9-21-2003

Editor's Note

Padraig O'Malley
University of Massachusetts Boston, padraig.omalley@umb.edu

Editor's Note

Padraig O'Malley

> Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed. The world in arms is not spending money alone. It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children. . . . This is not a way of life at all, in any true sense. Under the cloud of threatening war, it is humanity hanging from a cross of iron.
>
> —Former U.S. President, Dwight D. Eisenhower, April 16, 1953

The twenty-first century had hardly put its first fledgling year behind it when the promise of its possibilities, so endlessly recapitulated at the millennium's turn, were shattered. The television images of two huge Boeing 767 jets lumbering at low altitude across the skyline of a bright Manhattan morning, bellies full of baleful fuel, lifting their noses and ripping into the guts of the twin towers of the World Trade Center, symbols of New York's global stature, and the towers collapsing in the inferno of a towering rage, were replayed endlessly across our planet, imprinting indelible memories of random mayhem, sudden death, and the once unthinkable was now an instant reality.

9/11 ushered in a new era, one that redefined the new century's connection with the twentieth century just as the madness of World War I redefined that century's connection with the nineteenth. It did more than destroy the twin towers; rupture America's belief in its invulnerability to attack; instill a sense of the dread of an invisible enemy that could strike without warning, directing its wrath at people, not armies, and not at the state but at its ordinary citizens, individuals and families that tried to live ordinary lives with a sense of safety in their surroundings.

That morning dumped memories of the twentieth century into their own ground zero, consigned them to the dustbin of the past. Indeed, with our obsessive preoccupation with the threats of imminent dangers — color codes indicating levels of terror alert, a president who announced that America arrogated to itself the right to take preemptive action against any country that appeared to pose a threat to its national security, a relentless and unforgiving search for weapons of mass destruction, which culminated in the invasion of Iraq on grounds that later proved to be baseless, the constant harping on regime change as a policy instrument, the elimination of "an axis of evil" becoming a religious-like obligation of a secular polity — the twentieth century was swallowed by the immediacy of the present. "Imminent threat" became the parlance of choice, although those who assiduously cultivated the threat of imminence increasingly found difficulty identifying where the threat was coming from and just how imminent something was that could not be detected. But the logic of the newly created insecurity argued that the less definable the threat, the greater the threat it posed.

Padraig O'Malley is a senior fellow at the John W. McCormack Graduate School of Policy Studies, University of Massachusetts Boston.

The past counts for little. Not that we do not remember it — we do, but fleetingly, and then we proceed to repeat its mistakes — or, worse still, to believe that we cannot repeat its mistakes, when the realities all around us speak to the contrary. We are inured to scenes of mass destruction. Having seen the indescribable on so many occasions, we have become anesthetized to its impact. One more indescribable is tantamount to watching an old commercial — it is perceived as a rerun, time to switch channels.

In the early 1990s, the West, especially the European strand, watched nightly reports of the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia (euphemism for genocide) and the hidden concentration camps, heard repeated accounts of the rape of Muslim women by Serbian militias, and yet it stood idly by, allowed the indescribable to happen before its eyes, and people had their suppers. Ethnic cleansing brought a new dimension to warfare. Now when you take control of a piece of territory you insure your permanent presence by murdering everyone who might, at any point in the future, pose a threat to your hegemony, thus disposing of the threat of opposition. In a perverse way, it is the ultimate form of conflict resolution.

In our Brave New World, the inexorable flood of information impels us to dismiss everything except the instantaneous flow of the instantaneous, thus consigning the past to impermanence, temporizing the search for anything that has meaning. In our rush for immediate interpretations of events as they unfold, we reduce complicated trajectories of history to simple story lines that have no time nor room for recourse to the abstruse, often confusing, and sometimes seemingly random routes that history takes. Unfortunately, immediate interpretations of complex events leave little room for unwinding the complicated threads of history. More unfortunately, we are uninterested in untangling the threads, lacking both the skills and the patience.

History is located in time and space, and time and space change. Events explained in one context give order to the chaotic and provide the cushion of certainty that is necessary for the rationalization of the human condition. But for every context there is at least a competing context. Selectivity is the barometer of our preconceptions.

The reexamination of the past, therefore, becomes necessary to reset the equilibrium of a given time. Sifting memory's recollections and perceptions, once indelibly imprinted on our consciousness as enduring dogmas or ideological constructs beyond challenge, is necessary to our search for truth. Permutations of perceptions are a fulcrum that "truth" needs in order to balance its own mysterious untruths.

Thus, in this and the next issue of the *New England Journal of Public Policy* we will look at issues of war in the twentieth century; at how the nature and purpose of war have changed; at how evil stalks the human condition, how we forget, most likely because we want to forget. Some truths are too terrible to bear. They require us to ask questions of ourselves that our psyches are not equipped to answer and so they close down for the sake of our survival. Had we slaughtered dumb animals in the manner in which we slaughtered ourselves during the century we have left behind, we would have filled the air with our wails of anguish and protest.

The twentieth century will be remembered for many things — endless lists of scientific breakthroughs in physics, medicine, biology, genetics, and communications that were unthinkable mere decades before the impact of discovery in these fields transformed the way we live and think and communicate. Each discovery had an exponential impact on the next, each accelerated the next; the obsolete became the commonplace.

But with every innovation that improved the quality of life, we managed to find

new and "improved" ways of killing ourselves, not just the killing of some of us but the killing of all of us. Our ultimate accomplishment: weapons of war that will, if used, annihilate every living being, deplete the planet of Man leaving no memory of his ever having been here. And in our madness, we were not content to develop the capacity to merely vaporize all of us one time over, but we rushed, inebriated with the insanity of our success, to devise means of destroying ourselves multiple times over and then multiples of multiples and, still not satisfied, were by the end of the century, relentlessly pursuing more deadly means to extinguish whatever our previous endeavors might have missed.

Exquisite Arsenals

At the century's turn, the arsenal of our extinctive dreams amounted to 2,100 strategic nuclear weapons in the possession of five countries and between 23,000 and 32,000 tactical nuclear missiles in the possession of the same five plus another three. Other countries — thirty at one count — are eagerly biting at the nuclear cherry, albeit with pious denials. Earlier this year the "father" of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, "tearfully" admitted to sharing nuclear technology with a number of countries — Iran, North Korea, and Libya. The Pakistani president General Pervez Musharraf pardoned Dr. Khan — although everyone agreed that such egregious behavior on the part of Pakistan could only have occurred with the concurrence of the Pakistani military, which Musharraf presides over. More disturbing is the fact that, despite all the safeguards that were supposedly in place to preclude such illicit transfers of illicit technology, they took place with casual ease.

Countries with nuclear aspirations pursue them in secret using the clandestine underground arms networks that are the procurers of death. The nuclear black market is extensive. It operates with startling impunity and thoroughness. Countries have easy access to whatever they want whether it's raw uranium, machines for enriching it, or blueprints for turning nuclear fuel into atomic bombs. No country has a monopoly on the technology of mass destruction; technology crosses borders with impervious ease; the flow of knowledge is immune to border restrictions. What exists will at some point in time be used. Knowledge, as easily transferable as money from one account to another in a small bank, cannot be destroyed. Attempts to develop anti-nuclear shields mistakenly will make the countries that develop them believe they have an "edge," subconsciously implanting another belief — that they have the capacity to launch a first "strike," without having to worry about retaliation. Non-proliferation treaties are meaningless pieces of paper (Russia now claims to have developed a new strategic missile system that can evade the latest U.S. anti-missile defense program. "Not a single country in the world has such a weapons system at the moment," the Russian president Vladimir Putin boasted when he announced that his country possessed this "powerful means of warfare"[1]).

Indeed, one might be forgiven for thinking that our sole preoccupation during the twentieth century was with developing weapons of war that would ensure our extinction. Rather than being the century of innovation and globalization, we might better describe the twentieth century as the century of massacre.

The toll? In *Out of Control: Global Turmoil on the Eve of the Twenty-first Century*, Zbigniew Brzezinski, former National Security Adviser to President Jimmy Carter, provides the following calculations: "Lives . . . deliberately extinguished by politically motivated carnage": 167 million to 175 million. These figures include

war dead: 87 million — military dead account for 33 million; civilians for 54 million. Add to that "the failed effort to build communism in the twentieth century [that] consumed the lives of almost" 60 million. Stephane Courtois in *The Black Book of Communism* puts the carnage of Communism at 85 million.

Milton Leitenberg[2] uses different categories of classification: "politically caused deaths" in the twentieth century range between 214 and 226 million; "deaths in wars and conflicts, including civilians, between 130 and 142 million; and "political deaths" between 1945 and 2000 at approximately 50 million. In short, more people were killed by political violence after World War II than in both world wars put together.

In *Death by Government*, Rudolph J. Rummel, ascribes 169 million deaths between 1900 and 1987 to "Democides" — that is, "government inflicted deaths"; of which "Communist Oppression" accounts for 110 million. The number killed in war according to his calculations comes to 34 million and "Non-Democidal Famine" deaths to 49 million in China (1900–87) and in Russia approximately six million (1921–47). This brings his total body count to 258 million for all categories.

Matthew White (*Historical Atlas of the Twentieth Century*) uses yet another set of classifications "Deaths, Genocide and Tyranny": 83 million; "Military Deaths in War": 42 million; "Civilian Deaths in War": 19 million; "Man-made Famine": 44 million. In all: 188 million.

Thus at the lower boundary for the number of dead we have estimates that range from 167 to 175 million, the upper bounds from 188 million to 258 million. A median estimate suggests that the century claimed at least 200 million lives in war and conflict-related deaths. If we extrapolate a little and assume that three family members are directly affected by the death of one other, then we may draw broader strokes on the canvas — 200 million dead and 600 million family members who have to bear the loss or even bore witness to the loss. In all, 800 million peeling off the canvas and falling into the nether world of ineffable suffering or the solitude of eternal silence.

Wars are no longer waged between nation-states; they are waged by governments against their own people; by ethnic groups settling historical scores; by minorities within nation-states demanding self-determination; by warlords, drug lords, and lords who harbor illusions of being lords. The flip side of globalization is fragmentation. When the United States armed the mujahideen with shoulder-held stinger missiles in Afghanistan and old men sitting on donkeys with a steady arm, a good eye, and the press of a finger brought down Soviet helicopters in the austere wildernesses of barren mountains. The marriage of the pre-modern and the ultra-modern redefined the playing fields of killing.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the ratio of combatants to civilians killed in war was 8:1 — eight combatants for every civilian; at the end of the century the figures were reversed, the ratio was 1:8 — eight civilians were killed for every combatant. In the space of 100 years the nature of war itself had been redefined — people with weapons of war now kill unarmed civilians, not each other. In war today you are now safer being a soldier in one of the competing armies than being a civilian. Armies no longer "fight" on behalf of people; they kill people the better to prove the illusion of power.

The following data indicate that there are no limits to escalation of civilian casualties.[3] The data are based on the calculation of the percentage that civilian casualties represent among all casualties in wars in which the United States was involved. In World War I, the total number of civilian casualties was 11 percent of the total

casualties. In World War II the civilian casualties were approximately 51 percent. In the Vietnam War, civilian casualty estimates run as high as 86 per cent. In the Gulf War (1990–91) civilian casualties accounted for approximately 93 per cent of all casualties and since 1992, 99 percent of casualties in conflicts in which the United States was involved. In the argot, "collateral damage" manages to rob the dead of their humanity.

In the early nineteenth century, Karl von Clausewitz famously wrote that "war is merely a continuation of politics by other means," and for more than a century he was quoted approvingly or disapprovingly. In the twentieth century, Isaiah Berlin wrote that, "Men do not live by fighting evils. They live by positive goals." Unfortunately, one man's positive goal is another man's evil. The proliferation of suicide bombers adds a new dimension — the personal "acts of war" of ordinary people can provoke consequences across the political spectrum, derail attempts to negotiate across huge barriers of distrust. In the Middle East, Palestinian suicide bombers and Israeli retaliations have reduced the Road Map to virtual irrelevancy. Ariel Sharon's wall, which suicide bombers will effortlessly bypass, has merely put further obstacles in the way of a lasting peace. Walls are easy to erect but difficult to tear down. One may be an act of defense; the other is seen as an act of defeat. The resentment and anger Sharon's wall has ignited among Palestinians will only swell the ranks of suicide bombers. The wall is an advertisement for enlistment.

The suicide bomber needs no technology to carry out his acts, putting at a disadvantage societies that rely on advanced technology to secure their safety; the acts of terror that elude them take place beneath their lowest security thresholds. Terrorist groups, equipped with modern technology, can communicate among cells located within several sovereign states. They are not only extraordinarily elusive, they are recombinant.

There is no antidote to a determined suicide bomber. Rather than being the acts of aberrant fanatics eagerly courting martyrdom in order to luxuriate in the hereafter in the embrace of heaven knows how many virgins — as much of the West would wish to believe — suicide bombers are now more numerous than ever, and are increasingly ordinary people who look forward to committing their acts of life transcendence. In Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian suspected of ties to Al Qaeda, sought the help of Al Qaeda in waging a "sectarian war" on Shiites there. Having already directed some 25 suicide bombings in Iraq, he was ready to direct more. Within two days of the document outlining his plans being uncovered, two massive suicide bombings killed more than one hundred Iraqis. Within weeks, two more — in Karbala and Baghdad outside Shiite mosques on one of the Shiite's holiest days — killed at least one hundred eighty worshippers in the bloodiest day since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. As is being shown in Iraq, "shock and awe," reliance on the super sophisticated electronically guided precision weapons and satellite surveillance, may allow the United States to conquer but not to win. They count for little when resistance resorts to the most primitive methods of retaliation, not for the sake of defeating the vastly superior military power, but simply to create mayhem and undermine absolutely people's sense of security.

The purpose of war is no longer to defeat an "enemy," but simply to kill. Killing is an end in itself, not the means to achieve some purpose. What we refer to as the "new" war — the war on terrorism — is the incremental extrapolation of what we subconsciously came to accept as being "normal" ways to eliminate ourselves. September 11 simply raised the threshold, elevated the level of sophistication, set a record to be beaten. And it will be beaten.

Nor do we configure into our definitions of war the acts of child-soldiers, rape as a weapon of war, food as a weapon of war. Often more die fleeing war than in war itself. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) — an oxymoron if ever there was one — the largest and most deadly war was fought since World War II between coalitions of African nations, Hutu and Tutsi militias, ethnic tribes, communal groups, meandering gangster marauders. More than one million people — almost all civilians — were killed in "combat," another 1.5 million died fleeing shifting battlegrounds or psychotic plunderers. They died of cold, thirst, lack of food and shelter — victims of hostile environments in unforgiving terrain.

But there were no television cameras to record the indescribable there, and what does not exist on video tape has not happened. In the West the mention of the DRC merely raises quizzical looks. In the civilized West the atrocities committed in the name of ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia generated suppertime yawns. We have anesthetized ourselves so completely that the images of the mass murder of human beings are erased between the starter and the main course.

Nowhere To Go

The decade of the 1990s ended with 6.5 million more uprooted people worldwide than when the decade began, according to the U.S. Committee for Refugees (USCR).[4]

The number of people forced from their homes by violence and repression stood at more than 35 million at the end of 1999, compared to 29 million uprooted people in 1990. The most dramatic increase occurred in the size of the world's internally displaced population (IDP) — people who are effectively "internal refugees" within their own country. At least 21 million people were internally displaced at the end of the decade, compared to 13–14 million when the decade began. The number of countries with significant numbers of uprooted populations nearly doubled during the decade — 25 countries with a half-million or more uprooted people at the end of the 1990s, 13 countries and territories at the beginning.

Although the 1990s were the world's first post–Cold War decade, the end to the Cold War triggered more instability rather than less. More people than ever fled their homes because they feared for their lives. The growing number of internally displaced persons is a problem the international community has not come to grips with. The displaced are often cut off from international humanitarian aid and protection because of insecurity on the ground, difficult logistics, or restricted access imposed by the country's government. Internally displaced people are usually trapped in some of the world's most dangerous places, non-people in their own countries, where marginalization is usually the common condition of most.

Population upheavals intensified in Africa during the 1990s. About 13.7 million Africans remained uprooted (internally displaced and refugees combined) at the end of the decade, compared to about 12 million in 1990. Although the number of African refugees declined by about one-third, the number of internally displaced persons jumped from 7 million to about 10 million.

The number of refugees worldwide climbed by 600,000 — the first significant refugee increase in seven years. The number of internally displaced persons increased by four million. Most of the flight came from war or ethnic cleansing. More than 14 million people were refugees outside their home countries, and another 21 million were displaced within their countries.

But the twentieth century left us other legacies. Some 110 million landmines lie

buried in 70 countries and a further 110 million are stockpiled. A mere 100,000 are removed annually while between two and five million landmines are planted annually. If demining continues at its present rate it is estimated that it will require 1,100 years and $33 billion to eradicate the 110 million landmines currently planted. Over half of landmine victims die before receiving medical assistance. In addition to the destruction and loss of life — at least 26,000 annually — there is the loss of arable land to cultivation in some of the most poverty-ridden countries in the world. At least 100 companies in 55 countries produce 360 different anti-personnel mining devices. They cost between three dollars and ten dollars to produce, between $300 and $1,000 to remove.

Money for War = More Money for War

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), world military spending, fueled by the U.S. war on terrorism, rose 6 percent to $795 billion in 2002. The United States accounted for nearly 75 percent of the worldwide growth in military spending. Boosting its defense budget after the September 11 terrorist attacks, the United States accounted for 43 percent of all military procurement worldwide in 2002.

Japan, Britain, France, China, and Germany together accounted for a further 23 percent of military spending, while Russia and China boosted their spending by 12 percent and 18 percent respectively. Russia remains the world's top weapons exporter, accounting for 36 percent of arms deliveries in 2002. The market is insatiable; countries that cannot feed their people sate themselves with arms.

The rise in military spending "is due almost exclusively to the huge increase in U.S. military expenditures under the Bush Administration," SIPRI says. "A review of the global expenditure trends shows that the rest of the world is not prepared, or cannot afford to follow America's example in increasing military expenditure."

One result of the massive sums of money the United States allocates to military expenditure (the Bush administration is looking for another 7 percent increase in the 2005 budget, which does not include the cost of maintaining a military/civilian/proconsul presence in Iraq) is that the United States now increasingly relies on might rather than diplomacy to address conflict issues.

In *The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America's Military*,[5] Dana Priest writes that during the 1990s, "The US government had grown increasingly dependent on its military to carry out its foreign affairs." Alarmingly, she attributed the shift to "a vacuum left by an indecisive White House, an atrophied State Department and a distracted Congress." The war on terror is all war. The strengths and weaknesses of the military institutions whose "mission" it is to wage a war without end will determine the outcome.

Priest recounts how General Anthony Zinni, the general in charge of the Central Command — one of five of the military's regional commands —[6] concluded that "he had become a modern-day proconsul, descendant of the warrior statesmen who ruled the Roman Empire's outlying territory, bringing order and ideals from a legalistic Rome. Julius Caesar and Caesar Augustus would have understood. His compatriots he knew did not."

There were 21 major armed conflicts in 19 locations around the world in 2002. All were internal conflicts. In the post–Cold War era, internal conflicts invariably are struggles over control of exploitable resources and access to wealth and political power. Ethnic and religious differences often exacerbate or underlie such conflicts,

making them even more volatile. Civilians are perceived either as threats, in case they support the "other" side — or as a potential source of new supporters. Thus, they are often key targets for combatants on all sides.

In many internal conflicts, combatants have no compunction using the most nefarious techniques of warfare, including torture, demonstration killings, and maiming (as in Sierra Leone), or the wholesale expulsion of civilians (as in Kosovo). The violence of internal conflicts is facilitated by the wide availability, at modest prices, of an array of light and medium weapons. The growing availability of small arms has been a major factor in the increase in the number of conflicts. Small arms account for 90 percent of all casualties. The global arms trade is subject to no international monitoring or regulation. The United States accounts for almost 75 percent of all exports of small arms.

Armed groups are increasingly forcing child soldiers to fight. The SIPRI report estimated that in 2000 about 10 percent of all combatants worldwide were under eighteen years of age — a trend that is likely to increase in coming years. As recently as February 2004, the "child army"of the Lord's Resistance Army, most of them no more than ten or eleven years old, massacred 200 civilians in northern Uganda, one more atrocity in a seventeen-year-old civil war where the rebel army is made up mostly of abducted children.[7]

Refugee and IDP camps have been used as bases for operations by combatants in countries such as Burundi, DRC, Liberia, and Pakistan, increasing the risks for camp populations and relief workers alike.

Contending forces in a number of conflicts use relief as a weapon of war. In Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sudan, and Sierra Leone, warring factions systematically regulated the flow of food into specific areas to weaken public support for their opponents or to strengthen support for their own side.

Genocidal conflicts aimed at annihilating all or part of a racial, religious, or ethnic group, and conflicts caused by other crimes against humanity — such as forced, large-scale expulsions of populations — generate massive humanitarian needs.

Humanitarian emergencies generated by such conflicts typically produce sudden and especially large movements of refugees and IDPs, with accompanying emergency needs for food and shelter, as in Kosovo and Rwanda. Such conflicts evoke the most visceral emotional responses from victims and perpetrators alike; thus, the political, economic, and social conditions that provoke such conflicts are likely to be unusually persistent. Most countries experiencing such conflicts in the last decade have yet to restore their pre-conflict growth, while reconciliation between antagonists has proven elusive.

In a review of global security, the National Intelligence Council (NIC) estimated that in 2002 the overall number of people in need of emergency humanitarian assistance worldwide — including IDPs, refugees, and others in refugee-like situations — was approximately 42 million compared to 36 million in 1998.

Consensual humanitarian responses, it concludes, are substantially more numerous than forceful humanitarian interventions against the will of a local government or local combatants. Government and international humanitarian agencies and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) often will attempt to deliver relief to civilian groups at risk, but many governments will continue to be highly wary of forceful humanitarian interventions:

Major Western donor countries will increasingly invest in a range of conflict-prevention efforts as well as political and economic initiatives in post-conflict settings, rather than

deploy military forces during the course of a conflict.

Despite some improvement in the responsiveness and capacity of humanitarian agencies in recent years, limits imposed by budgetary constraints and bureaucratic competition among the major UN agencies and international NGOs — as well as the problems associated with operating in conflict situations — will continue to hamper the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance.

In the absence of adequate security, an increasing number of UN agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and NGOs will withdraw, at least temporarily, from particularly dangerous humanitarian operations.

On the other hand, *the assertion of the right to non-interference by many important G8 governments and their citizens will continue to act as a brake on early action in a potential humanitarian emergency* (my italics).

Many governments have marginally improved their military capabilities for intervention in the past decade. These units — primarily equipped for combat and trained for peace-keeping and peace enforcement missions — may be made available to respond to global humanitarian emergencies. The United States, United Kingdom, France, Canada, Germany, Ukraine, and Russia will remain the only countries with the long-range military airlift capabilities required to deliver bulk humanitarian aid in large, sudden emergencies or where humanitarian access is denied to large populations.[8]

National governments provide the lion's share of financing for emergency humanitarian relief, with OECD countries providing more than 80 percent of total global funding in recent years. Available data suggest that international funding for humanitarian emergencies totaled more than $5 billion in 2000 — a pittance in relation to needs; countries simply lack the resources to become involved.

The funding of UN Consolidated Appeals — a mechanism of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee in Geneva to coordinate agency budget requests for a given emergency — has provided roughly 25 to 30 percent of overall humanitarian funding in recent years. *On average, since 1992 the Appeals have received only 69 percent of the funds requested* (my italics).

Funding through the Appeals declined 20 percent in 2000 compared with 1999 (my italics), mirroring donor concerns about the efficiency and transparency of UN agencies, a shift toward greater bilateral management of humanitarian resources, and reliance on NGOs. Most donors now channel at least a quarter of their emergency assistance through NGOs.

For the UN, the shift in funding patterns has led to tighter budgets for most humanitarian agencies and less predictable and flexible programming. Funding by donors of specific humanitarian emergencies tends to be heavily influenced by strategic concerns, media attention, and geographic proximity. Needs in Kosovo and Central America dominated the humanitarian agenda in the late 1990s, leading to a relative decline in funding for Africa. Africa's share of resources solicited through the Consolidated Appeals for 2001 has returned to the 50-to-60 percent level it commanded in the mid-1990s, as compared with about 35 percent in 1999 — the height of the Kosovo crisis.

The aftermath of 9/11 produced a plethora of books, articles, conferences, seminars, and media discussions about anti-Western rage. They might have saved

themselves a lot of trouble had they used as a starting point two statistics: 800 million people in developing countries lack "food security" — they lack enough food to perform the basic tasks of daily living. The $365 billion the United States and EU pay in subsidies to their own farming sectors depress world prices and enable the United States and EU countries to dump their food products in poor countries, discouraging food production in these countries and depriving them of export earnings they desperately need.

At the G8 summit in Evian, in June 2003, Brazilian president Lula da Silva made a concrete proposal: create a fund for extreme hunger by imposing a tax on international trade in weapons. A global hunger fund, Lula told the G8, "would not only give food to those in need but would also create the conditions necessary to strike at the structural roots of hunger. There are many ways of gaining financial resources for such a fund. Taxes could be levied on the international arms trade: this would prove advantageous from both an economic and an ethical standpoint." No one listened.

Wealthy countries, especially the United States, impose their definitions of a "free" market on the poor. And yet we wonder why the poor in these countries might hate us when our food policies alone ensure that they die, that their farming sectors are crippled, and that they are subjected to lectures on the virtues of the free market. "It is easy to hate a nation," writes Susan Sechler, "where food is wasted and more than 60 percent of the people are officially overweight — as defined by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control — when its leaders will not take significant steps to help the hungry."[9]

If you take China out of the hunger equation, given its remarkable economic growth in the 1990s — which continues into this century, despite global recession — the number of people going hungry was higher at the end of the millennium than at the beginning of its last decade — the richest decade in world history. Writes Sechler: "In 1948, the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed that access to food is a human right. The United States agreed — until recently. At the 1996 World Food Summit, it changed it's position on this basic right, reportedly for fear of legal implications. When aid to foreign countries is measured as percent of gross domestic product, the United States ranks as the least generous of the wealthy countries. And most of the aid the United States does provide goes to a few better-off countries, primarily Israel and Egypt."

In *The Paradox of American Power,* Joseph Nye takes note of another global development that augurs for resentment, anger, and a desire to strike back on the part of developing countries — the ratio of incomes of the richest 20 percent of people living in the world in the richest countries to that of the 20 percent of people living in the poorest countries increased from 30:1 in 1960 to 74:1 in 1997.[10]

The degree of inequality between North and South is increasing. The level of anger at the disparity is growing. The young see the enticements of a consumerism they cannot access, which is more pronounced because of the global dominance of western consumer culture, and they protest. Many are prepared to go further, especially those who see their own cultures being subsumed by the flood of western, especially U.S., culture. The German journalist Joseph Joffe writes that America's "soft power" "looms even larger than its economic and military assets. U.S. culture, low brow or high, radiates outward with an intensity last seen in the days of the Roman Empire — but with a novel twist. Rome's and Soviet Russia's cultural sway stopped exactly at their military borders. America's soft power, though, rules over an empire on which the sun never sets." Oh, yes?

In *The Ideas that Conquered the World,* Michael Mandelbaum writes as follows:

> The attacks on Washington and New York were acts of war and the war they inaugu-
> rated, the American war against terrorism, became the first war of the new century.
> Yet, the war against terrorism was unlike the conflict that began for the United States
> on December 7, 1941, or any other of the great wars of modern history — the Euro-
> pean conflict touched off by the French Revolution at the end of the eighteenth cen-
> tury, the two World Wars of the twentieth century, and the four-decades-long political
> and military struggle known as the Cold War. The previous wars pitted mighty sover-
> eign states against one another, all of them seeking control of territory. They were
> waged by vast armies, which clashed in great battles — Waterloo, the Somme,
> Stalingrad — in which the fate of great nations and huge empires hung in the balance.
>
> By these standards the war against terrorism scarcely qualified as a war at all. The
> attacks thus illustrated another defining feature of the twenty-first century: the trans-
> formation, or at least the dramatic devaluation, of war — the age-old practice that, for
> the first two centuries of the modern age, did more to shape international relations than
> any other.

Mandelbaum simply gets it wrong. Rather than there being a devaluation of war,
there has been a nihilistic devaluation of human life. There is nothing "great"
about war, nothing noble. Mandelbaum implicitly subscribes to the belief of
America as the new Empire, but one that unlike other imperial powers wishes to
bring democracy and the values of the free market to all people. It wishes to "con-
quer" by the power of the ideas it stands for, and if in some instances the power of
these ideas requires a little imposition as in Iraq, let there be imposition. People
who have never experienced the practice of western concepts of freedom, goes the
argument, can be expected to be resistant to them, much as children are resistant to
inoculations that are good for them.

It is an illusion for the United States to believe that it can somehow impose a
"democracy" on a people to whom the concept is largely alien. The belief that free
elections equals a parliament equals democracy is one of those equations that is,
regrettably, wrong. (In South Africa when Nelson Mandela insisted that only ma-
jority rule is democratic rule, the United States backed him; in Iraq when Ayatollah
Sistani insists that only majority rule is democratic rule the United States says that
ain't so.)

Democracy is something that evolves from within the society itself; there has to
be a collective understanding of the collective good, a concept that takes genera-
tions to nourish; there have to be institutions to underpin it: an independent judi-
ciary and an understanding in the society of the rule of law. Not one of these ingre-
dients essential to establish a democratic order is present in Iraq. There is no soil to
germinate the seeds. What will emerge is a perverted form of democracy, all the
symbols and none of the substance.

There are those who argue that the United States will continue to be number
one, well into the twenty-first century, even though "in this global information
age, number one ain't gonna be what it used to be."

Empire beware!

This Issue of the New England Journal of Public Policy

When the idea to publish a couple of issues of the journal on the broad theme of war — what we might have learned from the wars of the twentieth century that might help us to take preventive steps to foreclose on wars of the twenty-first before they got underway — the world was different. 9/11 had not wreaked its awesome havoc, there was no war on terrorism and no wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, there was a consensus of interests in the international community on issues relating to war, the U.N. was the forum in which issues of war were debated and for the most part re-solved — sometimes not satisfactorily, and sometimes not at all. But even its failures were the failures of the collective, not of the actions of a single nation riding roughshod over the wishes of the majority.

After all, the League of Nations was established to ensure that a war like World War I could never happen again, and the United Nations was established to ensure that the likes of a World War II could never happen again. The League of Nations, of course, watched helplessly as Germany rearmed and Adolph Hitler thumbed his nose at the League, and the United Nations watched helplessly as the United States thumbed its nose at the UN.

With the Bush doctrine of preemptive strike, the first parameters for war were established for the twenty-first century. The parameters will change. That is all we can be sure of. That and uncertainty.

There are thirteen essays in the first issue of this pair. Each author speaks with a different voice, comes from a different starting point, and has a different ideological perspective, but most of them come to startlingly similar conclusions. War is too frequently the way to establish identity: true in the "Great Wars," in Vietnam, even in the Gulf Wars. The latter were American wars and the bitter legacy of Vietnam continues to spill its unholy bile into the body politic. The stain cannot be removed by hollow recourse to new, improved patriotic detergents; the stain of Iraq is begin-ning to spread, its corrosive impact yet to seep into the polity. But one cannot, in time of war, speak out against a colossal mistake, or so we are told.

Haunting Wars

Shaun O'Connell's "Wars Remembered," is not only a poignant account of what war did to his family, driving his father to alcoholism and suicide, but it draws on the literature of war — the haunting voices of the soldiers who have survived war, who were transformed by its experience, and who struggled to bring balance — and in some cases — sanity to their lives in its aftermath. For most, peace was unmanage-able. Once having learned the behaviors that war requires, most found it extraordi-narily difficult to unlearn the behaviors in "normal" society. Life without war was fraught with perils of survival as much if not more than life with war. For the many who define themselves in terms of the wars they have participated in, the absence of war creates a void. They struggle to find a new identity — and many can't make the adjustment.

In O'Connell's essay, we hear the notice given, but rarely acted on — John Keegan: "The First World War, its course and its outcome, determined the course of the rest of the century, ensuring that it would be one of almost unrelenting conflict"; Samuel Hynes: "War is not an occasional interruption of a normalcy called peace; it

is the climate in which we live"; Chris Hedges: "War is a force that gives us meaning; war is an exciting elixir. It gives us resolve, a cause. It allows us to be noble"; H. G. Wells: "War is just the killing of things and the smashing of things. When it is all over then literature and civilization will have to begin again;" Anthony Swofford: "The warrior always fights for a sorry cause. And if he lives, he tells stories"; Tobias Wolff: "When you're afraid, you will kill anything that will kill you." Here we have the definition of all conflict. Faced with the possibility of being killed, we will kill first. When we multiply the single fear by millions, we commit genocides. But in these narratives we are exposed to the contradictions endemic to conflict, the pain and the beginning of awareness that survival is a matter of random chance, life itself a happenstance.

But the literature of surviving civilians is sparse, other than the literature of the Holocaust and Gulag survivors. Who speaks on behalf of the survivors of aerial attacks launched some 70,000 feet above ground with computer-guided missile systems that are not as precise as their designers would have us believe? Do the pilots of F15s, the embedded computer radar experts who watch the images of mathematical coordinates cross their computer screens prompting the software to enter the codes that automatically release "shock and awe," ever wonder where the payloads fall? Do they ever remind themselves that precision is a statistical concept, a probability of outcome with defined margins of error, often square miles that might encompass thousands of people within their ambit? How does one gain awareness of human suffering, where is the point of "no return" when the casualties are unseen and referred to as "collateral damage" — death not warranting apology but dehumanization?

Causa Belli

Winston Langley in "What Have We Learned from the Wars of the Twentieth Century?" advances a thesis that he argues, provides a framework for understanding the wars of the century and the impacts of endogenous ideologies, thus enabling us to take preventive measures to ameliorate their repercussions. In his schema, "relative deprivation" and "othering" are the root causes of war in the last century. Relative deprivation (RD) refers to the perceived incongruity between what a nation-state (including its racial, religious, ethnic, and social components) believes it is entitled to and what it actually has. "Othering" refers to assigning actual or imputed differences to others to rob them of attributes generally shared by human beings. "Others" are different — not the same as we.

The three great ideologies of the twentieth century, Nationalism, liberalism, and Marxism, Langley concludes, "competed against each other and contributed in profound ways to the perception on the part of individuals and groups that they were being relative deprived. As such, the ideologies themselves may be said to have contributed to the wars we are attempting to analyze and explain." Othering, he writes, "has fueled RD through the use of religious, ethnic, social, socio-economic, and national cleavages to define conflicts." The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is, he believes, the instrument that holds the promise for a lessening of the conditions that marginalize people and cause war.

The Declaration, however, is more honored in the breach. More people have died in wars/conflicts in the second half of the twentieth century than in the first half. Without the authoritative tools to make of its provisions something more than noble aspirations, the Declaration of Human Rights remains an idealistic proclamation in a

very untidy world. But the steady inculcation of the culture of human rights among nations, accelerated by the information revolution, gives hope that progress toward the ideal will increase. Hope, however, is a palliative, the handmaiden to misbegotten assumptions.

Just War and Just Intervention

In "From Just War to Just Intervention," Susan Atwood addresses a problem that has engaged theologians and ethicists since early Christian days. What constitutes the grounds for a just war? The emphasis since the end of the Cold War has shifted. The mindless brutality of psychotic dictators, the mass elimination of political opposition in non-democratic states, internal dispositions for ethnic cleansing, internal conflicts that escalate into mass killings has increasingly focused the debate on the need to develop criteria for just intervention. No sovereign state has the right to murder its own citizens. How, then, do we balance the rights of sovereign states in a global world that has redefined the definition of sovereignty and the rights that sovereign states have in a world of increasing interdependencies that recognizes the international primacy of human rights? When does oppression reach a point where intervention on humanitarian grounds should give way to forceful intervention?

Of course, there is no single context. One could make a forceful case for a military intervention in Iraq on the ground that Saddam Hussein was ruthlessly exterminating Kurds and Shiites, but the UN would hardly have backed such a resolution. Besides the destabilization such an intervention would bring to triggering perhaps even more repression in neighboring countries, it would have required a prior debate to reach consensus on the grounds that would justify such an intervention, one that would henceforth be universally applied. The major redefinitions of international law would have ramifications, difficult to apply and impossible to enforce. We are faced with what Kofi Annan refers to as "problems without passports" — that require a serious review of the existing framework for the just use of force.

"The challenge of this next, global century," Atwood concludes, "is to improve the implementation of humanitarian interventions and to define their mandate, as well as to clarify international human rights law. At a moment in history when, increasingly, even local conflicts have global implications, abandoning the pursuit of justice within or across state borders in an attempt to recapture an illusion of order, is not an option."

Which, of course, leads us to the role of the United Nations in the new unipolar world where the United States reserves to itself the right to do pretty much what it wants to, yet perhaps is learning in the aftermath of the war in Iraq that it, too, is part of an interdependent world and thus dependent on the rest of the international community to bring order out of the continuing chaos there.

The UN and ICC

Robert Weiner examines how the UN has tried to adapt to a post–Cold War era, and now to a post-9/11 era. It was poorly equipped to do either. He notes the dichotomy in the UN Charter — although the UN was created to prevent war, member states could not agree that there should be a permanent UN international army, thus requiring it to improvise ways to deal with wars. Peacekeeping — never mentioned in the charter — had to be invented. The UN, for forty years the proxy battleground for competing ideologies, is still locked into the decisions or the lack of decision by the

Security Council.

The United Nations can be easily faulted for "sins" of omission and commission, but to properly judge it one would have to construct a context of what the world might look like had the UN not existed. On that level, speculative though it may be, it is safe to posit that the world is a safer place — not that the victims of the genocides in Bosnia and Rwanda would agree.

But in the aftermath of this disastrous war in Iraq, a war of immense hubris and deceit, the UN finds itself in a new position of strength but one it must muster the will to take advantage of. The United States has had to do an about-face and solicit the UN's aid to bring legitimacy to its efforts to transfer sovereignty to Iraq by June 31. The French and Germans, the powerhouses of the European Union, no longer march to the U.S. tune, and the more evidence emerges that the United States withheld vital arms' inspection information from the UN, the more the U.S. dominance is morally undermined.

Weiner's proposals for reform will not come easily. But if the UN is to become a viable instrument for the prevention of conflict, it must democratize the Security Council, which continues to reflect a Cold War composition, and develop a flexible military peacekeeping capability and concomitant instruments that will enable it to prevent potential conflicts from developing.

Haiti is a case in point, Both the UN and the united States were aware for at least a year that public discontent with the government of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide was heating up. When the discontent boiled in late February 2004, the United States opined that the democratically elected Aristide should call it a day. With U.S. pressure (and assistance) Aristide — no angel of democracy once elected — fled the country. Roaming thugs, bandits, residual elements of the army and paramilitary gangs sidelined when democracy was restored to Haiti, once again claimed power in the name of the people. Where was the United States? The UN? Had anyone given any consideration to what would follow once Aristide took the not too veiled hints to get-the-hell-out and fled? With the slow build-up to the eventual outcome, why was the international community caught napping?

And what is the message — if a democratically elected leader, backed by the United States loses favor with the United States, he is dispensable and should stand down in the face of mob violence and public protest? Is this the lesson the administration wishes to send to Iraq — that democratically elected leaders should resign once mob violence takes to the streets? That street power should override the electoral process? Of course, Aristide did not have a national army to call on to contain the violence. The army was disbanded by the United States. Some countries, it seems, just can't be trusted to have an army.

Absorbing the lessons of killing in the twentieth century is germane to reconstructing the UN, especially wiht an irreversible globalization not quite taking the form we have complacently assumed it should.

The need to reform the UN is germane to absorbing the lessons of killing in the twentieth century, more especially with globalization having become irreversible — which is not to say that it may not take very different forms than we currently associate it with.

But reform of the UN is dependent on its members' resolve, and if their willingness to meet their financial commitments is an indicator of intent, resolve is wanting. The UN and all its agencies and funds spend about $10 billion each year or about $1.70 for each of the world's inhabitants — a fraction of most government budgets and an infinitesimal percentage of the world's military spending. For over

a decade, the UN has faced a debilitating financial crisis. Many member states have not paid their full dues and have cut their donations to the UN's voluntary funds. At the end of August 2003, members owed the UN $2.332 billion, of which the United States alone owed $1.226 billion (53% in total and 72% of the regular budget).[11]

In "Globalization: New Challenges" Cornelio Sommagura, Philip Bobbitt, Ram Damodaran, and Robert Jackson discuss what forms these new challenges might take in the context of an evolving globalization. Their emphasis is on the norms being established for both international humanitarian and military intervention in conflicts that erupt in sovereign states, thus signaling a post–Cold War paradigm shift in the UN's conception of its role in keeping the peace. While the UN Charter expressly declares the sanctity of the principle of non-intervention, the UN now is setting limits on that sanctity of non-intervention. The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) sets out the principles for international military intervention in either failed, about to fail, or rogue states where conflict is ready to erupt or has already erupted. These principles are: the right intention, the last resort, proportional means, and reasonable prospect. Most importantly, the ICISS Commission was unambiguous in two regards: the principle of non-intervention yields to the principle to protect and with intervention comes the principle to rebuild. Thus, one of the major consequences of our interdependence is the recognition that a threat to peace must now include the "feared adverse international consequences of civil conflicts involving humanitarian catastrophes."

The UN has also addressed the question of accountability. The International Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda specifically address gender crimes perpetrated during war such as rape, sexual assault, sexual slavery, and forced prostitution, and for the first time define them as crimes against humanity, war crimes, grave breaches of the Geneva Convention, and genocide. The Rwanda Tribunal has handed down convictions for rape as a crime against humanity or genocide. In "Gender Crimes under International Law," Richard Goldstone and Estelle Dehon examine what they call "the tumultuous progress in international criminal law and prosecution of gender crimes committed during armed conflict" in the last decade. Along with the Tribunals, The International Criminal Court (ICC) came into formal being in July 2002, and the ICC statute gives formal recognition to gender crimes. The Statute is the first international treaty to acknowledge the crime of forced pregnancy. The question Goldstone and Dehon pose is: how do you ensure that these advances deter the perpetration of gender crimes when conflicts erupt? "One possibility," they write, "[is for] the countries in which the crimes took place, as well as the state to which perpetrators have fled, [to] invoke universal jurisdiction to try those who committed gender crimes" in domestic courts.

There can be no peace without justice. It is essential to hold accountable those who commit massive human rights crimes like genocide. The spiral of revenge that underlies many ethnic conflicts must be stopped. A whole society must not stand accused of the crimes that its leaders instigated. There must be a deterrent against future crimes because without the rule of law terrorism inevitably becomes acceptable.

The ICC, as John Shattuck, Valerie Epps, and Hurst Hannon point out in their discussion of "Human Rights & the International Criminal Court" has the potential to hold accountable perpetrators of war crimes or crimes against humanity, whether they are individuals, governments, heads of state, or members of paramilitary groups. The court has jurisdiction in the state where the crime took place, or the state of nationality of the accused where those states are party to the statute, or very

significantly have accepted its jurisdiction on an ad hoc basis for that particular case. In addition, the court will have jurisdiction over cases referred to it by the Security Council. In February 2003, 144 countries had signed the Rome Treaty, which gives statutory effect to the court. "If you look at any case of treaty ratification, it's extraordinary," says Hannon.

But the United States has not signed, citing reasons of sovereignty. The United States never seems to see itself as merely equal to other countries. It regards its constitution and Bill of Rights as being the best in the world; hence there is no need for an overriding international jurisprudence (all the more politically necessary as the United States spreads its military presence across the world.) But the U.S. opposition to the ICC goes further. It is actively signing bilateral treaties with other countries precluding them from signing the Rome Treaty in exchange for aid and other goodies.

Valerie Epps, however, sees problems arising with regard to the democratic legitimacy of the Court's claimed jurisdiction over states that are not party to the treaty. The system embodied in the treaty provides the ICC with the authority to conduct prosecutions when states are unable or unwilling to do so. If the state where the crime is alleged to have occurred, the territorial state, is a party to the treaty, then the ICC would have authority to prosecute even if the defendant's state of nationality were not a treaty party and had not consented to jurisdiction of the ICC. This is "the ICC's so-called jurisdiction over non-party nationals," which, she says, "is central to the controversy concerning the ICC's jurisdiction particularly within the United States."

The ICC will wield governmental authority as a judicial body to prosecute or punish individuals. At issue is the nature of the democratic linkage between this organ of governance and the national governments. National states that are party to the treaty have representation through their own state's consent to become a party to the treaty and through participation in the Assembly of State parties, the governing body overseeing the court.

But there is no democratic basis for the ICC's power as applied to populations whose states have not consented on their behalf and are not represented in the Assembly of States parties. Here, Epps says, it would be hard to claim democratic legitimacy for the ICC. The issue lingers and will have to be resolved before the ICC can claim a legitimacy that is universally recognized — a legitimacy the United States is actively working to undermine.

The Bush war against terrorism is conducted on the basis that if you are with the United States, you are against terrorism, the corollary being that if you are not "with" the United States, you are somehow "soft" on terrorism, that is, you may be suspect. Besides alienating many traditional allies who feel swept aside in the administration's assiduous adherence to unilateralism, the United States has been willing, in its quest for new allies that will back its all-out war on terror to overlook human rights records. As a result, some countries with atrocious human rights records — Pakistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia — are welcomed aboard the war-on-terror wagon, ignoring the fact that abuse of human rights itself spreads terrorism.

The bottom line, Shattuck observes, is that "the war on terrorism as it is now being conducted is weakening not strengthening international security and undermining, not promoting, our national interests. We are losing the support of moderates all over the world who should be our allies. We are strengthening the hand of authoritarian governments who are cracking down on reformers in the name of fighting terrorists. We are increasing the likelihood that terrorism will be bred by

repression in places like Egypt and Pakistan, Chechnya, Uzbekistan, and Indonesia. Above all, I believe we are destroying what Joe Nye has called 'our soft power,' our commitment to human rights, democracy, and the persuasion of people that those are values worth accepting and replacing our 'soft power' with military force to hold an increasingly hostile world at bay."

Prevention and Inequality

The U.S. failure to construct a security policy that is not entirely reliant on the military and intelligence means to address security issues is addressed by Brian Atwood in "The Link between Poverty and Violent Conflict." He calls for "a new 'culture of prevention' that will reorder resources and create institutions capable of taking cooperative, preemptive steps rather than waiting for crises to develop." If we are to reduce violent conflict, assuage its potential, alleviate threats and acts of terrorism, and address the causes that drive individuals and groups to engage in such acts, we must not overlook the far reaching lessons of the twentieth century — the relationship between poverty and violent conflict, between terrorism and poverty, and the interrelationship between the two.

Has 9/11 given more intensity to the need to act on that recognition? Perhaps, but it would seem that most of the intensity is misplaced; the need to act has resulted in a continuing propensity to rely on military and intelligence means to address security issues, rather than in constructing what Brian Atwood calls in "The Link between Poverty and Violent Conflict," a new "'culture of prevention' that will reorder resources and create institutions capable of taking cooperative, preemptive steps rather than waiting for crises to develop." If we are to reduce violent conflict, alleviate threats and acts of terrorism, and address the causes that drive individuals and groups to engage in such acts, we must not neglect the lessons of the twentieth century — the relationship between poverty and violent conflict, between terrorism and poverty, and the interrelationship between them.

Even though we hear the figures frequently, we remain disconnected from their far-reaching implications: half of the world's 6 billion people live under the poverty line of $2.00 a day, 1.2 billion live in extreme poverty on less than $1.00 a day. By 2020 the world population will increase by a further two billion people, most of them in the developing world, countries of poverty and extreme poverty. An aging West will face an explosion of young people elsewhere who face lifetimes of poverty and have little prospect for better lives. Relative deprivation and resource deprivation will affect social cohesion among developed and developing countries, within and among developing countries, and also within developed countries, fostering "alienation, exploitation, and dependency," the ingredients of violence.

The phenomenon of growing inequality accompanying global economic growth between the developed countries in the Northern hemisphere and the developing countries in the Southern hemisphere and the perception within developing countries that the developed countries (read the West) are using trade agreements to advance their interests at the expense of their poorer neighbors. Atwood quotes from a World Bank report that "argues that an unequal distribution of wealth execrates societal tensions" and "increases the perception of relative deprivation." This, it concludes, "leads to perceived grievance and potential strife." Global television feeds the feelings of envy and resentment that disparities in income levels generate. Violent conflicts are most likely to occur within countries with weak social cohesion, that is, countries where the informal sectors of the economy are most pervasive, where

surviving and protecting one's meager assets require guile, alliances with gangs, and frequently a resort to violence. In poor and extremely poor countries the informal sectors of society are expanding; adherence to such things as the rule of law is a misnomer since there is no rule of law, only the excessive consumption of the elites and the petty corruption that survival in the informal world necessitates.

The link between poverty and terrorism is less demonstrable, but it exists, nevertheless. Terrorist groups exploit conditions of poverty to expand the political appeal of their cause and find fertile grounds for nurturing recruits. Yet, the countries most in need of aid for development rarely receive it. The limited resources that developed countries are prepared to allocate to development aid is given to countries where the infrastructure offers the prospect for a high return on the aid they receive, that is, countries already some significant way up the developmental ladder. Those countries at the lowest rungs lack the basic capacity to utilize aid or the aid ends up in the coffers of corrupt officials. They have been written off. And therein lies the blind eye.

The rich North must direct its attention to the countries at the ladder's lowest rung. The commitments must be long-term no matter how faltering and difficult partnerships with the countries at barrel's bottom may be; otherwise they will fail. Marginalization incubates itself. Globalization that leaves billions of people in perpetual freefall is a prescription for violent conflicts, out of which will emerge new terrorist groups with agendas of hate and access to the technologies — and weapons — to give lethal expression to that hate. As a first step Atwood proposes a cabinet-level position in the U.S. government — a Department of International Development Cooperation. Unless national security analysts include in their security calculus the link between poverty and violent conflict and how poverty creates conditions that are breeding grounds for terrorist groups, their analyses of possible terrorist threats will be incomplete and possibly wrong. Military power will not "defeat" terrorism; developmental power may. But that calls for a re-ordering of our thinking. Having the populations of the West believe that their countries can somehow horde the wealth of the earth without consequence in the face of increasing abject poverty among the majority of the world's population is an invitation to fiddle with apocalypse.

Hording wealth is also the subject of discussion in Barry Levy's and Victor Sidel's article, "War & Public Health in the Twenty-First Century." More comparative data to bring home the enormity of the increasing disparity between rich countries and others: in 1960, in the twenty richest countries the per capita gross domestic product (GDP) was eighteen times that of the poorest twenty countries; in 1995, this gap had increased to thirty-seven-fold. Between 1980 and the late 1990s, inequality increase in forty-eight of the seventy-three countries for which reliable data were available. Inequality, of course, is not confined to income levels; it encompasses healthcare, schooling, housing, employment opportunities. Relative deprivation, one of the precursors of war, is increasingly exponentially among nations and within nations.

But this is the rub: the greater the levels of inequality within and among countries, the greater the perceived levels of relative deprivation, aggravated by the new information age. The greater the perceived levels of relative deprivation, the more at risk these countries are for violent conflict, especially if they are in the quadrant of extreme poverty and deprivation. But nearly seventy percent of conventional arms sales go to developing countries — the type of weaponry most used in civil conflicts. Thus the United States, which accounts for more than half of global exports

of conventional arms and ancillaries, is increasingly arming the developing world, which, collectively, is at higher risk of violent conflict. The more arms it receives, the greater the risk of conflict. The United States armed 50,000 Islamic mujahideen to fight the Soviet regime in Afghanistan and the mujahideen transmogrified into the Taliban. Some of these erstwhile "allies" of the United States — trained and managed by the CIA once upon a time — now find themselves ensconced in Guantánamo Bay with lots of time on their hands to ponder what it's all about.

American Pie

Three articles, Paul Atwood's "War IS an American Way of Life," Paul Camacho's "American Warfare in the Twenty-First Century," and Alfred McCoy's "The Costs of Covert Warfare," address the issues germane to American involvement in war, the manner and means of war, the rationales advanced to justify it, and the alliances made with countries and groups with grave records of human rights abuse and how such alliances undermine the value system that the United States promulgates as its commitment to democracy, human rights, and human freedom. All three articles are searing indictments of the American use of military power to advance and protect its national interests regardless of the cost — not in terms of American lives, but the lives of other people, thus attacking freedom in the name of freedom.

Atwood is undoubtedly the most critical of what he perceives as a culture of war driving American foreign policy since the country's founding. America was hell bent in the nineteenth century on "acquiring," "conquering," and "co-opting" other territories — first in its drive west, then across the Pacific Ocean, and finally into Latin America — to achieve dominance of the western hemisphere and a foothold in Asia. And in the twentieth century, to achieve dominance in the world. This need for hegemony beyond its borders in the latter part of the nineteenth century he attributes to America's perpetual need to find markets for its productive capacity and new sources of raw materials for its industrial engine. The "local" economy could not sustain the needs of the working classes without a radical redistribution. The solution: increase the size of the economy by establishing new markets for American products by force. In the latter part of the twentieth century from the need to preserve capitalism and, as we enter the twenty-first, on the ineluctable fallout of being the world's only superpower, America is increasingly referred to in terms of empire.

Some would argue that America as empire requires quite a stretch. However, several books in different ways have recently addressed the question. Reviewing them in the *New York Times Sunday Book Review*, Serge Schmemann, the editorial page editor of the *International Herald Tribune* concluded that what might have been seen even a decade ago as a rather frivolous proposition must now be taken seriously. "Though I have lived abroad for many years and regard myself as hardened to anti-Americanism, I confess I was taken aback to have my country depicted, page after page, book after book, as a dangerous empire in its last throes, as a failure of democracy, as militaristic, violent, hegemonic, evil, callous, arrogant, imperial and cruel"[12]

The American empire, writes Atwood, was not founded on the seizure of territory and traditional forms of colonization practiced by the great powers of Europe in the nineteenth century but in clearing the routes for trade, opening new markets for commerce, and discovering sources of raw material. Its vision was fixed on the hinterlands of America and the countries across the Pacific Ocean.

To make his case Atwood draws on the statements of U.S. leaders across two

centuries. Jefferson (1803): "Our people are decided in the opinion that it is necessary for us to take a share in the occupation of the ocean . . . but what will be the consequences? Frequent wars without a doubt"; the Monroe Doctrine (1823); Senator William Seward, a future Secretary of State (1853) "Multiply your ships and send them to the East. The nation that draws most materials and provisions from the earth, and fabricates the most, and sells the most of production to foreign nations, must be and will be the great power on earth"; Senator Cabot Lodge (1895) "We have a record of conquest, colonization and expansion unequalled by any people in the nineteenth century"; Theodore Roosevelt (1904): the United States would "police" the Western Hemisphere; and "I should say that I would welcome a foreign war . . . in strict confidence, I should welcome almost any war"; Senator Mark Hanna, Roosevelt's political opponent (1899): "We can and will take a large slice of the commerce of Asia. This is what we want . . . and it is better to strike while the iron is hot"; Senator Albert Beveridge (1902) on the Philippines War: "God has not been preparing the English-speaking and Teutonic peoples for a thousand years for vain and idle self–admiration. No, he has made us the master organizers of the world . . . that we may administer government among savage and senile people," Woodrow Wilson before the bombardment of Vera Cruz (1914):" I will teach them to elect good men"; FDR (1941): "Sooner or later the Japanese would commit an overt act against the United States and the nation would be willing to enter the war"; Henry Stimson (1941), "The United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act"; Henry Morgenthu (1941): "The Germans will form a kind of overall trading corporation and what are we to do about our cotton and wheat?" Assistant Secretary of State Breckinridge Long (1941): If Germany wins this war and subordinates Europe every commercial endeavor will be routed through Berlin and filled under its orders somewhere in Europe rather than in the United States"; Bernard Baruch (1941): "Germany does not have to conquer us in the military sense. By enslaving her own labor and that of the conquered countries, she can place in the markets of the world products at a price with which we could not compete. This will destroy our standards of living and shake to the depths our moral and physical fiber, already straining to the breaking point; Charles Wilson, FDR's production czar on what to do with 16 million GIs returning to civilian life: create a permanent war economy; The U.S. State Department (1946): Our petroleum policy is predicated on a mutual recognition of a very extensive joint interest and control... of the great bulk of the petroleum resources of the world . . . on US-UK agreement . . . [on] the utilization of petroleum under the control of the nationals of the two countries;" Harry Truman (1947): "if by default we permit free enterprise to disappear in other countries of the world, the very existence of our democracy will be gravely threatened." When the NSC called for a tripling of the U.S. military budget and Congress balked, the issue was resolved in the NSC's favor when the Korean War broke out Dean Acheson, Truman's Secretary of State, declared (1950): "Thank God! Korea came along and saved us." During the Cold War the issue was simplified: we had the Good Empire and the Evil Empire and when the latter fell apart the Good inherited the World.

Atwood catalogues America's imperial interventions: "America's territorial expansion from 1789 to 1854 — from sea to shining sea — was the most rapid and extensive — in human history. It was carried out by armed violence with genocidal results." One-third of California was forcibly annexed, Intervention in Japan (1855), Alaska purchased from Russia (1867) much of Samoa annexed (1895), Puerto Rico (1898), occupation of the Philippines (1902), ventures into Latin America, repeated

installations or the propping up of governments that would toe Washington's line, intervention in Russia to try and defeat the Bolsheviks (1918), and during the Cold War "America overthrew democracies and filled the vacuum with brutal dictatorships every bit as criminal as anything to be found in the Communist world." And, of course, the Bush administration's doctrine of the unfettered right of America to preemptive strikes against all perceived threats to America's national interests takes us to a new dimension and raises more questions.

"Dilemmas of Empire and Nation Building: The United States Role in the World" was the topic of the annual conference of the Education for Public Inquiry and International Citizenship (EPIIC), Tufts University in 2004. The second volume of this issue will carry a number of extracts of the proceedings from the conference. Many participants made the case that America was Empire, at least in terms of military power, but the new barbarians — Al Qaeda, Inc. — are clamoring at the gate, or so the administration would have us believe.

But what is this military might, and to what ends might it be deployed? In "American Warfare in the Twenty-First Century," Paul Camacho writes about the efforts to "revolutionize" the U.S. military.

After reviewing the plethora of theories of new warfare, attempts at implementing some proposals, and the realities of disparate defense bureaucracies competing among each other in their own warfare intrigues, Camacho concludes that "the development of a thoroughly new Armed Services is a virtually impossible task because it would require the complete cooperation of the entire military bureaucracy and its related defense contracting corporate linkages."

It would also require that all branches of the services radically divest themselves of a number of functions and then "a leap of faith and allegiance to a type of diversified and specialized set of self-contained battle and civil affairs groups under a joint command rubric that would be capable of developing and employing a variety of 'plug and play' configurations for specific types of interventions." An outcome, one should add, that is predicated on the military making a successful "leap of faith" is as likely as Humpty Dumpty doing so.

The overwhelming commitment to reform on the part of the military brass that this paradigm shift would entail is simply not there, he argues. Established traditions would have to be dispensed with; career — and career paths — would be at stake. New, independent, and equal military force structures such as space corps, civilian affairs corps, special operations corps, and the like, as well as the participation of other non–war-fighting "civil affairs/nation-building organizational entities — also as equals — would be created and control conceded to an expanded joint command.

He argues that the Army's standard ten-division structure is too large, complex, and centralized, which results in a slow deployment and potential vulnerability from even guerrilla-grade WMD technology. Others argue that even the brigade organization suffers deficiencies in command and control. Remedies calls for the breakup of the Cold War division force structure into twenty-five to thirty "plug and play" combat groups under a unified joint command. All discussion and argument for reorganization, however, butts up against the prevailing social conditions of inertia in the military corporate structure.

Iraq raises serious questions regarding the feasibility of maneuver warfare with rapid, mobile, technologically superior troops as the way of the future. Guerrilla war can exhaust conventional forces and the patience of the civilian society in the United States. There are serious cavets, therefore, relying extensively on hi-tech and lightning maneuvers. Another requirement for the new way of war: the ability to

deploy "troops" capable of winning the peace. Currently "winning the peace," Camacho asserts, "is a slippery concept, but for this administration in the grip of numerous imperial-minded Republican political theorists, it apparently means reconstructing societies in the American image, or at the very least reorganizing entire societies until they are willing to pay cultural homage and accept the current lopsided agreements concerning free trade as espoused by the global corporations: no other arrangement seems acceptable to the current administration." Yet, even advocating or accepting this as a national policy to pursue globally, the U.S. has no nation-building "divisions."

Alfred McCoy's article "The Costs of Covert Warfare" raises disturbing questions about the conduct of American foreign policy in Asia during the last forty years, especially with regard to the CIA's covert wars; the alignment of the CIA with drug lords; how the CIA tolerates and even facilitates drug trade in opium and heroin and follows a policy of intervention that destroys whole local economies leaving the indigenous population no recourse but to grow heroin and opium; the use of air power in place of infantry to subdue territory; proportionality with regard to the use of force and perceived threat; the lack of accountability and oversight that leaves the American people completely in the dark about what wars its government is conducting, how these wars are being fought, the wholesale violations of international law they spawn, the devastation of countries, displacement of people and what might be the two million innocent people slaughtered by U.S. air strikes that literally were intended to bomb peoples back to the Stone Age. His account of these covert wars is a chronicle of devastation and loss that cries out for public exposure. If you want to find a rationale for why terrorists want to kill Americans, you need go little further than read McCoy's article. If you wish to see warfare "as an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth," you will more easily understand why anti-America sentiments are so virulent among so many people in so many countries.

The unintended consequences of these covert wars included ethnic conflicts spreading westward from Pakistan to the weak nations in former parts of the USSR to the Balkans, with drug mafias that supply their European and American markets, and plough their profits into trafficking in the illegal arms market. In Kosovo, NATO troops faced Kosovaur militias, financed by illicit drug activities that could be traced to CIA-backed drug warlords in Afghanistan.

Over the last fifty years the United States fought four covert wars in which special operations forces combined with airpower took the place of conventional ground troops. These covert wars were not subject to Congressional oversight and conventional diplomacy. "Their battlegrounds become the black holes of political instability." In highland Asia, while these covert wars were fought, CIA protection transformed tribal warlords into powerful drug lords linked to international markets. American foreign policy was carried out in clandestine ways, beyond the scrutiny of international laws and most probably in serious violations of many. "In the wasteland that is the aftermath of such wars," writes McCoy, "only opium seems to flower, creating regions and whole nations with a lasting dependence on the international drug traffic."

These wars — Burma in the 1950s, Laos in the 1960s and 1970s, and Afghanistan twice: in the 1980s, to force a Soviet withdrawal and after 9/11 to overthrow the Taliban — led to the enunciation and implementation of new military doctrines that became the hallmark of American foreign policy. Massive airpower and the use of tribal mercenaries should take the place of sending in conventional war troops.

One case: In Northern Laos, the CIA led a secret war of 30,000 Hmong merce-

naries in covert war against Communist guerillas. "Simultaneously, the U.S. Air Force fought the largest air war in military history over Laos, *dropping 2.1 million tons of bombs* (my italics) on this tiny, impoverished nation — a*n amount equivalent to that dropped on Germany and Japan by the Allied powers in all of World War II* (my italics). Although the bulk of this tonnage was dropped on the Ho Chi Minh trail in the jungles of southern Laos, the U.S. Air Force blocked the annual Communist offensives on the capital Vientiane by dropping five hundred thousand tons on populated areas surrounding the strategic Plain of Jars in northern Laos."

"This massive bombardment of northern Laos — *over three times the conventional tonnage dropped on Japan in World War II* (my italics) — made a wasteland of this narrow, forty-mile plain and its fifty thousand peasants, bamboo villages, market towns, and medieval Buddhist temples. 'By 1968 the intensity of the bombings was such that no organized life was possible in the villages,' wrote UN advisor George Chapelier who interviewed refugees from this air war. 'The villages moved . . . deeper and deeper into the forest as the bombing reached its peak in 1969 when jet planes came daily and destroyed all stationery structures. Nothing was left standing. The villagers lived in trenches and holes or in caves. They farmed only at night. All of the informants, without any exception, had his village completely destroyed.'"

When the United States withdrew from Laos in 1974, it left behind a "wasteland." *Over two tons of bombs per inhabitant* (my italics) were dropped, over 200,000 people killed, 3,500 villages destroyed, and 750,000 people — a quarter of the population — became internal refugees.

The Laos experience incubated a new military doctrine: War without casualties: air power to replace troops on the ground. Pulverize the enemy into submission with an array of technical wizardry from 70,000 plus feet up — a perfect military doctrine for a country that didn't mind going to war as long as none of its troops were killed. Hence its deployment in U.S. interventions in Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan.

And the drug traffic?

"After CIA intervention in the 1950s, Burma's opium production rose from eighteen tons in 1958 to six hundred tons in 1970. During the CIA's covert war of the 1980s, Afghanistan's harvest increased from an estimated one hundred tons in 1971 to two thousand tons in 1991and then kept rising to 4,600 tons in the war's aftermath. A decade after the end of the Cold War, the CIA's three covert battlegrounds along the 5,000-mile span of the Asian opium zone — Afghanistan, Burma, and Laos — were, in that order, the world's three leading opium producers."

An African Perspective

Africa is different; especially sub-Sahara Africa where HIV/AIDS is rampant, conflict a constant, and extreme poverty pervasive. Africa is the "forgotten continent." It attracts marginal direct foreign investment (FDI); lacks infrastructure and thus the capacity to use foreign aid effectively; is at the whim of nature, which subjects it to devastating droughts and famine; and is in a continual uphill struggle to create the social and economic floor to promote sustainable development.

The discovery of oil in the seas off Angola and West Africa gives it a new strategic importance to the United States, which is beginning to reduce its own reliance on oil from the Middle East and substitute oil from off shore West Africa. HIV/AIDS has been identified by the CIA as a threat to U.S. national interests and the

Bush administration has committed some $15 billion to curb the pandemic — an insufficient sum, but at least an acknowledgment of the problem. Moreover, since the bombings, later traced to Al Qaeda, outside the U.S. embassies in Dar e Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya killed two hundred twenty-four people including twelve Americans, the Horn of Africa is among the high priority regions in the Bush administration's war on terrorism. But American security interests are far more diffused throughout Africa and largely left insufficiently attended to.[13]

All agree that it is in the collective interests of the West to provide more aid and assistance to Africa, promote political stability and help the African Union (AU) to find its feet. There have been positive developments, including the unqualified support from the United States, the UN, the EU, and the G8 for the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), the instrument for promoting economic growth, democracy and adherence to the rule of law in the continent. Moreover, since the bombings, later traced to Al Qaeda, outside the U.S. embassies in Dar e Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya that killed two hundred twenty-four people including twelve Americans, the Horn of Africa is among the regions of highest priority in the Bush administration's war on terrorism. But American security interests are far more diffused throughout Africa and largely left insufficiently attended to.[30]

But in the West, at least, we continue to disparage Africa, as if its afflictions were of its own making. And even when civil conflicts erupt, which in post colonial days they did with dizzying frequency and calamitous results, we uttered our pro forma and holier-than-thou condemnations without a thought to the fact that Europeans slaughtered each other in far greater numbers and with a more forbidding intensity throughout the twentieth century than Africans ever did; that in their hubris, the European powers, which lay in ruins after World War II, humiliated and diminished by the enormity of the suffering and death they had inflicted on each other, were still prepared to rouse themselves to do battle once again, wage more war, inflict more death and suffering on the peoples of Africa so that they might hold on to their colonial possessions and assert the superiority of the white man over the African just as Nazism had asserted the superiority of the Aryan over the Jew.

In the criticisms of Africa, we read much about the "Big Man" syndrome and how the Big Men of the continent looted their countries, plundered their economies and impoverished their people. But we hear little about the impact of misdirected International Monetary Fund (IMF) structural adjustment programs, written by economic bureaucrats with blinders who were prescribing economic medicine that would drive millions into poverty and despair. They knew nothing of the people whose futures they played with, nothing of their language, customs, history, traditions. The population in aggregate was merely one more endogenous variable in the econometric model that crunched out the numbers that would determine the country's "sentence." Despite some singular advances in the last decade, especially after Nelson Mandela became South Africa's first democratically elected president in 1994, there continues to be criticism of African leadership; to many it remains a puzzlement and to some a disappointment.

In "Worldview and Culture: Leadership in Sub-Sahara Africa," Betsie Smith does not subscribe to the notion of a clash of civilizations, but she does suggest that Africa's traditional worldview, while not being resurrected in total, has been reconstructed to answer post-traditional demands and that scientific analysis that originated in the West was being reformatted to suit African sensibilities. This, she suggests, is the contextual framework that we must use to understand African

responses to crises in Africa and Africa's complicated relationships with the west.

The traditional African worldview as seen by her has elements of religion, a different conception of time, a belief that "the present world will last forever," and a close link with tradition and the past and ancestors. Within the parameters of this worldview, progress is "primarily the realization by a given generation of stages that others have reached before it." We should, she says, take seriously prevailing African ideas about themselves when we reflect on African issues.

The individual is not important: "In all of African society, the group is seen to be the custodian of life, of cultural well-being and survival." Many African societies "put primary importance on the collective strengths of the older generation and religious leaders because they are deemed to be imbued with divine authority, power, and wisdom." Problem-solving in all aspects of life is done in a holistic, collective manner where the entire community is involved and a high premium is placed on leadership from above. Because the dignity of the person and his or her role in society is paramount, "it is . . . unusual to wash dirty linen in public" or to cause confrontations, "especially in front of outsiders."

Thus, when one compares post-colonial realities with those that prevail(ed) in traditional Africa, it is easy to understand, she argues, why there is such a fundamental resentment against colonialism and all the other manifestations of outside interference in Africa over the centuries, and why "a civilizational tension, and not an outright civilizational clash, persists."

The division of Africa in the 1880s was based on maps that provided detailed information about the coastal regions, but very little about the interior, and on the assumption that all powers were seeking "a reasonable allocation of African territory, which would reflect their general standing in world affairs as much as their already established interests on the ground." Most of the subsequent agreements were between European powers *about* African territories *without* Africans having any say in or control over them.

Apart from the imposition of artificial and unworkable borders in which the Africans had no input, Smith postulates that the most far-reaching impact of colonialism (and, for the most part, Christianity) on Africa was perhaps "in the realm of consciousness, time, and identity. . . . The notion of an end to time (and its scarcity), and of a finite universe (and the anticipation of a Judgment day) as the West (used to) understand them, are diametrically opposed to the traditional African approach." So, too, is the concept of the individual's responsibility for his/her own fate as distinct from that of the group.

Colonialism had a "deconstructive" effect on African culture and identity and it deconstructed other African concepts. With a few exceptions, the names of European states derive from their ethnic group, from the language they speak and from their cultural and territorial identities as they have existed for centuries. But in Africa, Smith reminds us "despite identities, cultures, languages, and territorial designations that had developed over millennia, a line was drawn across all of it with the stroke of a pen at the Conference of Berlin, and a division and renaming of people and places ensued. . . . Alien cultures and religious systems were introduced with the utmost cruelty (slavery and misguided missionaries), which ultimately made themselves felt in the very core of African consciousness, as articulated through language and manifested through alien educational systems."

Not only was there a replacement and displacement of people, all African languages were affected: "Those that have not been almost totally obliterated, became subservient to the languages of the colonizers, so much so that in the Organization

of African Unity, and since 2002 the African Union, not a single sub-Saharan language is recognized as an official language of the organization." As the very vehicle by means of which any human being gives expression to his/her consciousness, the effect on African consciousness and learning was devastating."

With the advent of independence, "leaders were supposed to lead so-called nation-states that were not 'nations' in the sense of a shared language and heritage nor states with long-accepted and evolved identities." These leaders, "while having much experience in fighting colonialism but no exposure to managing a modern state, had to take over responsibilities that used to be shared by respected individuals in their communities, within the collective framework of the homestead." And, "as happened elsewhere in the world, many leaders equated the states over which they presided (to which they felt no loyalty because their boundaries and state systems were decided upon by outsiders) with their personal identities; much as Louis XIV did by claiming, *"L'etat, c'est moi."* In addition, models of government were introduced that contradicted age-old notions of unity and humanity. Crucially, "the role of the elderly was disturbed. Elderly people are now being left to fend for themselves, which used to be completely unthinkable in traditional Africa. As 'ancestors-in-waiting,' they had been treated with utmost reverence and care by the extended family and never had to make plans for old age. As a consequence of "modernity," traditional concepts of leadership were affected "because older people no longer had their traditional place in society." Much of Africa "fell apart."

So, for a response to the question as to why no state in sub-Saharan Africa has called for "regime change" in Zimbabwe, despite the fact that Robert Mugabe has systematically clamped down on opposition groups, ignored the rule of law, destroyed the country's economy, unleashed violent militias across the country side, ignored human rights and condoned their abuse, been responsible for a "land grab" that has enriched his elite circle, eviscerated the agricultural sector and brought ruin to a once prosperous country that set an example of sustainable development for the rest of the region, one has to turn to how Africans see themselves, navigating the waters between the strictly "tribal" constructs and the Africanization of Western dictates, and not how we would like Africans to see themselves, that is, through the behavioral norms and value systems that prevail in the West.

The West demands that regional powers act more forcefully in the case of Zimbabwe, while the African mind dictates veneration of tradition, of elderly people, of the consensus-seeking, model, and of the spiritual connections to land. The West demands confrontation, but neighboring governments, especially one of the region's power brokers, South Africa's Thabo Mbeki, have opted for "quiet diplomacy." The resolution of the problem should be managed collectively; Mugabe should not be humiliated. Nor should he be blamed or attacked in public. Consensus-seeking should be paramount. If Mbeki followed the West's prescription, he would be expected to launch vitriolic diatribes against his neighbor, implement sanctions, close the border between South Africa and Zimbabwe, switch off the lights, and ultimately invade the country militarily." He does not do this because, Smith concludes, "Mbeki is consciously affirming African values."

Peace in Our Time?

"The Logic of Peace," is Jonathan Schell's vision of the steps we should take to achieve peace in the twenty-first century. His paradigm is the great non-violent events of the twentieth century — Gandhi's independence movement in India to the

explosion of civic activity that brought about the collapse of the Soviet Union. Schell maintains that we have either one of two choices in trying to maintain lasting peace: use coercive power or use cooperative power.

The UN, he asserts, failed in its core mission, because the world change between the time the mission was first set out in the Preamble to the Charter and when the UN opened the door for business. The central purpose of the UN was to prevent a third world war — to, "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind." The atomic bomb exploded on Hiroshima, changing forever the nature of warfare, and ushering in forty-five years of Cold War, during which the doctrine of mutual deterrence maintained the peace, not the UN.

But with the end of the bipolar Cold War order and the acceleration of nuclear proliferation, the "balance of mutual terror" no longer is relevant. Even with eight nuclear states — and North Korea a possible ninth — there is instability in the mix, which at some point might literally implode. With the rising threat of nuclear terror, globalization calls for a new set of cooperative international arrangements to preserve stability and peace.

While the United States, with more military power than the aggregate military power of all other nations, might attempt to go it alone, and try to become the enforcer of peace — disarming threats wherever it sees fit; flushing out would-be rogue states and implementing regime change whenever a government does not conform to the new order of democracy, freedom, and human rights according to America's prescriptions — Schell has his reservations whether military might alone would suffice. He sees rumblings of aspiration to global hegemony in the U.S. "National Security Strategy" document with its assertion that in all the world there is now "a single sustainable model for national success": the American one of "freedom, democracy, and free enterprise." It is a formulation, he says, that, when wedded to the assertion of unchallengeable American military superiority and the right to intervene militarily anywhere on earth, plainly sets the stage for attempts to impose America's will on almost any nation; that is, imperial rule.

But imperial rule has at least three dimensions: military, economic, and political. Only in the first is American supremacy unchallenged. Economic power is more diversified. The expanded EU will constitute a larger trading block and the new ones, China and India, are making there presence increasingly felt. Within fifteen years these two will account for 60 per cent of total world output. And Japan remains an economic powerhouse to be reckoned with. Political power is more intangible than military or economic power — winning wars has little to do with nation-building, something the United States has shown little proclivity to engage in other than through short bursts of activity. "Imperialism without politics is a naïve imperialism."

The cooperative path to peace that Schell lays out rests on four converging tracks: a worldwide treaty to abolish nuclear arms and other weapons of mass destruction; a program of international intervention to ameliorate, contain, or end wars of self-determination on the basis of a reformed conception of national sovereignty; enforcement of a prohibition against crimes against humanity; and the foundation of a democratic league to lend support to democracy worldwide as an underpinning of peace and to restrain existing democracies from betraying their principles in their foreign policies. Some of the paving stones are already in place — the EU, the ICC, and power-sharing agreements such as the Good Friday Agreement, which provides a model for other divided societies.

We have to choose, he concludes: "the path of cataclymic violence charted in the twentieth century and now resumed in the twenty first" or "a new, cooperative political path." His message is one of hope: "In our age of sustained democratic revolution, the power that governments inspire through fear remains under constant challenge by the power that flows from people's freedom to act in behalf of their interests and beliefs. Whether one calls this power cooperative power or something else, it has, with the steady widening and deepening of the democratic spirit, over and over bent great powers to its will. Its point of origin is the heart and mind of each ordinary person."

Schell's idealism shimmers on paper. But idealism rarely knocks realpolitik off the merry-go-round of sovereign states that express their national interests in terms of competition rather than cooperation.

A Final Observation

Whether Schell's hope is well founded depends on the degree to which we absorb some of the lessons of the wars of the twentieth century that are gathered between the covers of this volume: either America expands its imperial role, adhering to a policy that it alone with "coalitions of the willing" can police the world and make it safe for democracy, thus sidelining traditional allies, animating more distrust and hatred of America around the world, and generating more breeding room for terrorists. Or it can learn from the mistakes of Iraq: the UN, despite its much chronicled ineptitude and ingrained bureaucratic inertia, is still the only truly international organization we can turn to. We can restructure it, give it real muscle, so that it can play a significant role and intervene in situations where conflicts threaten or erupt, or we can allow it to atrophy. The UN should have a permanent peacekeeping force, capable of being rapidly deployed. Issues that threaten the security interests of one nation can be discussed and resolved. The webs of interdependence that connect us collectively can be our salvation. We must address the issues of economic inequality: this has been said so often that to repeat it once more has the hollow resonance of cliché. We will not do so until some act of senseless and savage violence — 9/11 multiplied many times over — jolts us to our senses. Perceptions of grievance fuel conflict. Perceptions of relative deprivation fuel conflict. Investment in nation–building requires a long-term commitment — an international effort. The West continues to play a dangerous, duplicitous game. On the one hand it expresses its concerns about the growing inequality between South and North; on the other hand, it continues to equivocate on the question of agricultural subsidies that keep the products of the South out of northern markets and allow the North to dump excess production into southern markets. In the Southern hemisphere, local production is made uncompetitive and local farmers are put out of business.

I could go on with lists of things that should be done, but most are already in the public realm. Our problem is not that there are too few instruments of conflict prevention available, but that the collective will to act, to intervene where fellow human beings are being slaughtered, remains elusive. We still yawn between the starter and the main course.

Gratitude

I thank the many people who have made the two issues that comprise this volume possible: Our contributors, many of whom had to bear with numerous delays as we weaved our way through budget cuts, institutional reorganization, and other factors

that slowed progress on many fronts. Our staff, especially Pat Peterson whose persistence, professionalism and indefatigable enthusiasm ensured that we could not fail; Matt Vasconcellos and Jamie Ennis who stepped into the position of Design Coordinator when Matt left to go to law school; and Bob Geary who helped out in emergencies, and Erica White who participated in the early stages of our deliberations and Sandy Blanchette for keeping us in the budget "loop" and Ed Beard for being there. But one person was indispensable to this effort. Paul Atwood gave unstintingly of himself, pursued contributors and would-be contributors tenaciously, and provided a vision for the issue that was rooted in his military experience.

Our thanks, also, to the program on Global Leadership and the 2003 EPIIC Symposium on "Sovereignty and Intervention" at Tufts University; to Director Sherman Teichman, Associate Director Heather Barry and the students who ran the symposium for their collaboration with the journal and for allowing us to use extracts from the proceedings of that memorable occasion. The EPIIC program is a truly inspirational educational achievement. The students who participate in it are provided with the tools to play active roles in their communities, whether at the local, national or global level. Its graduates can be found in Kosovo, Iraq, Sri Lanka — wherever there is the need for man to reach out to his fellow man. We look forward to further engagements with EPIIC.

Yogi Berra once famously said that "If you don't go to the other guy's funeral he ain't gonna go to yours." Similarly, if we don't learn the lessons of war from the twentieth century, we won't have to learn the lessons from the twenty-first. ❧

Notes

1. *New York Times*, February 15, 2004.
2. Retrieved from pcr.uu.se/Leitenberg_paper.pdf on Febriary 25, 2004.
3. Retrieved from zianet.com/boje/peace/documents/factsheets/War March 2, 2004.
4. World Refugee Survey 2000, retrieved from usembassy.it/file2000 March 11, 2004.
5. Dana Priest, *The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America's Military* (New York: Norton, 2003).
6. The Central Command includes Egypt, the Horn of Africa, the Middle East, South and Central Asia and the "Stans" of the former Soviet Union.
7. *Boston Globe,* February 24, 2004.
8. "Global Humanitarian Emergencies: Trends And Projections 2001-2002" retrieved from odci.gov/nic/NIC_project.html.
9. Susan Sechler, "Starved for Attention" *American Prospect* 13, no. 1 (Winter, 2002).
10. Joseph Nye, Jr., *The Paradox of American Power* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 101.
11. Retrieved from globalpolicy.org/vigil/talkpoi.htm on March 11, 2004.
12. Serge Schmemann, "The Coalition of the Unbelieving" *New York Times Book Review*, (February 25, 2004).The books reviewed were *American Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy*, by Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay (Washington: Brookings Institution Press); *The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic*, by Chalmers Johnson (New York: Metropolitan Books/Henry Holt & Company); *The Bubble of American Supremacy: Correcting the Misuse of American Power*, by George Soros (New York: Public Affairs); *Bush is Babylon:The Recolonization of Iraq*, by Tariq Ali (New York: Verso). *Superpower Syndrome: America's Apocalyptic Confrontation with the World,* by Robert Jay Lifton (New York:Thunder's Mouth Press/Nation Books); *Crisis on the Korean Peninsula: How to Deal with a Nuclear North Korea*, by Michael O'Hanlon and Mike Mochizuki (New York: Brookings Institution/ McGraw-Hill); *After the Empire: The Breakdown of the American Order*, by Emmanuel Todd (New York: Columbia University Press).
13. Princeton N. Lyman and J. Stephen Morrison, "The Terrorist Threat in Africa," *Foreign Affairs* 83, no.1 (January/February 2000).