University of Massachusetts Boston

ScholarWorks at UMass Boston

Publications from the Center for Women in Politics and Public Policy

Center for Women in Politics & Public Policy

1997

Beyond the Gender Gap: Women of Color in the 1996 Election

Carol Hardy-Fanta University of Massachusetts Boston, carol.hardy-fanta@umb.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umb.edu/cwppp_pubs

Part of the American Politics Commons, Race, Ethnicity and Post-Colonial Studies Commons, and the Women's Studies Commons

Recommended Citation

Hardy-Fanta, Carol, "Beyond the Gender Gap: Women of Color in the 1996 Election" (1997). *Publications from the Center for Women in Politics and Public Policy*. 36. https://scholarworks.umb.edu/cwppp_pubs/36

This Conference Proceeding is brought to you for free and open access by the Center for Women in Politics & Public Policy at ScholarWorks at UMass Boston. It has been accepted for inclusion in Publications from the Center for Women in Politics and Public Policy by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at UMass Boston. For more information, please contact scholarworks@umb.edu.

Beyond the Gender Gap: Women of Color in the 1996 Election

Carol Hardy-Fanta Director, Center for Women in Politics & Public Policy Research Associate, Gastón Institute for Latino Community Development & Public Policy

> University of Massachusetts Boston 100 Morrissey Blvd. Boston, MA 02125-3393

> > (617) 287-5546 carol.hardyfanta@ umb.edu carol.cardozo@umb.edu

Prepared for delivery at the 1997 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association Washington, D.C., August 28 - 31, 1997 ©American Political Science Association

Please do not cite without written permission of the authors.

Polling and Politics in the United States

Polling public opinion has become an important part of the democratic political process and plays a major role in U.S. elections. Mueller (1988, 33) contends that polling now serves to make public the "voice of the people" and is the way candidate and policy preferences are transmitted to the elite. In this way, polls influence electoral outcomes and policy decisions to a significant degree. Despite the bias obvious to most researchers, the sample public (typically registered voters) is often equated with the population as a whole.

Interest groups gain influence through systematic public opinion polling and, if a group is ignored, it is effectively excluded from influencing candidate selection and issue resolution (de la Garza 1987, 1991). Gender and other differences may be important because some groups may be more politically powerful than others or their preferences may be the driving force behind changes in mass opinion (Shapiro and Mahajan 1986, 44). Exit polls are one form of public opinion polling that are often seen as merely recording voter choice on election day. It should be remembered, however, that with results publicized early in the day and in some regions before others, exit poll results may also affect election outcome directly. In addition, as Cantrell (1992, 412) points out, exit polls also serve as pre-election opinion polls for the next election cycle and thus have a powerful influence on subsequent campaign strategies, political action committee (PAC) support, media coverage, and voter behavior.

Polls, the Gender Gap, and Women of Color

Since 1980 researchers, pollsters and the media have recognized and publicized the "gender gap," that is, the tendency of men and women to vote in different ways, to prefer different candidates and parties, and to have policy preferences different from men. Much has been written since then on this phenomenon (see, for example, Shapiro and Mahajan 1986; Wirls 1986; Mueller 1988; Carroll 1988; Costain 1996; Norris 1994), but the literature usually examines women and men in general, excluding any specific attention to race or ethnicity. The literature on public opinion polling has examined racial and ethnic differences in voter preference and policy choices more extensively but these studies in turn ignore the role of gender (Lovrich 1974; Cain et. al. 1991; Verba, et. al. 1993; de la Garza 1985, 1987; Brischetto 1987; Mitofsky 1987; Hero 1989).

Very few studies have examined the voter preferences and/or policy positions of women of color. Exceptions do exist, including Welch and Sigelman (1989, 1992, 1993), Montoya (1996), and Lien (1997). These studies have generally explored the question whether the gender gap that exists for Whites also exists for African American and/or Latina women. Lien, in her analysis of political participation, voting, and policy positions of whites, Asians, Blacks, and Latinos in Southern California, found, for example, that "evidence of a gender gap within each racial group is either weak or nonexistent" for women of color (1997, 26). Her study, nevertheless, "highlights the importance of including all groups of women" in studies of the gender gap (Lien 1997, 27). The specific findings of these studies will be discussed later in this paper.

Women of Color in the 1996 Election: Unheard and Unheeded

That women of color are excluded from the polling process, at least as a presence to be heeded, can be seen in reports issued during and after the 1996 election. The *Women's Monitor*, which tracked women's opinions during the 1996 presidential campaign, polled "key" audiences of women voters, e.g., Catholic women, suburban women, southern white women, etc., and did include a category called "minority women," but did not include separate categories for African American, Hispanic,¹ or Asian American women. In so doing, one can only conclude that these women are not considered "key" groups.² The same pattern occurred when election results were reported on election day and thereafter. Voter News Service (VNS) is the organization that conducts the national exit polls and supplies election results to the news media. Besides providing a breakdown of the overall outcome for President, VNS provides a breakdown of votes for President, for other offices, and on various ballot questions by gender, for *white* women and *white* men, and then by race, i.e., for Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians.³ Women of color are completely ignored.

In order to have collective influence, a group must be perceived to *be* influential and have some political clout so that candidates and parties pay attention to them. Because of the gender gap, women have been perceived as powerful and influential, to be courted by candidates and parties. In 1984, for instance, the Republicans pursued a strategy of breaking women down into important subgroups and assiduously courted those groups of women with whom they thought they had a chance to win. As a result, although there was a continuing gender gap in the 1984 election, Reagan won a majority of women's votes (Mueller 1988).

Women of color have had little such influence, although their importance cannot be denied. In the 1994 midterm elections, for example, white women shifted their allegiance to the Republican party, but African American women voted overwhelmingly Democratic. White women voted Republican by 52 percent to 46 percent, compared with the 1992 Democratic margin of 51 percent to 46 percent. Were it not for the African American women's overwhelmingly Democratic vote in 1994 -- 94 percent -- the Democrats would have lost the overall women's vote for the first time since it was counted.⁴

Furthermore, coverage of the 1996 election raised to almost icon status the role of "women" in Clinton's victory. By emphasizing the role of a gender gap irrespective of race or ethnicity, Clinton -- who received 54 percent of the votes cast by women versus 44 percent cast by men -- was portrayed as owing his victory, to a certain degree, to the "soccer mom." While it is true that many women of all races and ethnic backgrounds juggle driving their children to sports and other activities as well as work and other responsibilities, the enduring image of the "soccer mom" is suburban, middle-upper-middle class, and -- white. Considerably less coverage was given to the much larger racial divide that separated whites from African Americans and Latinos in support for Clinton.

Neither of the major party candidates, nor Ross Perot, raised as an important issue the continuing racial and ethnic divisions of the nation. As we will discuss later in this paper, Clinton would have lost the popular vote and many electoral votes were it not for the overwhelming support of African-Americans and Latinos. It was these votes, and not the gender gap, which gave Clinton his victory in key states such as Florida.⁵ The fact is, then, that the votes of racial and ethnic minorities *are* important, although they have been treated cavalierly by both parties: the Republicans seem to have written off most minority voters and the Democrats tend to take them for granted.

Even more ignored have been women of color. If women of color are to advance in the parties' political agenda and are to wield political influence, their opinions and preferences must be taken into account in polling. The importance of polling in reflecting and publicizing public opinion means that a group which is ignored has lost its chance to influence both candidates and policy makers. If women of color are to be heard, their opinions and preferences must be made known to both the general public and those elites who make the policy decisions that affect American lives. If a gender gap exists *within* African American, Latino, and/or Asian American communities, then this too, has implications for public policy. Gender solidarity might exist across racial and ethnic lines with potential alliances that can help the women's movement broaden its base and become more diverse. It is equally important to know if a gender gap does *not* exist and in what areas. In some cases, race or ethnicity may be more important than gender (Hero 1989; de la Garza, et. al. 1991; Lien 1997). The possibility of a coalition among different ethnic and racial groups is important and has policy as well as electoral implications. All of these differences or similarities must be investigated and interpreted, not only in the popular media but in the scholarly literature as well.

The Gender Gap, Voter Preference, and Policy Positions: Evidence from Prior Research

The persistent differences between men and women on different policy issues as well as voting choices and party identification have been part of the American political landscape from

the 1960s to today and have been well documented. American women have been shown to identify more strongly with the Democratic party and have consistently more liberal views than those of American men across a wide range of issues. Prior research suggests that women support reduced defense spending, government regulation and protection, and "compassion" issues such as funding for social welfare, education, health, and programs such as affirmative action. On the other hand, research has shown that, as a group, they have more traditional views in certain areas such as pornography or drug use (Shapiro and Mahajan 1986; Norris 1994; Rapoport, et. al. 1990; Costain 1996; Mueller 1988; Wirls 1986).

There are varying explanations for the gender gap, including a loosening of party ties, shifts in ideological orientation, the divergence of socioeconomic status between men and women, women's growing psychological and economic autonomy, the growth of the women's movement, and divergent developmental growth between the sexes (Norris 1994). None of these interpretations has been positively established, and there is no agreement in the literature about the definitive source of the gap. There is agreement, however, that there are several gaps, depending on marital status, age, income, education, employment status, and region (Kenski 1988). Researchers on this topic have to be sensitive to the significant diversity within groups of men and women and this includes issues of race and ethnicity (Norris 1994).

In a study of gender and political participation among ethnic groups, Schlozman, et. al. (1995, 287) concluded that questions of gender differences in issue agendas have to be posed as "Which men? Which women?" as there are notable within-group differences as well as differences by gender.

Race/Ethnicity and The Gender Gap: Recent Research

Welch and Sigelman (1989) examined the attitudes of African-American men and women as revealed in the 1987 General Social Survey (GSS) and found an almost complete lack of differentiation across a wide range of political attitudes, although Black women were more sympathetic to government welfare spending and spending to improve conditions of Blacks. They concluded that race was a more salient basis of political differentiation than gender. Compared to whites, Black men and women held much more liberal opinions on compassion issues and both were more likely to be Democrats than white women or men.

In another study, however, Welch and Sigelman (1992) examined the gender gap among Hispanics, African-Americans and Whites based on six exit polls in 1980, 1984, and 1988 and found a gender gap among all three groups, though of differing sizes. Women in all three groups were consistently more liberal and Democratic. The Anglo gender gap was larger than for African-Americans and Hispanics and more significant. (The authors point out, however, that

the sample size for Anglos was much larger than for either of the other two groups which almost guarantees that any difference, however small, is significant.) The Hispanic gender gap was negligible for ideology, larger for Democratic party identification, and strongest in vote choice. They found that, when other factors are controlled, there was also a gender gap for African Americans that was as large as for Hispanics and, in the case of vote choice, as large as for Anglos. Of course, one limitation of this study is that it did not include any of the substantive issues on which women of color (as well as white women, of course) might demonstrate a difference with the men of their respective groups.

Montoya (1996) stresses that this 1992 study is limited because it studied only exit polls, eliminating non-voters and non-citizens, especially important when analyzing Latino public opinion and because it did not disaggregate the Hispanic population by national origin. Montoya also points out that the few studies on Latino public opinion are limited geographically (de la Garza 1985, 1991; Lovrich 1974). Her study analyzes Latino public opinion with data based on the 1990 Latino National Political Survey (LNPS), using a sample of 2,676 respondents, citizen and non-citizen, disaggregated by Mexican, Cuban, and Puerto Rican origin. Participants were asked to respond to traditional public opinion survey questions, including those on defense spending and social welfare issues including welfare, education, health, and child care services. In addition, three questions were asked concerning the social and political roles of women.

The results of Montoya's study show a very small gender gap in certain areas and among certain groups. For instance, on defense spending the gap between Mexican men and women was small, with 34 percent of women favoring decreased military spending versus 32 percent of men; more Puerto Rican men than women favored decreased military spending (as opposed to the large and reverse gender gap among Anglos) and most Cuban men and women favored increased military spending. A multivariate analysis considering various socioeconomic factors added to gender revealed no great gender differences in social welfare policy nor any consistent gender differentiation with respect to military spending. Latinas were more likely than Latinos to favor more modern roles for women but the differences were not large. And Cuban men were more likely than Cuban women to favor careers outside the home for women.

If African American women and Latinas have been largely ignored in the literature on the gender gap and in national polling, the lack of information about Asian-American women is startling. There has been very little scholarship on the political participation and opinions of Asian American women and whether they differ from Asian American men, whites, or other minorities (Lien 1994, 1997).

In one of the few exceptions, Lien (1997) examined public opinion data for four racial groups, including Asians, using a 1993 Los Angeles Times survey in Southern California. All

women of color were far more supportive of Clinton as a candidate in 1992 and more supportive of affirmative action in college admissions than were white women. In an analysis of this data the author found that gender was a good predictor of a respondent's party registration and political ideology: women were more likely to register as Democrats and have a liberal ideology. However, Asians were marginally less likely than whites to be liberal and being an Asian of either gender was unrelated to presidential vote choice.

Race was a significant predictor of all aspects of political participation and political orientations except for ideology in this study. Compared to being white, being Asian meant that one was less likely to vote or participate in other activities; it also meant that one was less likely to support affirmative action. Asian women did not differ that much from Asian men in the directions of party registration, political ideology, presidential vote choice, and opinions towards affirmative action. The findings of the lack of gender differences among the three non-white groups and the greater differences between white women and men suggest that the role of gender may vary among the four groups. Race appears to be a more salient predictor than gender, but further studies are needed.

Hypotheses: Does the Interaction of Race/Ethnicity and Gender Matter?

H1: In keeping with the results of prior research, gender differences among Latinos will be smaller than for whites but larger than for African Americans in terms of vote choice, party identification, political ideology, social welfare and "compassion issues," and immigration policy.

H2: The effects of gender among Asian Americans will be different than for Latinos and African Americans both in direction and extent.

H3: For Latinos, African Americans, and Asian Americans, race/ethnicity will be more central than gender in determining candidate preference and policy positions that have a direct impact on their racial/ethnic group.

H4: Due to the different national origins of the preponderance of Latinos in New York, California, and Florida, state level differences will be evident in candidate preference and certain policy positions.

The few studies that examine gender differences among non-white groups in public opinion indicate that more research is necessary. This study begins the needed analysis by examining the political behavior and opinions of women of color using data from the 1996 election exit polls. Exit poll data, despite some major limitations which will be discussed below, offer the opportunity to study a national sample of voters not only in terms of candidate preference but also on a wide variety of policy positions. It is only by including women of color in voting and opinion polling that their distinctive voices will be heard and heeded.

Data and Methods

The data analyzed in this paper are from the Voter News Service (VNS) exit poll datasets for the 1996 Presidential election.⁶ These include the National exit poll and 51 individual State exit poll datasets (including the District of Columbia). The exit poll results are based on interviews with a two stage probability sample of voters exiting polling places around the county on election day.⁷ All analysis is based on weighted tabulations.

Bivariate and multivariate analyses were conducted on the National sample for presidential vote, vote for US Congress, and perceptions of economic and social conditions as well as various policy positions such as abortion, "social welfare" or "compassion" issues, views on the role of government, and the federal welfare reform law.

We also conducted bivariate and multivariate analysis by race/ethnicity and gender using the State samples for California, New York, Florida, Texas. They were included to test the hypothesis (H3) that when certain policy issues have direct import for certain groups, any gender impact is mediated by the interests of the racial/ethnic group. California, New York and Texas were included therefore because of their ballot questions concerning immigration policies which directly affect Latinos and Asians.

The California, Florida, and New York data also allowed us to test the hypothesis suggested by gender gap research: that women are more "compassionate" and concerned for social welfare than men. Two California ballot propositions were analyzed: Prop. 209 (Affirmative Action) and Prop. 215 (the medical use of marijuana). The Florida data were analyzed on whether respondents' highest priority was protecting the environment versus encouraging economic growth; and New York for a ballot question on the welfare reform issue. Future analysis is planned on additional states.⁸

Because the dependent variables are dichotomous, logistic regression is used as opposed to ordinary least squares regression to estimate the independent effect of race/ethnicity, gender, and the interaction of race/ethnicity and gender combined.

Sample Sizes and Data Limitations: The number and percent of respondents in each racial/ethnic group for the National and selected State exit poll datasets are shown in Table 1. There are several important limitations that need to be kept in mind when considering the results of exit poll data analysis, particularly of minority populations. We are well aware that criticism has been levied against the use of exit polls to measure public opinion, particularly for studying African Americans, Latinos, Asian Americans and other non-white groups. Montoya (1996), for

example, warns that these polls capture only the opinions of *voters* and the results cannot be generalized to the population as a whole. Since Latinos, in particular, vote considerably less than their share of the population, demographic differences between voters and non-voters can have a serious impact in generalizing from exit polls to the Latino population. While there is some precedent in exploring the question of the gender gap for women of color using exit poll data (Welch and Sigelman 1992), Montoya criticizes this study precisely because of its use of exit poll data and their lack of representativeness in terms of public opinion.

Other criticisms include: sampling bias introduced by how precincts are chosen; small sample size relative to whites for African Americans and, especially, Latinos and Asian Americans leading to extremely large margins of error for these groups; the language available to the respondents; interviewer effects (race and sex); and the lack of distinction by national-origin group for Latinos (i.e., Puerto Rican, Mexican/Chicano, Cuban, etc.) and Asian Americans (Chinese, Korean, Vietnamese, etc.). For a more complete discussion of these data limitations, please refer to the Appendix. It might be noted, however, that the 4.3 percent of the National sample that is Latino; in 1992, for example, de la Garza and DeSipio (1996) estimate that in 1992, the percent was 3.7. We would like to point out we do not include Asian Americans in state-level analysis other than for California due to the small sample size in those states.

Another problem with the data results from the fact that there are in fact four versions of the National exit poll questionnaire. These versions all include the key questions about vote for president and other candidates as well as race, sex, and income. Substantive questions such as opinions about abortion and welfare reform, for example, were asked of only about one-quarter of the respondents. This reduced the sample size available for analysis on certain variables.

We believe that, despite these limitations, exploring the interaction of gender and race/ethnicity using exit polls is valid, not because the polls reveal the public opinions of women of color in the population as a whole, but because of the importance voter public opinion in *shaping* U.S. politics as discussed above. These data are an untapped source of public opinion for groups of voters who are too often unheard and unheeded. Where gender differences within race/ethnic groups emerge (or commonalities exist), future studies can be designed to test how accurate the results are with more representative data samples.

Findings

The "Soccer Mom" Did Not Elect Clinton

The bivariate analysis we conducted (see Table 2) reaffirms what is now common knowledge: that a much higher percentage of women (54 percent) than men (43.5 percent) voted to reelect President Clinton (p<.001). Also reported in the media after the election, but receiving somewhat less attention, was the overwhelming support of African Americans and Latinos. Table 3 shows that 83.7 percent of African Americans and 71.7 percent of Latinos voted for Clinton compared to only 43.4 percent of whites. If white votes alone had been counted, Dole would be president, having won 45.6 percent of the white vote (p<.001). (This table also suggests that, as others have found, Asian Americans seem to vote more like whites than African Americans and Latinos.)

None of this should be news. Anyone who followed the reports after the election could reach the same conclusion. Most reports did not include a breakdown by race *and* gender, however, and thus missed a key factor in the outcome of the election. Table 4 illustrates why Clinton would not have won (at least the popular vote) if only white votes had been counted despite the apparently large gender gap. While it is true that there was still a ten point gender gap in the vote for Clinton between white women (48.2 percent) and white men (38.1 percent), 42.6 percent of white women and 48.8 percent of white men voted for Dole. Thus, the "Clinton-Dole gap" of 5.6 percentage points among white *women* was effectively canceled out by the 10.7 percentage point "Dole-Clinton gap" among white *men*.

Also evident in Table 4 is a fact that was not reported in the post-election coverage: that there was an equally large and statistically significant gender gap among African American voters as among whites: 88.6 percent of African American women compared to 78.5 percent of African American men voted for Clinton (p<.01). Even more striking is that the gender gap for Latinos was even larger: 13.4 percentage points; 77.9 percent of Latinas compared to 64.5 percent of Latino men voted for Clinton (p<.10). There was no significant gender difference for Asian Americans. These findings are consistent with prior research that found women of color to support Clinton (Lien 1997, 18).

In addition to the bivariate analysis that yielded these results, we conducted multivariate analysis to test the hypothesis that, at least in the case of African Americans and Latinos, there is an independent effect of the interaction of gender and race/ethnicity on presidential vote controlling for key demographic factors. Results of a logistic regression analysis was conducted on the National sample with the dependent variable "Vote for Clinton." Table 5 reports these results.

For this table (and the subsequent logistic regression tables discussed later), the first column (I) tests the independent effect of gender; the second column (II), the independent effect of race/ethnicity; and the third column (III) the interaction effect of race/ethnicity and gender on

the dependent variable under analysis. The last (III) allows us to examine how being African American *and* female, Latino *and* female, and Asian *and* female contributes to the model beyond what gender and race can explain separately.

Sociodemographic factors (i.e., income, age, and ideology) are included as important variables in estimating Presidential vote. It is important to remember that, when the interaction terms are included in the models, the comparison group becomes white males and "female" comes to mean "white women." It is also important to note as well that, among the data limitations discussed above, the most serious in terms of the multivariate analysis is the fact that education was not asked of all respondents in the National sample, thus precluding our ability to include this important demographic variables in the analysis. Tests were conducted to ascertain effects of this limitation and we found that not including education did not seriously affect the results; rather than exclude almost half of the cases for the sake of including education, we opted for maximizing the available number of cases, especially given the relatively small numbers of women of color respondents in the sample.⁹ In the following analyses, income was coded 1 for less than \$50,000; age was coded 1 for over 40 years; and ideology was coded 1 for liberal (conservative and moderate were coded 0).

Gender, race/ethnicity, and the interaction of gender and race/ethnicity were good predictors of presidential vote choice. As can be seen in Table 5 (I), female, income and ideology were good predictors of a vote for Clinton in 1996. Being Latino and, to an even greater degree, African American were extremely strong predictors (model II) and led to a substantial improvement in the model.

In model III we see that, while race/ethnicity and gender continue to be strong predictors, the unique experience of being a Latina or an African American woman is also a good predictor, independent of race/ethnicity and gender alone. In fact, the coefficient for the interaction variable of Latina*female was a larger than that for female (i.e. white woman) although, probably because of smaller sample size, the statistical significance is smaller. The coefficients for the interaction variables of race/ethnicity and gender for Latinas and African American women were also larger than lower income or age. These findings confirm Welch and Sigelman's (1992) study of exit polls conducted in the 1980s that a gender gap does exist for vote choice among African American and Latina women. It disagrees with Lien's findings using a population sample from a 1993 Los Angeles poll. It may be her study captured effects within the respective populations that were different than our study of voters.

These findings suggest that, combined with the high significance of the variable "income less than \$50,000," we conclude that the "soccer mom" with its image of white, middle/upper middle class, women as the group to whom Clinton owes his victory in 1996 is erroneous.

Instead, it seems that it was the Latino and African American voter -- with greatest support from Latinas and African American women -- who gave him his win.

Partisanship and Ideology: Continued Trends: Political ideology is clearly one of the major contributors to Clinton's win, as seen in the strong and highly significant predictive ability of that variable in the multivariate analysis shown in Table 6. Our analysis suggests that, while a gender gap exists for women in general, some of the strength in terms of political ideology comes from women of color. Table 6 shows, for example, that a higher percentage of white women voted Republican (50.0 percent) than Democratic (48.1 percent) in races for the US House of Representatives; the same is true for US Senate races (49.7 percent Republican to 48.5 percent Democratic). While the percentage point difference is small, because of the large N, these differences were highly significant (p<.001).

In contrast, Democratic congressional candidates received, again overwhelming, support from African Americans and Latinos whereas Asian Americans, in House races at least, resembled white voters. It is true, nevertheless, that a moderate gender gap exists between African American, Latino, and Asian American men and women in partisanship in votes for the US House but the difference was only significant for African Americans (p<.001). There were no significant differences in partisanship in votes for Senate candidates.

Tables 7 and 8 offer the results of our bivariate and multivariate analyses of party identification and political ideology. Table 7 shows that, for the voters in the 1996 National exit poll sample, there are significant gender differences in Democratic party identification for all race/ethnicity voting groups: 8.5 percentage points for whites, 11.6 for African Americans, 18 for Latinos, and 13.7 for Asian Americans. These differences were highly significant (p<.001) for the first three groups and moderately significant (p<.05) for Asian Americans. There was about a 5 point gender gap for whites (p<.001) and African Americans (p<.05) on political ideology.

The results of our multivariate analysis in Table 8 show that, while gender is an strong predictor of party identification, race is even stronger (note the improvement from I to II). However, the table shows that there is an independent effect of the race and gender interaction variables for Latinos and African Americans. Model III reveals that being an African American woman and being a Latina woman were strong predictors of being a registered Democrat, independent of the separate effects of race, gender, income, age, and ideology. There was no independent effect of these interaction variables in predicting a liberal ideology although the independent effects of gender and race separately were as strong as the demographic variables.¹⁰

Perceptions of Economic and Social Conditions: The exit poll data are useful in exploring the public opinions of women of color (at least for voters) for reasons that go beyond simply candidate preference, partisanship, and ideology. A number of questions are routinely

asked that capture concerns of the moment and that reflect opinions that shape voting patterns. In fact, part of the explanation for Clinton's win may lie in the race/ethnicity and gender gap in the certain perceptions the respondents had about their relative financial status. Latina women and African American men and women were more likely than whites of either sex to perceive their family's current financial situation as "better today" than four years ago and African Americans in general felt "safer" than four years ago. Although the baseline from which the different races perceive improvement in finances or safety may differ, the perceived improvement probably helped Clinton among Latina women and African Americans but hurt him among whites, regardless of gender. And, the gender differences that were evident were quite small and only mildly significant.

Heeding Women of Color: Where They Stand on the Issues

Given the importance of public opinion polling in shaping policy, any opportunity to examine where women of color stand on the various policy issues currently under legislative and public debate should be seized. In other words, the purpose of this study is not simply to test the existence or lack thereof of "the gender gap" but break with the common practice of subsuming the views of women of color as voters under an all-purpose "woman" category. The 1996 exit polls, despite the aforementioned limitations, offers such an opportunity to examine their views on abortion, "social welfare" versus "taxes," "foreign policy," "crime," the "economy/jobs" and the "deficit," as well as the role of government and the current federal welfare reform law.

The literature on the gender gap suggests that women in general have a stake in the abortion issue, are more "compassionate" and concerned about education (Sholzman 1995) and social welfare issues (Welch and Sigelman 1989) than taxes, the deficit, foreign policy, etc. (See, for example, Montoya 1996).¹¹ Prior research has also concluded that women are more likely than men to support an expanded role for government including in the area of income redistribution (Shapiro and Mahajan 1986) and affirmative action (e.g., Lien 1997).

We conducted a bivariate analysis of the National exit poll data on: abortion, social welfare vs. other issues, role of government, and the federal welfare reform law. We also selected two for multivariate analysis to test the hypothesis that women, including women of color, are more inclined to favor social welfare issues over others in determining vote choice and to be more "compassionate" in their position on welfare reform.

Abortion: This issue will be discussed first because -- rightly or wrongly -- it has become a salient issue when considering the gender gap. Table 9 shows the results of the bivariate analysis of this and the other issues under discussion. African American female and male voters, Latino male voters, and Asian American of both sexes who responded to the exit poll support abortion rights more than the white female respondents. On this issue, Latina voters

do seem to respond as expected: more conservative than their white or African American counterparts: only 51.2 percent of Latina respondents compared to 60.0 percent of white women and 68.1 percent of African American women respondents said that abortion should be legal in all or most cases. There was a substantial gender gap among Latinos: 65.9 percent of Latino men compared to 51.2 percent of Latina women indicated that this was their position; in contrast, the gender gap among white respondents was relatively small (3.1 percentage points (p<.01) and insignificant for African Americans. Other than for whites (who, by virtue of their numbers in the sample, almost always produce significant results), the differences for the other groups -- no matter how large -- are not statistically significant.

The Latino gender gap among Latino voters on this issue is much larger than previously found among the population as a whole. De la Garza et al. (1992, 111), for example, found gender gaps among the three major Latino subgroups to be +2.6 for Puerto Ricans and -7.9 and -7.8 for Mexican Americans and Cubans, respectively. Overall support among Latinos in that study was also somewhat lower ranging from a low of 42.5 percent support among Puerto Rican women and 43.4 percent among Mexican American women to a high of 52.2 percent among Cuban women.¹² This finding does suggest that the voter sample is somewhat more "pro-choice" than the Latino population as a whole. (Please note that the Asian American sample is extremely small, the results should not be considered reliable or valid but does appear to be in the opposite direction from whites and African Americans.) What these findings suggest is that, while there might be solidarity between African Americans of both sexes with white women and Latino men on the abortion issue, other issues may be more pressing in those communities that take precedence.

Social Welfare: The view that women are more "compassionate" than men suggests that women would be more inclined to vote for health, social welfare, and programs to aid minorities over military spending.¹³ While "cutting defense" was not on the questionnaire, a question included on all versions of the National poll was "What issue mattered most in your vote for president?" The choices included Foreign Policy, Education, Medicare/Social Security, Federal Budget Deficit, Taxes, and Economy/Jobs, Crime/Drugs. Several of these categories are collapsed in the analysis: Education/Medicare/Social Security, Economy/Jobs, Taxes/Federal Budget Deficit and Crime/Drugs. As can be seen in the second section of Table 9, the results suggest that: (1) Foreign policy is not a major interest for women *or* men in the recent election with less than 5 percent of all groups selecting that item. (2) There exists a substantial and significant gender gap among white women in the "compassion" area of Education/Medicare/Social Security with 30.2 percent of white momen compared to 18.6 percent of white men (p<.001) picking those issues as the ones that mattered most in their vote for President. No gap exists at all for African Americans; their position as a racial group resembles that of white

women. There was a smaller but statistically significant gap for Latinos (34.0 percent, 27.2 percent men; p<.05). While the numbers are very small for Asian Americans, the gap seems to be about the same size and direction. (3) The economy and jobs was the next largest concern for African Americans of both sexes; about 20 percent of whites and Latinos checked this issue with very small gender differences. (4) Taxes and the federal budget deficit was an area of large gender differences with 31.0 percent of white men compared to 21 percent of white women checking those issues (p<.001). An even larger gap in the same direction exists for Latino voters: 20.6 percent of men compared to only 8.8 percent of Latinas selected this issue (p<.05). African American men and women were closer to the position of Latina women than white men or women with only 9.5 percent of African American women and 11.5 percent of African American men selecting this issue. Again, the Asian positions are harder to interpret: with the exception of Education/Medicare/Social Security where their positions are in the same direction as white and Latina women, a very large percent of women (40.3 percent) chose taxes and the budget deficit as their issue that mattered and did so to a greater degree than Asian American men: 22.7 percent. Because of the sample size, however, and the other data limitations discussed above, these figures should be interpreted with extreme caution.

Role of government: Another "compassion" issue addressed in the exit poll is whether government should do more to solve problems or government is doing too many things better left to business or individuals. There is indeed a large and significant gender gap among whites: 41.8 percent of white women compared to 30.8 percent of white men agreed with the first statement (p<.001). There was a small but significant gap among Latinos (60.7 percent vs. 57.3 percent; p<.05). The number of Asian Americans in this subsample is even smaller but, the gender gap is large. What are clear from these data, however, is that the gap between the races is obviously much larger than any gender gap with African Americans and Latinos (both women and men) being more than twice as likely to look for an expanded role for government than white men.

Federal Welfare Reform Law: A related finding is that, while there was a very small gender gap among white women (16.5 percent) and men (13.5 percent; p<.001) who agreed that the Federal Welfare Reform Law "cuts too much," African American women (31.7 percent), African American men (30.0 percent) and Latina women (29.6 percent) were much more likely to hold that position. There was a statistically significant difference (p<.05) among Latinos with only 12.7 percent of Latino men holding that position (a percentage similar to white men).

Other Issues: Roughly similar percentages across the racial groups (7-8 percent for whites, African Americans and Latinos) indicated that Crime/Drugs was the issue that mattered most in their vote for President. We would like to remind the reader that a wide variety of items were included on the exit poll questionnaires that cannot be analyzed in this paper. Given the

concern about crime that occupies the nation in the nightly news as well as the percent of the voters who are concerned, one item was of particular interest: over half of the white male voters (50.6 percent) in the national sample reported owning a gun; this was larger than for any other group.

Multivariate analysis of "Social Welfare Issue" and "Welfare Reform": Multivariate analysis of social welfare as the issue that mattered most to the respondents in their choice of president and position on federal welfare reform shows contradictory results. Table 10 shows that gender is indeed a strong predictor of concern for education and the social safety net (Social Welfare I). (Low income, ideology and being over 40 were also strong predictors.) Race alone was a moderate predictor for Latinos and African Americans (II) but did not add much to the overall model. When the interaction variables of race and gender were added in III, gender, race (for Latinos and especially African Americans) became even stronger -- and there was an independent effect for African American women. This is a puzzling result because of the negative sign for that group of women given the fact that, in the bivariate analysis, Education/Medicare/Social Security was chosen by the highest percentage of African American women as the issue that mattered most in their vote. One may interpret this result as more evidence in support of H3 -- that race is more central in determining policy positions in areas that have a direct impact on a given racial/ethnic group.

The test whether the interaction of race and gender has any independent effect on whether a voter holds the position that the federal welfare reform law "cuts too much" shows that there is no such effect. In fact, in the three models on the right side of Table 10, one can see that gender, lower income and a liberal ideology alone (i.e., model I) has the best predictive value (82.0% predicted correct). Adding race actually decreases the value of the model (although African American is a strong predictor alone, and Latino weak but mildly significant). The interaction variables introduced with gender in III are not significant, and the slight improvement over II is probably due to the small and mildly significant reintroduction of female (white women).

Women of Color, Vote Choice and Policy Positions: Findings from Selected States

We conducted a bivariate and multivariate analysis of the vote for Clinton in four states: California, New York, Florida, and Texas. The first three states were analyzed to test whether, with larger portions of the Latino population in California being Mexican American compared to more Puerto Ricans in New York, and Cuban Americans in Florida, we could deduce from these admittedly rough proxies for ethnic subgroup any differences in the interaction of race and gender (H4). From Table 11 we can see that, indeed, Latinos in New York (proxy for Puerto Rican voters) were most likely to vote for Clinton; California (proxy for Mexican American voters) was next, and Florida (with the traditionally more conservative Cuban American subgroup), was least likely. In addition, the gender gap among African Americans was even larger (15.3 percentage points) in California (p<.05) and about the same (10.8 percentage points) in Florida (p<.10), larger than that for whites.

Most striking is that there was a large and very significant difference between Latinas and Latino voters in Florida and Texas: 51.0 percent of Latinas compared to 32.5 percent of Latinos in Florida and 81.7 percent compared to 68.3 percent in Texas voted for Clinton. The gender gap among Latinos was, therefore, 18.5 percentage points in Florida and 13.4 points in Texas (p<.001). This runs counter to much of the prior research that found only small gender differences for Latinos in vote choice (Welch and Sigelman 1992; Brischetto 1987).

The Asian American vote was only possible to analyze in California where the trend was reversed: more than half of the men voted for Clinton compared to 40.0 percent for Dole; the women's vote was split evenly. The apparent small difference in vote for Clinton between Asian American women and men is insignificant statistically but appears to be in the opposite direction from other women of color (providing some support for H2) and from Lien's finding (1997, 21).

Table 11 also indicates that Texas is one of the large states where the gender gap for Clinton (34.5 percent women versus 26.5 percent men) among whites is outweighed by the fact that 59.9 percent of white women voted for Dole. And, in Florida, the 14.6 percent gap between white men who voted for Dole versus Clinton canceled out Clinton's advantage among white women. The results of the multivariate analysis (not shown) reveal that, while the bivariate analysis indicate large gender differences, the interaction of race and ethnicity do not add much beyond race and gender alone in predicting a vote for Clinton.

Ballot Questions: Testing the "Compassion" Argument in Selected States

One of the primary reasons we selected these four states for special attention was because of the policy questions that appeared on their ballots. Voters in California, Texas, and New York were asked "Should legal immigration into the United States be: Increased, Decreased, or Kept about the same?" California voters were also asked to vote on affirmative action (Proposition 209) and the medical use of marijuana (Proposition 215). Voters in Florida were asked whether their highest priority was to protect the environment or encourage economic growth and New Yorkers voted on whether the federal welfare reform "cut too much, not enough, or about right." All of these questions embody one of the frequently proposed ideas about women's vote: that women are, in general, more likely to vote out of "compassion." On the other hand, certain groups, such as Latinos, and especially Latina women, are purportedly to be more conservative. It is therefore useful in our effort to understand how the gender gap notion relates to women of color to identify whether women of color resemble their male counterparts or white women on these policy issues.

Immigration: Table 12 shows the results for bivariate analysis by race and gender of the percent who responded that legal immigration should be decreased. Almost half of white (49.6 percent) and African American women (49.8 percent) in California and well over half of white women in New York (57.3 percent) and Texas (63.8 percent) checked that legal immigration into the United States should be "decreased." There was a slight gender gap in California and Texas among white women with them *more* inclined than their male counterparts toward an *anti-immigration* position (p<.05). In the case of African American voters, the gender gap was slight, not significant, and in the opposite direction.

Given that, especially in California and Texas, immigration policy has the greatest impact on Latinos, the results of the analysis for these two states are of particular interest. De la Garza, et al., found that "[m]ore than 65 percent of each of the Latino national-origin groups as well as Anglos believed that there were currently too many immigrants coming to the U.S." (1992, 100). They did not distinguish, however, between legal versus illegal immigration, and did not conduct any gender analysis. We found less support for decreasing *legal* immigration than their results (which included *illegal* immigration) would suggest.

In addition, we found a significant gender gap among Latinos with a higher percentage of Latinas indicating that immigration should be decreased: 41.4 percent of Latinas compared to 33.5 percent of Latino men in California (p<.10) and 40 percent of Latinas compared to 32.7 percent of Latino men in Texas. The Texas difference was highly significant at p<.001.

Immigration policy has a major impact on Asian Americans in California as well, where they make up about nine percent of the state population (Oliver, et al. 1995, 1-2). The gender gap was also large (37.3 percent women compared to 16.2 percent men), in the same direction as Latinos, and mildly significant (p<.10).

These findings would suggest that, on this policy under intense debate and with considerable impact on the future racial makeup of the United States, the "compassion" argument does not hold up for white, Latina, or Asian American women respondents in California nor for white and Latina women respondents in Texas.

Multivariate analysis of this policy question was also conducted to see if there were any independent effects of the interaction of gender and race on whether a respondent indicated that his/her position was that legal immigration should be decreased and whether the three states differed substantially on this issue. Table 13, which includes only the III level models with all variables entered, reveals that race is a strong predictor of disagreeing with the position that legal immigration should be decreased for Asian Americans in California and for Latinos in Texas; a

mildly good predictor of disagreeing in California and New York for Latinos. There were no independent effects for the interaction variables. The strongest demographic predictors for disagreeing with the position were lower education and not holding a liberal ideology. Gender was a strong predictor for white women in Texas of the position that legal immigration should be decreased, a finding consistent with the bivariate analysis shown in Table 12. This finding suggests that Latinos will find few allies among whites, including white women, around the issue of immigration and that, in all the states the racial divide around this issue is much greater than any gender gap.

Affirmative Action: The California exit poll questionnaire asked voters about their stance on affirmative action with the question: "How did you vote on Proposition 209, "which prohibits discrimination or preferential treatment?" A "no" vote indicated support for affirmative action. As can be seen in the bivariate results of Table 14 there was 5.8 percentage point gender gap among white women in the predicted direction (37.6 women, 31.8 men; p<.001). There was no statistically significant difference between African American and Latino men and women but the overall support for affirmative action was almost twice as large: 67.5 percent of African American and 64.8 percent of Latino voters in California voted "no" on this ballot question. There was also no significant difference for Asian Americans although a somewhat higher percentage of male voters in this group (52.6 percent) compared to the women (46.1 percent) voted for affirmative action.

In the first three columns of Table 15 we present the multivariate results on this issue, gender clearly was a good predictor for a no vote on Proposition 209 (I). Race was even a stronger predictor (II) and there were no independent effects of being a Latina, African American or Asian American woman (III).

''Medical Use of Marijuana:'' A "yes" vote on Proposition 215 indicated support for the medical use of marijuana. Referring back to Table 14, one can see that there was no significant difference among white voters on this issue with slightly more than half of white women (57.0 percent) and white men (53.4 percent) indicating that they voted "yes." There were statistically significant differences among African American and Latino voters, however. African American women were substantially more likely to vote "yes" on this question (78.8 percent) compared to African American men (63.7 percent; p<.10) but the view that Latina women are more conservative on "traditional values" seems to be borne out in this sample of California voters: only 50.6 percent of Latina women but 65.0 percent of Latino men voted "yes" for the medical use of marijuana (p<.05). Asian Americans in general seemed less supportive of this measure but the difference and the apparent gender difference was not significant.

These findings were borne out in the multivariate analysis on this issue shown in Table 15. there was no independent effect of gender (I) or for white women (III) in support for the

medical use of marijuana which would be indicated by a "yes" vote on proposition 215. Race (II) was an excellent predictor for Asian Americans and a good predictor for African Americans of *not* voting "yes" on the proposition. Independent effects of the interaction of race and gender were found only for Latina women (III). As suggested in the bivariate analysis of the previous table, being a Latina woman voter (in California) was a mildly good predictor of *not* supporting the medical use of marijuana, in a pattern different from the other non-white women but does support our hypothesis that, on some issues, Latinas would be more conservative contributing to an overall gender gap smaller than for white women (H1). (It should be pointed out that, on this issue, being lower income, younger, and liberal were, by far and more consistently across the models, the best predictors of a "yes" vote on this issue.)

Welfare Reform: The results in New York on the question of welfare reform (refer back to Table 14) mirror the national results shown in Table 9 with white and Latina women more inclined to say that the federal welfare reform law "cuts too much" than the men of their respective groups. The only difference between the National sample and the state sample for New York is that, in the former, there was no gender gap with 31 percent of African Americans in general agreeing with that statement whereas in New York 45.1 percent of the African American men compared to 38 percent of the women agreed. (This apparent difference was not statistically significant, perhaps due to the small sample size.) The Latino gender gap of almost 18 percentage points was in the same direction as the National sample but, again, not significant.

Environment vs. Economic Growth: Shapiro and Mahajan (1986) suggest that women are more willing to support policies that regulate and protect consumers, citizens, and the environment. The exit poll for Florida asked voters whether their highest priority was "protect the environment" or "encourage economic growth." It is evident from Table 14 that if any gender gap exists, is true only for whites: 54.4 percent of white women compared to 44.5 percent of white men indicated that they voted "protect the environment" (p<.01). In contrast, there was no gender gap at all among African Americans and Latinos; in addition, the priority was reversed for African Americans with 54.8 percent of women compared to 50.1 percent of men indicating that "encourage economic growth" was their highest priority. Interestingly, Latino men and women voted more like white men with less than half checking "protect the environment."

Summary of Findings: Table 16 summarizes the gender gap findings for both the National poll and polls from the selected states. On the left is a list of the variables included in the study. In each column the first number for a given variable is the gender gap. A positive number indicates that gender gap (in percentage points) is in the direction of more women than men of the given group who voted or held the policy position under consideration. A negative sign means that the percentage point gap is in the direction of more men than women. The

significance of the gender gap is indicated by asterisks for each group as explained in the note to the table.

Under the gender gap for in the columns for African Americans, Latinos, and Asian Americans, an additional number is in parenthesis. This number is the race/ethnic divide between the race/ethnic group and whites. A positive number means that a higher percentage of the racial/ethnic group voted or held the given policy position than whites. Thus, in the "Vote for Clinton" line in the African American column, the "10.1**/(40.4)" numbers mean that the percentage of African American women who voted for Clinton was 10.1 percentage points higher than the men (p<.01) but that there was an even larger racial divide between African Americans and whites of 40.4 percentage points. The first N under the variable name is for the gender gap and the second (N) in parenthesis is for the racial/ethnic divide. Significance for the racial/ethnic divide is attached to the (N) in parenthesis. As indicated in the note at the bottom of the table, all racial/ethnic divide figures are significant at p<.001 except for "Protect the environment: Priority" for the state of Florida.

For the National poll, looking at the White column, it is evident that there is a gender gap ranging from 3.0 on welfare reform to a high of 11.6 percentage points for white women showing them to be more likely to vote for Clinton, be Democrats, liberal, support abortion, choose education/Medicare/Social Security as the issue that mattered most in their vote for president, to think government should do more to solve problems, and to think the federal welfare reform law "cuts too much."

For African Americans there are only large gender gaps that are significant for vote choice and party identification; the gender gap for ideology is similar to whites in size. On the other issues there is no significant gender gap at all (except for a mildly significant gap on the medical use of marijuana; this is, however, more significant and larger than that for white women).. The race/ethnic divide, in contrast, is much more substantial on almost all the issues ranging from a low of 8.1 percentage points for abortion and 8.9 for social welfare issues, to 40.4 percentage points (Clinton vote), 48.2 points (Democratic), and 31.6 points for "government should do more to solve problems."

The Latino gender gap was largest and most significant for party identification (18.0) and there were other moderate gender gaps in the same direction as for white women on social welfare issues (9.3) and vote for Clinton (13.4). As was discussed earlier, these gender gaps were larger than for whites and African Americans. The gender gap among Latinos on feeling that welfare reform cuts too much (16.9) is much larger than among whites. On the abortion issue, Latinas clearly differ from their white counterparts and do not support abortion. The race/ethnic divide, again, is extremely large on vote for Clinton (28.3), party identification

(36.7), and role of government (22.5). The race/ethnic divide on ideology and welfare reform is also larger than the white gender gap as well.

As can be seen in the Asian American column, the only significant gender gap was in party identification (but the significance was much smaller than for the other two minority groups). It is clear from the results of this study that, without a larger and more representative sample size for Asian Americans, it is very difficult to have any confidence in the results for this group.

It is in the summary analysis of the State poll ballot questions that the most striking conclusions may be drawn on the interaction of race/ethnicity and gender. Whereas women in general have been portrayed in the literature as more "compassionate" than men vis-a-vis their support of such measures as affirmative action, protecting the environment, programs to aid minorities, etc., the second half of Table 16 suggests that self interest may play a larger role than the essentialist argument of women's greater "compassion." White women do support affirmative action (from which they have benefitted) and are more inclined to have as their highest priority in Florida "protect the environment" as opposed to "encourage economic growth." However, in California and Texas they are actually *more* inclined than men to say legal immigration should be decreased. There are no significant gender differences for African Americans (other than a mild support among women for the medical use of marijuana). The gender gap on the latter question actually indicates that Latinas are *less* inclined to support such a measure. And, interestingly, in California and Texas, at least, Latinas (and Asian women in California) are more in favor of decreasing legal immigration than their male counterparts.

Discussion

What message can be drawn from these results? The apparently simple question this and other studies have been trying to answer is: Is there a gender gap among women of color similar to that of white women? We would like to propose, however, that, based on our analysis, this may be the wrong question. While it is true that one purpose of this study was to test whether there is a gender gap among African Americans, Latinos, and Asian Americans, we also hoped to examine some of the policy positions women from these groups hold -- as having merit in their own right -- in other words, to pay heed to the distinctive opinions of, at least, women of color who voted in the 1996 election. And, finally, by examining the responses to the ballot questions and other public opinion questions included on these polls, to explore not only whether there is an interaction between race/ethnicity and gender but what the presence or absence of such an effect *means*.

We will turn first to examining what support the findings have for our hypotheses. First, the findings on presidential vote choice were not as predicted by H1: in fact the gender

difference among Latinos seen in the bivariate analysis was larger than for whites (but less significant); it was larger than the African American gender gap (which, in turn, was the same as for whites.)

Second, while we can confirm earlier research suggesting that race (and the interaction of race/ethnicity and gender) are less predictive of ideology than party identification, again, our findings are not in keeping with H1. The gender gap for Latinos for being registered Democrat was more than twice as large as that of whites. Whereas Welch and Sigelman found that the Hispanic and white gender gap was smaller than that of blacks, we found the Latino and African American gap larger than (and equally significant as) that between white women and white men.

Third, H1 receives mixed support from the analysis of the various policy issues included on the National questionnaire. The findings on abortion, for example, provide some support for H1 except that the Latino gender gap is larger than that of African Americans and whites and in the opposite direction, not as predicted. At the same time, the basis for the hypothesis is that Latina women are thought to be more traditional on some social issues which, in this case, would explain the reverse direction. The findings on social welfare ("compassion") issues support H1 in that the gender gap for Latinos (9.3) is larger than for African Americans (0.2) but smaller than for whites (11.6). On the role of government, H1 is supported with the gender gap among Latinos greater than for African Americans but smaller than whites and the difference by race being a much bigger factor than gender.

The California ballot question on the medical use of marijuana is, on the one hand a "compassion" issue: women are said to support programs for health. In fact, neither gender nor the interaction of race and gender had the predicted effect. Both the bivariate and multivariate analysis suggest that being a Latina woman voter (in California) was a mildly good predictor of *not* supporting the medical use of marijuana, in a pattern different from the other non-white women. On the other hand, any proposition that involves expanding drug use, albeit for "compassionate" reasons, may mean that this ballot question should be included in the "women are more conservative on traditional issues" including drugs. This finding does support prior studies that found Latinas to be more conservative on some issues. And, although H1 predicts that the African American gender gap will be smaller than that for whites, in fact it is larger than for whites and significant.

H2 predicted that the direction and extent of any gender gap would be different for Asian Americans than for Latinos and African Americans. The apparent small difference in vote for Clinton between Asian American women and men is insignificant statistically but appears to be in the opposite direction from other women of color (providing some support for H2) and from Lien's finding (1997, 21).

We found, however, that, there was a substantial gender gap for this group in terms of party identification. This finding is not consistent, either, with Lien (1997), who found no gender gap for Asian Americans in terms of being registered Democrats. In the area of social welfare as a priority issue (selecting education/Medicare/Social Security as the issue that mattered most for vote choice), the Asian American gender gap is in the same direction as for the other groups, a finding that also runs counter to H2.

This hypothesis was also not supported by findings on the issue of immigration. Asian American women voters in California, at least, resembled Latina women who were more likely than men to say legal immigration should be decreased -- but, in general, women were not "compassionate" on the immigration issue. In fact, the gender gap was extremely large and mildly significant for Asian Americans on this issue.

Our third hypothesis and prior research demonstrating the centrality of race in determining vote, partisanship, and ideology receive considerable support from the bivariate and multivariate analysis. Race/ethnicity also are extremely strong predictors (usually stronger than the interaction of race/ethnicity and gender) for virtually all of the policy positions. These include social welfare issues, the position that the federal welfare law cuts too much, as well as immigration. We would like to suggest that, in the case of the welfare law, self interest may play more of a role than the "compassion" explanation would suggest: the gender gap for Latinos -- a population with a high percent of households headed by single mothers -- is extremely large, almost 17 percent in the bivariate analysis. It is also possible to argue that "self interest" more than "compassion" may explain women's support for affirmative action in California.

The immigration results suggest that, on this policy under intense debate and with considerable impact on the future racial makeup of the United States, the "compassion" argument does not hold up for white, Latina, or Asian American women respondents in California nor for white and Latina women respondents in Texas.

Gender was a strong predictor for white women in Texas of the position that legal immigration should be *decreased*. Latinos will find few allies among whites, including white women, around the issue of immigration. In all three states the racial divide around this issue is much greater than any gender gap.

We did find support for H4: that presidential vote choice would differ in states with high Mexican American origin Latinos (California and Texas) compared to higher percentage Puerto Ricans (New York) and Florida where the preponderance of Latinos are Cuban American. New York Latinos were most likely of the three states to vote for Clinton followed by Texas and California. Florida, as predicted, was least likely. The large and highly significant gender gap for Clinton in Florida, however, suggests that Cuban American women are much less conservative than their male counterparts. The fact that Cuban American policy continues to be relatively conservative may reflect the ability of the men in that group to assert their interests more forcefully than the women. Perhaps with a more nuanced research approach, the more liberal ideology of Latinas in that state might emerge. (It is of course crucial to not overstate the likelihood that the Florida Latino vote is representative of all Cuban American voters in that state nor of the Cuban American population as a whole.) The fact that there is also a large and highly significant gender gap in Texas runs counter to much of the prior research that found only small gender differences for Latinos in vote choice (Welch and Sigelman 1992; Brischetto 1987). Clearly more research needs to be done.

Conclusion

As can be seen from the above discussion, National and State exit polls provide a wealth of information on the public opinions of women of color, beyond the choice of candidate and standard research questions of partisanship and ideology. Policy issues and ballot questions provide a window into the positions of voters who are women of color. (Many more than those analyzed for this paper are available in the exit poll datasets.) One of the major conclusions of this study must be to expand the political agenda of women and communities of color and insist on more representative polling with larger minority samples (especially for Asian Americans). Nevertheless, the findings presented above at least begin the exploration of this important topic. While this continues to be a work in progress, we have reached the following conclusions.

First, the "soccer mom" did not elect Clinton. The message needs to be transmitted to both the Republican and Democratic parties that their attempts to "do a better job of reaching out to female and minority voters" (Cornwell 1997) must acknowledge the contribution to election outcome of voters who are both "female" and "minority."

Second, exit polls are flawed because they do not capture the public opinion of communities of color, simply of voters in selected precincts. However, rather than approach analysis of exit polls as a tool in an effort to prove or disprove what is basically a white construct (i.e., the gender gap), researchers need to begin to explore the basis for apparent differences in voting, ideology, and policy positions. Gender gaps do seem to exist on several issues for African Americans and Latinos in particular. It may very well be that the gender gap is very fluid, and depends on the issue at hand rather than on fixed or essential qualities of women. It may be time to explore in a more meaningful way why voters (or the populations) support or do not support certain policies. The "compassion" argument, in such a scenario, may be found to be too essentialist -- many of the issues on which women are supposedly more "compassionate" (education, safety net, drugs, etc) could be argued as being in the women's self interest if the "self" includes family and community. Perhaps, if women of color are the starting point of

analysis, rather than merely in comparison to white women, the role of community needs would emerge as determinants of vote choice and policy positions more than gender.

Third, the supposed "gender gap," when women of color are included, is revealed to be more complex than apparent in the literature thus far. There has been a tendency, when the analysis has excluded women of color, to assume that finding "women" to be more "liberal" or "Democratic" also means that "women" are more progressive generally. By examining white women in comparison to women of color rather than men, we can see that white women are actually considerably less liberal, Democratic, and, dare we say, compassionate on many issues.

In fact, in this study as well as in others that preceded it, race and ethnicity are typically found to be more central than gender in predicting vote choice and other positions. The racial/ethnic divide evidenced in the results of this study suggests not only that gender is not as salient on certain issues for women of color or communities of color. Race is clearly salient for white policy positions as well and the divide that exists between them makes it very difficult for any of the groups to work effectively together toward resolving the problems that our society faces. Clinton's proposal to generate a dialogue about race in the United States has been extremely controversial and met with skepticism at best. Without such a dialogue, however, any suggestion that the gender gap implies a more liberal, [d]emocratic, and compassionate nature for women in general will certainly be met with skepticism by women of color.

Appendix: Data Limitations

There are numerous other sources of bias in these data. First, because of the relatively small percentages of the sample who are respondents of color, the margins of error for non-whites in the National dataset are considerably higher than that for the sample as a whole. They range from ± 3.5 percent for the African American subsample to ± 5 percent for Latinos and to more than ± 10 percent for the Asian American subsample. In addition, given that the goal of this study is to analyze gender differences *within* the racial groups, any differences that do exist must be very large before they show up as statistically significant. A power analysis conducted prior to data acquisition suggests that to detect significant gender differences within the African American subsample, there would have to be a 9.5 percentage point difference; for the Latino subsample, the difference would have to be 14 points. In the case of Asian Americans, especially, the results presented here should be taken with extreme caution.

In addition to the obvious sources of bias inherent in the unequal sizes of the different racial groups in the National and State exit poll data sets, there are other more subtle and pernicious sources of bias that are harder to see. Stanfield (1993) has discussed various problems of sampling for blacks and DeSipio (1996) describes how, even in studies where considerable effort has gone into designing appropriate sampling measures for Latino populations, problems occur. As Lien (1997) indicates, "on top of the general techniques of sampling, poll results on nonwhite minorities can be complicated by such issues as language, race, and sex of interviewers." Although staff at VNS indicated that, in precincts with Latino populations over a certain threshold, they offer a Spanish version of the poll questionnaire, this does not serve Latinos of who prefer Spanish in lower population precincts nor does it address more subtle issues of interviewer/respondent interaction. VNS also does not offer any Asian language questionnaires.

Another limitation of the data lies in the fact that, because respondents were asked: "Are you: White, Black, Hispanic/Latino, Asian, Other?," it is impossible to analyze the data by Latino subgroup. Voter choice and policy preference results, therefore, can offer little to our understanding of differences between Puerto Ricans, Mexican-Americans, Cuban-Americans, etc., let alone, gender differences within those subgroups.¹⁴ In addition, while it is certainly true that there are states with a higher African American voting population than these five (such as North Carolina, for example), those other states would not provide a similar opportunity for a comparison with Latino respondents, in particular.

References

- Cain, Bruce E., and D. Roderick Kiewiet and Carole J. Uhlasner. (1991). "The Acquisition of Partisanship by Latinos and Asian Americans, *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 35, no. 2, May, 390-422.
- Cantrell, Paul D. (1992). "Opinion Polling and American Democratic Culture," *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society,* Vol. 5, no.3, 405-437.
- Carroll, Susan J. (1988). "Women's Autonomy and the Gender Gap: 1980 and 1982," in Mueller, Carol M., *The Politics of the Gender Gap*, (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage Publications), 236-257.
- Cornwell, Lisa. (1997). Associated Press release, July.
- Costain, Anne N. (1996). "The Mobilization of a Women's Movement and the American Gender Gap in Voting," Paper prepared for delivery at the 1996 meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 29-September 1, San Francisco, CA.
- de la Garza, Rodolfo O., and Janet Weaver. (1985). "Chicano and Anglo Public Policy Perspectives in San Antonio: Does Ethnicity Make a Difference?" *Social Science Quarterly*, Vol. 66, no. 3, September.
- de la Garza, Rodolfo O. (1987). *Ignored Voices: Public Opinion Polls and the Latino Community* (Austin, TX: Center for Mexican American Studies, The University of Texas at Austin).
- de la Garza, Rodolfo O. and Jerry L. Pollinard, Robert D. Wrinkle, and Tomas Longoria, Jr. (1991). "Understanding Intra-Ethnic Attitude Variations: Mexican Origin Population View of Immigration," *Social Science Quarterly*, Vol. 72, no. 2 (June): 379-387.
- de la Garza, Rodolfo O., Louis DeSipio, F. Chris Garcia, John Garcia, and Angelo Falcon.
 (1992). Latino Voices: Mexican, Puerto Rican, and Cuban Perspectives on American Politics. (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press).
- de la Garza, Rodolfo O., and Louis DeSipio, with a forward by Bruce E. Cain. (1996). *Ethnic Ironies: Latino Politics in the 1992 Elections*. (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press).
- Greenberg Research/Lake Research. (1996). *Women's Monitor*, Washington, D.C., June 26, September 13.
- Hardy-Fanta, Carol, and James Jennings. (1996). "The untold election story: Blacks and Latinos gave Clinton his victory." *Boston Globe*, Nov. 30, 1996, A-15.
- Hero, Rodney E., and Kathleen M. Beatty. (1989). "The Elections of Federico Pena as Mayor of Denver: Analysis and Implications," *Social Science Quarterly*, Vol. 70, no. 2, (June): 300-310.
- Kenski, Henry C., "The Gender Factor in a Changing Electorate," in Mueller, Carol, ed. *The Politics of the Gender Gap*, (Newbury Park CA: Sage Publications), 38-59.

Lien, Pei-te. (1997). "Does Gender Gap in Political Participation Vary Across Racial Groups? Comparing Asians to Whites, Blacks, and Latinos." Paper presented at the 1997 Annual Meeting of the Western Political Science Association, Tucson, Arizona, March 13-15.

Lien (1997) Personal communication, June 24.

- Lovrich, Nicholas Jr. (1974). "Differing Priorities in an Urban Electorate: Service Preferences among Anglo, Black, and Mexican American Voters," *Social Science Quarterly*, Vol. 55, no. 3 (December): 704-717.
- Mitofsky, Warren J. and Kathleen A. Frankovic. (1987). "Exit Polls and the Latino Voter," in *Ignored Voices*, ed. Rodolfo de la Garza, 118-133).
- Montoya, Lisa J. (1996). "Latino Gender Differences in Public Opinion: Results from the Latino National Political Survey," *Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences*, Vol. 18, no. 2 (May): 255-276.
- Mueller, Carol M. (1988a). "Continuity and Change in Women's Political Agenda" in Mueller, Carol M., *The Politics of the Gender Gap*, (Newbury Park Calif: Sage Publications): 16-36.
- _____. (1988b). "The Empowerment of Women: Polling and the Women's Voting Bloc," in Mueller, Carol M., ed., *The Politics of the Gender Gap*
- Norris, Pippa. (1994). "Gender-Related Influences on Voting Behaviour and Public Opinion." Prepared for the Conference on Research on Women and American Politics: Agenda Setting for the 21st Century, April 23. Center for the American Woman and Politics, Rutgers University, NJ.
- Oliver, J. Eric, Fredric C. Gey, Jon Stiles, and Henry Brady. (1995). Pacific Rim States Asian Demographic Data Book. Office of the President Research Report. (Oakland, California: The University of California Pacific Rim Research Program).
- Rapoport, Ronald B., and Walter J. Stone and Alan I. Abramowitz. (1990) "Sex and the Caucus Participant: the Gender Gap and Presidential Nominations," *American Journal of Political Science*. Vol. 34, no. 3 (August): 725-740.
- Schlozman, Kay Lehman, and Nancy Burns, Sidney Verba and Jesse Donahue. (1995).
 "Gender and Citizen Participation: Is There a Different Voice?" *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 39, no. 2 (May): 267-293.
- Shapiro, Robert, and Harpreet Mahajan. (1986). "Gender Differences in Policy Preferences: a Summary of Trends from the 1960s to the 1980s," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 50: 42-61.
- Verba, Sidney, and Kay Lehman Schlozman, Henry Brady and Norman H. Nie. (1993). "Race, Ethnicity and Political Resources: Participation in the United States," *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 23: 453-497.

- Welch, Susan, and Lee Sigelman. (1989). "A Black Gender Gap?" <u>Social Science Quarterly</u>, Vol. 70, no. 1 (March): 120-133.
- Welch, Susan, and Lee Sigelman. (1992). "A Gender Gap Among Hispanics? A Comparison with Blacks and Anglos," Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 45, no. 1 (March):181-198.
- Welch, Susan, and Lee Sigelman. (1993). "The Politics of Hispanic Americans: Insights from National Surveys, 1980-1988," *Social Science Quarterly*, Vol. 74, no. 1 (March):
- Wirls, Daniel. (1986). "Reinterpreting the Gender Gap," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 50: 316-330..
- Wood, Harriett. (1995). "Women May Decide the Presidency in '96. Here's Why," *Working Woman* (May): 26.

Notes:

1. Please note that the term "Hispanic" is used interchangeably with "Latino" in this paper, despite the political ramifications and origins of the two terms. We use Latino to refer to those whose ethnic background is Puerto Rican, Mexican/Chicano/Mexican American, Cuban American, and from a variety of Latin American countries. When sources we cite use the term "Hispanic," we have followed the original. Throughout this paper we generally use African American rather than Black except, again, when an original source used the latter and in the logit tables, for the sake of brevity.

2. Greenberg Research/Lake Research, Women's Monitor, June 26, 1996.

3. Following the election, *AllPolitics, CNNInteractive*, and a variety of other Internet websites offer complete breakdowns of election results. This discussion is based on printed copies of those breakdowns. VNS also provides results to newspapers around the country; the *Boston Globe* of November 6, 1996 presented these data in chart form.

4. See Wood, Working Woman, May, 1995, p.26.

5. Carol Hardy-Fanta and James Jennings, "The Untold Election Story: Blacks and Latinos Gave Clinton His Victory," *Boston Globe*, November 30, 1996, p. A15.

6. Note: VNS is an association of ABC News, CNN, CBS News, Fox News, NBC News and the Associated Press. We would like to express our appreciation to the following individuals who offered assistance with the data analysis process: John Blydenburgh, formerly of (and still consultant to) ABC polls, and, at VNS: Dan Merkel, for leading me through some of the more interesting intricacies of the VNS data system and to Lee C. Shapiro for assuring that the datasets were made available in a timely fashion. We would also like to thank Tony Roman and Carol Casenza from the Center for Survey Research at the University of Massachusetts Boston for the many occasions on which they helped sort out many of the difficulties that arise when handling large datasets. Finally, it is important to acknowledge Dr. Edwin Meléndez, director of the Mauricio Gastón Institute for Latino Community Development and Public Policy and Dr. Paul Benson, Vice Provost of the Office of Sponsored Projects, at the University of Massachusetts Boston for their generous financial support that enabled us to acquire and analyze these datasets.

7. The National sample is a subsample of 300 precincts drawn from the state precinct samples. It should be noted that, in some states, precincts that have a large minority population were sampled at a higher rate than other precincts. The sample weighting adjusts the representation of these precincts to their correct share of the total vote. For a complete discussion of the VNS exit poll methodology please refer to the Voter News Service "Exit Poll Data Documentation for November 5, 1996." This document is available directly from VNS in New York.

8. We would like to include in future analysis states with higher percentages of Asian American

respondents. In addition, another study is underway for an analysis of the states with highest Latino populations including (as well as the four already mentioned): Illinois, Arizona, New Mexico, Colorado, and New Jersey.

9. The multivariate analysis on the national sample questions was conducted with the following demographic variables: Income, ideology, age, but not with education. To include only cases with education would have reduced the available sample from 13,996 to 6929 which we felt was an unacceptable sacrifice of data. In addition, education and income are often closely correlated. We did conduct tests comparing cases where education was missing with those where it was not. There were no significant differences on key variables such as race, sex, age, party identification, and region. There was a small but significant difference for the variable "income greater than \$50,000": 40 percent of cases with education compared to 37 percent with education missing. Also, on the presidential vote for Clinton, 49 percent with education as a variable compared to 51 percent without education.

10. Note that race caused a significant improvement over gender and the demographic variables for party identification and that, despite the contribution of the interaction variables, their addition did not generate much improvement in the model (III) overall. The lack of significance of the interaction variables for ideology is clearly demonstrated by the lack in improvement from model I to II or III.

11. We recognize that by not combining "economy/jobs" into the "compassion" category we are running counter to some other researchers (see, for example, Shapiro and Mahajan 1986, 51) but determined that not only are education and Medicare/Social Security "social welfare" or "compassion" issues but they are also "women's issues" that should show a gender gap in relation to the other issues.

12. The findings of the two studies are not perfectly comparable on another dimension, besides the fact that the de la Garza, et al., study was a population sample, not a sample of voters. Their question asked what conditions under which abortion should be permitted and the choices were: Any, Only if needed, Rape or incest, and None. The voter exit poll survey asked if abortion should be "Legal in all cases," "Legal in most cases," "Illegal in most cases," or "Illegal in all cases." In calculating the comparisons we collapsed the first two categories for each sample which may not yield comparable results but does at least suggest that the voter sample is more "pro-choice" than the Latino population as a whole.

13. For a discussion of this literature see, for example, Montoya (1996), Shapiro and Mahajan (1986), Cook (1979), Dietch (1988), Welch and Sigelman (1989) and Sapiro (1983).

14. It is important to note that, the term "white(s)" is generally used here to refer only to non-Hispanic whites. However, this term can sometimes refer to white persons of both Hispanic and non-Hispanic origins when sources of information do not allow the respondent to distinguish between the two.

| Table 1 Sample Sizes: National and State Datasets N (Percent) | | | | | | | | | |
|--|--------|---------------------|--------|-------------------|--|--|--|--|--|
| Dataset | White | African American | Latino | Asian American | | | | | |
| National (N=16,637) | 13,291 | 1570 | 717 | 182 | | | | | |
| | (79.9) | (9.4) | (4.3) | (1.0) | | | | | |
| California (N=3282) | 2462 | 207 | 375 | 139 | | | | | |
| | (76.0) | (6.4) | (11.6) | (4.3) | | | | | |
| New York (N=1899) | 1486 | 174 | 125 | 38 | | | | | |
| | (80.0) | (9.3) | (6.7) | (2.1) | | | | | |
| Florida (N=1892) | 1426 | 193 | 215 | 15 | | | | | |
| | (76.4) | (10.4) | (11.5) | (0.8) | | | | | |
| Texas (N=2423) | 1703 | 235 | 410 | 15 | | | | | |
| | (70.3) | (9.7) | (17.1) | (0.6) | | | | | |

Table 2 Presidential Vote by Gender National Exit Poll Sample (Percent)

| | Gender*** | | | | |
|--------------------|-----------|----------|--|--|--|
| Vote for President | Women | Men | | | |
| Clinton | 54.0 | 43.5 | | | |
| Dole | 37.6 | 44.2 | | | |
| Perot | 6.9 | 10.2 | | | |
| | (N=8427) | (N=7729) | | | |

***p<.001; percents in these two tables do not add up to 100 because a small percent voted for "other" and due to rounding.

Table 3Presidential Vote by RaceNational Exit Poll Sample
(Percent)

| | Race*** | | | |
|--------------------|-----------|---------------------|---------|-------------------|
| Vote for President | White | African American | Latino | Asian American |
| Clinton | 43.4 | 83.7 | 71.7 | 43.0 |
| Dole | 45.6 | 12.0 | 21.0 | 47.8 |
| Perot | 9.2 | 3.6 | 5.5 | 7.8 |
| | (N=13398) | (N=1637) | (N=730) | (N=181) |

***p<.001

| | Table 4 Presidential Vote by Gender & Race (Percent) | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---------|--|------|-----------------------------------|------|---------------|------------------------|---------------------------|------|--|--|--|--|
| Race | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Vote | White** (N=13291) | | African American** (N=1570) | | Latin (N=7 | no ⁺ 17) | Asian American (N=182) | | | | | |
| | Women | Men | Women | Men | Women | Men | Women | Men | | | | |
| Clinton | 48.2 | 38.1 | 88.6 | 78.5 | 77.9 | 64.5 | 41.7 | 44.4 | | | | |
| Dole | 42.6 | 48.8 | 8.4 | 15.5 | 17.4 | 25.3 | 48.3 | 47.4 | | | | |
| Perot | 7.7 | 10.9 | 2.1 | 5.5 | 3.6 | 7.9 | 8.7 | 6.9 | | | | |

***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05; *p<.10

| | Vo | te for Clinton | |
|---------------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| - | Ι | II | III |
| Female | .36*** (.04) | | .35*** (.04) |
| Latino | | 1.17*** (.09) | .96*** (.13) |
| Black | | 1.82*** (.08) | 1.71*** (.10) |
| Asian | | 02 (.18) | .27 (.25) |
| Latino * Female | | | .48* (.19) |
| Black * Female | | | .35* (.16) |
| Asian * Female | | | 57 (.35) |
| Income less than \$50,000 | .27*** (.04) | .21*** (.04) | .17*** (.04) |
| Age over 40 | .02 (.04) | .12** (.04) | .13*** (.04) |
| Ideology (1=Liberal) | 1.58*** (.05) | 1.58*** (.05) | 1.58*** (.05) |
| Constant | 71*** (.04) | 75*** (.04) | 91*** (.05) |
| -2 Log Likelihood | 17898.7 | 17165.4 | 16838.5 |
| At convergence | 13939.5 | 14219.0 | 14075.7 |
| % Predicted Correct | 62.4 | 67.8 | 67.8 |
| Ν | 13996 | 13994 | 13840 |

Table 5Logistic Regression Estimations of Gender and Racial Differences in
Presidential Vote
National Exit Poll Sample

***p<.001 **p<.01 *p<.05. Note: Numerical entries are logistic coefficients except where noted; standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable for is scored 1 if respondent voted for Clinton; 0 for else.

Table 6US House and Senate Vote by Race and Gender
National Exit Poll Sample
(Percent)

| | White | | African A | African American L | | ino | Asian American | |
|------------|--------------|--------|-------------|--------------------|---------|------|----------------|------|
| | Women | Men | Women | Men | Women | Men | Women | Men |
| US House | | | | | | | | |
| Democrat | 48.1 | 39.5 | 85.8 | 77.7 | 75.4 | 67.3 | 43.2 | 38.3 |
| Republican | 50.0 | 58.3 | 13.2 | 21.4 | 23.6 | 31.0 | 49.6 | 56.0 |
| Other | 2.0 | 2.2 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 1.0 | 1.7 | 7.3 | 5.7 |
| | (N=12408)*** | | (N=1460)*** | | (N=676) | | (N= | 158) |
| US Senate | | | | | | | | |
| Democrat | 48.5 | 41.8 | 83.9 | 80.0 | 70.3 | 66.4 | 54.9 | 56.2 |
| Republican | 49.7 | 56.1 | 14.2 | 18.6 | 27.9 | 32.7 | 45.1 | 43.8 |
| Other | 1.8 | 2.2 | 1.8 | 1.4 | 1.8 | 0.9 | | |
| | (N=654 | 46)*** | (N= | 885) | (N=2 | 263) | (N=58) | |

Note: Senate races were not held in all states. Significant differences between women and men within racial group are: ***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05; *p<.10. Percents do not add up to 100 because of rounding.

Table 7Party Identification and Political Ideology by Race and Gender
National Exit Poll Sample
(Percent)

| | White | | African A | American | Lat | Latino | | merican | |
|--------------|--------------|--------|-------------|----------|------------|--------|---------|----------|--|
| | Women | Men | Women | Men | Women | Men | Women | Men | |
| Party ID | | | | | | | | | |
| Democrat | 38.2 | 29.7 | 77.9 | 66.3 | 69.2 | 51.2 | 41.1 | 27.4 | |
| Republican | 36.8 | 40.4 | 9.7 | 13.9 | 17.5 | 25.0 | 41.2 | 37.1 | |
| Ind/Other | 25.0 | 29.9 | 12.4 | 19.8 | 13.3 | 23.8 | 17.7 | 35.5 | |
| | (N=12577)*** | | (N=1421)*** | | (N=669)*** | | (N=1 | (N=154)* | |
| Ideology | _ | | | | | | | | |
| Liberal | 20.3 | 15.2 | 31.0 | 25.9 | 27.6 | 25.5 | 29.1 | 18.6 | |
| Moderate | 48.2 | 44.9 | 50.2 | 51.1 | 50.6 | 46.8 | 54.1 | 61.3 | |
| Conservative | 31.5 | 39.9 | 18.8 | 23.0 | 21.9 | 27.7 | 16.8 | 20.1 | |
| | (N=124 | 35)*** | (N=13 | 376)* | (N= | 657) | (N=154) | | |

Note: Significant differences between women and men within racial group are: ***p<.001; ** p<.01; *p<.05; ⁺p<.10. Percents do not add up to 100 because of rounding.

Table 8Logistic Regression Estimations of Gender and Racial Differences in
Party Identification and Political Ideology
National Exit Poll Sample

| - | Par | ty Identifica | ation | Political Ideology | | | | |
|---------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--|--|
| | I | II | III | Ι | II | III | | |
| Female | .33*** (.04) | | .29*** (.04) | .30*** (.04) | | .33*** (.05) | | |
| Latino | | 1.13*** (.09) | .85*** (.13) | | .38*** (.10) | .54*** (.14) | | |
| Black | | 1.61*** (.07) | 1.50*** (.09) | | .51*** (.07) | .60*** (.10) | | |
| Asian | | .04 (.19) | 12 (.28) | | .40* (.19) | .29 (.30) | | |
| Latino * Female | | | .58** (.18) | | | 25 (.19) | | |
| Black * Female | | | .27* (.14) | | | 10 (.13) | | |
| Asian * Female | | | .30 (.38) | | | .20 (.39) | | |
| Income less than \$50,000 | .40*** (.04) | .34*** (.04) | .31*** (.04) | .12** (.04) | .10* (.04) | .08*** (.04) | | |
| Age over 40 | .15*** (.04) | .26*** (.04) | .26*** (.04) | 38*** (.04) | -37*** (.04) | 36*** (.05) | | |
| Ideology (1=Liberal) | 1.49*** (.05) | 1.52*** (.05) | 1.50*** (.05) | | | | | |
| Constant | -1.26*** (.04) | -1.33*** (.04) | -1.47*** (.05) | -1.42*** (.05) | -1.34*** (.04) | -1.51*** (.05) | | |
| -2 Log Likelihood | 17342.5 | 16618.2 | 16341.1 | 13868.6 | 13783.5 | 13581.7 | | |
| At convergence | 13980.8 | 14092.0 | 13980.4 | 14114.2 | 14094.0 | 13938.1 | | |
| % Predicted Correct | 67.9 | 71.1 | 71.2 | 80.3 | 80.4 | 80.4 | | |
| Ν | 14051 | 14037 | 13887 | 14179 | 14168 | 14010 | | |

***p<.001 **p<.01 *p<.05. Note: Numerical entries are logistic coefficients except where noted; standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable for Party Identification is scored 1 for Democrat; the dependent variable for Political Ideology is scored 1 for Liberal.

Table 9Policy Positions by Race and GenderNational Exit Poll Sample
(Percent)

| | Whi | White | | can ican | Latino | | Asian American | | |
|---|-------------|-------|-------|-------------|----------|------|----------------|--------|--|
| | Women | Men | Women | Men | Women | Men | Women | Men | |
| Abortion should be: | | | | | | | | | |
| Legal in all/most cases | 60.0 | 56.9 | 68.1 | 66.5 | 51.2 | 65.9 | 60.7 | 77.9 | |
| | (N=322 | 2)*** | (N=3 | 52) | (N=1) | 86) | (N=4 | 7) | |
| Issue that mattered most in Pres. vote: | | | | | | | | | |
| Foreign policy | 3.2 | 4.5 | 2.1 | 4.4 | 3.0 | 4.5 | 3.1 | 1.4 | |
| Education/Medicare/ Social Security | 30.2 | 18.6 | 34.2 | 34.0 | 36.5 | 27.2 | 22.7 | 15.5 | |
| Economy/Jobs | 19.1 | 21.2 | 28.7 | 26.0 | 19.4 | 21.7 | 23.6 | 34.8 | |
| Taxes/Budget deficit | 21.0 | 31.0 | 9.5 | 11.5 | 8.8 | 20.6 | 40.3 | 22.7 | |
| Crime/Drugs | 7.0 | 6.3 | 7.1 | 8.8 | 6.8 | 7.3 | | 4.1 | |
| | (N=680 | 3)*** | (N=8 | 03) | (N=364)* | | (N=9 | (N=93) | |
| Role of government | | | | | | | | | |
| Government should do more to solve problems | 41.8 | 30.8 | 68.1 | 66.5 | 60.7 | 57.3 | 69.0 | 19.7 | |
| | (N=3360)*** | | (N=4 | 03) | (N=18 | 88)* | (N=4 | 18) | |
| Federal Welfare Reform Law | | | | | | | | | |
| | 16.5 | 13.5 | 31.7 | 30.0 | 29.6 | 12.7 | 17.2 | 19.5 | |
| | (N=318 | 8)*** | (N=3 | 74) | (N=17 | /1)* | (N=4 | 3) | |

Note: Significant differences between women and men within racial group are: ***p<.001; ** p<.01; *p<.05; ⁺p<.10. Percents do not add up to 100 because a small percent did not respond; VNS counts non-responses on substantive questions as "Don't Know/Unsure."

Table 10Logistic Regression Estimations of Gender and Racial Differences in"Social Welfare as Issue" and "Welfare Reform"National Exit Poll Sample

| | Social | Welfare as | s Issue | W | Welfare Reform | | | |
|---------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|--|--|
| | Ι | II | III | Ι | II | III | | |
| Female | .55*** (.06) | | .63*** (.06) | .21* (.09) | | .20 ⁺ (.11) | | |
| Latino | | .24* (.13) | .43* (.19) | | .38 ⁺ (.21) | 10 (.39) | | |
| Black | | .28** (.09) | .61*** (.14) | | .66*** (.13) | .88*** (.21) | | |
| Asian | | 45 (.30) | 44 (.49) | | .35 (.43) | .73 (.62) | | |
| Latino * Female | | | 30 (.25) | | | .70 (.47) | | |
| Black * Female | | | 58** (.18) | | | 34 (.27) | | |
| Asian * Female | | | 01 (.62) | | | 68 (.86) | | |
| Income less than \$50,000 | .53*** (.06) | .53*** (.06) | .48 ⁺ (.06) | .46*** (.10) | .45*** (.10) | .42*** (.10) | | |
| Age over 40 | .21*** (.06) | .24*** (.06) | .24*** (.06) | .16 ⁺ (.10) | .20* (.10) | .20 ⁺ (.10) | | |
| Ideology (1=Liberal) | .56*** (.06) | .58*** (.06) | .54*** (.07) | 1.37*** (.10) | 1.35*** (.10) | 1.33*** (.10) | | |
| Constant | -1.96*** (.07) | -1.72*** (.07) | -2.04*** (.08) | -2.37*** (.12) | -2.37*** (.11) | -2.46*** (.10) | | |
| -2 Log Likelihood | 7795.0 | 7876.4 | 7656.4 | 2971.6 | 2949.1 | 2905.1 | | |
| At convergence | 7061.6 | 7062.2 | 6961.0 | 3328.8 | 3298.5 | 3265.0 | | |
| % Predicted Correct | 74.4 | 74.4 | 74.5 | 82.0 | 81.1 | 81.4 | | |
| Ν | 7148 | 7151 | 7063 | 3371 | 3335 | 3359 | | |

***p<.001 **p<.01 *p<.05 ⁺p<.10. Note: Numerical entries are logistic coefficients except where noted; standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable for "Social Welfare Issue" is scored 1 for if respondent selected either Education or Medicare/Social Security as the issue that mattered most in vote for President; Foreign Policy, Taxes, Federal Budget Deficit, Economy/Jobs, and Crime/Drugs were scored 0. The dependent variable for Welfare Reform is scored 1 for "Cuts too much"; "Does not cut enough," "Is about right," and "DK/NR" are scored 0.

Table 11Presidential Vote by Race and Gender

State Exit Poll Sample (Percent)

| | White | | Afrio Amer | can ican | Lati | Latino | | Asian American | |
|------------|--------|-------|---------------|-------------|---------|--------|---------------------|-----------------|--|
| | Women | Men | Women | Men | Women | Men | Women | Men | |
| California | | | | | | | | | |
| Clinton | 49.8 | 38.5 | 90.0 | 74.7 | 74.1 | 66.5 | 47.2 | 53.2 | |
| Dole | 39.7 | 47.7 | 5.0 | 12.1 | 19.9 | 24.3 | 50.3 | 40.0 | |
| Perot | 6.3 | 9.1 | 2.6 | 7.1 | 4.8 | 7.3 | 1.6 | 6.7 | |
| | (N=241 | 6)*** | (N=20 | 01)* | (N=3 | 64) | (N=1 | 37) | |
| New York | | | | | | | | | |
| Clinton | 56.7 | 46.3 | 93.5 | 84.9 | 89.4 | 80.7 | | | |
| Dole | 35.2 | 38.6 | 4.5 | 11.3 | 7.9 | 13.9 | | | |
| Perot | 6.0 | 12.7 | 2.0 | 2.5 | 2.7 | 1.6 | | | |
| | (N=146 | 6)*** | (N=167) | | (N=123) | | (N=38) ^a | | |
| Florida | | | | | | | | | |
| Clinton | 49.4 | 36.3 | 92.2 | 81.4 | 51.0 | 32.5 | | | |
| Dole | 42.3 | 50.9 | 5.8 | 10.8 | 41.6 | 51.4 | | | |
| Perot | 8.3 | 11.5 | 2.0 | 7.7 | 7.4 | 6.1 | | | |
| | (N=139 | 3)*** | (N=1 | 84)+ | (N=213 | 3)*** | (N=1 | 5) ^a | |
| Texas | | | | | | | | | |
| Clinton | 34.5 | 26.5 | 91.2 | 85.3 | 81.7 | 68.3 | | | |
| Dole | 59.9 | 65.4 | 6.2 | 12.2 | 12.7 | 22.1 | | | |
| Perot | 5.2 | 6.4 | 2.1 | 1.7 | 3.0 | 9.7 | | | |
| | (N=165 | 9)*** | (N=2 | 24) | (N=387 | 7)*** | (N= | 9) ^a | |

Note: Significant differences between women and men within racial group are: ***p<.001; ** p<.01; *p<.05; $^{+}p<.10$. ^aAsian American sample in these three states was too small for meaningful analysis.

Table 12Immigration Policy Positions by Race and GenderState Exit Poll Sample
(Percent)

| Immigration should | White | | Afric Amer | African American | | Latino | | Asian American | |
|--------------------|-----------|------|---------------|---------------------|--------|----------------------|-----------|------------------|--|
| be decreased | Women | Men | Women | Men | Women | Men | Women | Men | |
| California | 49.6 | 46.2 | 49.8 | 58.6 | 41.4 | 33.5 | 37.3 | 16.2 | |
| | (N=1635)* | | (N=1 | (N=120) | | (N=213) ⁺ | | 10)+ | |
| New York | 57.3 | 58.7 | 47.8 | 52.6 | 27.9 | 35.8 | | | |
| | (N=686) | | (N=8 | (N=86) | | 59) | $(N=7)^a$ | | |
| Texas | 63.8 | 57.1 | 54.0 | 55.2 | 40.0 | 32.7 | | | |
| | (N=11 | 10)* | (N=1 | .69) | (N=282 | 2)*** | (N=1 | (5) ^a | |

Note: Significant differences between women and men within racial group are: ***p<.001; ** p<.01; *p<.05; ^{+}p <.10. ^aAsian American sample in these three states was too small for meaningful analysis.

Table 13 Logistic Regression Estimations of Gender and Racial Differences in Vote on Immigration Policy California, New York, Texas State Polls

| | Immigration Should be Decreased | | | | |
|---------------------------|---------------------------------|---------|----------|--|--|
| | CA | NY | ТХ | | |
| Female | .16 | 08 | .46*** | | |
| | (.11) | (.17) | (.14) | | |
| Latino | 51* | -1.14* | -1.23*** | | |
| | (.23) | (.55) | (.23) | | |
| Black | .72* | 28 | 01 | | |
| | (.30) | (.39) | (.26) | | |
| Asian | -1.34*** | -4.80 | 9.93 | | |
| | (.37) | (8.04) | (18.48) | | |
| Latino * Female | .12 | 33 | .17 | | |
| | (.32) | (.66) | (.30) | | |
| Black * Female | 65 | 40 | 51 | | |
| | (.42) | (.52) | (.37) | | |
| Asian * Female | .69 | 2.40 | 9.93 | | |
| | (.49) | (8.35) | (18.48) | | |
| Income less than \$50,000 | 05 | .19 | .28* | | |
| | (.10) | (.16) | (12) | | |
| Age over 40 | .13 | 07 | 12 | | |
| | (.10) | (.16) | (.12) | | |
| Education (Years) | 13*** | 23*** | 11*** | | |
| | (.02) | (.04) | (.03) | | |
| Ideology (1=Liberal) | 76*** | 43* | 80*** | | |
| | (.12) | (.15) | (.17) | | |
| Constant | 1.97*** | 3.76*** | 1.86*** | | |
| | (.37) | (.61) | (.45) | | |
| -2 Log Likelihood | 2477.4 | 988.9 | 1759.4 | | |
| At convergence | 1878.3 | 777.0 | 1370.3 | | |
| % Predicted Correct | 60.4 | 63.4 | 63.4 | | |
| Ν | 1696 | 816 | 1181 | | |

***p<.001 **p<.01 *p<.05. Note: Numerical entries are logistic coefficients except where noted; standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable for Immigration Policy is scored 1 if R responded "Decreased" to the question: Should legal immigration into the U.S. be increased, decreased, or kept about the same? (Increased and kept the same are scored 0.)

Table 14 "Compassion" Policy Positions by Race and Gender Selected State Exit Poll Samples (Percent)

| | White | | African American | | Latino | | Asian American | |
|--|-----------|--------|---------------------|------|----------|------|---------------------|------|
| Policy Position | Women | Men | Women | Men | Women | Men | Women | Men |
| California | | | | | | | | |
| "No" on Prop 209: Affirmative action | 37.6 | 31.8 | 70.2 | 64.9 | 65.9 | 63.4 | 46.1 | 52.6 |
| | (N=245 | 54)*** | (N=2 | .03) | (N=372) | | (N=138) | |
| "Yes" on Prop 215: Medical use of marijuana | 57.0 | 53.4 | 78.8 | 63.7 | 50.6 | 65.0 | 46.2 | 36.6 |
| | (N=1566) | | $(N=109)^+$ | | (N=209)* | | (N=98) | |
| New York | | | | | | | | |
| Welfare reform cuts too much | 18.2 | 16.5 | 38.0 | 45.1 | 38.9 | 21.0 | | |
| | (N=839) | | (N=102) | | (N=68) | | (N=18) ^a | |
| Florida | | | | | | | | |
| Protect environment | 54.4 | 44.5 | 34.1 | 37.0 | 45.1 | 47.3 | | |
| Encourage economic growth | 34.4 | 44.9 | 54.8 | 50.1 | 49.1 | 46.0 | | |
| | (N=875)** | | (N=128) | | (N=143) | | (N=10) ^a | |

Note: Significant differences between women and men within racial group are: ***p<.001; ** p<.01; *p<.05; ⁺p<.10. In the case of Florida, the percentages do not add up to 100 because VNS codes blanks on substantive issues as "Don't know/Unsure." ^aAsian American sample in these three states was too small for meaningful analysis.

Table 15Logistic Regression Estimations of Gender and Racial Differences in
"No" Vote on Prop. 209: Affirmative Action
and "Yes" on Prop. 215: Marijuana for Medical Use
(California State Exit Poll)

| | | | Yes on Prop. 215 | | | |
|---------------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--|
| | | | Ι | II | III | |
| Female | | | .10 (.30) | | .10 (.10) | |
| Latino | | 1.18*** (.15) | | .02 (.16) | .32 (.23) | |
| Black | | 1.64*** (.21) | | 46* (.22) | .23 (.30) | |
| Asian | .24** (.09) | .83*** (.21) | | 81*** (.22) | -1.15*** (.33) | |
| Latino * Female | | | | | 57 ⁺ (.32) | |
| Black * Female | | | | | .47 (.44) | |
| Asian * Female | | | | | .71 (.45) | |
| Income less than \$50,000 | .22* (.09) | .16 (.10) | 05 (.10) | 04 (.10) | 1.15*** (.13) | |
| Age over 40 | 29** (.09) | 14 (.10) | 32** (.10) | 36*** (.10) | 36*** (.10) | |
| Education (Years) | .03 (.02) | $.04^{+}$ | 06** (.02) | 06** (.02) | 06** (.02) | |
| Ideology (1=Liberal) | 1.53*** (.12) | 1.58*** (.12) | 1.19*** (.13) | 1.15***(. 13) | 1.15*** (.13) | |
| Constant | -1.01** (.34) | | 76* (.37) | 69 ⁺ (.36) | 72 ⁺ (.27) | |
| -2 Log Likelihood | 2818.0 | | 2493.6 | 2469.7 | 2451.4 | |
| At convergence | 2233.9 | | 1892.7 | 1884.6 | 1880.6 | |
| % Predicted Correct | 66.3 | | 59.7 | 59.0 | 61.0 | |
| Ν | 2139 | | 1709 | 1703 | 1696 | |

***p<.001 **p<.01 *p<.05 +p<.10 Note: Numerical entries are logistic coefficients except where noted; standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable for Prop. 215 is scored 1 if R responded "Yes" to the question: How did you vote on Proposition 215 relating to the medical use of marijuana? "No" responses are scored 0.)

Table 16Presidential Vote, Party ID, Ideology, and Ballot QuestionsGender Gap(Racial Divide)

| | | White | African American | Latino | Asian American |
|--|-------|---------|----------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------------|
| National Poll | | | | | |
| Vote for Clinton N=16359 (16145)*** | | 10.1** | 10.1** (40.4) | 13.4 ⁺ (28.3) | -2.7 (-0.4) |
| Party ID: Democrat N=15391 (15176)*** | | 8.5*** | 11.6*** (48.2) | 18.0*** (36.7) | 13.7* (0) |
| Ideology: Liberal N=15180 (14969)*** | | 5.1*** | 5.1* (10.8) | 2.1 (8.4) | 10.6 (6.0) |
| Abortion: Should be legal N=3959 (3889)*** | | 3.1*** | 1.6 (8.1) | -14.7 (-0.1) | -17.2 ^a (10.5) |
| Social Welfare: Issue that mattered N=8381 (8270)*** | | 11.6*** | 0.2 (8.9) | 9.3* (7.3) | 7.2 (-5.9) |
| Role of Gov't: Should do more N=4153 (4093)*** | | 11.0*** | 1.6 (31.6) | 3.4* (22.5) | 49.3 ^a (8.6) |
| Welfare Reform: Cuts too much N=3683 (3634)*** | | 3.0*** | 1.7 (16.3) | 16.9* (8.1) | -2.3 ^a (3.4) |
| State Polls | | | | | |
| Legal immigration: Should be decrea N=2135 (2116)*** CA | used: | 3.4* | -8.8 (5.8) | 7.9 ⁺ (-10.2) | 21.1 ⁺ (-22.1) |
| N=876 (857)*** | NY | -1.4 | -4.8 (-7.0) | -7.9 (-27.8) | a |
| N=1617 (1599)*** | ТХ | 6.7* | -1.2 (-6.0) | 7.3*** (-24.1) | a |
| Pro-affirmative action N=3283 (3238)*** | CA | 5.8*** | 5.3 (32.0) | 2.5 (29.9) | -6.5 (15.1) |
| Medical use of marijuana N=2135 (2116)*** | CA | 3.6 | 5.1 ⁺ (11.9) | -14.1* (3.3) | 9.6 (-16.6) |
| Welfare reform: Cuts too much N=1070 (1051)*** | NY | 1.7 | -7.1 (22.7) | 17.9 (15.7) | a |
| Protect environment: Priority N=1199 (1181)** | FL | 9.9** | -2.9 (-14.4) | -2.2 (-3.5) | a |

Note: Significant differences between women and men within racial group are: ***p<.001; ** p<.01; *p<.05; p<.10.

A positive number for the gender gap indicates that a higher percentage of women than men hold this position; a negative sign indicates that more men hold this position. A positive number the racial/ethnic divide (in parenthesis) indicates that a higher percentage of the racial/ethnic group holds this position than the white group; a negative sign indicates that a higher percentage of whites hold this position than the racial/ethnic group in the column. Percentages for the racial/ethnic divide are all significant at p<.001, except for FL (p<.01). ^aThe Asian American sample in these cases was too small for valid analysis.