The Dual-State Character of U.S. Coloniality: Notes Toward Decolonization

Steve Martinot
San Francisco State University, marto@ocf.berkeley.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.umb.edu/humanarchitecture

Part of the Political History Commons, Race, Ethnicity and post-Colonial Studies Commons, and the United States History Commons

Recommended Citation
Available at: http://scholarworks.umb.edu/humanarchitecture/vol5/iss3/34

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks at UMass Boston. It has been accepted for inclusion in Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at UMass Boston. For more information, please contact libraryuasc@umb.edu.
The Dual-State Character of U.S. Coloniality
Notes Toward Decolonization

Steve Martinot
San Francisco State University
marto@ocf.berkeley.edu

Abstract: I begin with the story of Jack Johnson, the black prizefighter of the early 20th century who won the heavyweight championship against huge hostility. This introduces the operation of the color line in the U.S., not just as a boundary surrounding white supremacist society, but as the structure of obsessive anti-black populism, whose violence perpetrated against the black community in the U.S. reveals the operation of white racialized identity and its sense of social sanctity and impunity. I examine this white populism as representing a “state” that stands alternate to the Constitutional state. I call a “byelocolonial” state (“byelo-” from Greek meaning “white”), whose operations involve the entire history of white racist violence from the slave patrols and the KKK to police impunity and the prison industry today. I regard this dual state structure as exemplifying Fanon’s important point that the Hegelian master/slave dialectic is inadequate to describe colonialist domination, racism, and the structures of racialization as they appear in the U.S., because these phenomena operate by obviating mutual recognition. I relate Fanon to the dual state structure as a way of introducing a perspective of decolonization with respect to it.

JACK JOHNSON

Fanon is known as a theoretician of anti-colonialist struggle, and especially of the decolonization of the mind of the colonized. During the era of national liberation movements in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, his thinking, especially in The Wretched of the Earth (WE), spread widely through the third world, as well as communities in the U.S. (Black, Chicano, Native American, Puerto Rican, Asian, and others), many of whom saw themselves as “subcolonies” (in George Jackson’s phrase) in solidarity with those movements.1 It also spread within the Vietnam anti-war movement which sensed U.S. presence in Vietnam to be a colonialist project and sought to grasp what that meant for a nation that advertised itself as anti-colonialist.

The era of national liberation ended roughly at the end of the 1980s with the defeat of the Salvadorean revolution and the collapse of the U.S.S.R. A different form of EuroAmerican control had taken hold to which the prior anti-colonialist strategies were no longer adequate. Against the systematics of globalized neo-liberalism,
opposition required a different form of social movement, with a different ethos, if it were to continue its project of liberation. In this current era, Fanon’s Black Skin, White Masks (BSWM) has come into greater currency. And this suggests the need for a redescription of coloniality, especially with respect to the U.S.

To initiate such a redescription, let us turn to the story of Jack Johnson, a black prizefighter at the turn of the 20th century, about whom PBS produced a documentary a few years ago. Johnson was a quick and powerful man, an indefatiguable boxer who emerged from the illicit fight circles of Texas in the 1890s. He remained undefeated in all but one bout. Yet, as he rose in prominence defeating all opponents, black and white, he hit a wall when it came to the heavyweight title. His challenges were consistently declined by the current titleholders. In turn, John L. Sullivan, Jim Corbett, and Jim Jeffries refused him, saying that they would never let the title be taken by a black man.

That fear, and the forethought and premonition that it contained, revealed a certain fragility of white identity and white hegemony. Yet they were saved from the need to recognize that fragility by a vast outpouring of support for each titleholder’s refusal. The white press, white politicians, devotees of the sport and much of white society all vindicated each champ’s refusal. The typical racist inversions were deployed. Johnson was called lazy or a coward as a reason not to fight him. In the film, however, an image of veritable obsession with whiteness emerges in the social response to Johnson. Even that “man of the people,” Jack London, chimed in on the side of white sanctity.

Yet Johnson met it all with equanimity and wit. He had an endless intuition of how to out-maneuver the white obsessions with segregation and the denigration of black people. Beyond his talent in the ring, he showed an independence of personal comportment, and a sense of self-respect, that constituted a beacon of dignity and personhood for black communities all over the U.S. His words bit into the fabric of the society that sought to exclude him, as he metaphorically kicked down its little white picket fences. He followed the heavyweight champions around the country, and even to Europe, repeating his challenges and publicizing their refusals. When Tommy Burns (the titleholder in 1909) was finally shamed into fighting him, Johnson won both the fight and the title handily.

At that moment, the attacks on him escalated to a level of social panic. He was disparaged in the press for every aspect of his life except his fighting ability—his money, his women (many of whom were white), his life style. Editorials called upon him overtly to return to his place in the racist hierarchy. Hostility toward black people in general increased, and warnings appeared in newspaper editorials and political pronouncements that black people should not think differently of themselves because of Johnson’s success. In total, these assaults signified that Johnson’s very life, in a profoundly Fanonian manner, was perceived as violence itself directed at the coherence of white society, and the sanctity of white supremacy. In that symbolic sense, Johnson could be said to embody “Fanonian” personhood.

Ultimately, the nation became haunted with the need to find a white challenger (a “great white hope”) who could recapture the title. But to no avail; Johnson demolished all who were thrown at him. Jim Jeffries, the retired titleholder, was even coaxed out of retirement to fight him. Surrounded by thousands of white people, all clamouring for his blood, Johnson answered the taunts of the audience with a smile, and toyed with Jeffries for 14 rounds, holding him up when he started to go down, as if to both punish him and to wear down the crowd. Gerald Early suggests that if Johnson had simply knocked Jeffries
out in the first round, as he clearly could have, there probably would have been a riot. Indeed, in the wake of the fight, race riots occurred in dozens of cities around the U.S. As Johnson returned home to Chicago by train, hundreds of black people were beaten, shot, lynched by mobs, and burned out of their houses. It was as if white society could only reinstate itself through massive anti-black criminality.

Since nothing else could defeat him, the state was enlisted to find an indictment. All it could muster, however, was a distorted (and illegitimate) use of the Mann Act. The Mann Act prohibited the transportation of women across state lines for immoral purposes. Johnson was charged with doing this because he had travelled with a white girlfriend across state lines. Since the woman was white, Johnson’s intimacy with her, though of mutual affection, was proclaimed by definition to be “illicit.” Still, the government’s first attempt failed because his current lover, Lucile Cameron, refused to testify against him. It then procured the services of a former lover, Belle Schreiber, to charge him, though the journeys to which she testified occurred before the Mann Act had been passed. The law was warped in both cases; but for the white state, the repression of a self-respecting black person trumped all principles of jurisprudence or justice.

This obsessive solidarity between the media, the political profession, and a repressive social populism, has not been limited to the dark era of Jim Crow. We have seen it arrayed unapologetically against Fanny Lou Hamer, Lani Guinier, Mumia Abu-Jamal, Ward Churchill, and many others. It appears in the congratulatory mainstream silences that greeted the assassinations of black leaders like Malcolm X or Fred Hampton, the frame-ups of Assata Shakur, Geronimo Ji-Jaga Pratt, or Rachel Magee. It manifests itself today in a prison industry, into which people of color are shovelled and warehoused through racially enhanced sentences and a vast system of victimless crime laws, for which the accused become the victims. The U.S. has the largest prison population in the world, both in numbers and per capita, 80% of which are people of color.4

On the other hand, the list of Fanonian men and women who have emerged in the U.S. is legion. Marcus Garvey, in mobilizing whole communities to change the political nature of U.S. urban space, did decolonizing violence to the white monopoly of that space. Gregorio Cortez, mythified in song and film, symbolized the undefeatable spirit of resistance. Let us include Angela Davis, Leonard Peltier, John Trudell, the American Indian Movement, Adam Hakim, Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, Mother Bloor, Mother Jones, and Big Bill Haywood. Some are white; all present a form of courage against injustice that has elicited, in various forms, the howls of a threatened socius.

CONTRA-STATE AND ALLO-CULTURAL BEING

In the sense that Johnson’s life encountered a form of proscription and arraignment at the hands of both officialdom and white society at large, he lived what could be called a contra-state life—a life whose every move was apprehended as anathema to socio-political norms. But the “state” that named him its nemesis took two forms, that of a constituted political structure, and the system of social norms beyond the official state that white society acted out in its (populist and media) animus to his mere existence. In a sense, behind the traditional modernist nation-state governed by Constitutionality, legalist rhetoric, and officialdom, one detects an alternate self-defined para-political state, a state of social cohesion around white entitlement. It is this second state that first confronted Jack Johnson or the black community with its
own indictments and its own para-military operations. We could name this alternate state a “byelocolonial state” (“byelo-” from the Greek for “white”) insofar as it is white, exclusionary toward those who are not white, and colonialist in its insistence on dominating those it refuses to include.5

The byelocolonial state acts consensually within a white supremacist cultural framework. Its violence and judgments trump the legalisms of the Constitutional political structure; yet it calls upon Constitutionality when it needs more than self-legitimation. The entire history of vigilante para-military activities, such as lynch mobs, the current border Minutemen, the KKK, the hard-hat attacks on anti-war demonstrators during the Nixon administration, are the activities of the byelocolonial state. To call it a “state” is not simply to be metaphoric. Though it appears mostly in populist form, its actions actualize collective norms that imitate a state in four ways: it constitutes a conjunction of multiple political performances that have a common substance; it represents a cultural polity that generates and structures itself through forms of violence; it legislates sexuality; and it views the existence of someone like Johnson as an invasion, as if by a foreign power.

Police actions against black people which transcend legality, including profiling, arbitrary arrests, and torture—and which occur today in every major city in the U.S.—also represent the para-political violence of the byelocolonial state. Though the police are officials of the Constitutional state, their actions cross its boundary, and mark the interface between the two states. For instance, as law enforcement, the duty of the police, when a crime is committed, is to find a suspect to charge with the crime. In profiling, the police first encounter a suspect, and then look for a crime for that suspect to be charged with.6 This inversion marks one of the contrasts between the Constitutional and the byelocolonial state.

The legitimation and authorization that the byelocolonial state receives from the Constitutional state has long historical precedent, in its enactment of traditional white supremacy. It has appeared in the Constitution’s original support for slavery,7 the juridical valorization of white supremacy in the Dred Scott decision, the contemporary trampling of black women’s child-bearing rights,8 and the judicial and populist movement to abolish affirmative action. In the persecution of Jack Johnson, the Constitutional state conceded the byelocolonial state’s perception of his existence as an act of violence against itself, and the latter welcomed the former’s distortion of its own principles in its prosecution. Each state becomes a buttress for the other. In general, because the principles of segregationism and social dehumanization can be manifest only through the presence and involvement of an entire populace, the very consolidation of Jim Crow marked the effective force of the byelocolonial state.

The byelocolonial state is not a racialized state but the para-political state of racialization. Though Fanon did not articulate his own experience in the form (metaphoric or otherwise) of a state, he felt its para-political nature through his own blackness, through the constant (though never uniform) otherness that buried him alive under the presumptive, unthinking words of the white people he encountered.9 He feels the byelocolonial state’s inability to see him, its truncation of his being, its imposition of its version of his history on him. And despite his own retrieval of a history and a subjectivity through the Negritude movement, or through the writings of Aimé Césaire, he knows that other reality persists, demanding resignation, assuming entrapment and unreason. He restates the premise of the byelocolonial state thus: “All those white men in a group, guns in their hands, cannot be wrong. I am guilty” (BSWM,139).

But if Johnson’s very existence elicited
byelocolonial violence pursuant to its perception of its existence as violence against itself, two things follow. First, Johnson himself lived beyond the cultural framework of the byelocolonial state, in a contra-state existence that was thrust upon him. He represented an alternate culture, a cultural terrain without geo-political extension engendered by the operations of the byelocolonial state. This is what Lewis Gordon suggests when he refers to Fanon as the “other” of Europe (Gordon, 6). We could call this non-geographic terrain into which white society threw Johnson in order to confront him there in an “allo-cultural domain” (“allo-” from the Greek for “other”). The violence he represented for white society was not state or criminal violence as such, but “allo-cultural violence.”

Allo-cultural violence, by which the byelocolonial state perceived him, was not something Johnson defined or conceived for himself. It was defined by the byelocolonial state’s response to him. In other words, at the core of the issue of violence is not its existence but rather how it is defined, and who does the defining. As Bill Haywood pointed out, for working people to strike, to stop work and put their hands in their pockets, is considered the quintessential act of violence by the capitalist class.10 Similarly, Johnson’s “allo-cultural violence” against white society lay in his refusal of obedience and obeisance to byelocolonial culture, a refusal to acquiesce.

Fanon provides a view of the other side of this refusal. For Fanon, the first act of rebellion must be to break with the eurocentric norms of obeisance and the hold of acquiescence (WE, 311ff). And for him, if even that first refusal of obeisance would be perceived as violence, then it must itself be violent in some fashion in order to be self-determining.

**Fanon and Racialization**

In the U.S., as well as in Europe’s colonies, the obeisance required by the byelocolonial state is racial. The modern concept of race first emerged when European colonialism invaded and settled the Americas. The land was seized not by taking it in hand as an object, but by turning it into property. The land’s inhabitants, who had lived the land in an immediacy denied by property, had to be separated from it in their own consciousness, to obviate their claims, and to force them into bond-labor. The concept of racialization fulfilled the purpose; it defined an allo-social form of dehumanized life devoid of birthright.11 White supremacy is the inherent product of this project, and enslavement is the concrete side of a demand for obeisance, since it implies presence without subjective existence.

In his insight into colonialist racialization, Fanon perceived the inappropriateness of the Hegelian master-slave dialectic. For Hegel, the slave attains being because the master recognizes that he is dependent upon the slave for the slave’s labor, while the slave recognizes the master as a dominant force over him. Though the terms of recognition may be different, each achieves a sense of social being through the other.12 But the relation of racialization, upon which the modernist (colonialist) form of slavery depended, admits of no reciprocity. When whites define other people as non-white in order to define themselves as white against that “otherness,” the norm of the human that they conceptualize through that relation leaves the other, the non-white, diminished as such. The other is proclaimed devoid of humanity (by definition) and thus divested of human recognition. In other words, the relation of racialization is not dialectical. For Fanon, a black person faces an imposition that is absolute and irremediable (BSWM, 129).
Furthermore, insofar as whites as a group designate others as non-white in order to constitute themselves as white, they establish a subject-object relation with the “other,” a relation of unidirectional recognition. The same relation obtains in torture; the torturer not only sees the tortured as an object, but his every move is designed to force the tortured to see him/herself as an object as well, and thus to render recognition unnecessary. No reciprocity is possible. Sartre points out in his *Notebooks for an Ethics* that Hegel meant his “master/slave” relation to apply primarily to workers within a capitalist framework who stand in reciprocal relation to capitalists across the objects of capital (the means of production). But across the relation of racialization or enslavement, the master does not reciprocate the slave’s recognition, but returns objectification instead. Those who think racialized enslavement obeys a master-slave dialectic forget that, for Hegel those who acted in dialectic relation were to be located within a Constitutional state. Enslavement and racialization were for him simply juridical facts. Fanon recognized the byelocolonial presumption in this. Reciprocity, and the Hegelian master-slave dialectic, were for the colonized world simply eurocentric myths.

But the catcalls and threats, the calls for his blood, the warping of law and jurisprudence that pursued Johnson, were all terribly concrete in their attempts to reduce him to objecthood. When Lani Guinier’s appointment to the Civil Rights Commission was revoked by Clinton under the attacks from a media-politician mob that had not read her work, she was similarly rendered an object, an entity without the possibility of response. Because the byelocolonial socius defines itself through its performances of objectification of others for itself, *Ethics*,570 one’s extrication from or rebellion against subjugation and obeisance already implies a form of allo-cultural being.

**ANTI-COLONIALISM AND ALLO-CULTURAL POLITICS**

There is a difference between the concept of rebellion that Fanon calls upon, and allo-cultural being as cultural autonomy. Rebellion differs from cultural autonomy insofar as it is vertically oriented, while autonomy, as allo-cultural, is communally oriented. For the colonized, autonomy is the necessary response to de-subjectification. Rebellion can only initiate the process of re-subjectification, because rebellion can only occur against a Constitutional state. To the spectral fluidity of the byelocolonial state, rebellion can only be reactive; it is always unprepared, unable to be proactive in its opposition. It needs an extant power against which to throw itself, or against which to say “no.” (And this marks an inherent insufficiency for the project of political transformation. Reforming the Constitutional state will not change the byelocolonial state, which will then reconstitute the Constitutional state it needs. And the byelocolonial state will persist as long as it has the Constitutional state to hide behind. Each is a buttress for the other.)

While rebellion directly contests the political domination of power structures, autonomy does not; its focus is elsewhere, in constituting allo-cultural structures, a goal that takes the refusal of byelocolonial presence and violence as its basic assumption. The racialization that drives the byelocolonial state is not an ideology to be refuted; it is existentially alien to subaltern self-recognition (BSWM, 127). Refusal rather than reform or refutation constitute the “elsewhere” of the allo-cultural, and render it other than the “otherness” engendered by byelocolonial domination. There is a need for defense against byelocolonial violence, but it is different from the repression that rebellion faces. Instead of the dialectic of power and counter-power, one faces incommensurability.
Nevertheless, autonomy and rebellion stand in ineluctable relation to each other; each opens political space in which the other can operate. Autonomy depends on rebellion to defend it against the Constitutional state, and rebellion depends on the ability of autonomy, of allo-cultural structures, to subvert the byelocolonial state. It is the conjunction of the two, rebellion and allo-cultural autonomy, that poses an absolute threat to domination.

If the struggle for autonomy appears violent, it is only because it is seen as violence by coloniality. It is the nature of domination that there is nothing the dominated can do autonomously that will not be seen as violence. For Fanon, anti-colonialist violence is thrust on the colonized by their every attempt to be human, to achieve subjectivity. This implies that violence is the fundamental language that colonialism speaks or thinks in. And it establishes physical force as its only medium of exchange. This is the character coloniality gives itself in refusing to recognize the autonomy of the other. Herein lies the existentiality of violence for Fanon, and why it cannot be programmatic. Anti-colonialist violence becomes the inevitable condition for autonomy.

Since autonomy is seen as violence and responded to as violence, its every attempt to be what it is enmeshes it in the milieu of violence. When the police instruct a movement to keep its demonstrations peaceful, there is no response the demonstrators can give that will convince the police that they are already peaceful because the existence of the demonstration is already seen as an act of violence. Because violence is the only language coloniality can speak in its incommensurability with autonomy, the subjected confront an absolute inability to present themselves authentically or to reason with the dominant. It is an absolute inability of the dominant to hear the subjugated when the latter speak of a human justice that is not colonialist justice. The byelocolonial state is incapable of hearing any account of justice that is not “white” or byelocolonial justice. In that sense as well, colonialist and anti-colonial violence remain incommensurable. There can be no dialectic between them. Fanon puts this in very personal terms; against his own use of reason there stands the barrier of his corporeality, his blackness, by which coloniality renders dialogue impossible (BSWM, 116).

For Fanon, decolonization and anti-colonial violence are the same thing (WE, 35). Though many commentators have interpreted Fanon’s perspective on individual violence as a form of decolonizing therapy, Zahar points out that this is a misreading of Fanon (Zahar, 77). Rather than provide therapy to rehabilitate a dehumanized subjectivity, violence breaks the chains of subjection as the condition for the creation of a new subjectivity. This is not just the presumptive violence that coloniality views autonomy as, but real violence necessitated by the fact that violence is the only language colonialism speaks. Against the colonialist deprivation of subjective agency, decolonizing violence opens a door to the existence of subjectivity itself, to that which colonization had sought to destroy (WE, 94). Rather than reconstruct one’s social agency in terms of the oppressive conditions that constrain them, as therapy often does, Fanonian violence makes agency possible by breaking one’s relation to those conditions. Decolonized subjectivity belongs to a contra-state domain of allo-cultural violence in which the human can reinvent itself. As Sekyi-Otu confirms, Fanon saw violence is neither programmatic nor therapeutic; it was solely existential.

Thus, Fanon’s departure from Hegel is more complex than merely a refusal of the master-slave dialectic. For Hegel, violence is objective, while for Fanon, anti-colonialist violence is access to the subjective (Zahar, 80). And this carries Fanon toward a non-eurocentric epistemology that is
alien to Hegel because it remains beyond the dialectic in its incommensurability to the violence of coloniality. It is in recognition of this non-eurocentric epistemology that Fanon warned the national liberation movements against adopting the European model of nation-state independence. In its false representationism and dependence on corporate capital accumulation, the eurocentric modernist state would be a Trojan horse (WE,98ff). In so counseling the third world, Fanon recognized the difference between rebellion and allo-cultural autonomy, the difference between struggle against the Constitutional state and against the byelocolonial state.

THE DUAL CLASS STRUCTURE OF THE DUAL STATE

In the U.S. today, both forms of state, and both forms of state violence exist. From the torture of black and brown suspects in police stations to the trashing of Lani Guinier’s appointment by a politico-media mob, and the standard use of SWAT teams to serve arrest warrants on black or brown suspects for non-violent crimes, the two forms of state coexist and overlap. The outpouring of white cultural vituperation against Jack Johnson reappears in the ongoing denigration of Mumia Abu-Jamal and the refusal to give him a fair trial. It reappears in labelling affirmative action a “quota system” to deface its attempt to correct for a quota system that had been 100% for whites.

This dual state, acting in concert, reflects the existence of a dual class structure. There is a white class system organized in the traditional capitalist manner (capital and an exploited working class); and a racialized class system organized along a byelocolonial division between white society as a whole and the many classes and groups of racialized people dominated by it, both within the U.S. and in its global corporate reach. This duality of class constructions has its origins in the slave system that emerged in the North American colonies, the absoluteness of black exclusion, and the concomitant formation of a solidarist white society, to which white allegiance was demanded. Indeed, black exclusion contextualized the burgeoning white class system in a way that rendered it hermetic, and thus able as a whole to play the role of a ruling “class” stratum in the racialized system. 16

The interface between these systems has been constituted by an intermediary control stratum (ICS), which varies in form over time, but whose function is invariant: to subdue, repress, alienate, and control the racialized working classes in the racialized class system. Its first incarnation was the system of slave patrols in the early 18th century colonies. Composed of conscripted poor white farmers and workers, the patrols’ job was to catch runaways and to suppress all black autonomy or organization. They quickly developed a style of arbitrary violence against black people, which they advertised as the suppression of rebellion or black organization. For this, they gained the approbation of the white elite, and were granted inclusion and belonging as white society’s defenders. Thus, patrol violence constituted the first mortar for white cultural cohesion and coherence (Rule, 79-82).

During the 19th century, the ICS appeared as para-military anti-black mobs. Such mobs undertook black disenfranchisement in northern cities; para-military groups destroyed the edifice of Reconstruction, and then acted to enforce segregation; a chain-gang labor system maintained post-emancipation debt servitude in which black farmers found themselves trapped. In all cases, this ICS violence against black people has been gratuitous, that is, in response to nothing but their existence. Today, that role is filled by and large by the police through militarized operations, the use of racial profiling, routine brutality, and an umbrella impunity bestowed by the
Constitutional state. These actions, the massive incarceration, and the criminalization of people of color that results, constitute an irremediable division between the two class systems. (White people can step across this boundary and make common cause with people of color on common issues, but they forfeit all or part of their citizenship in the byelocolonial state when they do.)

This systemic division has been ratified throughout U.S. history. After the revolution, in the northern states, as white workers organized to play a role in the new political environment, they excluded free black people from their organizations, and from most job sites—despite the fact that black workers had skills equal to or surpassing those of whites. In enacting this exclusion, white workers were essentially defining themselves as the working class, and thereby defining the working class as white, at a time when the vast majority of laborers in the U.S. were black, working as bond-laborers (slaves) on agro-businesses called plantations. But in defining the working class as white, they were establishing a primary allegiance to white society rather than to working class solidarity, which would have included all workers. This priority not only explains why racism has worked so well as a weapon against working class organization in the U.S.; it also reveals that racism, more than a separation of black from white, is a mechanism for the unification of whites in an exclusionary culture.

The white workers who have filled the mobs, the para-military groups, and the police, have played a dual role. They are exploited by the white class system, and they maintain the coherence of the white class system through their byelocolonial participation as an ICS. Thus, they develop a dual consciousness, a dual sense of solidarity as workers and as white. When their class consciousness can extend to all workers, they step momentarily away from the byelocolonial state. But most often, the white solidarity embodied in the byelocolonial state has trumped class consciousness.

One way to understand this dual class structure is by analogy to prison administration. The prison guards stand in class contradiction to the administration, and call for solidarity among themselves with respect to job conditions. But they look upon the inmates as the materiality of their job as guards; the prison itself is the product of their labor. The inmates however are not raw material but real humans, caught in a discursive structure (the law) in whose creation or content they have played no role. Should the inmates ask for solidarity from the guards in militating for a more humane form of justice, the guards will refuse, since to make common cause with the inmates against the prison administration would eliminate their jobs, regardless of their estimate of the justice they enforce. And similarly, the inmates will not make common cause with the guards in the latter's union struggles for better working conditions because the guards still belong to the prison administration. Both may be oppressed by the prison administration, but the guards' role remains one of solidarity with the administration against any problem with the inmates.

Allo-cultural violence and allo-cultural structures are the unavoidable responses to the ICS, and to the byelocolonial state that organizes it. Locating themselves necessarily in the racialized class system, allo-cultural structures manifest, in their autonomy, a transformation in the political space that goes beyond rebellion. Though movements such as AIM, the IWW, Aztlan, and various “black power” organizations (for instance, the Panthers or Robert Williams’ movement in Monroe, NC) have seen themselves in rebellion against the Constitutional state, their lasting political effects have been to reveal the potentialities of autonomy for throwing off the byelocolonial state, and in rejecting the political
norms of byelocolonial obedience and obeisance. They then exemplify a form of community sovereignty that poses an alternative to the sovereignty of the Constitutional state.19

In sum, opposition to the byelocolonial state must locate itself within the racialized class system; it cannot be oppositional from within the white class system, from behind the ICS. Thus, the concept of decolonization of the U.S. begins with opposition to the byelocolonial state. It cannot occur simply through rebellion against the Constitutional state.

In other words, decolonization is a struggle for class liberation that is not the class struggle within white industrial culture. It begins outside that in an allo-cultural autonomy that contests the byelocolonial state in order to undermine the Constitutional state and capitalist society in general. The force of coloniality manifests itself both as the exploitation and derogation of people of color and the conscription of white workers to an ICS to maintain that system. Decolonization then refers to the liberation of those oppressed by coloniality and the byelocolonial state, which does not exclude the extrication of white people conscripted by the byelocolonial state to the criminality of its project. This latter possibility would imply disrupting and abandoning identification with white racialized identity; that is, with what marks membership in the byelocolonial state. But it must be recognized that class struggle, even in its traditional sense, can occur only by and for a class that requires liberation; and this is not the case for the ICS in its integration and allegiance to the byelocolonial state.

TOWARD A THEORY OF DECOLONIZATION

Because the state and the class systems it governs are dual, traditional class analysis is insufficient (but not unnecessary) to decolonization. The beginning of decolonization would have to address the entire eurocentric paradigm, including capitalism (labor as a productivity machine, earth as resource), the nation-state, the false representationism it calls democracy, and its legislation of sexuality. The latter, since it controls forms of intimacy, also controls friendship, and thus functions as a form of thought control. It is in order to address all the dimensions of social control (white supremacy, masculinism, heterosexism, nationalism, interventionism, etc.) which the eurocentric paradigm universalizes and naturalizes, that alternate political structures are necessary.

The revolutionaries who led the national liberation struggles of the 1960s sought to invent an independence out of dependence (the modernist tradition), rather than invent an allo-cultural structure out of traditions embedded in what had survived the weight of colonization (and something always survives). In the U.S., a transformation of class relations will not only be insufficient to alleviate the exploitation maintained by the byelocolonial state; such a class transformation cannot even be conceived in real terms without the collapse of the byelocolonial state, since the white working classes of the U.S. remain as components of its byelocolonialism.

Post-colonial theory has recognized that the prior anti-colonial process has failed. Its promises were not kept because it did not recognize that the modernist concepts of independence or revolution did not escape their eurocentric origins. Both only promised modernization, which included labor as a productivity machine, the earth as resource, and democracy as formal representationism; all these ultimately led back to an ethic of profitability. In the métropole (the U.S.), wielding representationist procedures will not transform the byelocolonial state. If democracy is the operation of participation, a culture of partici-
participation has to exist first that is neither byelocolonial nor obedient to representationism. Social movements may be steps toward the allo-cultural, but to survive, they have to know how not to simply become “special interests,” which reabsorbs them into representationist processes and the Constitutional state. A culture of participation requires an allo-cultural structure that neither rebellion nor class struggle against the Constitutional state can provide.

To transform a cultural structure such as the byelocolonial state, a theory of the transformation of cultural structures has to be developed. It would have to be a theory that understands the relationships between the ICS, the byelocolonial state, and white racialized identity on the one hand, and the Constitutional state, its class structure, and its structures of racialization on the other. Clearly a theory of cultural transformation is not cultural transformation itself, since it cannot become programmatic without losing its transformativity. But, however it engenders a self-understanding of allo-cultural communities and structures, it is, in a profound sense, the precondition for liberation from the modes of exploitation and oppression maintained by the byelocolonial state.

NOTES

1. Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, trans. Constance Farrington (New York: Evergreen Press, 1969); originally published by Maspero in 1961. Hereafter WE. George Jackson, Solidad Brother: the Prison Letters of George Jackson (New York: Bantam, 1970) George Jackson described a “subcolony” as a community relegated to second-class citizenship in the U.S., whose role was to be a source of cheap labor and a special market for certain kinds of products. (192) In the case of Native Americans, the colonization was a direct form of control of land, and exploitation of its natural resources. Jackson’s definition would hold not only for Black and Latino communities, but for women as well.


5. The coloniality of U.S. society has, of course, two sides. To be categorized as black or brown is to be colonized in body by the byelocolonial state, and in mind by being spoken for by the structures of racialization (to think that the Constitutional state is democratic, for instance). White people are colonized in mind by racialization to see themselves as a norm, a standard that flaunts itself through its alienation of others. They are instructed to adopt whiteness as an identity and identification, and to forget the brutal, criminal history of white supremacy.


9. Fanon gives an extended description of this in chap 5, “The Fact of Blackness,” of BSWM.


13. See Jean-Paul Sartre’s Introduction to Henri Alleg, *The Question* (New York: Braziller, 1958). Fanon recounts a Frenchman saying, about Algeria, “As long as the Arab is treated like a man, no solution is possible” (BSWM,113).


15. This was the issue that Fanon fairly shouted at Sartre when Sartre slipped into the rhetorical closet of the dialectician (BSWM,133-8). Despite Sartre’s anti-colonialism, he could not free himself from the eurocentric myth of reciprocity contained in racialization and byelocolonial enslavement. Sartre was not deaf to Fanon, however; he heard him, and expressed the fact that he had heard him in the *Critique of Dialectical Reason*.

16. For an extended description of how this dual class structure developed, see Martinot, *Rule of Racialization*, Chapter 2.


18. Only rarely in U.S. history has this definitional error been challenged as materially wrong (e.g., by DuBois, or the IWW). Generally, white syndicalism and white radicalism have only thought to ask white workers to stop being exclusionary. But few thought to redefine slavery as “prison labor” rather than as a threat to “free labor,” and call on white workers to make common cause with it—not even the early Marxists who arrived in the U.S. in the 1850s. This perhaps explains why today the massive incarceration of black and brown people produces disdain among most whites, rather than class solidarity and opposition to the process of criminalization.

19. For Native Americans, the question of sovereignty is already at the center; their problem has been re-constructing an allo-cultural existence that would both ground itself on the language of tradition, and speak the narratives of their present conditions as Native peoples. In a profound sense, what the Zapatistas have taught, as a native American movement, and which is partially iconized by Jack Johnson, is an alternate decolonizing epistemology, a transformed political spatiality responding to the byelocolonial state. Fanon traverses this domain in his articles on the African revolution, e.g., *L’An Cinq de la Revolution Algerienne* (Paris: Maspero, 1962), as does Amilcar Cabral. The Zapatista’s refusal to grant legitimacy to the Mexican state’s refusal to grant political autonomy to indigenous culture deconstructs the nation-state’s self-defined pretense to sovereignty, and shifts legitimacy to that very autonomy of those indigenous communities. The latter, based on elaborate systems of dialogue and consultation, escape the fraudulent claims of the Constitutional state to represent them.