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Our world is increasingly divided between the haves and the have nots, and the gap between these two is growing. Despite this, with all of its riches, the United States remains disconnected. A poor country in the aftermath of war is a microcosm of the world at large. Given the prodigious problems of the failed and failing nations discussed here — Afghanistan, Cambodia, East Timor, Haiti, Iraq, Kosovo, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sri Lanka, Somalia — the tendency is to deny the enormity of the task and to treat the problem superficially and peremptorily rather than to attack its root causes. The United Nations, flawed institution that it is, is at the core of peace-building. It has the experience, the expertise, and the mandate to help countries move from war to peace, but it must be strengthened. There are no certain prescriptions here, there are many sorrowful tales, some noble efforts, there are some elemental principles to guide us, and, finally, there is the necessity to keep trying, and to try harder.

Peace-building, the United Nations term and the less cantankerous one for nation-building,[1] isn't working. Since it takes generations rather than years, a true evaluation isn't yet possible. Beauty is in the eye of the beholder, of course, so in order to keep trying and to avoid demoralization, hope lives that success will be achieved. But not yet, and not the way things are going.[2]

A Rich-Poor Microcosm

The countries addressed here are among the sorriest and most afflicted, some regarded as failed or failing.[3] They are radically different from one another, while sharing certain qualities. Each peace-building country has a different configuration of afflictions to be confronted. The problems of Afghanistan, Cambodia, East Timor, Iraq, Kosovo, and Somalia stem from international conflict; Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo, and Rwanda live in particularly bad neighborhoods; Afghanistan and Iraq have regional enclaves with strong military and paramilitary forces; Afghanistan, Haiti, and East Timor have pathetically weak institutions; Haiti has a horribly destroyed environment and few natural resources,[4] and Rwanda has a severely damaged psyche and few natural resources; Iraq and Sri Lanka had better educated human resources and advanced infrastructure than most; Kosovo, Rwanda, and Sri Lanka are split by ethnic conflict; Somalia is dominated by clans and effectively without a central government.

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These are countries at the not end of the gap between the haves and the have nots that are gripped in internal crisis and trying to manage the transition from war to peace. Large portions of their populations struggle for protection, stability, and livelihood; their leaders struggle for power. They are post-conflict but remain conflict-prone. Predators sell arms, grab territory, or extract resources, if there are any. It's a mix of a crap-shoot and the Perils of Pauline, in messy, jumbled places, out of control. The "international community" — before, after, or in lieu of military intervention — fusses about what and what not to do, and a mix of policemen, do-gooders, and opportunists arrive from abroad, or don't, to help build peace.

Peace-building is a microcosm of the world today. Its countries, both in their inner turmoil and in the impact they have on the world outside, epitomize our moral and material dilemmas. They are havens of resentment and injustice, crucibles of enduring ethnic hatreds; they are the clash-points of rich and poor, of traditional and modern; they are the seedbeds of terrorism, disease, drug trafficking, and environmental degradation; they are the beacons of survival and hope. Their numbers are likely to grow; their problems are likely to spread. Waiting for the benefits of globalization, they threaten the harmony of interdependence. Peace-building challenges the world to be more connected and less separate.

Challenge and Denial

There are three realities that are important to keep in mind when considering peace-building and how to improve it. They tend to be denied or ignored, and to do so constitutes a huge liability.

First, the challenge is prodigious. A poor country in the aftermath of war is afflicted with multiple problems and vulnerabilities that tend to reinforce each other. To turn them around is a massive task. This is especially true when external factors work against progress rather than in favor of it: a highly competitive and discriminatory international economy, a widening gap between the haves and have-nots,[5] technological leaps that exacerbate disparities and resentment, and international pathologies such as disease, terrorism, narcotics, environmental degradation, and spreading conflicts. In the transition from war to peace, rehabilitation after recent conflict and early development out of poverty — rebuilding and building — are combined. Although priorities must be set, the various needs must be addressed simultaneously because they are mutually interdependent.

Depending on the specific circumstances, peace-building efforts include the following: (l) repairing and upgrading basic infrastructure such as secondary roads and bridges, wells and irrigation systems, and schools and clinics; (2) restoring basic water, health, and education services; (3) revitalizing agricultural production, livestock, and fisheries; (4) renovating markets, increasing trade, and creating jobs; (5) rebuilding capacity in local authorities and civil society; (6) reintegrating into the society repatriated refugees, displaced populations, and demobilized soldiers; (7) encouraging dialog and national reconciliation; and, (8) building capacity at the national level — in government ministries, the legal and justice system, effective security, elections, political parties and parliaments, and macro-economic policy and the financial and banking system. All this, and more, while attempting to keep politics and security from eating you up, is likely to be overwhelming.

Second, the powerful donor nations, which set the multilateral and bilateral agendas for peace-building and provide its financing, do not commit the necessary

will and funds. We pretend to do so. But recognizing the need to respond to these human tragedies and political dangers, the "international community" nevertheless tends to lessen the huge size and complexity of this phenomenon to something that matches what it is willing to invest. The true dimensions are distorted, perception is fuzzed; the Poconos are substituted for the Himalayas. The result is that insufficiency is built into the policies, and their implementation is inherently flawed. Failure results and is followed by recrimination. A different way of describing this is to point out that there is a natural lag between early efforts to deal with a new problem and the greater understanding and strengthened skills that come with experience over time. Another is simply to say that the situations calling out for peace-building, while requiring some attention, do not engage our national interest enough to merit greater investment, so we give some of them a try on the cheap, hoping for the best and trusting to luck. We play catch up, and fall behind.[6]

The third reality is the disconnect between the root causes of the problems these conflicted states need help coping with and the efforts applied by those outsiders who are offering help. The four principal sectors of effort are security, humanitarian, political, and development. Early effort encompasses rehabilitation and reconstruction programs that well-designed emergency humanitarian relief should have prepared the way for. These efforts lead to longer-term social and economic development, which stretches beyond the post-conflict transition period. The terms are inexact and subject to misuse. There is a continuum or spectrum of effort, dynamic rather than static in nature, with discernible phases but also simultaneity, overlapping, and bridging. Development invariably comes in a poor last. Security must be established and sustained for anything else to work. Political/diplomatic efforts proceed throughout. Humanitarian programs come when needed, are generally popular and attract relatively more funding, at least in the short-term, and are run by UN agencies and international NGOs. Development programs are more complex, controversial, take much, much longer, and must be undertaken in delicate partnership with local authorities and assets.

Secretary-General Kofi Annan's l997 package of reforms concentrated on humanitarian coordination and peace and security mechanisms; the Brahimi Report in 2000[7] failed to integrate development programs into UN peace operations; and the special structures set up under the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to provide overall UN authority in the most critical complex emergencies abroad give short shift to the development agenda. Development efforts tend to be crowded out by more immediate urgencies and pursued almost as an afterthought. Yet socio-economic development is the most fundamental assurance against future conflict. If it isn't made prominent and given sustained priority and strong financing, peace-building will end up chasing its tail, costly security-humanitarian-political efforts will be wasted, and the problems will return.

So, from the outset we have three powerful, fundamental obstacles: the enormity of the challenge itself, the insistent under-rating of it by those who try to take it on, and the persistent failure to attack the root causes of the crises. Unless peace-building efforts are able to recognize and deal resolutely with these broad problems, the specific efforts in individual countries cannot succeed.

Stumbling In

It's hard to say that the United States got into peace-building voluntarily, or even

consciously. It's more the case that we've stumbled in. Peace-building is the by-product of humanitarian emergencies and the interventions to deal with them, and of the associated erosion of sovereignty, of nations committing inhumanitarian acts against their own people.[8] If you've saved lives then the moral logic that follows is that you should help build livelihoods. A cruder version of the connection is this: "If you destroy it, you own it." But this can lead to lots of trouble: mission creep; intrusiveness in foreign cultures by the humanitarians; political and security factors unwilling to be kept separate; casualties; and getting seriously bogged down.

We've been providing foreign assistance to developing nations for a long time, often motivated by strategic interests and tied to our own pocketbooks. We have nonetheless kept ourselves reasonably immune from local problems, but this is different. Those were "normal development situations" and these are not. These are characterized by severe distress in the midst of grinding poverty, recurrent conflict, and political dysfunction. The setting now is post–Cold War, with a shrinking world offering different threats and opportunities, new kinds of incentives for alleviation and exploitation.[9] Cambodia was followed by Mozambique. Afghanistan staggered along, Zaire was covered up, and Sierra Leone blew up. Thousands of lives were saved in Somalia before the UN and the United States dived into civil war, got whacked, and exited, and soon after, the U.S.S. *Harlan County* was frightened out to sea from Port-au-Prince Harbor. Wars were fought and bombs dropped in Bosnia and Kosovo, together with international regimes devised to run the countries. Rwanda's tragedy was tragically botched. The Aussies provided the punch and the UN follow-on peacekeepers and a civilian administration in East Timor. Then international terrorism struck, the United States retaliated in Afghanistan and presumptively preempted in Iraq, making war on a major scale, followed by prolonged conflict, volatile politics, and limited reconstruction.

The peace-building phenomena resulting from these disparate configurations of provocation and response make the international community look like reeling, staggering Keystone Kops. In extreme cases, we're in danger of creating a witless cycle — making war in order to be able to make peace afterward, making war to get rid of the reasons why war is necessary, not being really serious about the cleanup after war and failing to understand what war is all about. Generally, we've gotten caught up in peace-building without being good at it and without being sure we're really in favor of it. The powers-that-be prefer, on the whole, economic and military imperialism to democratic and development imperialism, even with visions of milk and honey, prosperity, and democracy for all. At the same time, significant experience has been gained in acknowledging the importance of afflicted and failing states, in broadly consulting about collective action, in designing multi-faceted interventions, and in testing the tolerances of the societies hosting these undertakings.

Among the various aspects that, together, produce the complexity of peace-building there are three that particularly define it as a microcosm of the world at large. They are the interaction of security and development, the role of the UN, and the delicate relationship between the international and the indigenous players.

Security and Development

The intersection of needs and programs in security and development is fiendishly symbiotic. The two sides don't like each other, they don't understand each other,

and they can't live without each other. If there is violent conflict it must be ended and relative safety and stability established before significant reconstruction can get underway. Even the delivery of humanitarian relief requires some security and protection. In Afghanistan and Iraq, rehabilitation and reconstruction work in the countryside beyond Kabul and Baghdad is severely restricted by lack of security. Personnel dedicated to this work are pinned down and hemmed in at the capitals. The principle has long been established elsewhere: security comes first. As UN envoy Lakhdar Brahimi ruefully commented, "You can't have peace and justice at the same time and in most cases it's better to have peace first."[10] All sorts of ingenious and noble efforts are attempted to rebuild capacity in the midst of ongoing or recurrent violence, but as the need for security dominates, the military forces and programs to meet that need are so overpowering that they tend to impinge upon the other sectors of effort. Yet without socio-economic progress, insecurity will erupt again.

A major problem occurs when military personnel become involved beyond providing protection for emergency humanitarian relief and engage in rehabilitation projects such as infrastructure repair, restoring electrical power, temporary provision of human services, rudimentary training, setting up local governments, and so on. Such activity can indeed be valuable, and the military have relevant skills and equipment — for instance, in engineering. But these functions are inherently limited and, taken too far, run into trouble. In Haiti, special forces units sent to the countryside to restore order and demonstrate a show of force did excellent collateral work to help the local populations get on their feet. Yet this was undertaken and justified basically for the purpose of "force protection," that is, it was primarily self-serving, and the mutual benefits only extend so far before conflicts of interest and of culture are encountered. The real expertise and continuing dedication in extended humanitarian and prolonged development assistance lie in the UN agencies and NGOs that have long experience working together with local assets toward sustained growth. To the extent that they are falsely substituted for or preempted from their work, peace-building can be set back.

Three specific problems in Afghanistan illustrate the difficulty that the military and development sectors have in working productively together. This isn't a matter of fault or blame, particularly; both are trying their best, it's a matter of the radical differences between the two, and of the bubbling cauldron where peace is attempted. First, the civilian rehabilitation and development professionals operate traditionally in a neutral space with regard to the political and military activity taking place around them. The access and cooperation they get and their efficacy depend on not aiding (or being seen to aid) the contending partisans. This is a very difficult and delicate goal in itself, but when military personnel, sometimes in civilian garb, who may be providing protection and support but who are also gathering intelligence and fighting the war mix in, things become confused, and the civilian missions are infected. Second, military units operating in various locations throughout Afghanistan for the purposes of tracking down Al Qaeda and Taliban forces find it necessary to make alliances with regional warlords and local paramilitary commanders who live and exert power in these areas. Such alliances are as nasty as they are necessary, and the U.S. forces find various ways to ingratiate themselves with their local partners, including rehabilitation and local support services, and this can have a three-fold negative effect on peace-building: (a) the combat mission is emphasized at a cost to the security-establishing mission; (b) professional development personnel and

programs tend to be shut out; and (c) the national political strategy jointly pursued by the Afghan leadership in Kabul and its international sponsors to bring the warlords into a coherent national government tends to be undercut. Third, the provincial reconstruction teams combining military and civilian personnel and their missions, which were set up by the United States in order to contend with the voids of access and safety across Afghanistan's landscape are probably more harmful than helpful. They are oversold, too light and too thin to accomplish the security and reconstruction tasks they pretend to fulfill, and they act so as to substitute for serious area-based regional development programs jointly sponsored by the UN and the Kabul government, which are left struggling with inadequate support.

Militaries cannot substitute for civilian authorities in the political and economic areas of peace-building, despite the urgency of the security situation and even if such civilian authorities are not available or prepared. This is not what they do well and they shouldn't be saddled with it. Reports of the 101st. Airborne Division's work in Kurdistan recruiting local leaders and building municipal governments were impressive and even reassuring at the time, but provide an example of isolated military units performing resourcefully under pressure but unconnected to national governance strategies pursued by the Provisional Coalition Authority and its international and Iraqi advisers hunkered down in Baghdad, and therefore unlikely to be enduring. At the same time — here is the reciprocating dynamic again — it has also become embarrassingly clear that there must be an adequate number of troops able to supply overall security and that they cannot be withdrawn prematurely in response to local political pressure or pressure from home without causing grave harm to any peace-building commitment that includes sustainable development.

The UN Role

The United Nations role is at the core of peace-building for several reasons, aside from being so mandated by its charter and the global aspirations invested in it. It is likely to play key roles in most if not all of the sectors (security, humanitarian, political, and development), and is the only such organization. It is the best candidate to help coordinate disparate contributions to peace-building. It has the programmatic experience and expertise that is crucial to these challenges and with its NGO partners it actually does the work. Many of its agencies are active in the given country before and after as well as during the crisis and, therefore, they have acquaintanceship, memory, and continuity. And the UN provides an international legitimacy and multilateral cover to nations that want to participate but don't want to play too prominent a role.

Of course, there are problems and weaknesses that afflict the UN itself, and that circumscribe its peace-building missions, but none that aren't attributable to the following: l) it is assigned hugely daunting and improbable tasks by the often inflated instructions of its major intergovernmental bodies (the Security Council and the General Assembly); 2) it is a notoriously multifarious and loose-jointed collection, not so much decentralized as fragmented, of almost two hundred member nations mixing conflicting interests, ethnicities, and ideologies, producing an imposing bureaucracy; 3) it is totally a creature of the politics of its rulers, its membership, sometimes influenced by the greater numbers of the poorer states, but dominated by the wills and wealth of the most powerful ones; 4) it is populated by members of the human species, which hasn't matched scientific and technological progress with

moral and altruistic development. So, what do we expect? Well, enough to keep trying to make it better.

Three characteristics of UN involvement in peace-keeping exemplify the nature of the world at large. The first is that it engages at the convergence of war and peace, which is what these situations are all about, and what our global struggles are all about. The second is that it is an institution deeply committed to fighting the schism between the rich and powerful and the poor and weak, which appears in these instances in the form of both problem and prescription. The third is that it represents the major commitment to collaboration and partnership, which is the strategy that an unreconciled but interdependent world badly needs to gain ascendance given the haphazard bilateral and unilateral practices that will continue.

The in-country structure of the UN presence in peace-keeping operations is a major factor in their effectiveness. Ordinarily, the UN pursues its various humanitarian and development programs in a decentralized manner, which relies on the autonomy of individual agencies, loosely presided over by a UN Resident Coordinator appointed by the Secretary-General, and supported by the UN Development Program. In situations of "complex emergency" where conflict occurs and security forces are needed, the Security Council authorizes the Secretary-General to appoint his own Special Representative, called the SRSG, along with peace-keeping troops and a support staff imported in part from UN headquarters, and to set up a regime on the ground to oversee and to some extent direct the various programs. The military and political elements tend to dominate on-going efforts. Multiple variables come into play, for instance: the quality of international personnel assigned to the field, the setting of priorities and the difficulties of coordination, the policies devised and capacities mobilized by the local government, funding, and the dynamics of the problems themselves. Essentially, this is a very messy situation with inherently limited discipline and cohesiveness, characterized by a lot of dedicated people running around (among a few charlatans), trying to do their best and with progress made despite the obstacles.[11]

A selective review of UN struggles with peace-building suggests its difficulty in aligning its various parts and functions with other actors and events swirling about and throughout. In Afghanistan, the comfort that donor nations felt with the ease and familiarity of humanitarian assistance along with their suspicions of the capacity and integrity of the interim government to absorb more complex development efforts delayed for some time the availability and flow of support for the latter. In Cambodia and Kosovo, the structure of the UN enterprise demoted the rehabilitation and development priority.[12] In Iraq, the United States relegated the UN to a secondary role, which, along with the explosive insecurity, prevented reconstruction programs from getting underway and contributed to the buildup of the Iraqi anti-"occupation" psychology. In East Timor, when the UN was facing the end of its mission and realized its overly ambitious development agenda was falling seriously short, it prepared an inventory of unfulfilled and reformulated objectives to alert the unprepared East Timorese to take them over. In Mozambique and Rwanda, efforts by the UN to coordinate programs in-country were frustrated by instructions from headquarters of its operating agencies not to cooperate.[13] In Somalia, critical UN humanitarian efforts for drought-affected populations saved many thousands of lives, and the stumbling into political and security disaster was not due to the undesirability of "mission creep" itself but to horrendous misjudgments. Subsequently, UN headquarters' insistence in supporting a national government

which wasn't there lost the opportunity to invest in a regional "building blocks" strategy in Somalia.

Particularly intensive challenges emerge when UN programs combining security and political and rehabilitation components must be undertaken with the joint participation of both bilateral actors and local authorities. The ambition and complexity of these programs should be recognized prior to setting them in motion and burdening them with premature expectations. Two examples are CIVPOL (international civilian police recruited and deployed by the UN) and DDR (disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of local soldiers and paramilitary) programs. In the case of CIVPOL, there are invariable delays in scaring up enough cops from a variety of countries with different policing concepts, training, and languages — from the start the UN is placed in a disadvantageous situation, lacking reserve monies or personnel. The military forces become upset because policing is not what they are trained for or expected to do. It complicates their mission and delays their exit. Meanwhile, a local civilian capacity for assuring general security and law and order has to be trained, usually by the same CIVPOL component, but without the system of justice yet available that could provide infrastructure and reinforcement for the indigenous police to operate in.

Concerning DDR, the UN must have the skill to consult and collaborate with a number of powerful actors to design, negotiate, and implement integrated programs of extraordinary political and technical complexity. All sorts of conflicting interests are confronted. Different warrior populations have different political allies, regional warlords and the national government jockey for advantage, weapons owners have economic and cultural reasons for not giving them up, and the weapons trade remains robust enough in many countries to replenish fairly quickly. Finally, "reintegration" for reformed fighters — and to a lesser degree the same is the case for returning refugees or displaced persons — depends on there existing an economic and social fabric to absorb them in terms of jobs and livelihoods. Here security, political, and developmental concerns can come into serious discord: security requires demobilization and disarmament, politics wants this to happen quickly, but development will not be ready to fulfill its role prior to a long period of successful effort. So a crucial area of peace-building can be described as discordant and disintegrated, for analytically clear reasons, yet the UN is subject to being held responsible for the shortfall or the screwup, for not controlling the uncontrollables, often by those who are failing to provide the kinds of support that would help the common cause.

Meanwhile, back at UN headquarters, there is some potentially good news for peace-building. This is the adaptability of the world body to work with other international entities in various configurations and timing in collaborative peace operations. The UN's authority to act under Chapters VI and VII of its Charter lies with the Security Council,[14] but that organ may find it difficult to reach agreement as to what action it will authorize and it may refuse to approve or endorse at all, depending both upon the particular exigencies of the threat to international peace and security and humanitarian principles, as well as upon the respective national lenses through which the big powers view the issue. In some cases, the capacity and mandate of traditional UN peace-keeping forces proving too weak for the job are a factor. Hence, regarding the UN role in Kosovo and later in Iraq, there was severe disgruntlement and rousting about for acceptable approaches and alliances, but eventually there was compromise and accommodation. The members of the Security

Council and the Secretary-General have proved with passing time and changing events to be flexible enough to negotiate different models that preserve a useful role for the UN and its purposes.

In Cambodia and Mozambique, peace agreements and Security Council resolutions preceded intervention, and the UN mandate covered both peace-keeping and rebuilding. In Somalia, the UN and the United States collaborated in security and political and rehabilitation efforts, with an American SRSG bucking his own government and the U.S. military working apart from the UN peacekeepers — resulting in thousands of lives saved, mission creep, disaster, and egregious exit. In the case of Rwanda, the United States collaborated quite congenially with the UN and others in a series of terrible, cowardly, and tragic indecisions. In Bosnia, following a failed UN peacekeeping mission, NATO took military command and later the Dayton Accords powers set up a civilian administration under a High Commissioner, with UN acquiescence. In Kosovo, a NATO bombing campaign without UN approval was eventually followed by Security Council endorsement of national contingents of NATO ground troops dividing the province into five sectors, and a UN SRSG overseeing four civilian "pillars," two of which were headed by the European Union and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. In Haiti, East Timor and Sierra Leone, the Security Council authorized military interventions in advance by the United States the United Kingdom, and Australia, respectively — "multinational forces under the control of lead nations"[15] — in each case followed by UN peace-keeping forces and a UN-led civilian operation. In Afghanistan, the Security Council authorized military intervention by a United States-led coalition, with backup from UN and NATO peacekeepers; the United States retained control of security operations and the UN ran the civilian administration. In Iraq, the United States /United Kingdom-led coalition attacked Iraq on its own, to be followed later by Security Council resolutions acquiescing in control by the coalition of both the security and civilian operations with the UN playing a support role only. In the cases of Cambodia, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, E. Timor, and Iraq, the UN or a modified international authority actually took over and ran the given country for an interim period in lieu of any local government.

These mixed mechanisms have not been forged without serious cost to the United Nations, and some diplomats make strong arguments that in recent cases it has compromised away its integrity, especially in the face of United States unilateralism accompanied by arrogance and bullying. But the new world order is not so orderly that the UN has exclusive rights to peace and security action, and it shouldn't, for it is not the boss but the servant of an international community, which although at odds with itself hasn't given up trying to find ways that work. Despite appearances and behavior to the contrary, the United States has persistently demonstrated that it believes it is not in its interest to renounce or abandon the UN. And we are in a long chapter. Over the past several years, along with misconceived structures, workable models have been produced suggesting resourceful, viable partnerships in the future. It has been a period of trial and error, and of persistence, for the UN in peace-building, and we do not yet know which lessons have been learned and which will be missed.

Outsiders and Insiders

The interaction between the outsiders who come to provide assistance and the

insiders who live in the countries receiving it is extremely complex and delicate and seldom achieves its optimal harmony and productivity. By definition, this is where the two worlds interlocked in peace-building, the international and the local, really meet. The nature of the relationship is especially critical because it occurs at the delivery end, where the outcome of the enterprise is proven. This is not distant negotiation and policy theory, but immediate, on the ground, raw implementation. And it is the individual workers at this field level who are the real heroes of this story, operating face-to-face, in intimate engagement with the realities, and with the best opportunity to employ their best human qualities.

The reasons for the difficulty of this interface are not obscure. There are barriers of culture, language, tradition, and ideology; differences in education, training, experience, motivation, and capacity. It is dangerous to over-generalize here; one must allow for wide variations, and neither side is homogeneous. But the contrasts between those characteristics inherent in a developing society and those in economically advanced ones are in play. These contrasts between the two sets of partners are profound, and can easily produce conflict in the relationship. The real problem is the difference in relative power between the two sets of actors. One side is powerful, strong, rich, in a position to be of help; the other is weaker, poorer, and in a position to have to ask for it. The phenomenon of superiority/inferiority is at the same time not only a potentially destructive psychology but also the very basis of the relationship.

There are several elemental principles to keep in mind when attempting to manage the interaction between the two sets of partners. One is to recognize the profound differences, not to smooth them over superficially or pretend that they don't exist, let alone try to erase them. Another is to try jointly to understand them better, rather than to accept isolation and indulge resentment. The key is reciprocated respect, which can't be assumed but takes serious effort, discipline, and patience. A great deal can be accomplished simply by how competently each actor does his or her assigned job in the context of contributing to the mutual goal — concentrating on the work at hand can help focus energies on building common cause and confidence rather than magnifying countercurrents. So, as obvious as they are often ignored, there are some things each side can usefully keep in mind.

The initial obligation for getting the relationship working right lies with the international side, simply because they are the outsiders and because they are the more privileged. Above all, it must not distort the collaboration by domination, nor arbitrarily impose its interests on the local society. This is difficult, since one of the reasons the outsiders are present is that they hold convictions about solving the problems of deprivation, instability, and conflict. An example of the necessary restraint is not to overload local capacity; not to ask local actors to do things they can't do yet. But also, the international community must be ready to apply certain conditions and enforce certain standards in the kind of assistance it offers. This is dangerous territory with delicate thresholds; but it is not conditionality itself that is bad, it is when the leverage used is unfair or counterproductive. In Haiti, it was the prolonged failure of the international contributors and the Aristide government to reach agreement on the ongoing obligations of each that contributed to stagnancy, instability, and the eventual failure of the government. Who's to blame? Who knows? The point is that greater accommodation was necessary and possible. In any case, Haiti is now in a much weaker position dealing with an international community even more inclined to ensure that its investments are not wasted.

In the political realm, the influence of the external actors is particularly treacherous. They can too easily design their models and project their timetables based on their own concepts and interests, distorting national capacities and warping the emergence of national leadership. Elections are a prime candidate for this danger; for instance, the first winner-take-all elections can produce polarization and propel extremist elements. While outside help is needed to encourage functional self-governance; a consultative approach in preparing both structure and personnel (as in the case of Lakhdar Brahimi, the UN envoy in Afghanistan) to insure the result has a better chance of being organic than a largely imposed approach that tempts local rejection (as in the case of L. Paul Bremer III, U.S. head of the Coalition Provisional Government in Iraq). Likewise, foreign assistance programs cannot be designed in foreign capitals and delivered wholesale overseas, but must be negotiated locally so as to match them with the absorption and production capacity of the recipients. Care must be taken in the case of ongoing governments and systems in place to build on what's there rather than with replacement or too much "reform" too quickly.

Expatriate staff working in-country must recognize from the outset, as Maj. Gen. William L. Nash[16] has warned, speaking of peace-building operations everywhere, that "If you're part of the solution, you're part of the problem." They must be freed up from too much headquarters bureaucracy, static templates, and micro-management, and be allowed to do the job and be supported in their efforts to get it done. They must be allowed to identify what the special circumstances and priorities are in the given country and, working closely with the local authorities, to figure out the best ways to address them. They must be willing to challenge instructions from above that they believe to be wrong. They must be devoted to transparency and to being careful to send the right message to their local counterparts, which is, first of all, to avoid inflated expectations. By not over-promising, indeed even by explicating areas of lower priority that cannot be funded (not a normal talent of the international community), the imperative that local leadership do its part can be underscored.

Which brings us to the performance of the indigenous folk, those who have the ultimate obligation to make the relationship work right so that peace-building will be successful. Their first requirement is to mobilize their best capabilities and apply them to priority needs. They must be able, without subservience, to abide — to tolerate — the intruders; no easy assignment. Candid and precise communications are especially important, keeping in mind that in order for the whole endeavor to work the insiders will have to generate as much understanding as possible about what is going on locally; they will have to work overtime to educate the outsiders — who will believe they know more than they do — about the realities in their country. This means being willing to bite the hand that feeds them, or at least speak up and explain why a given policy or program won't work or is harmful.

But the overriding challenge will be for the coherent exercise of political will locally. The international actors can act in such a way as to encourage or to frustrate the development of political leadership, but the ultimate responsibility rests at home, and only national leaders and groups — institutions, civil society, political parties, to the extent they exist — can inspire limpid and harness fractious energies for the common good. We should not casually assume that local rulers will choose to serve the best interests of their whole populations and reject the temptation to simply secure and expand the power of those in charge. Here again, is the microcosm of the

rich-poor gap in peace-building — are we hypocritical in expecting that national leaders not emulate in their own country what they see internationally? In any event, how and whether "getting their act together" will happen is something of a mystery, or at least is not predictable under current circumstances and will be different in every case.

Although the ultimate outcomes are unknown, there is plenty of evidence of tough going. In Cambodia when UNTAC pulled out in l993, shortly after supervising elections, the two major political factions joined in a coalition government, but instead of finding a way to provide the stability enabling sustainable progress and growth, prolonged political struggle took over and has since resulted in a one-party and one-leader dictatorship, institutions that are not accountable, and the majority population remaining in dire poverty. In Haiti, from l995 to 1998 competent and courageous Haitian officials in partnership with the international community rebuilt the Haitian National Police — an impressive feat. But subsequently, more powerful Haitian actors, fearing a strong, publicly accountable professional security organization immune from political manipulation and corruption, quickly and effectively denuded it, which led to widespread criminality and insecurity. Since NATO intervened in Kosovo in l999, the obsession with the idea that the province must become an independent state, along with shortcomings in UN security and human rights efforts, drove the deeply embedded hostility of ethnic Albanian extremists to erode prospects for a multi-ethnic society. In Sri Lanka in 2002, Sinhalese, Tamils, and Muslims were unwilling or too frightened to take advantage of a cease-fire and peace talks to participate in consultation and dialogue at the community level to plan a peaceful and secure future.

As late as June 2004 in Afghanistan and Iraq, warlords and ethno-religious factions were sparring for power with evolving fragile interim governments amid serious ongoing conflict, endangering social, political, and economic progress. At the same time, following the return of the UN to Haiti, Famli Lavalas, the largest political party and closest to the once overwhelmingly pro-Aristide peasantry, was still refusing to participate in an Electoral Council responsible for setting up national elections, and the interim government was unwilling or unable to entice it to join, forewarning another potentially crippling stalemate. Also, in Sri Lanka the inability of the Sinhalese majority government in Colombo and the rebel Tamil Tigers to compromise enough either to undertake badly needed humanitarian and development assistance in the northeast of the country, or to agree on a model for an interim administration there prior to a final political settlement, created a standoff that resulted in serious schisms threatening resumption of fighting.

These are not happy stories, even though they should not be regarded in isolation and are not over. What happens to peace-building if the locals don't do their job, don't mobilize and coalesce? The foreigners may perform better and stay longer, but they can't produce sustained progress by themselves even if they were so inclined, and the failing state will continue to flounder, at best — unless members of the international community were to revisit outright colonialism or trusteeships.

Prospects and Prescription

The prospects for peace-building are poor, generally speaking, assuming: (l) the extended existence of unstable, failing, conflict-prone states; (2) the international community not undergoing radical change in raising its sophistication, resources,

and commitment to deal with the problem; (3) the further widening of the rich-poor gap. There are some potential bright spots: (l) an increased willingness by the international community to get engaged in these situations in various ways (pre-emptive war requiring reconstruction afterwards not being one of them); (2) such greater involvement producing familiarity and connectedness encouraging less detachment and isolation; (3) learning from more experience and improved performance (though slow, erratic and painful) perhaps leading to greater public awareness about interdependence and broader perceptions of national interest. Future possibilities include: (1) increasing interdependence and globalization causing more serious response and more reliance on multilateral strategies; (2) bad mistakes, especially in the application of military force, and bad performance in peace-building, leading to the proliferation of Vietnam and Somalia syndromes; (3) triage.

Various prescriptions for better peace-building are implicit summarily in earlier passages describing its challenges and complexities. But a few can be summarily enumerated here, both macro and micro suggestions for future effort. Some general propositions require change internationally in values, priorities, and behavior. They can justifiably be characterized as bromides, yet also as ideas honored by enlightened opinion but not by enlightened action.

1. More multilateral effort, consultation, and collaboration across the international community (including the Bretton Woods institutions); and the obverse of this, which is less competition and exploitation for selfish advantage by international actors, both in distant foreign capitals and on the ground.
2. Greater tolerance for complexity, respect for incremental effort that expects difficulty and set-backs and is willing to learn as it progresses, which does not expect too much and accepts uncertainty as it proceeds.
3. Infusion of respect and application of programmatic restraint in the interaction with local actors so as to maximize their mobilization of their own capacity.
4. An appreciation of the time necessary to peace-building, requiring a virtually revolutionary change in farsightedness, in perception of how long it takes, and a corresponding commitment and effort.
5. Openness, candor, and transparency both in the characterization of the undergirding and ongoing realities of peace-building and in the interests and positions taken by international actors about it.
6. Serious funding, way beyond the financial peanuts now committed for peace-building. [17]
7. Various radical, outlandish reforms even less likely to be adopted by the powerful should not be overlooked here — such as the cessation of international arms-peddling, the elimination of agricultural subsidies that distort international trade, and the establishment of serious governance capable of protecting the global environment.

Other proposals for the international side are more specific, programmatic, and operational, in nature. It would be a mistake to think that the following specific proposals are sufficient without progress on the preceding general propositions.

1. Establishing sufficient security to allow peace-building to take place requires not only the external military authority responsible to sustain it beyond "combat operations" and deploy adequate troops to do the job, but also to: (a) undertake initial urgent local rehabilitation projects, such as getting basic facilities and services up and running; (b) hand over policing functions to international and local police personnel in an organized and coordinated manner so such transitions are handled smoothly; (c) connect with and support civilian (UN, NGO, and bilateral) organizations in physical and other reconstruction efforts; (d) train indigenous security personnel thoroughly so that they can take over. Despite efforts to strengthen broad "peacekeeping operations," or OOTW ("operations other than war"), largely the responsibility of Civil Affairs Reservists and despite claims out of Afghanistan and Iraq about military support for local governance, the U.S. military still really doesn't like to be saddled with this stuff. The earlier intellectual and operational leadership of Marine General Anthony Zinni to build this kind of capacity should be revived and made an integral part of U.S. military doctrine and capacity.[18] It can't just be left up to the Reserves.
2. It is important to get the international cops in fast, and the CIVPOL program run by the Department of Peace-keeping Operations in the UN Secretariat, which relies on contributions of civilian police contingents of uneven quality from individual nations (with different experience, training and languages and taking much too long to get into place) recruited after crises have struck, must be upgraded. It might be possible to set up a system of pledges by individual nations, with pre-financing, for a standby corps of reserve police, designated national cadres that have undergone special training by the UN, and which can be deployed quickly.
3. When the UN seeks to provide oversight and structure in peace-keeping situations, it should: (a) be employed with a minimum of bureaucratic weight and layering from New York; (b) insure that the flow and ebb from Resident Coordinator to SRSG models and back again are integrated and converted so as to ensure that the development role is not subsumed and operating agencies not inhibited; (c) coordinate across the various functions of international actors and programs without making coordination an end in itself[19]; (d) not undertake these efforts without quality personnel to do the job.
4. The various operating agencies of the international peace-keeping enterprise, however it is configured, must design their programs based on an assessment of the capacity level in the various sectors of the given society, rejecting standard stereotypes that ignore the huge variations in absorption and need among and within receiving countries.
5. More sophisticated strategies must be developed on the relationship between conditionality and the mobilization of political will and action, through intensive consultations among the major international actors, including the Bretton Woods institutions, and with the indigenous authorities, country by individual country, so that pragmatic and consistent messages are conveyed about what is expected nationally and what will not be provided internationally. Regardless of the level of anticipated international investment there is an obligation — while committing to

non-abandonment and long-term help — to make it clear that there's no bail-out: without the requisite strength in domestic response there will be failure.

6. Let the expatriates on the ground, working closely with each other and with their local counterparts, have as much responsibility as possible to determine programs and implement them, and give them the support from above and outside to their jobs. The amount of hierarchical micro-managing, interference, and outright bad judgment, often encouraged by donor states and substituting for reinforcement, is staggering in this business.
7. Democratization should be carefully calibrated and adjusted so as to work with the traditions and tolerances of individual countries and in any case pursued gradually and with patience, rather than being forced arbitrarily according to external ideologies and political timetables.
8. The international community, most of whose representatives come from advanced rather than poor societies, should not allow its preference for relatively fancy "governance" programs in support of institution-building at the national government level to (a) under-prioritize more basic programs addressing needs at the grassroots level in poverty reduction, agricultural reform, basic health, education, and welfare services, and support for civil society, or (b) overlook regional "building blocks" strategies in the absence of strong central authority. "Bottom-up" efforts not only address the needs of the most vulnerable, but their value is likely to be more enduring in the event of resumptions of violence and instability destructive to some more fashionable "top-down" investments.
9. The availability of competent personnel to be recruited and deployed for peace-building assignments by the international community must be elevated by cooperative national and multilateral effort. This means not only educating and training people so that they know something about the cultures they will be working in and maybe even speak the language as well as have specific expertise and skills to do their jobs, but also providing incentives to attract people of exceptionally high quality. Shortfall in human resource capacity is a perpetual plague for the internationals as well as the local actors.
10. There are some organizational and structural changes that can be made at home within governments active in peace-building, which could help their policies and programs have better results. Some European donor nations have combined their foreign and development ministries, for instance. Suggestions have been made and models are being studied in the United States for a cabinet department in development cooperation, a reconstruction bureau in the State Department, and a remodeling of the National Security Council, for instance. Aggregating and focusing greater expertise and competence is essential, but undue faith should not be placed in such tinkering, which takes a lot of time, energy, and wrangling, and which sometimes acts as a stealthy substitute for the kind of real change in perception, values, and national priorities that is necessary for true success in peace-building.

11. When William James was asked what he thought were the three most important human qualities, he answered: "Kindness, kindness, kindness." That's not irrelevant for peace-building, either, but if the question were phrased a little differently to address our purposes here, the answer might be "Capacity-building, capacity-building, capacity-building."

How We're Going to Treat Each Other

What will happen as this unique crunch between war and peace remains unresolved, in a world both flailing to sort out and trying to ignore a lot of confusion, hope, fear, collision, ambition? There are bigger challenges that may have more impact on our future than these desperate imbroglios, although not wholly separable from them: trade, terrorism, nuclear proliferation, AIDS, the environment, the Middle East, China, for example. But peace-building circumstances and undertakings combine many of our issues and reveal a lot about ourselves, the human condition. Peace-building reasserts pathologies and strengths, both in our nature and in our behavior, in our better angels and meaner shadows. Simply put, because it is important and floundering, it needs more reflection and action.

In concluding, there are some essential thoughts, distillate, from this examination. The first is that the peace-building microcosm manifests most profoundly the disparity between people who have and people who don't, simultaneously a moral and an existential phenomenon, and our challenge is to be sure that the twain shall meet. The rich/poor gap is the philosophical core here. It produces the need for peace-building and complicates its pursuit.

Another central idea is that the antidote to disconnectedness — the latent apartheid, which characterizes our existence — unsurprisingly is greater connectedness. There is need for a more integrated approach to almost everything we do, and it takes a broader perspective and a bolder imagination to translate this into policy. The relationship between peace-building and terrorism, for instance, demonstrates this. The circumstances that require peace-building also provide an incitement to terrorism, and joint efforts to effect peace-building become the targets of the terrorists. One can't be fought without combating the other; you have to get at the roots, not just go for the head.[20] Those who argue that the relationship between poverty and terrorism is irrelevant or nonexistent have concocted an elitist pretension. Failing states, states in chaos and violence, are breeding grounds for terrorism. People who are miserable are more likely to resort to violence. People who regard with ugly clarity the disparity between their meager existence and the lives of those who are consuming the most and polluting the most will use the weapons distributed with unending efficiency by the same perps to respond, and the response will be destructive. One of the things that peace-building tries to confront is what to do with these arms. But the overall goal it aims for is to help build enough security, political stability, and economic sustainability to reduce that disparity.

It follows that this has to be a joint effort: partnership, collaboration. The "us vs. them," dog-eat-dog, mentality does not work, at least not in peace-building. Unilateralism and dominance won't work, either. You can't fight nationalism with nationalism. Multilateralism is needed; peace-building won't work without it and the world won't work without it. Unilateral action must not be sacrificed, and should always be available, but its limited and negative values as a strategy need to be

recognized, particularly when connected to an over-reliance on military force, so that it can be seen as a bad idea and relegated to the category of last resort.

The increasing intensity of interdependence, one aspect of which is "globalization," with positive and negative forces moving across continents and seas and political boundaries, ever faster and with more impact and with little control, may bring us to confront its implications and consequences. For the United States this means defining our national interest much less narrowly, recognizing that geo-political strategy is geo-developmental, and perceiving our future as integrally connected to people both distant and different from us. The world should not be viewed as good or bad — it is both, and we're part of it — but as inseparable. Here is where the moral and the operational meet,[21] the idealist and the realist join forces. It comes down to how we're going to treat each other, not only here but there, and what that means for our survival.

For this redefining of our national interest, there must be a commitment to open debate and public education about the true nature of the world —what this implies for us and what our obligations are. Shibboleths and slogans that misrepresent without attempting to generate an understanding of the depths of our dangers and opportunities, are to be shunned. And either in response to needed leadership or in its absence, the polity — the sovereign of democracy, which is the people of our nation — must assert itself. Dedicated participation in self-government is the patriotic obligation on which future happiness, not to say survival, depends.

It may be that the remarkable thing about our present experience with peacebuilding, a cause for hopefulness if not exactly optimism, is that we are still trying. Halting, marginal, even agonized progress is being made somewhere some of the time. People are being helped, not just with lives but with livelihoods, and they are responding. Some connections are dynamically, reciprocally active. For peacebuilding to catch, hold, and prevail will require radical rather than merely incremental or gradual change. How fast could that happen? How long will that take? U.S. Major General David Petraeus, during his exceptional tour in peacebuilding in northern Iraq, asked a reporter, "Tell me how this ends?"[22] It doesn't.

Notes

1. Excerpts from a briefing on terrorism given by the Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University at the National Press Club, Washington, D.C. on November 28, 2001: "Peacebuilding is different from peace-making (bringing about the end of a war, including negotiations) and peace-keeping (using troops in an attempt to insure that the peace is kept and war doesn't break out again). . . . A section of the Secretary-General's reform program announced in July 1997 contained the following description: 'The concept of post-conflict peace-building refers to the various concurrent and integrated actions undertaken at the end of a conflict to consolidate peace and prevent an occurrence of armed confrontation. . . . Peace-building does not replace ongoing humanitarian and development activities in countries emerging from crises. Rather it aims to build on them.'"
2. When the U.N.'s Transitional Authority departed Cambodia in 1993, following war, genocide, and invasion, a peace agreement, the expenditure of almost two billion dollars in foreign aid, the holding of elections, and the adoption of a constitution, the Authority judged the peace-building a "success." But this self-serving label was part of an effort to make the exit felicitous, and masked the bad news ahead. Mozambique, having "recovered" following an eleven-year civil war and enduring another major presence and effort of the U.N. and its colleagues, tends to

appear on the plus side of the ledger, but it's simply too early to tell. Namibia, further in the past, looks like a winner. In the present, Sierra Leone and East Timor have made progress. Elsewhere, the future looks more questionable or forlorn, especially in Africa — e.g., Angola, Rwanda, Somalia, Congo, Ivory Coast, Liberia and Zimbabwe.

3. The countries in which post-conflict peace-building has been undertaken that are given the most attention in this essay are Afghanistan, Cambodia, East Timor, Haiti, Iraq, Kosovo, Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia, and Sri Lanka. The author draws on direct, in-country experience in all of them except Iraq.
4. The Haitian town of Mapou and the one thousand people who lived there were destroyed by the May 2004 flood. Fernando Gueren, a farmer whose parents and son were swept away, said: "Most people here work the earth, but the most desperate take the trees (to make charcoal). When they take the trees, there's nothing left to drink up the water. They work the land to survive. This is one of the problems of Haiti too great to solve with a sack of rice." Tim Weiner, *New York Times*, May 31, 2004.
5. "Almost half the world's six billion people live under the poverty line of two dollars a day: l.2 billion earn less than one dollar a day and are in the extreme poverty category. By the year 2020 the globe likely will add 2 billion more people, 95 percent will reside in the developing world." J. Brian Atwood, "The Link between Poverty and Violent Conflict," *New England Journal of Public Policy*, 19, no.1 (Fall/Winter 2003–2004): l59. "The rich-poor divide is growing: in l960, in the twenty richest countries the per-capita gross national product (GDP) was eighteen-fold that in the poorest twenty countries; by l995 this gap had increased to thirty-seven fold. Between l980 and the late l990s, inequality increased in forty-eight of the seventy-three countries for which there are reliable data. Inequality is not restricted to personal income, but other important areas of life, including health status, access to health care, education and employment opportunities are also involved. Relative deprivation, one of the precursors of war, is increasing exponentially among nations and within nations. . . . Growing socioeconomic and other disparities between the rich and the poor within countries, and between rich and poor nations, also contribute to the likelihood of armed conflict." Barry Levy and Victor Sidel, "War & Public Health in the Twenty-First Century," *New England Journal of Public Policy,* 19, no.1 (Fall/Winter 2003-2004): l69, l72.
6. "In l994, the cost of U.N. peace-keeping operations was running at roughly 4 billion U.S. dollars per year, and the U.N. was spending about the same on emergency assistance. U.N. grants for development worldwide were estimated at about 5 billion dollars annually. Combined bilateral assistance for development was about 60 billion annually (compared to the total net flow of Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries to developing countries and multilateral organizations of almost 106 billion in l992). . . . Donor response to consolidated emergency appeals were way under half of what was asked; for instance, such requests for Afghanistan set at l22 million for the period October l993 to September l994 raised roughly 40 per cent of that." Jonathan Moore, *The U.N. and Complex Emergencies: Rehabilitation in Third World Transitions* (Geneva: U.N. Research Institute for Social Development, l996): 53.

   The U.N. requested $35 million in emergency funds for Haiti in March and was still $26 million short of that goal by the beginning of June. Tim Weiner, *New York Times*, June l, 2004.
7. "Report of the Secretary General on the Implementation of the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations," United Nations, 2000, l5, para 6.
8. "Of 55 peace operations the U.N. has mounted since l945, 4l began after l989; fifteen were still underway in 2003." James Dobbins, *America's Role in Nationbuilding: From Germany to Iraq* (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 2003), xiv-xv.
9. One sign of the unpreparedness of the times was that the World Bank was flabbergasted, first by being a bank, but principally because it spurned helping in trouble-spots where a nation was in debt, experiencing significant insecurity, or where it was difficult to identify an actual government.

10. Sultan Aziz, former senior advisor to the SRSG in Afghanistan, at the Kennedy School's Institute of Politics Study Group on Nation-Building, Cambridge, Mass., April I5, 2004.
11. "There are various sets of actors, putative partners, who participate in rehabilitation in the field in different ways: I) the host government, or other authority, in the recipient state which bears the primary responsibility for its own recovery and with which external assistance programmes must be closely connected, as well as other native participants such as parties, factions, religious bodies, local and provincial authorities, private sector traders, entrepreneurs, et al; 2) the donor nations which contribute to the UN programmes, but also conduct separate bilateral aid programmes in diplomatic missions in the given country; 3) private, voluntary, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) both international and indigenous, which run humanitarian and development activities there; 4) UN operational agencies (technically called Related UN Organs, Funds and Programmes), such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), and the World Food Programme (WFP); 5) more autonomous Specialized Agencies of the UN system, such as the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the World Health Organization (WHO), and the International Labor Organization; and, 6) other entities, including the UN Secretary General and Secretariat, the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, regional banks and other regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the International Organization on Migration." Jonathan Moore, *The U.N. and Complex Emergencies: Rehabilitation in Third World Transitions* (Geneva: U.N. Research
    Institute for Social Development, I996), 26.
12. In both cases, the coordinating structure of the U.N. under the SRSG included UNHCR, its leading humanitarian assistance agency, and excluded UNDP, its leading development assistance organization.
13. In Mozambique in I993, a UNICEF team from New York headquarters carried instructions to dissuade its chief representative in Maputo from responding to coordination requests from the assistant SRSG overseeing humanitarian and development programs there. In Rwanda in I997, UNHCR headquarters in Geneva instructed its chief representative in Kigali not to cooperate with the U.N. Resident Coordinator there.
14. Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter covers Security Council action regarding the "Pacific Settlement of Disputes," and Chapter VII addresses "Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression". Chapter VII includes under Article 42 authorization for "such action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security."
15. Described by former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright as "peace enforcement missions authorized by the United Nations, in which the Security Council deputizes an appropriate major power to organize a coalition and enforce the world's will." Interview published in *Foreign Policy* (Sept-Oct. 2003): 20.
16. Former Regional Administrator for the United Nations in Northern Kosovo based in Mitrovica, at Kennedy School's Institute of Politics Study Group on Nation-Building, Cambridge, Mass., March 11, 2004.
17. The Commission on Weak States and U.S. National Security and the Center for Global Development recently reported that the United States was one of the "least generous of all donors in its public spending on development assistance as a proportion of the economy." They also stated that the Bush administration and the U.S. Congress rely too heavily on military force and not enough on development aid to fight terrorism: the administration's request for increases in the current budget include $I billion for HIV/AIDS and assistance to the poorest nations, and $21 billion for the Defense Department (not including supplemental requests for military operations in Iraq). The report also pointed out that failed states were excluded from receiving aid from the new development account set up by the United States for poor nations with a proven track record for fighting corruption and supporting democracy. Elizabeth Becker, *New York Times*, June 9, 2004.

18. See Gen. Zinni's "Twenty Lessons Learned for Humanitarian Assistance and Peace Operations," Center for Naval Analyses l995 Annual Conference Proceedings, *Military Support to Complex Humanitarian Emergencies: From Practice to Policy* (Alexandria, Virginia): l7–2l.
19. See "Independent Study of U.N. Coordination Mechanisms in Crisis or Post-Conflict Situations," report by Jonathan Moore for UNDP/ERD, October 3l, 2000: 9 (lll, A1 & 2).
20. James D. Wolfensohn, President of the World Bank, said in a recent interview: "There is no doubt that today the priority is being given, and maybe correctly so, to terror, to conflict. . . . I would argue that there is also a need for a parallel and equally urgent attention to the question of development as a way to prevent terror, and to prevent conflict — and I really passionately believe that." Elizabeth Becker, *New York Times*, April 22, 2004.
21. See *Hard Choices: Moral Dilemmas in Humanitarian Intervention*, ed., Jonathan Moore (Boulder, Colo.: Roman & Littlefield, l998), 7.
22. Now Lt. Gen. Petraeus was Commander of the 101st Airborne Division, based in Mosul. (In June 2004 he returned to Iraq to head up the training of Iraqi security forces.) His question was quoted in a book review (In *the Company of Soldiers: A Chronicle of Combat* by Rick Atkinson) written by Christopher Dickey, *New York Times*, April 4, 2004, l3.