
Ministry of Urban Development (framers of federal sanitation programs) on the basis of shared socio-economic characteristics of these policy elites (see Handwerker and Wozniak, 1997). Since they occupy key positions in shaping the agenda and rules of sanitation policy, I would argue that adherence to the idea of sanitation-as-personal responsibility that sustains the federally-designed laissez faire framework in Delhi can be attributed to the class bias of these governing elites in policymaking for the poor.

While senior bureaucrats shared a coherent view vis-à-vis social constructions of the poor, they did not share a common view of policy implementation choices regarding government support for sanitation upkeep in the poor communities. This absence of shared knowledge regarding policy implementation design was also observed for the overall group of 30 bureaucrats. Lack of cultural consensus in implementation design suggests that political power of target populations can have an important role to play in shaping the deservingness of the poor for sanitation policy benefits by the bureaucracy. Anonymizing communities on the survey divorced them from their political context when, as qualitative findings demonstrate, the ability of the poor to mobilize political power and intervention of elected public officials in the decisionmaking process can play a major role in regulating the flow of sanitation rewards.

Lack of consensus in policy design also resonates with the foregoing discussion on the discretionary decisionmaking by policy bureaucrats whose strategic beliefs vis-à-vis constructions and deservingness of the poor for real/rhetorical policy support are made and re-made on a case-by-case basis (based on active/dormant political power) and not always so straightforwardly as predicted by the Schneider-Ingram model. Lack of
bureaucratic consensus in policy design also supports extant research on distributive politics in India where bureaucratic discretion in determining who gets what, when, and how does not happen in the abstract (or for an abstract group of people), but behind opaque transactions between citizens, politicians, and bureaucrats that shape the ‘rules of the game’ of policymaking (e.g., Benjamin, 2008; Berenschot, 2014; Chatterjee, 2008).

7.1.3 Policy Implications of Unequal Sanitation Service to the Poor

The discretionary and discriminatory impact of social constructions of the poor and clientelist politics on policy designs that manufacture disparities in sanitation outcomes has two major implications for policymaking for the poor in a democracy.

First, compliance with informal rules of fixed and limited community sanitation, and non-compliance with formal rules of improved (sewerage) provision and government-monitored service upkeep weakens the accountability between the bureaucracies and the poor. Whether an erratically functioning slum community toilet in Kusumpur Pahadi illegal slum, or broken community toilet in Bawana public housing project, or uncollected trash piling up in open drains in Baprola EWS public housing, or open defecation/urination by the homeless poor in the shelters and on the streets having limited or no access to public toilets, these policy experiences of government apathy, at best, toward the deprivations and daily struggle for safe and dignified sanitation have created feelings among the poor that the “government does not work” for them or that it “does not care” about their problems. Communities that did not have political clout did not engage with the bureaucracy for their problems, and attributed poor sanitation as a “natural outcome” by the bureaucratic state that “only provided under political
influence.” The direct impact of discretionary policymaking has been to weaken political mobilization of the poor, deepen social marginalization and helplessness, and deprive the poorest of the poor of their right to live in good health, with dignity, and free from bodily harm as citizens. Rather than expect displays of “good citizenship” from the poor who do their civic duty before demanding their rights, the state should fulfill its constitutional duty to not discriminate in protecting rights and providing opportunities that constantly improve their lives. This will be necessary to create capabilities of the poor to perform their citizenship duties, without duress.

Second, targeted provision or withholding of rule-based sanitation services by politicians to reward supportive client-communities or punish non-supportive rival communities significantly weakens the electoral accountability of democratically-elected representatives towards all citizens. Politicians intervening to either directly punish rival communities like Gurhai Mohalla legal slum or indirectly penalizing communities like Basai Darapur legal slum that are no longer a political stronghold forces voters to mortgage their vote to access essential and entitled public services. This has a perverse effect on public trust in a free and fair ballot. And as politicians reap the benefits of electoral victory through selective provision of public services, it worsens legislative quality by disincentivizing law-making that would guarantee universal access to quality public services.

When policymaking bureaucrats actively and strategically prioritize resources not necessarily on the basis of service needs but to serve the constituencies of powerful political patrons – as in Ballimaran legal slum v. Trilokpuri public housing – citizens
experiencing government apathy vis-à-vis worsening service outcomes may be perversely incentivized to vote for politicians who can deliver targeted benefits and not necessarily those who are most qualified to govern. This finding was salient in communities that were not clients of political patrons (Bawana, Kusumpur Pahadi, Baprola EWS, Gurhai Mohalla) or whose patrons were unable to improve sanitation outcomes in their communities (Trilokpuri). Interestingly, while these communities had largely withdrawn from political engagements with the bureaucracy, they had not lost faith in the electoral process as it likely was the only feasible way to access improved sanitation service.

7.2 Policy Recommendations

To minimize the effect of social construction bias and clientelist politics on policymaking for the poor, the study offers three important recommendations that can improve sanitation outcomes for all. The three policy recommendations are (i) legislative reform to allow household sanitation and covered drainage systems, and make homeless shelters the constitutional responsibility of a government agency; (ii) bureaucratic reform to hire professionals with diverse education and training background; (iii) information campaigns in the media on service standards and public expenditures for transparency and accountability of the government to its citizens. Though these reforms are mostly targeted at law-making and law-implementing agencies, participation of NGOs/advocacy organization, citizen groups, and even public officials may be necessary to galvanize external and internal pressure to change institutional status quo.
7.2.1 Legislative Reform of Community Sanitation and Shelter Exclusion

The evidence presented in this research study shows that community sanitation facilities in slums are neither feasible (user fee as an entry barrier), nor usable (inadequate provision), nor properly maintained to be considered a reliable and hygienic sanitation option. There is also evidence to show that sanitation agencies spend more, per capita, on construction and maintenance of these public facilities than if they allowed slums to apply for federal subsidy programs for household sanitation. The Government of India and several local research organizations and international development agencies located in Delhi offer financial and technical assistance for installing unconventional sewer systems in dense and unplanned settlements. With the help of federal toilet subsidies, the availability of these systems would allow poor families to construct household toilets for round-the-clock access to better sanitation. These improvements can happen for all slums, or at least the government can be held accountable to deliver these benefits to all, if the state assembly of Delhi approves an amendment to the DJB Act (1998) that widens the definition of sewerage to include alternative systems of household sanitation for areas where conventional systems are not feasible. Similarly, the city legislature should amend the DMC Act (1957) to formally define community drainage (i.e., stormwater drains) as covered water outlet systems such that they do not become receptacles for trash and breeding grounds for water-borne diseases due to stagnant, polluted water.

Following the decisions of the Delhi High Court and Supreme Court of India in 2010-11, DUSIB has assumed de facto responsibility of providing shelter facilities to the homeless.

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29 It is true that tenant households in slums depend on community sanitation, and that having a private toilet would cause the rent to go up. But in the absence of a usable public toilet facility, tenants may be forced to use dirty toilets or defecate in the open that, in turn, increases the economic burden of disease.
populations of Delhi. Though sheltering the homeless is the legal responsibility (but a discretionary function, as per governing constitution) of the municipality (DMC Act, 1957: 42), the state government has access to greater financial resources that it has used to construct to close 200 shelters in Delhi. However, a majority of these shelters are temporary (tents, insulated aluminum sheds) which means that toilet facilities for these shelters are largely temporary without reliable or adequate supply of water. To formalize its institutional commitment, which would likely stem the trend of diminishing financial support for service upkeep and ensure more permanent, livable, and functional shelter facilities, the state legislature should amend the governing constitution of DUSIB (DUSIB Act, 2010) to include homeless shelters as its mandate. This amendment would mean that the agency is held accountable to continuously improve the quality of services for the homeless poor at the shelters.

7.2.2 Recruitment Reform in Sanitation Bureaucracies

To minimize the effect of bias by including diverse perspectives in policymaking for the poor, I recommend hiring professionals whose skill sets and qualifications are aligned with the constitutional mandate of the agencies. My informal conversations with some bureaucrats at the end of the interviews and surveys revealed that the engineering department is often the largest recruiter of personnel, and is also responsible for planning and implementing various sanitation infrastructure projects (see also Mehta and Shubhagato, 2006). An engineering approach to delivering sanitation has equated this public service with building infrastructures which de-emphasizes the social welfare aspect of sanitation for poverty alleviation. Recruiting professionals who have an educational background in social sciences and/or prior field experience may bring about
policy change as these officials may be more open to recognizing and understanding the structural causes of poverty. As such, these officials may be more willing to hear the voices of the poor at the agenda-setting and policy planning stages. This recruitment reform, therefore, holds the potential for challenging and changing laissez-faire governing framework. Direct engagement with poor communities will be necessary to design policy solutions that not only cater to their specific needs and demands, but that “work” given the socio-economic heterogeneity within and across communities.

Another recruitment practice to identify personnel (regardless of academic background) who are likely to perform better (committed to agency mandate/mission) may to be administer tests of motivation and attitudes. Public service motivation and attitude toward their work can be strong indicators of bureaucrats’ commitment to organizational mission and performance, and can improve policy outcomes in target communities (e.g., Akerlof and Kranton, 2005; Winter et al., 2008). Attitude-focused training – such as anti-bias training – may also bring about behavioral change among bureaucrats vis-à-vis the poor. If officials are highly motivated to serve the public, attitude-based training can lead to more positive policy outcomes across poor communities. While these interventions may be able to improve bureaucrats’ attitudes toward the populations they are mandated to serve to some extent, policy implementation on the ground, by its very nature, is discretionary which means that bias cannot be completely eliminated.

7.2.3 Information Campaigns

Media can play an important and more active role in re-shaping the public image of the poor and disseminating policy-relevant information to curb patronage-based targeting of
public services. The inadequate and poor quality of public services available to the vast majority of urban poor make national news largely during times of major health crises, extreme weather conditions, or major accidents when lives are lost. The daily struggles faced by the poor to access quality services to meet their basic needs deserve more than crises-contingent reporting or occasional blurb-length description of unspent public funds. To change the negative stereotypes associated with the poor, the news media should inform the public of the availability and quality of sanitation services in poor communities. Tracking government allocations and monitoring expenditures on public sanitation for the poor will also educate the public at large that unsanitary conditions cannot be blamed on the culture of poverty. In so doing, the media holds the government accountable on behalf of the citizens who are most dependent on the government, and have the most to lose when public services are deficient.

To improve the quality of governance, it is important for media outlets to collect and publish information on the legislative record and public spending of elected officials, and standards of public services across jurisdictions. Informing the public how bad services are in their neighborhood relative to others and whether/how their political representative represents them will allow the poor voters to punish poorly-performing candidates. In addition, creating public awareness about the process by which political representatives can shape policy outcomes can trigger mobilization of previously unorganized voters, in general, and residents within communities, in particular. And finally, disseminating information on ongoing policy programs or reforms (e.g., eligibility of households in illegal slums to apply for a federal toilet subsidy) can have a direct impact on improving service outcomes by improving government accountability to its citizens.
7.3 Future Research

In the future, scholars can advance the empirical application of social construction theory by replicating the research design of this multiple-case study to investigate varied public service outcomes across poor communities in other cities of India. Scholars should also consider casting a wider net for sampling poor communities to include other vulnerable poor like homeless populations. Similar studies on policymaking for the urban poor in India will open up further research opportunities for comparative analyses of policymaking processes for services delivered to the poor across different and multiple sites in the developing world. To strengthen the validity of the qualitative findings of this study and ensure statistical generalizability of the relationship between policymakers’ constructions of their clients and policy behaviors, I or other researchers can carry out a large N survey of policymaking bureaucrats that also include other factors influencing decisionmaking behaviors such as individual capacity, public service motivation, perceptions of institutional capacities etc. Another research avenue fertile for empirical inquiry, and largely unexplored in policy studies for countries like India would be to test the impact of social constructions of the poor and the experiences they have with policy/policymakers on their citizenship practices like voting, applying for entitled welfare benefits etc.

Just as the analytical power of policy research on urban poverty can be strengthened by moving beyond a monolithic conceptualization of the poor, further investigation of

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30 It would also be interesting to use this theoretical model to study policymaking for rural poor, and compare the results with their urban counterparts
clientelistic power of political patrons would be instrumental in questioning the theoretical assumption that all politicians can or are able to deliver targeted benefits to their voter-clients. Future research should test the indicators of credible patron power from this study as well as explore other factors that can contribute to making an elected representative an efficacious provider/withholder of targeted benefits/penalties to his voter-clients/non-voting opponents. Based on the emerging evidence from this study, future investigations can further explore the intersection between social constructions of target populations and clientelist theory that can shape differential provision of public services to the poor. The scope of empirical testing and knowledge-sharing between these two major theories in public policy and political science is vast and largely unexplored.
## APPENDICES

### A. SANITATION OUTCOMES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community Name</th>
<th>Community Type</th>
<th>Outcome Type(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Block B, Kusumpur Pahadi</td>
<td>JJC</td>
<td>No sewerage; partial coverage of self-built septic toilets/pit latrines; erratically-functional community toilet; open defecation; sewage and stagnant water in open surface drains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhaiya Ram Camp</td>
<td>JJC</td>
<td>Sewered toilets; two community toilet facilities; trash, stagnant water in open surface drains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D-Block, Mangolpuri</td>
<td>JJC</td>
<td>Complete coverage of sewered household toilets; covered and clean surface drains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gurhai Mohalla</td>
<td>Notified Slum</td>
<td>Complete coverage of sewered household toilets; animal feces/stagnant water in open drains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basai Darapur</td>
<td>Notified Slum</td>
<td>Complete coverage of sewered household toilets; resident complaints about pending sewer upgrade; underground drainage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ballimaran</td>
<td>Notified Slum</td>
<td>Complete coverage of sewered household toilets; underground drainage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Block-E, Bawana</td>
<td>JJR</td>
<td>No sewerage; partial coverage of septic toilets and pit latrines; one community toilet facility; trash and stagnant water in open surface drains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satya Niketan</td>
<td>JJR</td>
<td>Complete coverage of sewered household toilets; underground drainage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blocks 16, 22, 31 Trilokpuri</td>
<td>JJR</td>
<td>Complete coverage of sewered household toilets; underground drainage (16, 22); trash/stagnant water in open surface drains (31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sector 16B, Dwarka</td>
<td>EWS</td>
<td>Complete coverage of sewered household toilets; open and clean surface drains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rajiv Rattan Awas, Baprola</td>
<td>EWS</td>
<td>Complete coverage of sewered household toilets; trash in open surface drains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Toilet Facility Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lodi Road (Women)</td>
<td>Homeless Shelter</td>
<td>Off-site paid public toilet facility connected to a sewer system; located approx. 10m away; night-time open urination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkman Gate (Men’s shelter, including disabled men)</td>
<td>Homeless Shelter</td>
<td>On-site free toilet facility connected to a sewer system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yamuna Pushta (Men)</td>
<td>Homeless Shelter</td>
<td>On-site free toilet facility connected to a septic system; open defecation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nizamuddin Homeless Pavement-dwellers</td>
<td>Pavement-dwellers</td>
<td>Pay-to-use public toilet located 50m away; shelter with toilet facility located 100m away; open defecation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: JJC = Jhuggi Jhonpri Cluster (i.e., illegal slum); Notified Slum = Legal slum; JJR = Jhuggi Jhonpri Resettlement (i.e., public housing); EWS = Economically Weaker Section (i.e., public housing)
B. INTERVIEW PROTOCOL

Semi-structured Interview Guide

Probes for Investigator:

Broad Lines of Inquiry/Prompts for Introductory Questions:

- **Community**: Sanitation history to present outcome(s); key players and steps in decisionmaking (who participated/didn’t; how/why, why not); sanitation demand/how important
- **Politicians**: Development objectives/goals; priority of sanitation/communities; role in decisionmaking process; setting budget priorities and targeting spending of discretionary public funds (allocated each year to an elected official for his/her ward)
- **Bureaucrats**: process of agenda-setting, problem-definition, planning for resolution, rules, tools, rationales across residential categories; budget preparations, and setting service priorities; questions about revenue sources/fiscal viability, personnel, and service provision costs and technologies
- **NGOs**: service profile and role in the decisionmaking process; sanitation history in service-community; process of sanitation need/demand assessment and problem-resolution; engaging bureaucracies and openness (how open/closed?) of policy process to NGO/community voices

Sample Questions for Key Informants:

(i) **Community Residents**

- Would you please describe to me how (process, decisions/steps leading up to) this particular sanitation situation in your community came about? Who participated/How, Why not?
- Success/challenges in service access/improvement; Who provides when, how, and why
- Role of larger neighborhood organizations/associations in access and/or improvements
• How you go about problem-resolution? Why didn’t you go?
• What happened at bureaucracy/political reps office when you visited?
• Community X is also a slum/public housing/shelter, but sanitation outcomes are different (draw out variations in infrastructure and service standards) from your community. Why do you think that’s the case?

(ii) Politicians
• Tell me about ongoing sanitation works in your consistency
• Would you please describe to me the process of how you identify a problem, selection of communities/neighborhoods, planning for problem-solving in any given year?
• How do you go about assessing sanitation demand in a community for service provision/improvement?
• How do you decide funding allocations across various projects and communities in your constituency in any given year?
• Public housing X in your colleague’s constituency has sewered household toilets and underground drainage, but public housing Y in your constituency has no provision of piped sewers with a run-down community toilet and poorly-serviced open drains Can you help me understand why we see this difference?
• Illegal slum X in your constituency has household toilets but that’s not the case in illegal slum Y in another constituency. Can you help me understand why we see this difference?
• Legal slum X in your colleague’s constituency is seeing upgrades in sewer infrastructure but that’s not the case for legal slum/public housing Y in your constituency that also has an old system which is causing some problems (according to residents). Can you help me understand why we see this difference? How are these decisions made?
• Presentation of relevant counterfactual evidence (if available)
(iii) **Bureaucrats**

- How would you define sanitation as an amenity provided by your agency?
- Would you please describe to me your (agency’s) sanitation policy for legal/illegal slums, public housing, and homeless shelters? How does your agency provide sanitation to pavement dwellers?
- How do you identify communities for service provision/improvement?
- How do you assess sanitation demands/needs in selected areas/communities?
  How do you go about addressing service problems, esp. when there are multiple demands on your resources?
- Can you please walk me through the service delivery process once target areas/communities have been identified (*formulation of a plan of action, budget allocation, implementation rules and procedures*)? How were these decisions made (who participates/doesn’t, when, how/why), and why this specific content of policy elements?
- Public housing X and Y have been provided with sewerage, but public housing Z has been without one. Can you help me understand why this is the case?
- Illegal slum X has closed underground drains, but they are open in illegal slum Y. Can you help me understand why we see this difference?
- Open drains in public housing X are better kept than those in public housing Y. Can you help me understand why we see this difference?
- Toilet facilities in shelter X are broken/malfunctioning but those in shelter Y are functional. Can you help me understand why we see this distinction?
- Your agency is replacing old sewers in legal slum X but not in legal slum Y with an equally old system. Can you help me understand why this is the case?
- Presentation of relevant counterfactual evidence for communities (if available)

(iv) **Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)**

- How did you get involved in sanitation provision/evaluation in poor communities?
- Can you talk about your role in the policymaking process?
• Can you talk about your experience with engaging the state for sanitation services to the poor?

• Would please describe for me the success/challenges in maintaining high service standards (functional/well-kept sanitation facilities) in the shelter managed by your NGO? How did these come about – key players, mechanisms?

• Would please describe for me how you go about identifying the sanitation problem in the shelter? Process of assessing sanitation needs/demands of the community?

• Can you help me understand the process you follow to resolve a sanitation problem that comes up/is identified in your shelter?

• Can you tell me why is that shelter X managed by your NGO does not have a supervisor on-site with the caretaker whereas shelter Y managed by another NGO has at least one supervisor during working hours?

• Toilet facilities in shelter X, managed by your NGO, are broken/malfunctioning but those in shelter Y, managed by another NGO, are functional. Can you tell me why we see this distinction?

• Can you help me understand why is it that residents of shelter X managed by your NGO face restricted access to toilet facilities, while residents of another shelter Y have 24x7 access?
C. CODING SCHEME FOR CHAPTER 4

(a) Federal Sanitation Institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Themes</th>
<th>Codes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| (i) Definition of Sanitation Problem | (a) Structural  
  • *Basic minimum services: community toilets, open drains*  
  (b) Individualistic  
  • *Habits* [open defecation] |
| (ii) Rules of Service Delivery | (a) Provision  
  • *1 seat for 20-50 families*  
  (b) Maintenance  
  • *Community participation*  
  • *Private-sector participation* |
| (iii) Tools to achieve Rules    | (a) Community Mobilization by  
  • *NGOs*  
  (b) Media Campaigns by  
  • *Government*  
  • *Civil society* |
| (iv) Rationale for (i), (ii),   | (a) Economic  
  (iii)                      • *cost-efficiency/recovery, low-cost sanitation* |
(b) Sanitation Institutions in Delhi

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Themes</th>
<th>Codes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(i) Definition of Sanitation Problem</td>
<td>(a) Structural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>•  <em>community toilets</em> [fixed ratio]; <em>open drains</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>•  <em>sewerage</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(b) Behavioral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>•  <em>habits/practices</em> [open defecation; unwillingness to pay]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) Rules of Service Delivery</td>
<td>(a) Provision Eligibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>•  Access barriers [pub housing; slums; pavements]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(b) Maintenance/Oversight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>•  <em>Communities</em> [slums; pub housing]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>•  <em>Non-state agencies</em>: NGO/private companies [slums; shelters]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>•  <em>Govt</em> [mandate in pub housing; slums; contract rules in shelters]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iii) Tools to achieve Rules</td>
<td>(a) Education by</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>•  NGOs [shelters]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>•  Govt [shaming in illegal slums]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iv) Rationale for (i), (ii), (iii)</td>
<td>(a) Lack of service demand [pub housing]</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(b) Lack of mandate [slums]</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(c) Technical constraints [legal slums]</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(d) Belief/Ideology [slums, shelters, pub housing]</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>•  <em>Personal responsibility</em> [appropriate/sufficient public provision]*</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>•  <em>Behavior change</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>•  <em>Unwillingness to pay</em></td>
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</table>
D. CODING SCHEME FOR CHAPTER 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Themes</th>
<th>Codes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Neighborhood Effects        | (a) Political zone  
  • Neighborhood of political establishment  
(b) Economic zone  
  • High property tax revenue zone  
  • Low property tax revenue zone  
(c) Historical zone  
  • Cultural district [Old heritage/historical zone] |
| Organizational Constraints  | (a) Technical know-how  
  • Alternative sewer technology for difficult terrains  
  • Skilled human resources  
(b) Cost  
  • Population size/density  
  • Distance from bulk infrastructure  
  • Technology cost  
(c) Institutions  
  • Formal Rules/Organizational Mandate |
| Clientelism                 | (a) Community-Bureaucracy  
  • Solidarity  
  • Corruption  
(b) Community-NGO  
  • Solidarity  
  • Corruption  
(c) Community-Politician  
  • Positive: vote-rewards  
  • Negative: no vote-punishment |
| Social Construction of      | (a) Contenders  
  • Construction: Mostly Negative (Nuisance, Wantonly)  
  • Policy Design: Opaque/Deceptive, Hidden Rewards  
(b) Dependents  
  • Construction: Mostly Positive (Needy, Helpless)  
  • Policy Design: Limited Rewards; Self-help  
(c) Deviants  
  • Construction: Negative (Slum habits, Convenience culture)  
  • Policy Design: Largely exclusion |
Target Populations
### E. DEMOGRAPHIC DATA OF SURVEYED BUREAUCRATS IN DELHI

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent Code</th>
<th>Age (years)</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Organizational Tenure (years)</th>
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<tr>
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</table>
F. CONSENSUS ANALYSIS RESULTS: SUB-GROUP OF 18 BUREAUCRATS

(a) COMPETENCE SCORE: SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent Code</th>
<th>Age (years)</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Organizational Rank</th>
<th>Competence Score</th>
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</table>

Note: Eigenratio = 4.63; Average Competence Score = 0.68
(b) **ANSWER KEY: SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Community Code</th>
<th>Community Name</th>
<th>Community Type</th>
<th>Response Code</th>
<th>Interpretation</th>
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<tr>
<td>X 1</td>
<td>Baprola</td>
<td>Public Housing</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Deviant</td>
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<td>X 2</td>
<td>Satya Niketan</td>
<td>Public Housing</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Advantaged</td>
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<tr>
<td>X 3</td>
<td>BR Camp</td>
<td>Illegal Slum</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Needy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X 4</td>
<td>Nizamuddin</td>
<td>Pavements</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Deviant</td>
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<tr>
<td>X 5</td>
<td>Yamuna Pushta</td>
<td>Homeless Shelter</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Deviant</td>
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<td>Turkman Gate</td>
<td>Homeless Shelter</td>
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<td>Advantaged</td>
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<td>X 7</td>
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<td>Public Housing</td>
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<td>Ballimaran</td>
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<td>X 9</td>
<td>Kusumpur Pahadi</td>
<td>Illegal Slum</td>
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<td>X 10</td>
<td>Trilokpuri</td>
<td>Public Housing</td>
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<td>Dwarka</td>
<td>Public Housing</td>
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<td>X 12</td>
<td>Basai Darapur</td>
<td>Legal Slum</td>
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<td>Advantaged</td>
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<td>X 13</td>
<td>Lodi Road</td>
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<td>X 14</td>
<td>Mangolpuri</td>
<td>Illegal Slum</td>
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<td>X 15</td>
<td>Gurhai Mohalla</td>
<td>Legal Slum</td>
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<td>Deviant</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
G. SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

Please put a (✓) mark in the boxes against your answers.
Please select only ONE answer for each multiple-choice question.

1. X1 is an EWS colony located in west Delhi. X1 has 1168 households living in one-bedroom apartments. All apartments have sewered in-house toilets. The drains are open, and some are clogged with household trash.

(a) In your opinion, the residents of X1 are:
   - Dutiful
   - Politically well-connected
   - Needy
   - Uncultured

(b) In your opinion, the relevant government agency should:
   - Undertake maintenance of sanitation service in this community
   - Monitor NGOs for maintenance of sanitation service in this community
   - Encourage residents to form self-help groups to improve sanitation in this community
   - Penalize residents for their unsanitary practices in this community.

2. X2 is a resettlement colony located in south Delhi. X2 has 299 households. All households have sewered in-house toilets and underground drains to discharge wastewater.

(a) In your opinion, the residents of X2 are:
   - Dutiful
   - Politically well-connected
   - Needy
   - Uncultured

(b) In your opinion, the relevant government agency should:
   - Undertake maintenance of sanitation service in this community
   - Monitor NGOs for maintenance of sanitation service in this community
   - Encourage residents to form self-help groups to improve sanitation in this community
   - Penalize residents for their unsanitary practices in this community.
3. X3 is a JJ Cluster located in New Delhi. X3 has 466 households. Some residents have sewered in-house toilets, and others use two community toilet blocks. The drains are open and clogged.

(a) In your opinion, the residents of X3 are:
- Dutiful
- Politically well-connected
- Needy
- Uncultured

(b) In your opinion, the relevant government agency should:
- Undertake maintenance of sanitation service in this community
- Monitor NGOs for maintenance of sanitation service in this community
- Encourage residents to form self-help groups to improve sanitation in this community
- Penalize residents for their unsanitary practices in this community.

4. X4 is a cluster of about 50 pavement dwellers located near a religious site in south Delhi. There is a homeless shelter and two roadside paid public toilets about 100m away. Some pavement dwellers were seen urinating on the roadside, and this area is very unclean.

(a) In your opinion, the residents of X4 are:
- Dutiful
- Politically well-connected
- Needy
- Uncultured

(b) In your opinion, the relevant government agency should:
- Undertake maintenance of sanitation service in this community
- Monitor NGOs to ensure maintenance of sanitation service in this community
- Encourage residents to form self-help groups to improve sanitation in this community
- Penalize residents for their unsanitary practices in this community.

5. X5 is a cluster of homeless shelters for men located near Old Delhi. X5 accommodates 600 homeless persons on any given day. There are 9 porta potties on-site, and open defecation and urination is rampant.

(a) In your opinion, the residents of X5 are:
- Dutiful
- Politically well-connected
- Needy
- Uncultured
(b) In your opinion, the relevant government agency should:
- Undertake maintenance of sanitation service in this community
- Monitor NGOs to ensure maintenance of sanitation service in this community
- Encourage residents to form self-help groups to improve sanitation in this community
- Penalize residents for their unsanitary practices in this community.

6. X6 is a homeless shelter for men located in Old Delhi. X6 accommodates 300 men on any given day. There is one toilet complex for able-bodied men and 2 porta toilets for disabled men. The facility is clean with no open urination/defecation.

(a) In your opinion, the residents of X6 are:
- Dutiful
- Politically well-connected
- Needy
- Uncultured

(b) In your opinion, the relevant government agency should:
- Undertake maintenance of sanitation service in this community
- Monitor NGOs to ensure maintenance of sanitation service in this community
- Encourage residents to form self-help groups to improve sanitation in this community
- Penalize residents for their unsanitary practices in this community.

7. X7 is a resettlement colony located in north-west Delhi. Block E in X7 has 4000 households. There are two community toilet complexes, and some households have constructed in-house unsanitary toilets. The drains are open and clogged with sewage and household waste.

(a) In your opinion, the residents of Block E are:
- Dutiful
- Politically well-connected
- Needy
- Uncultured

(b) In your opinion, the relevant government agency should:
- Undertake maintenance of sanitation service in this community
- Monitor NGOs for maintenance of sanitation service in this community
- Encourage residents to form self-help groups to improve sanitation in this community
- Penalize residents for their unsanitary practices in this community.
8. X8 is part of the notified slum area in central Delhi. X8 has 10,000 households. Most households have sewered in-house toilets, and some use community toilets. The drains are underground to discharge wastewater.

(a) In your opinion, the residents of X7 are:
   - Dutiful
   - Politically well-connected
   - Needy
   - Uncultured

(b) In your opinion, the relevant government agency should:
   - Undertake maintenance of sanitation service in this community
   - Monitor NGOs for maintenance of sanitation service in this community
   - Encourage residents to form self-help groups to improve sanitation in this community
   - Penalize residents for their unsanitary practices in this community.

9. X9 is a JJ Cluster located in south-west Delhi. Block Y in X9 has 4999 households. There are two community toilet complexes, and some residents defecate in the open. The drains are open and carry household wastewater and sewage.

(a) In your opinion, the residents of Block Y are:
   - Dutiful
   - Politically well-connected
   - Needy
   - Uncultured

(b) In your opinion, the relevant government agency should:
   - Undertake maintenance of sanitation service in this community
   - Monitor NGOs for maintenance of sanitation service in this community
   - Encourage residents to form self-help groups to improve sanitation in this community
   - Penalize residents for their unsanitary practices in this community.

10. X10 is a resettlement colony located in east Delhi. Blocks A, B, and C in X10 have 500 households each. All the 3 blocks have sewered in-house toilets. The drains are partially open and clogged with household waste.

(a) In your opinion, the residents of blocks A, B, and C are:
   - Dutiful
   - Politically well-connected
   - Needy
   - Uncultured
(b) In your opinion, the relevant government agency should:
☐ Undertake maintenance of sanitation service in this community
☐ Monitor NGOs for maintenance of sanitation service in this community
☐ Encourage residents to form self-help groups to improve sanitation in this community
☐ Penalize residents for their unsanitary practices in this community.

11. X11 is an EWS colony located in south-west Delhi. X11 has 980 households. All apartments have sewered in-house toilets. The drains are open and clean.

(a) In your opinion, the residents of X11 are:
☐ Dutiful
☐ Politically well-connected
☐ Needy
☐ Uncultured

(b) In your opinion, the relevant government agency should:
☐ Undertake maintenance of sanitation service in this community
☐ Monitor NGOs for maintenance of sanitation service in this community
☐ Encourage residents to form self-help groups to improve sanitation in this community
☐ Penalize residents for their unsanitary practices in this community.

12. X12 is a notified slum area located in West Delhi. X12 has 4700 households. All households have sewered in-house toilets and underground drains to discharge wastewater.

(a) In your opinion, the residents of X12 are:
☐ Dutiful
☐ Politically well-connected
☐ Needy
☐ Uncultured

(b) In your opinion, the relevant government agency should:
☐ Undertake maintenance of sanitation service in this community
☐ Monitor NGOs for maintenance of sanitation service in this community
☐ Encourage residents to form self-help groups to improve sanitation in this community
☐ Penalize residents for their unsanitary practices in this community.
13. X13 is a homeless shelter for women located in south Delhi. X13 accommodates 25 women on any given day. There is one public toilet around 20m away from the shelter. Some women urinate in the open outside the shelter at night.

(a) In your opinion, the residents of X13 are:
   - Dutiful
   - Politically well-connected
   - Needy
   - Uncultured

(b) In your opinion, the relevant government agency should:
   - Undertake maintenance of sanitation service in this community
   - Monitor NGOs to ensure maintenance of sanitation service in this community
   - Encourage residents to form self-help groups to improve sanitation in this community
   - Penalize residents for their unsanitary practices in this community.

14. X14 is a JJ Cluster located in north-west Delhi. X14 has 50 households. All households have sewered in-house toilets. The drains are covered and clean.

(a) In your opinion, the residents of X14 are:
   - Dutiful
   - Politically well-connected
   - Needy
   - Uncultured

(b) In your opinion, the relevant government agency should:
   - Undertake maintenance of sanitation service in this community
   - Monitor NGOs for maintenance of sanitation service in this community
   - Encourage residents to form self-help groups to improve sanitation in this community
   - Penalize residents for their unsanitary practices in this community.

15. X15 is a notified slum area located in east Delhi. X15 has 250 households. All households have sewered in-house toilets. The drains are open and clogged with faeces of farm animals kept by some residents.

(a) In your opinion, the residents of X15 are:
   - Dutiful
   - Politically well-connected
   - Needy
   - Uncultured
(b) In your opinion, the relevant government agency should:

- Undertake maintenance of sanitation service in this community
- Monitor NGOs for maintenance of sanitation service in this community
- Encourage residents to form self-help groups to improve sanitation in this community
- Penalize residents for their unsanitary practices in this community.

The following information is sought for demographic analysis only, and **cannot** be used to reveal your identity.

**Age:** _____ years

**Sex:**  
- Male  
- Female  
- Other

**Number of years in the current organization:**

- Less than 5 years  
- 5 - 10 years  
- More than 10 years
H. IRB CONSENT FORMS
INTERVIEW CONSENT FORM: ENGLISH

Introduction and Contact Information: You are being asked to take part in a research project that examines the policymaking process of sanitation service provision in Delhi. The researcher is Tanushree Bhan, a PhD Candidate in the department of Public Policy at the University of Massachusetts Boston. Please read this form and feel free to contact Tanushree if you have any questions. She can be reached at 91-9818057026.

Study Participation: Participation in this study will take about 45 minutes. If you decide to participate, you will be asked questions about your role in planning, implementing, or evaluating sanitation policy impacting the urban poor in Delhi. This interview will take place in your office or a public meeting area in your locality.

Risks or Discomforts: Participation in the interviews is not expected to pose greater than minimal risk that the subjects experience in their everyday life. Nevertheless, if you feel that you may be uncomfortable answering questions during the interview, you may decline to respond and/or participate in the study.

Audio Recording and Transcription: The interviewer will ask your permission to record the session (audio only) that will be transcribed later. If you say no, you will not be audio-recorded. Your name or any identifying information will not be associated with the recording or transcript. Only the researcher will have access to the recording and transcripts. At any point during the interview, you can ask the researcher to stop recording or have her delete the audio file if you wish to rescind your participation from the study.

Confidentiality: Your participation in this research is confidential. The interviewer will assign you a unique code that will keep your real identity confidential. That is, the information gathered for this project will not be published or presented in a way that would allow anyone to identify you (such as by your name or voice). The information
collected from you will be stored on a password-protected computer accessed only by the interviewer.

**Voluntary Participation:** The decision to participate in this research study is voluntary. You can terminate your participation at any time without consequence or penalty. You should tell the researcher if you wish to withdraw from the study.

**Rights:** You have the right to ask questions about this study before you sign this form and at any time during the study. You can contact Tanushree at Tanushree.Bhan001@umb.edu or +91-9818057026. You may also contact her faculty advisor, Dr Erin O’Brien at Erin.Obrien@umb.edu, or +1 617-287-6920. If you have any questions or concerns about your rights as a research participant, please contact a representative of the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at the University of Massachusetts Boston which oversees research involving human participants. The Institutional Review Board may be reached at the following address: IRB, Quinn Building - 02-080, University of Massachusetts, 100 Morrissey Boulevard, Boston, MA 02125-3393. You can also contact the Board by telephone or email at (617-287-5374) or at human.subjects@umb.edu.

**Signatures**

I HAVE READ THE INFORMATION SHEET, AND MY QUESTIONS HAVE BEEN ANSWERED. MY SIGNATURE BELOW ATTESTS MY CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY, AND HAVE THE RESPONSES RECORDED ON AUDIO TAPE, TRANSCRIBED BUT USED WITHOUT ATTRIBUTION.

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Signature of Participant                  Date                Signature of Researcher
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Name of Participant                      Name of Researcher
INTERVIEW CONSENT FORM: HINDI

सहमति प्रमन

मूलिका एवं संपर्क सुच: आप सभी को यहूएक रोबर परीक्षण नें भाग लेने के लिए कहा जा रहा है, जो दिल्ली में स्थितता सेवा प्राप्तवण के नीति-निर्माण प्रक्रिया की जाति करेगी। शोधकर्ता तनुजी मान यूनिवर्सिटी ऑफ मैसूचुआल्स, बौंस विद्युत अनलिक पार्टियों से द्वितीय डिप्लोमा की पी-एच. डी. छात्र है। कुछ क्रम इस प्रमन को पढ़े तथा किसी भी प्रकार की जानकारी के लिए वेबसाइट तनुजी से संपर्क करें। तनुजी का मोबाइल नंबर 09818057026 है।

अध्ययन में सहभागिता: इस अध्ययन में शामिल होने के लिए 45 मिनट का समय देना होगा। यदि आप शामिल होने का निर्णय कर चुके हैं, तो आप स्वीकृती में हैं विभिन्न लोगों को मानता करने-स्वीका स्वच्छता नीति योजना, उसके कार्ययोजना अथवा उसका मूल्यांकन करने में आपकी मूलिका से संबंधित सावधान पूरे जाएगी। यह साक्षात्कार आपके कार्ययोजना अथवा आपके मोहल्ले के सामाजिक केंद्र में किया जाएगा।

जोखिम अथवा अनुमानित: इस साक्षात्कार में शामिल होने का यह सत्य नहीं है कि आप दैनिक जीवन में जो जोखिम अनुमान करते हैं, उसे बढ़ा-बढ़ाकर बताएं। किर भी, साक्षात्कार के दौरान, यदि आप किसी सावधान का जवाब देने में अनुमान अथवा अनुमान करते हैं तो आप जवाब देने अथवा इस अध्ययन में शामिल होने से मना कर सकते हैं।

ऑडिओ रिकार्डिंग तथा लिप्यंतरण: साक्षात्कार लेखावाला आपस पुरुष वातचीत की ऑडिओ रिकार्डिंग के लिए आपकी अनुमति लेगा, जिसे बाद में लिप्यंतरित किया जाएगा। आपका नाम अथवा अथवा किसी भी प्रकार के नामस्कार संबंधी सूचना रिकार्डिंग या लिप्यंतरण में नहीं जोड़ी जाएगी। केवल शोधकर्ता द्वारा रिकार्डिंग तथा लिप्यंतरण का उपयोग करेगा। साक्षात्कार के दौरान आप किसी भी समय शोधकर्ता से रिकार्डिंग रोकने के लिए अथवा अध्ययन में अपनी भागीदारी रद्द करने की इच्छा दे रिकार्डिंग रोकने अथवा ऑडिओ किड दिखाने के लिए कह सकते हैं।

गोपनीयता: शोध में आपकी भागीदारी गोपनीय रही जाएगी। अर्थात् इस परीक्षण के लिए जो भी सूचना इकट्ठा की जाएगी उसे इस प्रकार प्रकाशित अथवा प्रस्तुत किया जाएगा, जिससे आपकी पहचान (आपके नाम अथवा आयाज के माध्यम से) गोपनीय रहेगी। एकत्रित सूचना को पासवर्त संरक्षित कंप्यूटर देश की संगुणीत किया जाएगा, जिसका उपयोग केवल शोधकर्ता ही करेगा।

स्वीकृत मान्यता: इस शोध में भाग लेने का निर्णय पूरी तरह से स्वीकार है। आप किसी भी समय परिशिष्ट अथवा जुर्माने की चिंता किए बगैर अपनी भागीदारी रद्द कर सकते हैं। यदि आप इस अध्ययन से बाहर करना चाहते हैं, तो आप उसके बारे में शोधकर्ता को सूचना देनी होगी।
अधिकार : आपको यह प्रपत्र नरने से पूर्व तथा अध्ययन के दौरान किसी भी समय इस अध्ययन से जुड़े सवाल खोजने का पूरा अधिकार है। आप Tamushree.Bhan001@umb.edu पर 09818057026 पर तत्वरी के संपर्क कर सकते हैं। आप तत्वरी के फैकल्टी सलाहकार प्रॉफ. एरिन ओब्रीन से Erin.Obrien@umb.edu या 617-287-6920 पर संपर्क कर सकते हैं। शोध प्रतिमागी होने के नाते अपने अधिकारों को लेकर आपको बता सकता है कि कोई भी सवाल या चिंता है तो आप कृपया शोध में शामिल होनेवाले मान्य प्रतिमागियों का का व्यावसायिक इंटिज़म ऑफ वॉर्ल्ड बोर्ड (आई. आर. बी.), यूनिवर्सिटी ऑफ मैसाचुसेट्स, बॉस्टन के प्रतिनिधि से संभाल सकते हैं। आप आई. आर. बी. से निर्दिष्ट घर पर संभाल सकते हैं : आई. आर. बी., विज्ञान एंड इंजीनियरिंग बिलिंग्स, 02-080, यूनिवर्सिटी ऑफ मैसाचुसेट्स, बॉस्टन, 100, नोर्थर्न बुलवार्ड, बॉस्टन, एमए 02125-3393। आप बोर्ड से फोन नं. 617-2875374 पर अध्ययन ई-मेल human.subjects@umb.edu पर संभाल सकते हैं।

हस्ताक्षर

मैंने सहमति प्रदेश स्थित है; तथा मेरी विश्वासों का समावेश ही गया है। प्रपत्र पर किए गए मेरे हस्ताक्षर इस अध्ययन में मेरे शामिल होने की पुष्टि करते हैं; तथा मेरी प्रतिक्रियाओं आंदोलनें टेबल पर रिकार्ड कर ली गई है, जिन्हें संपर्क किया जाएगा, लकिन जिनका उपयोग मेरे संदर्भ के बिना ही किया जाएगा।

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प्रतिमागी के हस्ताक्षर दिनांक शोधकर्ता के हस्ताक्षर

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प्रतिमागी का नाम

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शोधकर्ता का नाम

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