The Meaning of the Browning of America

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THE MEANING OF THE BROWNING OF AMERICA

MIREN URIARTE

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THE MEANING OF THE BROWNING OF AMERICA

I wanted, first of all, to thank Aida Rodriguez of the Rockefeller Foundation and Diana Campoamor, Director of Hispanics in Philanthropy for inviting me to address you here tonight.

In the course of the last three weeks, we have talked several times about the issues facing you as Latinos and as people concerned about the future of Latinos in the world of philanthropy. In the process of these discussions, I lost whatever nervousness I may have had about addressing you because I realized that your questions and your struggle is not different from mine in the academy and the world of policy, or for that matter, from that of many, many Latinos across the United States in their daily lives.
Many of you are in the same position that many of us are in the academy or at the community level. We have two jobs. That of doing the work we are paid to do—be it research or anything else—as well as developing the awareness of those around us of the particular needs of Latinos in the hopes of having the community receive a more equitable treatment.

In my experience, there is no other way to accomplish both jobs and remain sane without getting together with others in the same situation and discussing strategies and action. I salute you in your organization and hope that your deliberations here this week are fruitful.

Tonight I wanted to talk to you about social change, not revolutionary change, but rather a gradual change in the social and demographic makeup of the United States and its implications to the work of those of us involved on issues affecting Latinos.
I will first tell you about the change and hopefully put it in some perspective. Then I will give you some information about Latino groups nationally. And then focus in on the meaning of these changes at the local level, or how is the browning of America affecting Latino communities and the cities and states in where they live.

In doing the latter, I will be concentrating on Massachusetts, perhaps not the state with the largest Latino population in the country, but one in which the changes are having a profound effect.

Staff at the Gaston Institute at UMASS-Boston have prepared some charts for you that I hope you will find helpful. My hope that after I present some information briefly, we can have a discussion of the meaning of it to you and what you are trying to accomplish.
The big news of the 1990 census is the growing diversity in the population of the United States.

From 1980 to 1990, the non-Hispanic white population of the United States increased by 7.8 million people, a growth of 4.4%; while the population of Blacks, Asians, Latinos and other groups had a combined growth of more than 14 million, a rate of growth of 30.9%.

Today, about one out of every four Americans is a Black, a Latino, an Asian or a person of another Third World origin.

This growth has been most pronounced among Latinos and Asians. The national rate of growth for Asians nationally is a whopping 107%; for Latinos it is 53%. In comparison, Blacks grew by 13.2% and as I mentioned above, the Non-Hispanic whites population grew only by 4.4% between 1980 and 1990.
Although increases by births contributes to this growth, most of the growth among Latinos and Asians is due to immigration. Among Latinos, immigration from Mexico and from Central American, has been significant in this decade. Among Asians, it is safe to say that a large chunk of that growth comes from Southeast Asia.

Although we know that this is a fact, it is important that we understand that we are talking about a rate of immigrant growth that rivals the great European migrations of the early 20th Century. Your first chart graphs the numbers in millions of the immigrants that arrived during each decade from 1820 to 1990. As you can see, at 7.3 million people over the last 10 years, immigrant growth during this decade surpasses that of every previous decade with the exception of the decade from 1901 to 1910.

The Boston Globe, as part of a lengthy analysis of the diversification of the U.S.
population in terms of race, produced the graph that we reproduced with their permission. Again, using figures from the Immigration and Naturalization Service, they track the growth of immigrants by area of origin during the same period.

We tried to reproduce this graph for you in a way that would make the information more clear, and for example, separate English speaking from Spanish-speaking Caribbean immigrants, but the time did not allow it. It is not perfect, but follow it with me, if you can.

The line that peaks in 1901-1910, is that of immigration from Europe. White European immigrants up until 1970, accounted for the largest number of immigrants to the U.S. Today, immigration from Europe falls behind that
The image is a historical timeline graph titled "US immigration by racial/ethnic group, 1820-1990, in millions." The timeline highlights significant events and periods related to immigration, such as the gold rush, Civil War, Spanish-American War, World War I and II, Immigration Act of 1921, and Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952. Additional events marked include the Siege of the Alamo, First wagon train for California, Lincoln assassination, Great Chicago fire, San Francisco earthquake, influenza epidemic, Stock Market crash, Jackie Robinson breaking baseball's color barrier, Kennedy assassination, Nixon resignation, and American bicentennial.

A box on the timeline indicates that "Immigration reached a peak between 1901 and 1910, when 8.8 million newcomers (8 million of them white Europeans) arrived in the United States." Another box explains that "Four out of five immigrants in the 1890s came from Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean. Counting approximately 540,000 undocumented immigrants, there will be more newcomers in the United States in the 1990s than in any previous decade."
of every other area of the world except Africa.

But let's look at what is happening at immigration from third world countries. As they point out 80% of immigrants came from Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean. The rest came from Europe and Africa. The growth of immigration from Asia, particularly since the 1970's is clear on the graph.

But although the graph leads one to believe that it is the highest, let's look at immigration from Mexico, Latin America and the Caribbean. When you add the numbers of immigrants from Mexico and Central and South America, it approaches very closely that of Asians. Those numbers, though, do not include immigration from Cuba and the Dominican Republic (both Caribbean nations) or the migration of Puerto Ricans to the United States.

What I conclude, from this graph, is that the rate of movement from Latin America to the U.S.
is perhaps the most significant factor in the growth of immigration in the last decade. And if so, the most significant factor in the diversification of the population of the United States.

Let me talk briefly about what has fueled this large migration from the Third World. The first factor, clearly is consistent dynamic of migratory flows from peripheral to core areas of the world economic. The uneven development of the world economies leads to migration from the more marginal areas towards the core. The United States is a powerful world economy with great influence over Latin America and many Asian countries. The deterioration of the economic and political conditions in this section of the World, would naturally fuel economy towards the United States.
Another factor is the political upheavals that have been experienced in the last two decades. Central America has been an important focus of instability, fueling the movement of refugees north. Although many of these people, for political reasons, are not considered refugees in the United States, they still make their way into the country in large numbers. South East Asia has also experienced marked changes in the last twenty years, fueling the movement of refugees all over the world, including the United States.

U.S. migration policies that began to be implemented in the 1960's are also contributing to an increased migration by people of color. At that time, President Kennedy proposed reforms in immigration law that ended the preference for persons of European background - that preference had been in force since the early 1800's and basically barred large immigrations from the
Caribbean and Latin America, Africa and Asia, except in some instances – for example the African slaves, the Mexican braceros and the Asians imported to build the railroads in 1800’s.

The democratization of immigration law that took place in the 1960’s, gave every country an equal allotment of immigrants per year. By definition, since there are more areas of the world populated by people of color, the effect of the democratization of the law was to increase the numbers of immigrants of color. It also served to bring the United States closer to the reality of the world in terms of race and ethnic representation.

Recent immigration reform bills sought to curtail again immigration from Third World countries in favor of immigration from European, particularly Eastern European nations. Although reformers succeeded in imposing sanctions to
illegal immigrants and the employers that hire them, the broader goals of their initiatives were largely defeated. What this means is that for the time being migration from the Third World will continue.

The effect of immigration today as a percentage of the total U.S. population is smaller than that of the great immigration of the early 1900's. This is because, although in absolute numbers, the phenomena may be similar, the overall U.S. population is larger today than it was in 1901 and thus, the rate of immigrant to native born americans is smaller. But the fact that most immigrants today are of color - Asian, Latin American, and African- represents a demographic revolution as well as a tremendous social change.

Population analysis and projections of the U.S. minority population conducted by the Urban Institute point to the fact that by 2070, over
half of the population of the U.S. will be of color. The minority population that we will be speaking about then will be white. By the year 2000, just less than 1/3 of the U.S. population will be of color.

This is a profound transformation for the United States. It will call into questions many of the values and principles that formed this nation: equality, democracy, the rights of individuals. It will engage us socially and politically for years to come.

The United States is just now waking up to the magnitude of the transformation. We are in the first two decades of the journey that will take almost three quarters of a century.

Often, it is hard to be very concerned about a social change that will come into fruition when none of us will be here. It is also hard to see, with all the things that are happening around us, the outlines of the emerging debate.
From English only, the difficulties in the assimilation of immigrants of color, and the development of scapegoat groups among ourselves to the arduous work at the community level around issues of diversity, the growing -but still lacking- understanding of the dynamics of new immigrant communities and the work of folks like you, everywhere in the U.S. that, in one way or another are arguing that inclusion now is important in order to avoid violence and turmoil for the next 75 years.

At the center of this transformation will be the Latinos in the United States. Latinos will be the largest minority in the country where racial minorities will be becoming majorities. How we approach this transformation, how we prepare ourselves and our communities for this process, how do we develop leaders with the vision that will be required, are key questions for Latinos everywhere.
U.S. MINORITY POPULATION BY REGION

PROJECTED GROWTH 1990-2000


- % of total 1990
- % of total 2000
Let me walk you through some additional figures that fill out the picture of diversity in America. By far the most diverse areas of the country are the West and the South. In the West, 19% of the population is Latino, 7.7% is Asian, and 5.4% is Black; in the South, 19% of the population is Black, and 8% is Latino, and 1.3% is Asian. The Northeast is the third most diverse area. In the Northeast, 11% of the population is Black, 7.4% is Latino, and 2.6% is Asian.

Projections by the Urban Institute in Washington D.C. indicate that by the year 2000, this pattern will be maintained, but that some regions will experience more change than others. The West Coast will lead the way, followed by the Northeast. The South will experience less growth in minority populations, although its share of minorities will continue to be very large. The Midwest will continue to lag far
behind.

When we examine the geographic dispersion of Latinos, we see that Latinos congregate in the West and the South, 75% of Latinos live in these areas. But if we look at the 10 states with the largest numeric increases of Latino population over the last decade, one is in the midwest (Illinois), two are southern states (Texas and Florida), three are in the Northeast (New York, New Jersey and Massachusetts), and four are in the West (Arizona, California, New Mexico, Washington); seven out of ten are in the Northeast and the West.


In terms of composition, we can see that Mexicans account for the largest percentage of Latinos followed by Puerto Ricans. Central and
Puerto Rican (13.7%)
Cuban (6.5%)
Mexican (50.9%)
1990 Census

South (30.3%)

Midwest (27.7%)

Northeast (16.8%)

West (45.2%)
South Americans together account for 14% of the population. Cubans account for just under 5%. Other Latino, which really means Dominicans, since everyone else is accounted for in the other categories, account for almost 7%. So the ranking should go: Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, Dominicans, Cubans, and everyone else.

Although the categories are not the same, a comparison between 1980 and 1990 figures provides some light as to which Latino populations are growing. The share of Mexicans of the Latino population increased by just over 4% in the decade. Both Cubans and Puerto Ricans decreased in their share of the Latino population, while the combination of Dominicans, Central and South Americans remained roughly the same.

Latinos are a young population as compared to the overall population. Among Latino groups, median age is higher among Cuban Americans and
PERCENT WITH 4 YRS OF H.S. OR MORE

Population 25 years old and over

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Latino</th>
<th>Non Latino</th>
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<td>53</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>51</td>
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Latino Non Latino
lowest among Mexican Americans. The youth of the Latino population has great implications for policy in the area of education. It also has great implications in the area of political participation; almost half of the Latino population is not able to vote because of age.

We prepared a few indicators on Latinos for this discussion. We have data on the percent of Latinos and non-Latinos that have educational attainment at the top levels of the educational scale.

In comparison to non-Latinos, Latinos lag well behind the rest in educational attainment. Just over half of the Latino population has an education of four years or more compared to 80% of the non-Latino population. As is true for the non-Latino population, the percent of Latinos with a high school degree or more increased from 1970 to 1990. But the rate of increase was much higher for non-Latinos.
PERCENT WITH 4 YRS OF COLL. OR MORE

Population 25 years old and over

Latino  Non Latino

<table>
<thead>
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<td>1989</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>22</td>
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</tr>
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Educational attainment of high school or more among Latinos increased by 19 points from 1970 to 1990, and lags well behind the 27 point increase achieved by other groups.

The rate of attainment of a college education among Latinos in more than half of that of the non-Latino population. In 1990, just 9% of the Latino population had 4 years of college or more as compared to 22% for the non-Latino population. The percent of both Latinos and non-Latinos attaining a college education or more increased over the last 20 years, but the patterns are somewhat different. For non-Latinos, the pattern has been one of sustained increases over the 20 year period, doubling the rate over the last two decades. The rate of Latinos has also increased, in fact it doubled between 1970 and 1988, but by 1990 it had begun to decline.

Among Latino groups, the highest rates of
educational attainment—as measured by high school completion—are among Central and South American and "other Hispanic". Mexican Americans have the lowest rates of high school completion among Latino groups. Educational attainment of four years of college or more is highest among Cuban Americans and lowest among Mexican Americans.

Latinos labor market participation of males—the percentage of Latinos that are working or actively seeking a job—ranges from the high sixties among Puerto Ricans to the mid-eighties among Central and South Americans. A similar pattern is observed among women from different national groups. The labor force participation of Latino men is in fact higher than that of non-Latinos but the participation of women is significantly lower. Through the 1980's, the overall labor force participation of Latino men, remained stable in the high 70’s; labor force
LARGEST \& PARTICIPATION RATES
MALE AND FEMALE 16+

LATINO MALE + LATINO FEMALE
NON LATINO MALE
NON LATINO FEMALE
UNEMPLOYMENT RATES: MARCH 1982-1990

Population 16 years old and over

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<td>9.5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
MEDIAN EARNINGS: 1981-1988

1987 S. (March CPS)
participation for non-Latino males was also stable in the mid 70's. Among women, the labor force participation of both Latinas and non-Latinas increased significantly during the 1980's.

Still, unemployment remains a problem among Latinos. During the 1980's, unemployment rates among Latinos were considerable higher than those of non-Latinos. Unemployment rates were highest among Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans at the end of the decade.

Median earnings for Latinos were significantly lower than those of non-Latinos. Among both men and women, Mexican American men had the lowest mean earnings of all Latino groups during the late 1980's. Cuban American men had the highest mean earnings of all groups; among women, the earnings of Puerto Rican, Cuban and other Hispanic women are comparable while those of Mexican American and Central and South
American were lower.

The high unemployment rates, the lower rate of participation of women in the labor force and the lower wages Latinos earn in their jobs has led to considerable rates of poverty in the population.

Rates of poverty among Latino families has remained more than twice that of non-Latino families during the 1980’s. Poverty among Latino families reached a high of 27% in 1983 (compared to 11% among non-Latinos). By the end of the decade, both rates had decreased but Latino families still had rates of poverty hovering around 25%.

Poverty is higher among Puerto Ricans than among any other Latino group. In 1988, poverty rates for Puerto Rican families reached 38%, four times the rate of non-Latino families. By the end of the decade, they were at 30%.
FAMILIES WITH INCOME BELOW POVERTY

Percent, (March CPS)

- 1982: 10.5%
- 1983: 11.4%
- 1984: 11.5%
- 1985: 10.7%
- 1986: 10.4%
- 1987: 9.9%
- 1988: 9.7%
- 1989: 9.4%
- 1990: 9.2%

- Latino
- Non-Latino
Poverty rates are lowest among Cubans, with their rates of poverty being lower than the Latino average but significantly higher than that of non-Latinos.

More than one quarter of Mexican American families are poor, which is about average for the Latino population and just under three times that of non-Latino families.

Lower educational attainments and a population that is by and large working and poor, characterizes the situation of Latinos nationally.

There is a lot of debate about the future of the Latino population in the United States. On the one hand some argue that their immigrant characteristics -language proficiency, low educational attainment, etc- in time will disappear for, at least, some of the groups and that Latinos may, with time, follow the path of earlier immigrants.
Others argue that Latinos are behaving structurally like racial minorities, that is that their immigrant status is secondary to their race and ethnic background in the outcomes of their economic and social insertion.

But regardless of the ultimate outcome, the fact is that the situation in Latino communities is a serious one. No where in the United States is the situation worse than in the state I come from, Massachusetts. Latino educational outcomes, earnings, and poverty rates are the worst of any Latino community in the United States.

Let me retake the initial discussion, in explaining the Massachusetts situation.

The New England States, particularly Massachusetts have experienced among the highest rates of growth of Blacks, Latinos and Asians of any area of the country. If we look at the 5 states with the highest rates of growth for each
of these groups, we find that 3 out of 5 of the States is a New England State. In Massachusetts, over the last 20 years the population of Non-Hispanic whites (European background) has decreased by 4.5% while the minority populations have increased by (3.6%).

Although, the state and the region remain primarily white, the large presence and high growth of the Black, Latino and Asians population is a significant change in the region.

This region has been racially homogeneous for most of its history, - aside from the pockets of Blacks in Hartford, New Haven and Boston, the population has been ethnically diverse, but racially homogeneous. The experiences in the West and South during the earlier part of the century, largely by-passed New England and Massachusetts.
Unlike Blacks, who congregate primarily in the South central area of Boston, Latino settlements are more widespread throughout the city and the State. About half of the Latino population of the State lives in Boston; but the highest rates of growth have taken place outside of the capital city.

There are large Latino concentrations in Lawrence for example, where Latinos account for 42% of the population of the city; in Holyoke and Chelsea, Latinos account for 31% of the population of these cities. Latinos account for 10.8% of the population of Boston.

Massachusetts has led the nation in the process of de-industrialization and in the re-structuring of the economy. De-industrialization in the city of Boston, for example, began in the 1930's and by the 1980's industry in the city has almost disappeared. It has been replaced by a high powered service
economy and a high technology industry which, unlike California and Texas, emphasizes the least labor intensive aspects of the industry—software and systems development rather than assembly of computer equipment, for example.

Latinos, by and large work in the dying manufacturing sector of the state. In Boston, Latinos are the cleaners, the food handlers and the clerks of the city’s financial, health, and service industries. Poverty among Latinos in Boston, for example, declined very little during the city’s boom of the 1980’s. In fact, among families headed by women, poverty increased. 75% of the Latino children in Boston live in a poor household.

Although the growth of the Latino population has had important effects in their labor market experience, it has had a tremendous effect in the social and political experience of the group. We can safely say that the high rate of
growth has not allowed city and state government to abreast of changes within Latino communities specifically, and in general, with the dramatic changes in the demographics of the population.

With the notable exception of the Gateway Cities Legislation in the late 1980’s, there has been little accounting by state and city government of the growth of "newcomers" and little attention has been paid to their very pressing needs.

Latinos, by and large, have been invisible to policy makers. There are several reasons. Latinos are a young population; median age for Latinos in Massachusetts is 21. This means that half of the population cannot vote and has not political participation. Even in those areas in which Latinos compose high percentages of then population, there are no Latino elected officials. In Lawrence, for example, the lack of district representation forces Latinos to run
city-wide rather than from within their own base; no Latino has ever held office in Lawrence. By and large, Latinos are not a political threat, at this point, to elected officials.

But Latinos have been invisible to government policy makers in other ways as well. Latino rates of employment in city and state government in Massachusetts are very low, lower than those of Latinos in other areas of the country. Although there have been some highly visible appointments, such as Chair of the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination and Commissioner of Welfare, the truth is that highly placed appointed officials rely on the work of staff, staff that is primarily non-Latino. In this context, there is little that an official alone can do.

There are other structural sources of invisibility. For example, up to 1989, there
was no information on birth or death rates for Latinos in Massachusetts. Today, there are few economic indicators in the state that disaggregate Latinos from whites or blacks. This absence of Latino information in the routinely available data handled by administrators and policy makers in the state is a serious structural problem, one that repeats itself in other areas of the United States.

The result has been that even under the best intentioned policy makers, with money to develop initiatives directed at problems facing Latinos in the state -such as model employment and training programs and extensive social service initiatives- Latinos were largely bypassed by these reforms.

How were they by-passed? Because the general policies although laudable and sound, did not take into account the needs of Latinos at the time of implementation.
An example of this is the employment and training program in Massachusetts, a model program that, by most accounts, has been highly successful in placing AFDC women in jobs.

Latinas participated actively in ET programs, particularly in programs operated at the community level - most participants were involved in a community based program. That they did right, they involved community based contractors and in doing so resolved a strong barrier to participation.

But what they did wrong is that they did not pay attention to the kinds of programs that would be successful with a population that required both remedial education and skills training. No combined programs were ever funded, in fact they were discouraged. There was never any connection articulated between educational and skills training programs. There was no effort to develop strong linkages to the
sources of employment.

The result is that although Latinas participated, they participated primarily in education only programs that did not lead to jobs. Outcomes—in terms of placement and wages—for Latino participation were the worse of any group. From my perspective, a very large opportunity was missed.

Like this one there are many examples of good policy not having the desired effect in particular sectors of the population; in Massachusetts, more often than not, that sector happens to be Latinos.

Lack of information that is readily available, lack of Latino personnel in policy positions and the non-threatening nature of the Latino population in the voting booth are potentiated by the tremendous effect on the capacity for advocacy and strategy development that the tremendous growth and needs of the
Latino population represents for Latino community based organizations.

The sustained high rate of growth, particularly in the absence of official response, has placed a great burden on Latino communities to develop transitional and ongoing supports that would help stabilize a community undergoing this high rate of change. Although there has been considerable institutional development in the Latino community in Boston and Massachusetts, the growth of these institutions has not kept up with the increases in the population and its needs.

Strengthening the institutional base of Latino communities is critical both for the healthy survival of these communities under the stress of such rapid growth, but also for the capacity of Latinos to participate actively in shaping policies and programs that affect their daily lives and their future.
There is a lot of debate about the extent to which community based organizations, which in many cases are service organizations, are an asset or a liability to communities. Some argue that the dependency in government programs on the part of these agencies has changed their character and effectiveness.

It is important to understand, though, that this dependency is fostered by lack of resources that permit more creative and innovative approaches at the community level. That dependency in government programs is a strategy for survival for organizations that, in most cases, form the institutional backbone of Latino communities across the United States.

Strengthening the institutional base of Latino communities is a critical priority at this juncture. Community organizations should be encouraged to expand their vision and endeavor at the community level from one focused
solely on service to one focused on the community development needs -whatever they may be. This may include a range of initiatives such as voter registration and citizenship education to community based economic development activity to the experimentation in model programs of employment and training.

Strengthening the power, reach and effectiveness of community based organizations along a range of areas that are not now even considered is critical for the development that is necessary for Latinos to take their place in the new majority. Community based organizations are the best training grounds for leadership in our communities; they are also the best springboard to the participation of Latinos, that are really knowledgeable of community conditions and needs, in the debate on public policy at the local level.
A great Massachusetts politician - former Speaker of the House of Representatives Tip O’neill always used to say that all politics are local. In the era of the new federalism, that is certainly true. The federal government has, in large measure, abandoned the terrain to the states and localities in the policy making that most closely affects people’s lives - schools, economic development, job strategies, etc.

The results of the new federalism are just beginning to be felt. The great diversity of experience from one state to the other in terms of life chances and opportunities will surely begin to be documented with this census.

In Massachusetts, the most insidious of the results of these policies at the federal and state levels are making themselves felt with a vengeance due to the economic crisis facing the state. I mention them here today, because they may be a harbinger of things to come.
Over the last three years, we are seeing that the fiscal crisis in the state is leading to the abandonment of municipal systems, particularly the schools. The tax payers' revolt is taking the shape of having large sectors of the middle class resist supporting educational services and other municipal services. In Massachusetts, the state has just released a report on the tremendous crisis affecting several school districts: all four of the school districts highlighted are districts where Latinos predominate: Chelsea, Lawrence, Holyoke, and Brockton. In the case of Chelsea, the school system is already being managed by a private entity, Boston University, in a move highly contested by the large Latino community of the city. The Lawrence and Holyoke school systems are about to be placed in receivership.

But the problem extends beyond the schools. A month ago the mayor of the city of Chelsea was
replaced with a receiver appointed by Governor Weld because the elected city government was unable to manage the city's affairs. Lawrence, Massachusetts is widely discussed as the next city where the Governor will have to appoint a receiver. Both are cities where the Latino population is very high and where the demographic changes have been profound and extremely quick.

It is still too early to tell whether the examples of abandonment and anarchy that we are witnessing in Chelsea and Lawrence following the rapid transformation of the population will become a pattern in other communities undergoing similar change. But it is clearly a development to be watched very carefully.

The demographic transformation of the population is an incontrovertible fact, whose outlines we are just beginning to witness and whose outcome will not come in our lifetime.
Whether this will be a peaceful process will depend on the basis that we set now, it will rely on the values and the principles that our generation establishes.

That Latinos will be at the center of this process is also clear. And as I said earlier, how we approach this transformation, how we prepare ourselves and our communities for this process, how do we develop leaders with the vision that will be required, are key questions for Latinos everywhere.

I have taken a lot of your time and I wanted to leave some space for discussion. I hope that I have provided you with some ideas as to the challenge we face together.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mexican</th>
<th>Puerto Rican</th>
<th>Cuban</th>
<th>Central or South Hispanic American</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population (thousands)</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>12,110</td>
<td>2,471</td>
<td>1,035</td>
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<td>12,565</td>
<td>2,330</td>
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<td>13,305</td>
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<td>1,014</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Median age (yrs)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>27.6</td>
</tr>
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<td>23.6</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>28.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>28.0</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Percent male</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td>47.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>48.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>47.7</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>48.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percent female</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>52.7</td>
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<td>50.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>51.2</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Percent with 4 yrs of HS or more</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>60.5</td>
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<tr>
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<td>55.5</td>
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<td>58.5</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Percent with 4 yrs of college or more</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>1988</td>
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<td>9.6</td>
<td>17.2</td>
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<td>5.4</td>
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<td>20.2</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Male Labor Force Participation Rates (16+)</th>
<th>Female Labor Force Participation Rates (16+)</th>
<th>Male Unemployment Rates</th>
<th>Female Unemployment Rates</th>
<th>Male Median Earnings (civilians 15+)</th>
<th>Female Median Earnings (civilians 15+)</th>
<th>Percent of Families Below the Poverty Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>80.4%</td>
<td>68.6%</td>
<td>77.2%</td>
<td>84.8%</td>
<td>74.5%</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
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<td>1989</td>
<td>82.8%</td>
<td>69.6%</td>
<td>76.3%</td>
<td>85.4%</td>
<td>72.2%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>81.2%</td>
<td>69.2%</td>
<td>74.9%</td>
<td>83.7%</td>
<td>75.3%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>52.4%</td>
<td>40.9%</td>
<td>53.6%</td>
<td>61.7%</td>
<td>51.6%</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1989</td>
<td>52.7%</td>
<td>41.7%</td>
<td>49.1%</td>
<td>61.7%</td>
<td>53.2%</td>
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<td>52.9%</td>
<td>41.4%</td>
<td>57.8%</td>
<td>61.0%</td>
<td>57.0%</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

SOURCES FOR GRAPHS: Unless otherwise noted, all data come from yearly (March) U.S. Census Current Population Surveys, the U.S. Census of 1980 and the U.S. Census of 1990.

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