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PRIVATE BANKS AND PUBLIC MONEY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MASSACHUSETTS LINKED DEPOSIT PROGRAM

by

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Prepared for the John W. McCormack Institute of Public affairs

University of Massachusetts at Boston

Winter 1985

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CONTENTS

	EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	i
I.	INTRODUCTION	1
II.	BACKGROUND	4
	A Brief History Structure and Operation	
III.	BIDS, SCORES, AND DEPOSITS: QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS	8
IV.	EVALUATION	17
	Leagues Eligibility Scoring Allocation Publicity	
V.	CONCLUSIONS	40
	21	
	NOTES	43
	REFERENCES	47
	APPENDIX OF MASSACHUSETTS LINKED DEPOSIT PROGRAM MATERIALS A1 - A	10
	STATISTICAL APPENDIX	20

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In March 1978, in accordance with the unanimous recommendations of two special commissions, the Treasurer of Massachusetts established a "linked deposit program." Under the terms of this program, a portion of the approximately \$400 million available for short-term investment from the state's General Fund was to be deposited with in-state banks and thrift institutions, selected on the basis of their performance in promoting the economic and social welfare of Massachusetts citizens and communities through their lending and related activities.

Six years after its inception, the Massachusetts linked deposit program (LDP) has grown to become a sizable and stable part of the Treasurer's investment program. By the spring of 1984, when the research for this study was undertaken, there were \$114 million of LDP deposits outstanding, at 72 of the state's approximately 400 banks. In spite of its size, however, and contrary to recommendations by both special commissions that program implementation include careful monitoring and evaluation, there has never been a systematic evaluation or review of the Massachusetts LDP.

The rationale for an LDP is straightforward: by giving preference in awarding public deposits to banks whose loan portfolios contain a relatively large amount of loans in specific publicly-designated categories, public funds would be channeled to those banks most likely to put them to socially desirable uses, and banks would have an incentive (the prospect of obtaining increased public deposits at favorable rates) to alter their overall loan portfolios in socially-desired directions. By following the lead of state Treasurers in Illinois, Missouri, and Colorado in adopting an LDP, the Treasurer of Massachusetts sought to utilize a promising mechanism for making

i

banking institutions responsive to the public interest as well as to the interests of their shareholders and depositors.

In fact, the recommendation by the Special Commission on State Investment that Massachusetts establish an LDP was a highly qualified one. The Commission emphasized that the program's ability to promote its stated objective would depend on the nature of the LDP adopted: "...it is crucial that [an LDP] be well-designed, well-implemented, and well-publicized."

This report presents the results of a systematic analysis of the extent to which the operation of the Massachusetts LDP meets the three-part standard articulated by the Special Commission on State Investment. After a short Introduction, Part II reviews the historical evolution and present structure of the Massachusetts LDP. Part III summarizes the methods and the results of a quantitative analysis of all of the bids by, linked deposit scores of, and LDP awards to the banks that participated in the program during 1983 (the most recent year for which complete data were available). Part IV contains a systematic evaluation of each of the major aspects of the Massachusetts LDP's design and implementation. Because one goal of this project, which was undertaken with the cooperation of the Treasurer's office, was to identify desirable changes in the program's structure and operation, a number of constructive proposals for strengthening and improving the Massachusetts LDP are included. Part V offers a brief conclusion.

Two principal conclusions follow from this study's evaluation of the design and implementation of the Massachusetts LDP. First, <u>there is in fact</u> <u>no linkage in the Massachusetts linked deposit program as it is currently</u> <u>operated</u>; deposits are allocated among banks independently of the banks' linked deposit scores as determined by the Treasurer's own scoring formula (see Tables III & IV, pp. 15-16). In effect, the program is operating as a

ii

"keep-the-money-at-home" program that deposits state funds in Massachusetts banks (at slightly lower interest rates than could be earned by investing them in national money market instruments), rather than as a genuine <u>linked</u> deposit program, which would make the awarding of these public deposits conditional on bank performance in promoting designated economic and social public policy objectives. Second, and more generally, <u>the Massachusetts LDP</u> <u>falls far short of being "well-designed, well-implemented, and well-</u> <u>publicized</u>." This study identifies serious deficiencies in every program aspect reviewed.

These conclusions suggest the need for substantial reforms in the Massachusetts LDP. Among the most important of these are: re-establishing an appropriate cut-off point for dividing commercial banks into two leagues; either establishing an explicit, reasonable, and enforceable "maintenance of effort" requirement, or else eliminating the maintenance of effort requirement altogether; revising the scoring formula so that it more accurately reflects bank performance; developing an explicit formula for allocating awards among banks on the basis of their scores and other specified criteria; developing appropriate means for publicizing the program's operation and its results; creating forms and instructions that are clearer for participants and more informative for program managers; and improving data processing and reporting within the Treasurer's office.

If Massachusetts is to continue to have a linked deposit program, it should be as vigorous, visible, efficient, and effective -- that is, as "well-designed, well-implemented, and well-publicized" -- as possible. At its core must be a strong, clear, and sensible <u>link</u> between the allocation of public deposits and the performance of private banking institutions,

`iii

I. INTRODUCTION [1]

In March 1978, in accordance with the unanimous recommendations of two special commissions, the Treasurer of Massachusetts established a "linked deposit program." Under the terms of this program, a portion of the approximately \$400 million available for short-term investment from the state's General Fund was to be deposited with in-state banks and thrift institutions, selected on the basis of their performance in promoting the economic and social welfare of Massachusetts citizens and communities through their lending and related activities.

In adopting a linked deposit program (LDP), Massachusetts was following the lead of three other states -- Illinois (1967), Missouri (1973), and Colorado (1975). Although the structure of each state's LDP was distinctive, all were based on the basic concept that a state, in deciding how to invest the money under its control, can take into account the extent to which the lending (or other) behavior of potential depositories contributes to the achievement of the state's social and economic objectives. In particular, preference in awarding deposits could be given to banks [2] whose loan portfolios contain a relatively large amount of loans in specific publicly-designated categories, thereby establishing a "link" between a bank's lending performance and the amount of public deposits that it receives. Not only would this link result in public funds being channeled to those banks most likely to put them to socially desirable uses, but also it would give banks an incentive (the prospect of obtaining increased public deposits) to alter their overall loan portfolios in socially-desired directions. Because they provide banks with this incentive to increase their lending in particular areas specified by public policy, LDPs were regarded as

- 1 -

a promising mechanism for making banking institutions responsive to the public interest as well as to the interests of their shareholders and depositors.

Six years after its inception, the Massachusetts LDP has grown to become a sizable and stable part of the Treasurer's investment program. By the spring of 1984, when the research for the present study was undertaken, there were \$114 million of LDP deposits outstanding, at 72 of the state's approximately 400 banks [3]. In spite of its size, however, and contrary to recommendations by both special commissions that program implementation include careful monitoring and evaluation, there has never been a systematic evaluation or review of the Massachusetts LDP [4].

This absence of evaluation is particularly unfortunate given the controversy concerning the ability of a linked deposit program to fulfill its proclaimed objectives that marked the deliberations of both commissions. Skeptics had argued that the costs of a Massachusetts LDP would be likely to outweigh its benefits. They contended that accepting a below-market interest rate on state deposits would provide a subsidy from taxpayers to banks without providing sufficient incentive for banks to alter their lending behavior. Even if some individual banks were to make more loans in the categories designated by the program, these loans would mainly displace loans that other lenders would have otherwise provided, rather than increase the total amount of lending in the categories specified. The skeptics maintained that the relatively efficient operation of capital markets, both intra- and inter-state, made it highly unlikely that redirecting funds to even a very carefully selected set of Massachusetts banks would result in a significant net change in either the pattern or the total amount of lending within the Commonwealth. In addition, they expressed concern about the administrative

- 2 -

burdens that the program would place on both depository institutions and the Treasurer's office.

LDP advocates acknowledged that the state Treasury's direct interest earnings would be lower than under the existing policy of simply investing for maximum return (subject to the constraints imposed by considerations of safety and liquidity), a policy which had resulted in almost all public money leaving the state for national money markets. But they argued that the difference need not be great in a properly structured LDP; that by increasing the supply of carefully selected types of loans an LDP could promote more --and more balanced -- economic development within the Commonwealth; and that the additional investment, jobs, housing, sales, and income made possible by an LDP might actually result in sufficient additional tax revenue (and reduced social welfare spending) to create an overall increase in net Treasury revenue. They emphasized the distinction between a simple "keep-the-money-at-home" investment policy, which would also result in increased deposits in Massachusetts banks, and an LDP, which would <u>link</u> the deposit of state funds to bank performance.

In light of this controversy, the final report of the Special Commission on State Investment endorsed the notion of a Massachusetts LDP in a highly qualified way. The force of the skeptics' arguments led them to emphasize that "because there are a wide variety of ways in which public deposits could be linked to bank behavior,...it is crucial that [an LDP] be <u>well-designed</u>, well-implemented, and well-publicized." The Commission continued:

In order to achieve its potential benefits, an LDP must be based on criteria that are effective in stimulating additional lending in categories that contribute to the economic needs of poorer citizens and communities, it must be operated in an efficient, timely, and predictable manner and it must be open to public scrutiny, both so that other depositors and community groups can make use of the information obtained about individual bank · lending practices and because public scrutiny is the best single

- 3 -

guarantee that any public program will be administered in the public interest [1977, pp. 2, 3].

This paper reports the results of a research project that investigated the extent to which the Massachusetts LDP has met what could the called the "well-well-well" criterion enunciated by the Special Commission on State Investment. Part II offers a brief review of the historical evolution and present structure of the Massachusetts LDP. Part III summarizes the methods and the results of a quantitative analysis of the bids by, linked deposit scores of, and LDP awards to the banks that participated in program during 1983 (the most recent year for which complete data are available). Part IV contains a systematic evaluation of each of the major aspects of the Massachusetts LDP's design and implementation. Because one goal of this project, which was undertaken with the cooperation of the Treasurer's office, was to identify desirable changes in the program's structure and operation, a number of constructive proposals for strengthening and improving the Massachusetts LDP are included. Part V is a brief conclusion.

II. BACKGROUND

A Brief History.

In early 1977 the Massachusetts Social and Economic Opportunity Council, an independent, federally-funded state agency charged with promoting state policies that would further the interests of low and moderate income people, established a Special Commission on State Investment (SCSI) to investigate the potential of a linked deposit program for Massachusetts. After four months of deliberation, including review of a lengthy report from its research staff [Campen 1977], the Commission's final report cautiously

- 4 -

endorsed the idea. Its "principal conclusion" was

that a well-designed, well-implemented, and well-publicized linked deposit system could -- as one element of an overall policy to offset economic imbalances in the Commonwealth -contribute significantly to the economic well-being of low and moderate income people and communities in Massachusetts.... [1977, p. 2].

In response to this report, to prodding from Massachusetts Fair Share (a powerful statewide citizens lobbying organization), and to the possibility of a liberal challenge in his 1978 bid for reelection, State Treasurer Robert Q. Crane (whose representative on SCSI had played the role of observer rather than advocate) embraced the proposal. He established a Linked Deposit Commission of his own (which included SCSI's Chairman), chaired the hearings which this Commission held around the state, and quickly accepted its recommendation, early in 1978, that he proceed with the implementation of a Massachusetts LDP.

In April 1978 the first round of LDP deposits was awarded to the twenty banks that had submitted eligible bids. Because the total amount of eligible bids, \$23.3 million, was less than half of the \$50 million that the Treasurer had set aside for the program, each bank received every dollar that it had bid for. This meant, of course, that there was no "link" between state deposits and bank performance; unless total bids exceed total awards, bank performance, as defined and measured by the LDP, cannot become a criterion in the competitive awarding of deposits [5]. By April 1979 the number of banks submitting eligible bids had more than doubled, to 42, and the deposits awarded had grown to \$34.9 million, but the system remained with neither competition nor linkage, as each bank continued to be awarded every dollar for which it bid [6].

By 1982, however, the program had grown substantially [7], so that

- 5 -

competition for funds had become a reality and the Treasurer did have the opportunity to put genuine linkage into the Massachusetts LDP by making linked deposit awards depend on bank lending performance. During the four semi-annual bidding cycles conducted in 1982 and 1983, award totals ranging from \$66.2 to \$78.5 million per cycle were awarded to an average of 63 banks per cycle. Although it remained the case that every bank submitting an eligible bid received a deposit of some size, total awards during this period amounted to less than half of total bids. After the November 1983 LDP awards were made, the state had \$114.2 million on deposit with 72 banks (in addition to \$66.2 million awarded in November, \$48.0 million of twelve-month deposits awarded in May were still outstanding); 15 additional banks had held LDP deposits between May and November.

Structure and Operation. [8]

The Massachusetts LDP has bidding cycles in May and November of each year. Approximately three weeks before bids are due, the Treasurer sends each bank in the state a current description of the program (the "Linked Deposit Program Supplement") and of the administrative details of the upcoming bidding cycle (the "Linked Deposit Program Guide"), together with an invitation to participate by using an enclosed form (the "Linked Deposit Bid Form") to bid for six-month and/or twelve-month term deposits. A bank that wishes to participate must specify the following, among other things, on its completed bid form: (1) the amount of deposit of each maturity that it seeks; (2) the interest rate that it bids for each deposit; (3) the amount of its total in-state deposits and total in-state loans; (4) the amounts of its loans to each of six particular categories of borrowers (small businesses,

- 6 -

students, tax-exempt organizations, community development corporations, mental health providers, and mortgage or home improvement borrowers in census tracts with average family income below 85% of the state average); (5) the amount of its holdings of investment instruments issued by public entities located in Massachusetts; (6) the annual dollar value of food stamps distributed; and (7) a signed "maintenance of effort" pledge that it will increase its loans in the specified areas by at least 70% of whatever amount it is awarded under the LDP. In addition, banks that previously received awards under the program must submit a completed "Maintenance of Effort Form." (All of the Treasurer's LDP materials mentioned in this paragraph are reproduced in an appendix to this report.)

Each bank is placed into one of three "leagues," and competes directly only with other banks in the same league. League I consists of commercial banks with total assets over \$200 million; the minimum acceptable interest rate bids for League I banks are the New York money market rates for large certificates of deposit of the same maturities, as published in the <u>Wall</u> <u>Street Journal</u> on the date by which bids must be postmarked. League II consists of all other commercial banks; their minimum acceptable interest rate bids are the League I rates minus three-quarters of a percentage point. Banks in League III, which consists of all thrift institutions (savings banks, co-operative banks, and savings & loan associations) must bid at least the League I rates minus one full percentage point.

- 7 -

The "linked deposit score" for each bid is computed according to the following formula, reproduced here from the Treasurer's "Linked Deposit Program Supplement":

 $.01 \times [(B + C)/A] = LDS + R = TOTAL$

where: A = total in-state deposits in thousands of dollars,

- B = total in-state loans in thousands of dollars,
 C = total of the amounts noted in (4), (5), and (6), above, in thousands of dollars, with the summation being made after student loans, low-income housing loans, and food stamp sales are each multiplied by a factor of 5,
- and R = interest rate bid, expressed as a decimal (e.g. 9.5% = 0.095).

Bid forms are reviewed and decisions on the distribution of deposit awards are made within the Treasurer's office. Bidding banks are notified of the results approximately one week after the bidding deadline, and deposits are electronically transferred to the successful banks on the following business day.

III. BIDS, SCORES, AND DEPOSITS: QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

To some extent, the design and operation of an LDP can be evaluated on the basis of a careful review of the documents describing the program, supplemented by interviews with those responsible for program administration. By itself, however, this is insufficient. Empirical analysis of the actual operation of the program is needed for at least three reasons: first, only empirical analysis can indicate how the program actually operates when its stated guidelines are incomplete or ambiguous. Second, it is an empirical question whether or not the program is operated in conformity with its stated guidelines. Third, the relative importance of the elements of a formula in discriminating among banks depends on the relative amounts of variation among banks in each of the categories of bank loans, which is an empirical matter. For all of these reasons, the present study includes a detailed quantitative analysis of all LDP bids received and awards made during the May and November 1983 bidding cycles. This analysis, summarized in this part of the report, provides one significant input into the evaluation of the Massachusetts LDP's design and implementation that follows in Part IV.

The analysis is based on a data set compiled from information extracted from the originals of all linked deposit bid forms received by the Treasurer's office for the May and November 1983 bidding cycles, and from lists, prepared by the Treasurer's office, of all linked deposit awards made during 1982 and 1983 [9]. Sixteen pieces of information were recorded for each bidding bank, for each cycle: dollar amount bid, interest rate bid, and dollar amount awarded for each of the two deposit maturities; dollar amount of total in-state deposits and of total in-state loans; and the dollar amount of each of the eight specific categories of bank performance identified by the Massachusetts LDP.

For the first step of this analysis, League III (all thrift institutions) was broken into two sub-leagues of approximately equal size, thereby creating a total of four "Leagues." "League IIIM" consists of (mutual) savings banks, and "League IIIC" consists of cooperative banks and federal savings and loan associations (these are appropriately grouped together, because Massachusetts cooperative banks are, essentially, state-chartered savings and loan associations). This division of League III, which was carried out to make computation and data display more manageable, facilitates the investigation of possible systematic differences in the performance of the two types of thrift institutions. While it will sometimes be interesting to examine data for the two sub-leagues separately, Leagues IIIM and IIIC are artifacts of this study rather than of the Massachusetts

- 9 -

LDP itself; thus, every summary statistic reported for the sub-leagues will, also be reported for League III as a whole.

On the basis of the data set described above, eight tables were calculated -- one for each of the four "leagues" for each of the two bidding cycles. One of these tables, that for League IIIM in the November 1983 bidding cycle, is included here, for illustrative purposes, as Table I; the other seven are included in the statistical appendix. Each table summarizes a great deal of information about the linked deposit score and total score, and their components, as well as about the dollar amounts bid and awarded --not only for each bank, but also in terms of the minimum, average, and maximum values for all banks in each league. Because so many subsequent results are based on information included in these eight basic tables, some points of explanation and clarification are essential.

Each line displays information for an individual bank, identified in the table by a "bank code" assigned for this study (col. 1); the statistical appendix lists the codes and names of all participating banks. For each of the eight specific categories of bank performance taken into account by the LDP, the dollar amount reported by the bank has been divided by the bank's total in-state deposits (col. 2) and is expressed as a three-point decimal fraction (cols. 3-10) -- in three of the categories the banks weighted their actual dollar amounts by a factor of five before reporting them, as specified in the Treasurer's "Linked Deposit Bid Form." The total of these eight numbers is shown (in col. 11) as "Total 'C'" (the "C" can be thought of either as standing for <u>categorical points</u> or as corresponding to the notation of the Treasurer's formula) [10]. Total in-state loans, as a three-point decimal fraction of total in-state deposits, is shown next (col. 12). The sum of these two totals is reported (in col. 14) as "LDS points" (this

- 10 -

corresponds to the term "LDS" in the Treasurer's formula, although that formula's multiplicative term of .01 has been ignored in order to eliminate two unnecessary zeroes).

The Table's treatment of interest rate bids involves an additional modification of the Treasurer's formula, similarly designed to enhance clarity, without substantive impact on banks' relative scores. Because every bank must bid at least the required minimum interest rate, only the portion of the bid interest rate that is above this minimum can have any impact on a bank's relative score. Thus, what matters is the number of percentage points by which a bank's bid exceeds the required minimum; this is what is shown in column 13. (The heading "Max Ex i" stands for "maximum excess interest rate" [11].) Interest rates are shown as whole numbers plus three-point decimal fractions, again in order to avoid two unnecessary zeroes -- e.g, 1.25% would be written here as 1.250, as opposed to 0.0125 in the Treasurer's formula. When these "interest rate points" are added to "LDS points," the result is a bank's "Total Points" (col. 15), which corresponds to the "TOTAL" term in the Treasurer's formula, and which is the score to be used by the Treasurer in allocating awards among banks.

The final three columns of the table (cols. 17-19) show the total amount of deposits bid for and received by each bank [12], in thousands of dollars, as well as the amount awarded as a percentage of the amount bid. In addition to displaying each column's information for each individual bidding bank, the table also displays, in its bottom three rows, the average value for all bidding banks in the league as well as the minimum and maximum values for any single bank.

Three additional tables, constructed on the basis of the information in these eight basic tables, are helpful in presenting the results of our

- 11 -

quantitative analysis. Table II shows, for each of the three original leagues, and for the two sub-leagues of League III, the average value of each component involved in calculating the banks' linked deposit scores, as well as the minimum and maximum values and the range between these two extremes. The table reports on the November 1983 bidding cycle; an analogous table for May, included in the statistical appendix, does not differ in any significant way.

Tables III and IV present summary information, for May and November respectively, on the scores and awards of the best-scoring and worst-scoring banks in each of the three leagues. (In League I, only six banks submitted bids in May and eight in November, so all of these are included in the tables; for the other two Leagues, the five best- and worst-scoring banks are included.) For each bank included, the table shows its total point score, the deposit it was awarded (in thousands of dollars), and its award as a percentage of the amount it bid for. Summary statistics -- average score, average percentage of bid awarded, and total dollars awarded -- are shown for each group of banks in each league. Because they do differ substantially, tables for both May and November are included here. (Analogous tables, with -League III replaced by its two sub-leagues, are included in the statistical appendix.)

- 12 -

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TABLE	

DETAILS OF LDP SCORES AND AWARDS

UNWEIGHTED TOTAL BASIS (For bids & awards, totals = 12 month amount + 6 month amount) LEAGUE IIIM -- SAVINGS BANKS NOVEMBER 1983

Bank Code	Mass Depts (\$Mil)	Small Stud Exemp Inv Ment Fd St Mort Bus x5 Orgs Insts CDC Hlth x5 x5	Total Total Max "C" In-St Ex i	LDS Total Pts Pts	\$Bid \$Awd Total Total	l Awd/ L Bid-Z
IW	142	0.013 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000		0.798 1.298	1	i
M6 M6	11/ 107	0.124 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000	20c.U	0.821 0.821		
M7	53	0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.012	0.135 0.733 0	0.868 0.868		
M8 M9	147 247	0.000 0.106 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.643 0.001 0.057 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.084	0.754 0.594 0 0.147 0.823 0	1.348 $1.3480.970$ 0.970	1000 500 4000 4000	0 50%
MIO	236	0.042 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000	0.334 0.581 0	0.915 0.915		
M11	43	0.059 0.000 0.040 0.000 0.000 0.000	0.747	1.187 1.187		
MIS	6	0.000 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000	0.741 0.615 0	1.356 1.356		
M17	28	0.199 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000	0.714	3.837 3.837		
M18	166	0.075 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000	0.811	1.470 1.470		
M19	357	0.055 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000	0.393	0.558 0.558		
M20	136	0.008 0.000 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.000	0.645 0.70	1.121 1.821		
M22	109	0.190 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000	0.245 0.544 0	0.789 0.789		
M23	158	0.129 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000	0.291 0.776 0.250	1.067 1.317		
AVE	137	0.026 0.076 0.004 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.421	0.531 0.662 0.130	1.193 1.323	1870 1057	7 72%
MIN MAX	9 357	0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.103 0.199 0.011 0.040 0.015 0.003 0.012 2.874	0.074 0.393 0 3.123 0.823 0.700	0.558 0.558 3.837 3.837	100 100 6000 4000	0 10% 0 100%
5			TOTAL BIDS AND	AWARDS:	28050 15850	0 57%

[For source and explanations, see accompanying text, esp. pp. 9 & 11]

SCORES BY LEAGUE AND BY PERFORMANCE CATEGORY: NOVEMBER 1983 AVERAGE, MINIMUM, MAXIMUM, RANGE (Range = max - min)

LDS Total Pts Pts 	1.132 1.132	0.756 0.756 1.458 1.458	0.702 0.702	1.361 1.456	0.587 0.837 2.191 2.224	1.604 1.387	1.193 1.323	0.558 0.558 3.837 3.837	3.279 3.279	1.353 1.496	0.645 0.645 3.433 3.433	2.788 2.788	1.270 1.407	0.558 0.558 3.837 3.837	3.279 3.279
Total Total "C" In-St Ex i	0.461 0.671 0.000	0.207 0.549 0.000 0.702 0.756 0.000	0.495 0.207 0.000	0.696 0.664 0.096	0.189 0.361 0.000 1.731 1.080 0.550	1.542 0.719 0.550	0.531 0.662 0.130	0.074 0.393 0.000 3.123 0.823 0.700	3.049 0.430 0.700	0.538 0.815 0.143	0.056 0.589 0.000 2.495 1.118 1.250	2.439 0.529 1.250	0.534 0.736 0.136	0.056 0.393 0.000 3.123 1.118 1.250	3.067 0.725 1.250
SmallStudExempInvMentFdStMortBusx5OrgsInstsCDCH1thx5x5	0.248 0.067 0.003 0.049 0.002 0.002 0.016 0.075	0.007 0.004 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.449 0.173 0.014 0.140 0.013 0.006 0.068 0.199	0.442 0.169 0.014 0.130 0.013 0.006 0.068 0.199	0.241 0.056 0.002 0.050 0.001 0.001 0.073 0.272	0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.497 0.294 0.013 0.300 0.011 0.008 0.630 1.245	0.497 0.294 0.013 0.300 0.011 0.008 0.630 1.245	0.026 0.076 0.004 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.421	0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.103 0.199 0.011 0.040 0.015 0.003 0.012 2.874	0.103 0.199 0.011 0.040 0.015 0.003 0.012 2.872	0.019 0.064 0.002 0.015 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.438	0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.073 0.234 0.008 0.180 0.001 0.014 0.000 2.480	0.073 0.234 0.008 0.180 0.001 0.014 0.000 2.480	0.023 0.070 0.003 0.009 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.429	0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.103 0.234 0.011 0.180 0.015 0.014 0.012 2.874	0.103 0.234 0.011 0.180 0.015 0.014 0.012 2.874 ons, see accompanying text, esp. pp. 9-12]
Mass Depts (\$Mil)	272	168 461	293	74	7 160	153	137	9 357	348	96	4 294	290	117	4 357	353 Janati
1	LEAGUE I Ave.	Min. Max.	Range	LEAGUE IF Ave.	Min. Max.	Range	LEAGUE IIIM Ave.	Min. Max.	Range	LEAGUE IIIC Ave.	Min. Max.	Range	LEAGUE III Ave.	Min. Max.	Range 353 0.103 0.234 0 [For source and explanations, see accomp
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TABLE II

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SCORES & AWARDS: SUMMARY RESULTS -- MAY 1983

SCORES: LDS SCORE + INTEREST RATE IN EXCESS OF MINIMUM REQUIRED BID AWARDS & BIDS: UNWEIGHTED TOTAL BASIS (12-mo amount + 6-mo amount)

6-mo amount)	LEAGUE III: THRIFT INSTS	Awd/ Score Bid%	1 C11 3.856 100% 400 2 M17 3.668 100% 1000 3 M9 3.160 25% 500 4 M13 2.951 50% 1000 5 M20 2.842 29% 1000	3.295 617 3900	34 M7 0.863 100% 1000 35 C4 0.836 15% 150 36 M6 0.811 10% 500 37 M21 0.794 100% 3500 38 M22 0.7786 100% 1000	0.818 657 6150	38	36
BIDS: UNWEIGHTED TUTAL BASIS (12-mo amount + 6-mo amount)	LEAGUE II: OTHER CBS	Awd/ Score Bid%	$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	2.038 65% 9090	22 I19 1.101 40% 200 23 I129 0.975 60% 1200 24 I116 0.935 100% 300 25 I132 0.775 67% 1000 26 I13 0.739 50% 1000	0.905 637 3700	26	25
AWAKDS & BIDS:	LEAGUE I: BIG CBs	Bank Awd/ Rank Code Score BidZ ^{&} Awı.	$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	TOP BANKS: Ave Score: 1.390 Ave Awd/Bid Z: 70Z Total \$ Award: 13200	4 I2 1.129 337 1000 5 I4 1.064 507 1000 6 I3 0.833 757 3750	BOTTOM BANKS: Ave Score: 1.009 Ave Awd/Bid Z: 53Z Total \$ Award: 5750	Banks w/ Bids: 6	Banks w/ Awards: 6

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SCORES AND AWARDS: SUMMARY RESULTS -- NOVEMBER 1983

SCORES: LDS SCORE + INTEREST RATE IN EXCESS OF MINIMUM REQUIRED BID AWARDS & BIDS: UNWEIGHTED TOTAL BASIS (12-mo amount + 6-mo amount)

LEAGUE III: THRIFT INSTS	Awd/ Score Bid% 9	1 M17 3.837 100% 200 2 C11 3.433 67% 400 3 C5 2.285 100% 50 4 C3 2.260 100% 150 5 M20 1.821 50% 3000	2.727 837 3800	25 M7 0.868 100% 1000 26 M6 0.821 10% 500 27 M22 0.789 100% 500 28 C14 0.645 50% 500 29 M19 0.558 100% 2000	0.736 727 4500	29	29
LEAGUE II: OTHER CBS	Awd/ Score Bid%	1 1125 2.224 717 500 2 1122 2.191 337 100 3 1117 2.115 657 2000 4 1116 2.072 257 300 5 116 1.905 267 2400	2.101 44% 5300	19 1129 0.978 50% 1000 20 1132 0.975 50% 1000 21 1119 0.921 100% 300 22 114 0.878 100% 150 23 113 0.837 33% 2000	0.918 67% 4450	23	23
	\$Awd	2000 1500 2000 2000	1.262 76% 13000	1000 1000 3000 3000	1.002 38% 8000	80	80
LEAGUE I: BIG CBS	-Bank Awd/ Rank Code Score Bid%	1 17 1.458 407 2 15 1.299 1007 3 18 1.145 637 4 16 1.144 1007	TOP BANKS: Ave Score: Ave Awd/Bid %: Total \$ Award:	5 II 1.128 22% 6 I4 1.088 17% 7 I2 1.036 60% 8 I3 0.756 52%	BOTTOM BANKS: Ave Score: Ave Awd/Bid %: Total \$ Award:	Banks w/ Bids:	Banks w/ Awards:

The purpose of the present section is not only to evaluate -- on the basis of documents, interviews, and the just-summarized quantitative analysis -- the current structure and operation of the Massachusetts LDP, but also to suggest potential improvements that might be implemented by the Treasurer.

At the heart of any linked deposit program are three formulas (which may be implicit or explicit): an <u>eligibility formula</u> used to determine whether and to what extent a bank can receive LDP deposits; a <u>scoring formula</u> used to summarize and rank a bank's performance according to specified criteria; and an <u>allocation formula</u> used to determine the award made to each bank, on the basis of its eligibility and its score as determined by the two previous formulas, plus any other factors deemed relevant by an LDP's architects. It is these three formulas, acting together, that establish the LDP's <u>link</u> between bank performance and LDP deposits.

These three formulas provide the principal organizing device for the following pages: there are sections on eligibility, scoring, and allocation. The very next section, however, considers the division of banks into - "leagues," and a final section examines how well the Massachusetts LDP has been publicized -- two issues that affect the impact of all three formulas.

Leagues.

The state's banks were originally divided into leagues so that competition for funds would take place among banks similar enough in nature that it would make sense to evaluate their relative performance using a common formula. Given legal restrictions and other institutional factors, it

- 17 -

would hardly be reasonable to reward a commercial bank relative to a thrift institution because it devoted a larger portion of its portfolio to small business loans -- nor to punish it for making relatively fewer loans for lowand moderate-income housing. Thus, one distinction recognized by the division into leagues was that between commercial banks (CBs) and thrift institutions (thrifts) -- between Leagues I and II on the one hand, and League III on the other. Table II shows the validity of this distinction: the average ratio of small business loans to in-state deposits was roughly ten times greater in Leagues I and II than in League III (0.248 & 0.241 vs. 0.026); while the ratio for low-income housing loans was substantially lower.

The division of CBs into Leagues I and II was intended to recognize another qualitative distinction -- that between "money center" banks and more locally-oriented ones. This distinction was never as clear-cut conceptually as that between CBs and thrifts, although there was general agreement that the structure and behavior of Boston's four biggest banks did differ in significant ways from the state's other, smaller CBs. Thus, the idea of placing these four banks into a separate league was indeed a reasonable one [13]. But the use of an unchanging quantitative criterion -- a bank is placed in League I if its total assets exceed \$200 million -- to implement the underlying qualitative distinction has not worked as intended. During 1983, none of the state's four "money center" banks participated in the LDP. Eight banks did bid for and receive linked deposit awards in League I, but none were money center banks -- their classification as League I banks was the result of maintaining the same dollar cut-off point in spite of inflation and economic growth [14]. If the cut-off line had been re-established in accordance with the basic intention of the LDP's designers, so that only

money-center banks were included in League I -- and there is no apparent reason why it shouldn't have been -- there would have been no League I participants in 1983. One immediate consequence of this observation is clear: this study's quantitative analysis can provide no basis for a comparative examination of the performance of money-center and non-money-center banks in terms of the criteria incorporated in the linked deposit scoring formula.

In short, of the two qualitative distinctions underlying the present league structure, that between commercial banks and thrifts appears justified by the available data, while that between money-center and other CBs has been implemented in a manner inconsistent with its underlying rationale -- all of the 1983 CB participants in the Massachusetts LDP should have been grouped into the same league.

A more complex league structure could incorporate additional divisions along any or all of the following three lines: first, thrift institutions could be divided so that savings banks would form one league and co-operative banks and savings & loan associations another. Second, banks could be restricted to competing with other banks of roughly equal size. Third, geographical areas could be used as a basis for grouping -- e.g., a league of Western Massachusetts thrifts, or of CBs from southeastern Massachusetts and Cape Cod [15]. Although a detailed review of these possibilities is beyond the scope of this study, there are reasons to believe that a more complete study would conclude that the creation of additional leagues is unwarranted. First, the similarity of the data for "League IIIM" and "League IIIC" in Table II suggests that there is no strong basis for subdividing the thrifts by type of institution. Second, if it were to be determined that there are strong public policy grounds for wishing to take bank size and/or location into account in the distribution of LDP awards, this might be more simply,

- 19 -

flexibly, and effectively pursued through appropriate modification of the . scoring and/or allocation formulas, rather than by redefining "leagues."

Eligibility.

In order to be eligible for receipt of a Massachusetts LDP award, a bank must satisfy a number of requirements, three of which merit individual discussion. First, it must have statutory authorization to receive a public deposit of the amount in question. This is really a two-part requirement. Part one is that the bank belong to a class of institutions authorized to be depositories for state funds. This is not automatic -- credit unions have not been so authorized, and in mid-1983 those state-chartered savings banks that changed their charters to become federal savings banks (FSBs) lost this authorization. Part two is that the deposit awarded under the LDP not result in the total dollar amount of a bank's state deposits exceeding the maximum permissible amount determined by statute (or by the Treasurer's own investment policy guidelines, which are sometimes more restrictive). The specification of this maximum varies by class of institution: for CBs it is 55% of capital, surplus, and undivided profits (up to 85% if the excess over 55% is collateralized); for savings banks it is 5% of total deposits; for cooperative banks it is 1.5% of total deposits; and for federal savings and loan associations it is the maximum amount covered by federal deposit insurance, currently \$100,000.

Although an evaluation either of the content of these statutory and policy limits or of their apparently arbitrary variation among types of depository institutions is beyond the scope of this study, it is appropriate to observe critically that the linked deposit bid form itself requires banks neither to furnish the data nor to perform the calculations necessary to

- 20 -

demonstrate that they are eligible for deposits of the size they are bidding for. It would be desirable to redesign the linked deposit bid form so that each bank was required to show explicitly each step in calculating the maximum linked deposit award for which it would be eligible (first, the statutory maximum would be calculated, if necessary; then all existing state deposits -- excluding expiring linked deposit awards -- would be subtracted from this amount; the difference obtained in this way would be the bank's maximum permissible linked deposit bid in the current bidding cycle; this amount could then be readily compared to the amount being bid for). Such a redesigned form could ease bank compliance with, and Treasurer administration of, this first eligibility requirement.

The second eligibility requirement is that a bank must bid at least the required minimum interest rate, as determined by the money market rate for large certificates of deposit of like maturity quoted in the Wall Street Journal on the last possible day for postmarking bids. League I banks must bid at least the quoted rates, League II banks must bid rates no more than 75 basis points (three-quarters of a percentage point) below the quoted rates, and League III banks must bid rates no more than 100 basis points (one percentage point) below the quoted rates. There may be good reasons for requiring a higher minimum interest rate from money center banks, but there is no apparent public policy rationale for having relatively large non-money center commercial banks pay 75 basis points more than smaller CBs. (Although this issue would disappear with an appropriate redrawing of the cut-off line between Leagues I and II that isolated money center banks in League I, it will persist if that cut-off line remains unchanged). Nor is it clear what public policy consideration supports CBs being required to pay more than thrifts; the two types of banks do not compete directly for LDP funds, so the

- 21 -

effect is simply to give thrifts a relatively greater financial incentive to participate in the program.

The third eligibility requirement, applied to banks that have previously received an LDP award, involves meeting a "maintenance of effort" standard. Each bidding bank must sign a statement on the bid form that reads, in part:

As a condition of award the Bank agrees to maintain its present loan efforts in the areas listed in component C on the bid form. The bank further agrees to increase its loans in those areas by an amount equal to at least 70% of the amount of the total award made to the Bank under this program.

Two or three weeks prior to the bidding deadline, moreover, the bank must have completed a form showing the dollar amounts in each categorical area as of the close of the preceding quarter; for example, to be eligible for an award in the May 1983 bidding cycle, a bank was required to use data as of March 31, 1983 on the maintenance of effort form due in early May.

The maintenance of effort form itself does not provide a precise formula that would enable the bank to display the calculation of the new minimum total dollar amount in the eight designated categories (its total "C") that would be necessary to meet the maintenance of effort standard. Rather, the necessary calculations must be performed in the Treasurer's office on the basis of the information supplied on the bank's maintenance of effort form plus information retained from the previous maintenance of effort form(s) and/or the previous linked deposit bid form(s) from the same bank. The present study did not include an empirical assessment of how accurately or rigorously the maintenance of effort requirement is in fact being enforced. According to the Treasurer's office, the maintenance of effort requirement is taken seriously, but banks that fail to meet the requirement are not automatically ruled ineligible for deposits in the current bidding cycle; rather, they are called, asked if they have good reasons for not being in

- 22 -

compliance, and warned that they must be back in compliance by the following bidding cycle. There have been numerous such warnings, but apparently no bank has ever been ruled to be ineligible for failing to meet the maintenance of effort standard [16].

The absence of a precise formula for specifying the meaning of the maintenance of effort standard quoted above is troublesome, because the standard as stated is subject to multiple possible interpretations. Among the questions it leaves unanswered are these: do its two sentences imply two different standards -- that effort will be maintained in every single category, while the 70% requirement applies to the total of all categories -or is there only a single standard, stated in the second sentence? Does the requirement apply only to the loan categories or to the two non-loan categories as well? Is maintenance of effort taken to mean maintenance of at least the same ratio of loans to in-state deposits or maintenance of at least the same dollar amount of loans? Is the base period for measuring compliance with the standard taken to be the previous bidding cycle, or is it taken to be the bidding cycle when the bank was first awarded LDP funds [17]? In addition, the LDP's written description provides no guidance on the question of when and how a bank that fails to meet the maintenance of effort criterion in one bidding cycle can regain its eligibility for future participation in the program.

The existence of so ambiguous a standard seems bound to cause problems of administration and enforcement. If a maintenance of effort requirement is to be maintained, it would be much more efficient and mutually informative, as well as less burdensome to the Treasurer's office, to include a maintenance of effort section as part of the linked deposit bid form itself, rather than to continue to require a separate form, due on a different date.

- 23 -

This section could provide a step-by-step guide for the bank to fill in the required information and to do the necessary calculation to compute both its current "C" total and its required minimum "C" total; this would remove ambiguity, eliminate a whole set of forms, and reduce the administrative burden on the Treasurer's staff.

A more basic question is whether there should be any maintenance of effort elibility requirement at all. The requirement has a clear common-sense rationale -- that the funds provided to banks under the program should be used by the banks to increase their lending in the categories targeted by the program. But the actual functioning of banks makes it difficult to devise an operational formula that is both reasonable (so that it would be fair to take away the eligibility of banks that fail to meet it), and meaningful (so that it would impose a non-trivial standard for bank performance). There is seldom a direct relationship between particular deposits and particular loans, so there is no real way to ascertain what particular use was made of the particular funds received under the LDP program. Growth in total "C" is likely to be determined primarily by growth in the dollar volume of lending, including the effects of inflation, rather than by the use of a particular deposit; thus the criterion could be satisfied even by a bank that immediately reinvests its LDP award in the New York money market to take advantage of the spread between the rate that it can earn there and the rate that it must pay for its linked deposit award (this is what the treasurer of one large savings bank said that he probably would do). On the other hand, loan totals can periodically fluctuate downwards even for banks that are making a genuine effort to expand lending in the designated areas; for example, a bank's amount of outstanding housing loans falls when a set of existing loans is sold to a packager of

mortgage-backed securities, precisely in order to obtain the funds necessary for the bank to be able to undertake additional lending.

To see another problem with the maintenance of effort requirement, consider a bank that has participated in the LDP for several years, with a constant linked deposit award of \$100,000. It would not be reasonable to say that "C" should rise by \$70,000 before the next bidding cycle, when the deposit is merely being rolled over; on the other hand, to require only that "C" be \$70,000 greater than when the bank first entered the program several years before is to set a standard so loose as to be almost meaningless. Faced with a choice between these two alternatives, the latter interpretation (that actually adopted by the Treasurer's office) is clearly preferable. But it may be more reasonable still to abandon the maintenance of effort requirement and to rely on the LDP's scoring formula for evaluating bank performance. If that part of the LDP is working well, and if the program is truly competitive, a bank that fails to maintain its effort would find that it was unable to compete successfully for funds. In short, because of the practical and theoretical obstacles to designing a meaningful maintenance of effort requirement, it may make most sense simply to eliminate this third eligibility requirement altogether.

Three additional eligibility criteria may be noted here, without evaluation, for the sake of completeness. One noted on the linked deposit bid form itself is that a bank will be ineligible to participate in the LDP if "it is reported to the Treasurer's Office by the Commissioner of Banking that the Bank has been convicted of any discriminatory offence in the past three years" [18]. Another, applied informally and nowhere explicitly stated, but nevertheless a very real eligibility criterion, is that the Treasurer's office have no serious question about the safety of the state's deposits in

- 25 -

terms of a potential bank failure. Finally, of course, the bank must submit a correctly completed bid form by the stated deadline.

Scoring.

To increase clarity, this study examines the Treasurer's linked deposit scoring formula (p. 8, above) in an equivalent, restated form, as explained previously (pp. 9-12, above). The restated formula, like the original one, consists of three major parts: (1) "C points" for the dollar volume, as a share of the bank's total Massachusetts deposits, of bank activity in eight specified categories; (2) "in-state points" for total in-state lending relative to total Massachusetts deposits; and (3) "interest rate points" for the interest rate bid. That is,

Total Points = C Points + In-state Points + Interest Rate Points.

<u>Total Variation</u>. The data displayed in Tables I - IV indicate that the scoring formula does indeed discriminate among banks. In November 1983, total scores ranged from a low of 0.558 to a high of 3.837 (both in league III). In both May and November, the average score of the top five banks in League II was more than twice as high as the average score of the bottom five banks, while the average score of the top five banks in League III was more than four times as large as their five lowest-scoring competitors. Thus the scoring formula is successful in avoiding one potential problem --- that of giving all bidding banks very similar scores. Furthermore, the analysis in the following subsection shows that all of the major components in the scoring formula, as well as a majority of the categories contributing "C points," made substantial contributions to the total variation of the scores awarded to individual banks.

- 26 -

<u>Relative Importance of Components</u>. The significance of any given component in determining the ranking of banks and the relative differences in their scores depends not on the absolute number of points provided by the component, but in its variation. (This is the principle that made it possible to remove the minimum required interest rate from the formula; because it is the same for every bank within a league, subtracting it from every bank's score has no substantive effect, even though the points provided by this term alone account for more than 80% of the total points received by most banks under the Treasurer's scoring formula.)

One indicator of the variation of each of the formula's components is provided by the difference between its maximum and minimum values, defined here as that component's "range." An examination of the "range" lines in Table II reveals three clear conclusions: first, each of the three major components does vary significantly by this measure (a single exception results from the fact that no Leauge I bank bid more than the required minimum interest rate). Second, in each league the variation in "C points" is greater than the total of the variations in the other two types of points combined. Third, the amount of variation of the eight individual components of "C" is highly unequal [19].

A more detailed examination of the individual categories contributing to total "C points" shows which ones have the greatest and which ones have the least relative importance. On the one hand, the great bulk of the variation in "C points" for Leagues II and III is accounted for by the low-income housing component (the range of this component alone is 1.245 and 2.874, in the two leagues respectively, while the range of total "C points" is 1.542 and 3.067). On the other hand, three of the components -- loans to exempt organizations, to community development corporations, and to mental health

- 27 -

providers -- account for almost no variation (the maximum range for any one of these three in any league is .015; more detailed examination of the underlying data contained in the statistical appendix shows that the <u>sum</u> of the points from these three categories of loans varies by no more than .022 in any league). Between these extremes, the components of small business lending, student lending, and investments in obligations of Massachusetts public entities each vary by a significant extent in all three leagues, low-income housing loans in League I have a similar amount of variation, and the food stamp sales component shows a large range in League II.

"Range," which depends only on minimum and maximum values, is a crude measure of the amount of variation. And because the range of a total is not necessarily equal to the total of the ranges of its components (e.g., in League III, the range of total scores is 3.279 while the ranges for interest rate points, in-state points, and C points are 1.250, 0.725, and 3.067, respectively), there is no simple way to describe the proportion of variation in a total that is accounted for by the variation of each of its components. For present purposes, however, the analysis just summarized may be adequate; in the context provided by the rest of this study, there would appear to be small potential payoff from undertaking a more sophisticated quantitative analysis of the relative importance of the multiple components of the Massachusetts LDP scoring formula [20].

By any measure, the relative importance of a component is affected by the "weight" that it is given in the formula as well as by the numerical value of the underlying data. In the Treasurer's present scoring formula, a weight of 5.0 is given to three of the individual categories that contribute "C points." Because the dollar amounts of student loans, of food stamp sales, and of low-income housing loans are each multiplied by five before

- 28 -

being included in the calculation of the formula (the linked deposit bid form requests only the post-multiplication amount), each dollar in either of the two lending categories counts three times as much as a loan in any of the other specified lending categories, and a dollar of food stamp sales counts two and one-half times as much. (Why not five times as much? Because each dollar loaned in any of the categories also counts toward in-state points, the correct comparison is between 6 and 2 -- or, in the case of food stamps, 5 and 2 -- rather than between 5 and 1.) This weighting clearly did make a difference in the relative importance of the three components so weighted, although in the case of food stamp sales even the weighted amount was substantial in only one of the three leagues.

Accuracy. The most fundamental questions about the scoring formula remain to be asked, however: Does it produce scores that really reflect bank performance? Is it able to discriminate accurately among banks according to their relative contributions to the welfare of Massachusetts residents and communities? Does it provide an operational measure of the extent to which banks are channeling capital into areas where it is particularly needed? In sum, does it offer an effective means of identifying which banks are particularly worthy of being awarded public deposits?

There does not exist any independent, generally accepted measure or ranking of bank performance against which LDP scores could be checked for accuracy (if there were such a measure, of course, then LDP scores would be unnecessary). The closest thing to this is provided by the implementation of the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), which has established criteria of responsiveness to the needs of the geographical community within which a bank is located. However, these criteria are not used to periodically calculate a numerical score or a rank for every bank; instead, they are applied only in certain circumstances (e.g., when a bank seeks approval for a merger or for opening a new branch), in which case the judgment reached is essentially binary -- either a bank's performance is judged good enough to justify approval of its application, or it isn't.

Those involved in the CRA process have, however, inevitably reached informed individual and collective conclusions about the relative responsiveness of individual banks to commuity needs. Although a systematic investigation of the relationship between the ranking of banks in the minds of participants in the CRA process and the ranking produced by the LDP scoring formula would be well beyond the scope of the present project, it can be reported that a small number of informal discussions on this issue left the distinct impression that there is little, if any, correlation between the two rankings. Although this impression, even if correct, does not necessarily imply that the LDP scoring formula is an inaccurate indicator of a bank's overall contributions to the economic and social welfare of the Commonwealth, it at least raises questions concerning the reasons for the apparently divergent evaluations.

An alternative way to address the question of the effectiveness of the LDP scoring formula is to focus attention directly on the components and structure of the formula itself. When this is done, one's first conclusion is likely to be that it is a crude instrument for measuring something that is in fact quite complex. Reflection on possible modifications of the formula is then likely to lead to a second conclusion -- that this crudeness is less the result of particular flaws in the present formula than it is an unavoidable feature of any attempt to evaluate a highly diverse set of banking institutions by means of a single quantitative formula. Should banks be evaluated on the basis of what they are doing now -- or on the basis of the direction in which they are moving? Should a bank's loan portfolio be assessed against an statewide standard -- or against a standard that takes into account its own particular location? Should banks be given credit for making types of loans that are, from some public interest perspective, inherently worthy -- or for making loans that increase the flow of funds into areas experiencing some kind of capital shortage? Should some types of loans be weighted more heavily than other types of loans -- and, if so, what should determine the assignment of weights? Although there are no clearly best answers to such questions, any LDP scoring formula must necessarily come down on a single side of each of these issues.

Some specific features of the present scoring formula can be identified as raising high-priority questions to be addressed in any effort aimed at revising the formula presently used by the Massachusetts LDP. First, should the present weights be modified? The great relative importance of low-income housing loans in accounting for the overall variation in scores is heightened by its heavy weighting; the tiny relative importance of the three narrow categories of loans to CDCs, tax-exempt organizations, and mental health providers suggests that only if such loans are given a very heavy weighting does it make sense to maintain them in the formula at all; and the rationale for extra weighting on student loans and food stamp distribution is not clear.

Second, is the volume of food stamp distribution a good measure of a bank's overall provision of services (as opposed to just loans) to the community? (This was the rationale that led to the seemingly anomalous inclusion of this non-loan category in the scoring formula.) If so, there is a good case for retaining it in the formula; if not, is there some better measure of this aspect of bank performance?

- 31 -

Third, is it appropriate to include interest rate points in the scoring formula, rather than simply to require that each participating bank pay a uniform rate, established by the Treasurer? The excess interest rate bids do provide additional revenue for the Treasury, but they can have the effect in some cases of dramatically raising a bank's relative score, and thereby potentially diverting deposits away from other banks whose lending (and service) performance is superior. In November 1983, for example, the top scoring bank in League II would have had only the fifth best score if interest rate points were not included, and another bank raised its rank from eighth to third. At the same time, there were even more dramatic effects in League III: interest rate points enabled one bank to rank second rather than twelfth and another to rank third rather than sixteenth.

Because there is no clear objective standard for its evaluation, any overall assessment of the Massachusetts LDP's scoring formula -- favorable or critical -- must necessarily be somewhat subjective. This study's quantitative analysis showed that the formula does indeed effectively discriminate among banks, in the sense of producing scores that vary considerably from bank to bank. But its more qualitative analysis of the formula's "accuracy" suggests a lack of good grounds for being confident that the fundamental questions asked in the first paragraph of this subsection can be answered affirmatively.

Allocation.

The most straightforward system of allocation for an LDP is what can be called the "strict auction" system, commonly used in financial markets: once any ineligible bids are eliminated, the highest scoring bidder receives the

full amount bid for, then the next highest scorer receives its full bid, and so on until the amount of the good being auctioned, generally specified in advance, is exhausted. But more complicated allocation formulas can also be employed. For example, an allocation formula could impose contraints that would result in some bidders receiving less than they would under the strict auction system (e.g., that no more than a specified percentage of the total awards go to a single bidder, or that there be upper and lower limits on the percentage of total awards going to bidders in specified geographical regions). Another possibility is that an allocation formula could use weights to adjust the scores of bidders in specified categories -- e.g., minority bidders, or bidders from a specific geographical area, could be given weights greater than one, or smaller bidders could be favored by assigning weights inversely related to, say, bank size. Alternatively, scores could be used to place bidders into groups, with all bidders qualifying for the same group receiving the same award; the simplest instance of this is to divide the auctioned good equally among all bidders who score above a specific required minimum.

Whatever factors are taken into account in the allocation of awards, however, fundamental principles of public administration dictate that an LDP should have clearly stated criteria and procedures that determine the allocation of awards (once ineligible bids have been eliminated) on the basis of individual bank scores, plus whatever other data (e.g., bank size) are needed as inputs into the allocation formula. In other words, the system of allocating awards should be as objective and automatic as possible [21].

The Massachusetts LDP is seriously deficient in the way that it allocates awards. First, neither the total amount to be awarded in any given bidding cycle, nor the division of the total among the three leagues, is announced in advance of the awards themselves. Second, the "method of allocation" stated in the Tresurer's "Linked Deposit Progrm Supplement" --

Awards will be made through a process of mathematical proration between the funds available for deposit and Linked Deposit Scores. The deposits will be awarded at the rates bid, starting with the highest scoring bidder in each league and moving down. The Treasurer reserves the right to reject any or all bids in whole or part.

-- cannot be clearly and unambiguously translated into an quantitative, operational allocation formula (although it strongly suggests that a method quite akin to the strict auction method will be employed). In fact, according to the Treasurer's office, awards are actually determined not by application of any formula, but by a committee that takes into account a number of factors, including scores and maintenance of effort.

By themselves, these procedural defects in the allocation procedures of the Massachusetts LDP, while worth rectifying, do not necessarily have major substantive impact on the allocation of awards. Another deficiency in the Massachusetts LDP's allocation of awards is, however, clearly of major significance -- indeed, it is the single most striking and significant finding of the present study: <u>The actual allocation of linked deposit awards</u> <u>among banks is virtually unrelated to the scores awarded to banks by the</u> Treasurer's own scoring formula.

The quantitative analysis undertaken for the present study produced results that are clearly sufficient to support this finding. The most compelling of these results are summarized in Tables III and IV (pp. 15-16, above), which show the scores and awards for both the highest-scoring and lowest-scoring banks in all three leagues in both of the 1983 bidding cycles. One would expect that the high-scoring banks would have received awards that were equal to a high percentage (perhaps even 100%) of their

- 34 -

bids, and that low-scoring banks would have received awards that were equal to a small percentage (perhaps even 0%) of their bids. Similarly, one would expect that the total dollar value of the awards to high-scoring banks would be very much greater than the total dollar value of the awards to low-scoring banks. The results for League I show differences between the higher-scoring and lower-scoring banks that are substantially less than might have been expected. More importantly, in the results for Leagues II and III, which contain most of the participating banks, which accounted for 73% of the LDP awards in 1983, and where the number of banks is sufficient to produce large gaps between the scores of high-scoring and low-scoring banks, the expected relationships between scores and awards are altogether absent. In two of four cases -- League III in May and League II in November -- the five lowest-scoring banks received a larger average percentage of the amounts that they bid for than did their highest-scoring counterparts. In both bidding cycles, the five highest-scoring banks in League III were awarded a smaller total dollar amount than their lowest-scoring counterparts. And an examination of the data for the individual banks that are included in these tables, as opposed to just the group averages, reveals no clear patterns.

To further examine whether and to what extent the awards to individual banks are related to their linked deposit scores, two sets of correlation coefficients were calculated. An advantage of correlation coefficients over the results shown in Tables III and IV is that the former measure takes into account all banks in each League, not just those with the highest or lowest scores.

First, for each league and for each of 1983's two bidding cycles, the standard correlation coefficient between the scores of banks and their awards as a percentage of bids was computed. (These scores and percentages are

shown in columns 15 and 18 of Table I, and of its seven counterparts in the statistical appendix.) The results are shown in the next to last column of Table V. In five of the six cases, the correlation coefficient is low (less than 0.16), but positive; in the sixth case (League II in November), the correlation coefficient has a substantially higher absolute value, but has a negative sign (-0.397). (Only the negative coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 5% significance level.) The precise interpretation of these numerical values is unclear, because the correlation coefficient is a measure of the closeness to an exact linear relationship between two varibles, and there is no reason to hold that up as a standard in the present instance [22].

Second, correlation coefficients were calcuated between each bank's rank in terms of its score and its rank in terms of its bid/award percentage, again for each league and each of 1983's two bidding cycles. The results of these calculations are shown in the right hand column of Table V. Again, five of the six coefficients are low positive numbers that are not significant at the 5% significance, while the sixth coefficient (again for Leauge II in November) is again much larger in absolute value, negative in sign, and significant at the 5% level.

The calculation of these correlation coefficients offers additional support for the conclusion that the Massachusetts Linked Deposit Program fails to actually <u>link</u> deposits to bank performance, even as imperfectly measured by its own scoring formula.

What does, in fact, determine the allocation of awards? No systematic quantitative investigation of this question has been undertaken, but simple inspection of the data suggests two principles at work, and the Treasurer's office has confirmed their use: first, every bidding bank is given at least

TABLE V

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN TOTAL POINT SCORES OF INDIVIDUAL BANKS AND AWARD/BID PERCENTAGES

MAY 1983 AND NOVEMBER 1983

League	Month	Number of Banks 	score-% r [*] 	rank-rank r [+]
I	May	6	0.157	0.257
	Nov	8	0.129	0.311
II	May	25	0.025	0.081
	Nov	23	-0.397(#)	-0.385(#)
III	May	36	0.090	0.002
	Nov	29	0.139	0.159

- [*] "score-% r" is the correlation coefficient between the actual linked deposit scores of individual banks and their linked deposit awards as a percentage of the amount that they bid for.
- [+] "rank-rank r" is the correlation coefficient between the ranks of the linked deposit scores of individual banks and the ranks of their award/bid percentages. That is, the highest score (or percentage) is assigned a rank of "1," the next highest is given rank "2," etc. In the case of ties, banks were assigned a common rank -- e.g., three banks tied for ranks 4, 5, and 6 would each be assigned the rank "5."
- [#] indicates significantly different from zero at the 5% significance level.

For sources and additional explanation see accompanying text.

something, no matter how low its score; second, there is a general understanding that the total amount that a bank holds under the LDP will remain roughly constant, if the bank wishes to maintain it. In other words, the Treasurer's office attaches considerable importance to providing LDP funds to as many interested banks as possible, and to providing continuity and predictability for those banks that do participate in the program.

Publicity.

The third part of the "well-well-well" standard enunciated by the Special Commission on State Investment was that the Massachusetts LDP be "well-publicized." The Commission believed that three types of benefits could result from a high level of publicity: increased likelihood of exposing any false reporting or other misbehavior by any of the parties involved in the program; increased public interest and involvement in the on-going task of monitoring and improving the program's design and implementation; and, most importantly, multiplied impact of the LDP itself. Two related processes were seen as contributing to this last effect: on the one hand, banks' general desire to obtain favorable publicity (and to avoid unfavorable publicity) would lead them to alter their lending patterns in ways that would result in higher LDP scores and rankings; on the other hand, the actual dollar inflow of deposits to high-scoring banks could greatly exceed the amount of direct LDP awards if other public-spirited depositors (e.g., other government entities, churches, foundations, unions, fraternal organizations. individuals) responded to the publicized results of the linked deposit competition in allocating their own deposits among banks. [SCSI 1977, pp. 2, 9; Campen 1977, p. 24.]

In fact, the Massachusetts LDP has not been well-publicized. While the

- 38 -

Treasurer's office has shown considerable public relations skills in publicizing its lottery programs and its lists of persons entitled to unclaimed money, it has operated its linked deposit program with an extremely low profile. A number of the people contacted in the course of the present study, individuals who are generally well-informed about the state's economic and social policies, expressed surprise when they were told that Massachusetts has a linked deposit program currently in operation. The semi-annual distribution of linked deposit awards is not publicized through the media, in spite of the obvious possibilities for interesting stories (e.g., "One can imagine an aggressive treasurer personally visiting and congratulating high-scoring bank presidents, making sure the press was on hand" [Kittredge 1979, p. 7]). Individual banks are informed only of the results of their own bids; they do not routinely receive a listing of the bids, scores, and awards of all participating banks. Indeed, the present study found no evidence of the existence of any such lists -- information about bids and scores was seen only on the linked deposit bid forms of individual banks; and information about awards was seen only on internal lists of all banks receiving awards during a bidding cycle, lists that contained no information about bids or scores. It appears that even if a concerned citizen, or an enterprising reporter, were to ask the Treasurer's office for information about the relative performance of the state's banks as indicated by their linked deposit scores, there would be nothing readily available.

It should be noted that the apparent lack of such readily available information is related not only to the ability of the Treasurer's office adequately to publicize the LDP, but also to its ability to manage the program effectively. The computations necessary to process the raw numbers

- 39 -

submitted by banks on their linked deposit bid forms and maintenance of effort forms appear to be carried out and recorded by hand. The implementation of even a simple computerized data processing system for the Massachusetts LDP could have considerable benefits in terms of calculating scores quickly and accurately, allocating awards in accordance with specified criteria, producing lists, tables, and charts useful both for external reporting and internal program management, and maintaining records.

V. CONCLUSIONS

Two principal conclusions follow from this study's systematic evaluation of the design and implementation of the Massachusetts LDP. First, there is in fact no linkage in the Massachusetts linked deposit program as it is currently operated; deposits are allocated among banks independently of the banks' linked deposit scores as determined by the Treasurer's own scoring formula. In other words, the program is operating as a "keep-the-money-at-home" program that deposits state funds in Massachusetts banks (rather than investing them in national money market instruments) but that does not link the awarding of these public deposits to bank performance in promoting designated economic and social public policy objectives. Second, and more generally, the Massachusetts LDP falls far short of being "well-designed, well-implemented, and well-publicized" -- that is, it fails to meet the three-part criterion originally set forth by the Special Commission on State Investment [1977, p. 2]. The evaluation presented in Part IV, above, identified serious deficiencies in every aspect of the program that was reviewed.

These conclusions suggest the need for substantial reforms in the Massachusetts LDP. Among the most important of these are: reestablishing an

- 40 -

appropriate cut-off point for dividing commercial banks into two leagues; either establishing an explicit, reasonable, and enforceable maintenance of effort requirement, or else eliminating the maintenance of effort requirement altogether; revising the scoring formula so that it more accurately reflects bank performance; developing an explicit formula for allocating awards among banks on the basis of their scores and other specified criteria; developing appropriate means for publicizing the program's operation and its results; creating forms and instructions that are clearer for participants and more informative for program managers; and improving data processing and reporting within the Treasurer's office.

Although the critical findings presented in Part IV were frequently accompanied by constructive suggestions for improving the design and operation of the Massachusetts LDP, it would be well beyond the scope of the present study to provide a comprehensive and detailed set of recommendations for reform. Putting together any such package of proposed reforms would involve making a large number of interrelated judgments on matters of fact, on policy issues, and on administrative feasibility. If the Treasurer is interested in undertaking substantial reform of the LDP, an initial step might be the creation of a small advisory group -- perhaps consisting of bankers who have participated in the program, public sector staffers concerned with the financing of balanced economic development, and representatives of advocacy groups concerned with the distributional issues that the LDP was intended to address, as well as members of the Treasurer's own staff -- charged with recommending a specific set of changes in the Massachusetts LDP.

If Massachusetts is to continue to have a linked deposit program, it should be as vigorous, visible, efficient, and effective -- that is, as

· - 41 -

"well-designed, well-implemented, and well-publicized" -- as possible. At its core must be a strong, clear, and sensible <u>link</u> between the allocation of public deposits and the performance of private banking institutions [23].

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- 1. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Northeast Business and Economic Association Conference, Boston, November 9, 1984. Research was begun as a member of the Faculty Research Seminar of the McCormack Institute of Public Affairs at the University of Massachusetts/Boston; the support of that Institute, and of its Director, Ed Beard, is gratefully acknowledged. Thanks are also due to the Massachusetts Treasurer's Office, particularly to Deputy Treasurer Patrick D. Sullivan, for cooperation and assistance, and for reviewing the final draft during December 1984 for possible errors and omissions.
- 2. In this paper, the term "banks" is used to refer to depository institutions in general, including commercial banks, savings banks, cooperative banks, and savings and loan associations.
- 3. By 1983, the total size of the state's General Fund had grown to about \$500 million. The 72 banks holding linked deposits awards consisted of 34 of the state's approximately 135 commercial banks (about 25%), 21 of the approximately 150 savings banks (about 14%), 14 of the approximately 105 cooperative banks (about 13%) and 3 of the approximately 27 federal savings and loan associations (about 11%). The statistical appendix includes a listing of all banks that received linked deposit awards during 1982 and 1983.
- 4. In fact, there seems never to have been a written evaluation of the LDP of any state, with the single exception of a 1969 study of one aspect of the first year of the Illinois LDP.
- 5. It is possible that some linkage between LDP awards and bank performance could result from self-selection by banks. If banks choose whether or not to bid for linked deposit funds on the basis of their own perception of how their lending performance would be evaluated by the linked deposit scoring formula, and if these perceptions are accurate, then the program would create a sort of "linkage" between bank performance and the deposit of state funds. There is, however, no evidence that this has actually happened.
- 6. "Eligible" bids here refers to bids meeting the deadline, completing the forms correctly, bidding at least the minimum required interest rate, etc.; confusion over such matters resulted in almost half the bids submitted in the first two bidding cycles being declared ineligible, but by April 1979 this seems no longer to have been a significant problem.
- 7. According to the Treasurer's office, no data on bids and/or awards at even the aggregate level have been retained for the period before 1982 (the data in the preceding paragraph is from another source that obtained information from the Treasurer's office in 1979).
- 8. The Massachusetts LDP has undergone only minor changes since its inception; the description here is accurate for 1983 and 1984, but differs in minor details from the structure of the program in earlier years.

- 9. 1982 data were used only in the tables at the beginning of the statistical appendix which show the awards, and the total amounts on deposit, for each participating bank during the May 1982 - November 1983 period; while it would have been interesting to have a record of the amounts on deposit with individual banks over a longer period, data for earlier years are not available (see note 7).
- 10. Actually, "Total 'C'" here is equal to "C/A" in the Treasurer's formula.
- 11. The difference between the interest rate bid by a bank and the minimum interest rate required is referred to here as the "excess i." Since a bank can submit simultaneous bids for both six-month and twelve-month deposits, it is possible that its "excess i" can differ between its two bids. In fact, this happened on 14 of the 133 linked deposit bid forms received during 1983. This study dealt with such cases by simply using the larger of a bank's two "excess i" numbers. The results obtained with the use of this simplification are only very slightly different than they would have been if the smaller of the two numbers had been used; a detailed check showed, for example, that no changes would have been necessary in the rankings of any of the banks included in Table III, below, and in Table IV there would have been just two cases where adjacently ranked banks would have switched positions.
- 12. Because the LDP includes both six-month and twelve-month deposits, there is no obvious single best measure of either the overall size of the program, nor of an individual bank's participation. From the point of view of outstanding deposits, a bank that receives two consecutive six-month deposits of \$1 million is in the identical position as a bank that receives one twelve-month deposit of the same amount; but from the point of view of total awards made, the first bank has received \$2 million rather than \$1 million. In performing the present quantitative analysis, four separate calculations were initially made: for six-month deposits only; for twelve-month deposits only; for weighted total deposits, where total deposits were defined as twelve-month deposits plus one-half of six-month deposits; and for unweighted total deposits, where six and twelve month deposits were simply added together. Looking at either maturity by itself clearly gives a partial picture of how the relationship between the amount bid for by a bank and the amount awarded to that bank is correlated with that bank's linked deposit score. Neither of the two total measures is clearly superior to the other; the unweighted totals are used here for simplicity and because they correspond most directly with the accounting measures used by the Treasurer. In any case, there was no significant difference between the results obtained using unweighted totals and those obtained when weighted totals were used.
- 13. In fact, of course, a significant qualitative distinction could be made between the state's biggest bank -- the First National Bank of Boston (now Bank of Boston) -- and the next three -- New England Merchants National Bank (now Bank of New England), Shamut Bank, and State Street Bank -- but creating a separate league for just one bank (even a bank that is "in a league by itself") was not seen as a viable option.

- 14. Even at the beginning of the LDP, League I was not limited to the state's "big four" banks. The Chairman of SCSI, who also served as a member of the Treasurer's Special Commission on Linked Deposits, and who played an active role in the design of the system, was a Senior Vice President of Boston's (although not the state's) fifth largest bank, United States Trust Company. In order to avoid any appearance of impropriety, he suggested a cut-off point that put his bank at the bottom of League I rather than at the top of League II, and that is where the cut-off point was placed.
- 15. The Colorado LDP grouped commerical banks into four geographic regions.
- 16. It may be worth noting that the current procedures for administering the maintenance of effort requirement were implemented following a report issued by the Social and Economic Opporunity Council (the group that established SCSI) on June 28, 1979, the last working day before its abolishment by Governor Edward King became effective. This report [Kittredge 1979] showed that roughly half of the 26 banks that received LDP awards in at least two of the first three bidding cycles were in violation of the maintenance of effort standard -- 11 of the 26 banks by a loose interpretation of the standard, 15 of 26 by a more stringent interpretation -- but that the Treasurer had continued to make LDP awards to these banks. Although the initial reaction of the Treasurer's office to this finding, as reported in the Boston Globe [June 29, 1979], was that it "was not disturbed at the report indicating many banks are not complying with their pledges" and that "it did not want to force them to live up to their pledges," it did in fact put the current procedures into place.
- 17. According to the Treasurer's office, current practice is to adopt the second of the two alternative answers to each of these four questions when making calculations in connection with the maintenance of effort requirement.
- 18. According to the Treasurer's office, no such report about any bank has ever been received from the Commissioner of Banking, nor is there any more detailed written explanation either of what kinds of discrimination this eligibility requirement is concerned with (e.g., racial, sexual, geographic and/or age? in lending and/or employment?) or of what is meant by the term "convicted."
- 19. Table II is based on the November bidding cycle; an analogous table based on the May bidding cycle is included in the statistical appendix. The data from the May bidding cycle are generally similar; in particular, they support all three of the conclusions stated here.
- 20. Such an analysis could make use of analysis of variance or related statistical techniques.
- 21. In a description of his state's LDP, the Treasurer of Illinois emphasizes this feature: "In order to eliminate subjectivity from our allocation, we use a computerized system..." [Campen, 1977, Appendix A].
- 22. In particular, precise conformity to "strict auction" procedures would

not have produced a "score-% r" of 1.0. For comparison, a "strict auction score-% r" was also calculated for each league in each month. The results showed that, in every case, if the actual total amount of awards made had been allocated according to strict auction rules, the correlation would have been substantially greater; presented in the same order as in Table V, the six correlation coefficients calculated in this way were 0.884, 0.465, 0.609, 0.136, 0.718, and 0.588 (all except the second and fourth of these are significantly different from zero at the 5% level of significance).

23. The related question of whether or not Massachusetts <u>should</u> continue to have a linked deposit program -- that is, of whether and to what extent an effectively reformed Massachusetts LDP could be expected to produce benefits to offset its cost to the Commonwealth (lower direct interest income on state deposits) -- has also been investigated as part of the present study. I hope to report the results of this still-to-be-completed analysis of the potential impact of the Massachusetts LDP in a future paper that will complement the present paper's analysis of its design and implementation.

REFERENCES

- Campen, James T., <u>A Linked Deposit System for Massachusetts?</u> Information, <u>Issues, and Analyses</u>, Report to the Special Commission on State Investment, June 30, 1977.
- Kittredge, Jack, "A Preliminary Evaluation of the Linked Deposit System in Massachusetts," Massachusetts Social and Economic Opportunity Council, June 1979.
- Special Commission on State Investment, <u>Final Report</u>, Presented to the Massachusetts Social and Economic Opportunity Council, July 1977.

LINKED DEPOSIT PROGRAM MATERIALS DISTRIBUTED BY THE TREASURER OF MASSACHUSETTS

AN APPENDIX

to


PRIVATE BANKS AND PUBLIC MONEY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MASSACHUSETTS LINKED DEPOSIT PROGRAM

by

James T. Campen

Contents:

I.	Linked Deposit	Program G	Guide .	•	•	•	•	•••	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	A2
II.	Linked Deposit	Program S	Suppleme	nt	•	•	•	••	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•		A3-A6
III.	Linked Deposit	Bid Form	• • • •	₽.	•	•	•	•••	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•		A7-A9
IV.	Maintenance of	Effort Fo	orm						•	•	•								. A10



LINKED DEPOSIT PROGRAM GUIDE

CORRESPONDENCE - All mailings regarding this program should be forwarded to:

Robert Q. Crane, State Treasurer c/o Investment Division State House Room 227 Boston, Massachusetts 02133

- TAX IDENTIFICATION 04-6002284 The Commonwealth of Massachusetts is totally exempt from all withholding taxes.
- OCTOBER 4, 1983 Banks currently active in this program should have received their <u>Maintenance Of Efforts Agreement</u>. If not, contact us immediately on 727-2014.
- OCTOBER 31, 1983 Maintenance Of Efforts Agreements should have been mailed to the Treasurer's Office no later than October 31, 1983.
- NOVEMBER 10, 1983 Completed Linked Deposit Bid Forms should be forwarded to the Treasurer's Office by certified mail - return receipt.

Bid forms postmarked after November 10, 1983 will not be accepted.

NOVEMBER 17, 1983 - All banks who submitted bids will be notified of the results after 2:00 P.M.

Those banks who will be receiving awards will be given pertinent information regarding wiring of monies and issuance of Certificates of Deposits.


NOVEMBER 18, 1983 - Linked Deposit Awards will be made.

Banks receiving awards <u>must</u> issue a Certificate of Deposit dated November 18, 1983 and forward same to the Treasurer's Office the same day.

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- INVESTMENT FACT After Certificates of Deposits are received at the Treasurer's SHEETS Office, an Investment Fact Sheet detailing said investment will be forwarded to those banks receiving awards.
- INTEREST AND
REDEMPTION
PAYMENTS-All monies due the Commonwealth on Certificates of Deposits to be
dated November 18, 1983 must be payable through the N. E. A. C. H.
System.

Interest payments will be due on the last business day of each month, effective December 30, 1983 on Certificates of Deposit dated November 18, 1983.



LINKED DEPOSIT PROGRAM SUPPLEMENT

* * * * * * * * * *

I DESCRIPTION:

The Linked Deposit Program has been designed to provide a fair return to the Commonwealth while re-directing state funds to in-state banks to aid and benefit the people of Massachusetts. Time deposits will be awarded under this program to banks located in Massachusetts which receive the highest ratings based on the criteria set out below.

II ELIGIBILITY:

Participation in the Linked Deposit System is voluntary. Any financial institution which can legally receive public deposits is eligible. Pending authorizing legislation, this will exclude credit unions. To encourage fair competition in the bidding for public funds, leagues have been established. Interested institutions will compete only with other banks in their leagues. The leagues are as follows:

LEAGUE I	Commercial banks with total assets of over \$200 million.
LEAGUE II	Commercial banks with assets of under \$200 million.
LEAGUE III	Thrift institutions (savings, co-operatives and savings and loan)

\$.,

III MAXIMUM DEPOSIT AMOUNT AND TERM:

Commercials, savings, co-operatives and savings and loans may bid for any amount of deposits so long as a winning bid does not violate: the 55% limit imposed on capital, surplus, capital notes and undivided profits for commercial banks; the \$150,000 or 1 and 1/2% of shared capital restriction for co-operatives; (Restriction may be waived. See MGLA, Chapter 170, Section 16) or any other limitation or restriction imposed under Massachusetts General Laws or any applicable federal statute.

The following term deposits are being put out for bid:

12	MONTH	TERM	DEPOSIT	-	NOVE	MBER	9,	1984	(357	days)
6	MONTH	TERM	DEPOSIT	_	MAY	18,	1984		(182	davs)

- A3 -

IV ESTABLISHMENT OF MINIMUM RATES:

Interest rate minimums will be established at the time applications are solicited.

- (A) The minimum acceptable interest rate for League I will be the Money Rate for Certificates of Deposit, one million (\$100,000 units) as published in the Wall Street Journal Thursday, November 10, 1983.
 (6 month term deposit - 12 month term deposit)
- (B) The minimum acceptable interest rate for League II will be 75 basis points below the rate established for League I. (6 month term deposit - 12 month term deposit)
- (C) The minimum acceptable interest rate for League III will be 100 basis points below the rate established charged for League I. (6 month term deposit - 12 month term deposit)

V LINKED DEPOSIT SCORE:

The Linked Deposit Score will be computed by each bank as part of its bid submission. This score can be obtained by inserting the amount of the component described below in the following formula:

$$.01\left(\frac{B+C}{A}\right) = LDS + R = TOTAL$$

R = Interest rate bid expressed as a decimal.

- (A) = Total dollar value of all deposits located in Massachusetts, including repurchase agreements.
- (B) = Total dollar value of:
 - In in-state loans, including loans secured by real property in the state.
 - (2) Investment instruments issued by public entities located in Massachusetts.
 - (3) Investments in direct obligation of the United States Government or its Agencies identified as collateral for Repurchase Agreements located in Massachusetts.

- (C) = Total dollar value of the following loans made in Massachusetts:
 - (1) All loans to small business, defined as having no more than 500 employees; no more than \$5 million in total assets; no more than \$250,000 net before tax profit; no more than \$2.5 million in net worth.
 - (2) All student HELP loans.
 - (3) All loans to organizations exempted from Federal Tax by Section 501 (c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code.
 - (4) All investment instruments issued by public entities located in Massachusetts.
 - (5) All loans to organizations organized as community development corporations in accordance with M.G.L.A., Chapter 40F.
 - (6) All loans to organizations licenses or applying for licensure as community or group residence providers under M.G.L.A., Chapter 19, Section 29 or who have a valid contract with the Department of Mental Health to provide residential services for mentally retarded persons, or who are certified or applying for certification as an intermediate care facility for mentally retarded persons.
 - (7) Annual dollar value of Food Stamps distributed.
 - (8) Housing loans limited to:

All mortgages and home improvement loans given in the census tract areas appearing in the "LISTING BY CENSUS TRACTS AREAS WHERE AVERAGE FAMILY INCOME IS LESS THAN 35% OF THE STATE AVERAGE", include 1 to 4 family, conventional, FHA-VA, 5 unit and commercial.

This figure is used in calendar year 1983 which will be reported to the Division of Banks and Banking.

FIGURES FOR USE IN THE FORMULA SHOULD BE AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 1983 EXCEPT WHERE NOTED.

VI MAINTENANCE OF EFFORT AND NON-DISCRIMINATION REQUIREMENTS:

As part of the Linked Deposit bidding process, the participating bank will be required to sign a maintainance of efforts and non-discrimination statement. The Treasurer's Office with the assistance of the Banking Commissioner's Office will monitor compliance with the system.

VII LINKED DEPOSIT PAYMENTS THROUGH N. E. A. C. H.:

In order for the Treasurer's Office to receive its interest and maturity principal on the dates due, it will be necessary for the selected banks to allow the State Treasurer's Office to directly charge an account within the bank, or if the bank is not a member of the N. E. A. C. H., a charge will be made to an account in a correspondent bank who is a member of the N. E. A. C. H. System.

Once the bank is selected and the interest payments are determined, each selected bank will be supplied by the Treasurer's Office a listing showing the date and amount of interest due and the date and amount of the principal maturity.

On the last business day of each month, the Treasurer's Office will charge the bank account number you have supplied using the N. E. A. C. H.

This new procedure will allow this office to decrease its clerical work along with eliminating any float due to late payments or lost checks.

The first interest payments due the Commonwealth on certificates of deposits dated November 18, 1983 will commence on December 30, 1983.

Each bank will sign and forward along with their bid the attached form authorizing the State Treasurer to charge the account they have assigned.

VIII METHOD OF ALLOCATION:

Awards will be made through a process of mathematic proration between the funds available for deposit and Linked Deposit Scores. The deposits will be awarded at the rates bid, starting with the highest scoring bidder in each league and moving down. The Treasurer reserves the right to reject any or all bids in whole or part.

LINKED DEPOSIT BID FORM DATED: NOVEMBER 10, 1983

11

IV

I	BANK:		TEL:	
	OFFICER:	TITLE:		
	ADDRESS:STREET	CITY/TOWN		ZIP
	CURRENT DEPOSITS: NOVEMBER 1983 \$		MAY 1984 S	
	* * * *	* * * * *		
11	BID STATUS (See 11 of Supplement)	сн	ECK ONE	JOURNAL RATE
	Commercial - Assets over \$200 million	LEAGUE I	Da	ted Nov. 10, 1983
	Commercial - Assets under \$200 million	LEAGUE II	Mir	nus 75 Basis Poinț
	Thrifts - (Savings, Co-operatives, Savings and Loans)	LEAGUE III	Mir	nus 100 Basis Poin
	* * * * *	* * * * *		
111	BID AMOUNT AND TERM (See III of Supple	ment)		
	TERM - CHECK ONE OR MORE		AMOUNT OF BID	<u>)</u>
	6 MONTH (182 days)	\$		
	12 MONTH (357 days)	\$		
	* * * *	* * * * *		
IV	MINIMUM RATES (See IV of Supplement)			
	TERM - SEE MONEY RATE FOR CERTIFICAT	ES OF DEPOSIT		
	ONE MILLION (\$100,000., UNITS) - WAL Dated Thursday, Novembe		BID RATE	
	6 MONTH (182 day	s)	3	
	12 MONTH (357 day	s)	2	

						g
$.01\left(\frac{B + C}{A}\right)$) = LDS	+	R	=	TOTAL	.0

COMPUTATION OF LINKED DEPOSIT SCORE

+____ -)= +

LOANS OUTSTANDING (nearest 1,000) AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 1983

=

R = BID RATE (taken from Section IV)		
A = Total in-state deposits (See V (A))	\$	
B = Total in-state loans (See V (B))		s
		*
C = (1) Total small business loans	(See V (C)) \$
(2) Total student loans (total figure X 5)		\$
(3) Total exempt organization loans	нин	\$
(4) Total investment instruments		\$
(5) Total CDC loans		\$
(6) Total Mental Health provider loans		\$
<pre>(7) Total dollar value - Food Stamp Distribution (total figure X 5)</pre>	ннн	\$
SUB TOTAL	L	\$
(8) Total low income mortgages (total figure X 5)	44 44 44	\$
		¢
	TOTAL FOR C	\$
Total capital, surplus, capital notes and undivided pro	ofits	\$

LINKED DEPOSIT SCORE

.

VI MAINTENANCE OF EFFORT AND NON-DISCRIMINATION STATEMENT (See VI of Supplement)

As a condition of award the Bank agrees to maintain its present loan efforts in the areas listed in component C on the bid form. The bank further agrees to increase its loans in those areas by an amount equal to at least 70% of the amount of the total award made to the Bank under this program.

- 3 -

The Bank understands and acknowledges that it will be excluded from participation in the program in the event that it is reported to the Treasurer's Office by the Commissioner of Banking that the Bank has been convicted of any discriminatory offense in the past three years.

SIGNED:

VII	AUTHORIZATION OF N. E. A.	C. H. SYSTEM	(See VII of Supplement)	
	l,		, as part of the condition of a	ccepting
	a deposit on the Linked D	eposit Program of th	he State Treasurer of the Commonw	ealth of
	Massachusetts dated Novem	y authorize him to charge bank ac	count	
	No	located		
	for the total interest du	e on the last busine	ess day of each month and for the	total
	principal due on maturity	•		
	DATE:	SIGNED:		
	PLEASE PRINT:			
		NAM	1E	
		TIT	TLE	
	-	BANK	NAME	

COMPLETED FORMS SHOULD BE RETURNED TO THE STATE TREASURER'S OFFICE

* MAINTENANCE OF EFFORT *

BANK:		DATE:	
OFFICER:		PHONE:	
ADDRESS:			
Deposit amount under	Certificate of		
Linked Program	Deposit #	Issue Date	Maturity Date

Loans outstanding as of. March 31, 1984 (NEAREST THOUSANDS)

1.	Total small business loans	ş
2.	Total student HELP loans	\$
3.	Total exempt organizational loans	\$
4.	Total Investment instruments	\$
5.	Total CDC loans	\$
6.	Total Mental Health provider loans	\$
7.	Total annual dollar value of Food Stamp Distribution	\$
8.	Total low income mortgages for calendar year 1983	<u>\$</u>

GRAND TOTAL: \$

BY:

AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE

STATISTICAL APPENDIX

to

PRIVATE BANKS AND PUBLIC MONEY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MASSACHUSETTS LINKED DEPOSIT PROGRAM

Ъу

James T. Campen

Contents:

I.	Banks Participating in the Masschusetts LDP, 1982-83	•	•	•	•	•	S2–S5
II.	LDP Awards to and LDP Funds Held by Individual Banks, May 1982 - November 1983, by League	•	•	•		•	S6–S9
III.	Details of LDP Scores and Awards, May 1983 and November 1983, by League	•	•	•	•	S1	0-S17
IV.	LDP Scores by League and by Performance Category: Average, Minimum, Maximum, and Range, May 1983	•	•	•	•	•	S18
۷.	LDP Scores and Awards, Summary Results, with League III replaced by Two "Sub-Leagues," May and November 1983					S1	9–S20

(For sources and explanations, see text of report, esp. pp. 9-12.)



DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS PARTICIPATING IN MASSACHUSETTS LINKED DEPOSIT PROGRAM, 1982-83*	LEAGUE I	<pre>II Bank of Boston/ Middlesex Burlington [formerly: Old Colony/Middlesex; in II thru May 83] I2 Bank of Boston/Western Mass Holyoke [formerly: Old Colony/Hampden Co.; in II thru Nov 82] I3 Capitol Bank and Trust Co Boston [in II thru May 82] I4 Mechanics Bank Worcester [in II thru 82] I5 Rockland Trust Co</pre>	I6 Security National Bank Danvers [in II thru May 83] 17 South Shore Bank and Trust Quincy 18 United States Trust Co Boston 19 Bank of New England Boston	LEAGUE II	<pre>IIl Bank of Boston/Bristol County New Bedford [formerly: Old Colony/Bristol County] II2 [no bank with this code; see I1] II3 Bank of Boston/Norfolk Wellesley Hills [formerly: Old Colony/Norfolk] II4 Bank of Massachusetts Chelsea II5 Bank of New England/Baystate Lawrence</pre>	<pre>II6 Bank of New England/Bristol County Fall River II7 Bank of New England/Northshore Gloucester II8 Boston Bank of Commerce II9 Cape Ann Bank and Trust Gloucester II10 Century Bank and Trust Somerville</pre>	 *Notes: 1. Bank code prefixes refer to League that bank was in as of November 83, or most recent bid; the growth of some banks resulted in their being promoted from League II to League I. 2. Name changes and pre-merger names are indicated where I am aware of them. 3. League III is separated into two sub-leagues, one consisting of savings banks and the other consisting of cooperative banks plus federal savings and loan associations. 4. Within each league or subleague an alphabetical list of banks that submitted bids in 1983 is followed by an alphabetical list of banks that received awards in 1982 but did not bid in 1983. I have not reviewed the 1982 bid forms to determine if any additional banks bid that year.
					- S2 -		

	Lynn
	ł
E	e Bank and Trust
1	and
-	Bank
ċ	Shore
	y North Shore
(Century
	111

- Colonial National Bank -- Danvers **II12**
- Coolidge Bank and Trust Co -- Watertown II13
 - Durfee Attleboro Bank -- Fall River **II14**
 - First National Bank of Athol II15
- Gloucester National Bank [116
- Home National Bank -- Milford [117
 - Lee National Bank **II18**
- Liberty Bank and Trust -- Boston **II19**
 - Lincoln Trust Co -- Hingham II20
- Lowell Bank and Trust **II21**
- Luzo Bank and Trust Co -- New Bedford **II22**
 - Malden Trust Co **II23**
- Massachusetts Bank and Trust -- Brockton II24
 - Northeast National Bank -- Amesbury II25
- Park West Bank and Trust -- Springfield II26
 - no bank with this code; see I6] II27
- Shawmut Bank/Bristol County -- New Bedford II28
- II29
- University Bank and Trust Co -- Chestnut Hill
 - U S Trust Co/Braintree II30
- [no bank with this code; see II32] **II31**
- [May 83: U S Trust Co/Charlesbank; 1982: Charlesbank Trust Co.] J S Trust Co/Middlesex -- Cambridge **II32**
 - Brookline Trust Co **II33**
- no bank with this code; see [3] II34
 - Commonwealth Bank and Trust Co II35
- Commonwealth Bank/Norfolk County II36
- First Agricultural Bank -- Pittsfield II37
 - First National Bank of Malden II38
- Hancock Bank and Trust Co -- Quincy II39
 - Harbor National Bank -- Boston II40
- [no bank with this code; see [4] I141
- Old Colony/Franklin County **I142**
 - no bank with this code; see I2] II43
 - II44
 - Woburn National Bank

LEAGUE III/DIVISION M -- SAVINGS BANKS

- Beverly Savings Bank MI M2
- Boston Five Cent Savings Bank
- Bristol County Savings Bank -- Taunton
- Clinton Savings Bank M3 M5 M5
- Community Savings Bank -- Holyoke
- Danvers Savings Bank M6 M7
- East Weymouth Savings Bank
- Fall River Five Cent Savings Bank M8
- First American Bank for Savings -- Boston **6**M
- [7/82 merger: Amherst Savings Bank & Franklin Savings Inst] Heritage Bank for Savings -- Amherst M10
- Hibernia Savings Bank -- Boston MII
 - Home Savings Bank -- Boston M12
 - Hudson Savings Bank M13
- Massachusetts Bank for Savings -- Reading M14 M15
 - Merrimac Savings Bank
- Mutual Bank for Savings -- Boston M16
 - Orange Savings Bank M17
- Peoples Savings Bank -- Holyoke M18
- Peoples Savings Bank -- Worcester M19
- [as of 5/83: incorporates Somerville Savings Bank] Somerset Savings Bank -- Somerville M20
- South Boston Savings Bank M21 M22
- South Weymouth Savings Bank
 - Winchester Savings Bank M23
 - Melrose Savings Bank M24
- Northhampton Institution for Savings M25
- Worcester Cty Inst for Savings M26

LEAGUE III/DIVISION C -- COOPERATIVE BANKS + FEDERAL S&LS

- Beacon Cooperative Bank -- Brighton U
- Central Cooperative Bank -- Somerville
 - Community Cooperative Bank -- Medford
- Coolidge Corner Cooperative Bank -- Brookline 32,23,23
 - Economy Cooperative Bank -- Merrimac
- Everett Cooperative Bank
- Glendale Cooperative Bank -- Everett
- Medford Hillside-Cambridge Cooperative Bank --
 - Hyde Park Cooperative Bank -- Boston
 - Merchants Cooperative Bank -- Boston C10
- Mount Washington Cooperative Bank -- Boston CII
 - Norwood Cooperative Bank C12
- Pioneer Financial A Cooperative Bank -- Malden C13
 - Quincy Cooperative Bank C14 C15
 - Saugus Cooperative Bank
- -- Boston Workingsmen's Cooperative Bank C16 C17
 - Commonwealth Cooperative Bank
- New Bedford Acushnet Cooperative Bank C18
- Home Federal Savings and Loan -- Worcester F1 F2 F4 F5
- Leader Federal Savings and Loan -- Lexington
 - Milford Federal Savings and Loan

 - Scituate Federal Savings and Loan
- Commonwealth Federal Savings and Loan -- Lowell

LDP AWARDS TO AND LDP FUNDS HELD BY INDIVIDUAL BANKS MAY 1982 - NOVEMBER 1983 LEAGUE I: BIG COMMERCIAL BANKS

t After Nov83	2000 4000	6750	2000	4200	2000 4000 10500 0
Deposit May83	2000 3500	6750	2000	4200	2000 2000 10000 0
Amt on Nov82 	2000 2500	6750	1000	4200	2000 2000 10000 0
Nov83 Total	1000 3000	3000	1000	1500	2000 2000 8000 0
May83 Total 	1000 1000	3750	1000	2700	2000 2000 8500 0
Nov82 Total	1000 2500	3000	1000	1500	2000 0 7500 0
May82 Total	1000 2000	3750	1000	2700	2000 2000 2500 1000
	1000		1000	1500	000 2000 500 4500
Nov 6mo	1000 1000 1000 3000				2000 2000 2000 2500 3500 4500
May 1983 Nov 6mo 12mo 6mo	1000 1000 3000	3750	1000	2700	2000 2500 3500 4
1983 Nov 12mo 6mo	1000 1000 3000	3750	1000	2700	2000 2000 2000 1500 6000 2500 3500 2500 2500 2500 2500 2500 2
Nov 1982 May 1983 Nov 6mo 12mo 6mo 12mo 6mo	1000 1000 2500 1000 3000	3000 3750	1000 1000	1500 2700	2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 200
1982 May 1983 Nov 12mo 6mo 12mo 6mo	1000 1000 2500 1000 3000	3000 3750	1000 1000	1500 2700	2000 2000 2000 1500 6000 2500 3500 2500 2500 2500 2500 2500 2
Nov 1982 May 1983 Nov 6mo 12mo 6mo 12mo 6mo	1000 1000 1000 2000 2500 1000 3000	3750 3000 3750	1000 1000 1000	2700 1500 2700	2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 6000 1500 2500 3500 2

LDP AWARDS TO AND LDP FUNDS HELD BY INDIVIDUAL BANKS MAY 1982 - NOVEMBER 1983 LEAGUE II: OTHER COMMERCIAL BANKS Ч

t After Nov83	1000	2000	1000	2400	600	500	0	2500	006	400	2000	2000	0	2000	400	400	1500	0	1000	1000	1000	250	3000	2200	3000	000T	0	0	0	0	0	0 0	
Deposit May83	1000	2000	1000	2400	0	100	009	2500	006	400	2000	2000	003	1390	374	009	1500	2300	0 0		1000	250	3000	2200	3000	200	500	500	2000	0	0	1500	0
Amt on Nov82	2000	2000	1000	1400	0	100	400	2500	006	400	1000	2000	0009	1000	300	500	1500	2300	0001	1000	500	250	2500	2200	2000	200	500	500	2000	0	1000	005	100
Nov83 Total	'	2000																									0	0	0	0	00		00
May83 Total	0	1000	1000	1000	0	0	200	750	006	400	2000	2000		1390	374	100	1500	2300 0	00		500	250	2500	1200	1000		0	0	0	0	00		00
Nov82 Total	1000	1500		1400	0	100	400	2500	500	0	0	2000	000		300	500	500	1000	0001	0001	500	250	500	1000	2000	500	500	500	2000	0	0	200	100
May82 Total	2000	1000	1000	0	0	0	400	1000	400	400	1000	2000	300	1000	0	0	1000	1300	00001	1000	0	0	2000	1200 î	0001	0	0	0	1000	1000	1000	0001	00
2 1																																	
1983 N 12mo 7	1000	2000 150		2400	300				500			1000	300	2000	400			001	100		500		500	1000	2000								
	1000	2000 150	1000		300 300	500		2500	500			1000 1000	300	2000		300	500	001		1000			200	1000	2000	000							
1983 12mo	 	100 150	1000			500		2500	400 500	400			300 300			300		100		1000					1000	000							
Nov 1983 6mo 12mo			1000					2500	400	400	2000	1000	300		1.0	100 300	1000			1000				1200 1000	1000								
1983 Nov 1983 12mo 6mo 12mo			1000		300		200	2500	400	400	2000		300	1390	374	100 300				1000		250	2500		1000 1000		500	500	2000		1500	500	
May 1983 Nov 1983 6mo 12mo 6mo 12mo		150 100	1000 1000	1000	300		400 200	750 2500	500 400	400	2000	1000		1390	374	500 100 300	500 1000	2300			500 500	250	2500	1200	1000 1000		500	500	2000		1500	500	100
1982 May 1983 Nov 1983 12mo 6mo 12mo 6mo 12mo	1000	1000 1000	1000 1000 1000	1400 1000	300		400 200	750 1750 750 2500	500 500 400		2000	2000 I000		1390	300 374	500 100 300	500 1000	1000 2300	0001		500 500	250 250	2500	1000 1200	1000 1000	500	500	500	2000		1000 1500		
Nov 1982 May 1983 Nov 1983 6mo 12mo 6mo 12mo 6mo 12mo	1000	150 1000 1000	1000 1000 1000	1400 1000	300	100	400 200	750 1750 750 2500	500 500 400		1000 2000	2000 I000		1390	300 374	500 100 300	500 500 1000	1000 2300	0001	1000	500 500	250 250	500 2500	1000 1200		500	500		1000 2000				

LDP AWARDS TO AND LDP FUNDS HELD BY INDIVIDUAL BANKS MAY 1982 - NOVEMBER 1983 LEAGUE IIIM: SAVINGS BANKS ONLY

Note: One November 1982 deposit is missing from this listing because it was illegible on xerox copy of deposit listing. LDP AWARDS TO AND LDP FUNDS HELD BY INDIVIDUAL BANKS MAY 1982 - NOVEMBER 1983 LEAGUE IIIC: COOP BANKS + FEDERAL S&Ls ONLY

Deposit After 100 0 Nov83 600 150 2500 400 250 250 1000 500 0 0 May83 600 2500 500 $100 \\ 100$ Amt on Nov82 100 100 100 150 500 600 Nov83 Total 300 0 0 500 May83 **[otal** 500 Nov82 Total Total May82 600 150 6mo 12mo Nov1983 6mo 12mo May1983 6mo 12mo 600 Nov1982 200 150 6mo 12mo May1982 Bank Code C7 C8 C9 C9 C10 C11 C12 C13 C14 C15 C15 C16 C17 C17 C18 F1 F2 F3 F4 F5

DETAILS OF LDP SCORES AND AWARDS MAY 1983 LEAGUE I UNWEIGHTED TOTAL BASIS (For bids & awards, totals = 12mo amount + 6mo amount)

	Bank Code	Mass Depts (\$Mil)	Small Bus	Stud x5	Stud Exemp Inv x5 Orgs Insts	Inv Insts	CDC	Ment H1th	Fd St x5	Mort x5	Total "C"	Total In-St	Max Ex i	LDS Pts	Total Pts	\$Bid Total	\$Awd Total	Awd/ Bid-Z
	12		0.215 0.022 0.000 0.012 0.018 0.000 0.	0.022	0.000	0.012	0.018	0.000	0.016 0.207	0.207	0.489	0.639	0	1.129	1.129	3000	I	33%
	Ι3		0.032	0.026	0.000	0.147	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.040	0.245	0.587	0	0.833	0.833	5000		75%
	14		0.257	0.004	0.000	0.078	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.033	0.373	0.691	0	1.064	1.064	2000		50%
	15	234	0.395	0.090	0.001	0.059	0.000	0.000	0.077	0.003	0.625 0.736	0.736	0	1.361	1.361	3500		77%
	17		0.454	0.089	0.007	0.007	0.001	0.005	0.033	0.147	0.742	0.747	0	1.490	1.490	3000		67%
	I8		0.349	0.033	0.002	0.046	0.000	0.008	0.000	0.087	0.525	0.795	0	1.320 1.320	1.320	13000	8500	65%
-																		
S10	AVE	267	0.284	0.044	0.002	0.284 0.044 0.002 0.058 0.003 0.002 0.021 0.086	0.003	0.002	0.021	0.086	0.500 0.699	0.699	0	1.199	1.199 1.199	4917	3158	61%
-	NIM	150	0.032	0.004	0.000	0.032 0.004 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.003	0.245 0.587	0.587	0	0.833	0.833 0.833	2000	1000	33%
	MAX	435	0.454	060.0	0.007	0.147	0.018	0.008	0.077	0.207	0.742	0.795	0	1.490	1.490	13000		77%
											Ţ	TOTAL B]	BIDS AND	AWARDS:		29500	29500 18950	64%

DETAILS OF LDP SCORES AND AWARDS NOVEMBER 1983 LEAGUE I UNWEIGHTED TOTAL BASIS (For bids & awards, totals = 12mo amount + 6mo amount)

Awd/ Bid-%	22%	60%	52%	17%	100%	100%	40%	63%	57%	172	100%	50%
\$Awd Total	1000	3000	3000	1000	1500	2000	2000	7500	2625	1000	7500	21000
	4585	5000	5750	6000	1500	2000	5000	12000	5229	1500	12000	41835
LDS Total Pts Pts	1.128 1.128	1.036 1.036	0.756 0.756	1.088 1.088	1.299 1.299	1.144 1.144	1.458 1.458	1.145 1.145	1.132 1.132	0.756 0.756	1.458 1.458	AWARDS:
Max Ex i	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	BIDS AND A
Total Total "C" In-St	0.546 0.583	0.468 0.569	0.207 0.549	0.351 0.737	0.592 0.707	0.415 0.728	0.702 0.756	0.410 0.735	0.461 0.671	0.207 0.549	0.702 0.756	TOTAL B]
SmallStudExempInvMentFdStMortBusx5OrgsInstsCDCH1thx5x5	0.287 0.173 0.000 0.022 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.063	0.191 0.034 0.003 0.010 0.013 0.000 0.022 0.194	0.007 0.025 0.000 0.140 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.033	0.263 0.004 0.000 0.076 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007	0.370 0.090 0.001 0.060 0.000 0.000 0.068 0.002	0.103 0.081 0.002 0.027 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.199	0.449 0.098 0.007 0.011 0.001 0.006 0.034 0.097	0.314 0.032 0.014 0.044 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000	0.248 0.067 0.003 0.049 0.002 0.002 0.016 0.075	0.007 0.004 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.000	0.449 0.173 0.014 0.140 0.013 0.006 0.068 0.199	
Mass Depts (\$Mil)	186								272	168	461	
Bank Code	11	12	13	I4	IS	9I	17	, I8	AVE VII		MAX	

12mo amount + 6mo amount) UNWEIGHTED TOTAL BASIS DETAILS OF LDP SCORES AND AWARDS Ш awards, totals LEAGUE II 8 bids 1983 (For МАҮ

Bid-% 100% 47% 0% 40% 43% 00% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 60% 70% 20% 20% 25% 25% 25% .00% 58% 00% 50% 16% 0% 60% 33% 50% 90% 17%57% /pmW \$Awd Total 2500 0 25664 2300 500 250 2000 1200 987 1000 250 1000 1000 200 750 900 400 2000 2000 750 300 1390 374 1500 2500 1000 1000 1000 100 250 54304 Total \$Bid 2089 400 2000 2000 1500 300 2780 500 500 5400 0001 000 2000 6000 2000 3000 2000 250 2000 5200 000 500 .750 000 674 5050 500 2.437-5.38E+81 0.739 Pts 1.172 1.372 2.437 0.975 1.247 0.739 1.258 1.516 1.468 .629 0.935 1.786 .628 1.492 1.556 2.044 2.174 1.297 1.448 .515 1.748 1.532 ..360 . 254 1.457 Total 1.101 .471 0.739 0.982 1.178 1.372 0.739 1.266 1.629 0.935 1.411 0.892 1.306 0.975 LDS 1.258 1.268 1.748 1.155 1.254 2.437 1.594 Pts 1.101 1.457 1.924 1.247 1.172 1.415 BIDS AND AWARDS 1.221 0.600 0.250 0.450 Ex i 0.250 0.200 0.550 0.205 0.450 0.250 00 0 0.600 0.250 0 0 0.375 0 0 0 \bigcirc 0 0.100 0 0 0 0 0.151 Мах 0.969 $0.232 \ 0.277$ $1.344 \ 1.093$ 0.528 0.502 0.637 0.6860.508 0.613 0.741 0.277 0.656 0.735 0.777 0.575 0,660 0.656 1.093 0.733 0.983 0.812 0.629 0.582 1.015 0.697 0.571 In-St 0.598 0.772 0.509 **FOTAL** Total 0.852 0.653 0.360 0.442 0.518 0.617 0.716 0.574 0.611 Total "C" 0.645 0.526 0.445 0.524 0.454 1.344 0.321 0.722 0.734 0.232 0.686 1.137 1.112 0.377 0.474 0.6110.266 0.543 0.216 0.0001.009 x5 0.548 0.427 1.009 0.000 0.186 0.000 0.147 0.000 0.000 0.040 0.628 0.000 0.199 0.353 0.503 0.276 0.037 0.004 0.085 0.144 0.431 0.107 0.007 0.111 0.281 Mort 0.096 0.000 (0.274 0.000 0.106 0.057 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.000 0.142 0.000 0.016 0.000 0.029 0.099 0.011 0.014 0.000 0.029 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.274 0.000 0.000 0.035 0.113 St Fd 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.260 0.012 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 H1 th 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 Ment 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.005 0.002 0,*000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 CDC 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.015 0.000 Insts 0.000 0.015 0.028 0.013 0.052 0.118 0.260 0.008 0.039 0.055 0.011 0.000 0.095 0.122 0.030 0.044 0.005 0.027 0.000 0.022 0.071 0.057 0.041 0.035 0.027 0.000 (0.011 (Orgs 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.006 0.005 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.004 0.005 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.008 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002 Exemp 0.001 0.002 0.070 0.000 0.082 0.076 0.048 0.093 0.082 0.063 0.105 0.091 0.301 0.058 0.079 0.062 0.000 0.000 0.024 0.020 0.026 0.000 0.000 0.099 0.002 0.014 Stud х5 0.202 0.049 0.017 0.064 0.510 0.011 0.588 0.015 0.426 0.136 0.268 248 Bus 0.097 0.167 0.256 0.295 0.588 0.418 0.283 0.101 0.294 0.361 0.331 0.436 0.232 0.137 0.280 0.194 0.154 0.141 0.221 0.100 0.011 Small (\$Mil) 143 4 148 Depts 100 22 22 22 22 48 48 48 33 58 68 124 59 105 62 Mass 31 10 76 18 15 78 45 29 78 73 1119 Code II3 II4 II5 II5 II6 118 611 II10 **II14** [115 .116 [I18 II20 II12 II13 II17 II25 II26 I 28 I 29 AVE MIN IIII II21 16 [I30 MAX Bank [I32 Ξ 1

S12 -

DETAILS OF LDP SCORES AND AWARDS NOVEMBER 1983 LEAGUE II UNWEIGHTED TOTAL BASIS (For bids & awards, totals = 12 month amount + 6 month amount)

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Awd/ Bid-%	 13% 223%	مردد 100%	50%	26%	75%	63%	63%	50%	50%	25%	65%	44%	100%	33%	33%	100%	44%	71%	10%	50%	57%	50%	600	%7C	10%	100%	41%
\$Awd Total	500	150	1000	2400	600	500	2500	500	2000	300	2000	400	300	500	100	1000	1000	500	500	1000	2000	1000	000	606	100	2500	22750
\$Bid Total]	4000	150	2000	9200	800	800	4000	1000	4000	1200	3095	006	300	1500	300	1000	2290	700	5000	2000	3500	2000	0070	C7 1 7	150	9200	55735
LDS Total Pts Pts	1.278 1.528	$\frac{1}{2}$		1.655 1.905	-	-	-	-	-	5	5	Ļ.	0	-	5	-	Ŀ.	5	-	0	1.182 1.182	0		004.1 100.1	0.587 0.837		AWA RDS:
Total Total Max "C" In-St Ex i	0.883 0.395 0.250	0.568 0.568	0.716 0.050	0.658 0.250	0.606 0	0.728 0	0.775 0	0.892 0	0.817 0	0.581 0	1.080 0.500	0.677 0.350	0.483 0	0.576 0	0.460 0	0.575 0	0.750 0	0.780 0.550	0.800 0	0.553 0	0.656 0	0.787 0		U.U04 U.U90	0.189 0.361 0	1.080 0.550	TOTAL BIDS AND A
Small Stud Exemp Inv Ment Fd St Mort Bus x5 Orgs Insts CDC Hlth x5 x5	0.000 0.	0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.	0.079 0.003 0.064 0.000 0.001 0.000	0.052 0.003 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.031 0.	0.005 0.002 0.028 0.003 0.000 0.000	0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.630	0.072 0.004 0.105 0.000 0.000 0.010	0.015 0.000 0.300 0.000 0.000 0.002	0.097 0.004 0.056 0.004 0.000 0.088	0.112 0.000 0.043 0.000 0.000 0.000	0.100 0.000 0.088 0.000 0.000 0.000	0.045 0.007 0.011 0.000 0.004 0.005	0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000	0.294 0.000 0.091 0.011 0.000 0.000	0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.486	0.077 0.001 0.049 0.000 0.000 0.009	0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.	0.139 0.001 0.048 0.000 0.000 0.000	0.043 0.013 0.038 0.000 0.000 0.206	0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000	0.000 0.147 0.000 0.000 0.0	0.015 0.001 0.057 0.000 0.000	0 241 0 056 0 002 0 050 0 001 0 001 0 023 0 273		0.000 0.000	0.294 0.013 0.300 0.011 0.008	
Mass Depts (\$Mil)	69	80	146	98	84	6	107	29	159	43	77	20	19	84		147	32	25	140	67	113	65	74	-	2	160	
Bank Code	II1	LI4	II5	9II	II7	II8	II10	1111	II14	II16	, II17				II22	II23	II24	II25	II28	II29	II30	II32	AVF.		NIM	MAX	
											-	S	513	5 -													

UNWEIGHTED TOTAL BASIS (For bids & awards, totals = 12 month amount + 6 month amount) DETAILS OF LDP SCORES AND AWARDS LEAGUE III -- SAVINGS BANKS MAY 1983

100% 41% Bid-% 56% 1%25% 50% 67% 25% 10% 50% 25% 50% 100% 50% 67% 2007 100% 00% 00% 1%25% 29% \$Awd Awd/ Total 100 10000 500 10000 100 500 1000 250 500 1000 1300 100 1000 100 1000 500 1000 1295 24600 250 3500 1000 59350 20000 \$Bid **[otal** 2000 20000 1000 500 2000 2000 1300 00001 2000 1500 100 1000 2000 3500 100 1000 4800 3500 3124 150 1000 1.628 3.668 Pts 0.863 1.529 0.926 1.182 1.349 1.619 3.668 1.782 2.842 0.794 0.786 0.868 1.204 0.956 1.336 3.160 2.951 0.811 0.786 1.592 Total 3.160 2.326 0.849 0.786 3.668 1.204 0.956 1.336 0.811 1.628 3.668 1.682 1.642 1.529 1.182 LDS 1.369 Pts 0.868 0.863 0.794 0.786 1.451 FOTAL BIDS AND AWARDS: 0.500 0.625 Ex i 0.250 0 0.100 0.857 1.200 00 0 2.926 1.095 1.200 0.765 0.687 0.141 Мах 0.813 0.571 0.733 1.095 0.650 0.688 Total 0.753 0.540 0.719 0.573 0.539 0.837 0.610 0.742 0.350 0.350 0.569 In-St 0.683 0.726 0.115 (0.316 1.676 0.990 0.533 0.161 2.926 "C" 0.448 0.785 0.664 0.237 0.763 0.128 0.136 0.869 Total 2.323 0.797 0.444 0.115 0.217 0.283 0.000 2.687 ςx 0.788 0.235 0.202 0.487 0.008 0.079 0.841 2.269 0.333 0.384 1.584 0.008 0.724 2.687 0.761 0.378 0.008 0.000 0.635 Mort 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.015 0.015 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 х5 0.011 0.001 0.000 0.000 Ment Fd St 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 Hlth 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 CDC 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.050 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.317 0.036 0.050 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.090 0.006 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 Inv Orgs Insts 0.036 0.000 0.006 0.010 0.003 0.009 0.004 0.007 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.004 0.012 0.012 Exemp 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 Stud 0.317 0.031 0.023 ζx 0.053 0.068 0.108 0.000 0.144 0.054 0.142 0.032 0.132 0.002 0.184 0.070 0.000 0.053 0.160 0.136 0.041 0.000 0.000 Bus 0.000 0.104 0.126 0.012 0.002 0.058 0.016 0.071 0.043 0.010 0.000 0.004 0.001 0.000 0.011 0.008 0.029 Small 0.047 Mass 343 51 51 135 135 228 228 42 326 70 210 8 993 Depts \$Mil) 202 62 26 59 63 ∞ 135 993 525 105 Code M11 M11 M12 M13 MI5 M17 M18 M14 M20 AVE Bank M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 **M9** M21 M22 MIN MAX M1 M2

DETAILS OF LDP SCORES AND AWARDS

#BER 1983LEAGUE IIIM-- SAVINGS BANKSUNWEIGHTED TOTAL BASIS(For bids & awards, totals = 12 month amount + 6 month amount) NOVEMBER 1983

	Bank Code	Mass Depts (\$Mil)	Exemp Orgs	Mort x5	Total Total Max "C" In-St Ex i	LDS Total Pts Pts	\$Bid Total	\$Awd A Total E	Awd/ Bid-%
	IM	142	0.013 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000	0.056	0.074 0.724 0.500	0.798 1.298	2000	500	25%
	M3	117	0.077 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000	0.152	0.232 0.562 0.500	0.795 1.295	1000	500	50%
	M6	107	0.124 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000	0.002	0.151 0.670 0	0.821 0.821	5000	500	10%
	M7	53	0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.012	0.019	0.135 0.733 0	0.868 0.868	1000	1000	100%
	M8	147	0.106 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000	0.643	0.754 0.594 0	1.348 1.348	1000	500	50%
	6M	247	0.001 0.057 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.000	0.084	0.147 0.823 0	0.970 0.970	4000	4000	100%
	MIO	236	0.042 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000	0.284	0.334 0.581 0	0.915 0.915	1000	1000	100%
- 3	MII	43	0.059 0.000 0.040 0.000 0.000 0.000	0.316	0.747	1.187 1.187	750	750	100%
51	M15	6	0.000 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000	0.695	0.615	1.356 1.356	100	100	100%
5.	M17	28 .	0.199 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000	2.874	0.714	3.837 3.837	200	200	100%
-	M18	166	0.075 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000	0.573	0.659 0.811 0	1.470 1.470	3000	1000	33%
	M19	357	0.055 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000	0.076	0.393	0.558 0.558	2000	2000	100%
	M20	136	0.008 0.000 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.000	0.447	0.645 0.70	1.121 1.821	6000	3000	50%
	M22	109	0.190 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000	0.008	0.245 0.544 0	0.789 0.789	500	500	100%
	M23	158	0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000	0.092	0.291 0.776 0.250	1.067 1.317	500	300	60%
	AVE	137	0.026 0.076 0.004 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.001	0.421	0.531 0.662 0.130	1.193 1.323	1870	1057	72%
	MTN	C							
	MAX	357	0.103 0.199 0.011 0.040 0.015 0.003 0.012	0.002 2.874	0.0/4 0.393 03.123 0.823 0.700	0.558 0.558 3.837 3.837	100 6000	100 4000	10%
					TOTAL BIDS AND	AWA RDS:	28050	15850	57%

DETAILS OF LDP SCORES AND AWARDS MAY 1983 LEAGUE III -- CO-OPs + FED S&Ls UNWEIGHTED TOTAL BASIS (For bids & awards, totals = 12 month amount + 6 month amount)

Awd/ Bid-%	50%	100%	50%	15%	100%	100%	20	100%	33%	100%	63%	50%	50%	100%	50%	10%	100%	%0	100%	62%	20	100%	51%
\$Awd A Total B	1																			322		1400	6110
\$Bid Total T	200																			629	10	2800	11960
LDS Total Pts Pts	1.017 1.017	1.568 1.868	1.996 1.996	0.836 0.836	0.972 2.472	0.996 0.996	1.161 2.161	0.939 0.939	1.081 1.081	3.856 3.856	0.837 1.537	1.082 1.082	0.865 0.865	0.871 2.371	1.240 1.440	0.573 1.273	0.916 0.916	1.287 1.287	1.088 1.088	1.220 1.531	0.573 0.836	856	AWA RDS:
Max Ex i	0		0 2	0 /	3 1.500	0	3 1.000	0	0	0	0.700	0			0	0	0	0	0	t 0.311	0 /	1.500	AND
Total Total "C" In-St	0.165 0.852	0.653 0.915	1.068 0.927	$0.189 \ 0.647$	0.154 0.818	0.144 0.852	0.263 0.898	0.026 0.913	0.334 0.748	2.929 0.928	0.116 0.72	0.338 0.743	0.050 0.815	0.110 0.762	0.397 0.843	0.046 0.527	0.205 0.71	0.252 1.035	0.084 1.002	0.396 0.824	0.026 0.527	2.929 1.035	TOTAL BIDS
Mort x5	0.138																			0.306	0.000		
Fd St x5	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	
Ment H1th	0.015	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.015	
CDC	0.000																			0.000	0.000	0.001	
Inv Insts	0.	0.	0.0	0	0.	0.	0		0	0	0.	0.	0.	0.110	0.	0.	0.000		0.000	0.023 0.055 0.004 0.007	0.000 0.000	0.110	
Stud Exemp x5 Orgs					0.003		0.000	0.000	0.005	0.000	0.000					0.015	0.010	0.000	0.009	0.004	0.000	0.015	
I	0.				0.054			0.004					0.	0.			0.154		0.000	0.055	0.000 0.000	0.252	
Small Bus	0.010	0.000	0.000	0.021	0.048	0.000	0.039	0.022	0.068	0.000	0.000	0.062	0.000	0.000	0.079	0.000	0.018		0.075	0.023	0.000	0.079	
Mass Depts (\$Mil)	8	152	17	47	4	41	17	21	247	41	75	294	146	21	163	264	203	85	33	66	4	294	
Bank Code	C1	C2	C3	C4	C5	C6	89	C9	C10	C11	C12		C14		C16	Fl	F2	F3	F4	AVE	NIM	MAX	
														-									

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DETAILS OF LDP SCORES AND AWARDS NOV. 1983 LEAGUE III -- CO-OPs + FED S&Ls UNWEIGHTED TOTAL BASIS (For bids & awards, totals = 12 month amount + 6 month amount)

	Bid/ Awd-%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	67%	67%	67%	50%	25%	50%	100%	50%	100%	77%		25%	100%	57%	2
		200	600	150	50	300	100	2000	400	250	500	500	20	1400	100	469		2000	2000	6570	
	\$Bid Total	200	600	150	50	300	150	3000	600	500	2000	1000	20	2800	100	819		20	3000	11470	
	LDS Total Pts Pts	1.084 1.084	1.417 1.467	2.260 2.260	1.035 2.285	0.952 0.952	1.633 1.633	0.980 0.980	3.433 3.433	$0.876 \ 0.876$	1.063 1.063	0.645 0.645	0.918 1.618	1.252 1.252	1.398 1.398	1.353 1.496		0.645 0.645	3.433 3.433	AWARDS -	
	Total Total Max "C" In-St Ex i	0.917	0.626 0.790 0.050	0.865	0.893	0.863	0.793 0.840 0	0.600	0.938	0.736	0.725	0.589	0.727	0.444 0.809 0	0.280 1.118 0	0.538 0.815 0.143	() () ()		1.118	TOTAL BIDS AND	
	Stud Exemp Inv Ment x5 Orgs Insts CDC H1th	009 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.000	0.119 0.006 0.000 0.001 0.000	000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000	033 0.064 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000	000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000	000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000	073 0.125 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000	000 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.000	000 0.131 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.000	072 0.035 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000	000 0.048 0.006 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000	006 0.005 0.000 0.180 0.000 0.000 0.000	067 0.132 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000	000 0.234 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000	0.019 0.064 0.002 0.015 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.438	000		0.014		
Mass	Depts (\$Mil)	∞	160	18	4	43	15	249	42	78	294	159	24	162	88	96		907.	774		
		C1	C2	S	C5	C6	C7	C10	C11	C12	C13	C14	C15	C16	F3	AVE	NTN	NTM	VHL		
												-	S	17	-						

		Mass Depts (\$Mil)	SmallStudExempInvMentFdStMortBusx50rgsInstsCDCHlthx5x5	Total Total "C" In-St Ex i	LDS Total Pts Pts
LEAGUE I	Ave.	267	0.284 0.044 0.002 0.058 0.003 0.002 0.021 0.086	0.500 0.699 0.000	1.199 1.199
	Min. Max.	150 435	0.032 0.004 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.454 0.090 0.007 0.147 0.018 0.008 0.077 0.207	0.245 0.587 0.000 0.742 0.795 0.000	0.833 0.833 1.490 1.490
	Range	285	0.422 0.086 0.007 0.140 0.018 0.008 0.077 0.204	0.497 0.208 0.000	0.657 0.657
LEAGUE II	Ave.	73	0.248 0.064 0.002 0.044 0.001 0.001 0.035 0.216	0.611 0.686 0.151	1.297 1.448
	Min. Max.	.148	0.011 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.588 0.301 0.011 0.260 0.012 0.005 0.274 1.009	.232 0.277 0.000 1.344 1.093 0.600	0.739 0.739 2.437 2.437
	Range	144	0.577 0.301 0.011 0.260 0.012 0.005 0.274 1.009	1.344 0.816 0.600	1.698 1.698
LEAGUE IIIM	Ave.	202	0.029 0.090 0.006 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.635	0.765 0.687 0.141	1.451 1.592
	Min. Max.	8 993	0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.126 0.317 0.036 0.050 0.013 0.000 0.015 2.687	0.115 0.350 0.000 2.926 1.095 1.200	0.786 0.786 3.668 3.668
	Range	985	0.126 0.317 0.036 0.050 0.013 0.000 0.015 2.687	2.811 0.745 1.200	2.882 2.882
LEAGUE IIIC	Ave.	66	0.023 0.055 0.004 0.007 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.306	0.396 0.824 0.311	1.220 1.531
	Min. Max.	4 294	0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.079 0.252 0.015 0.110 0.001 0.015 0.000 2.914	$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	0.573 0.836 3.856 3.856
	Range	290	0.079 0.252 0.015 0.110 0.001 0.015 0.000 2.914	2.903 0.508 1.500	3.283 3.020
LEAGUE III	Ave.	151	0.026 0.073 0.005 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.471	0.581 0.756 0.226	1.336 1.562
	Min. Max.	4 993	0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.126 0.317 0.036 0.110 0.013 0.015 0.015 2.914	0.026 0.350 0.000 .2.903 1.095 1.500	0.573 0.786 3.856 3.856
	Range	989	0.126 0.317 0.036 0.110 0.013 0.015 0.015 2.914	2.877 0.745 1.500	3.283 3.070

SCORES BY LEAGUE AND BY PERFORMANCE CATEGORY: MAY 1983 AVERAGE, MINIMUM, MAXIMUM, RANGE (Range = max - min)

S A	SCORES: LDS SCORE + INTEREST RATE IN EXCESS OF MINIMUM REQUIRED BID AWARDS & BIDS: UNWEIGHTED TOTAL BASIS (12-mo amount + 6-mo amount)	BIDS:	IRE + UNWEJ	INTER	EST RI TOTAI	ATE IN 2 BASIS	CST RATE IN EXCESS OF MINIMUM REQUIRED BI TOTAL BASIS (12-mo amount + 6-mo amount)	JF MI amou	NIMUM R nt + 6-	EQUIRE mo amo	D BID unt)					
LEAGUE I: BIG CBS		Π	LEAGUE II:		OTHER CBs	CBs	LEAG	JE "I	LEAGUE "IIIM": MSBs ONLY	SBs ON	LY	LEAGUI	E "I]	IC": C	LEAGUE "IIIC": COOPs+S&Ls ON	&Ls ON
Bank Awd/ Rank Code Score Bid%	\$Awd	Rank	Bank Code	Score	BB		Rank	Bank Code	Score	Awd/ Bid%	\$Awd	Rank (Bank Code	Score	Awd/ Bid%	\$Awd
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	2000 2700 8500	. 2 2 1	 II21 II28 I6 II17 II117 II11	2.437 2.174 2.044 1.786 1.748	 43% 42% 42% 50% 90%	2300 2500 2000 1390 900	0 4 0 5 1	M17 M9 M13 M20 M18	3.668 3.160 2.951 2.842 1.782	 100% 25% 29% 29%	1000 500 1000 500	24351	C11 C5 C15 C3 C3 C3	3.856 2.472 2.371 2.161 1.996	100% 100% 100% 0% 50%	 400 100 0 150
TOP BANKS: Ave Score: Ave Awd/Bid %: Total \$ Award:	$1.390 \\ 70\% \\ 13200$			\$		2.038 65% 9090					2.881 46% 4000					2.571 70% 660
4 I2 1.129 33% 5 I4 1.064 50% 6 I3 0.833 75%	1000 1000 3750	22 24 25 26	II9 II129 II16 II132 II132 II13	$\begin{array}{c} 1.101\\ 0.975\\ 0.935\\ 0.775\\ 0.775\\ 0.739\end{array}$	40% 60% 100% 67% 50%	200 1200 300 1000 1000	15 16 17 18 18 19	M1 M7 M6 M21 M22 M22	0.868 0.863 0.811 0.794 0.786	$\begin{array}{c} 25\%\\ 100\%\\ 10\%\\ 100\%\\ 100\%\\ 100\%\end{array}$	500 500 3500 1000	15 16 17 18 18	C1 C6 C9 C14 C14 C4	1.017 0.996 0.939 0.865 0.836	50% 100% 50% 15%	100 300 150 150
BOTTOM BANKS: Ave Score: Ave Awd/Bid %: Total \$ Award:	1.009 53% 5750					0.905 63% 3700					0.824 67% 6500					$\begin{array}{c} 0.931 \\ 63\% \\ 1200 \end{array}$
Banks w/ Bids:	9					26					19					19
Banks w/ Awards:	9					25					19					17

MAY 1983 1 SUMMARY RESULTS SCORES & AWARDS:

- S19 -

SCORES & AWARDS: SUMMARY RESULTS -- NOVEMBER 1983

SCORES: LDS SCORE + INTEREST RATE IN EXCESS OF MINIMUM REQUIRED BID AWARDS & BIDS: UNWEIGHTED TOTAL BASIS (12-mo amount + 6-mo amount)

S&Ls	\$Awd	400 50 150 100 20	2.246 87 720	500 2000 300 250 500	0.903 58 3550	14	14
)0Ps+8	Awd/ Bid	 67 100 67 100		25 67 50 50 50	Q		
C": CC	/ Score	3.433 2.285 2.260 1.633 1.618		1.063 0.980 0.952 0.876 0.645			
)III"	Bank Code Sc	C11 3. C5 2. C3 2. C7 1. C7 1. C15 1.		C13 1. C10 0. C6 0. C12 0. C14 0.			
LEAGUE "IIIC": COOPs+S&Ls	Bá Rank Co	24321		10 111 111 111 1111 1111 1111111111111			
		200 200 1000 500	966 67 800	1000 500 2000	90 82 000	15	15
ONLY			1.966 67 4800		0. 790 82 5000		
MSBs	А	100 50 33 50 50		100 100 100 100 100			,
M": 1	Score	3.837 1.821 1.470 1.356 1.348		0.915 0.868 0.821 0.789 0.789			
III"	Bank Code S	M17 3 M20 1 M20 1 M18 1 M15 1 M8 1 M8 1		M10 C M7 C M6 C M22 C M19 C			
LEAGUE "IIIM": MSBs ONLY	B. Rank C	2 4 3 5 1		11 11 12 13 14 1 15 1			
LI		ł					
CBs	\$Awd	500 500 2000 300 2400	2.101 44 5300	1000 1000 300 150 2000	0.918 67 4450	23	23
THER	Awd/ Bid	 71 33 65 25 26 26		50 50 100 33			
II: OTHER	Awd/ Score Bid	2.224 2.191 2.115 2.072 1.905	4.	0.978 0.975 0.921 0.878 0.837			
LEAGUE		 III25 2 III122 2 III17 2 III16 2 II16 1		<pre>[1129 0 [132 0 [119 0 114 0 113 0</pre>			
LEA	Bank Rank Code	- 1 11 - 7 11 - 7 11 - 7 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1		19 11 20 11 21 11 22 1 23 1 23 1			
	Rai	1					
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